DOCSLIB.ORG

H-Diplo Article Review No

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
H-Diplo Article Review No H20-Diplo Article15 Review H-Diplo Article Review Editors: Thomas Maddux and H-Diplo Diane Labrosse H-Diplo Article Reviews Web and Production Editor: George Fujii No. 531 Commissioned for H-Diplo by Thomas Maddux Published on 10 June 2015 Guy Laron. “The Domestic Sources of Israel’s Decision to Launch the 1956 Sinai Campaign.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 42:2 (2015): 200-218. DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2014.993848. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2014.993848 URL: http://tiny.cc/AR531 Reviewed by Avshalom Rubin, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State1 uy Laron’s article is a well-researched, provocative, and largely convincing revisionist take on Israel’s road to war in 1956. Laron does not see Israel’s decision G to align itself with Britain and France against Egypt primarily as a response to Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser’s September 1955 decision to purchase arms from the Soviet bloc. Like Moti Golani, another prominent scholar of the 1956 conflict, Laron believes that Israel’s Sinai campaign had its roots in Prime Minister David Ben- Gurion and the Israeli military leadership’s regrets over not having conquered more territory in 1948.2 Yet, Laron argues, “The domestic context is an important and overlooked aspect of this significant episode in Israeli history” (200). Specifically, scholars have not adequately explained how Ben-Gurion and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan managed to convince the Israeli cabinet to support their drive for a preventive war. Since, as Laron points out, “major decisions, such as going to war, could not have proceeded without the support of the cabinet,” an “inquiry into the balance of power between hawks and doves within the cabinet” can provide valuable insight into Israel’s foreign policy during this crucial period. (202) Laron draws upon a wide variety of archival sources in order to analyze the domestic political backdrop to Israel’s decision for war, including cabinet minutes, minutes of IDF General Staff meetings, minutes of the MAPAI party (Land of Israel Workers Party) political committee, and minutes of the 1 The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or the United States government.) 2 See Moti Golani, Tihiyeh Milhamah ba-Kayitz: Ha-Derekh le-Milhemet Sinai, 1955-1956 (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1997). A much shorter English-language version of Golani’s book was published as Israel in Search of a War: The Sinai Campaign, 1955-1956 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998). 1 | Page H-Diplo Article Review Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee meetings. Many of these sources were declassified after scholars like Golani, Michael Oren, David Tal, Mordechai Bar-On, and Benny Morris published important studies on Arab-Israeli relations during the 1949-1956 period.3 Laron argues that neither Ben-Gurion nor the IDF brass felt satisfied with how the 1948 war had ended. During the final months of the war, the IDF was at the peak of its power, and could have conquered the entirety of Mandatory Palestine - and perhaps more. The Israeli government chose not to go further primarily because they feared that Britain might intervene to help their Arab enemies. After the guns fell silent in 1949, Ben-Gurion and his generals remained unhappy with the armistice lines that separated Israel from a hostile Arab world. To make sure that Israel consolidated its hold on the land it already had, Ben-Gurion launched a massive effort to resettle Jewish immigrants in peripheral areas. Yet he and the IDF leadership had not given up hope that Israel would get a chance to redraw its narrow boundaries if another war broke out. Accordingly, Ben-Gurion sought to build up the IDF’s offensive capabilities rather than spend money on static defense measures designed to block cross-border infiltration. The IDF developed a military doctrine that emphasized preemptive, and later, preventive action. The problem, however, was that Ben-Gurion’s efforts to resettle large numbers of immigrants on Israel’s frontiers and prepare the army for a ‘second round’ drove the Israeli economy to the brink of collapse. To fund Ben-Gurion’s grand designs, the government imposed tough austerity measures resented by veteran, middle-class Ashkenazi Israelis. Many of these middle-class voters deserted MAPAI for the more centrist General Zionists, who won 20 seats in the 1951 Knesset elections and subsequently became part of the governing coalition. By 1953, General Zionist ministers in the cabinet had united with MAPAIniks worried about losing votes to oppose Ben-Gurion’s security policies and divert resources from the border settlements. That December, a frustrated Ben-Gurion retired to his kibbutz in Sdeh Boqer, leaving Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett in his place as Prime Minister. Laron’s analysis of Sharett’s premiership is the most interesting and original feature of his article. Since Sharett’s diaries were published in 1978, several historians have praised him for his desire to integrate Israel into the international community and his faith in a diplomatic solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Sharett’s scholarly boosters have depicted him as a noble figure whose efforts to reach out to Egypt were scuttled by the hawkish IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan and Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon, both of whom Ben- 3 In addition to the books by Golani cited above, see Michael Oren, The Origins of the Second Arab- Israeli War: Egypt, Israel and the Great Powers, 1952-1956 (New York: Frank Cass, 1992); David Tal, Tefisat ha-Bitahon ha-Shotef shel Yisrael: Mekorotehah ve-Hitpathutah, 1949-1956 (Be’ersheva: Ben-Gurion University Press, 1998); Benny Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Mordechai Bar-On, The Gates of Gaza: Israel’s Road to Sinai and Back, 1955-1957 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). 