Practice makes perfect Small states and Multi-national Military Exercises

Teodor Frost

Thesis, 15 ECTS (hp) Political Science with a focus on security policy Master’s Programme in Politics Spring 2021 Supervisor: Stephanie Winkler Word count: 15997

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Abstract

Multi-national military exercises have been recognised to have both military utility and political effects, however these mechanisms have been mainly studied from of major states. The purpose of the study is to determine what motivations Small states have to participate in multi-national military exercises and how they are used as a political tool, in order to further develop a analytical framework for analysing Small states behaviour in military exercise.

The study was conducted via a single case study on Sweden through a deductive thematic analysis with themes developed on the basis of existing theory on a military exercise and Small state theory. Press releases and annual reports were scrutinised and relevant codes were identified.

Results show that all themes outlined were represented in the material. What can be gathered from the investigation is how Small states highly value factors such as increasing military capacity and interoperability. The major find of the investigation was how Small states use multi-national military exercises is order to enhance deterrence, strengthen relationships, and to increase prestige and relevance, all in the pursuit of security. The investigation showed that Small states are indeed different from that of Great states in how they use multi-national military exercises. Recommendation were then made on further studies, such as quantitative or comparative efforts.

Keywords: Military Exercises, Multi-national military exercises, military cooperation, Small states, thematic approach.

2

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Table of contents

Abstract ...... 2 Table of contents ...... 3 Introduction ...... 5 Research problem ...... 5 Aims ...... 6 Research questions ...... 7 Contribution ...... 7 Disposition ...... 7 Literature review ...... 8 Military exercise theory ...... 8 Small state theory ...... 14 Small states strategies ...... 17 Analytical framework ...... 19 Aspirations ...... 19 Ontological Assumptions ...... 19 From Great to Small ...... 20 Rehearsal ...... 21

Innovation and generation of new competencies ...... 22

Deterrence & signalling ...... 22

Interoperability ...... 23

Relevance and Prestige: ...... 23

Research design and method ...... 25 Single case study thematic analysis ...... 25 Case selection ...... 25 Material used & samples ...... 26 Thematic analysis ...... 26 Study execution ...... 26 Empirical limitations ...... 27 Case study, Swedish major exercises 2015-2019 ...... 28 Exercises studied ...... 28 Aurora 17 ...... 29

3

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Trident Juncture 18 ...... 30

Cold Response ...... 30

BALTOPS ...... 31

Northern Coasts ...... 31

Arctic Challenge ...... 31

Results ...... 32 Rehearsal ...... 32 Innovation and generation of new competencies ...... 33 Deterrence & signalling ...... 34 Interoperability ...... 36 Relevance and Prestige ...... 38 Analysis and discussion ...... 40 Rehearsal and Innovation ...... 40 Deterrence and signalling ...... 41 Interoperability ...... 41 Relevance and Prestige ...... 42 Reproducibility ...... 43 Role of themes ...... 43 Generalisability of the case...... 43 Limitations ...... 44 Future opportunities and Conclusions ...... 46 Suggestions for future studies ...... 46 Conclusions ...... 46 Bibliography ...... 48

4

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Introduction

Research problem Central to every state’s behaviour is establishing its own security, and military exercises play a part in that process. Military exercises, and multi-national military exercises (MNE) are usually understood by most scholars to be either have certain military utility or have certain distinct diplomatic implications. The military utility can be seen in many aspects, leading to increased ability to reach specific military goals in either tactical or operational levels. In addition to the military utility, the overt show of force, displays of readiness, and military capability that large exercises offer can be seen as both intimidating or deterring to rivals and reassuring for allies.1 This aspect is the one most usually associated with the study of the political dimension of military exercises, particularly in relation to great powers and major exercises.

Recently some authors have made suggestions that there are additional forces at work.2 Forces such collective capacity building, role-forming, and trust-developing, where exercises are used to shape the relationship between states.34 These could be informal steps towards an alliance or future military cooperation. This shows how major states may use MNEs to leverage their power with different effects, to attain security.

However, existing theories are mainly concerned with the behaviour and utility of exercises as seen by the major powers. Small states, by virtue of having comparatively much less power to wield, yet choose to engage in military exercises and likely not purely for the military utility as they offer certain political options. There are a multitude of definitions of Small states, put simply Small states have a relative power disparity in a given system, to borrow Rothstein’s definition a Small state cannot provide for its own security without the aid of others.5 Small states in existing alliances and officially non-aligned states may choose to engage in exercises

1 Beatrice Heuser and Harold Simpson, ‘The Missing Political Dimension of Military Exercises’, The RUSI Journal 162, no. 3 (4 May 2017): 21–23. 2 Beatrice Heuser, Tormond Heier, and Guillaume Lasconjarias, Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact, NDC Forum Papers Series 26 (Rome: NATO Defence College, 2018); Kyle J Wolfley, ‘Military Statecraft and the Use of Multinational Exercises in World Politics’, Foreign Policy Analysis 17, no. 2 (29 January 2021): 22; Derrick V. Frazier and J. Wesley Hutto, ‘The Socialization of Military Power: Security Cooperation and Doctrine Development through Multinational Military Exercises’, Defence Studies 17, no. 4 (2 October 2017): 379–97; Dan Öberg, ‘Exercising War: How Tactical and Operational Modelling Shape and Reify Military Practice’, Security Dialogue 51, no. 2–3 (April 2020): 137–54. 3 Wolfley, ‘Military Statecraft and the Use of Multinational Exercises in World Politics’. 4 Wolfley, 4. 5 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 29. 5

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

by other sets of motivations. Small State theory establishes that Small states are not merely weaker versions of their greater counterparts, but have their own complexities and have to employ other methods to strive for security.

The theoretical conceptions of military diplomacy through MNEs are rather insufficient as the concepts of reassurance and deterrence (which are so key to major power behaviour) do not entirely explain how small states use MNEs. Small states are less likely to pursue reassurance measures, as for instance they do not shepherd weaker allies like greater powers have a tendency to do. Neither can they merely outright display military prowess for the purposes of deterrence, since they lack the relative strength to do so. Doing so may even highlight potential weaknesses.

Aims Extant theory regarding military exercises does not satisfactorily explain how the characteristics of Small States and how they cope with their power disparity interacts with the use of MNEs as a political tool. The majority of existing theories such as by Heuser and Wolfley explains the military utility of MNEs, and how major states may leverage their ample power using MNEs. This thesis will attempt to expand the analytical framework for studying military exercises to include elements from Small state theory, in an effort to better understand how Small states use military exercises as a political tool, in order to exercise power and gain influence, and ultimately strive for security. The study of military exercises as a political tool is a burgeoning field, with ample potential for establishing theoretical foundations which one may further understand state actor behaviour.

The goals that the research questions serve are twofold. First is to determine how Small states use military exercises. What is known is what factors Great states value, but what is unknown is what Small states require. Small states and Great states have different characteristics, and what needs to be determined is what mechanisms and effects are specific to the desires of Small states in how they use military exercises. The second aim is the how theory can be adapted to include factors involving Small states, and what insights from the empirical exploration can be garnered. They are therefore formulated as research questions thus:

6

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Research questions What are the motivations of Small States to engage in multi-national military exercises?

How can an analytical framework of military exercises be adapted to include Small States?

Contribution The thesis will depart from extant theoretical concepts and will seek to develop them further in order to better grasp the concept of multinational military exercises in a fuller view. Extant theory describes how major states leverage power, what this investigation seeks to determine is how Small states can use military exercises to offset their power disparity. In this way, the thesis contributes to the field by shedding onto a hitherto neglected and largely unexplored area of international relations and Small state behaviour.

In sum, the main objective of this investigation is to develop theoretical concepts of military exercises. In order to explore these theoretical concepts, the case of Sweden and its multi- national military exercises in the time period 2015-2019 will be studied.

Disposition This thesis will first review the existing theoretical concepts of military exercises and Small state theory. Then a revised analytical framework will be developed based on these sets of theories. The research design and methods will be discussed along with ontological and empirical limitations, followed by the case study. Ultimately the case study’s results will be analysed, followed by conclusions and recommendations for further study.

7

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Literature review In his commentary on the Peloponnesian war Thucydides claimed “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”6 What was true two and a half millennia ago in ancient Greek city states may not be as applicable in modern international relations. Thucydides did not ascribe much agency to the weak, being subservient to their more powerful masters. However, the weak are not necessarily entirely without agency. As Hey states, Small states “enjoy more international prestige and visibility than at any other time in history”.7

Military exercise theory Military exercises are a rather understudied area, even though they have had, and continue to have in an increasing severity, a vast impact on history.8 The history of wargames and the development of military exercises have been explored by authors such as Van Creveld9 and Öberg.10 Despite this empirical impetus, only a few attempts have been made at fashioning an applicable theoretical framework, which is sorely lacking in order to understand state behaviour and the subtleties therein, particularly when it comes to MNEs. With the aforementioned significant increase, the number of military exercises and their renewed empirical significance of late, there have been some attempts to contribute to this nascent field in recent years, such as by Heuser et al., Wolfley, Frazier and Hutto.11 Heuser et al. attempts to outline the factors involved and which effects military exercises may have, however it mainly concerns the development of NATO exercises during and following the Cold War.12 In the same vein, and in a more theoretically extensive manner, Wolfley attempts to explain the increase of exercises since the end of the Cold War, with particular emphasis on major state’s exercises with non- allies.13

6 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War (Floyd: Wilder Publications, 2015), p. 226. 7 Wivel et al in Clive Archer, Alyson J.K. Bailes & Anders Wivel, Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond (Hoboken: Routledge, 2014), p. 6. 8 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact, 1. 9 Martin Van Creveld, Wargames, From Gladiators to Gigabytes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 10 Öberg, ‘Exercising War’, 141–43. 11 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact; Wolfley, ‘Military Statecraft and the Use of Multinational Exercises in World Politics’; Frazier and Hutto, ‘The Socialization of Military Power’. 12 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact, 4–8. 13 Wolfley, ‘Military Statecraft and the Use of Multinational Exercises in World Politics’, 1–3. 8

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

In order to create any form of analytically useful theory, we first need to determine the relevant factors and effects that military exercises have. The first dimension is what Heuser refers to as the “tactical-technical” or operational dimension, which amounts to the pure military utility of military exercises.14 At the very core, it concerns the “training of staff and forces”, “preservation of old, and generation of new skills and competences”.15 In addition, Heuser identifies that exercises provide the opportunity for experimentation and development of operational plans.16 Wolfley shares the same assumptions on the traditional military utility under the heading of rehearsal, wherein exercises are used to increase military effectiveness and preparedness for potential missions.17 As for the multi-national aspect of this, the shared experience of the exercises allows participants to familiarise each other with other’s tactics, techniques and procedures.18 After all, one of the main goals of international exercises is to promote interoperability and reach international standards.19

Frazier and Hutto further develops this learning experience with how shared experiences during exercises can affect doctrine development, as a form of socialization and forming an “in- group”.20 Borrowing from both realist and constructivism, they claim that the shared experience helps to change the identity of the organisations involved. The military-to-military interaction helps form doctrinal development and increase interoperability at a tactical and operational level.21 From a Small state perspective, increasing interoperability will lead to increased ability to function with other states in event of a conflict, thus increasing potential military capacity.

