Deep Cuts Working Paper No. 12, August 2018

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE STATE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

By Wolfgang Richter THE STABILIZING ROLE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Increasing threat perceptions

In spring 2018, as no end to the conflict in Against this background, and with uncertain- Eastern is in sight, tensions between ty about the future intentions of the Kremlin, and NATO remain at a worrisome western “frontline countries” regard any Rus- level. Both sides have accused each other of sian military activity in geographical vicinity violating key principles of the European secu- a reason for immediate concern. That pertains rity order and arms control agreements as well to the restructuring and modernization of as increasing political pressure and mounting Russian forces, the deployment of Iskander military threat. Escalatory rhetoric and mili- ballistic and cruise missiles at Russia’s Western tary action such as the introduction of new periphery or large-scale manoeuvres such as weapons systems, restructuring and stationing ZAPAD 2017 and unannounced snap exer- of additional military units adjacent to critical cises. Moreover, there is the impression that areas, enlarged sizes and numbers of military frequent hazardous incidents seem to increase manoeuvres, reconnaissance and show of force the likelihood of escalatory responses. Even combined with brinkmanship in and above intended conflict scenarios such as Russian High Seas have added to threat perceptions hybrid or surprise attack against the Baltic in a number of NATO countries as well as in States are seriously considered. Recent an- Russia. Thus, an additional layer of tensions nouncements by the Russian President about and potentially dangerous developments the introduction of new nuclear weapons have have grown beyond the territorial conflict further alerted western capitals. in Ukraine as such which indicates a larger geopolitical rift in Europe between the United In consequence of such perceptions, NATO States and its allies on the one side and Russia provided military reassurances to the alarmed on the other. Baltic States and . That included an “Enhanced Forward Presence” of four “rotat- Western threat perceptions and motives for ing” battle groups, eight small NATO Force action Integration Units, further elements for a training brigade in Romania and Bulgaria, in- The West perceives Russia’s military interven- creased readiness and enlargement of NATO’s tion in Ukraine and the enforced control of Response Force (NRF) to 40,000 personnel Crimea as a breach of fundamental principles with its “spearhead”, the Very High Readiness of the agreed European security order such as Joint Task Force (VJTF) of up to 20,000, the respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty to be deployable within 2-3 days.1 It entails and independence of states, inviolability of a 5,000 strong land component. Almost borders, the ban of the threat or use of force uninterrupted series of national and multina- and the commitment to peaceful resolution tional military exercises at different command of conflicts. In particular, the Russian claim levels and in various regions complement such to have the right and obligation to protect measures.2 countrymen and pro-Russian minorities in an exclusive sphere of influence (“near abroad”) Nevertheless, while reassuring allies , has caused concern in Europe that such action and other western European states have could be repeated. Covert tactics carried out insisted to keep the door open for dialogue by proxies and disguised special operation with Russia and maintain the commitment forces that initially evade attribution to a state enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act have generated the fear of “hybrid” aggression, of 19973 to forgo additional permanent sta- particularly in neighbouring countries that tioning of substantial combat forces. This view harbour large Russian-speaking minorities is reflected in the NATO Summit de- such as the Baltic States and other post-Soviet cisions of July 2016 that limit the “Enhanced states. Forward Presence” to the combined level of

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one combat brigade in the Baltic States and Kiev had failed and the Maidan revolution Poland despite various political pressures to had ousted President Yanukovich. Expecting station permanently several heavy brigades in that the new Maidan government would turn this region. However, in the framework of the to the West, the Kremlin sought to prevent national “European Reassurance Initiative”4 a further shift of geopolitical realities to the U.S. moved additional brigade combat the detriment of Russian security interests. groups to “frontline countries” on a rotational While Moscow believed to react in “strategic basis. Furthermore, the U.S., U.K., Canada, defence” under exceptional circumstances, it Poland and support Kiev with unleashed far-reaching aspirations in South military assistance such as training, informa- and Eastern Ukraine towards autonomy tion exchange, joint exercises, equipment and or separation. However, securing the Black armaments.5 Sea Fleet bases and preventing the U.S. and NATO from extending defence commitments Russian threat perceptions and military bases to the Don River seem to have been of highest strategic importance and motives for action while the claim to protect Russian minorities referred to historical bonds and satisfied feel- On the other side, Russia for a long time has ings of national dignity rather than fulfilling repeatedly expressed concern that the West separatist ambitions in Eastern Ukraine. undermined Russian security interests and pa- rameters of the European power balance that Accordingly, Moscow lent military and logis- were agreed in the accords of 1990/92 and tical support to Eastern Ukrainian militias 1997/99. Russian concerns focus on NATO’s when the new government in Kiev in May enlargement towards Russian borders, the fail- 2014 ordered an “Anti-Terror Operation” and ure to create a common OSCE space of equal deployed regular formations and volunteer security without dividing lines (a “common battalions to crack down on oppositional and European house”) and action in contravention separatist movements by force. In contrast to the agreed security cooperation, such as the to Russian action in Crimea and Sevastopol, blockade of the Adaptation Agreement to the Moscow did not accept local attempts to gain CFE-Treaty, the inefficiency of the NATO- independence or join the Russian Federation. Russia Council and the build-up of strategic Instead, it agreed to the Accord that missile defence. In particular, the deployment the Normandy format had brokered. The Ac- of Aegis ashore systems in Romania and soon cord provided for a general ceasefire, with- in Poland, U.S. “prompt global strike” con- drawal of heavy weapons from the line of con- cepts, fielding of long-range stand-off weap- tact, amnesty for militias, release of prisoners, ons, adversarial rhetoric of the U.S. National and disbandment of foreign fighters and ir- Security Strategy of December 2017 and regular units. It also stipulates, inter alia, that the planned introduction of low yield pre- the conflict areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk cise nuclear warfighting options have added regions acquire a special constitutional status to Russian threat perceptions and fuelled within Ukraine and, subsequently, Kiev regain suspicion about U.S. strategic purposes. Rus- control over the borders to Russia.7 However, sian risk perceptions also pertain to western Crimea is no subject to the agreement. military interventions violating international law (Kosovo 1999, Iraq 2003, Libya 2011) Neither the political nor the military provi- and the perceived support for regime change sions of the Minsk Accord have been fully policies in Russia’s neighbourhood.6 implemented. However, while the number of victims of the conflict has risen to more Moscow’s action in Ukraine started in March than 10,000 fatalities and the OSCE Special 2014 when European mediation between Monitoring Mission (SMM) is reporting daily the government and the street opposition in frequent violations of the ceasefire, no major

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offensive operation was launched since spring rhetoric in itself might pose a serious escala- 2015. Recently, Moscow and Kiev made pro- tion risk. posals to field a UN peacekeeping operation (UN PKO). However, significant differences In such a crisis, arms control and CSBM as to purposes and mandates of such UN mis- instruments designed to ensure stability, sion hamper progress. Moscow wants a lightly strategic restraint and military predictability armed UN PKO to protect the SMM along are needed urgently. However, the fact that the line of contact and calls upon Kiev to talk such instruments have eroded over the last directly to the leaders of the Luhansk and decade or proven insufficient to hedge to- Donetsk “People’s Republics” with a focus on day’s risks and threat perceptions has signifi- implementing the political provisions of the cantly aggravated the situation. Against this Minsk accord. In contrast, Kiev wants to avoid background, the German OSCE Chairman- freezing the status quo or giving the rebels any ship in 2016 had announced the objective to status and, therefore, asks for a heavily armed “renew dialogue, rebuild trust and re-establish UN PKO with a robust mandate that can take security”. To that end, it suggested to revital- full control in the entire rebel areas including ize conventional arms control.9 While this the borders to Russia, and eventually, return proposal attracted wide support, in par- control to the capital.8 ticular by the group of like-minded states10, it also met with scepticism by the United Addressing political and mili- States and NATO “frontline states”. They stated that the time was not ripe for new tary threat perceptions: The agreements as Russia violated treaties and OSCE Structured Dialogue principles. Return to security cooperation was not possible before Russia fully complied with international obligations, respected While attempts by the Normandy format to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of hedge the hot war in Eastern Ukraine were neighbouring countries, and withdrew from only partially successful, the Russian military occupied areas. In contradiction to such intervention deepened the political rift with arguments, the same group of states focused the West and added a wider threat dimension on the need to “modernize” the Vienna to the sub-regional conflict. With political Document that is the backbone of security tensions growing, NATO countries now re- cooperation in the OSCE area.11 gard any Russian large-scale manoeuvres and snap exercises or flights in international sea The OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting in and airspace in the Baltic, North or Black Sea Hamburg in December 2016 adopted an as aggressive moves against allied countries OSCE Declaration in which participating prone to provoking further escalation. In States (pS) agreed to launch a broad and turn, Moscow receives NATO’s “Enhanced “structured” dialogue that tackles all security Forward Presence”, the United State’s “Euro- concerns including OSCE principles, inter- pean Reassurance Initiative” along its western national law, compliance with treaty obliga- borders and Aegis-ships cruising close to tions, arms control and CSBM and military Russian territorial waters with sea-launched activities in order to lay the ground for “mov- cruise missiles (SLCM) aboard as further ing forward”.12 The declaration is interpreted indications of Western anti-Russian poli- by Germany and Western European states as cies and confirmation of earlier national risk a mandate to create the basis for renewal of assessments. In consequence, both sides have conventional arms control as the Hamburg developed diverging, even contradictory and declaration referred to the Lisbon “OSCE increasingly hostile narratives that seem to Framework for Arms Control” adopted in fortify threat perceptions and confrontation, 1996 and underlined the value of arms con- often based on interpretations rather than trol and CSBM for the security in Europe. facts. This is a reason for concern as bellicose

