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The Northern Tandem. the Swedish‑Finnish Defence Cooperation

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The Northern Tandem. the Swedish‑Finnish Defence Cooperation Centre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 298 | 20.03.2019 www.osw.waw.pl The northern tandem The Swedish-Finnish defence cooperation Piotr Szymański In response to the change in the security environment after 2014, militarily non-aligned Sweden and Finland are developing their defence cooperation with NATO and the USA and strengthening their bilateral defence relationship. Although a bilateral alliance is unlikely, the two states are suggesting that, were a situation of a conflict in the Nordic-Baltic region to occur, the hypothetical aggressor will need to take into account their cooperation and joint actions with NATO. The Northern Wind 2019 exercises carried out in March 2019, whose scenario includes the defence of northern Sweden, are a display of the interoperability of the Swedish and Finnish armed forces. However, the military synergy between Sweden and Finland is limited by the differences in their respective models of armed forces, years-long insufficient defence expenditure, and military personnel cuts. Military cooperation and defence ambitious programme of Swedish-Finnish de- policies of Sweden and Finland fence cooperation was another element com- plementing these actions. The Russian-Ukrainian war, the development In May 2014, the two states announced their of Russia’s military potential and the increase Action Plan for Deepened Defence Cooperation, in NATO’s and the US’s military presence in the a framework document heralding the develop- Nordic-Baltic region have all contributed to ment of cooperation between all branches of a redefinition of the security policies of Sweden the armed forces and the defence ministries1. and Finland. Sweden, which used to focus on The final report on deepened defence cooper- global threats, began to place greater emphasis ation between Finland and Sweden compiled on security in the Baltic Sea region and to re- a year later specified six key cooperation areas2. build its capability of defending its own territo- These include: cooperation of the navies, the air ry. Finland, for its part, which traditionally used forces, the land forces, cooperation in logistics to be focused on maintaining its independent and in the supply of matériel, international co- defence capability, opened up to providing and operation (joint participation in crisis manage- receiving military assistance. It should be not- ed that neither Sweden nor Finland have made 1 Action Plan for Deepened Defence Cooperation, Ministry attempts to join NATO, but they have strength- of Defence of Finland, May 2014, https://www.defmin. fi/files/2833/ACTION_PLAN_FOR_DEEPENED_DEFENCE_ ened their military cooperation with NATO as COOPERATION_BETWEEN_SWEDEN_AND_FINLAND.pdf a whole and with those of its members that are 2 Final reports on deepened defence cooperation be- tween Finland and Sweden, Ministry of Defence of Swe- of key importance in the context of defending den, May 2015, https://www.government.se/49baf3/ the northern flank, i.e. mainly the USA but also globalassets/government/dokument/forsvarsdeparte- mentet/final-reports-on-deepened-defence-coopera- the United Kingdom. The adoption of a more tion-between-finland-och-sweden.pdf OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 298 1 ment operations and multinational forces) and partner does not require any fundamental re- cooperation in ensuring secure communication vision of the current security policy, the foun- between the armed forces and the defence dation of which is to remain outside military ministries. alliances. Building joint military capabilities and developing international cooperation is partly treated (especially in Sweden) as compensation The tightening of Swedish-Finnish for insufficient military spending4. Moreover, defence cooperation is facilitated by the increasingly close Swedish-Finnish cooper- the common political, military and eco- ation is bringing benefits such as interest on nomic interests of the two states. the part of Washington in developing trilateral collaboration. This was evident in the Trilateral Statement of Intent regarding defence coopera- The framework memorandum of July 2018 is tion between the USA, Sweden and Finland, an- a political document that forms the basis for nounced in May 20185. The trilateral format and bilateral defence cooperation during peace- the expansion of Swedish-American military re- time, crisis, and wartime3. The memorandum lations carried out by the leftist government in does not set any limitations on developing mil- Stockholm facilitate the process of Finnish cen- itary cooperation, nor does it contain any for- tre-left political parties ‘growing accustomed’ mal mutual defence obligations. The current to the idea of military cooperation with the bilateral