Frazier and Hutto recognises there are motivations in exercises to maximise status and prestige and social influence, and how the own perceptions of threats and plights can be accepted by others.22 This may particularly be seen as beneficial by Small States, as they may want to bring attention to their own strategic situation and increase deterrence via increased efforts by partner states to address perceived threats.

14 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact, 9. 15 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, 10–12. 16 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, 15. 17 Wolfley, ‘Military Statecraft and the Use of Multinational Exercises in World Politics’, 4. 18 Frazier and Hutto, ‘The Socialization of Military Power’, 382. 19 Erik Hedlund, ‘Team Learning and Leadership in Multinational Military Staff Exercises’, Armed Forces & Society 43, no. 3 (July 2017): 459. 20 Frazier and Hutto, ‘The Socialization of Military Power’, 382. 21 Frazier and Hutto, 387. 22 Frazier and Hutto, 385. 9

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

As famously stated by Clausewitz, ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means.’23 While war may be the final argument of kings, military exercises, while not being actual warfare, similarly have definite political dimension, and one that is even less theoretically explored. Yet it might be the most impactful from an International Relations perspective.

The Political-strategic dimension is the political level beyond that of the purely military utility. Heuser outlines a number of effects and uses that military exercise may have. First is the aspect of reassuring allies and the own population, wherein exercise is used to signal continued commitment with an ally and even the own population, thus leading to a sense of greater security.24

Second is the use of exercises as a tool of military diplomacy, wherein MNE are used as a show of trust and friendship. In a manner slightly different from that of reassurance, exercises are used to display either continued or renewed commitment, strategic focus or even disapproval with policy by cancelling standing exercises.25

Third is the aspect of deterrence. As large military exercises display military capability and intentions for military cooperation, it may serve to dissuade rival states from committing to an aggressive posture or outright attacking. Large-scale exercises are some of the most overt uses of military force just short of actual warfare, especially considering if exercises are held in an aggressive manner such as exercising in close proximity to the rival or in a sensitive area where conflict may be anticipated. However, deterrence is not assured, as it may even cause an escalation of conflict due to increased tensions.26 Instances such as snap-exercises in response to exercises both show the risk of confrontation, as well as the deterring or intimidating effect of major exercises.27 One should note the importance of observers (such as mandated by the OSCE and the Vienna Document), which serve to both increase transparency and lessening risks for exercises being seen as preparations for hostile acts.28 As a brief aside, Russia withdrew from the Vienna Document in 2016.29 There is a risk of what that information might

23 Carl von Clausewitz et al., On War, Oxford World’s Classics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 28. 24 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact, 16–18. 25 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, 20. 26 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, 21. 27 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, 22–23. 28 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, 361. 29 Olivier Schmitt, ‘The Vienna Document and the Russian Challenge to the European Security Architecture’, in Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact, Forum Papers, no. 26 (NATO Defence College, 2018), 269. 10

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

lead to, exercises are usually held in areas of concern or “where you expect to fight”.30 Exercises have a certain “body language” that one must be cognisant of when planning exercises.31

The final aspect that Heuser outlines is that exercises being used for or “maskirovka”32 offensive preparation purposes.33 This aspect is not expected to be as useful for Small states, or at least defensively oriented ones. This aspect has historically been seen to be used by the Soviet Union and Russia where exercises are held prior to commencement of hostilities.

Figure 1 Military and political effects according to Heuser34

Exercise Effect Type Training of Staff and forces Tactical-technical Preservation of old and acquiring of new skills Tactical-technical Experimentation Tactical-technical Reassurance Political-Strategic Defence reform and standardisation Political-Strategic Military diplomacy Political-Strategic Deterrence Political-Strategic Preparation of wartime operations Political-Strategic

Heuser’s overview of exercises is not explicitly about MNEs but attempts to be an overview of the effects that military exercise can have in general. The list is by no means exhaustive, yet it has the focus on how a major state can leverage its military might in times of peace.

Wolfley furthers the military exercise theory by expanding on the way exercises are used by states, rather their mere history, military utility, and political effects. The categories Wolfley uses is Recruitment, Capacity-building, Role-forming and Trust-developing.35 These are labelled “shaping” exercises, in that their use is to shape the relationship between militaries (and in extension states), alter characteristics or reduce strategic uncertainty.36

30 Duncan Depledge, ‘Train Where You Expect to Fight: Why Military Exercises Have Increased in the High North’, Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 3, no. 1 (16 December 2020): 289–90. 31 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact, 356. 32 Famous Russian term for military deception. 33 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact, 24. 34 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, 9. 35 Wolfley, ‘Military Statecraft and the Use of Multinational Exercises in World Politics’, 5. 36 Wolfley, 6. 11

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Figure 2 Military and Political effect according to Wolfley37

Exercise Use of Goal of Exercise Mechanism of Influence / Uncertainty Type Military Reduction Power Rehearsal Traditional Increase effectiveness to Increase and/ or test multinational military accomplish missions with effectiveness partners Deterrence Traditional Prevent undesirable Signal to adversary that cost of invasion behaviour from rivals outweighs benefit Recruitment Shaping Attract and prepare partners Convince partner’s government official, for alliance membership or military, or public that the partnership is multilateral mission beneficial. Reduces uncertainty of partner assistance Capacity- Shaping Delegate mission to other Strengthens partner to provide own security Building states to combat non-state or participate in regional missions. Reduce actors uncertainty of threat emergence. Role- Shaping Change practices or values Influence character of partner military to Forming of other militaries fulfil particular role and develop certain practices Trust- Shaping Prevention escalation or war Change perceptions from hostile to friendly Developing with rivals to prevent escalation of hostilities. Reduce uncertainty of threat emergence

The core of Wolfley’s argument is that major states use military exercises as part of military statecraft, in response to strategic uncertainty following the Cold War.38 Ergo, the increase of military exercises with allies and non-allies alike is a result of a strategic upheaval. Initiatives such as the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), and exercises between India and China as Wolfley argues aid de-escalation and reduction of hostility, as well as fostering future alliances.39 Wolfey focuses on the strategic uncertainty of major states following the Cold War, and the great reshaping of the world system following the fall of the Soviet Union.

Wolfley identifies the upgoing trend of traditional and shaping exercises following 2014, as well as the potential use of exercises in a more “soft power” manner such as the NATO PfP and Russian attempts at using exercise in an authoritarian manner.40 Further, Wolfley anticipates that the use of exercises will continue to grow, together with growing necessity to understand them.

Nevertheless, Wolfley focuses on major states, one would assume this corresponds to Keohane’s Great or middle powers, or Edström et al.’s first or second tier states. However, the

37 Wolfley, 5. 38 Wolfley, 34. 39 Wolfley, 8–9. 40 Wolfley, 17–20. 12

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

question is how exercises can be used by third tier states. The concept of shaping exercises is certainly useful for analysing the use of exercises by major powers, however smaller states may not be able to wield such power as to shape relationships to such a degree. They may however, attempt to use exercises in a similar shaping manner, albeit in a more limited sense, and perhaps with different motivations and purposes. Furthermore, one may consider the possibility that smaller states may value shaping more than traditional military exercises, as it offers the opportunity to improve relationships with more powerful states, thereby furthering their own security agenda.

What is not clear however, is how the extant theories on military exercises explain the behaviour of Small states. Actions such as reassuring allies, delegating responsibilities and attracting states in order to shore up support against a rival certainly has a tinge of great state politics. They all imply a vast amount of capability and power to leverage, as well as ability to shape the global system. Small states lack the luxury of such options. Thus, Small states have to use strategies to leverage the power they have to offset the capability deficiency. This lack of power is underdeveloped when it comes to theory on military exercises. Moreover, it does not indicate how non-aligned states may act in order concert with alliances and multi-lateral military cooperation. Therefore, it becomes necessary to develop these concepts further to include these factors, for without which the fullness of Small states behaviour cannot be fully understood.

13

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Small state theory In order to explore the relationship between smaller states and military exercises, some matter of attention is needed on the theory behind small states, their options and strategies. Military exercises and cooperation are part of a greater security strategy and does not exist in a political void. While military exercise theory may be in its infancy, Small State theory has a long history of research. The study of small states is not merely the study of the weak compared to the great or strong, but have a different character as compared to their greater counterparts, they have their own capabilities, opportunities, and challenges, and allows us to understand their limitations.41

In order to discuss these aspects, a definition of a small state is first needed. There are a number of different approaches attempting to delineate what constitutes a small state. The first is that of mere quantity being the delineating factor. Either a value such as GDP or population, which generally indicates the capabilities and power of the particular state, in accordance with realist perceptions of power.42 Inherently this approach comes with some arbitrary quantitative demarcation on what constitutes smallness.43 The small states are thus the “residual category” wherein states are classified as small by the virtue of lacking the quantitative characteristics of being great. This view of smallness comes with certain shortcomings, such as focusing on the traditional military aspects of security, rather than the complex contributions to security that exists, such latent power as described by Mearsheimer.44 The focus on the weakest aspects of small states lead to the challenges and opportunities being obscured, and easily devolves into to a mere ranking of states without particular regard to their strengths and different character.

Attempts to further delve into the character of Small states in a more comprehensive manner have been attempted by several scholars. Rothstein attempted to include the psychological aspects of a Small state, in order to further explain their character.45 Deriving some concepts from discourse-theory, the self-perception of a Small state is important to its definition.46 Central to Rothstein’s definition of a Small state is that it cannot provide for its own security

41 Wivel et al in Archer, Bailes, and Wivel, Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond, 7. 42 Wivel et al in Archer, Bailes, and Wivel, 7. 43 Håkan Edström, Dennis Gyllensporre, and Jacob Westberg, Military Strategy of Small States: Responding to External Shocks of the 21st Century, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2018), 10, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351054348. 44 Wivel et al in Archer, Bailes, and Wivel, Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond, 7. 45 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 29. 46 Rickli 309 14

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

on its own without relying on other states, institutions or processes, and in addition, this lack of capability needs to be recognized by other states.47. This definition is very useful indeed, as it exemplifies the impetus of a Small State to seek security with others, or employ strategies to avoid aggression.

