China Papers No. 15 | 2009
State capacity, Democratic Principles and
Constitutional Order:
Modern State-building in Post- Totalitarian Society
Qiang Li
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ABSTRACT
This paper challenges the popular discourse on political change in China. It starts with a model of two-dimension political reform in a post totalitarian society: modern state building through reorganizing of state-society relations and reconstruction of a political order through democratic restructuring. The chapter argues that while we have seen the predominance of the second dimension in the political reform in the former Soviet Union, significant political change in China has been taking place primarily along the first dimension. The focus on state building has enabled the Chinese state to experience a revolutionary change in the past 30 years while still able to provide an institutional environment ensuring economic reform and opening.
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The past three decades have witnessed China's market oriented economic reform and rapid economic growth. The general consensus, however, is that China has not undertaken meaningful political reforms in comparison with the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The question then naturally arises: without some forms of political reforms, would China's relatively successfully market transition and sustained economic development be conceivable? Or put it in another way; is a totalitarian social and political structure compatible with market economy? The key to answer such a question is to specify the meaning of "political reform", particularly the main tasks of political reform in a post-totalitarian society. Theoretically, political reforms in post-totalitarian societies contain at least two tasks. The first is to redefine the state society relationship and build a modem state. The second is to subject the "state" power to democratic process. The difference of political reforms in China and in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is not whether there have been political reforms, but the different paths of political reforms they have pursued. In the former Soviet Union, political reforms started from democratization. In China, the core of political reforms in the post-Mao era has been modem state building. To theoretically conceptualize the nature and process of this state building in China is not only important to understand Chinese politics, but will also shed light on some important issues in political theory, such as the nature and structures of modem state, importance of modem state for market economy and civil society, and state makings in post-totalitarian societies. In the following, I will try to examine the nature and the mam institutional characteristics of the state-building in China through re-examining some basic theoretical issues regarding to state. I will first revisit the theory of the state as developed by Max Weber and other contemporary social theorists, and in particular re-examine the institutional characteristics of totalitarian state. I will then suggest that changes of workings of the Chinese state in the past three decades signify a revolutionary change in the nature of the Chinese state. China has in fact experienced a process of modern state-building through de-tantalization.1 Although the following discussion will be based on the case of China, the main concern is more conceptual than empirical. My main aim is to develop a theoretical framework to understand the institutional features of the post-totalitarian societies including China.
1 The term de-tantalization is used by Giovanni Sartori in his "Totalitarianism, Model Mania and Leaming from Error," Journal o/Theoretical Politics, 5(1), 1993, p. 6.
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1. The Concept of Modern State The emergence of the modern state is one of the main features of modern society. Otto Gierke characterizes rightly the social structure of modern society as "the sovereignty of the state and the sovereignty of the individual.2 That means, in modern society, on the one hand, individual has been gradually emancipated from communitarian ties of family, clan, locality or religion, and· becomes his· own sovereignty, and individual rights become the basis of civil law. On the other hand, the state as an institution surpasses various traditional institutions, religious, local and patrimonial alike, and becomes the power canter of the society. The ideal typical modern state is characterized by Max Weber as an organization which successfully upholds a claim to binding rule making over a territory by virtue of commanding a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. As some recent scholars have emphasized, Max Weber's definition of the state contains three elements: it is a set of institutions, it is bound by particular territory, and it monopolizes the legitimate use of violence. 3 The core of Weber's definition is that the state is a differentiated institution which particularly performs the duty of rule making.4 Following Weber's conception, Norbert Elias provides an excellent account on the process of modem state formation in Western Europe. Elias particularly highlights the importance of the development of modern public finance for the development of modem state. He wrote in his The Civilizing Process: The society of what we call the modern age is characterized, above all in the West, by a certain level of monopolization. Free use of military weapons is denied the individual and reserved to a central authority of whatever kind, and likewise the taxation of the property or income of individuals is concentrated in the hands of a central social authority. The financial means thus flowing into this central authority maintains its monopoly of military force, while this in turn maintains the monopoly of taxation.5
In addition to the monopoly of use of violence and taxation, the modem state also distinguishes itself from other organizations by its functions. Max Weber characterizes these functions simply as rule-providing. Some contemporary economists describe the
2 Otto Gierke, Political theories o/the Middle Ages, Translated into English by F. W. Maitland, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 87. 3 Cf. John A. Hall & G. John Ikenberry, The State, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, pp 1-2 4 Gianfranco Poggi, The Development ofthe Modern State: A Sociological Introduction, Stanford University Press, 1978, p. 1. 5 Norbert Elias, On Civilization, Power, and Knowledge: Selected Writings, ed. by Stephen Mennell & Johan Goudsblom, the University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 139.