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The Austrian OSCE Chairmanship in 2017 European. Therefore, it seems highly unlikely initiated the “structured dialogue” and that tackling only status issues of the Don- entrusted the German OSCE ambassador to bas region and local ceasefire arrangements begin with the work in an open-ended Infor- can bring about an overall settlement of the mal Working Group (IWG). In January 2018, security crisis in Europe without addressing its under Italian OSCE Chairmanship, Belgium geopolitical dimension in parallel. Therefore, has assumed the chair of the IWG to continue while it seems a conditio sine qua non that all the dialogue. Starting in spring 2017, several involved actors implement the Minsk Agree- meetings dealt with current threat percep- ments in good faith, such undertaking needs tions, principles of the European security to be complemented by a more comprehensive order, violations of international law, compli- dialogue on the principles and power balances ance with international obligations, including of the European security order to distil a way arms control and CSBM, as well as military out of the larger crisis. doctrines, defence budgets, unusual military activities, restructuring of forces, hazardous In regard of military threat perceptions, it seems incidents and military-to-military contacts. of utmost importance to gain a clearer and sober Although no short-term breakthrough is in picture on current and planned force structures sight, the fact that such dialogue takes place is and capabilities as well as military activities, par- positive news in itself. As NATO has decided ticularly in border areas. Risk scenarios need to to sever expert talks in the NATO-Russia be based on solid and comprehensive facts rather Council, the “Structured Dialogue” in the than on political interpretations of selected OSCE has filled this gap in communication. data while disregarding their context. Relevant criteria could be comparisons of doctrines and The OSCE dialogue has to address both budgets, force structures and permanent peace- political and military threat perceptions that time locations together with military hardware, are closely interwoven. While political threat mobility and long-range strike capabilities as perceptions are rooted in mutual accusations of well as out-of-garrison-activities and deploy- violations of international law, agreed principles ments outside peacetime locations that could of the European security order and mutual be used for cross-border operations. restraint commitments, military risk percep- In this regard, the OSCE “mapping exercise” tions originate from controversial assessments conducted within an informal sub-group of of force postures and military activities. They the structured dialogue opens opportunities have generated a high potential of additional as it aims at collecting facts and evaluating misunderstanding of mutual intent, misper- current force postures and their development ception of military activities and the danger during recent years. As a first step, the OSCE of escalation, particularly where they lack Secretariat has provided compilations of data convincing explanation, restraint, transpar- based on information exchanges in accordance ency and verification. As opposed to military with the Vienna Document (VD) and the routine activities in peacetime, today’s military Global Exchange of Military Information activities are assessed against the background of (GEMI). Although their evaluation would actual use of force in current conflicts and the not tackle supposed violations of principles distrust regarding future intentions. Neverthe- and compliance issues, a sober “mapping” less, for analytical and practical reasons, one could help avoiding further deterioration by should distinguish these two layers of risk and exaggerated threat scenarios. threat perceptions in order to find appropriate responses. However, such positive outcome of the “map- ping” process is far from assured. Open ques- The political conflict in and around Ukraine tions on its objectives, scope and time periods is characterized by a number of interlocking under review could still pose major obstacles dimensions – local, bilateral, sub-regional and to future progress. While many states hope for

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the “mapping” results to lead to de-escalation, 1. The Russian Western Military District others have flagged that details of force pos- (MD) is one of four MD which cover the tures cannot resolve questions of principle and whole land mass of the Russian Federa- that available data were already sufficient to tion stretching from Eastern Europe to justify existing threat perceptions. The scope the Asia-Pacific region. (A fifth “Arctic” of an acceptable database is subject to con- MD has been established by separating troversial discussions, too: While some states the from the Western want to limit data to the narrow scope of the MD.15) The Western MD extends from Vienna Document in its Zone of Applica- the western borders of Russia to the tion, others are inclined to include broader Central MD, i.e. east of Moscow close to military capabilities taking into account other the Ural Mountains and from the High official government information. Further- North, i.e. the Arctic region, down to the more, Russia wants to reflect developments Don River in the south where it borders during larger periods in the past including the to the Southern MD. The latter cov- 1990s and the beginning of NATO’s enlarge- ers the Caucasus and Black Sea region. ment to the East while “frontline countries” Thus, the Western MD borders to eight prefer focusing on recent developments only.13 states, namely , (with the While some states obviously want to delay or longest border), and (with terminate proceedings soon to avoid complex significantly shorter borders, mainly of discussions, others deem it important to accel- the Pskov oblast), Lithuania and Poland erate the process and add military substance in (around the Kaliningrad exclave), order to produce viable outcomes for political and Ukraine. Therefore, it is contrary consideration. to facts and misleading when influential studies limit the geographical description The crucial question is whether states are of the Western MD to the term “adjacent willing to develop and assess a full picture of to the Baltic States” only to suggest that current force postures and military capabili- ground forces located there are concen- ties that could help to indicate realistic risk trating against NATO’s “frontline coun- scenarios. To that end, overall force balances, tries”. In fact, in the areas “adjacent to the rapid reaction potentials, effects of far-reach- Baltic States”, namely the Oblasts Kalinin- ing modern weapons as well as geostrategic grad and Pskov, no permanent stationing advantages and disadvantages in and beyond of additional substantial combat forces Europe need to be taken into account. In con- was observed since 1997/99, which is in trast, limiting considerations on one selected line with respective reciprocal commit- sub-region with its specific geographical ments made in context with the NATO- disparities and pointing at one side’s advan- Russia Founding Act and the CFE Final tages to rapidly concentrate a number of land Act (see below). formations, would lead to unrealistic conclu- sions as to the chances and risks of waging co- 2. Such sub-regional threat perceptions also alition warfare. That is particularly true when ignore the roles and functions of vari- neglecting both the roles of such troops in a ous Russian formations and units in the wider conflict scenario and strategic escala- MD West. Kaliningrad, Kronstadt and tion risks posed by overall military potentials. Murmansk (Arctic MD) host impor- A case in point is the assertion that Russia is tant harbours, garrisons and airports of concentrating the bulk of the ground forces the Russian Baltic and Northern Fleet, located in its Western Military District against including strategic nuclear submarines. the Baltic States as suggested by a number of Navy and naval air forces pursue mari- studies of renounced institutes.14 That ignores time and strategic tasks, whereas naval the following facts: infantry and coastal defence units have

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to protect vital bases rather than leaving ances in the Baltic sub-region, which might them behind and attacking neighbour- geographically favour potential Russian ing States. While NATO believes that deployment of ground units, misjudges Russian forces could block the 100 km the strategic situation: it neglects NATO’s broad corridor between Kaliningrad and overall conventional land, air and naval su- Belarus (“Suwalki Gap”) and thus cut the periority, which favours flexible allied force Baltic States from land reinforcements, projections in a wide geographical spec- Russia regards the Exclave Kaliningrad trum. It is not reasonable to assume that threatened and difficult to defend as it is Russia ignores the strategic consequences of surrounded by NATO countries. Further- a coalition war given the fact that a narrow more, also strategic nuclear missile units Russian focus on the Baltic States would and airborne formations are located in the leave vast areas of national territory unpro- Western MD under separate operational tected and vulnerable to military counter- command. They pursue special strate- action – including exposed positions at and gic tasks and clearly differ from ground beyond the Russian periphery. A global war, forces as to offensive armoured capabili- however, is in nobody’s interest. ties and command structures. E.g., the lightly armed 76th air assault division in This example of balancing sub-regional against Pskov has been used in past and current strategic threat assessments shows what difficul- conflicts outside the Western MD but is ties the “Structured Dialogue” will still have to less suited for high intensity operations face. If the ambition is to unfold and evaluate against capable foes. reasonable military options and risks, not only a comprehensive data collection will be required 3. A narrow focus on sub-regional force bal- but also an assessment of military capabilities ances between the Baltic States and Rus- and their potential use in realistic strategic sce- sian forces in the Western MD ignores narios. To that end, pS should initiate a dialogue the fact that this MD is responsible for between militaries that involves operational the defence of a vast territory including planners, strategic analysts and high-ranking portions of the border to Ukraine. The decision makers. partial return of Russian ground force postures from brigades back to the former Against this background, one can assume that division structures obviously focuses on even a highly sophisticated “Structured Dia- the East-Ukrainian conflict and, there- logue” alone will not be able to eliminate all fore, takes place at Russia’s southwestern threat perceptions though it might promote borders. Before 2014, no major forma- more realism as to risks involved in selected sce- tion was stationed at this borderline. narios. States should acknowledge that diverg- Beginning in 2016, three new division ing perceptions will remain even if exaggerated structures have been created in this region concerns could be reduced. Rather than trying (including one in the Southern MD)16, to convince partners that their perceptions are mainly by regrouping or relocating exist- inappropriate, one should accept diverging risk ing brigades and regiments with some assessments as facts without necessarily sharing reinforcements shifted from the Central those views. They do not stand in the way of MD to the West (approx. one brigade). cooperative measures but rather inform them In contrast, at the borders to the Baltic to conceptualize risk reduction, design tailored States no substantial reinforcement of confidence and security building measures Russian ground combat forces took place (CSBM) and provide reciprocal reassurances since the reciprocal restraint commit- enshrined in arms control instruments. Such ments of 1997/99.17 outcome should be the eventual objective of the “Structured Dialogue” if its ambition is to 4. Limiting risk scenarios to ground force bal- deescalate the security situation in Europe.

