North Korean Policies and the ROK-US Alliance Under the Moon Administration: Dilemma Between ROK-US Alliance and Inter-Korean Co

North Korean Policies and the ROK-US Alliance Under the Moon Administration: Dilemma between ROK-US Alliance and Inter-Korean Cooperation Kwang Kyu Nam (SSK Research Center of Korea University, Research Professor)

The objective of this paper is to present the realistic dilemma facing the Moon administration that is aiming at pursuing both Korea-US alliance and cooperation with the North, by analyzing the North Korean policies and the Korea-US relationship under the Moon administration. Specifically, it aims to take a look at the North Korean policies of the Moon administration that is carrying out sanctions and dialogue side by side based on the appeasement policy framework, thereby comparing the different stances of the Republic of Korea and the United States surrounding the content of the alliance dealing with the North Korean nuclear issues and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). It also revisits how the means to denuclearize the North have their limits in realistic terms and the conditions on the resumption of dialogue for the related discussions. This paper reveals that the approach taken by the Moon administration regarding Pyongyang is similar to that of China, and that the Korea-US alliance is likely to weaken should there be any change concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. If the Moon administration takes an ambiguous position without having frank communication with the US, the US counterpart will only try to resolve by working with China, and strengthen the US-Japan alliance. In this sense, the so-called ‘Korea Passing’ phenomenon lies in the ambiguity of the Korea-US alliance in responding specifically to the North Korean nuclear issue. Thus, change in the issue in any direction will only lead to a weaker alliance with the US. If the issue enters into a condition right for dialogue, the US’ stance will likely be, in the long term, neutral. In addition, should the issue become one that urges a solution for peaceful regime on the Korean peninsula, then it will need go beyond solving the nuclear issue itself to form a security community in the Northeast Asia as a whole.

Ⅰ. Introduction

While the domestic politics was escalating into the presidential impeachment and the follow-up election, the so-called ‘Korea passing’ phenomenon persisted in which ROK was isolated from the issues on the Koran peninsula including mainly the North Korean nuclear issue. The Trump administration engaged in closer cooperation with China while imposing strong sanctions and pressure on the North. On the other hand, ROK was not able to deal properly with the regional issues surrounding the Korean peninsula due to the precarious domestic politics. With the Moon administration taking power on May 10th through the election, ROK was now able to tackle the escalating security issues in Northeast Asia arising from the North Korean nuclear program. Unlike the previous conservative administrations, the Moon administration is attempting to pursue North Korean policies to induce denuclearization through a leading role of the ROK government, on the basis of the principle to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully. It is pursuing sanctions and dialogue simultaneously, a point that slightly differs from that of the US which is strongly imposing sanctions against the North. The North Korean issue takes up the most important part of US foreign policies under the Trump administration, which include sanctions and diplomatic pressure as well as military measures. President Trump is emphasizing the role of China in tackling the North Korean issues and is pressing China to quit trading with the North and limit supplying oil and applying secondary boycott on companies doing business with Pyongyang. In his speech at the United Nations, President Trump vowed to “totally destroy” North Korea if it threatened the United States or its allies (Jason Silverstein, 2017), alluding the possibility of considering even the military options. However, despite the sanctions 2371 and 2375 which are currently in place and considered to be the strongest ever in UN history as well as strong pressure from the US and China, North Korea is advancing its nuclear capabilities, pressing ahead with the 6th nuclear test and launching as many as 16 ballistic missiles including mid- to long-range missiles. The regime called its 6th test as a “successful hydrogen bomb experiment,” boasting of being a nuclear state (North Korean Central Broadcasting, 2017). Moreover, it announced the plan to strike the area around Guam, threatening to enter into an armed clash with the US. Due to the conflict between the North and the US, which involves nuclear and missile provocations and even the talk of a war, the North Korean nuclear issue is becoming the most daunting task and critical factor facing the Moon administration since its start. While the government is aiming to resolve the issue peacefully by harmoniously pursuing ROK-US alliance and inter-Korean cooperation, it is in reality stuck in a dilemma between the two. The Moon government’s diplomatic leeway is too small, faced with the international nature of the nuclear issue, the Northeast Asian policies of the US and China, as well as the North Korean attitude dealing only with the US. In the second part, this paper explains the direction of the North Korean policies of the Moon administration trying to pursue the sanctions and dialogue side by side based on the appeasement policy, against the backdrop of the nuclear crisis. The third part focuses on the ROK-US alliance in response to the North, the conflict between Korea and the US surrounding the Thaad, and the position of the Moon administration which attempts to take a neutral approach between the US and China regarding the Thaad issue. In the fourth chapter, this paper reveals the realistic limits of the means to denuclearize the North, inconsistencies in the conditions for the resumption of the talks to discuss nuclear issues, and the differences between the ROK and the US on these issues as well as the dilemma of the Moon administration. In the last part, it concludes by saying that the government of President Moon is taking a similar approach with that of China, and that in whatever direction the North Korean nuclear issue may take, the Korea-US alliance has a high likelihood to weaken under his administration. It also lays out that if ever the North’s nuclear issue reaches the dialogue phase, it should constitute the beginning of the formation of a Northeast Asian security community.