Keohane followed with a more exhaustive definition, labelling four discrete categories. The first is that of the system-determining Great states, which at the time was exclusively the United States, Russia and China.48 Further are the secondary states, such as the United Kingdom and France that still exercise significant power to the system, but do not reach the heights of power to define the system by their actions alone. The third category is that of the Middle powers, which are able unable to act alone, but managed to exercise power through international institutions. The fourth once again is a category of exclusion, the states that are powerless or insignificant enough as not to be able to influence alone or even a small group i.e., “System- ineffectual” states.49

Another group of scholars such as Wivel argue for a more relational view, stating that the definition of a Small state is the “weaker one in an asymmetric relationship”.50 Here a state’s Smallness is relative to a “specific spatio-temporal context”. A state can be less significant in a greater context such as in a large defensive alliance such as NATO, but may exercise substantial impact in another context in which they wield greater relative power and influence than other states in that particular context.. The use of power in this view is the ability to preserve autonomy of the own state and exercise influence on others, with influence being the ability to affect the behaviour of other states.51

Edström, Gyllensporre and Westberg argue for a synthesis between Rothstein and Keohane, with the addition some of Wivel et al.’s relativism, with the added particular emphasis on the military capabilities. First-rate states are the only ones able to provide for their own security, defend itself against all tiers of states, and able to lead and organize major multi-national

47 Živilė Marija Vaicekauskaitė, ‘Security Strategies of Small States in a Changing World’, Journal on Baltic Security 3, no. 2 (1 December 2017): 9. 48 Robert O Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics’, International Organization 23, No.2, no. Spring (Spring 1969): 293–96. 49 Keohane, 295–96. 50 Wivel et al in Archer, Bailes, and Wivel, Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond, 9. 51 Jean-Marc Rickli, ‘European Small States’ Military Policies after the Cold War: From Territorial to Niche Strategies’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21, no. 3 (September 2008): 309. 15

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

military operations.52 Second-rate states are those unable to defend themselves alone against first rate states, but can defend itself against other second and lower tiered states, as well as the ability to organise and lead multi-national military operations in concert with other states or institutions.53 Third-rate states are those that do not fulfil the criteria of first or second rate states, and cannot defend themselves against their greater rivals alone, but can defend itself against equal or lesser states. Most relevantly is that third tier states can still significantly contribute to multi-national military operations, which the fourth-rate states cannot. What is important with this distinction is that the third tier of state still is able exercise influence within the system if it chooses to, and may thus contribute to collective security. Furthermore, Small states are now “expected to be security producers as well as security consumers”.54

Ergo, a state’s relevance and ability to influence would be closely tied to its ability to contribute to multi-national military operations, without which it would markedly be less relevant to potential partners. If military exercises are a form of simulated multi-national operations, being able host and contribute exercises could conceivably be a form of exercising influence and power. Edström et al argue that all the Nordic nations, with the exception of Iceland) belong to the third category of states, along with the great plurality of states at large.55 For the purposes of this study, this is the definition to be applied.

For the purposes of this investigation, the four tiers will be divided into two phrases. The two top tiers, the Great or middle states will be referred to as “Great states”, while the third and fourth tiers are “Small states”. This theoretical divide does not particularly change the definition of what a Small state is, but exists for the sake of simplicity. The nuances of where a Great and a Small state lies on the spectrum is not significantly impactful for determining whether the analytical framework is practicable.

52 Edström, Gyllensporre, and Westberg, Military Strategy of Small States, 12. 53 Edström, Gyllensporre, and Westberg, 12. 54 Mariager and Wivel in Anne-Marie Brady and Baldur Thorhallsson, eds., Small States and the New Security Environment, vol. 7, The World of Small States (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021), 115, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51529-4. 55 Edström, Gyllensporre, and Westberg, Military Strategy of Small States, 12. 16

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Figure 3 Great and Small state concepts

Edström et al. Keohane Small state analytical framework First Great Great Second Middle Third Small Small Fourth System ineffectual

Small states strategies Recent scholarship on the strategies of Small states outlines different mechanisms that can be employed in order to overcome their challenges and arrange for their own security. Rickli argues that all the strategies essentially are a trade-off between autonomy and influence for the purpose of maintaining security.56 The Small state, having limited capabilities, must choose these strategies to offset its shortcomings.

In terms of balancing, the Smaller state may choose to attempt to align itself in the regional or global system as to encourage an equilibrium between greater states, similar to the balance of power theory.57 However, as Rothstein notes, greater powers may sacrifice the integrity of smaller states for their own purposes, further illustrating the loss of autonomy for perceived security.58 Balancing behaviour is more likely when there is a rising power in the system that upsets the previous balance of power.59 States may “chain-gang” by joining a larger alliance and attempt to increase collective security, or “pass the buck” essentially attempting to free- ride within the embrace of the larger alliance. In addition, a Small state may choose to engage in “courting” behaviour, in which it attempts to engage with other states via informal cooperation in order to lay the foundations for future alliances.60

States may however also attempt offensive band-wagoning as described by Schweller wherein the smaller state may seek profitable relationships with greater power. Bandwagoning, according the Edström et al. provides the possibility of the smaller state ingratiating itself with

56 Rickli, ‘European Small States’ Military Policies after the Cold War’, 309–10. 57 Edström, Gyllensporre, and Westberg, Military Strategy of Small States, 34–35. 58 Edström, Gyllensporre, and Westberg, 35. 59 Edström, Gyllensporre, and Westberg, 35. 60 Edström, Gyllensporre, and Westberg, 34. 17

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

others and increasing its influence.61 Bandwagoning is more likely to occur when the state is 62 threatened, as well as when mutual benefits can be had. Isolation, or remaining neutral is the approach that grants the most autonomy or sovereignty, essentially reducing the security provided to either camouflage i.e. passive “hiding” or active distancing, however this is less likely in an interdependent world.63 States may also engage in Hedging strategies are a form of risk management, wherein a state uses partial, or modified versions of the strategies as described above, particularly when they involve multi possible partners.64

Implications for MNEs and small states The main point that can be gleaned from the discussion on theories of MNEs and Small states is that Small states have to solve their power disparity through different means with other states. Military exercise theory describes that MNEs are one such mechanism towards increased security. However, current analytical tools such as those by Heuser and Wolfley are not oriented towards the behaviour of Small states. Small states do not share the behaviour of Great powers, wielding their might and influence through military diplomacy. Hence, there is a need to include the aspects that Small States desire in an analytical framework in order to better explain their behaviour. There are existing theoretical elements of existing military exercise theory as seen in the previous discussion that may be suitable to add to such a framework such as increasing interoperability, socialisation between military organisations, stive towards prestige, and using MNEs to shape relationships. Factors may be similar, yet Small States would certainly value them differently.

61 Edström, Gyllensporre, and Westberg, 36. 62 Vaicekauskaitė, ‘Security Strategies of Small States in a Changing World’, 11. 63 Rickli, ‘European Small States’ Military Policies after the Cold War’, 310. 64 Vaicekauskaitė, 12. 18

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Analytical framework

Aspirations In an effort to bridge the gap between extant military exercise theory with that of Small State theory, certain assumptions are required to be made clear. First is that Small states are fundamentally different from that of the great or middle states. Second is that major states use MNEs to leverage military power to influence other states and rivals. One could conceive of a Small states’ motivations to participate and host exercises may be significantly different, even though they may participate in the same set of exercises as the great powers.

Smaller states have a much lower threshold for military threats, compared to great states and middle states65 As stated by Edström et al. the “strategic shocks” suffered by the Nordic counties have both been non-state actors (the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the growth of the Islamic state), as well as major military threat from Russia following aggression toward Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014.66 Thus, one anticipates that Small states have a higher priority on ascertaining security quickly when under direct or indirect threat from a higher tiered power. Thereby, Small states have to mitigate the their capability gap by employing strategies. Beyond providing security, there is the aspect of the Small state attempting to exert influence to the greatest degree possible. One can anticipate that the Small state would engage in shaping exercises to a greater degree in order to alter relationship with partners and potential allies, as well as influencing how other states perceive it and its military capabilities.

Ontological Assumptions Every theoretical endeavour requires a series of assumptions. The first is based on realist assumptions of state behaviour, quite simply that states are rational actors, who strive to gain power and influence to assure their own security. Heier states that military exercises and deterrence, based on the case of Norway, mirror realist conceptions of uncertainty.67 While a simplistic definition, is it useful since Small State strategies are concerned with offsetting their power disparity, and the aim of this thesis is to determine how Small states use military

65 Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics 30, no. no.2 (January 1978): 172– 73. 66 Edström, Gyllensporre, and Westberg, Military Strategy of Small States, 1. 67 Heier in Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact, 176– 79. 19

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

exercises as a tool in this process. Wivel et al. describe the importance of interest and identity, and that may certainly be a relevant factor in who one chooses to exercise with.68.

This study will utilize Edström et al.’s definition of a Small State, which as mentioned earlier is largely based on Keohane’s concept of Great, Middle and Small states. One fundamental assumption is that being able to effectively contribute to multi-national operations and hence being a security producer is a top priority of any Small state wishing to expand its influence. One should not expect a different definition of a Small state will yield significantly different results. A constructivist or identity-driven approach may look into how a state perceives itself and the impact of identity, yet the military capabilities, the willingness to improve them and the desire to attain safety will be the same.

In sum, central to the argument of this investigation is the assumption Small States value certain aspects of MNEs differently from that of higher tier states. The disparity of power causes states to use other methods than Greater States employ. Military exercises have been discussed as to be a tool to leverage power. Ergo, Small states will use military exercises differently from that of Greater states. What follows below is thus the fruits of the synthesis of the two sets of theories.

From Great to Small In order to include these aspects into an analytical framework for understanding military exercises from the perspective of the Small state, a certain measure of attention is needed as to how effects of exercises are used differently, as well as already explained mechanisms can be valued differently from that of major states. What follows is an amalgamation of extant theory by Heuser, Wolfley, and other authors on military exercise theory, with the addition of Small state specific aspects. This matrix does not necessarily exclude their parameters, but focuses on what is Small state specific. Other parameters may still be relevant, but deemed to be less relevant to Small states. For example, using exercises to masquerade preparations for offensive operations is less likely to be high on the list of priorities for a Small state. The list of effects is by no means comprehensive, however attempting to offer a holistic framework at this juncture would be contrary to the scope of the enquiry.

68 Anders Wivel, ‘The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests, Identity and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor*’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 43, no. 2 (June 2005): 393–412. 20

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Figure 4 Analytical Framework for Military and Political effects for Small States

Exercise Use of Goal of Exercise Mechanism of Source in Example of Type Military Influence theory associated terms Power Desired by the Small state Rehearsal Traditional Increase Increase and/ or test Heuser, Capability, exercising effectiveness to multinational Wolfley, units. accomplish military Depledge missions with effectiveness partners Innovation & Traditional Test new systems Practice new Heuser, Acquiring skills or generation of new and procedures capabilities and Wolfley, abilities, expanding competencies technologies not Frazier & capabilities, learning available to the Hutto from others. Small state. Ability to exercise in a greater context. Deterrence & Traditional Prevent undesirable Signal to adversary Heuser, Thresholds, sending Signalling behaviour from that cost of invasion Wolfley signals, collective rivals outweighs benefit. security. Shows rivals potential alliances in action. Interoperability Shaping Increase Increases ability to Depledge, Interoperability, interoperability give and receive Frazier & working with others. military aid. Hutto, Møller, Hedlund Relevance& Shaping Increases reputation Convince partner’s Frazier & Showing / displaying Prestige of own state government official, Hutto, capabilities, military among military, or public Jakobsen et emphasising other military that the partnership al., Wood geography or utility of organisations. is beneficial. the own military Attract and prepare organisation for partners for alliance others. membership or bi/multilateral cooperation

Rehearsal Rehearsal is the pure military utility of military exercises as outlined by Heuser in the “tactical- technical” dimension and by Wolfey in the “traditional” category, wherein tactics, techniques and procedures are exercised and the desired effect is to increase effectiveness.69 This is perhaps the effect the least dissimilar between that Small states and Great Powers as it is not inherently linked to power disparity. However, it may still be a fruitful area of study, especially if one considers the assumption that exercises are training where you expect to fight.70 This may be

69 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact, 13; Wolfley, ‘Military Statecraft and the Use of Multinational Exercises in World Politics’, 5. 70 Depledge, ‘Train Where You Expect to Fight’, 297. 21

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

particularly attractive to Small states as they cannot organise as large-scale operations in their area on their own, as well as exploring what potential real-world scenarios may look like.