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Such an approach could take an example of munity failed to revitalize conventional arms the well-construed conventional arms control control. That has left a significant gap as to instruments and CSBMs negotiated at the mutual restraint, transparency and verification. end of the . By combining sub- Before 2008, Russia received approx. 40 regular regional and pan-European military aspects, and 10 additional declared site inspections in they reduced and limited offensive military the former CFE “flank area” which included capabilities, made military activities predict- the Oblast Pskov adjacent to the Baltic States. able, and thus dispelled concerns on under- The ACFE would have increased the number lying intentions. Such measures reflected of regular declared site inspections by one military and political realities of the time and third. provided for the necessary degree of restric- Since their independence in 1991, the Baltic tions, transparency and verification of military States have remained outside the CFE Treaty. potentials and deployments. Consequently, They did not change this position after join- they contributed significantly to geostrategic ing NATO in 2004. The unfulfilled Russian stability and security cooperation in Europe request to close the arms control gap in these with the CFE Treaty labelled the “cornerstone new NATO areas close to St. Petersburg was of European security”.18 one of the six declared reasons why Russia suspended the CFE Treaty, which it deemed obsolete. In consequence of such developments, Addressing potentially no legally binding arms limitations apply in the offensive force postures: most critical areas on both sides of the borders between the Baltic States and Russia. Moscow Closing the arms control gap also withdrew from voluntary bilateral CSBMs with the Baltic States and Poland in response In the current security crisis in Europe, the to their support for Kiev and “anti-Russian” repercussions of giving up on the “cornerstone politics after the beginning of the crisis in 2014. of European security” are felt painfully, namely the failure to ratify the CFE Adaptation Agree- The lack of viable arms control, verifiable ment (ACFE)19 that was signed by all CFE limitations and full transparency has contrib- States Parties in November 1999 in Istanbul uted to miscalculations and exaggerated threat together with a political Final Act20. This perceptions. One example is the assumption adaptation had become necessary when NATO that Russia has deployed additional significant enlarged to the East, eventually including combat formations in areas adjacent to the the territories of nine countries that formerly Baltic States in preparation for cross-border belonged to the “Eastern Group of CFE States operations. If that was true, it would constitute Parties”. In consequence, the bloc-related a clear violation of the commitments enshrined limitation concept of the CFE Treaty had lost in the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) and relevance. the Istanbul CFE Final Act (1999) to forego additional permanent stationing of substantial However, the ACFE did not enter into force. combat forces. NATO gave this pledge in view The Alliance had established linkages between of its prospective enlargement of 1999. Russia ratification processes and the complete fulfil- reciprocated with a similar formula covering ment of Russian Final Act commitments on the the Pskov and Kaliningrad oblasts. withdrawal of all stationed forces from Georgia and Moldova. In particular, the status of forces However, neither the results of remaining in conflict areas was disputed were Russia was CSBMs, such as Open Skies observation monitoring ceasefire agreements together with flights and rare Vienna Document evaluation the OSCE and the UN. Having ratified the visits, nor available data on permanent Russian ACFE Russia suspended the 1990 CFE Treaty ground and air force deployment support the in December 2007. Thereafter, the CFE com- assessment that Russia has violated that com-

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mitment. Otherwise, NATO would have had fact that shortly before the NATO Summit in no reason to consider such restraint pledge as in July 2018, a concrete proposal was a binding limit when deciding at the Warsaw made to station permanently a complete U.S. Summit 2016 on an enhanced forward pres- tank division in Poland is a reason for con- ence in the region. cern.24 If this was realized, Russia would prob- ably react in kind. As the military situation Available data suggests that Russian troop has not changed since the Warsaw Summit in formations in the areas of Pskov and Kalinin- July 2016, NATO has no reason to correct its grad and further north towards the Finnish decision on reassuring allies by a limited en- border did undergo some modernizations but hanced forward presence on a rotational basis. do not indicate significant restructuring and Allies should clearly signal that also bilateral additional stationing of substantial combat decisions on additional stationing would forces.21 However, the reciprocal commitment undermine not only regional stability but also lacks formal definition, despite Russian request. agreed NATO policies. Therefore, it needs contextual interpretation. The agreement was concluded in context with In order to deescalate mutual threat percep- the expected entry into force of the ACFE, tions regarding a destabilizing force build-up which would have replaced bloc limitations by in the Baltic region, it seems a logic first step national ceilings for five (land and air) CFE to agree on reciprocal regional limitations. categories of armaments and equipment (TLE) They should provide reciprocal security assur- and territorial ceilings for three land TLE ances to prevent regional arms race without categories.22 Informal talks in the CFE Joint impeding legitimate defence requirements. Consultative Group in Vienna in 2007/08 This is one of the measures suggested by for- reflected the general understanding that defini- mer German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter tions pertain to such five TLE categories but do Steinmeier, who proposed in August 2016 to not cover weapons systems beyond the scope of revitalize conventional arms control in Europe the CFE Treaty such as air and missile defence, in order to re-establish military stability and short-range ballistic missiles and naval forces.23 predictability.

In consequence, neither the stationing of Such regional limitations do not have to be Aegis ashore missile defence systems in Poland invented from scratch; one could rather build and Romania nor the modernization of air on the restraint commitments enshrined in defence and the replacement of short-range both the NATO-Russia Founding Act and Tochka ballistic missiles by Iskander missiles in the Istanbul CFE Final Act. Notably, Russia Kaliningrad fall in the scope of those com- committed to reciprocal self-restriction also mitments. Whether such deployments run in a bilateral agreement with Norway regard- counter to its spirit might be questionable and ing the former military district of Leningrad. should be subject to dialogue. However, in the Taking the 1999 levels of categories of arma- absence of intrusive arms control regulations, ments limited by the CFE Treaty as a baseline, the politically binding restraint commitment renewing such agreements more formally is a conceptual anchor that could and should seems conducive to restore stability in this be used and further elaborated to keep mili- sub-region. Thereby, the term additional“ sub- tary stability in the Baltic region and avoid stantial combat forces” needs clarification and regional arms race. an agreed definition. Furthermore, one could consider a limited margin for exceeding such In contrast, any additional permanent station- thresholds for the purposes of exercises or ing of substantial heavy ground forces in the crisis response, however, under strict transpar- region would destroy this last anchor of pre- ency and verification obligations. The adapted dictability, provoke counter-action and lead CFE Protocol of Inspections, Section IX, to even more instability in critical times. The provides pertinent precedence.

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In view of today’s advanced military po- However, the Vienna Document is not suited tentials, which have significantly enhanced to substitute for conventional arms control. military capabilities, the scope of such com- Being the primary instrument for security co- mitments could be enlarged to meet cur- operation of the entire OSCE community it is rent threat perceptions as they do not only geared to provide additional CSBMs and en- envisage potential cross-border operations hance military transparency for all OSCE pS. involving CFE armaments of the 1990s. They Its purpose is supplementing, not replacing, also refer to modern air and missile defence legally binding CFE limitations. Therefore, with its anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) it offers only a few evaluation visits of active capabilities, short-range ground-launched bal- land and air combat units within a limited listic missiles and long-range precision-guided scope of information requirements. Only one munitions such as air- and sea-launched out of 60 active combat units notified by pS standoff and cruise missiles (ASM/ ALCM/ in the annual VD information exchange can SLCM) that can be fired from far outside the be evaluated per year.26 By comparison, the actual zone of conflict. Also strategic air mo- CFE Treaty quota for declared site inspec- bility, rapid reaction forces and multinational tions amount to 15 % of all notified objects of cooperation should be taken into account. verification within a much wider scope. The Therefore, it seems necessary for renewed ACFE would have increased this figure to conventional arms control to address both 20%. (sub-)regional force postures and operational capabilities in a wider geographical context to Preventing preparations for offensive cross- reflect realities of modern warfare and ensure border operations in the disguise of large-scale military relevance. In sum, there is an urgent military exercises has been one of the dominat- need to fill the gap that the failure to adapt the ing objectives of the Vienna Document since CFE Treaty, Russia’s suspension of the Treaty its inception. After the Georgian war in 2008 in 2007 and the lack of arms control in the and the Russian intervention in Ukraine in Baltic area have left. 2014, this purpose stands again in the centre of current VD modernization efforts. The Addressing large-scale exercises: focus is on enhancing transparency of Rus- Enlarging the limited scope of the sian large-scale and snap exercises, which figure high in Western threat assessments. A Vienna Document prominent example was the Russian exercise ZAPAD (WEST) 2017, which was conducted The political and military importance of the under the command of the Russian Western arms control gap became obvious when the MD on 14-20 September 2017, mainly on the Ukraine crisis unfolded in 2014. The unravel- territory of Belarus with some phases carried ling of legally binding limitations and intru- out in Russia. sive transparency had resulted in a significant lack of verification of Alarming assessments of that exercise illus- by NATO member states and a minor one trated how a lack of relevant instruments in a for Russia regarding NATO’s activities in tense atmosphere, charged with suspicion and “frontline countries” and beyond. Since then, demonization of the adversary, could lead to NATO and particularly the United States misperceptions. While the official numbers have emphasized the need of “modernizing” notified by Belarus, namely 12,700 personnel, the politically binding Vienna Document remained just under the threshold of obliga- (VD)25 to close transparency “loopholes” tory invitation to observation required by while they remained sceptical on the German the Vienna Document, the estimated figures proposal to renew conventional arms control amounted to 70,000 or even 100,000 upwards. aiming at reciprocal military restraint. The Polish General Staff estimated 100,000

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Russian troops, Lithuania put the figure at deployed on its territory and the rest in Rus- 140,000 and Ukraine claimed 240,000.27 sia), suspicion was voiced that such figures Consequently, various assessments were voiced were artificially reduced to avoid obligatory as to the likely purposes of the exercise such as observation by western states given that Rus- preparing offensive operations against the Bal- sian government website statements seemed tic States, deploying a third frontline against to contradict OSCE notifications. Further- Ukraine or initiating a long-term military oc- more, Russia did not notify those phases of cupation of Belarus.28 The exercise even figured the exercise that were planned to take place as one of the arguments justifying the station- on Russian territory. Russia claimed that this ing of a U.S. tank division in Poland. part did not exceed VD notification thresh- While none of these exaggerated estimates mate- olds. However, Russia briefed the NATO- rialised, they demonstrate the urgent need for a Russia Council and Belarus informed renewal of military-to-military dialogue, mutual the OSCE about the exercise beforehand information and transparency as well as verifi- and invited voluntarily military attachés, able limitations of force potentials and military neighbouring states and OSCE officials for activities, particularly in vicinity of sensitive observation. Obviously, Belarus and Russia borders. Furthermore, there seems to be a need acted in accordance with VD requirements. to inform political decision makers and the pub- However, such proceedings made clear that lic about the provisions of current transparency the scope of VD notification and observation instruments as to their scope of information, is too limited to provide sufficient transpar- notification and observation of certain military ency in times of crisis. activities. This scope is significantly smaller than the overall size of a large-scale manoeuvre involv- The narrowly defined scope of the VD ing different branches and services of armed information and notification requirements is forces. This difference should be taken into confined to exercises of land forces. Where consideration and not be used for unfounded applicable, it includes air combat support, accusations of violating such provisions thus amphibious and air landing.32 In conse- fuelling additional threat perceptions. quence, formations and units that do not fall under the term “land forces” (with their The Vienna Document requires OSCE pS to supporting elements) and pursue genuine notify 42 days in advance any exercise activity of purposes are not covered by the VD scope, formations of land forces, if applicable, also in e.g. naval, coastal, air, air defence, general combination with air or naval combat support, service support, strategic or internal security once 9,000 or more personnel are participating forces and civil defence units. Thus, the real or 250 battle tanks or 500 armoured combat figures of personnel involved in exercises vehicles (ACV) or 250 artillery systems or 200 can be significantly higher than the num- sorties by aircraft are involved.29 For amphibious bers to be notified in accordance with VD and air landing operations, personnel thresholds rules. Therefore, it is no contradiction when amount to 3,000 only.30 notified numbers of participating person- nel deviate from those announced in official If the thresholds of 13,000 personnel (or 3,500 government websites. in cases of amphibious or air landing operations) or 300 battle tanks or 500 ACV or 250 artil- This interpretation of VD transparency obli- lery systems are reached in the exercise, any pS gations is also demonstrated by the Swedish on whose territory such activities are planned large-scale multinational exercise AURORA to take place is obliged to invite other OSCE 2017, which took place on 11-29 September participating States for observation.31 2017, almost simultaneously with ZAPAD 2017. Similar to Belarus, notified When Belarus notified 12,700 personnel 12,500 personnel participating in the exer- for the (with 10,200 cise and thus stayed just below the threshold