Ⅱ. Basic Framework of the Moon Administration’s North Korean Policies

1. Sanctions and Dialogue in Parallel Based on the Appeasement Policy

The North Korean policies of President Moon Jae-in and the ruling Democratic Party is to reflect the ‘sunshine policy’ in today’s situations and environment, which was an appeasement policy approach pursued by the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations in the past. The official name under the Roh administration was a ‘policy of peace and prosperity,’ which is a more specified, refined version of the ‘sunshine policy’ of the Kim administration. During his presidential campaign, President Moon said that his North Korea policy “will build on the sunshine policy and North Korean engagement policy, thereby eliciting change of attitude from North Korea.” (Yonhap News, 23 April 2017) The appeasement policy and inter-Korean cooperation first began to take shape in the Inter-Korean Summit in June, 2000, and were most actively pursued under the Roh administration. However, while the Kim administration was striving to pursue inter-Korean cooperation within the framework of the ROK-US alliance, the Roh administration advocated inter-Korean collaboration over the ROK-US alliance. (Jeon, 2017, p. 2) The conservative governments that came to power since the Roh administration, which are the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations, began to restore and strengthen the ROK-US alliance that had been relatively weakened during the former governments against the backdrop of the persistent nuclear experiments and nuclear development of the North, virtually abandoning the inter-Korean cooperation. The rationale was that the aid projects for North Korea and inter-Korean economic collaboration that existed in the past did not stop Pyongyang from developing nuclear capabilities. Rather, they claimed, the North used the support and cooperation from the South in advancing their nuclear program. However, the reasons that disabled cooperation during the two conservative governments were mainly provided by the North. Events like the murder of a tourist at Mount Kumgang in 2008, 2nd nuclear experiment in 2009, and the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 came to pass during the Lee administration. In response, the government put a stop to the Mt. Kumgang tour, and suspended economic cooperation with the North by taking the May 24 measures except the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The Park Geun-hye government attempted at improving the inter-Korean relations gradually through the Korean peninsula trust-building process.‘ However, the new leader of the North Kim Jong-un primarily focused on strengthening his power rather than improving its relations with the South. Kim launched three rounds of nuclear tests, created an atmosphere of a war on the peninsula, threatened to mar operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and installed the landmines at the Military Demarcation Line. The Park government responded more strongly to the provocations than other governments in the past by even declaring a retaliatory raid, going so far as to cease the operations at Kaesong after the 4th nuclear test. However, the Moon administration believes that the North Korean policies of the Lee and Park administrations as well as the ‘strategic patience’ of the Obama administration failed at resolving the North’s nuclear issue, that talks must be resumed and that the sanctions should only be a means to negotiation with the North (Choe, 2017). President Moon’s ‘two-track’ approach that pursues sanctions and dialogue side by side in fact places more emphasis on dialogue as a means to lay the ground for mutual trust (Cho, 2017, p. 21). In this effort, his government is aiming at modifying or even discarding the North Korean policies of the past governments, restoring support and engaging with the North. More on his plan include the resumption of operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mt. Kumgang Tour which were suspended in the past governments, once certain conditions are met, as well as inter-Korean cooperation that became history with the ‘May 24 measures.’ He also plans on delivering the ‘June 15 North-South Korea Joint Declaration in 2000’ which was agreed when President Kim visited the North to discuss the direction of unification and inter-Korean relations, as well as the October 4 Agreement in 2007, which came out when President Roh visited the North to agree on some inter-Korean cooperation projects. The basic framework of the North Korean policies of the Moon administration is enshrined in the Berlin Initiative, which President Moon announced in Germany on July 6th. Through the initiative, which is also known as the ‘New vision of peace on the Korean peninsula,’ President Moon urged to find a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations by beginning with the easiest things. His proposals in the Initiative include the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, signing of the Peace Agreement, reunion of the separated families on Chuseok holiday, mutual suspension of hostile activities at the MDL and others. He has also shown his will to pursue the economic plans for the two countries as well as exchanges and cooperation in non-political areas consistently. He suggested that the two Koreas resume official communication including the inter-Korean summit, and requested that the North Korean athletes attend the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games in 2018. (Moon, Ministry of Unification, 2017) Thus far, South Korean presidents’ proposals to the North in Germany included the Berlin Declaration by President Kim in March 2000, Berlin Suggestion by President Lee in May 2011, and the Dresden Declaration by President Park in March 2014, most of which are suggestions on improving the inter-Korean relations and providing humanitarian aid to the North. President Moon’s Berlin Plan includes the similar proposals as his predecessors. Yet, he primarily suggests that low-level people-to-people exchanges and humanitarian aid to North Korea be resumed in the current situation where the nuclear crisis is escalating, thereby inducing North Korea to come to the negotiating table.