Thus, for example a non-aligned states exercise behaviour may indicate preferred partners, areas of concern, as well as levels of active participation in organisations such as NATO joint response forces. Invitation to participate or hosting certain events may indicate policy shifts as it may illuminate what the state is willing to cooperate within. For example, in the Swedish case, willingness to invite foreign militaries to participate in national defence drills was previously prohibited, but now is a prime exercise scenario.

Innovation and generation of new competencies Heuser explains how MNEs are used to develop one’s military in concert with others, with preservation of old skills and generation of new competencies.71 Larger-scale exercises and exchange of skills may be especially attractive to the military organisations of smaller states due to potentially the vastly increased scale of exercises than what is possible domestically. Larger-scale exercises offer the possibility of simulating larger scenarios than domestically possible, leading to new skills that would be difficult to acquire otherwise. In addition, it offers the possibility of developing new tactics, techniques and procedures and shared doctrine development (as described the Frazier & Hutto), along with gaining knowledge of systems and capability that the own state lacks or wishes to acquire. This is perhaps one of the strongest contributions to military utility from MNEs, as it allows interplay between organisations with different skills or technologies.

Deterrence & signalling Considering that one of the prime priorities of Small states is to maintain and increase deterrence, effective deterrence via MNEs would surely be attractive. For a non-aligned Small state in particular, participation in major exercises allows for a demonstration of cooperation with potential allies, without taking the measure of joining alliance. Hence, exercises may show what could be if alliances develop further or cooperation increases, or deterring rivals from furthering such cooperation.

71 Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact, 14–15. 22

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Interoperability While the military utility may be very similar to greater states, the impetus to be interoperable is conceivably pointedly higher. Interoperability can be defined as “The ability of military forces of two or more nations to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks.”72 Hedlund pointed out that interoperability was one of the main aspects of MNE.73 However, it is noticeably absent in the major state framework of Wolfley and Heuser. The military utility and socialisation aspects of interoperability as outlined by Frazier and Hutto show the avenues of organisational intermingling and social power than can be gained and leveraged within the arena of military exercises.

Considering that increased interoperability leads to greater security due to ability to receive and provide military aid, a Small state is more likely to pursue interoperability as a goal than a greater power due to its power disparity. Hence, interoperability may be seen by the Small state as a prerequisite for effective military aid in times of crisis, as well as laying the foundations for more fruitful interactions in peace-time. A lack of interoperability, whilst not a complete barrier to military cooperation, is a significant obstacle to meaningful exchange between organisations. This is exemplified by the great premium some states put on increasing interoperability, even if officially non-aligned, as in the case of Sweden.74

Relevance and Prestige: Keeping in mind the weight of effort and importance placed on larger MNEs, being a major part of the exercise may both indicate relevance, as in being a relevant or useful partner, as well as being prestigious. Prestige is not a matter of vanity, but a measure of influence. Prestige- seeking behaviour in regards to participating in military operations can be seen by smaller states, as an attempt to gain favour of the greater states.75 A simplistic definition of prestige is a “recognition of importance” according to Wood.76 Prestige thus serves as a measurement of

72 Joakim Erma Møller, ‘Trilateral Defence Cooperation in the North: An Assessment of Interoperability between Norway, Sweden and Finland’, Defence Studies 19, no. 3 (3 July 2019): 240. 73 Hedlund, ‘Team Learning and Leadership in Multinational Military Staff Exercises’, 459. 74 Hedlund, 459–60. 75 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Jens Ringsmose, and Håkon Lunde Saxi, ‘Prestige-Seeking Small States: Danish and Norwegian Military Contributions to US-Led Operations’, European Journal of International Security 3, no. 2 (June 2018): 257–58. 76 Steve Wood, ‘Prestige in World Politics: History, Theory, Expression’, International Politics 50, no. 3 (May 2013): 388. 23

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

social power.77 Small states have to address their power disparity, and increasing prestige and relevance is thus an ability to gain and leverage social power.

As observed in Small state theory, contributing to military operations is key to being seen as a good and worthy ally. Thus, increasing participation in MNEs may increase relevance and international standing among military organisations and decision-makers, hence being an avenue to gain influence, as observed by Frazier and Hutto.78

Larger contributions to important exercises may also lead to a greater input on what is exercised. In addition, hosting major exercises that other states find useful may further increase such prestige. This is connected to the “courting” behaviour as seen in Small State theory, wherein one increases attractiveness to potential partners. Edström et al.’s defining characteristic of a third-rate state is the ability to contribute to multinational operations, thereby being an active and contributing participant. Ergo, being able to display effective military capability is both ingratiating to other states as well as proving one’s worth and military reliability.

Implementation of the framework The themes identified above will serve as the coding for the thematic review to follow. The themes are demonstrably anchored in both extant theory on Military exercises, as well as Small State Theory. While perhaps not exhaustive, they are deemed sufficient for the purposes of this investigation. Should these themes be identified in the material, they may integrate into our understanding of how Small States use military exercises to their benefit.

77 Wood, 389. 78 Frazier and Hutto, ‘The Socialization of Military Power’, 384–86. 24

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Research design and method

Single case study thematic analysis The investigation took the form of a single-case study, which was analysed by means of a thematic analysis. A large-N quantitative content analysis based on untested vague terms may prove to be misleading. Thus, to explore the applicability of the coding terms, a qualitative thematic analysis was chosen instead. Further, a quantitative analysis would better suit when reviewing a larger data set, such as comparing multiple different Small states. When addressing a single-case study, a qualitative analysis better suits the subject matter as it may better detect the nuances of such a focused investigation rather than enumerating instances of themes. The depth allows better evaluating indeterminate factors, rather than attempting to compare unknown factors.79

Case selection The case in question is that of Sweden in the time period 2015-2019. Its position in northern Europe was seen as strategically important during the Cold War, and remains so today.80 As opposed to its other Nordic and Baltic neighbours, Sweden and Finland did not join NATO, and remains outside the alliance, but have close security policy relationships and bilateral agreements.81 The time limitation is based on the 2014 – 2015 changes in exercise behaviour 82 and scope following increased Russian aggression in Europe.

The case of Sweden is thus a case of a non-aligned state, yet has chosen to deepen its relationship of late. This process is both interesting from an empirical point of view, as well as a theoretical since it offers the ability to investigate Small state behaviour unburdened by the element of the Small state being subject to the processes and intricacies of an organised alliance such as NATO. Choosing an aligned state would perhaps yield similar results, but with a different set of priorities. A state already in a formal alliance has the benefit of already having certain guarantees for its safety, however it may still want to highlight its own security challenges to the alliance as a group. Furthermore, states in the alliance as subject to the

79 Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, Qualitative Inquiry 12, no. 2 (April 2006): 228. 80 Archer in Archer, Bailes, and Wivel, Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond, 107–9. 81 Archer in Archer, Bailes, and Wivel, 95–96. 82 ‘Prop. 2015/16:122 Deltagande Med Väpnad Styrka i Utbildning Utomlands.’ (Swedish Government, 3 March 2016), 8. 25

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

overarching exercise schedule and focus of the alliance. The Swedish situation may be a sui generis case, however the insight into military exercises if seen in a greater context and the investigation therein may offer some generalisability for the analytical framework.

Material used & samples The material used in this enquiry was largely based on statements by the Swedish Armed Forces in press releases. These contained information on the exercises, declared goals, and often interviews with relevant personnel such as exercise leaders or commanding officers. In addition, the annual reports by the Swedish Armed Forces were used, since they feature a review of that year's exercises.

The material was gathered via finding relevant exercises in annual reports. Exercises are selected on the basis on importance and size of exercise, availability of materials. Then press releases concerning the exercises were then identified and gathered.

Though the sample is in principle small, it does serve to illustrate the effects desired by Small states as outlined in the analytical framework.

Thematic analysis A thematic analysis is chosen for its flexibility and its advantages of understanding raw textual data.83 Since the focus of the investigation is on developing theoretic underpinnings of MNEs, a deductive thematic analysis will be used that departs its themes from theory. The advantages of a thematic analysis are the flexibility offered to explore whether terms are applicable to the subject matter. Since this investigation is attempting to contribute to a nascent field, a comprehensive analytical framework does not yet exist. Thus, the purpose of the method is to identify what is relevant to study, and explore assumptions based on theory. Thematic analyses are useful for finding topic involved.84 The themes are based on the theoretical assumptions of the needs and wants of Small States, but has not yet been tempered by rigorous empirical study.

Study execution The study was conducted via a qualitative thematic analysis of official statements and documents pertaining to a series of MNEs. The statements were analysed against the themes

83 Ken Benoit in Luigi Curini and Robert Franzese, The SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations (London: SAGE Publications, 2020), 470, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781526486387. 84 Ken Benoit in Curini and Franzese, 468. 26

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

based on the analytical framework to identify the terms and themes of the exercises. These extracts were then coded and aggregated, by doing so, a general trend could be discerned, from which then conclusions were made.

While the true motivations or aspirations may not be entirely transparent, the stated goals of the exercises, desired capabilities, where the exercise is held, who participates and with how much troops and materiel is used should provide a glimpse into how these statements represent intended effects and how they relate to the themes in the analytical framework.

One should be cognizant of the fact that the documents themselves are designed to provide a certain message and justification of the exercises. This is not necessarily an issue in uncovering motivations or aspirations. This investigation will not be a discourse analysis, but a thematic analysis, so the impact and use of language itself is not a chief concern. Nevertheless, the use of MNEs as a policy tool should be possible to adequately ascertain through how states reason about their use and how exercises are employed and justified as part of a greater strategy.

Empirical limitations This investigation will largely be concerned with conventional MNEs. As such, it will not study other domains such non-military cooperation and other domains such as cyberwarfare or security.