2 | Page H-Diplo Article Review Gurion appointed before he retired.4 While Laron acknowledges Sharett’s struggles with Dayan and Lavon, he depicts the Prime Minister as a rather inept and aloof politician whose downfall resulted in large part from his inability to manage his own party. Not only did Sharett’s fellow MAPAIniks quickly grow impatient with his diplomatic efforts, they deeply resented his reliance on the support of the General Zionists to implement his foreign policy. While Sharett was happy to keep the dovish General Zionists in his government, MAPAI’s bosses were furious that their coalition partners were egging on white-collar workers who opposed MAPAI’s efforts to hold down salaries. Many figures within the MAPAI leadership concluded that the only way that they could keep the party faithful loyal and keep workers’ wages in check was to promote a sense of national emergency. Sharett’s party rivals got their chance in August 1954, when the Egyptians uncovered an Israeli spy ring in Cairo. The ensuing political crisis allowed the MAPAI elders to force the hapless Sharett to replace Lavon with Ben-Gurion, whom they believed would inspire middle-class Israelis to rally around MAPAI once more. And indeed, when Ben-Gurion became Prime Minister again in November 1955, he “gave several speeches in which he called for white collar workers to relinquish their demands for indexation due to the mortal danger in which Israel found itself” (215). Over the next several months, the white-collar wage crisis was resolved, giving Ben-Gurion the intra- party support he needed to sideline Sharett and eventually force him out of the government. By the fall of 1956, Ben-Gurion could feel confident that his cabinet would support him if he wanted to go to war with Egypt. Laron does an excellent job illuminating how party politics and class conflict impinged upon the better-known story of Ben-Gurion and the IDF General Staff’s struggle with Sharett over the direction of Israeli foreign policy. Historians may quibble over the relative importance that one should assign to domestic developments when considering why Israel went to war. I found myself wishing that Laron had more directly addressed the question of how the role of domestic politics and political economy should be weighed against the military and diplomatic factors that have preoccupied other scholars. What was ultimately more important in determining Israel’s decision for war: changes in the balance of power within the cabinet, or the more favorable international context provided by Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal? In fairness, however, Laron has not set out to supplant the more traditional diplomatic narratives, but to force us to look at those accounts in a new light. He has succeeded quite admirably in doing so. Avshalom Rubin received his Ph.D. in Middle Eastern history from the University of Chicago in 2010. He is a historian at the U.S. Department of State, where he works on 4 See especially Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World Since 1948 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999); Gabriel Sheffer, Moshe Sharett: Biography of a Political Moderate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). 3 | Page H-Diplo Article Review Foreign Relations of the United States volumes on the Middle East. He is completing a book on the role of the West Bank in the Arab-Israeli conflict during the 1950s and 1960s. © 2015 The Author. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States License. 4 | Page .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • JABOTINSKY on CANADA and the Unlted STATES*
    A CASE OFLIMITED VISION: JABOTINSKY ON CANADA AND THE UNlTED STATES* From its inception in 1897, and even earlier in its period of gestation, Zionism has been extremely popular in Canada. Adherence to the movement seemed all but universal among Canada's Jews by the World War I era. Even in the interwar period, as the flush of first achievement wore off and as the Canadian Jewish community became more acclimated, the movement in Canada functioned at a near-fever pitch. During the twenties and thirties funds were raised, acculturatedJews adhered toZionism with some settling in Palestine, and prominent gentile politicians publicly supported the movement. The contrast with the United States was striking. There, Zionism got a very slow start. At the outbreak of World War I only one American Jew in three hundred belonged to the Zionist movement; and, unlike Canada, a very strong undercurrent of anti-Zionism emerged in the Jewish community and among gentiles. The conversion to Zionism of Louis D. Brandeis-prominent lawyer and the first Jew to sit on the United States Supreme Court-the proclamation of the Balfour Declaration, and the conquest of Palestine by the British gave Zionism in the United States a significant boost during the war. Afterwards, however, American Zionism, like the country itself, returned to "normalcy." Membership in the movement plummeted; fundraising languished; potential settlers for Palestine were not to be found. One of the chief impediments to Zionism in America had to do with the nature of the relationship of American Jews to their country. Zionism was predicated on the proposition that Jews were doomed to .( 2 Michuel Brown be aliens in every country but their own.
