IRAQ: Camp Closure Status Date: 14 January 2021

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IRAQ: Camp Closure Status Date: 14 January 2021 IRAQ: Camp Closure Status Date: 14 January 2021 Date of Departures Site closed Governorate District Site Name 1 Site Type Population3 closure/change 2 (ind.) TURKEY Under closure Al-Sulaymaniyah Al-Sulaymaniyah Ashti IDP Camp No closure announced* 8,865 Closure paused Al-Sulaymaniyah Kalar Tazade Camp No closure announced* 1,031 Zakho No closure announced Baghdad Al-Mahmoudiya Latifiya 1**** Camp No closure announced* 126 Camp population Baghdad Al-Mahmoudiya Latifiya 2**** Camp No closure announced* 58 Duhok Al-Amadiya Dawadia Camp No closure announced* 2,577 Al-Amadiya 22,583 Sumail Al-Zibar Duhok Sumail Bajet Kandala Camp No closure announced* 8,549 10,000 Duhok Sumail Rwanga Community Camp No closure announced* 12,759 Duhok Sumail Kabarto 2 Camp No closure announced* 11,120 Aqra Rawanduz 2,500 Telafar Duhok Sumail Khanke Camp No closure announced* 14,210 Tilkaef Duhok Sumail Shariya Camp No closure announced* 15,217 Al-Shikhan Shaqlawa Duhok Sumail Kabarto 1 Camp No closure announced* 11,873 Al-Hamdaniya Duhok Zakho Berseve 1 Camp No closure announced* 5,712 Sinjar Erbil Rania Pshdar Duhok Zakho Berseve 2 Camp No closure announced* 7,126 Khazer Camp Hamam Al Ali 2 Camp Duhok Zakho Chamishku Camp No closure announced* 22,583 Erbil Al-Mosul Duhok Zakho Darkar Camp No closure announced* 3,358 Al Salamyiah Camp Qayyarah-Jad’ah 5 Camp Koysinjaq Erbil Erbil Baharka Camp No closure announced* 4,528 Dokan Sharbazher Erbil Erbil Harshm Camp No closure announced* 1,434 Qayyarah-Jad’ah 1 Camp Panjwin Erbil Makhmour Debaga 1 Camp No closure announced* 7,450 Dibis Kirkuk Yahyawa Camp Ninewa Al-Hamdaniya Hasansham U2 Camp No closure announced* 4,084 Makhmour SYRIA Al-Sulaymaniyah Ninewa Al-Hamdaniya Hasansham U3 Camp No closure announced* 5,827 Ninewa Al-Shirqat Arbat IDP Camp Ninewa Al-Shikhan Essian Camp No closure announced* 13,104 Halabcha Al-Baaj Al-Hawiga Al-Hatra Ninewa Al-Shikhan Mamrashan Camp No closure announced* 7,426 Al-Sulaymaniyah Ninewa Al-Shikhan Sheikhan Camp No closure announced* 3,199 Kirkuk Chamchamal Laylan Camp Ninewa Aqra Mamilian Camp No closure announced* 879 Beygee Daquq Al-Anbar Al-Falluja AAF Camp Closure paused** 2,792 Tooz Kalar Al-Sulaymaniyah Al-Sulaymaniyah Arbat IDP Camp Closure paused** 1,353 Tikrit Khurmato Diyala Khanaqin Qoratu Camp Closure paused** 560 Al Karamah Camp Ninewa Al-Hamdaniya Khazer M1 Camp Closure paused** 5,572 Kifri Qoratu Camp Ninewa Al-Mosul Qayyarah-Jad'ah 5 Camp Closure paused** 7,098 8,571 Salah Al-Din Al-Daur Ana Al-Anbar Al-Falluja HTC Reclassified*** Changed: 11 Nov 2020 960 2,505 Al-Wand 1 Camp Baghdad Al-Kadhmiyah Al-Ahel Camp Closed: 18 Oct 2020 345 345 Al-Kaim Samarra Khanaqin Haditha Baghdad Al-Kadhmiyah Al-Shams Informal Closed: 19 Oct 2020 612 510 Al-Khalis Al-Wand 2 Camp Baghdad Al-Mada'in Al-Nabi Younis Camp Closed: 21 Oct 2020 270 270 AL-Ishaqi Informal Site Baghdad Al-Risafa Zayona Reclassified*** Changed: mid-Nov 2020 361 Al-Muqdadiya IRAN Heet Balad Diyala Baquba Muskar Saad Camp Camp Closed: 27 Oct 2020 500 500 Diyala Khanaqin Al-Wand 2 Camp Closed: 11 Nov 2020 661 668 Al-Ahel Camp Muskar Saad Camp Diyala Khanaqin Al-Wand 1 Camp Closed: 28 Nov 2020 2,423 2,162 Al-Kadhmiyah Baquba Diyala Kerbala Al-Hindiya Al-Kawthar Camp Camp Closed: 18 Oct 2020 519 519 Al-Shams Informal Site Al-Adhamiya Al-Nabi Younis Camp Kirkuk Kirkuk Yahyawa Camp Closed: 13 Nov 2020 1,665 1,832 Al-Falluja Al-Thawra Kirkuk Kirkuk Laylan IDP Camp Closed: 30 Nov 2020 6,899 7,143 HTC Al-Mada'in Baladruz Al-Ramadi Al-Karkh Zayona Ninewa Al-Hamdaniya As Salamyiah 2 Camp Closed: 14 January 2021 7,377 10,637 Ninewa Al-Mosul Hamam Al Alil 2 Camp Closed: 15 Nov 2020 8,136 8,585 Al-Mahmoudiya Badra Ninewa Al-Mosul Qayyarah-Jad'ah 1 Camp Closed: 12 Nov 2020 2,953 4,455 AAF Camp Al-Mussyab Al-Suwaira Salah Al-Din Balad Al-Ishaqi Informal Closed: 12 Nov 2020 308 250 Salah Al-Din Tikrit Al Karamah Camp Closed: 06 Dec 2020 712 726 Al-Rutba Kerbala Al-Mahaweel Wassit • Departure data is reported by camp management partners, or by other partners for self-managed sites Ali Al-Gharbi Al-Kawthar Camp Ain • Initial population is from the start of each month, and may therefore have discrepancies with reported departures. Al-Tamur Babil Al-Namaniya Al-Kut • Data will continue to be adjusted as partners reconcile their data. Kerbela Al-Hindiya Al-Hashimiya Al-Anbar Maysan Afaq Al-Hai Al-Najaf The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Creation date: 17/01/2021 Source: 1) CCCM Camp Master List updated December 2020; 2) Camp closure status provided by CCCM situation reports; 3) Figures as of December 2020, except for camps marked closed or reclassified for which the population figures are as of the start of the month of closure; ** Closure announced but has since been postponed or cancelled ***The settlement type for HTC and Zayouna has changed from "Camp" to "Informal site”; **** Status of Latifyah camps 1 & 2 (Baghdad) is pending MoDM confirmation on whether they remain as formal camps or are reclassified into informal sites. Feedback: [email protected], iraq.humanitarianresponse.info, www.reliefweb.int.
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