2. Emphasis on ROK’s Leading Role in Dealing with Issues on Peninsula

The Moon administration is advocating the “Korean peninsula driver theory,‘ in which the Korean government plays a leading role in tackling the issues on the Korean peninsula, including the nuclear issue. He specifically said, “We want to take the leading role in solving the issues on the peninsula rather than sitting and watching from the back seat.” (The Washington Post, 2 May 2017) Moon administration is a government that came to power with the politically leftist and radical nationalists at its foundation, who emphasize the Korean government’s ‘autonomy’ in dealing with foreign affairs. In his government, a considerable number of figures used to belong to the ‘Anti-US independent group,’ which was a political line of the student activists in the 1980s. Resisting the military regime through the democratization movements in the 1980s, they claimed that Korea was subjugated to the US and that North Korea was one nation with South Korea, one that is subject to cooperation. They place more emphasis on the inter-Korean cooperation over the ROK-US alliance. Some of them even maintain that we should realistically acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear state. The people working for the National Security Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Unification, Ministry of National Defense, National Intelligence Service and others that constitute the diplomatic and security lines are mostly evaluated as belonging to the ‘Dialogue Group’ or ‘Autonomy Group.’ (Weekly Kyunghyang , 2017) What President Moon said as the most prominent achievement of the first KOR-US summit in June was also that President Trump acknowledged that South Korea has a leading role in achieving peaceful unification in the Korean peninsula, and that the transfer of wartime command should be made promptly. In the KOR-US summit in September 2006, President Roh agreed with the US to take back the wartime control in 2012. However, the period of transfer was readjusted during the Lee and Park administrations. President Lee postponed it to December 1, 2015, and President Park said that the government “would decide on the time frame when certain conditions that the two countries have agreed upon have been met, without specifying the exact deadline.” (The Hankyoreh, 2014) Transfer of wartime control is an issue that will bring about structural changes in the KOR-US alliance including the operational system of the ROK-U.S. Combined Force as well as Japan’s support system for it, should the war break out on the peninsula. While the transfer of wartime control back to South Korea will improve the independent operational capability of the Korean military, it still remains unclear whether that in itself will help sustain and strengthen the ROK-US alliance, and drive the Korea-US-Japan cooperation as the US envisions it. During his early months, President Roh did set the principle of his North Korea policy, which is that the Korean government will take the leading role. However, the goal was difficult to be achieved since the first ROK-US summit on May 15, 2003. The US-North conflict was escalating under the Bush administration which called the North the ‘axis of evil,’ working as an impediment to the Roh administration. The second North Korean nuclear crisis began to take shape in 2002 when the US raised suspicions that Pyongyang had HEU, and in the following year as North Korea walked away from the NPT. The possibility of military response to the North was proposed then, straining the inter-Korean relationship further. (Jeong & Goh, 2017, p. 200) China pressured North Korea by going so far as to temporarily close the oil pipes going to the North (Kim, 2016, pp. 78-79), which brought North Korea to the three-party talks among North Korea, the US, and China, leading to the six-party talks in August, 2003. The escalating nuclear crisis, pressure coming from the hawkish factions within the Bush administration, President Roh’s recognition of the North and the limits of his diplomatic leverage, and the domestic politics influencing the negotiations with the US have all combined to put a constraint on the negotiations with the US (Jeon, 2017. p. 13). Still, it was before the North launched its nuclear tests that the Roh administration could continue on with and even expand the economic cooperation with the North. During his presidency, the people-to-people and material exchanges expanded and the projects to build the Kaesong Industrial Complex, connect the railroads, and Mt. Kumgang tour could all begin in full swing. His government saw that the improvement of relations with the North and the internal stability of the Northern regime through the active economic exchanges with the South would be the best choice to prevent the nuclear crisis. (Lee, 2011. p. 37) However, against the backdrop of ever-increasing nuclear capabilities of the North with its latest experiment, the Moon administration could not pursue the appeasement policy without repeating the same kind of Korea-US conflicts surrounding the North Korean policies with those under the Roh administration. The current situation makes it unable to resume the economic support or cooperation in any form that the Moon administration planned. With that recognition, the government is prioritizing private, non-political exchanges and humanitarian support rather than official economic cooperation or support. In particular, it is deeming the attendance of the North Korean athletes at the Pyeongchang Olympics in 2018 as highly significant, and it is in fact highly likely that it will come to pass. The government is likely to take the opportunity as a start of restoration of the frozen relations as the Olympics is largely a symbol of peace. Thus, the ‘leading role’ that the Moon administration wants South Korea to take can be interpreted in such a way that the Korean government will bear the brunt of delivering the conditions to resume talks between the North and the US, or meeting their demands after such talks do actually happen. This may be a similar approach with how the Korean government took on the proactive role of providing support to the North since the Geneva Agreed Framework of 1994.