This essay will focus on what the desired effects states attempt to achieve through the means of MNEs. It will not attempt to discern causality of the exercises themselves. While certainly interesting, determining causality would require a different approach and likely a much- expanded data set. Causal linkages of military exercises such as impact on deterrence, increased cohesion of alliances and other desired outcomes will not be explored in this investigation.

27

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Case study, Swedish major exercises 2015-2019 Sweden has historically maintained an official position of being militarily non-aligned, but recently has taken significant steps to be more integrated into other states militarily, particularly in cooperation with other Nordic states as well as NATO. There has been massive increase in troop participation in NATO exercises, with much more frequent and extensive exercises with Finland and others for the purpose of national and collective defence, something that was up until recently prohibited. Prior to 2015, international exercises had to be restricted to peace- keeping missions.85

Exercises studied The exercises used in this investigation are selected on the merit of being the major exercises that Sweden has hosted or participated in. The sheer number of exercises Sweden participated in, multi-national otherwise, prohibits a comprehensive analysis of all of them, which leads to only a few that can be studied.86 The selection is due to a number of reasons. First, major exercises are likely the most politically impactful, due to the weight of effort involved by participant states and organisation. The assumption is that the larger the exercise, the greater the effect granted, such as military utility, deterrence and prestige. One should note that there is a plurality of smaller exercises conducted throughout the years, with the high-degree of bi- and multilateral exercises among the Nordic countries. Smaller exercises such as the commonplace Air Force’s Cross-Border Training are certainly impactful, especially when it comes to interoperability, but will not be studied extensively. One should note that these smaller exercises and day-to-day cooperation usually culminate in the larger ones studied. Several of the exercises are recurring annually, some every few years. Due to the inherently impactful and political nature of major exercises, they usually involve a substantial number of press-releases in order both to increase transparency as well as being a vehicle for the signalling aspect itself. The exercises themselves are a wide range of national and NATO exercises, as well as covering all of the military branches (Army, Navy, Air Force).

85 ‘Prop. 2015/16:122’. 86 Over 30 significant exercises in 2016, over 40 in 2017, over 50 in 2018 (according to annual reports of the Swedish Armed Forces) 28

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Figure 5 Exercises studied

Exercise Year Partners (major contributors) Aurora 17 2017 Finland, USA, Germany, France. Trident Juncture 18 (TRJE 18) 2018 NATO, Finland Cold Response 2016 Norway, Finland, NATO Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 USA, Finland, NATO Northern Coast (NoCo) 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 Rotating host, NATO, Finland Arctic Challenge (ACE) 2017, 2019 Finland, Norway, UK, Germany, USA

Aurora 17 The culmination of the post-2015 change in Swedish exercise behaviour was the 2017 National Defence exercise “Aurora”. The first of its kind in 23 years (the last one being “Orkan” in 1993), and by far the largest.87 Despite being a national exercise and not explicitly an MNE, it has a significant multi-national component, with the first time US ground troops exercised in a large amount in Sweden, providing armour and mechanised infantry. Among the participants are Finland, the United States, Germany, and France.88 Over 19.000 Swedish troops with over 1000 U.S troops, with significant contributions from Finland. The scenario was a simulated a large attack on Sweden from the east, with particular emphasis on the defence of the strategically important island Gotland in the Baltic Sea.89 Exercise Aurora was due to be repeated in 2020, but was postponed to 2023 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.90

87 Swedish Ministry of Defence, ‘Swedish Armed Forces Exercise Aurora 17 Will Increase Military Capability’ (Government of Sweden, 11 September 2017), https://www.government.se/articles/2017/09/swedish-armed- forces-exercise-aurora-17-will-increase-military-capability/. 88 ‘Utökat Militärt Samarbete Med USA:S Armé’, SVT Nyheter, 19 January 2017, https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/utokat-militart-samarbete-med-usa-s-arme. 89 ‘Aurora 2017: Shedding Light on Swedish Defence Thinking’, Military Balance Blog, IISS (blog), 11 September 2017, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2017/09/aurora-2017-swedish-defence. 90 ‘Aurora 2020 Flyttas Fram’ (Swedish Armed Forces, Swedish Armed Forces), https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2020/04/forsvarsmaktsovning-aurora-20-flyttas-fram/. 29

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Trident Juncture 18 Trident Juncture 18 (TRJE 18) was a major NATO “high-visibility exercise”, held every three years and organised by the NATO Joint Forces Command, Naples. With over 50.000 participants, 250 aircraft, 70 ships and 10.000 vehicles, it was one of the largest exercises held by NATO since the Cold War.91 The exercise was held in Norway, simulating a response to an attack on Norway. The Swedish contingent was around 2.200 persons, with representation of all three branches of the Swedish military. The naval and Air Force contributions also used the exercise prepare for their upcoming participation in the NATO Response Force (NRF).92

Cold Response Cold Response is a recurring major Norwegian exercise, and while it is primarily a NATO exercise, it is open to PfP members if invited by Norway.93 The exercise has been held a number of times previously, and most recently in 2012, 2014 and 2016, all times with significant participation from Sweden. The exercise is mainly for the purpose of providing winter training for NATO troops.

The exercise consisted in 2016 of about 15.000 troops from 14 countries. Sweden contributed with a significant portion of troops (circa 2000), and was placed in command of the third brigade in the exercise, together with Finnish battalion and two companies from the US and Canada, along with providing some airspace for the air portion of the exercise.94 In addition to the Swedish troops, there was significant US involvement of the exercise.95

The exercise has previously been described as a peacekeeping scenario under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.96 However, the focus on merely peacekeeping has been reduced and the exercise is instead focused on traditional warfare capability at a larger scale.97

91 ‘NATO Exercise Trident Juncture 18 Concludes’ (JFC Naples Public Affairs Office, n.d.), https://jfcnaples.nato.int/newsroom/news/2018/nato-exercise-trident-juncture-18-concludes. 92 ‘Jätteövningen Har Börjat’ (Swedish Armed Forces, Oktober 2018), https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2018/10/jatteovningen-har-borjat/. 93 ‘Deltagande Med Väpnad Styrka i Utbildning Utomlands: En Utökad Beslutsbefogenhet För Regeringen: Betänkande’ (Statens Officiella Utredningar, 2015), 58. 94 ‘Svensk Brigadledningsförmåga Prövas under Cold Response’ (Swedish Armed Forces, 12 October 2016). 95 ‘US To Assume Higher Profile in Nordic Exercises’, DefenceNews, accessed 17 May 2021, 27 February 2016. 96 ‘SOU 2015:1’, 58. 97 Jan Majlard, ‘USA-Befäl: Vill Öva På Att Flytta Missiler till Sverige’, Svenska Dagbladet, 7 March 2016, https://www.svd.se/cold-response-vi-forbereder-oss-pa-det-varsta. 30

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

BALTOPS BALTOPS is an annual exercise, hosted by United States Naval Forces Europe. Originally conceived as a freedom of navigation exercise during the Cold War, now it is one of the premier naval NATO PfP exercises in the Baltic Sea.98 The purpose of the exercise is to promote cooperation and interoperability among NATO forces, and to “receiving and integrating” allied forces, which in the 2016 exercise was Sweden and Finland.99 The 2016 exercise involved large amounts of troops with amphibious landings conducted by the multinational task force, landing troops both in Sweden and Poland.100

Northern Coasts Northern Coasts is a recurring German-led naval MNE held since 2007 which rotates its host annually.101 Denmark was the host in 2016, Sweden in 2017, and Finland in 2018. Northern Coasts is one of the major naval exercises in the Baltic Sea, with normally a major Swedish contribution.

Arctic Challenge Arctic Challenge is a recurring Air Force exercise held under the Cross-Border Agreement between Sweden, Norway and Finland, due to be held every two years.102 Due the unique geographical opportunities of such a cooperation, it is one of the largest exercise areas available, and thus offers the possibility of conducting large-scale aerial scenarios. Following a directive from the Swedish government, the aspiration is to be able to produce an exercise advanced enough to be equivalent to the so-called flag-exercises, similar to the highly respected U.S Red Flag exercise held in Nevada.103 Beyond the Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish components, usual invitees are Germany, the United States and United Kingdom among others. 104

98 ‘NATO Allies Will Begin Naval Exercise BALTOPS in the Baltic Sea.’ (SHAPE, NATO, 2016), https://shape.nato.int/2016/nato-allies-begin-naval-exercise-baltops-in-the-baltic-sea. 99 Baltops 2016 enters final phase operations, U.S Naval Forces Europe-Africa / U.S 6th Fleet. 10 June 2016, (accessed 05-05-17) 100 Ocean completes Baltops 2017, Royal Navy 21 June 2016 (accessed 04-05-17) 101 ‘Annual Report, 2016’ (Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, 2016). 102 Jesper Sundström, ‘Arctic Challenge Exercise 19 Är Igång’ (Swedish Armed Forces, 23 May 2019), https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2019/05/arctic-challenge-exercise-2019-ar-igang/. 103 Dag Enander, ‘Så Högt Du Kan Komma - Därför Ger ACE Dubbel Effekt’ (Swedish Armed Forces, 27 July 2017), https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2017/07/sa-hogt-du-kan-komma-darfor-ger-ace-dubbel-effekt/. 104 Jesper Sundström, ‘Multinationell Flygövning Lyfter Mot Högsta Klass’ (Swedish Armed Forces, 10 June 2019), https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2019/06/multinationell-flygovning-lyfter-mot-hogsta-klass/. 31

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Results

Rehearsal The aspect of rehearsal and the increase in capability and effectiveness was a near universal theme in all statements regarding the military exercises studied. Phrases such as increasing capability and various descriptions of overcoming challenges of various military objectives were common. For example, in the Cold Response 2016 exercise, the type of terrain and adverse weather was touted as a unique training opportunity.105 Similarly, descriptions of facing high qualified opposition and the necessity to build capabilities of facing such opposition were described very often.106

This is somewhat unsurprising since it is the very raison d’être of military exercises from the perspective of military organisations in the first place. A recurring phrase in numerous statements and interviews is “enhancing military capabilities” or variants thereof, however purely elevating military capabilities are rarely separated from their political purpose.107

For example, in the statement regarding Trident Juncture 18,

Sweden is contributing to Trident Juncture 18 by providing qualified troops from all Armed Forces combat forces. This exercise will enhance our ability to defend Sweden and our national capabilities, while also strengthening our cooperation with Finland, the US, Norway and NATO.108

One of the recurring aspects of this theme is how military exercises are used to rehearse existing military cooperation such as task forces. For example, during BALTOPS 2019, the two Visby- class corvettes participated in the exercise as part of the NATO British-led quick-reaction force Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)109. Similarly, the Northern Coast exercise in 2019 exercised the Swedish Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG).110 Here exercises are used to reaffirm

105 Jesper Sundström, ‘Svensk Brigadförmåga Provas under Cold Response 2016’, Swedish Armed Forces (blog), n.d., https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2015/10/svensk-brigadformaga-provas-under-cold-response- 2016. 106 See exercise summary Cold Response in the 2016 Annual report p.42, Northern Coast 2019 p.43. 107 Swedish Ministry of Defence, ‘Swedish Armed Forces Exercise Aurora 17 Will Increase Military Capability’. 108 ‘Trident Juncture 18’ (Swedish Armed Forces, 2018), https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/activities/exercises/trident-juncture-18/. 109 Per-Ola Mjömark, ‘Lyckat Bokslut För Årets Upplaga Av Baltops’ (Swedish Armed Forces, 20 June 2019), https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2019/06/lyckat-bokslut-for-arets-upplaga-av-baltops/. 110 Jimmie Adamsson, ‘Svensk-Finsk Ledning i Northern Coasts’ (Swedish Armed Forces, 5 September 2019), https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2019/09/svensk-finsk-ledning-i-northern-coasts/. 32

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

commitment to military cooperation as well to increase the capabilities and cohesion of such commitments.

