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China Papers No China Papers No. 15 | 2009 State capacity, Democratic Principles and Constitutional Order: Modern State-building in Post- Totalitarian Society Qiang Li China Papers ABSTRACT This paper challenges the popular discourse on political change in China. It starts with a model of two-dimension political reform in a post totalitarian society: modern state building through reorganizing of state-society relations and reconstruction of a political order through democratic restructuring. The chapter argues that while we have seen the predominance of the second dimension in the political reform in the former Soviet Union, significant political change in China has been taking place primarily along the first dimension. The focus on state building has enabled the Chinese state to experience a revolutionary change in the past 30 years while still able to provide an institutional environment ensuring economic reform and opening. China Papers The past three decades have witnessed China's market oriented economic reform and rapid economic growth. The general consensus, however, is that China has not undertaken meaningful political reforms in comparison with the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The question then naturally arises: without some forms of political reforms, would China's relatively successfully market transition and sustained economic development be conceivable? Or put it in another way; is a totalitarian social and political structure compatible with market economy? The key to answer such a question is to specify the meaning of "political reform", particularly the main tasks of political reform in a post-totalitarian society. Theoretically, political reforms in post-totalitarian societies contain at least two tasks. The first is to redefine the state society relationship and build a modem state. The second is to subject the "state" power to democratic process. The difference of political reforms in China and in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is not whether there have been political reforms, but the different paths of political reforms they have pursued. In the former Soviet Union, political reforms started from democratization. In China, the core of political reforms in the post-Mao era has been modem state building. To theoretically conceptualize the nature and process of this state building in China is not only important to understand Chinese politics, but will also shed light on some important issues in political theory, such as the nature and structures of modem state, importance of modem state for market economy and civil society, and state makings in post-totalitarian societies. In the following, I will try to examine the nature and the mam institutional characteristics of the state-building in China through re-examining some basic theoretical issues regarding to state. I will first revisit the theory of the state as developed by Max Weber and other contemporary social theorists, and in particular re-examine the institutional characteristics of totalitarian state. I will then suggest that changes of workings of the Chinese state in the past three decades signify a revolutionary change in the nature of the Chinese state. China has in fact experienced a process of modern state-building through de-tantalization.1 Although the following discussion will be based on the case of China, the main concern is more conceptual than empirical. My main aim is to develop a theoretical framework to understand the institutional features of the post-totalitarian societies including China. 1 The term de-tantalization is used by Giovanni Sartori in his "Totalitarianism, Model Mania and Leaming from Error," Journal o/Theoretical Politics, 5(1), 1993, p. 6. China Papers 1. The Concept of Modern State The emergence of the modern state is one of the main features of modern society. Otto Gierke characterizes rightly the social structure of modern society as "the sovereignty of the state and the sovereignty of the individual.2 That means, in modern society, on the one hand, individual has been gradually emancipated from communitarian ties of family, clan, locality or religion, and· becomes his· own sovereignty, and individual rights become the basis of civil law. On the other hand, the state as an institution surpasses various traditional institutions, religious, local and patrimonial alike, and becomes the power canter of the society. The ideal typical modern state is characterized by Max Weber as an organization which successfully upholds a claim to binding rule making over a territory by virtue of commanding a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. As some recent scholars have emphasized, Max Weber's definition of the state contains three elements: it is a set of institutions, it is bound by particular territory, and it monopolizes the legitimate use of violence. 3 The core of Weber's definition is that the state is a differentiated institution which particularly performs the duty of rule making.4 Following Weber's conception, Norbert Elias provides an excellent account on the process of modem state formation in Western Europe. Elias particularly highlights the importance of the development of modern public finance for the development of modem state. He wrote in his The Civilizing Process: The society of what we call the modern age is characterized, above all in the West, by a certain level of monopolization. Free use of military weapons is denied the individual and reserved to a central authority of whatever kind, and likewise the taxation of the property or income of individuals is concentrated in the hands of a central social authority. The financial means thus flowing into this central authority maintains its monopoly of military force, while this in turn maintains the monopoly of taxation.5 In addition to the monopoly of use of violence and taxation, the modem state also distinguishes itself from other organizations by its functions. Max Weber characterizes these functions simply as rule-providing. Some contemporary economists describe the 2 Otto Gierke, Political theories o/the Middle Ages, Translated into English by F. W. Maitland, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 87. 3 Cf. John A. Hall & G. John Ikenberry, The State, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, pp 1-2 4 Gianfranco Poggi, The Development ofthe Modern State: A Sociological Introduction, Stanford University Press, 1978, p. 1. 5 Norbert Elias, On Civilization, Power, and Knowledge: Selected Writings, ed. by Stephen Mennell & Johan Goudsblom, the University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 139. China Papers function of the modem state as providing "public goods" to the society, Later professor of economics, Mancur Olson, once made a very interesting comparison between the modern state and bandits. Both bandits and the state ruler may monopoly the use of violence and taxation in a given territory. But the state ruler distinguishes himself from a bandit by his function of providing certain public goods. Wrote Olson: The bandit leader, if he is strong enough to hold a territory securely and monopolize theft there, has an encompassing interest in his domain. This encompassing interest leads him to limit and regularize the rate of his theft and spend some of the resources that he controls on public goods that benefit his victims no less than himself A bandit leader with sufficient strength to control and hold a territory has an incentive to settle down, to wear a crown, and to become a public good-providing autocrat.6 If we combine definitions of Weber, Elias, and Olson, we may be able to come to a conception of an ideal typical modem state. First, it is a specialized institution,. differentiated structurally from other organizations of the society, which monopolies the legitimate use of violence. Or put it differently, state is a public authority. Secondly, it is funded by public finance. Thirdly, its exclusive function is to provide public goods for the society. The importance of the existence of a modem state for modem society has been well recognized by many political theorists, legal philosophers, and economists in the early modem period. There has been general understanding in political theories that modem state building forms the basis of democracy. The objective of democracy is to subject political power to democratic process. Without a clearly defined political power and its institutions, democracy would be impossible. Historically, European state building appeared much early to the process of democratization. Secondly, there has been a consistent theme that modem state is a precondition for the development of market economy and civil society. Modem state alone, by its monopoly of the use of violence for public goods, can provide peace and security internally and externally and can provide universally applicable and enforceable laws for the modem market economy. Probably because the importance of modem state is too common sense to be considered seriously, there have not been many discussions about it in contemporary political and economic theories. Gradually scholars, particularly economists, have forgotten this theme altogether. As Olson and Kahkonen have complained, the importance of the state "is so elemental and natural that it is usually not even stated explicitly or introduced as an axiom in formal theorizing. It is the half-conscious assumption that markets are natural entities that emerge spontaneously, not artificial contrivances or creatures of government. 6 Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity, New York: Basic Books, 2000, pp. 10-11. China Papers The markets that a society needs, unless prohibited or repressed by government, may be taken for granted."7 2. Institutional Characteristics of a Totalitarian State Modem state could play such important functions largely because it has specific institutional structures. Charles Tilly characterizes the institutional characteristics of the modem state in terms of "differentiated", "autonomous", "centralized," and "institutionalized.”8 Among those characteristics, "differentiation" is the key feature of the modem state. By differentiation it means that there is clear differentiation of functions between state and other organizations of the society. State has limited sphere of control and limited functions.
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