Ⅲ. ROK-US Relations Surrounding North Korean Policies and Factors Causing Conflict

1. Moon’s ‘Dialogue First’ vs Trump’s ‘Sanctions First’

The Trump administration’s stance on North Korea is to impose strong sanctions through economic and diplomatic means and pressure China into playing more roles and at the same time, all while not shying away from military options against the North as well. Last April, it announced a set of policies towards the North, ‘ Maximum Pressure and Engagement,’ in which it called the efforts of the past US governments to denuclearize the North a failure, and specified that Pyongyang’s nuclear program is an urgent threat to the US security and therefore is on its first priority list in US foreign policies. Not acknowledging Pyongyang as a nuclear state, it is poised to take all kinds of measures to place economic and diplomatic pressure on the North, while basically taking an approach to solve through dialogue without pursuing the regime collapse or regime change (Washington AP, 2017). In the ROK-US summit on June 29th, the two countries reaffirmed the ROK-US alliance regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. As for North Korean policies, they promised to closely cooperate to peacefully achieve the common goal of complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. They also agreed on fully implementing the sanctions as well as a new set of measures, while imposing maximum pressure to prevent Pyongyang’s provocations. At the same time, they hinted at the possibilities of dialogue with the North “under the right circumstances,” suggesting both countries did not have any hostile policies against the North. President Trump also reaffirmed his plege that the US will provide extended deterrence to South Korea by mobilizing all of its military capabilities including the conventional and nuclear weapons (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2017) As such, while ROK-US alliance was reaffirmed to scrap Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons, President Moon emphasized ‘dialogue,’ while his US counterpart emphasized ‘sanctions and pressure.’ His approach to pursue ‘sanctions and dialogue’ side by side and President Trump’s mention “Strategic patience is over” reveal a slight difference of perception towards the only isolated nation on earth. The two countries also remained unclear about the “right circumstances” for the dialogue with the North. While ROK-US alliance was emphasized to tackle Pyongyang’s nuclear issue, President Moon took a vague stance on the specific resolutions to change the status quo. Although the government is actively implementing the sanctions, they stop short of going more than the UNSC’s sanctions against the North. It is true that there are not many sanctions measures that South Korea can take alone. However, there have been criticisms that there is no real action from the Korean government as it lacks even symbolic measures to emphasize sanctions and pressure (The Segye Times, 2017/9/27). Unlike the US that independently imposed sanctions against the North six times, the ROK has never done it a single time. Recognizing it, the Moon government announced its own sanctions on November 6th for the first time, the day before Trump’s visit. Yet, President Moon mentioned in a statement that there is no room for South Korea to actually do something to make change regarding the nuclear issue, and the Minister of Unification said that Pyongyang is never going to abandon its nuclear weapons, which are none other than self-contradictions (The Chosun Ilbo, 2017/10/19). Though the government did make accomplishments in getting the US president to lift restrictions on its missile payload capabilities and South Korea’s military can now respond to the North’s provocations by launching ballistic missiles (The Segye Times, 2 September 2017), these measures are no less than to live up to the domestic public opinion. Another area of conflict between the two countries is the extent of support and cooperation with the North by the Moon administration. While Moon stressed human rights and humanitarian support, Trump showed support for Moon’s desire for humanitarian issues. The Moon administration decided to provide 8 million dollar worth of aid to Pyongyang in September through an international organization, a measure that was not acceptable to the US which is committed to imposing sanctions. The US maintains that economic support and cooperation cannot be resumed without the approval of the 1718 Committee under the UNSC, since implementing the UNSC resolutions on sanctioning the North is important. The US does not believe that an appeasement policy of any kind such as the sunshine policy will bring about a change in attitude from the North (William Newcomb 2017, p. 3). President Trump does not disapprove of an inter-Korean dialogue, but maintains that it should take place in the right circumstances, by which he means the time when North Korea stops launching nuclear tests and missiles and shows the will to denuclearize with action (Lee Tae-hwan 2017, p. 17). The Trump administration was also cold at the inter-Korean military talks that President Moon proposed to Pyongyang in July (The JoongAng Ilbo, 19 July 2017). As such, South Korea often mentioning dialogue in the current sanctions regime does not seem appropriate. The ROK-US alliance and the inter-Korean cooperation that the Moon administration pursues can only be realized with advancements in the US-North relations, which means that realistically speaking, the resolution of the nuclear issue should be on the first agenda. In this sense, the inter-Korean cooperation that the Moon administration is aiming to achieve should come after the atmosphere of dialogue and negotiation is made and after compromise between them can be made. The inter-Korean summit in 2007 under the Roh administration could take place because the nuclear issue was settled through the six-party talks and the ‘February 13 Agreement’ was made in 2007, making it possible for Pyongyang and the US to talk at least temporarily (Hwang, 2017, p. 42).