Innovation and generation of new competencies Closely linked to the theme of Rehearsal is that of innovation and generation of new skills or competencies. The first commonality between the exercises is the exchange of information and skills as a major impetus for MNEs. As stated by one of the prime incentives for a Small state is the training opportunities offered in MNEs beyond what is domestically.

Exercise Aurora was mainly an exercise for the Swedish military, rather than being explicitly an MNE (8 nations participating in some form) for collective improvement with 2000 foreign participants out of the total 21900.111 A significant part of the exercise was developing host nation support, as stated by Major General Andersson:

Aurora 17 is a step on the war to increase Sweden’s conditions for receiving foreign military support if needed, if the government decides to, in a real crisis or war situation.112

Further, military exercises serve to provide mutual training opportunities among organisations and new systems. As stated by Alqvist, command officer of HMS Karlstad:

Baltops have given us an opportunity to collaborate with a number of different nations and different types of ship systems. The experiences we gain during an exercise like this are invaluable.113

Similarly, the exercise leader for ACE 19 remarked on developing exercises further to include more complex scenarios, increased air-defence systems and additional fifth-generation fighter aircraft.114

The benefits of scale are often mentioned in regards large exercises such as Trident Juncture and Cold Response that far outstrips anything any single non-first-tier power can organise on its own. As seen in Cold Response, the exercise offered much needed experience in brigade-

111 ‘Annual Report, 2017’ (Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, 2017), 2. 112 Charlotte Petterson and Joakim Elovsson, ‘Värdlandstöd i Praktiken’ (Swedish Armed Forces, 2017), https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2017/03/vardlandsstod-i-praktiken/ (Translated by the author from the original Swedish). 113 Mjömark, ‘Lyckat Bokslut För Årets Upplaga Av Baltops’. 114 Sundström, ‘Multinationell Flygövning Lyfter Mot Högsta Klass’. 33

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

level operations and leadership, a skill of which was as exercised very rarely prior to 2015.115 The Small state here uses the military exercises and the wealth of knowledge among the organisations present in order to strengthen relationships cooperation with other states while increasing the own warfighting capabilities. This can also be reflected in Swedish doctrine where together with other actors “aims to cost-effectively develop operational capabilities in certain areas”.116

Deterrence & signalling In almost every instance of an official statement of military exercises, some mention is made of deterrence. Terms like threshold effect or raising thresholds were common. In a press release concerning Aurora 17, deterrence was particularly explicit.

Deterrence lies at the core of a strong defence, one that rises to all threats and overcomes all challenges. It is designed to deter potential attackers, and force them to carefully consider the risks of attacking our country. For a deterrent to be effective, it needs to be credible and visible. Through frequent and extensive training and exercise, especially with other defence forces, Sweden is strengthening its deterrence effect and makes it more credible.117

An often-repeated phrase found in the material (or variants thereof) is “building security and stability with others”.118 The Swedish Chief of the Navy Jens Nykvist stated the BALTOPS 17 exercise

Contributes to building security and stability in the Baltic Sea region by so many nations working together.119

Similar language was found concerning Trident Juncture 18:

We take responsibility for our neighbouring region, and contribute to Sweden promoting security in solidarity with others. We also hold regular exercises to reinforce

115 ‘Svensk Brigadledningsförmåga Prövas under Cold Response’ (Translated by the author from the original Swedish). 116 ‘Militärstrategisk Doktrin MSD 16’ (Försvarsmakten, 2016), p48. 117 ‘Aurora 17’ (Swedish Armed Forces, 2017), https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/activities/exercises/aurora- 17/. 118 Swedish Ministry of Defence, ‘Swedish Armed Forces Exercise Aurora 17 Will Increase Military Capability’. 119 Jimmie Adamsson, ‘Northern Coasts Sammanfattas’ (Swedish Armed Forces, 22 September 2017), https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2017/09/northern-coasts-sammanfattas/ (Translated by the author from the original Swedish). 34

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Sweden’s defences, and in autumn 2018 we will be taking part in the Trident Juncture 18 exercise, involving troops from all military forces.120

In general, deterrence was one of the most visible themes in the exercises, sometimes more prominent than other goals. This highlights the stress that participants put on this aspect. In addition, one may interpret the preponderance of this theme is to be part of the messaging of military exercises themselves, considering the nature of the material chosen is largely press releases.

Usage of the terms such as signalling was often used as well, both in terms of deterrence but also signals between allies or partners. Statements such as:

[a]ppreciative signals about Sweden´s participation have come from both top military commanders and at unit level, both from the NATO countries and Finland… And it has been praise that goes beyond the normal courtesy. by Major General Michael Claesson in regards to Trident Juncture which exemplifies the inter- partnership signalling that take place in exercises.121

120 ‘Trident Juncture 18’. 121 ‘Time to Take Stock of Trident Juncture 18’ (Swedish Armed Forces, 9 November 2018), https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/news/2018/11/time-to-take-stock-of-trident-juncture-18/ (Quote shortened by the author). 35

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Interoperability Interoperability was a very common theme in the material, occasionally as an explicit goal itself, and a recurring motif in the text.

In the annual report on exercises by the Swedish Armed Forces, interoperability is one of the most prominent terms used in describing exercises. Interoperability with other states is often equated to national defence capability.122

In 2018 the report stated

The exercises have through their intensity and multifaceted design contributed to a clear development of the Armed Forces' operational capability, e.g., regarding brigade management, combat in the brigade's framework, Counter IED, interoperability, logistics supply and collaboration. The time scope and complexity of the exercises, both in terms of national and international exercises, has increased, which long-term contributes to the Armed Forces' total capability development within the national framework.123

Here one can clearly see how highly the term interoperability is placed, however one should note that interoperability can also mean inter-service interoperability as well as international. However, the frequency in which interoperability is mentioned in relations to MNE highlights the international interoperability sought.124125 Similar emphasis can be seen in the 2016, 2017 and 2019 documents.126

The ACE 19 exercise had a substantial focus on this aspect in addition to the capability increase:

The international aims of the exercise are to train participating units to collaborate in combined air operations, practise safe and effective dissimilar aircraft combat training, improve interoperability by adopting NATO procedures and providing host nation

122 ‘Annual Report, 2016’, 34. 123 ‘Annual Report, 2018’ (Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, 2018), 44 (Translated from the original Swedish by the author). 124 Seen in relations to Baltops 18, Northern Coasts 18, Trident Juncture 18, as well as numerous other exercises that year. 125 ‘Annual Report, 2018’, 46,52,54. 126 ‘Annual Report, 2019’ (Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, 2019), 30–36. 36

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

support, and carry out a cost-effective exercise using the Cross Border Training concept.127

Similarly, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe stated “the 49th BALTOPS has been an outstanding success, highlighting NATO’s agility and interoperability”.128

Aurora was the first time Swedish, Finnish and American special operations units exercised in a cohesive unit in Sweden. The commanding officer for the Swedish Special Forces Command was quoted saying:

We have trained and tested our interoperability. We must be able to talk to each other, our systems must be able to connect and by testing it, we identify areas we have to improve.129

Interoperability is also seen as a continual process that requires certain upkeep, with regular exercises needed, with one Swedish naval officer observing

Even if we are skilled and interoperable, the knowledge must be maintained at all times, through regular exercises.130

Further, some peculiarities of being inside or outside of an alliance in these exercises were illustrated by this theme. Issues such as not having access to cryptographic equipment and procedures were a “constant headache every time Swedish vessels is exercising with NATO- forces, because Sweden is not a NATO-member”.131

127 ‘ACE 19 Air Exercise to Gather 100+ Aircraft under the Northern Skies.’ (The Finnish Defence Forces, 9 May 2019), https://puolustusvoimat.fi/en/-/1951206/euroopan-suurin-lentotoimintaharjoitus-ace-19-jarjestetaan- touko-kesakuun-vaihteessa. 128 ‘Exercise BALTOPS 2020 Wraps Up’ (NATO, 17 June 2020), https://shape.nato.int/news- archive/2020/exercise-baltops-2020-wraps-up. 129 ‘Specialförband under Radarn i Aurora 17’ (Swedish Armed Forces, 2 October 2017), https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2017/10/specialforband-under-radarn-i-aurora-17/ (Translated from the original Swedish by the author). 130 Jimmie Adamsson, ‘Tillsammans i Östersjön’ (Swedish Armed Forces, 2020), https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2020/06/tillsammans-i-ostersjon (Translated from the original Swedish by the author). 131 Adamsson (Translated from the original Swedish by the author). 37

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Relevance and Prestige The investigation identified several main trends in the material regarding the theme of relevance and prestige.

The first is the desire to display ability to conduct effective military operations and contribute in multi-national organisations and operations. Displaying effective cooperation and warfighting capability implies a dependable and effective ally. Examples such as Sweden being given command of the third brigade in the Cold Response 2016132, with it being described as a particular honour to be entrusted to lead one of the brigades in the exercise.133 Further evidence can be seen in how one chooses to display particular strengths, such as littoral combat capability in the Baltic Sea which is something the Swedish Navy in particularly specialised in. As emphasised by the commanding officer of HMS Karlstad during Baltops 2020, littoral combat capability is something that most other nations and NATO lacks.134

Similarly, Special Operations exercises with the US (as mentioned in the theme of interoperability) also have a signalling effect, particularly when outright displayed as such. As described by the Swedish Minister of Defence:

This collaboration is a resource which means that if you choose to act in a situation of crisis, you can do it in an early and effective manner. It is also a very clear signal of a development of capabilities that we are undergoing in the Swedish Armed Forces and which is elevating us in comparison to has it has been before.135

Second is demonstrating the ability to hold sizable and useful exercises. The stated goal of exercises, in particular in the case of Aurora;

“[s]ending signals to the surrounding world about Sweden's military capabilities”.136

132 Which the article notes Sweden did in Cold Response 2014 as well. 133 ‘Svensk Brigadledningsförmåga Prövas under Cold Response’. 134 Adamsson, ‘Tillsammans i Östersjön’. 135 ‘Försvaret Avslöjar: Håller Hemliga Övningar Med USA.’, SVT Nyheter, 12 November 2020, https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/forsvaret-avslojar-hemliga-ovningar-med-usa (Translated from the original Swedish by the author). 136 Swedish Ministry of Defence, ‘Swedish Armed Forces Exercise Aurora 17 Will Increase Military Capability’. 38

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

This can be interpreted in several ways. Either as the traditional conceptions of deterrence, but also as a point of showing one’s relevance, either by the organisation of the exercise itself, or directly to the participants of the exercise first-hand, and of course a form of signalling.

