North Korean Policies and the ROK-US Alliance Under the Moon Administration: Dilemma between ROK-US Alliance and Inter-Korean Cooperation Kwang Kyu Nam (SSK Research Center of Korea University, Research Professor) The objective of this paper is to present the realistic dilemma facing the Moon administration that is aiming at pursuing both Korea-US alliance and cooperation with the North, by analyzing the North Korean policies and the Korea-US relationship under the Moon administration. Specifically, it aims to take a look at the North Korean policies of the Moon administration that is carrying out sanctions and dialogue side by side based on the appeasement policy framework, thereby comparing the different stances of the Republic of Korea and the United States surrounding the content of the alliance dealing with the North Korean nuclear issues and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). It also revisits how the means to denuclearize the North have their limits in realistic terms and the conditions on the resumption of dialogue for the related discussions. This paper reveals that the approach taken by the Moon administration regarding Pyongyang is similar to that of China, and that the Korea-US alliance is likely to weaken should there be any change concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. If the Moon administration takes an ambiguous position without having frank communication with the US, the US counterpart will only try to resolve by working with China, and strengthen the US-Japan alliance. In this sense, the so-called ‘Korea Passing’ phenomenon lies in the ambiguity of the Korea-US alliance in responding specifically to the North Korean nuclear issue. Thus, change in the issue in any direction will only lead to a weaker alliance with the US. If the issue enters into a condition right for dialogue, the US’ stance will likely be, in the long term, neutral. In addition, should the issue become one that urges a solution for peaceful regime on the Korean peninsula, then it will need go beyond solving the nuclear issue itself to form a security community in the Northeast Asia as a whole. Ⅰ. Introduction While the domestic politics was escalating into the presidential impeachment and the follow-up election, the so-called ‘Korea passing’ phenomenon persisted in which ROK was isolated from the issues on the Koran peninsula including mainly the North Korean nuclear issue. The Trump administration engaged in closer cooperation with China while imposing strong sanctions and pressure on the North. On the other hand, ROK was not able to deal properly with the regional issues surrounding the Korean peninsula due to the precarious domestic politics. With the Moon administration taking power on May 10th through the election, ROK was now able to tackle the escalating security issues in Northeast Asia arising from the North Korean nuclear program. Unlike the previous conservative administrations, the Moon administration is attempting to pursue North Korean policies to induce denuclearization through a leading role of the ROK government, on the basis of the principle to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully. It is pursuing sanctions and dialogue simultaneously, a point that slightly differs from that of the US which is strongly imposing sanctions against the North. The North Korean issue takes up the most important part of US foreign policies under the Trump administration, which include sanctions and diplomatic pressure as well as military measures. President Trump is emphasizing the role of China in tackling the North Korean issues and is pressing China to quit trading with the North and limit supplying oil and applying secondary boycott on companies doing business with Pyongyang. In his speech at the United Nations, President Trump vowed to “totally destroy” North Korea if it threatened the United States or its allies (Jason Silverstein, 2017), alluding the possibility of considering even the military options. However, despite the sanctions 2371 and 2375 which are currently in place and considered to be the strongest ever in UN history as well as strong pressure from the US and China, North Korea is advancing its nuclear capabilities, pressing ahead with the 6th nuclear test and launching as many as 16 ballistic missiles including mid- to long-range missiles. The regime called its 6th test as a “successful hydrogen bomb experiment,” boasting of being a nuclear state (North Korean Central Broadcasting, 2017). Moreover, it announced the plan to strike the area around Guam, threatening to enter into an armed clash with the US. Due to the conflict between the North and the US, which involves nuclear and missile provocations and even the talk of a war, the North Korean nuclear issue is becoming the most daunting task and critical factor facing the Moon administration since its start. While the government is aiming to resolve the issue peacefully by harmoniously pursuing ROK-US alliance and inter-Korean cooperation, it is in reality stuck in a dilemma between the two. The Moon government’s diplomatic leeway is too small, faced with the international nature of the nuclear issue, the Northeast Asian policies of the US and China, as well as the North Korean attitude dealing only with the US. In the second part, this paper explains the direction of the North Korean policies of the Moon administration trying to pursue the sanctions and dialogue side by side based on the appeasement policy, against the backdrop of the nuclear crisis. The third part focuses on the ROK-US alliance in response to the North, the conflict between Korea and the US surrounding the Thaad, and the position of the Moon administration which attempts to take a neutral approach between the US and China regarding the Thaad issue. In the fourth chapter, this paper reveals the realistic limits of the means to denuclearize the North, inconsistencies in the conditions for the resumption of the talks to discuss nuclear issues, and the differences between the ROK and the US on these issues as well as the dilemma of the Moon administration. In the last part, it concludes by saying that the government of President Moon is taking a similar approach with that of China, and that in whatever direction the North Korean nuclear issue may take, the Korea-US alliance has a high likelihood to weaken under his administration. It also lays out that if ever the North’s nuclear issue reaches the dialogue phase, it should constitute the beginning of the formation of a Northeast Asian security community. Ⅱ. Basic Framework of the Moon Administration’s North Korean Policies 1. Sanctions and Dialogue in Parallel Based on the Appeasement Policy The North Korean policies of President Moon Jae-in and the ruling Democratic Party is to reflect the ‘sunshine policy’ in today’s situations and environment, which was an appeasement policy approach pursued by the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations in the past. The official name under the Roh administration was a ‘policy of peace and prosperity,’ which is a more specified, refined version of the ‘sunshine policy’ of the Kim administration. During his presidential campaign, President Moon said that his North Korea policy “will build on the sunshine policy and North Korean engagement policy, thereby eliciting change of attitude from North Korea.” (Yonhap News, 23 April 2017) The appeasement policy and inter-Korean cooperation first began to take shape in the Inter-Korean Summit in June, 2000, and were most actively pursued under the Roh administration. However, while the Kim administration was striving to pursue inter-Korean cooperation within the framework of the ROK-US alliance, the Roh administration advocated inter-Korean collaboration over the ROK-US alliance. (Jeon, 2017, p. 2) The conservative governments that came to power since the Roh administration, which are the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations, began to restore and strengthen the ROK-US alliance that had been relatively weakened during the former governments against the backdrop of the persistent nuclear experiments and nuclear development of the North, virtually abandoning the inter-Korean cooperation. The rationale was that the aid projects for North Korea and inter-Korean economic collaboration that existed in the past did not stop Pyongyang from developing nuclear capabilities. Rather, they claimed, the North used the support and cooperation from the South in advancing their nuclear program. However, the reasons that disabled cooperation during the two conservative governments were mainly provided by the North. Events like the murder of a tourist at Mount Kumgang in 2008, 2nd nuclear experiment in 2009, and the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 came to pass during the Lee administration. In response, the government put a stop to the Mt. Kumgang tour, and suspended economic cooperation with the North by taking the May 24 measures except the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The Park Geun-hye government attempted at improving the inter-Korean relations gradually through the Korean peninsula trust-building process.‘ However, the new leader of the North Kim Jong-un primarily focused on strengthening his power rather than improving its relations with the South. Kim launched three rounds of nuclear tests, created an atmosphere of a war on the peninsula, threatened to mar operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and installed the landmines at the Military Demarcation Line. The Park government responded more strongly to the provocations than other governments in the past by even declaring a retaliatory raid, going so far as to cease the operations at Kaesong after the 4th nuclear test. However, the Moon administration believes that the North Korean policies of the Lee and Park administrations as well as the ‘strategic patience’ of the Obama administration failed at resolving the North’s nuclear issue, that talks must be resumed and that the sanctions should only be a means to negotiation with the North (Choe, 2017).