The Implications of the State of Conventional Arms Control for European Security
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Deep Cuts Working Paper No. 12, August 2018 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE STATE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY By Wolfgang Richter THE STABILIZING ROLE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL Increasing threat perceptions In spring 2018, as no end to the conflict in Against this background, and with uncertain- Eastern Ukraine is in sight, tensions between ty about the future intentions of the Kremlin, Russia and NATO remain at a worrisome western “frontline countries” regard any Rus- level. Both sides have accused each other of sian military activity in geographical vicinity violating key principles of the European secu- a reason for immediate concern. That pertains rity order and arms control agreements as well to the restructuring and modernization of as increasing political pressure and mounting Russian forces, the deployment of Iskander military threat. Escalatory rhetoric and mili- ballistic and cruise missiles at Russia’s Western tary action such as the introduction of new periphery or large-scale manoeuvres such as weapons systems, restructuring and stationing ZAPAD 2017 and unannounced snap exer- of additional military units adjacent to critical cises. Moreover, there is the impression that areas, enlarged sizes and numbers of military frequent hazardous incidents seem to increase manoeuvres, reconnaissance and show of force the likelihood of escalatory responses. Even combined with brinkmanship in and above intended conflict scenarios such as Russian High Seas have added to threat perceptions hybrid or surprise attack against the Baltic in a number of NATO countries as well as in States are seriously considered. Recent an- Russia. Thus, an additional layer of tensions nouncements by the Russian President about and potentially dangerous developments the introduction of new nuclear weapons have have grown beyond the territorial conflict further alerted western capitals. in Ukraine as such which indicates a larger geopolitical rift in Europe between the United In consequence of such perceptions, NATO States and its allies on the one side and Russia provided military reassurances to the alarmed on the other. Baltic States and Poland. That included an “Enhanced Forward Presence” of four “rotat- Western threat perceptions and motives for ing” battle groups, eight small NATO Force action Integration Units, further elements for a training brigade in Romania and Bulgaria, in- The West perceives Russia’s military interven- creased readiness and enlargement of NATO’s tion in Ukraine and the enforced control of Response Force (NRF) to 40,000 personnel Crimea as a breach of fundamental principles with its “spearhead”, the Very High Readiness of the agreed European security order such as Joint Task Force (VJTF) of up to 20,000, the respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty to be deployable within 2-3 days.1 It entails and independence of states, inviolability of a 5,000 strong land component. Almost borders, the ban of the threat or use of force uninterrupted series of national and multina- and the commitment to peaceful resolution tional military exercises at different command of conflicts. In particular, the Russian claim levels and in various regions complement such to have the right and obligation to protect measures.2 countrymen and pro-Russian minorities in an exclusive sphere of influence (“near abroad”) Nevertheless, while reassuring allies Germany, has caused concern in Europe that such action France and other western European states have could be repeated. Covert tactics carried out insisted to keep the door open for dialogue by proxies and disguised special operation with Russia and maintain the commitment forces that initially evade attribution to a state enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act have generated the fear of “hybrid” aggression, of 19973 to forgo additional permanent sta- particularly in neighbouring countries that tioning of substantial combat forces. This view harbour large Russian-speaking minorities is reflected in the Warsaw NATO Summit de- such as the Baltic States and other post-Soviet cisions of July 2016 that limit the “Enhanced states. Forward Presence” to the combined level of Page 2 THE STABILIZING ROLE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL one combat brigade in the Baltic States and Kiev had failed and the Maidan revolution Poland despite various political pressures to had ousted President Yanukovich. Expecting station permanently several heavy brigades in that the new Maidan government would turn this region. However, in the framework of the to the West, the Kremlin sought to prevent national “European Reassurance Initiative”4 a further shift of geopolitical realities to the U.S. moved