The hosting of, or the significant contribution to large-scale exercises can also be seen as being a relevant partner. In the case of Artic Challenge, the ability to hold a flag-level exercise is not only useful from a military utility perspective, but could be seen as being a useful partner in times of peace. Providing access to such high-quality training opportunities would be attractive to many air forces and in extension their states.

39

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Analysis and discussion The results show that all themes in the framework are present and applicable, and serve to highlight many of the desired effects. However, some themes were more fruitful than others, and that many of the themes have a slight overlap. The themes work in unison and one single statement, goal or motivation often carries multiple themes. This thesis has attempted to separate them to a satisfactory level; however, they remain interlinked. For example, aspects such as deterrence and signalling can be found in statements on interoperability or attempts at increasing capabilities under innovation. The results in relation to the individual themes will be discussed in turn.

Rehearsal and Innovation The rehearsal aspect was the least surprising or insightful aspect. Closely linked to this is the theme of rehearsal. The military utility of exercises is rather self-evident, as it does not differ substantially between Great and Small states. The extraction of military capabilities from partners is perhaps the defining characteristic within this theme, where the Small state can gain skills otherwise hard-won.

However, MNEs are designed for mutual leaning and one aspect that can be found here is the reverse flow of information from the previous statement. Small states occasionally have capabilities that Greater states lack, due to the need to specialise, such as the littoral combat capability demonstrated. This is perhaps more represented in the relevance and prestige theme, as it directly correlates to the perception of capabilities and perceived usefulness of the Small state as an ally or partner as seen by others.

The separation of Rehearsal and Innovation could be discussed. Having them separately prevents the two from being overly nebulous, which is both a methodological concern when coding the themes, as well as an empiric one. Maintaining skills in relation to other states prevents stagnation, while direct innovation increases desired capabilities. Hence, they are two sides of the same coin, both pertaining to direct military utility but in a slightly different manner. Depending on the granularity one may desire in terms of analysing military exercises, the two may be collapsed into one theme.

40

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Deterrence and signalling Deterrence was very prevalent in the material, both in terms of developing capabilities and relationships in order to provide deterrence, as well as the exercises sending deterrence signals with others. Deterrence is described by increasing military capabilities, collectively or singularly, as well as deterrence in relationships built by exercises themselves. Phrases such as “building security with others” exemplify how deterrence in military exercises go beyond the strictly military utility of increasing capabilities. The relationships formed during the exercises between organisation and states are explicitly stated, and quite possibly a significant part of the exercise design.

The annual reports on exercises routinely emphasise how relationships are maintained and developed with exercises, highlighting the value that military organisations can place on developing these relationships for the purpose of deterrence. One can only speculate on the impact of these relationships, but Small states would likely emphasise such relationships greater due to the deterrence they provide. Larger states would use these relationships to exercise power, smaller states use them to gain power.

As for the subtheme of signalling, the results show how exercises can both be used in terms of deterrence, but also to signal one’s own capabilities for potential partners. As mentioned earlier, being able to display marked improvements in capabilities and competency, again increasing relevance and prestige.

Interoperability Interoperability was likewise significantly emphasised in the material. One may assume that interoperability is one of the main indicators of the process of exercises, as it is one of the main goals for a Small state. Interoperability is the ability to effectively act with partners and allies, and thus are a prerequisite for effective cooperation. What cannot be determined by this investigation alone is the degree to which interoperability is prized by Small states compared to Great states. However, one may speculate that interoperability is more advantageous to Small states, as it provides access to greater states. Great states can use interoperability to aid allies, Small states require interoperability to be able to act effectively in concert with others. Considering the great emphasis placed on interoperability in this investigation, one can safely assume its importance. Any analytical framework of studying Small states involvement would

41

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

likely require including this aspect, given its utmost import in being able to effectively give and receive military aid, or act in concert with other states.

Relevance and Prestige Perhaps one of the most interesting finds in the investigation is how many of the factors of military exercises lead into the theme of relevance and prestige. States do pursue prestige due to vanity, rather prestige is a matter of seeking relevance and influence, be it displaying capability, dependability, or the ability to host and participate in major exercises. The former two are directly linked to perception. If the Small state is perceived to be competent and dependable, it is likely to be seen as more relevant and invited to further cooperation or given aid. The latter is a matter of being useful in terms of the exercise themselves. The example of organising a major “flag-exercise” as displayed in the Arctic Challenge Exercise illustrates allow a Small state like Sweden to produce together will partners a world-class Air Force exercise that would certainly be attractive and allow Small states to “punch above their weight” in terms of offering high-quality training and attracting partners. What is key here is being able to offer significant contributions to peace-time military cooperation. This leads to security via deterrence, which in turn increases capability to conduct operations, as well as integrating military organisations, and in extension the states themselves. Attracting partners for training would further increase the capability-heightening aspects of MNEs.

Relevance and prestige may also lead to is increased influence. If one is a significant part of exercises, one will have the ability to shape what is exercised. Hence, there is the possibility that through the medium of exercises, even Small states can exert influence. Inviting states to participate in domestic wargames will highlight one’s own strategic predicament and may bring it to the forefront in the perception of one’s allies. This cannot be proven by this investigation alone, but there are multiple elements of this aspect present.

Where major states can use shaping exercises to shape the relationship with allies to suit their needs, perhaps Small states can use shaping exercises to their advantage too. Being able to enlist the aid of other and the courting behaviour as illustrated above would certainly place MNE in a valued place in the tool chest of a Small state.

.

42

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Reproducibility Substantial parts of the material are written in Swedish, and have been translated by the author of this thesis. It is assumed that the translation is correct and does not impact the results to any noticeable manner. The nuances of language are not the object of the investigation, and it is not a discourse approach, therefore subtle translation differences should affect the results.

Outright statements on the more complex and subtle themes such as Relevance or Prestige were less frequently occurring in the text, but may yet be considered by the actor to be of utmost importance, albeit perhaps not verbalised as such. Hence, the sample is deemed sufficient to illustrate the themes present, but may be inadequate to fully prove the relationship between the themes and the motivations of the particular actor.

Role of themes Further one should discuss the number and character of themes chosen. As stated previously, they are not designed to be a cohesive view of military exercises, but representative of certain aspects particular to Small states. The choice of themes how both methodological implications as well as theoretical ones. Overly nebulous or undefined themes may be unable to identify empirical material correctly or disregard pertinent factors. Overly strict interpretations can likewise cause pertinent information to be discarded due to not fitting in overly tight confines..

Further is the issue of possible unknown unknowns, factors that are unknown theoretically so far and not included in the themes, and has not been found by an emergent theme. The design of this investigation was to identify themes from theory and apply them to the empirical material in a deductive manner. As such, there may have been factors beyond what could have been anticipated in current theory.

Generalisability of the case The themes in this case may very well be common to many other cases, as argued above. The themes are wide enough and the effects such as striving for relevance and prestige are likely very common in the plurality of Small states. The strength of a single case study lies not in its generalizability but in understanding the subtleties and depth of a single case.137 This study did not seek to with certainty falsify existing theory or assumptions, but to add factors that did exist in other extant theory and required by the empirics. As such, the object of the investigation is

137 Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, 241. 43

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

not for the themes to be universally verifiable in all cases, but serve to illustrate what possible effects may be desired by Small states.

The case of Sweden is one a non-aligned small state with close connections with a major defensive alliance, and as such it strides the line between non-aligned and member of an alliance. While this particular arrangement may be unusual when compared to the vast majority of Small states, the requirements such as to be interoperable, relevant and increasing deterrence would surely be applicable to other Small states, as the fundamental characteristics of a Small state such as power disparity and the need to seek security with others remains the same, though their distinct character may differ. For instance, Edström et al. outline the great deal of similarity between the responses of the Nordic states in response to Russian aggression since 2014, even though some of the states are NATO-members.138

The themes used in the analytical framework were derived from existing theory of military exercises, combined with the focus on the requirements of small states. The results show that the themes were present, and applicable to a Nordic Small State in close proximity to both a significant strategic threat, but also friendly partners. The themes are not exclusive to the case as the theory they were extracted from was not, and there may be a significant degree of generalization. This is however largely speculative and needs to be further reviewed by a wider comparative study.

Limitations Causality and intended and unintended effects have not been addressed in this thesis. The act of using overt military force may have both the intended effects and well as unintended ones. What cannot be established with the scope, methods and materials chosen in this investigation is whether these themes actually have an effect, intended or otherwise.

The focus has been on what effect states want to achieve, not whether they are achievable. It has been demonstrated by which means states seek deterrence or prestige, but the actual impact of their efforts is yet to be established. Such as investigation would likely involve a much greater data-set over a greater time period. The analytical framework proposed by this investigation may prove useful for future ventures. The impact of exercises with themes suggested in this

138 Edström, Gyllensporre, and Westberg, Military Strategy of Small States, 172–75. 44

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

thesis on increased interoperability and the alliance-forming effects would certainly be interesting with a greater timespan.

45

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Future opportunities and Conclusions

Suggestions for future studies This investigation has not explored the different experiences of aligned or non-aligned states. States inside an alliance may still enjoy these benefits as it reaffirms their position in an alliance. Many of the states in the exercises studied are member of a major defensive alliance, NATO. In fact, only Sweden and Finland are non-NATO members. Many of the themes would likely very similar, but may have a slightly character. Rehearsal would likely be more emphasised as it would rehearse and affect actual operational planning. Deterrence and signalling would likely include the addition of intra-alliance politics, similar to Heier’s evaluation of Norway.139 However, most of the factors would likely be represented. Similarly, relevance and prestige, and interoperability would again have a slightly different meaning. The core concepts of the difference between the Great States and Small States in an alliance would likely be similar, even if there is an explicit vow of mutual defence such as NATO’s Article 5. Small states would still require to gain influence and relevance even in the embrace of a military alliance.

Additionally, how the exercises are designed, with whom, and to what end has not been extensively discussed. The relationship between different military organisations, their defence departments, and their governments would surely be an interesting investigation. The political nature of these exercises is abundantly clear, yet how the actors choose to act internally has not been reviewed. This in part due to the focus of the investigation to develop a framework, and the granularity of data needed to understand the complexities and decision-making process of the particular state would require would be prohibitive.

Conclusions The aim of this thesis was to develop an analytical framework to better understand how Small states use exercises as a political tool. The insight in how Small states use exercises to increase their capabilities and shape relationships is markedly different from that of the Great states. The power disparity leads to a different conception of deterrence as has been demonstrated. Further, the great value placed on interoperability show how Small states can use military exercises in order to strengthen their ability to give and receive military aid, with the ultimate goal of

139 Heier in Heuser, Heier, and Lasconjarias, Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact, 163– 85. 46

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

producing security. As been stated, good partners are expected to be security producers instead of being consumers.