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function of the modem state as providing "public goods" to the society, Later professor of economics, Mancur Olson, once made a very interesting comparison between the modern state and bandits. Both bandits and the state ruler may monopoly the use of violence and taxation in a given territory. But the state ruler distinguishes himself from a bandit by his function of providing certain public goods. Wrote Olson: The bandit leader, if he is strong enough to hold a territory securely and monopolize theft there, has an encompassing interest in his domain. This encompassing interest leads him to limit and regularize the rate of his theft and spend some of the resources that he controls on public goods that benefit his victims no less than himself A bandit leader with sufficient strength to control and hold a territory has an incentive to settle down, to wear a crown, and to become a public good-providing autocrat.6
If we combine definitions of Weber, Elias, and Olson, we may be able to come to a conception of an ideal typical modem state. First, it is a specialized institution,. differentiated structurally from other organizations of the society, which monopolies the legitimate use of violence. Or put it differently, state is a public authority. Secondly, it is funded by public finance. Thirdly, its exclusive function is to provide public goods for the society. The importance of the existence of a modem state for modem society has been well recognized by many political theorists, legal philosophers, and economists in the early modem period. There has been general understanding in political theories that modem state building forms the basis of democracy. The objective of democracy is to subject political power to democratic process. Without a clearly defined political power and its institutions, democracy would be impossible. Historically, European state building appeared much early to the process of democratization. Secondly, there has been a consistent theme that modem state is a precondition for the development of market economy and civil society. Modem state alone, by its monopoly of the use of violence for public goods, can provide peace and security internally and externally and can provide universally applicable and enforceable laws for the modem market economy. Probably because the importance of modem state is too common sense to be considered seriously, there have not been many discussions about it in contemporary political and economic theories. Gradually scholars, particularly economists, have forgotten this theme altogether. As Olson and Kahkonen have complained, the importance of the state "is so elemental and natural that it is usually not even stated explicitly or introduced as an axiom in formal theorizing. It is the half-conscious assumption that markets are natural entities that emerge spontaneously, not artificial contrivances or creatures of government.
6 Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity, New York: Basic Books, 2000, pp. 10-11.
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The markets that a society needs, unless prohibited or repressed by government, may be taken for granted."7
2. Institutional Characteristics of a Totalitarian State Modem state could play such important functions largely because it has specific institutional structures. Charles Tilly characterizes the institutional characteristics of the modem state in terms of "differentiated", "autonomous", "centralized," and "institutionalized.”8 Among those characteristics, "differentiation" is the key feature of the modem state. By differentiation it means that there is clear differentiation of functions between state and other organizations of the society. State has limited sphere of control and limited functions. As Poggi expresses clearly, modem state is such an institution which monopoly over the means of coercion and which "can fulfil all the political functions and only political functions. 9 Differentiation of state structure is necessary condition of autonomy of the state. If we understand modern state from perspective of functional differentiation, it is clear that modern state not only differs from traditional state, but also differs from what has been called "totalitarian state", or "total state". The term totalitarianism has been highly controversial as applying to the former communist countries. Originating in 1920s Italy, the term gained prominence during the early period of the Cold War as a dominant theoretical framework for characterizing the Communist regimes. Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski's famous conceptualization of totalitarianism as having six distinguished features was quite influential in the studies of Chinese politics in the 1950s and 1960s. It has been, however, challenged by pluralist approaches and conflict models since the 1960s. There are still serious debates now on whether the notion of totalitarianism can be used as an interpretive model to analyze the former communist societies like China. I do not want to go to details of this debate. I just want to re-examine the conception of totalitarianism from the perspective of state institutions and will argue that such re- examination will shed light on our understanding societies like China.