    [Show full text]
  • The Labor Party and the Peace Camp
    The Labor Party and the Peace Camp By Uzi Baram In contemporary Israeli public discourse, the preoccupation with ideology has died down markedly, to the point that even releasing a political platform as part of elections campaigns has become superfluous. Politicians from across the political spectrum are focused on distinguishing themselves from other contenders by labeling themselves and their rivals as right, left and center, while floating around in the air are slogans such as “political left,” social left,” “soft right,” “new right,” and “mainstream right.” Yet what do “left” and “right” mean in Israel, and to what extent do these slogans as well as the political division in today’s Israel correlate with the political traditions of the various parties? Is the Labor Party the obvious and natural heir of The Workers Party of the Land of Israel (Mapai)? Did the historical Mapai under the stewardship of Ben Gurion view itself as a left-wing party? Did Menachem Begin’s Herut Party see itself as a right-wing party? The Zionist Left and the Soviet Union As far-fetched as it may seem in the eyes of today’s onlooker, during the first years after the establishment of the state, the position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was the litmus test of the left camp, which was then called “the workers’ camp.” This camp viewed the centrist liberal “General Zionists” party, which was identified with European liberal and middle-class beliefs in private property and capitalism, as its chief ideological rival (and with which the heads of major cities such as Tel Aviv and Ramat Gan were affiliated)­.
    [Show full text]
  • Exporting Zionism
    Exporting Zionism: Architectural Modernism in Israeli-African Technical Cooperation, 1958-1973 Ayala Levin Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy under the Executive Committee of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2015 © 2015 Ayala Levin All rights reserved ABSTRACT Exporting Zionism: Architectural Modernism in Israeli-African Technical Cooperation, 1958-1973 Ayala Levin This dissertation explores Israeli architectural and construction aid in the 1960s – “the African decade” – when the majority of sub-Saharan African states gained independence from colonial rule. In the Cold War competition over development, Israel distinguished its aid by alleging a postcolonial status, similar geography, and a shared history of racial oppression to alleviate fears of neocolonial infiltration. I critically examine how Israel presented itself as a model for rapid development more applicable to African states than the West, and how the architects negotiated their professional practice in relation to the Israeli Foreign Ministry agendas, the African commissioners' expectations, and the international disciplinary discourse on modern architecture. I argue that while architectural modernism was promoted in the West as the International Style, Israeli architects translated it to the African context by imbuing it with nation-building qualities such as national cohesion, labor mobilization, skill acquisition and population dispersal. Based on their labor-Zionism settler-colonial experience,
    [Show full text]
  • Iraqi Jews: a History of Mass Exodus by Abbas Shiblak, Saqi, 2005, 215 Pp
    Iraqi Jews: A History of Mass Exodus by Abbas Shiblak, Saqi, 2005, 215 pp. Rayyan Al-Shawaf The 2003 toppling of Saddam Hussein’s Baath regime and the occupation of Iraq by Allied Coalition Forces has served to generate a good deal of interest in Iraqi history. As a result, in 2005 Saqi reissued Abbas Shiblak’s 1986 study The Lure of Zion: The Case of the Iraqi Jews. The revised edition, which includes a preface by Iraq historian Peter Sluglett as well as minor additions and modifications by the author, is entitled The Iraqi Jews: A History of Mass Exodus. Shiblak’s book, which deals with the mass immigration of Iraqi Jews to Israel in 1950-51, is important both as one of the few academic studies of the subject as well as a reminder of a time when Jews were an integral part of Iraq and other Arab countries. The other significant study of this subject is Moshe Gat’s The Jewish Exodus from Iraq, 1948-1951, which was published in 1997. A shorter encapsulation of Gat’s argument can be found in his 2000 Israel Affairs article Between‘ Terror and Emigration: The Case of Iraqi Jewry.’ Because of the diametrically opposed conclusions arrived at by the authors, it is useful to compare and contrast their accounts. In fact, Gat explicitly refuted many of Shiblak’s assertions as early as 1987, in his Immigrants and Minorities review of Shiblak’s The Lure of Zion. It is unclear why Shiblak has very conspicuously chosen to ignore Gat’s criticisms and his pointing out of errors in the initial version of the book.