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requiring obligatory invitation for observa- of conflict. However, like A2/AD such new tion. Counting personnel numbers subject capabilities do not fall in the scope of VD to VD notification and observation, Sweden information and verification. They should like Belarus and Russia excluded naval, air and be taken into consideration when discussing coastal defence forces and civil emergency the future scope of renewed conventional units. The real number of personnel involved arms control and CSBM regimes in Europe was about 21,500 including 19,500 Swedish if they were to keep military relevance. personnel and approx. 2,000 participants from In this context, the definition of the VD the United States (1,300+), France, Scandina- zone of application needs clarification. It via and Baltic States.33 Quite correctly, nobody covers Europe between the Atlantic and the accused Sweden to have “cheated” about the Urals, Central Asia and “adjoining sea area notified numbers of personnel participating and airspace”, which also refers to “ocean in the exercise. Remarkably, however, Sweden areas adjoining Europe.” 34 In regard of these established special communication lines in- maritime spaces, the Document expressively cluding to Russia for incident prevention and states that CSBMs “will be applicable to the extended voluntary invitations to a number of military activities of all participating States countries for observation. taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute This analysis leads to the conclusion that a part of activities taking place within the widening the scope of the VD would be whole of Europe …”. However, these areas more pertinent to enhance transparency of were never defined. With a view to cover large-scale exercises than lowering the thresh- naval capabilities and tackle hazardous air olds for notification and observation. Such and sea incidents, which in most cases take approach would also solve another substantial place in international waters in Europe’s lit- problem: as opposed to the situation 30 years toral seas, a definition is required urgently. ago, certain units and weapon categories have acquired enhanced capabilities that can Addressing uncertain mili- substantially alter the situation of the land tary activities: Tackling excep- battle and, therefore, cannot simply be quali- fied as “defensive” and subsequently excluded tions from transparency rules from the VD scope as it was done in 1990. E.g., what used to be air defence systems with Current security concerns also refer to “loop- limited capabilities and ranges have evolved to holes” in the Vienna Document that would be enhanced air and missile defence systems that frequently exploited to evade notification and can engage dozens of targets simultaneously at observation requirements. Such concerns aim ranges of up to 500 km. As these systems are at “snap exercises” and compartmentalized capable of covering a large airspace they have exercises that are suspected to be parts of the acquired A2/AD capabilities. same exercise. However, such exceptional rules did not result from default; they were de- Rapid reaction forces and strategic air signed at a time when all states still conducted mobility require similar attention as they parallel and snap exercises. significantly increase the capability to rein- force troops on the spot over long distances VD 2011 rules do not count simultaneous in short time. Precise long-range standoff exercises as one coherent exercise if they are munitions launched by ships (SLCM) or not part of “the same exercise activity conducted aircraft (ASM/ALCM), have generated new under a single operational command.35 Wheth- force capabilities as well. In the framework er simultaneous exercises pursue the same of net-centric warfare they can impact heav- operational purpose under a “single operational ily on potential battlefields although they command” depends on what one wants to might be located far outside the actual zone define as operational“ ”. Certainly, all exercises

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serve the same strategic purpose, namely train- sibility of participating States for notification ing and demonstrating warfighting capabili- and observation. It might blur the full size of ties in order to defend and “deter”. But at the multinational exercises under a single com- operational level quite different tasks have mand that take place in various national ter- to be carried out and different branches and ritories and only in combination exceed VD headquarters train their particular duties also thresholds. They should be made subject to independently. notification and observation requirements.

Thus, it is not the parallel timing of exercises Likewise, the day-to-day counting of person- or their general strategic purpose, which nel involved in sequential phases of one and defines the VD term single“ activity” but their the same exercise might pose another problem independent conduct and control by different that needs clarification. It could imply that operational commands. Therefore, NATO’s at no single day VD thresholds are exceeded simultaneous or sequential exercises (on an while the overall numbers of personnel par- average six per week in 201536) with different ticipating during a larger time frame might be formations and services, various operational significantly higher.38 purposes, in different countries and under alternate operational commands cannot be Also frequent Russian snap exercises have counted as the same exercise activity by VD contributed to rising concerns in Western terms even if most of them serve the same countries. Their military purpose is testing the strategic purpose, namely reassuring allies and readiness of units at any given time without signalling preparedness. prior notice to the troops involved. For such cases, the VD allows exceptions for prior no- In contrast, parallel Russian exercises under tification (regularly 42 days in advance) even different operational command were often if such drills exceed thresholds. Notifications assessed as a single operational activity con- are required, however, as soon as such activi- stituting violations of the Vienna Document ties commence.39 If thresholds for obligatory even if such activities took place in quite dif- invitations to observation are exceeded, the ferent geographical areas and with units that participating State conducting snap exercises do not fall in the scope of the document. That does not need to invite observers unless the included naval operations, air defence train- duration of such activities exceeds 72 hours.40 ing, strategic missile tests or railroad repair drills, and even exercises conducted outside Certainly, one could consider enhancing trans- the VD Zone of Application, i.e. beyond the parency, e.g. through reducing such exceptions Urals and in Russia’s Eastern MD (sometimes to 48 hours or promoting prior information of in combination with Chinese forces).37 Such neighbouring countries, particularly in times of assessments misinterpret the limited scope crisis. In many cases embassies were informed of the Document and its zone of application anyway and military attachés allowed to ob- between the Atlantic and the Urals (including serve. However, for informing risk perceptions Central Asia). Neither manoeuvres on Rus- it seems also necessary to take a closer look at sian territory beyond the Urals in the Central the actual operations carried out during snap or Eastern MD (TSENTR and VOSTOK) exercises, the composition of forces and the count under the Vienna Document nor U.S. locations of their activities. It makes a differ- exercises on the American continent or in the ence whether readiness tests involve single units Asia-Pacific region including South Korea and in their peacetime locations or if combined Japan. arms capabilities of various formations, includ- ing logistics and air transport, are assembled in However, analysis of recent large-scale the field. Moreover, it is of highest relevance exercises suggests the need of devoting more whether such operations are conducted in attention to the principle of territorial respon- far-away places or in vicinity of international

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borders. Assessments should distinguish ac- In the meantime, voluntarily implementing cordingly and not ring the alarm bell anyway regional measures as suggested in Chapter X even if such tests do not fall in the scope of the of the Vienna Document could be a pertinent VD or take place outside its area of application. fast track response to deescalate the situation. The true core of the issue is not the alleged vi- They do not require consensus by all VD pS. olation of the Vienna Document but the fact Therefore, they can be implemented imme- that both sides have increased frequency, levels diately once neighbouring states have agreed and ambitions of exercises with a view to show to reassure each other by reciprocal CSBMs, preparedness for war and deter potentially ag- such as extra transparency and restraint of gressive military action of the opponent. This military postures and activities, particularly in is not a question of how one would interpret border areas. Furthermore, states should make Vienna Document provisions such as the term full use of the decision taken by the Forum “single operational command” or exceptions for Security Cooperation (FSC) to provide for “snap exercises”; it is rather a worry at the voluntary notification of (at least) one exercise strategic level which requires urgent action as per year that does not exceed VD thresholds both snap exercises and simultaneous military for notification of certain military activities. activities can lead to misinterpretation and might even suggest imminent offensive opera- Addressing incident prevention: tions. International law and risk reduction However, the Vienna Document also contains precautionary measures to provide transpar- Both NATO States and Russia have claimed ency of large-scale military activities that frequent violations of “own sea and airspaces” either do not exceed VD thresholds or were and dangerous brinkmanship by the opponent not properly notified. For such cases, the that could lead to hazardous incidents and Vienna Document allows for three passive military escalation. Indeed, one can observe area inspection quota per year in the terri- a significant increase in numbers of naval tory of every OSCE pS no matter whether exercises and reconnaissance patrols of both big or small.41 Such inspections have become sides predominantly in and above international a longstanding routine in the VD Zone of waters, particularly in the Baltic Sea, the North Application. They were widely used during the Sea, the Black Sea and the North Atlantic. Such current security crisis, including in Russian activities regularly trigger military counter- territory adjacent to Ukraine and the Baltic measures such as scrambling and “intercep- States, and complemented by frequent Open tions” of fighter jets and monitoring by war- Skies observation flights. ships. In several cases, parties claim intrusion of adversary aircraft or ships into own territorial Obviously, the limited number of such inspec- waters or airspace, daring flight manoeuvres tions does not substitute for regular and intru- that might trigger unwanted accidents or hos- sive arms control verification required in crisis. tile action such as close passes or locking-on of Since more than 30 OSCE pS are competing targeting radar and activation of laser-guidance for conducting inspections in Russia or the systems, which could lead to military clashes. territories of its allies, three passive inspection quota are usually exploited early in the year, Certainly, the high number of military ac- which does not leave any flexibility for verifica- tivities in itself is a reason for concern as it tion later on. Better coordination and more demonstrates the current political tensions quota would be necessary to enhance transpar- and enhanced military vigilance. In addition, ency in times of crisis. Eventually, a return to every hazardous incident carries the danger of an intrusive conventional arms control arrange- escalation, must be prevented or, once it had ment would provide a more pertinent and com- happened, deescalated through appropriate prehensive response to a strategic challenge. military channels and political consultations.