7 Mancur Olson & Satu Kahkonen ed., A not-sa-dismal Science: A Broader View of Economics and Societies, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 1-2. 8 Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the history of European state-making," in The formation of national states in Western Europe, ed., Charles Tilly, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 70. 9 Gianfranco Poggi, The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects, Polity Press, p.20.
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There were two different usages of the term totalitarianism, or totalism in the 1920s and 1930s. The term totalism and totalitarianism were originally used by the Italian Fascists. It suggests "a fiery spirit and a commitment to a total transformation of society, partly through a kind of religious monism and partly through the ultimately healthful ordeal of violence." 10 The term "totalism", or "totalitarianism", was also used in Germany in the 1930s when German theorists debated the direction of the German state building.11This can be clearly seen from the most prominent writer on this topic, Carl Schmitt. In most cases, Carl Schmitt used totalitarianism to describe a new type of state which he also called 'administrative' or 'total' state."12 The greatest insight of Carl Schmitt is that he indicates that "the administrative or total state was not properly a state but served as the portrayal of its dissolution." In such type of the state, a centralized state would expand in every direction and politicize every domain of human existence. There would be no sphere that could remain free from its interventions. There was no distinction between the state and society.13 For Carl Schmitt, this is not a receipt for s strong state, but a weak state. "The total state identified state and civil society. This meant a weakening of the authority of the state. Stepping beyond the limits that separated its interests from that of civil society, and becoming involved in what was the exclusive concern of civil society, meant that the state lost its autonomy and independence and advanced towards its own extinction."14 The very existence of the state, for Schmitt, depends upon the dualist structure constituted by the separation of the state from civil society. The dissolution of the state occurred, according to Schmitt, when the dualism maintained by the separation between civil society and the state dissipated."15
3. Defining The Chinese State under Mao
In its institutional sense, the Chinese state after 1949 has been a total state. Unlike the imperial system in the past, the Communist rule over the society was complete and comprehensive. Its organization reached the very basic unit of the society and achieved a
10 Abbott Gleason, Totalitarianism: the Inner History of the Cold War, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 16. 11 Abbott Gleason, Totalitarianism: the Inner History of the Cold War, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 20-23. 12 Renato Cristi, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1998, pp. 181-2. 13 Renato Cristi, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1998, pp. 31-2 14 Ibid., p. 23. 15 Ibid., pp. 181-2.
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total political mobility China had ever experienced. In order to perform the function of total control over every aspect of the entire society, the Chinese Communist party –state developed a set of institutions.16 There were three main actors in this organization. At the top were the central authorities, the Central Committee of the Communist party as well as the central government. At the bottom was the "unit" (Danwei). The "unit" was a special organization existed in some former communist countries. It functioned as a productive unit, a provider of social welfare and a political organizer. Between these two, there were various local governments from provinces down to townships. Some characteristics of this institutional arrangement are important for our understanding of the Chinese politics. First, the entire system was highly centralized. The central authority as represented by the Central Committee of the Chinese communist party and its leadership was the sources of all powers. All of the important political, economic, social, and cultural decisions were made from the central authority. All of the important nominations of leaders of the provincial governments, large enterprises, universities and so on were made by the central authority. In a sense, administrators of all other levels, including those in the "units" were branches of the central government. The entire country was organized as a single political machine in which the central authorities, through their various organizations in local levels, organize and control every aspect of the society. Secondly, local governments in various levels had identical functions and structures to those of the central government. Governments in all levels as well as the administrator of units were supposed to be the organizer of economic, social, and political lives in the respective areas. The most important feature which should be noted here is that there existed no differentiation both in structure and in functions between various actors of the society. All actors have dual functions: on the one hand, they organized productions and provided jobs and social security for people in their domain. On the other hand, they were social and political administrator. They were the providers of what is called public goods.