2. ROK-US Conflict Surrounding Thaad and Moon’s Neutral Stance

During the park Administration the Thaad deployed in Korea to respond to the nuclear threats from the north became a reason for conflict between Korea and China as well as Korea and the United States. After the 6th nuclear test by the North on September 3rd, the issue was concluded with the Moon administration completing the deployment of Thaad. While as a candidate, Moon maintained that the deployment of Thaad should be decided in the next administration and not during the Park administration (The Seoul Economic Daily, 16 Feb. 2017), remaining neither for nor against the matter. The Democratic Party, then the opposition party, opposed the Thaad deployment claiming that it has been processed without proper procedures that it must be ratified and approved by the National Assembly (Democratic Party, 2017). Upon taking office, President Moon criticized the process in which the Park government pursued the negotiations on Thaad, and announced that the matter will be decided after the results of the test on the environmental impact are out, though it may take a while. Most of his supporters who voted for him are against or critical of deploying Thaad, and some even rallied around the US embassy for a protest. In contrast, the Trump administration was trying to understand the sincerity of President Moon regarding the ROK-US alliance through Moon’s attitude about the deployment of Thaad. The US seemed to lose trust in President Moon who was extremely conscious about China’s reaction and critical of Park’s negotiation process with the US. Even though Moon said the Thaad will be deployed by the time the environmental impact test is concluded, the US understood that Moon’s government explained to China that environmental impact evaluation is a measure to postpone the Thaad deployment (Woo, 2017, pp. 5-6). The US government suspected that the Moon government is reading the countenance of both China and the US. Thus, unlike what many expected, Thaad was never mentioned as an agenda in the first ROK-US summit, and the completion of the Thaad deployment since the 6th nuclear test of Pyongyang put an end to the discussion regarding this matter. South Korea and China also settled their opinions about Thaad through the negotiations on October 31st that were held to resolve the conflict arising from Thaad. However, in the agreement, South Korea promised that it would not take part in building the Missile Defense System of the US or deploy Thaad. It also agreed to make sure that the Korea-US-Japan military cooperation will not advance into a military alliance (The Chosun Ilbo, 3 Nov. 2017). The fact that the ROK government mentioned three specific security matters to China since China does not call Thaad into question can be taken as a sign that the Moon administration agreed with China in keeping the US in check. While Foreign minister Kang Kyung-wha premised that it would not lead to a military alliance, doing so could conflict with the ROK-US summit as well as the contents of the joint statements on ROK-US-Japan security cooperation announced in the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting on October 28. Moreover, it could come into conflict with the Northeast Asian policy of the US that tries to strengthen ROK-US-Japan, and incapacitate the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) between the ROK and Japan. In the current situation where the Moon administration is demanding renegotiation of the ROK-Japan agreement on comfort women agreed during the Park administration, ROK-Japan military cooperation is a distant dream. As for Thaad, the Moon administration completed the task as it was agreed upon during the Park administration on the one hand, while agreeing with China in holding the US in check on the other, striking a balance between the US and China. In that sense, the debates about the deployment of Thaad in our domestic politics shares some similarities with what existed within the Joseon dynasty regarding the surrounding powers in the late 19th century. The country was declining with power struggle among the qing dynasty, Japan and Russia. People were divided on who will be our friend and our enemy, and the recognition of the international powers surrounding the country led to different factions, such as pro-Qing, pro-Japanese, and pro-Russian groups Lee, 1994). Similarly, the debates about Thaad are being shaped by questions like which country we need to maintain friendlier relations to work them to our advantage and views on North Korea. While the ROK-US alliance remains intact, the public preference has continued to change within the South Korean society regarding which country we should side with. The differences in the perceptions of foreign relations can be well witnessed when it comes to military security related to the strategic interests of the US and China like the Thaad issue. Those who approve of Thaad emphasizes the ROK-US alliance more, while those who do not place more emphasis on the relations with China. The negative attitude the Moon administration has on deploying Thaad and the seemingly neutral stance it takes in treating the US and China can lead to suspicions and mistrust from the US on ROK-US alliance.