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However, most of the “incidents” can be quali- jacent to their territorial waters, they are in no fied as routine activities rather than dangerous way entitled to qualify such zones as “own” or encounters or violations of national airspace.42 “national” sea and airspace.46 In this context, In this context, it seems necessary to clarify also the so-called “Air Defence Identification respective provisions of international law. The Zones” (ADIZ) are often misinterpreted. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN- Their purpose is identifying unknown flying CLOS) distinguishes between “territorial objects in international airspace that might waters” and the open sea. “Territorial waters” take course towards sovereign airspace of regularly extend from the coastal “baseline” states. Accordingly, the objective of air patrols to a breadth of 12 nautical miles (22 km) in the ADIZ is identifying foreign military toward the open sea, except for cases in which aircraft and preventing illegal intrusion into narrow sea spaces with close coastal baselines national airspace through escorting (“shadow- or narrow straits with international waterways ing” rather than “intercepting”) long before require a division of territorial waters.43 In they approach national territories. To that addition, coastal countries are entitled to ex- end, fighter interceptors might signal to the ercise certain limited rights in specified zones opposing pilots that an incursion into national adjoining territorial waters. In the “Contigu- territories might trigger military countermea- ous Zone” (24 nm from the “baseline”) they sures. In most cases, such operations serve may conduct law enforcement operations surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence to prevent or pursue violations of national gathering rather than preparing for hostile ac- laws in national territories; in the “Exclusive tion. Sea patrols carry out similar operations. Economic Zone” (EEZ, 200 nm from the “baseline”) and the “Continental Shelf ” they Depending on the geography, an ADIZ can enjoy exclusive rights as to exploration and extend far into High Seas (e.g. up to 250 nm economic exploitation of natural resources. in the Atlantic and Pacific). However, narrow littoral seas and straits might limit their exten- However, all special zones beyond territo- sion (e.g. in the Baltic Sea, the English Chan- rial waters, and the High Sea – alongside nel or the Danish Straits) as ADIZ operations their superjacent airspace – are considered above territorial waters of other countries international space, where the freedom of would be illegal. While an ADIZ serves purely navigation and aviation remains unrestricted. military purposes, it has no legal footing in In consequence, coastal-lying countries may the Law of the Sea other than making use of not interpret preferential rights in a way that the residual right of free navigation and avia- would impede the freedom of navigation and tion. It does not change the legal character aviation in these special zones.44 In territorial of international waters and its superjacent waters, however, only the right of peaceful “in- airspace. Therefore, flying in an ADIZ beyond nocent passage” of ships is guaranteed. That national airspace or navigation and aviation excludes action that violates national laws or in and above an Exclusive Economic Zone endangers the security of coastal states such as (EEZ) cannot be qualified as “assertive behav- military manoeuvres or intelligence gathering. iour” or “aggressive incursions into national sea and airspace”. Against this backdrop, frequent public no- tions of alleged intrusions of bombers, fighters In practice, when NATO and Russian war- or warships in “own sea or airspace”45 need ships and aircraft conduct flight or sea patrols qualification. In accordance with international and reconnaissance missions, they exercise law, there is neither a European nor NATO the right of free navigation and aviation in nor Collective Security Treaty Organization and above international waters, irrespective (CSTO) sea or airspace. While coastal coun- of coastal countries’ ADIZ or EEZ. Neither tries may enjoy preferential economic rights Russian bomber flights in the North Sea in specified zones of international waters ad- and the Atlantic 100 km from the French

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coast or 55 nm off the Canadian or Ameri- states claimed intended airspace violations in can coast and their “shadowing” by allied jet combination with hazardous incidents. fighters, nor allied reconnaissance flights in close proximity to Russian territorial waters In a few cases, however, reconnaissance flights or and their escort by Russian fighters as such ship patrols were associated with intended show are “dangerous incidents”.47 That is also true of force. Russia expressed concern about an un- for most of the reported “incidents” in the safe interception by Polish fighters of an aircraft English Channel or the Baltic Sea where the carrying Russian Defence Minister Shoigu in international sea and airspace is much smaller June 2017.49 The fighters were operating as part and more prone to errors or unwanted en- of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing Mission in inter- counters. national airspace. Russia also reacted nervously to the appearance of the USS Donald Cook in In this context, one might note that supply the Black Sea close to Crimea or the Baltic Sea flights of Russian transport aircraft between off the coast of Kaliningrad. With its anti- St. Petersburg and the Kaliningrad exclave submarine weapons, missile defence assets and routinely pass close to territorial waters of the long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) Baltic States and are “shadowed” by NATO the Aegis destroyer possesses an impressive aircraft. In turn, Russian jet fighters patrol intervention potential. From cruising positions above international waters off the coast of in the Eastern Baltic Sea, it can hold Moscow Kaliningrad or in the Black Sea to identify at risk. On 12 April 2014 an unarmed Russian foreign reconnaissance aircraft or ships cross- jet fighter carried out jamming operations and ing in the vicinity. Similarly, Russian trans- several high-speed passes at close range over the port and combat aircraft use the international U.S. destroyer that cruised in the Black Sea after waterways through the English Channel and Russia had taken control of Crimea.50 On 12 the Danish Straits not only for sea patrols but April 2016 a similar incident occurred when the also for reinforcements and logistical support Donald Cook exercised with the Polish navy 70 of the Syrian campaign. nm off the coast of Kaliningrad.51

Against this backdrop, most of the 66 “inci- On 7 September 2014, during a Russian naval dents” that were recorded by the European exercise off Sevastopol, an unarmed Russian Leadership Network (ELN) within the fighter buzzed the Canadian frigateToronto timeframe from March 2014 to March 2015 that was “shadowing” these military activities. describe routine activities in various ADIZ’s The warship reacted by locking on its targeting rather than dangerous encounters.48 Only five radar.52 Differences in interpretation of the legal cases of unintended, mostly short violations status of the territorial waters around Crimea of Swedish, Finnish and Estonian airspace and Sevastopol complicate the issue as the West were reported in which Russian, U.S. and does not recognize Russian sovereignty over French aircraft were involved. In one case, these territories.53 Enforcing the right of in- a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft patrolling off nocent passage in close proximity to the coastal the coast of Kaliningrad was intercepted by baseline and interference in ongoing exercises a Russian fighter and sought refuge in Swed- can lead to clashes. ish airspace. Obviously, the overlapping civil air space control regime over the Estonian The downing of a Russian ground attack island of Vaindloo, which falls under the fighter SU-24 by a Turkish F-16 jet fighter on responsibility of St. Petersburg Flight Infor- 24 November 2015 close to the Turkish-Syrian mation Region, has guided Russian transport land border demonstrated the dangers of escala- aircraft over the island in a number of cases. tion. The Russian light bomber had engaged in Russia also claimed a number of incursions by repeated attacks against Turkmen rebel units in NATO aircraft into own airspace which were Syria and, thereby, had mistakenly flown for sev- not recorded by the ELN. However, in no case eral seconds through a bulge of Turkish airspace.

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Though the unintended short violation of na- 34 States Parties “from Vancouver to Vladivo- tional airspace was the official reasoning for this stok”. As observation flights and image pro- well-prepared interception it seems that support cessing are carried out jointly by the observ- for “countrymen” was the predominant Turkish ing and the observed party, a high degree of rationale. Nevertheless, both sides kept restraint, openness and reliability of fact-finding can be activated military and political communication achieved. Multilateral sharing of images is pos- channels and deescalated the situation. Mean- sible. Furthermore, the high number of passive while, the Turkish government had apologized observation flight quota for larger countries and re-established friendly relations with Russia. (e.g. 42 each for Russia/Belarus and the U.S., 12 each for Canada, Germany, France, Italy, As daring flight manoeuvres and potentially U.K., Ukraine) provides for frequent observa- hostile operations are exceptions from the tion flights and thus carries the potential to reconnaissance, surveillance and identification further transparency, either independently or routine, there is no reason to qualify the overall in support of other CSBM. Open Skies ob- situation as “dangerous brinkmanship”. How- servation flights were frequently conducted in ever, even the rare truly dangerous encounters context with the security crisis in and around demonstrate the urgent need of taking national Ukraine and the Baltic region. and international action to prevent hazardous incidents and escalation in a crisis that is laden In addition to the optical film and video with high vigilance, nervousness and prepared- cameras in use for many years, observation ness to react. To that end, states should consider aircraft are now being certified for the use of tightening their rules of engagement (RoE) to digital and electro-optical cameras. The treaty comply with the “due regard” principle of inter- principally allows for further modernization national law and train pilots and commanders of observation tools such as the introduction accordingly. 24/7 emergency communication of infrared sensors (which is on its way in lines between operational headquarters seem Russia, Germany and Canada) or sideways- to be as necessary as the conclusion of agree- looking synthetic aperture radar (SLAR). ments on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea Russia has started the certification process for (INCSEA) and the Prevention of Dangerous two new long-range open skies observation Military Activities (DMA) between Russia and aircraft (Tu-214) and, thus, demonstrated the littoral states in the Baltic and Black Sea that high value it attaches to the treaty. The U.S. have not yet done so. NATO and Russia should Department of Defence has also signalled resume military-to-military dialogue to increase interest in replacing two outdated open skies transparency of military activities and prevent aircraft by new models. Germany has de- or deescalate incidents. OSCE participating cided to strengthen its observation capability States could consider enhancing risk reduction by procuring a new open skies aircraft. The mechanisms including the use of the OSCE rollout of the Airbus 319 CJ is scheduled for communication network and facilitating impar- 2019.55 tial fact-finding missions under the auspices of the Secretary General. Despite its successful implementation in the past 26 years, the treaty is now at risk. Already Preventing further ero- in the past, there were disputes about Russian sion of CSBMs: Saving the flight range limitations in the Kaliningrad exclave while Russia complained that the U.S. Treaty on Open Skies would hamper Russian flights along the Aleut Islands and to Hawaii. However, it is the The Treaty on Open Skies54 offers a flexible Russian-Georgian dispute over the territorial and cooperative instrument for monitoring status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which military sites and activities across its area of now carries the potential to thwart observa- application, which covers the territories of all tion flights in general. According to treaty