16 One of the best early studies of the Chinese communist system has been Franz Schurmann's work Ideology and Organization in Communist China (second edition, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). In this book, Schurmann discerns three factors as the main mechanism of achieving total control over society by the Communist party. These are: organizations, ideology and elites (cadres). Some recent studies both in China and in the West began to address the institutional aspects of the Communist rule in China. For instance, Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic, Stanford University Press, 1988; Victor Nee & David Stark, Rethinking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe, Stanford University Press, 1989; Andrew Walder ed., The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary, University of Californian Press, 1995; Lu Feng, "The Origin and formation of the Dan-Wei System in the Communist China" (in Chinese), Chinese Social Science Quarterly, 1993, No. 4; Li Qiang, "The Paradox between the Power and Capacity of the State," China Book Review, 1998, No. 11.
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Thirdly, organizations in every level, from unit to province, are all closed and autonomous units. Although theoretically all units are part of the system, in practice, every unit was highly self-sustained. The relationship between the leaders of a unit and, its members resembled that of parents and children. While all leaders were subordinate to their superior levels of governments, they were nevertheless almighty masters in their domain of administration. Everything in the unit, man and property, is property of the unit, and then in abstract sense, the property of the state as a whole.17As Vivienne Shue has vividly described, "This organization of economic life in pre-reform China to a large degree resembled 'an enormous honeycomb of small, similar, connected yet more or less fully bounded cells of mostly inward-regarding activity' .18 In such a system, there was a complete merge between state and society. From the perspective of ideal typical modern state, there existed no independent institutions which could be identified as state institutions. There was no independent sphere which could be called society either. The predominant aim of the entire structure was political control and political mobilization.
4. Reforming The Post-Totalitarian State The economic reform initiated in 1978 immediately posed challenges to the totalitarian political structure. Beginning in 1978, the goal of the state changed from political mobilization to economic development. In 1984, the central authority further decided to pursue socialist market economy instead of the planned economy in the past. Those changes posed significant challenges to the traditional total state. As we have outlined above, the total state was efficient in penetrating into every corner of the society and achieving political mobilization in China. It, however, was not quite adequate for promoting economic development. Particularly when China decided to pursue socialist market economy, this inadequacy was clearly demonstrated. For the operation of the market economy, certain institutional arrangements are necessary. On the one hand, as many contemporary researchers have showed, the existence of modern state is a precondition for market economy because the state alone could provide public goods, particularly legal structure for market economy.19 Secondly, market economy requires a new type of enterprise which operates in accordance with market principles, rather than political
17 Cf. Li Qiang, "Institutional Reforms in Economic Transformation", in Comparative Studies o/Social and Economic Structures, Beijing, 1998, No. 2. 18 Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches o/the Chinese Body Politic, Stanford University Press, 1988, pp. 2-3. 19 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins a/Our Time, 1944, p. 38~
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principles. Clearly the total state structure before the reform could neither provide an autonomous state which is capable to provide public goods, nor the new type of enterprise. In the face of the challenges posed by economic reform, the Chinese leadership chose a unique path of political reform which is drastically different from that of the former Soviet Union. In the later, democratization was the dominant theme both in ideas and in practice. In China, transforming the functions of the state has been the central theme of political reform. In the earlier stage of China's reform, Deng Xiaoping spelled out clearly that the goal of political reform is to promote economic development, or "socialist market economy." He suggested that the main problem of China's political system was that "all levels of government have taken responsibilities of many matters which they should not and could not to take care." Based on such a understanding, it is quite understandable that the main direction of China's political reform is, on the one hand, to transform the functions of the government from total state to a more or less limited state, and on the other hand, to transform the functions of the units from a cell of the total state to a more or less independent actor in the socialist market economy. If we analyze such reforms from the perspective of functional differentiation, it could be argued that the process of China's reform on transformation of the functions of the state is in fact a process of state building. To be sure, this process of state building differs significantly from that in modem Europe. In the latter case, the process of state building was a process of "building", namely to build state institutions, bureaucracy, and public finance from without. In the case of China in the past three decades, the process of state building is not "building" in literal sense, but deconstruction. China's state building has had dual tasks. On the one hand, it needs to reduce the penetration of the state power into society in order to build a differentiated and autonomous state structure. On the other hand, it needs to increase state functions in providing public goods. In other words, the entire process contains both the task of de-totalization and the task of capacity building. In the past three decades, particularly since 1982, China has undertaken series reforms in this process of de-totalization. First, since 1982, there have been six rounds of major administrative reforms in the central government (1982, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008). Those reforms have significantly reduced ranges of functions of the government, particularly its functions in organizing production directly. Most of the ministrations under the State Council which directly managed economic production have been abolished or restructured. As a result, the number of ministration has been reduced from about 100 in 1982 to 22 at the present. In the administrative reform in 2003, a separate Committee on Managing State-owned Assets was established. Through this action, the government function in providing public good and its function in managing state-owned property was separated.