Ⅳ. ROK-US Alliance on North Korean Nuclear Issue and Dilemma with Inter-Korean Cooperation

1. North Korea’s Claim of Being a Nuclear State and Refusal to Denuclearize

North Korea amended its constitution in April 2012 to specify that it is a ‘nuclear state,’ and presented the ‘Economy-Nuclear Power parallel lines’ in the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in March 2013. It reaffirmed the parallel lines strategy in the 7th Party Congress held in May 2016. It boasted of the its diversified and miniaturized nuclear weapons through the 3rd nuclear test (North Korean Central News, 2 Dec. 2013), and in January 2016 launched the 4th experiment evaluated as the boosted nuclear fission bomb experiment. In its 5th nuclear experiment in September 2016, it displayed the ever-stronger explosive power through the highly enriched uranium experiment (Ahn, 2017, p. 174), and claimed that the 6th experiment last September 3 was a ‘hydrogen bomb test.’ Kim Jong-un considers the status of North Korea as a nuclear state the identity of the regime, as well as the most remarkable achievement. North Korea has no plans to denuclearize as of now, since it is trying to be acknowledged as a nuclear state through the nuclear arms race with the US (Hwang, 2017, 38). Because it is using its status as a nuclear state as a leverage in the negotiations with the US, nuclear weapons for Pyongyang are an aggressive means to pressure the US rather than to preserve its regime. North is confident that the maximum nuclear capability will bring the US to the negotiating table that it wants. Its intention is to secure the ‘mutual deterrence’ with the US as a nuclear state (Waltz, 1990, 740-741), and therefore not to accept any dialogue and negotiations on the premise of abandoning the nuclear program. North Korea wants a structural change in its relations with the US while keeping its nuclear capability, which is the signing of a peace agreement with the US and the withdrawal of the US Forces from the peninsula as a follow-up measure. Pyongyang held the 7th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea last May, where it issued statements that it would use its strengthened nuclear capability to make the US scrap its hostile policies and turn the cease-fire agreement into peace agreement, thereby having the US Forces withdraw from South Korea (North Korean Central News, 5 September 2016). Under the international law, ceasefire agreement refers to a state in which military battles are suspended without dealing with the cause of war (Yoram, 1982, p. 547). In the Article 4 of the ceasefire agreement which was struck among the US, China and North Korea in 1953 says all foreign forces must withdraw, and the Chinese military withdrew completely after 1958. North Korea is demanding that the US Combined Forces withdraw since they are stationed in South Korea due to ROK-US alliance (Lee Seung-Yeol, 2017, pp. 3-4).

2. Limits with Means to Urge Pyongyang’s Dismantlement of Nuclear Programs and Moon Administration’s Opposition to Military Solutions

Since Pyongyang is claiming to be acknowledged as a nuclear state, the means to drive it down the path to denuclearization is showing its limits. While the ongoing UNSC sanctions may impede the North, they are insufficient to fundamentally induce nuclear dismantlement. The UNSC is expecting stem the flow of approximately a billion dollars every year through its resolution 2371, which bans Pyongyang’s main exports to China such as coal, steel, seafood and others (UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 5 August 2017). Sanction 2375 reduces its crude oil imports by 30% and exports of textiles, bans renewed permissions of its workers abroad, and allows inspections of suspicious vessels (UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 11 September 2017). However, a total of eight sanctions resolutions since Pyongyang’s 1st nuclear test in October 2006 could not stop the North from sophisticating its nuclear capabilities. At this point in time when the North’s nuclear and missile development is just a year from completion, there is not enough time before the sanctions measures can work. The sanctions can work only if we completely contain the North for an extended period of time to expect some internal change. The role of China that the Trump administration is pinning hopes on has its own limits as well. The US-China cooperation to resolve the North’s nuclear issue began to take shape since the summit on April 6th. The strong UN sanctions led by the US are virtually the sanctions to be implemented by China, which has been reinforcing the degree of sanctions in favor of the US’ demands. However, they remain strict about not including the areas that affect the North Korean citizens, and there can be many loopholes as can be seen from the Chinese local governments not faithfully implementing the sanctions imposed by the central government. Above all, China is emphasizing that the nuclear issue cannot be fundamentally solved with sanctions, and the purpose of sanctions is to gain the opportunity of dialogue and negotiations. China sees it difficult to make North Korea abandon nuclear weapons (环球时报, 18 April 2017), and it many never give up on Pyongyang. North Korea is not giving it a thought to give up its nuclear program even if it means having to bear the sanctions from China. It is armed with the ideologies that advocate ‘autonomy.’ and highly distrusts China unlike what seems on the outside. North Korea condemns China for joining the sanctions by saying that it is following the opinions of the US (North Korean Central News, 22 September 2017). Thus, Pyongyang is threatening not just the US but also China through its nuclear provocations. The only option available once the economic and diplomatic pressures have their limits is a military one. If the US strikes the North, the options may include preemptive attacks, preventive attacks, or operation of decapitation of Kim. However, the preemptive attack is hard to materialize since the objective point of its missiles is difficult to goal missile projection is difficult to assume. So is the preventive attack as it is difficult to remove all its nuclear facilities and about 200 mobile missile launchers scattered around the country. US Special Forces attempting to infiltrate the closed society to attack Kim is also a difficult job to fulfill (Park Won-gon, 2017, p. 5). Even if it is possible, the internal control down the road is uncertain. The military options of the US seem to be a means to pressure the North to stop further provocations into the negotiating table and China to take an active role. But as the subjective perception of a decision-maker rather than the situation itself can influence the decision making process (Richard C. Snyder, 1963, p. 65), it is likely that the hostile perceptions the leaders of the US and North Korea have for each other may lead to armed conflicts. The beliefs of President Trump and the moral evaluations about Kim can increase the possibility of choosing to go military. The US deems that it needs a military option when North Korea has the ability to strike the homeland of the US with missiles carrying a nuclear warhead (Richard Hass, 2017, pp. 4-5), the nuclear weapons and missiles of the North are presenting an ‘urgent, clear, and sufficient’ threat to the US. The show of force by B-1B lancer strategic bombers over the international waters of North Korea shows that the military options are not just empty words. The military options of the US for the nuclear facilities in the North were planned under the Clinton administration in 1994, and mentioned during the Bush administration in 2003 as well. However, since President Moon said, “No one can decide on any military action on the Korean peninsula without the approval of the Republic of Korea (Yonhap News, 15 August 2017),” independent military action by the US without the permission from ROK is likely to bring about a crisis in ROK-US alliance (Lee Sang-hyeon, 2017, p. 3). However, one should remember that the nature of the crisis on the Korean peninsula is the North’s nuclear weapons themselves. Setting a boundary on the response that the ROK and the US cannot engage in together only means that the decision power of resolving the nuclear issue will be handed over to Pyongyang. This means that should the US choose to take military options, the Moon administration will likely face the fundamental problems of whether to choose the US and North Korea, and whether to maintain the ROK-US alliance.