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provisions, observation flights have to keep a narratives to prevail over sober fact-finding. minimum distance of 10 km to international OSCE pS and States Parties to the Open Skies borders of states that are no States Parties Treaty should unite to save the instrument. to the treaty. As Russia has recognized the independence of the two breakaway regions, Conclusions and recommendations it had insisted for observation flights over Russian territories to keep this minimum dis- Serious tensions between Russia and NATO tance to the two entities. Georgia in turn has are rooted in both mutual accusations of suspended the treaty implementation towards having violated principles of international Russia in 2012 and rejected a Russian request law and the European security order and for one observation flight over Georgia in the of engaging in multiple military activities calendar year 2018. The dispute has resulted that are interpreted as mounting political in a stalemate of the annual consensus-finding pressure and military threat even beyond process of the Open Skies Consultation Com- the territorial conflict in Ukraine. Escala- mission (OSCC) on the observation flight tory rhetoric and opposing narratives fortify schedule for 2018. In consequence, all Open mutual threat perceptions and deepen the Skies States Parties are prevented from using geopolitical rift in Europe between the their rights enshrined in this important trans- United States and its allies on the one side parency instrument and no observation flights and Russia on the other. Western military took place since the beginning of 2018. threat perceptions focus on potentially of- fensive force postures and imbalances in a It is difficult to imagine that Georgia would sub-regional context, Russian large-scale and block treaty functions without the backing snap exercises as well as dangerous encoun- of its strategic partner, the United States. ters in and above sea areas. Russian military Already in context with supposed violations of threat perceptions do not only concentrate the INF-Treaty by Russia, the U.S. Congress on NATO’s sub-regional force build-up, but had made the Treaty on Open Skies subject also on allied rapid reinforcement capabili- to possible sanctions. Thereby, several sena- ties and strategic imbalances as to NATO’s tors also accused Russia of using the treaty overall force projection potentials. for spying purposes.56 Russia lately has shown flexibility and announced to relinquish safety Against this backdrop, stabilizing instru- distances at Russian borders to the two break- ments such as arms control treaties and away entities. It is not clear yet whether and CSBMs, which were agreed in the 1990s, are under which conditions Georgia would be needed urgently. However, they have eroded willing to allow for the resumption of treaty during the past decade or proven insufficient operations.57 to hedge risks and maintain strategic stabil- ity. The absence of effective arms control at Obviously, the Open Skies Treaty has become the sub-regional and pan-European level, subject to political bargaining over disputed limited transparency and verification of territories. That might signal the beginning force postures and military activities as erosion of yet another cooperative stability well as the lack of meaningful military-to- instrument that is badly needed to temper the military dialogue have increased the feeling crisis of European security. If the stalemate of insecurity and fuelled suspicion on the could not be resolved and the treaty was used future intent of the respective opponent. as a lever to enforce solutions to territorial This development combined with bellicose status questions, it could suffer the same fate rhetoric resulted in frequently exaggerated as the CFE Treaty and the ACFE. A failure to threat perceptions, which in turn provide keep treaty operations alive would further re- arguments for abandoning remaining duce transparency of military activities in Eu- cooperative security arrangements such as rope and beyond and allow worst case threat the mutual restraint commitment enshrined

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in the NATO-Russia Founding Act or the 4. States should acknowledge and actively overarching verification tool of the Treaty on pursue the objective to use the “Struc- Open Skies. tured Dialogue” as a basis for hedging the dangers of misperceptions, developing In this situation, it seems of utmost impor- deescalatory measures and returning to tance to hedge against additional escalatory mutual security assurances, restraint and developments, replace bellicose rhetoric by predictability. To that end, the dialogue facts-based analysis, maintain existing instru- should review available stability instru- ments and prevent their further deterioration, ments with a view to identifying gaps, restore a meaningful political and military modernizing CSBMs and revitalizing dialogue and focus on most pressing security conventional arms control. concerns. In particular, states should consider how to reduce risks emanating from poten- b. Addressing potentially offensive force tially offensive force postures, exercises and postures: Closing the arms control gap unintended hazardous incidents of military 1. In response to mutual threat perceptions aviation and navigation in international sea- in the Baltic Region, NATO Member and airspace. States and Russia should recommit to re- ciprocal restraint commitments enshrined The following measures are recommended: in the NATO-Russia Founding Act and a. Returning to fact-based threat as- the CFE Final Act. sessments: Strengthening the OSCE 2. Clarifying and defining the term “ Structured Dialogue addi- tional permanent stationing of substantial 1. OSCE pS should support and acceler- combat forces” would help to dispel doubts ate the OSCE “Structured Dialogue”. It about its meaning. It would enhance offers a most valuable forum for resuming sub-regional restraint and stability with- a substantial dialogue on political and out formal negotiations on a new arms military security concerns. control regime. 2. The “Mapping” process seems conducive 3. For establishing stability benchmarks, to gaining a clearer and sober picture on states could take the 1999 levels of arma- current and planned force postures and ments limited by the CFE Treaty (TLE) military activities and basing risk assess- as a baseline. In addition, some margin of ments on solid and comprehensive facts flexibility could be considered allowing rather than on incompatible political for modernization or reinforcement of narratives. Although the evaluation of existing units below the threshold of “ad- military facts would not mitigate sup- ditional permanent stationing of substantial posed violations of principles and compli- combat forces”. ance issues, a sober “mapping” could help 4. To satisfy the need for legitimate de- avoiding further deterioration by exagger- fence and training requirements, one ated threat perceptions. could consider a limited margin for 3. States should allow for enlarging the limit- temporarily exceeding such thresholds ed scope of data under evaluation (Vienna for the purposes of exercises or crisis Document, Global Exchange of Military response, however, under strict transpar- Information) in order to reflect today’s ency and verification obligations. military capabilities more comprehensively 5. As current threat perceptions do not and, thus, enable realistic assessments of only refer to mobile ground operations, risk scenarios. That requires a balanced enlarging the scope of such restraint approach taking into account sub-regional, commitments seems advisable. There- regional and strategic potentials and risks.

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fore, restraint and verified transparency enhanced military capabilities but are not measures should also cover A2/AD covered by VD provisions. That includes capabilities, ground-launched short- advanced air and missile defence systems range ballistic missiles, long-range air- or and long-range precision-guided standoff sea-launched precision-guided munitions munitions that can be launched by ships as well as strategic air mobility, rapid reac- or aircraft from geographical positions far tion capabilities and multinational force outside the actual zone of conflict. cooperation and integration that can alter 3. In this context, the definition of the VD the sub-regional force balance. zone of application in Europe needs 6. Germany and like-minded states should clarification as to the term adjoining“ sea make concrete proposals on conceptual areas”. approaches towards a future conventional 4. Attention should also be devoted to rapid arms control regime that is suited to reaction forces and strategic mobility contribute to military stability. To rally assets as they significantly increase the ca- the widest possible support such concepts pability to reinforce troops in crisis areas should be based on the principles of mutual over long distances in short time. strategic restraint, reciprocity of measures, military relevance as to scope and area d. Addressing uncertain military activities: of application, verifiable sufficiency, i.e. Tackling exceptions from transparency upper thresholds for forces not exceeding rules legitimate defence requirements, and full transparency also in times of crisis. Though 1. Vienna Document exceptions from obser- such measures are not enough to solve ter- vation obligations for snap exercises could ritorial disputes, they can help to deescalate be reduced to 48 hours. the wider crisis in Europe, prevent any 2. Prior information of snap exercises of further escalation in and beyond the actual neighbouring countries should be pro- conflict zone and reduce military tensions moted, particularly in times of crisis, to in other sensitive areas. This might pave avoid misperceptions and escalation. the way for exploring new avenues towards a comprehensive conflict settlement with 3. States should consider providing more a view to rebuilding trust and eventually transparency and observation opportuni- restoring security cooperation. ties voluntarily in times of crisis and keep restraint in large-scale and snap exercises, c. Addressing large-scale exercises: En- particularly in border regions, to reassure larging the limited scope of the Vienna neighbours and deescalate the situation Document as suggested in Chapter X of the Vienna Document. 1. In order to generate comprehensive trans- parency of large-scale exercises, enlarging 4. States should also make a more generously the scope of the Vienna Document would use of the FSC decision to provide volun- be more pertinent than lowering the tary notification of one exercise per year thresholds for notification and observa- that does not exceed Vienna Document tion. It should cover also non-combat thresholds for notification of certain formations and units of armed forces military activities. beyond ground forces and their support- 5. States should make proper use of VD ing elements. inspections designed to monitor any 2. Such extension of the VD scope would area in which large-scale military activi- also take account of certain units and ties take place that either do not exceed weapon categories, which have acquired VD thresholds or are supposed to evade