Exercises are a means for states for states to try military cooperation without actively committing in an alliance. One may view it as somewhat of a diminutive version of the band- wagoning strategy. There are two aspects of this behaviour identified in this investigation. The first is participating in an alliance allows military cooperation and the benefits of participating in MNEs organised by organisations such as NATO. States gain the benefits outlined, such as described in the themes of rehearsal, innovation, and increased interoperability, without establishing formal alliances. The Small State can “test the waters” of military cooperation via exercises and perhaps slowly enter into deeper cooperation, or alternatively using exercises may be an indicator of that process.

Second, is that that participating in exercises allows states to display their military prowess and capabilities, which has the effect of increasing the perception of the own nation’s military organisation. The ability to perform well when participating in exercises can be used to gain prestige and show other potential allies one’s relevance. The Great states power and utility is apparent by their very virtue of being Great, Small States have to offset the power disparity by other means. One means of doing this is attracting allies by proving oneself to be a capable and reliable ally. This prestige-seeking behaviour has been seen in states regarding military operations, and has been shown in this investigation in exercises. Prestige allows states to be able to be recognised as important, and thus a worthy ally. This is thus a means to deterrence, as it allows states to ingratiate themselves to other states. A realist interpretation is that states will only be aid will only be rendered if it served the states own interests, and being a worthy ally is a gateway to being more secure. Hence, one may state that participating in exercises leads to increased security via deterrence, not only by increasing military capabilities and the ability to be interoperable with other states in times of conflict, but will increase the likelihood of being aided by proving oneself to others.

Returning to the quote by Thucydides, “the strong do what they can, and the weak may suffer what they must” may have been true during the Peloponnesian wars, but as the discussion above shows, the weak have their own agency and have to find means navigate the roiling waters of the world. However, they have not to do so alone. “Si vis pacem, para bellum”, if you desire peace, prepare for war.

47

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Bibliography Literature

Archer, Clive, Bailes, Alyson J.K. & Wivel, Anders, Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond (Hoboken: Routledge, 2014).

Brady, Anne-Marie & Thorhallsson, Baldur (eds.)., Small States and the New Security Environment (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021).

Clausewitz, Carl von, Howard, Michael, Paret, Peter & Heuser, Beatrice, On war (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

Curini, Luigi & Franzese, Robert, The SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations (London: SAGE Publications, 2020).

Depledge, Duncan, "Train Where You Expect to Fight: Why Military Exercises Have Increased in the High North", Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 3:1 (2020), pp. 288–301.

Edström, Håkan, Gyllensporre, Dennis & Westberg, Jacob, Military Strategy of Small States: Responding to External Shocks of the 21st Century, 1 ed. Routledge, 2018).

Flyvbjerg, Bent, "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research", Qualitative Inquiry 12:2 (2006), pp. 219–245.

Frazier, Derrick V. & Hutto, J. Wesley, "The socialization of military power: security cooperation and doctrine development through multinational military exercises", Defence Studies 17:4 (2017), pp. 379–397.

Hedlund, Erik, "Team Learning and Leadership in Multinational Military Staff Exercises", Armed Forces & Society 43:3 (2017), pp. 459–477.

Heuser, Beatrice, Heier, Tormond & Lasconjarias, Guillaume, Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact (Rome: NATO Defence College, 2018).

Heuser, Beatrice & Simpson, Harold, "The Missing Political Dimension of Military Exercises", The RUSI Journal 162:3 (2017), pp. 20–28.

Jakobsen, Peter Viggo, Ringsmose, Jens & Saxi, Håkon Lunde, "Prestige-seeking small states: Danish and Norwegian military contributions to US-led operations", European Journal of International Security 3:2 (2018), pp. 256–277.

48

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Jervis, Robert, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", World Politics 30:no.2 (1978), pp. 167–214.

Keohane, Robert O, "Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics", International Organization 23, No.2:Spring (1969), pp. 291–310.

Møller, Joakim Erma, "Trilateral defence cooperation in the North: an assessment of interoperability between Norway, Sweden and Finland", Defence Studies 19:3 (2019), pp. 235– 256.

Öberg, Dan, "Exercising war: How tactical and operational modelling shape and reify military practice", Security Dialogue 51:2–3 (2020), pp. 137–154.

Rickli, Jean-Marc, "European small states’ military policies after the Cold War: from territorial to niche strategies", Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21:3 (2008), pp. 307–325.

Rothstein, Robert L., Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

Schmitt, Olivier, "The Vienna Document and the Russian challenge to the European Security Architecture", in Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact NATO Defence College, 2018), Forum papers no. 26, pp. 269–284.

Thucydides, The history of the Peloponnesian War (Floyd: Wilder Publications, 2015).

Vaicekauskaitė, Živilė Marija, "Security Strategies of Small States in a Changing World", Journal on Baltic Security 3:2 (2017), pp. 7–15.

Van Creveld, Martin, Wargames, From Gladiators to Gigabytes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Wivel, Anders, "The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests, Identity and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor*", JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 43:2 (2005), pp. 393–412.

Wolfley, Kyle J, "Military Statecraft and the Use of Multinational Exercises in World Politics", Foreign Policy Analysis 17:2 (2021), p. 22.

Wood, Steve, "Prestige in world politics: History, theory, expression", International Politics 50:3 (2013), pp. 387–411.

49

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Empirical material

ACE 19 air exercise to gather 100+ aircraft under the northern skies., 2019, The Finnish Defence Forces, https://puolustusvoimat.fi/en/-/1951206/euroopan-suurin- lentotoimintaharjoitus-ace-19-jarjestetaan-touko-kesakuun-vaihteessa [accessed 2021-5-15].

Adamsson, Jimmie, Northern Coasts sammanfattas, 2017, Swedish Armed Forces, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2017/09/northern-coasts-sammanfattas/

Adamsson, Jimmie, Svensk-finsk ledning i Northern Coasts, 2019, Swedish Armed Forces, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2019/09/svensk-finsk-ledning-i-northern-coasts/ [accessed 2021-5-16].

Adamsson, Jimmie, Tillsammans i Östersjön, 2020, Swedish Armed Forces, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2020/06/tillsammans-i-ostersjon [accessed 2021-5- 15].

Annual Report, 2016, Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, 2016.

Annual Report, 2017, Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, 2017.

Annual Report, 2018, Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, 2018.

Annual Report, 2019, Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, 2019.

Aurora 17, 2017, Swedish Armed Forces, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/activities/exercises/aurora-17/ [accessed 2021-5-13].

Military Balance Blog, IISS, Aurora 2017: shedding light on Swedish defence thinking, 11/9 2017, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2017/09/aurora-2017-swedish-defence

Aurora 2020 flyttas fram, Swedish Armed Forces, Swedish Armed Forces, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2020/04/forsvarsmaktsovning-aurora-20-flyttas- fram/ [accessed 2021-5-17].

Deltagande med väpnad styrka i utbildning utomlands: en utökad beslutsbefogenhet för regeringen: betänkande, Statens Officiella Utredningar, 2015.

50

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Enander, Dag, Så högt du kan komma - därför ger ACE dubbel effekt, 2017, Swedish Armed Forces, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2017/07/sa-hogt-du-kan-komma-darfor- ger-ace-dubbel-effekt/ [accessed 2021-5-15].

Exercise BALTOPS 2020 wraps up, 2020, NATO, https://shape.nato.int/news- archive/2020/exercise-baltops-2020-wraps-up

"Försvaret avslöjar: Håller hemliga övningar med USA.", SVT Nyheter, 12/11 2020, https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/forsvaret-avslojar-hemliga-ovningar-med-usa [accessed 2021-5-12].

Jätteövningen har börjat, 2018, Swedish Armed Forces, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2018/10/jatteovningen-har-borjat/

Majlard, Jan, "USA-befäl: Vill öva på att flytta missiler till Sverige", Svenska Dagbladet, 7/3 2016, https://www.svd.se/cold-response-vi-forbereder-oss-pa-det-varsta [accessed 2021-5-17].

Militärstrategisk doktrin MSD 16, Försvarsmakten, 2016.

Mjömark, Per-Ola, Lyckat bokslut för årets upplaga av Baltops, 2019, Swedish Armed Forces, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2019/06/lyckat-bokslut-for-arets-upplaga-av- baltops/ [accessed 2021-5-17].

NATO Allies will begin naval exercise BALTOPS in the Baltic Sea., 2016, SHAPE, NATO, https://shape.nato.int/2016/nato-allies-begin-naval-exercise-baltops-in-the-baltic-sea

NATO Exercise Trident Juncture 18 concludes, JFC Naples Public Affairs Office, https://jfcnaples.nato.int/newsroom/news/2018/nato-exercise-trident-juncture-18-concludes

Petterson, Charlotte & Elovsson, Joakim, Värdlandstöd i praktiken, 2017, Swedish Armed Forces, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2017/03/vardlandsstod-i-praktiken/ [accessed 2021-5-14].

Prop. 2015/16:122 Deltagande med väpnad styrka i utbildning utomlands., Swedish Government, 2016.

Specialförband under radarn i Aurora 17, 2017, Swedish Armed Forces, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2017/10/specialforband-under-radarn-i-aurora-17/ [accessed 2021-5-15].

51

Teodor Frost Master thesis FHS 2021

Sundström, Jesper, Arctic Challenge Exercise 19 är igång, 2019, Swedish Armed Forces, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2019/05/arctic-challenge-exercise-2019-ar-igang/

Sundström, Jesper, Multinationell flygövning lyfter mot högsta klass, 2019, Swedish Armed Forces, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2019/06/multinationell-flygovning-lyfter- mot-hogsta-klass/

Sundström, Jesper, Svensk brigadförmåga provas under Cold Response 2016, , https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2015/10/svensk-brigadformaga-provas-under-cold- response-2016

Svensk brigadledningsförmåga prövas under Cold Response, Swedish Armed Forces, 2016.

Swedish Ministry of Defence, Swedish Armed Forces Exercise Aurora 17 will increase military capability, 2017, Government of Sweden, https://www.government.se/articles/2017/09/swedish-armed-forces-exercise-aurora-17-will- increase-military-capability/ [accessed 2021-5-16].

Time to take stock of Trident Juncture 18, 2018, Swedish Armed Forces, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/news/2018/11/time-to-take-stock-of-trident-juncture-18/

Trident Juncture 18, 2018, Swedish Armed Forces, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/activities/exercises/trident-juncture-18/ [accessed 2021-5- 16].

"US To Assume Higher Profile in Nordic Exercises", DefenceNews, 27 February 2016 [accessed 2021-5-17].

"Utökat militärt samarbete med USA:s armé", SVT Nyheter, 19/1 2017, https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/utokat-militart-samarbete-med-usa-s-arme [accessed 2021- 5-16].

52