3. Difference of Opinions about Conditions for Talks and Ambiguity of Moon Administration

While the remaining options aside from sanctions are dialogue and negotiations, currently there are no common grounds in the conditions to resume talks. The US maintains that it can consider dialogue once Pyongyang stops its nuclear and missile provocations. State Secretary Tillerson demanded the suspension of all ballistic missle tests as a condition for talks (George Stephanopoulos, 9 April 2017), and US Ambassador Haley to the UN also said that the US is willing to talk if Pyongyang’s nuclear program and all forms of nuclear and missile tests are suspended (AFP news agency, 16 May 2017). The Moon administration shares the same stance, as he said, “We can go on to the negotiating table with the North without any conditions once they stop nuclear and missile provocations (Yonhap News, 2017/06/15)." Such a position is also revealed in President Moon’s Berlin Plan, where he said the opportunities for talks can be created once Pyongyang freezes the nuclear and missile tests (Lee & Hyung & Lee, 2017, p. 3). Yet, as argued by top security adviser Moon Jung-in, there are voices within the ROK that call for the reduction in the joint ROK-US military exercises to present it as a condition to resume talks (Yonhap News, 2017/09/14). Their rationale is to accept North’s proposals considering the inevitable reality of its sophisticated nuclear capabilities. In fact, Pyongyang did demand the suspension of the ROK-US joint military exercises after its 4th and 5th nuclear experiment (Rodong Sinmun. 7 January 2016: Rodong Sinmun. 12 September 2016). In this context, they argue that we should secure the least autonomy with which we should be able to readjust the size of the military exercise, should the North freeze its missile activities (Hong Hyun-ick). This is in line with the conditions that China is presenting to resume talks, which means that the practical stance of the Moon administration on this matter is closer to that of China than the US. China is laying out three basic principles in its policies on the Korean peninsula: Denuclearization, Peace and Security, and Resolution through Dialogue and Negotiation. China is proposing a ‘freeze-for-freeze’ approach where the North freezes its provocations and the ROK and the US freeze their joint military exercises. It is also suggesting what it calls the ‘talks and negotiations’ approach where we pursue denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and peace agreement between the North and the US (王毅, 27 September 2017). Some in the US concur with China’s ‘freeze-for-freeze’ approach to be practical and realistic (John Merrill, 20 July 2017). The plan to adjust the size of the joint military exercises during the phase of Pyongyang’s freezing of its nuclear weapons was contained in the bipartisan report ‘A Sharper Choice on North Korea’ published last year by CFR. (Frank Aum & Nathan Park, 38North,, 28 June 2017). Some say that we should resolve the crisis by freezing Pyongyang’s nuclear program at the current level (Litwak, 2017, p. 5). During the phase leading up to the Geneva Convention in 1994, the joint military exercise ‘Team Spirit Exercise’ by the ROK and the US was suspended (Frank Aum & Nathan Park, 2017). Moreover, the ‘February 29 agreement’ mainly contained the sending of an IAEA inspection team and suspension of uranium enrichment (Park Jong-chul, 2017, p. 4). Therefore, the room for any adjustment to turn the current situation into a dialogue phase would be the intermediation of China. However, the US remains convinced that despite such a negotiation Pyongyang will not accept the inspection and verification of the international community and doing so will mean that it will have to acknowledge the North as a nuclear state (Jeong Sung-jang, 2017). Even if the US accepts the intermediation plan of China, Pyongyang is likely not to accept it. In addition, even if the US and the ROK accept to suspend the ROK-US military exercises, it is still highly likely that the North will demand a full suspension of the sanctions implemented by the international community. The North claims that the sanctions of the UNSC are driven mainly by the force of the US that it is unfair on their part (Rodong Sinmun. 26 April 2016). Thus, even if Pyongyang comes to the negotiating table, the conditions regarding the reward for resuming talks and others will be mentioned. Yet, President Trump and his administration are strongly convinced that there will be no compensation for the North in any case. State Secretary Tillerson mentioned that unlike in the past there is no room for the US to pay every time the North comes to the negotiating table (NPR Interview Secretary of States Rex Tillerson, NPR, 28 April 2017). Instead, he said, compensations will be made once the North implements the denuclearization measures. However, the North’s nuclear issues can only turn into dialogue and negotiations once its demands are reflected and it will likely take the lead when the talks are resumed. Therefore, the US’ stance of not providing any incentives in any case unless the denuclearization measures are implemented may differ from that of the Moon administration. Even if the nuclear program is frozen, the Trump administration that tries to pursue the denuclearization first may be different from the Moon administration that will accept some of the demands of the North on some levels to strengthen the inter-Korean relations first and move on to denuclearization. Pyongyang will try to take a fully leading role and sign up the peace agreement with the US first. In contrast, the Moon administration will pursue the denuclearization and discussion of a peace regime at the same time, while the US will likely demand denuclearization first. Ⅴ. Conclusion