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proper notification. As three passive in- 3. Neighbouring states should enhance spection quota per year do not substitute sub-regional security cooperation and for regular arms control verification, bet- military contacts with a view to avoid ter coordination among interested parties misinterpretations as to unusual military and more quota are necessary to enhance activities. They should keep restraint transparency in times of crisis. as to military stationing, air and sea patrolling and large-scale exercises, par- 6. More attention should be devoted to the ticularly in border areas as suggested by principle of territorial responsibility of Chapter X of the Vienna Document. states for notification and observation. It might blur the full size of multinational 4. Russia and NATO states, that have not exercises under a single command that yet done so, should conclude bilat- take place in different national territories eral Agreements on the Prevention of and exceed VD thresholds in combina- Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) and on tion only. Such activities should be made the Prevention of Dangerous Military subject to notification and observation Activities (DMA). requirements. 5. NATO and Russia should resume 7. Day-to-day counting of personnel in- military-to-military dialogue to increase volved in sequential phases of one single transparency of military activities and exercise also poses a problem that needs prevent or deescalate potential inci- clarification. This practice might imply dents. To that end, they should keep that at no single day VD thresholds are direct military links operational at any exceeded while the overall numbers of time. personnel participating during a larger 6. OSCE pS should use Vienna Document timeframe could be significantly higher. Chapter III (no. 17) provisions to avoid and deescalate hazardous incidents, inter e. Addressing incident prevention: alia, by informing all pS through the International law and risk reduction OSCE communication network and 1. In order to prevent unintended hazard- using OSCE mechanisms for risk reduc- ous incidents in international sea- and tion (VD, III., no. 16, 18). airspace, all states should take “due re- 7. OSCE pS should consider enhancing gard” as required by international law and risk reduction mechanisms by facilitat- tighten their rules of engagement (RoE) ing impartial fact-finding missions un- accordingly. They should train pilots and der the auspices of the OSCE Chairman navy captains to keep secure minimum in Office or the Secretary General. distances from international borders as well as disputed territories and carry out 8. As most incidents take place in and responsible flight manoeuvres that neither above international waters, the defini- endanger the safety of aviation nor trigger tion of the VD zone of application in unwanted hostile action. Europe needs clarification as to the term “adjoining sea areas”. 2. To that end, regional states should engage in a military dialogue with a view to en- f. Preventing further erosion of CSBMs: hancing the security of national territorial Saving the Treaty on Open Skies spaces and the safety of aviation and navi- gation in international space. They should 1. A failure to keep the Treaty on Open install 24/7 emergency communication Skies operational would further reduce lines between operational headquarters, transparency of military activities in which are able to prevent and defuse Europe and beyond. It would destroy incidents. another cornerstone of cooperative verifi-

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cation and help worst-case-risk-narratives 2. OSCE pS should make better use of the to prevail over sober fact-finding. OSCE results of Open Skies observation flights pS and States Parties to the Open Skies for assessing military risks in the secu- Treaty should unite to save the instru- rity dialogue of the Forum for Security ment. Cooperation.

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1 NATO: Wales Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State 11 Cf. Bruce I. Turner: “Revitalizing Military Confidence-Building, and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Risk Reduction and Arms Control in Europe”. Remarks at the Council in Wales, 05 Sep. 2014, No. 5-8; Press Release (2014) OSCE Security Days, 3 October 2016 http://www.state.gov/t/avc/ 120 issued on 05 Sep. 2014, updated 26 Sep. 2016. https://www. ris/262657.htm ; Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of State: “At a time .int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm; NATO: Warsaw when existing arms-control agreements are being violated, we cannot Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government seriously discuss new arrangements …” in: “Remarks at OSCE Min- participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw isterial Plenary Session”. Hofburg Palace, Vienna, Austria, December 8-9 July 2016; No. 10, 35-41; Press Release (2016) 100 issued 7, 2017. See also Stephen Blank: “Mission impossible: Pursuing on 9 July 2016, updated 03 August 2016. https://www.nato.int/cps/ arms control with Putin’s Russia.” European Leadership Network, en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm Euroatlantic Security Policy Brief. January 2018

2 In 2015, approx. 270 exercises were planned to be held under 12 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a NATO umbrella, with about 50 % devoted to reassuring Eastern Ministerial Council: “From Lisbon to Hamburg: Declaration on the allies. Joint press conference with Military Committee Chairman Twentieth Anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control” (MC. General Knud Bartels, SACEUR General Breedlove and SACT General DOC/4/16), Hamburg, 9 December 2016 (MC(23) Journal no. 2, Paloméros, 21 May 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opin- Agenda item 7) ions_119868.html also quoted in: Thomas Frear, Ian Kearns, Lukasz Kulesa: “Preparing for the Worst: Are Russian and NATO Military Ex- 13 Overview in: Wolfgang Richter: “Die OSZE zwischen Konfron- ercises Making War in Europe more likely?” ELN Policy Brief August tation und “Strukturiertem Dialog”. Unter Österreichs Vorsitz bekennt 2015, p. 3. According to NATO’s Warsaw Summit Communiqué of 9 sich die Organisation zu ihrer friedensstiftenden Rolle“. SWP Aktuell July, 2016, No. 37 g. NATO and allies conducted 300 exercises in 5, Januar 2018 2015 alone. (see Fn. 1) 14 Shlapak, David A. and Johnson, Michael. “Reinforcing Deter- 3 NATO/Russian Federation: Founding Act on Mutual Rela- rence on NATO’s Eastern Flank”. RAND Corporation. 2016 https:// tions, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html Scott Boston, Federation. Paris, 27 May 1997. www.nato.int/cps/en/natolife/of- Michael Johnson, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Yvonne K. Crane: ficial_texts_25468.htm “Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe. Implica- tions for Countering Russian Local Superiority.” Rand Corporation, 4 U.S. Department of Defense (Office of the Under Secretary of Research Report, 2018; Edward Lucas: “The Coming Storm”. Baltic Defense (Comptroller)): European Reassurance Initiative. Depart- Sea Security Report. Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), ment of Defense Budget. Fiscal Year (FY) 2018. May 2017. See Washington 2015; Artur Kacprzik, Karsten Friis: “Adapting NATO’s also Thomas Gutschker: “Der lange Treck”. Frankfurter Allgemeine Conventional Force Posture in the Nordic-Baltic Region.” In: The Sonntagszeitung, 13. May 2018 Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). Policy Paper No. 3 (156), August 2017, p. 2; Ivo H. Daalder: “Not quiet at the Eastern 5 The United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Lithuania have Front”. In: Foreign Affairs November/December 2017 (“Responding deployed a total of 626 soldiers in Ukraine to support training of to Russia’s Resurgence”). Daalder asserts that “more than 300,000 Ukrainian forces: Canada 200 (Operation Unifier), U.K. 100 (Opera- (sic!) well-trained troops are deployed in Kaliningrad … posing a tion Orbital), U.S. 310 (JMTG-U), Lithuania 16 (JMT-U). International significant military threat to Poland and the three Baltic states.” The Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2018, p. 213. real number of military personnel in Kaliningrad (including fluctuating navy units) is less than 30,000 with approx. 15,000 professionals 6 Overview on Russian threat assessments in: Wolfgang Richter: registered in the area with their families. The overall strength of active “Return to Security Cooperation in Europe: The Stabilizing Role Russian military personnel amounts to approx. 900,000, the strength of Conventional Arms Control.” Deep Cuts Working Paper No. 11, of the Russian army to approx. 280,000 including conscripts. Inter- September 2017, p. 2-6 national Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2018, p. 192-193. http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tmib20 7 Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements agreed by the Trilateral Contact Group at the Summit 15 Catherine Harris and Frederick W. Kagan. “Russia’s Military in Minsk on 12 February 2015 (Russian Text) www.osce.org/ Posture: Ground Forces Order of Battle”. Institute for the Studies of cio/140156 English text in: International Business Times, February War. Washington 2018, p. 24 12, 2015 www.ibtimes.com/minsk-ceasefire-deal-full -text-agree- ment-between-russia-ukraine-germany-france-1814468 16 Harris/Kagan. “Russia’s Military Posture: Ground Forces Order of 8 Overview on perspectives for a UN mission in Donbass contai- Battle”. Loc. cit., p. 11, 12, 18-20. Two newly created division head- ned in: Walter Feichtinger, Hanna Grininger: „UN-Mission im Donbass quarters are located in Yelnya, Smolensk Oblast (144th Motor Rifle – Neue Perspektiven für das Krisen- und Konfliktmanagement in der Division) and Boguchar, Voronezh Oblast (3rd Motor Rifle Division). Ukraine“. Institut für Friedenssicherung und Konfliktmanagement, They are subordinated to the 20th Guards Army in Voronezh (Western Landesverteidigungsakademie Wien. IFK-Monitor Mai 2018 MD). A new division headquarter was established in Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast (150th Motor Rifle Division) which is subordinated 9 Frank-Walter Steinmeier: “Mit Rüstungskontrolle Vertrauen to the 8th Army (Southern MD). See also International Institute for schaffen”. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26. August 2016, p. 8 Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2018, p. 172. http://www. tandfonline.com/loi/tmib20 Some authors incorrectly state that “three 10 „Erklärung der Gruppe der Gleichgesinnten zur Unterstützung new Russian divisions in the Western MD” were postured “closer to des Neubeginns auf dem Gebiet der konventionellen Rüstungskon- the Baltic state borders”. Thomasz K. Kovalik, Domink P. Jankowski: trolle in Europa.“ Auswärtiges Amt, Pressemitteilung, 25 November “ZAPAD 2017: NATO Should Be Keeping an Eye on Russia’s Training 2016 Exercises” http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/zapad-2017-nato-

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should-be-keeping-eye-russia-training-20540 The authors serve in feature/yes--military-training-mega-war-what-militaries-do the Polish Ministry of National Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Eric Schmitt: „Vast Exercise Demonstrated Russia’s Growing Military Prowess“. In: New York Times, October 1, 2017 https://www.ny- 17 Harris/Kagan. “Russia’s Military Posture: Ground Forces Order times.com/2017/10/01/us/politics/zapad-russia-military-exercise. of Battle”. Loc. cit., p. 12, 14, 20; the 6th Army in St. Petersburg html see also https://nytimes.com/2017/07/31/world/europe/ controls two Motor Rifle Brigades only (138th in Kamenka north of russia-military-exercise-zapad-west.html St. Petersburg at the Finnish border, 25th in Luga, closer to the Pskov Oblast). The 76th Guards Air Assault Division in Pskov was located 29 Vienna Document (VD) 2011, loc. cit., Chapter V, No. (38), there since the end of the Cold War and never dissolved. It belongs (40.1), (40.1.1), (40.1.2), p. 20 to the Airborne troops. Ground force structures in the Kaliningrad exclave also did not change: The 79th Motor Rifle Brigade and the th7 30 VD 2011, loc. cit., Chapter V, No. (40.2), (40.2.1), p. 20 Motor Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps) together with the 336th Naval 31 VD 2011, loc. cit., Chapter VI, No. (47), (47.1), (47.2), Infantry Brigade are subordinated to the Baltic Fleet. (47.4), p. 24