    [Show full text]
  • Downloaded from Manchesterhive.Com at 09/26/2021 04:35:42AM Via Free Access DEF3 7/31/02 10:33 PM Page 42
    DEF3 7/31/02 10:33 PM Page 41 3 Between militarism and moderation in Israel: constructing security in historical perspective Jonathan B. Isacoff his chapter examines the concept of security through discursive contestation at the leadership level in a critical Middle Eastern case – that Tof Israel. The approach adopted here can be called historical constructivism in that it traces the fractured construction of security as a phenomenon that changes dramatically, and with significant political implications, over time. This historical constructivist approach is predicated on two fundamental claims. The first is that concepts such as ‘state’, ‘security’ and ‘nation’ are socially con- structed and thus will hold different meanings in different spatial and temporal contexts. The second is that the meaning of any socially constructed phenom- enon is perpetually contested. That is, one cannot allude to a single ‘objective’ understanding of security at any point in time. From these basic assumptions the chapter argues that it is both possible and necessary to distinguish between security – a state of protected existence – and the referent object of security – that which is to be protected.1 Related to this point is the contemporary Israeli notion of national or strategic security versus individual or ‘current’ security.2 All states and peoples want to be secure. In the case of Israel, however, the lines between these various and otherwise distinct concepts – security v. referent object; and state v. individual as referent object – have been constructed in an increasingly blurred fashion over time so as to advance the political agendas of specific political groups. In order to explain how and why this is the case, the chapter examines the specific discourses of secu- rity employed by opposing political groups during key periods in the history of the Arab–Israeli conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • The Lavon Affair
    Israel Military Intelligence: The Lavon Affair jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/lavon.html Best choice for browsing Browse from Czech Republic Browse from France Browse from Sweden Browse from Canada (Summer 1954) Military Intelligence: Table of Contents | The Mossad | Targeted Assassinations The Lavon Affair is a spy story in Israel's early years that left a nasty mark on the young state, with reverberations for the following 20 years. It's name derived from Israeli Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon, though it is also referred to as " Esek HaBish" or "The Mishap". Revolving around nearly a dozen young Egyptian Jews who agreed to spy for Israel against their home country, the affair taps into a story of idealism and self-sacrifice as well as abandonment and an unwillingness to take responsibility. Due to strict censorship in Israel in the early 1950's, few knew that in the year 1954 Israeli underground cells that had been operating in Egypt were uncovered by the Egyptian police. A number of young Jews were arrested and forced to undergo a show trial. Two of them - Yosef Carmon and Max Binnet - committed suicide in prison due to the brutal interrogation methods of the Egyptian police. Two more - Dr. Moshe Marzouk of Cairo and Shmuel Azar of Alexandria - were sentenced to death and hanged in a Cairo prison. Israel glorified them as martyrs. Their memory was sanctified. Neighborhoods and gardens were named after them in Israel, as were dozens of children born in the year 1955. At the same time it was not publicly conceded that they died in the service of Israel.
    [Show full text]
  • No Public Enthusiasm in Israel Elections
    • " ........... _ . ,.".,.,,~, "1 . Thursday, July 20, 1961 Page Twelve THE JEWISH POST '.roggestions for setting up this type I A meeting of those interested will Wanted - Exchange MTC Grows Up of an organization. All enquiries be called within the next two weeks, Baby-sitter Manitoba Theatre Centre has regarding the proposal should be at which time a committee will be d Wanted - Baby-sitter for two taken its first step on the road to­ sent in writing to Tom Hendry, formed to study the I?robJ.;m, :m children in exchange for free holi­ Man ito b a Theatre Centre, 419 to make recommendations m Vlew ward becoming a professional thea­ By REUBEN SLONIM day (room and board) at Detroit tre with the adoption of a poliey Avenue building, 265 Portage ave- of the experience of the people Lakes. Phone JUstice 64624. guaranteeing its actors weekly fees nue, Winnipeg 2. concerned. I Associate Editor of The Telegram, " Board and Room Wanted rather than expense allowances, J. Toronto IWanted: Board and room for Ogden Turner, president of the Mr. Ben-Gurion explained his "ir­ Vol. XXXVII WINNIPEG, THUHSDAY, JULY 27, 1961 No, 30 A series written for ten newspapers girl university student in River Centre, said this week. 'But, he rev.ocable" stand which had led to Reject Stand his resignation and the subsequent in The Telegram News Service Heights district. Reply to Box 0, added, "it creates a concern within The Jewish Post, 1244 Main St., (Cant. from page 1) fall of the Government, That step, (Published by permission) MTC for the person not making FOR SALE Winnipeg 4, Man.