cooperation areas were supplement- USA. These parties continue to value the herit- ed with host nation support (HNS), protection age of the Cold War policy of non-involvement against weapons of mass destruction and hy- in the rivalry between the great powers, and brid threats, and strategic communication. are reluctant to compromise Finland’s relations with Russia. Reasons for a military rapprochement Military reasons: It is highly likely that, in the between Sweden and Finland case of a conflict in the Baltic Sea region, the operational activity of the Swedish armed forc- Aside from unfavourable changes in the secu- es would concentrate in the most densely pop- rity environment connected with the tension ulated southern part of the country. This area between Russia and NATO, catalysts for the is of key importance for maintaining strategic development of Swedish-Finnish defence coop- locations (e.g. Gotland), ensuring the capabili- eration include the common political, military ty of hosting NATO troops and organising the and economic interests of the two states. transit of NATO assistance for the Baltic states6. Political reasons: For Sweden and Finland, the In this scenario, Sweden would not have suffi- development of bilateral defence cooperation cient forces at its disposal to defend the north- is politically convenient because it does not ern part of the country, or to conduct forward raise controversy in their parliaments nor with- defence operations in the Baltic states and in in their societies the way military cooperation with NATO and with the USA does. Strength- 4 J. Gotkowska, ‘Szwedzko-fiński sojusz wojskowy?’, ening defence ties with a militarily non-aligned Analizy OSW, 14 May 2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/ pl/publikacje/analizy/2014-05-14/szwedzko-finski-so- jusz-wojskowy 3 Memorandum of Understanding between the Govern- 5 Trilateral Statement of Intent, ‘Ministry of Defence of ment of the Republic of Finland and the Government of Finland’, May 2018, https://www.defmin.fi/files/4231/ the Kingdom of Sweden on Defence Cooperation, Minis- Trilateral_Statement_of_Intent.pdf try of Defence of Sweden, July 2018, www.government. 6 K. Neretnieks, ‘NATO and Scandinavian Strategic Inter- se/49fcef/globalassets/government/dokument/forsvars- dependence’, Karlis N, 4 October 2018, http://karlisn. departementet/2018/mou-finnish-swedish-defence-co- blogspot.com/2018/10/nato-and-scandinavian-strate- operation-20180625-signerad.pdf gic.html?spref=tw OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 298 2 Finland. Hence the importance of Finland as also entails an increased capability to defend a country securing the northern flank and the the Åland Islands which have demilitarised and Swedish interest in bilateral military coopera- neutralised status. tion7. According to Sweden’s defence strategy Economic reasons: The development of bi- for 2016–2020, adopted in 2015, it is crucial to lateral defence cooperation is also intended tighten the country’s cooperation with Finland, at generating budget savings by joint interna- as it is intended to result in joint operational tional involvement, joint military capabilities, planning and preparations for the defence of and the procurement of armament and mili- the territory of both states8. tary equipment. Cooperation between the re- spective branches of armed forces is intended to enable the participation of joint units in cri- Both states form a common strategic sis management operations: for example the space and, during a conflict with Russia, Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group, the land Sweden could play an important role in forces brigade, the NH90 helicopter unit and Finland’s defence operations. military logistics. Closer Swedish-Finnish coop- eration is in the interest of the strong Swedish defence industry, which is an important sup- From Helsinki’s point of view, the two states plier of armament and military equipment for form a common strategic space, which is why the Finnish armed forces. After 2000, the arma- Sweden is Finland’s major partner in foreign ment and military equipment Finland bought and security policy9. Finland does not intend from Sweden included infantry fighting vehi- to introduce limitations in its defence cooper- cles (the purchase of 102 CV9030 with a 50% ation with Sweden. It would like the gradual offset), armoured personnel carriers, anti-ship, coordination of defence policies and the high anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, naval guns level of armed forces interoperability in peace- and radars10. However, Finland has a cautious time to translate in the future into a joint war- approach to joint modernisation projects, fear- time operational plan. During a conflict with ing the domination of Swedish companies and Russia, Sweden could play an important role aiming to protect its own defence industry that in Finland’s defence
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