18 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), 32 VD 2011, loc. cit., Chapter V, No. (40.1) with footnote 4, p. 20, signed on 19 November 1990 in Paris, entered into force on 9 60; Chapter VI, No. (47.1) with footnote 6, p. 20, 60. Accordingly, “the November 1992 www.osce.org/library//14087 term land forces includes amphibious, airmobile or heliborne forces and airborne forces.” According to Chapter V, No. (40.2), footnote 5, “am- 19 Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional phibious landing includes total troops launched from the sea by naval and Armed Forces in Europe, in: OSCE Summit 1999 (Istanbul Docu- landing forces embarked on ships or craft involving a landing on shore.” ment). (PCOEW389), ed. OSCE (Istanbul OSCE, January 2000), p. 118-234 33 Colonel (GS) Johan Huovinen: “Topic 3: Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms”, in: Austrian OSCE Chairmanship 2017 (ed.): 20 CFE Final Act, Istanbul, November 1999, in: loc. cit. p. 235-251 “Promoting Military Stability and Security. Key findings and documents of 21 See footnotes 14, 17 the Intersessional Dialogue on Military Doctrines and the Breakout Work- shops on CSBMs.” December 2017, p. 211-213; see also: Government 22 Land TLE categories are: (1) Battle Tanks (2) Armoured Offices of Sweden: “ Exercise will in- Combat Vehicles (3) Artillery Systems crease military capability”. http://www.government.se/articles/2017/09/ Air TLE categories are (4) Combat Aircraft (5) Attack Helicopters swedish-armed-forces-exercise-aurora-17-will-increase-military-capability

23 The author participated in these talks representing Germany. 34 VD 2011, Annex I, loc. cit., p. 49

24 Edyta Zemla and Kamil Turecki: “Poland offers US up to 35 VD 2011, Chapter V, No. (40.1), loc. cit., p. 20 $2B for permanent military base”. https://www.politico.eu/article/ nato-poland-offers-us-up-to-2-billion-for-permanent-american- 36 NATO and allies conducted 300 drills in 2015. Warsaw Summit military-base/ ; Ministry of National Defence. Republic of Poland: Communiqué 9 July, 2016, No. 37 g. (Fn. 2) “Proposal for a U.S. Permanent Presence in Poland.” 2018 https:// g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/ 37 Dave Johnson (NATO International Staff): “ZAPAD 2017 and Euro- uploads/2018/05/Proposal-for-a-U.S.-Permanent-Presence-in- Atlantic security”. December 14, 2017. https://www.nato.int/docu/re- Poland-2018.pdf view/2017/Also-in-2017/zapad-2017-and-euro-atlantic-security ; Daniel Brown: ”Russia just finished the Zapad military exercises that freaked 25 Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): out NATO – Here’s what we know:” Business Insider Deutschland, Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building 26.09.2017 https://www.businessinsider.de/heres-what-we-learned- Measures. FSC.DOC/1/11, 30 November 2011 www.osce.org/ from-russias-zapad-military-exercises-2017-9?r=us&ir=t fsc/86597 38 Such da-to-day counting is not limited to Russian practice. Johan 26 Vienna Document 2011, loc. cit., Chapter IX, No. (109), p. Huovinen noted that in the course of the Swedish exercise AURORA 2017 38 altogether 19,500 Swedish personnel were involved but at no single day more than 15,500 simultaneously. J. Huovinen, loc. cit., p. 212 27 Igor Sutyagin: “Zapad 2017: Why Do the Numbers Matter?”, RUSI Commentary, 12 September 2017 https://rusi.org/commen- 39 VD 2011, Chapter V, No. (41), (41.1), loc. cit., p. 21 tary/zapad-2017-why-do-numbers-matter 40 VD 2011, Chapter VI, No. (58), loc. cit., p. 26 28 Keir Giles: “Russia begins huge ‘Zapad 2017’ military drills”. In: CNN: “Russia’s military exercises: Could they turn into war?” 41 VD 2011, Chapter IX, no. (74) – (106), loc. cit., p. 32-38 September 14, 2017 https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/15/opin- ions/zapad-2017-keir-giles/index.html; Alexander Smith, Mac Wil- 42 Cf. Thomas Frear, European Leadership Network (ELN): “List liam Bishop, Courtney Kube: “Russia Kicks Off Huge Zapad 2017 of Close Military Encounters Between Russia and the West, March Military Exercises With Belarus”, August 2, 2017 in: https://www. 2014 – March 2015”; see also Thomas Frear, ELN, “Lessons Learned? nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-plans-huge-zapad-2017-military- Success and Failure in Managing Russia-West Incidents 2014-2018”. exercises-with-belarus Ukrainian President Poroshenko expressed Euro-Atlantic Security Policy Brief. April 2018 concerns that Russia may be planning a “full-scale invasion”. In: Simon Saradzhyan: “Yes, Russia’s Military Is Training for a ‘Mega 43 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Part I, Articles War’. That’s What Militaries Do.” http://nationalinterest.org/print/ 1-4, 17-21

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44 UNCLOS, Part II, Art. 33; Part V, Arts 55-58; Part VI, Arts 76-78¸ 51 NATO. “How can the OSCE help to reduce the risk of hazardous Part VII, Art. 87 military incidents?” https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also- in-2016/OSCE-help-reduce-risk-military-incidents/ 45 Andrew Foxall (The Henry Jackson Society): “Close Encounters: Russian Military Intrusion into UK Air- and Sea Space Since 2005.” Russia 52 Frear, ELN: “List of Close Military Encounters Between Russia Studies Centre Policy Paper No. 7 (2015). Contrary to its title the study and the West, March 2014 – March 2015”, loc. cit., (Fn. 41), does not mention any violation of U.K. territorial waters or airspace by Incident No. 7, p. 10 Russian aircraft or ships but interprets U.K. EEZ and U.K.-based Flight Information Regions as “UK Air- and Sea Space”. A NATO study notes 53 Thomas Frear, ELN, “Lessons Learned? Success and Failure in with concern that Russian fighters on 12 April 2016 made multiple high- Magaing Russia-West Incidents 2014-2018”. Euro-Atlantic Security speed passes above the USS Donald Cook in international waters in the Policy Brief. April 2018, p. 7 Baltic Sea but at the same time expresses worries that Russian bombers on 22 September 2016 appeared less than 100 km from the French 54 Treaty on Open Skies, signed 24 March 1992, entry into coast, i.e. in international waters as well. In: NATO. “How can the OSCE force 2002 after 10 years of preliminary application. www.osce.org/ help to reduce the risk of hazardous military incidents?” https://www.nato. library/14127 int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/OSCE-help-reduce-risk-military- incidents/ 55 For a general overview cf. Hartwig Spitzer: “The Treaty on Open Skies – Status quo and Prospects”. In: IFSH CORE OSCE Yearbook 46 U.K. Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson on 23 May 2018 high- 2004, Hamburg 2005, p. 369-380 https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/docu- lighted “British tensions over increased Russian aggression” by referring ments/yearbook/english/04/Spitzer.pdf; see also Hartwig Spitzer: expressively to the Royal Navy’s and Royal Airforce’s task to guard not “Open Skies: transparency in stormy times.” In: VERTIC: “Trust and only Britain’s territorial waters (12 nm zone) but also “a 200-mile eco- Verify” July-September 2014, Issue Number 146, ISSN 0966- nomic exclusion zone and NATO areas of responsibility within international 9221, London 2014; I owe my gratitude to Hartwig Spitzer for waters” (sic!). Financial Times, 24 May 2018: “Royal Navy intercepted sharing his Power Point Presentation reviewing the status of the Open Russian military ships 33 times in 2017”. Skies Treaty in June 2018

47 Cf. Alex Horton: “U.S. jets intercept pair of Russian bombers off 56 On latest attempts by House Armed Services Chairman Mac Alaskan coast”. The Washington Post, 14 May 2018 Thornberry to struck funding for two U.S. Open Skies Treaty observa- tion aircraft see Michael Krepon: “Crippling the Open Skies Treaty 48 Cf. Thomas Frear, European Leadership Network (ELN): “List of Punishes Allies and the US, not Russia.”, May 23, 2018 https://www. Close Military Encounters Between Russia and the West, March 2014 – armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1205274/crippling-the-open-skies- March 2015” treaty-punishes-allies-and-us-not-russia

49 Thomas Frear, ELN, “Lessons Learned? Success and Failure in 57 Cf. Open Skies Consultative Commission. Chairmanship: Czech Managing Russia-West Incidents 2014-2018”. Euro-Atlantic Security Republic. 2nd Meeting of the 76th Session. Journal of 22 May Policy Brief. April 2018, p. 7 2018. (OSCC76.JOUR/256 22 May 2018), Annexes 1-4 with state- ments by the delegations of Georgia, the Russian Federation, Canada 50 Ibid., Incident No. 1, p. 9 and Germany.

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About the Author Wolfgang Richter (Colonel ret.) is Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin, Research Group on Security Politics. His previous assignments in- clude, inter alia, Head of the military section of the Permanent Representation of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, and to Disarmament fora of the United Nations, New York (1995-1999); Head of de- partment (global and European arms control), Federal Armed Forces Centre for Verification Tasks (1999-2005); and Head of the military section of the Permanent Representation of Germany to the OSCE, Vienna. Contact: [email protected]

About Deep Cuts

The Deep Cuts project is a research and analyses and specific recommendations, the consultancy project, jointly conducted by Commission strives to translate the already the Institute for Peace Research and Secu- existing political commitments to further rity Policy at the University of Hamburg, nuclear reductions into concrete and the Arms Control Association, and the feasible action. Deep Cuts Working Papers Institute of World Economy and Interna- do not necessarily reflect the opinion of tional Relations of the Russian Academy individual Commissioners or Deep Cuts of Sciences. The Deep Cuts Commission is project partners. seeking to devise concepts on how to over- come current challenges to deep nuclear For further information please go to: reductions. Through means of realistic www.deepcuts.org

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Impress: Project Management Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik Lina-Marieke Hilgert an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH) Götz Neuneck Beim Schlump 83 Email: [email protected] 20144 Hamburg, Germany

Phone: +49 (0)40-86 60 77-70 Fax: +49 (0)40-866 36 15

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