    [Show full text]
  • Democracy, Identity and Security in Israel's Ethnic Democracy
    DEMOCRACY, IDENTITY AND SECURITY IN ISRAEL’S ETHNIC DEMOCRACY: THE IDEATIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE By Dubi Kanengisser A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Dubi Kanengisser, 2016 Democracy, Identity and Security in Israel’s Ethnic Democracy: The Ideational Underpinnings of Institutional Change, Doctor of Philosophy, 2016, Dubi Kanengisser, Graduate Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Abstract This work expands on the growing ideational institutionalist literature by proposing that institutional change and stability are influenced most substantially by changes to the underlying ideational network which link core societal ideas. These core ideas create the framework on which institutions are built and in which form they are fashioned. Changes to the ideational network lead to adaptive changes in institutions, but the difficulty in completely removing core ideas from these networks protects the institutions from substantial change. The theory is demonstrated using the case of the surprising stability of ethnic democracy in Israel in the wake of the substantial changes to the country’s economic and security realities. Small adaptive changes in the institution of ethnic democracy are traced back to changes in the balance between three core ideas: democracy, Jewish identity, and security. The overall stability of the institution, however, is linked to the enduring linkages of the three core ideas even as they experienced changes in their individual meanings. ii Too many years the Israeli left also accepted the separation between Jews and Arabs. First by looking away, then through submission, and finally wholeheartedly, it adopted the racist world view that the Arabs are not part of the political game.
    [Show full text]
  • JANUARY 6, 1961- 16 PAGES Ernment, It Was Reported in Tel the Lavon Crisis That H!U! Split His Aviv by Dr
    I f • -'!¢mple BHh El 10 70 Or~hal"d Ave. '· FrQvideDQe, R. I• NEWS Premier Ben-Gurion 811.ief,4 To Take Leave As Result Of Crisis PERMISSIO~ FOR THE CON­ JERUSALEM - Premier David struction of a new synagogue hlUI THE ONLY ANGLO-JEW IS H WEEKLY IN R. I. AND SOUTHEAST MASS. Ben-Gurlon w!ll take a leave of been granted by the Soviet Gov­ four or five weeks as a result of VOL. XLIV No. 44 FRIDAY, JANUARY 6, 1961- 16 PAGES ernment, it was reported in Tel the Lavon crisis that h!U! split his Aviv by Dr. Gerhard Riegner, party and threatens to topple the European director for the World" Israeli Government according to Jewish Congress. At a press con­ Son Born To Michaels; Cabinet Committee Exonerates a New York Times article by Law­ ference Dr. Riegner said that he rence Fellows. saw signs of possible easement of First Providence Jewish Former Defense Minister Lavon The Premier's decision was con­ Soviet Russia's attitude toward firmed last week by Yitzhak Na­ Jews in the USSR. Among the Baby Of The New Year TEL AVIV, Israel - A Cabinet mier David Ben-Gurlon's coali- von, his political secretary. Mr. signs, he said, are the ,permission committee reported last week that The first Providence Jewish tlon Government. A summary of Ben-Gurion told the Cabinet of for the building of the new syna­ a senior army officer submitted a the report was made public last it at a meeting a week ago Sun- gogue, the announced readiness baby of 1961 arrived on Sun­ forged document In 1954 to blame day, January 1, at 12:23 P.M.