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Secondly, in the meantime of transformation of the functions of the state, the reform in the state-owned enterprise has also made progress. Through various reforms in the past decades, including ownership reforms, the amount of state-owned enterprise has been reduced significantly. These changes, together with the rapid development of private owned enterprises and joint-venture enterprises have fundamentally transformed the social and political structure of the total state. Various types of enterprises no longer act as the basic social, economic and political units of a total state. They behave more or less as a rational actor in pursuing profits in market. Thirdly, along with the transformation of the functions of the government and transformation of enterprises, there have been also great efforts in establishing modem public finance system. Operation of governments in various levels depends more and more on taxation rather than different types of fees. Fourthly, the transformation of the functions of governments and enterprises has created certain space for the development of civil society. Various types of civil society associations began to emerge in the last decades. If we analyze those reforms through the perspective of state building, it is clear that China has achieved significant progress in dismantling a totalistic state structure and in building a modem type of state. The progress of the state building has not only provided political and legal framework for China's economic development in the past decades, it also provide opportunities for the growth of civil society. The growth of civil society in turn will promote development of democracy. Despite its great progress in the past three decades, it is fair to say that modem state building in China is still in a half way journey. For many critics, at least for liberal critics, government still has too much power in interfering with economic and social life. Party power and structure has by and large remained the totalistic model without parallel reforms as in the government. Public service sectors, such as education and medical service, have not experienced reforms as in the state-owned enterprise. Probably both as a response to critics from society, and as efforts to bring renewed momentum to reform and development, the second plenum of the seventeenth party congress passed an important document "Opinions on Administrative Reforms". The "opinion" has been hotly discussed in China both by officials and by scholars. It has been regarded as providing a blueprint for the administrative and political reforms in the next decade. The "opinion" outlines the overall objective of the administrative reform as following: "through further transforming the functions of government, a comparatively satisfactory administrative structure will be completed by 2020." In order to achieve such a goal, the "opinion" specifies four "separations" as the main tasks of administrative reform which are, further separation between the government and
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enterprise management, further separation between government and the management of state assets, separation between government and public service sectors, and separation between government and civil society. There are some innovations in the four separations which deserve closer attentions. One is the notion of separating government from public service sectors (shiye danwei). This implies that the Chinese authorities may extend reforms from state owned enterprises to broad state owned public service sector. The goal of the reform is to reduce government's direct management of public service sectors, such as education and medical service. In the past three decades, reforms in public sectors have lagged behind enterprise reforms in economic areas. Public service sector is still managed directly by government. There have been consistent arguments that there should be similar reforms in public service sector in order to transform the functions of government and enhance autonomy and efficiency of units in public sectors. The "opinion" outlines that in public service sectors there will be reforms directed towards much more autonomy of the units and less direct management from government. The other innovative idea is the separation between government and civil society. It has two implications. On the one hand, in the past several decades, many former government branches have been transformed as "associations". Although they appear to be civil service organization, they in fact act like government branches in that they monopoly some rule- making and rule-implementing powers. On the other hand, civil service organizations and associations emerged from society have faced strict control from government. The "opinion" outlines that the overall goal of reform is to promote development of civil society. It, however, does not provide concrete methods for achieving this goal. It is far from clear whether the government has the willingness and plan to redefine the relationship between government and civil society. It has been only one year since the "opinion" was passed. Except for some minor changes in government structures, there have not been any significant moves either in reforms of public sectors or in separation between government and civil society. It is too early to tell whether this "opinion" will mark an important landmark in China's state- building process. From its announcements, one could suggest that it has touched upon some important areas of state building. If all measures announced in this "opinion" are carried out, the Chinese state will look drastically different not only from totalistic state, but from traditional state. The process of modem state building would be by and large completed.
5. Conclusion
……
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