The choices for the Moon administration amidst the dilemma between the Korea-US alliance and inter-Korea cooperation can be presented in three scenarios. First, the nuclear program and the sanctions from the international community may continue. In this scenario, the Moon administration will be limited in playing the role of simply joining the US-led sanctions regime against the North. The international negotiations regarding the North’s nuclear issue will center around the US and China, and the ROK will follow the negotiations between the two countries, left to take no leading role. The practical discussions regarding the nuclear issue will be handed over to the US and North Korea and the changes in their relations. The independent role of the Moon administration will virtually be on the back burner. This is a similar approach with what was repeated before the Trump administration, where the ROK government simply adjusted itself to the progress made in the negotiations between the US and the North. Second, should the US opt for military strikes to prevent the North from becoming a nuclear state, the ROK-US alliance will practically lose its functions since the Moon administration opposes military options. Third, the Moon government virtually bears the brunt of providing incentives to the North if the circumstances are right for dialogue and negotiations. Thus, the current approach of the Moon administration shares some commonalities with that of China in that the sanctions should be a means to bring the North to the negotiating table, military options should not be considered, and we should accept some of pyongyang’s demands on some levels. When it comes to the ROK-US relations, however, only the general stances of not acknowledging the nuclear weapons and bringing the North to dialogue are the same, without the specifics. In this sense, the Moon administration remaining unclear about the specific North Korea policies and ambiguous between the US and China will only lead the US to reinforce its alliance with Japan and resolve the matter by negotiating with China. In this vein, the nature of ‘Korea passing’ is arising from the ambiguity of the ROK-US alliance in responding specifically to the North Korea problem. Changes in the North Korean nuclear problem in any direction will weaken the ROK-US alliance down the road. Certainly, the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, which the Moon administration has made a foundation of its North Korea policy, depends on the normalization of the US-North relations. If the North’s nuclear issue takes a turn for dialogue and negotiations, some structural changes within the Northeast Asian Politics surrounding the North’s nuclear issue and the Korean peninsula in the long run. Pyongyang will likely demand a peace agreement and the withdrawal of the US Combined Forces that the discussion of a peace regime on the peninsula will take place with high likelihood. The Inter-Korean Basic Agreement in 1991, The inter-Korean declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1992, Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994, Four-party Talks in the late 1990s, and the September 19 Joint Declaration in 2005 have all been attempts at a transition into a peace regime. During the September 18 Joint Declaration, the parties to the six-party talks promised to negotiate for a regime of lasting peace on the Korean peninsula through a separate forum. Member countries also agreed on setting up a working group for regime of security and peace in Northeast Asia during the February 13 Agreement in 2007. Should Pyongyang’s nuclear issue enter the phase of dialogue and negotiation, the US stance on the two Koreas in the long term will become neutral, which will also lead to structural changes in the inter-Korean relations. In that case, the international community must take the opportunity to cooperate in resolving the nuclear issue to actually find a security community in Northeast Asia as well. The temporary negotiation with the North or a peace regime only overseeing the division system on the peninsula will not guarantee stable peace and the military security crises can always be repeated. Therefore, international collaboration then should be considered as a chance to create a security community in Northeast Asia to melt away the Cold War structure in the region.

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