additional brigade combat the detriment of Russian security interests. groups to “frontline countries” on a rotational While Moscow believed to react in “strategic basis. Furthermore, the U.S., U.K., Canada, defence” under exceptional circumstances, it Poland and Lithuania support Kiev with unleashed far-reaching aspirations in South military assistance such as training, informa- and Eastern Ukraine towards autonomy tion exchange, joint exercises, equipment and or separation. However, securing the Black armaments.5 Sea Fleet bases and preventing the U.S. and NATO from extending defence commitments Russian threat perceptions and military bases to the Don River seem to have been of highest strategic importance and motives for action while the claim to protect Russian minorities referred to historical bonds and satisfied feel- On the other side, Russia for a long time has ings of national dignity rather than fulfilling repeatedly expressed concern that the West separatist ambitions in Eastern Ukraine. undermined Russian security interests and pa- rameters of the European power balance that Accordingly, Moscow lent military and logis- were agreed in the accords of 1990/92 and tical support to Eastern Ukrainian militias 1997/99. Russian concerns focus on NATO’s when the new government in Kiev in May enlargement towards Russian borders, the fail- 2014 ordered an “Anti-Terror Operation” and ure to create a common OSCE space of equal deployed regular formations and volunteer security without dividing lines (a “common battalions to crack down on oppositional and European house”) and action in contravention separatist movements by force. In contrast to the agreed security cooperation, such as the to Russian action in Crimea and Sevastopol, blockade of the Adaptation Agreement to the Moscow did not accept local attempts to gain CFE-Treaty, the inefficiency of the NATO- independence or join the Russian Federation. Russia Council and the build-up of strategic Instead, it agreed to the Minsk Accord that missile defence. In particular, the deployment the Normandy format had brokered. The Ac- of Aegis ashore systems in Romania and soon cord provided for a general ceasefire, with- in Poland, U.S. “prompt global strike” con- drawal of heavy weapons from the line of con- cepts, fielding of long-range stand-off weap- tact, amnesty for militias, release of prisoners, ons, adversarial rhetoric of the U.S. National and disbandment of foreign fighters and ir- Security Strategy of December 2017 and regular units. It also stipulates, inter alia, that the planned introduction of low yield pre- the conflict areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk cise nuclear warfighting options have added regions acquire a special constitutional status to Russian threat perceptions and fuelled within Ukraine and, subsequently, Kiev regain suspicion about U.S. strategic purposes. Rus- control over the borders to Russia.7 However, sian risk perceptions also pertain to western Crimea is no subject to the agreement. military interventions violating international law (Kosovo 1999, Iraq 2003, Libya 2011) Neither the political nor the military provi- and the perceived support for regime change sions of the Minsk Accord have been fully policies in Russia’s neighbourhood.6 implemented. However, while the number of victims of the conflict has risen to more Moscow’s action in Ukraine started in March than 10,000 fatalities and the OSCE Special 2014 when European mediation between Monitoring Mission (SMM) is reporting daily the government and the street opposition in frequent violations of the ceasefire, no major Page 3 THE STABILIZING ROLE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL offensive operation was launched since spring rhetoric in itself might pose a serious escala- 2015. Recently, Moscow and Kiev made pro- tion risk. posals to field a UN peacekeeping operation (UN PKO). However, significant differences In such a crisis, arms control and CSBM as to purposes and mandates of such UN mis- instruments designed to ensure stability, sion hamper progress. Moscow wants a lightly strategic restraint and military predictability armed UN PKO to protect the SMM along are needed urgently. However, the fact that the line of contact and calls upon Kiev to talk such instruments have eroded over the last directly to the leaders of the Luhansk and decade or proven insufficient to hedge to- Donetsk “People’s Republics” with a focus on day’s risks and threat perceptions has signifi- implementing the political provisions of the cantly aggravated the situation. Against this Minsk accord. In contrast, Kiev wants to avoid background, the German OSCE Chairman- freezing the status quo or giving the rebels any ship in 2016 had announced the objective to status and, therefore, asks for a heavily armed “renew dialogue, rebuild trust and re-establish UN PKO with a robust mandate that can take security”.