    [Show full text]
  • Marcelle Ninio.Pdf
    Marcelle Ninio egy.com suggests following articles FAREWELL VILLA CASDAGLI - KOPSES HANUM - NESLISHAH SULTAN 1921-2012 - HISTORY OF TAHRIR SQU KHEDIVA'S ISTANBUL PALACE - THE ZAMALEK LEGEND - EGYPT'S FIRST LADIES EGY.COM - JUDAICA OLYMPIAN STYLE TERRORISM REVISITED From Alexandria City Center to Downtown Tel Aviv by Samir Raafat Egyptian Mail, August 3, 1996 hatching state sponsored terrorism in the region: Golda Meir, Pinhas Lavon http://www.egy.com/judaica/96-08-03.php[6/30/2015 12:44:07 AM] Marcelle Ninio Marcelle Ninio arrested Following the November 1995 attack on a US Army base in Riyadh and the Hamas bus bombings in Israel, 1996 will be remembered as the year of anti-terrorism. To begin with there was the March 1996 Sharm al-Sheik anti-terrorism summit which brought together world leaders in an unprecedented conclave. Then there was the July security conference in Cairo which attempted to define terrorism, followed by an August G7+1 ministerial conference in Paris on how to combat terrorism. Asif to underline his concern of the growing plague recently punctuated by the June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing which killed 19 American airmen in Dahran, President Clinton's White House declarations during his July 30 joint press conference with Egypt's President Mubarak, focused primarily on terrorism. Terrorism today denotes a range of "antiestablishment" actions. From violent objector, freedom fighter and guerilla, to insurgent, spymaster, separatist Vietcong, fedayeen and Black Panther. Some observers will throw in such movements as ETA, IRA, PKK, Shining Path and Hamas. Saboteurs' and agents provocateurs a la Guevara and Carlos the Jackal, once romanticized in le Carre and Robert Ludlum novels, are things of the past.
    [Show full text]
  • Thomas Mitchell: Rebuilding Labor
    Thomas Mitchell: Rebuilding Labor In a previous article, I wrote about lessons from the Northern Ireland peace process for the Middle East. I wrote that Israel’s parliamentary peace camp will need rebuilding in order to implement those lessons and make peace with the Palestinians. Since the formation of the second Rabin government in June 1992, Israel’s parliamentary peace camp—Labor and Meretz—has lost half of its representation. The rebuilding of Labor—or a new center-left party—is more critical than the fate of Meretz, because the latter is the junior partner. Meretz is the missionary party that has already succeeded in selling the concept of the two-state solution to Labor. But unless Labor rebuilds to the point that it can head a coalition government without Likud or other right-wing elements, there will not be peace in the Middle East. Labor is a middle-aged party suffering from several problems. First, it is overly dependent on former generals to fill the upper slots on its Knesset list. This has been the situation since Labor was formed in 1968 and the problem has only gotten worse over time. Second, it allowed itself to become too dependent on a few key leaders and did not replace them as they retired and left the party. Third, it has served in too many national-unity governments and so has not sufficiently differentiated itself from the center-right parties, Kadima and Likud. Fourth, it is suffering from the fallout of both a failed peace process and a failed war. A major characteristic of Labor is its dependence on former generals.
    [Show full text]
  • BERYL SEGAL by the .Late Dr
    Temple Beth El 10 TO Ore-hard Ave. hovlde11c_e, R. r.· . ':?LE BETH-El L1Bfl.(RY NEWS To· Install , I BltiejlL New Knesset This Month DELEGATES TO A NATIONAL JERUSALEM - Israel's new Jewish ·youth convention in Star­ THE ONLY ANGLO-JEWISH WEEKLY IN R. I. AND SOUTHEAST MASS. Knesset, the fifth since the es- light, Pa., this week criticized their parents for failing to give VOL. XLV, No. 26 FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1961 16 PAGES tablishment of the State in 1948, them a more adequate Jewish;,;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;.----------------------------- - is expected to be convened here on Monday, Sept. 4. That wlll be ~~:ro~~ID ARAB BOYCOTT Religious Zealots the date for the official convoca­ Only Yiddish Literary Review tion of the new Parliament, re­ which has barred some major sulting fi;wn last week's elections, brand cigarettes from shipment to Still Hold Some Makes Debut lil Soviet Union if the final vote tabulation - in­ Israel since 1956 is near the break­ MOSCOW - The first Yiddish- early as 1956, shortly after the ex- eluding the ballots cast by service­ ing point," according to Congress- Israeli Children language periodical published in posure of Stalin's "cult of per- men and women in Israel's Army man Alfred E. Santangelo. A PLAN TO INSTITUTE COM- JERUSALEM (Israeli Sector), the Soviet Union since 1948 made sonality" and the posthumus re- - are completed. Should a hitch pulsory savings as one of the - A few immigrant children were it debut here. habilitation of leading Yiddish develop in the final counting, the means to meet the needs of in- still missing last week following a The first ~ue of the publlca- writers executed in 1952.
    [Show full text]