IFS Info 1/1996

Sven G .. Holtsmark

Great Power Guarantees or Sman State Cooperation?

Atlanticism ami !European Regionalism in Norwegian !Foreign Policy, 1940m 1945 Introduction ...... 5 Prewar Norwegian attitudes to Nordic and European regional cooperation ...... 6 Sunuuer I 940: reorientation ofNorwegian foreign policy attitudes ...... 7 and the introduction ofthe "Atlantic Policy" ...... 8 Wladyslaw Sikorski and the idea ofa Central European Confederation ...... 8 The Nordic alternative ...... I 0 The Soviet Union in Norwegian wartime foreign policy planning ...... 13 Conclusion: great power guarantees or small power cooperation? ...... I 6 Notes ...... I9

IFS Into 1/96 3 Introduction the three great powers which were likely to play leading roles in Europe after the war. The policy formulation which started soon after Until the Second World War, was a the Norwegian government's arrival in London in country with limited foreign policy traditions and mid-June 1940 included discussions of the basic experience. Foreign policy and international affairs premises of Norway's foreign and security poli­ played a subordinate role in public debates, and cies.' From June 1940 to May 1945 the policy of there was little professional or academic expertise the government-in-exile went through three main in the field. The aims of the country's diplomatic stages. , the prewar foreign minister activity seemed simple: to maintain a distance to who continued in office until he was replaced by potential issues and areas of conflict. Norway Trygve Lie in November 1940,3 struggled in vain to intended to be everybody's friend and nobody's salvage what was left of prewar neutralism. foe. Neutralist inclinations b>rew stronger and Although it is difficult to reconstruct a complete gradually became dominant as tension increased in picture of his thinking, he apparently thought that Europe in the latter 1930s. During this period Norway should take part in the war against Ger­ Norway's involvement in the League of Nations many without involving itself in a clear-cut and increasingly focused on efforts to restrict the formalised alliance with Great Britain. Trygve Lie, compulsory character of the Covenant's Article on the other hand, from the onset of his tenure as 16, i.e. the right and duty of member states to minister of foreign affairs saw as his primary task participate in sanctions against an aggressor. the strengthening of Norway's ties to Great Britain Norway declared its intention to follow a policy of and the consolidation of its position within the formal neutrality in the case of war involving the alliance. Partly in order to demonstrate and under­ European great powers. line Norway's break with its neutralist past, he Behind the policy of non-involvement in great introduced his "Atlantic policy", a scheme for power conflict was the conviction that Great Atlantic cooperation to be continued and developed Britain would, in its own interest, come to Nor­ further when hostilities ended. way's rescue in case of attack from Germany or With the rise of the Soviet Union as a major the Soviet Union, the only conceivable aggressors. partner in the alliance and a power which must be Thus Norway based its security on an "implicit included in all planning for the postwar world, the guarantee" by, primarily, Great Britain, but Nor­ "Atlantic policy" gradually receded in Norwegian way's official stance as a non-aligned country foreign policy declarations. The "Atlantic policy" precluded public declarations to this effect. 1 had been conceived when the Soviet Union played In the eyes of most influential Norwegians, the a subordinate role in Norwegian foreign policy German attack on Norway on 9 April 1940 and considerations. The new balance of forces within Britain's inability to provide effective military the alliance, however, forced the Norwegian assistance had once and for all compromised the government to retreat from the one-sided western basic tenets of prewar Norwegian foreign and political and military orientation inherent in the security policies. The need to demonstrate Nor­ "Atlantic policy". The Norwegians began to think way's active commitment to the allied war effort in tenns of Norway as a "bridge" between the and the necessity of starting planning for the future Soviet Union and the two dominant western made the Norwegians in London rethink the basic powers, the United States and the United Kingdom. premises of Norway's security and its foreign While making less mention of the need for political relations. The need to cultivate relations with all the and military cooperation with the "Atlantic powers" major allies, including the Soviet Union from 22 (Lie had even suggested that the United States June 1941, forced the Norwegian government to might wish to establish military bases in Norway define Norway's place in the relationship between after the war), Norwegian policy turned gradually

IFS lnfo 1/96 5 towards supporting schemes of global great power argued, was incompatible with participation in the cooperation. "Bridge-building" succeeded "Atlantic League of Nations. The conflict between interna­ policy" as the declared Norwegian foreign policy tional solidarity and commitments, expressed doctrine. through Norway's active participation in Geneva, Aspects of the government's international and strong neutralist sentiments, remained a orientation, most markedly the declaration of the characteristic feature of Norwegian foreign policy "Atlantic policy", was criticised and opposed by in the interwar period.' Whereas Norwegians groups of Norwegians abroad and from allied placed great hopes on the new world organisation governments. Various counterproposals were during the relatively tranquil I 920s, enthusiasm introduced. Isolated neutralism as represented by waned in inverse ratio to the growth of tension and Halvdan Kohl was hardly present in discussions conflict in Europe. In the latter half of the I 930s after the summer of I 940. lt may be argued, Norway and the other Scandinavian states took the however, that elements of the idea survived and lead in attempting to weaken the strength of the surfaced with the rise of "bridge-building" and Covenant's Article 16. Norway and the Nordic global rather than Atlantic commitments as the states also took steps to prepare the ground for foundations of Norwegian foreign policy. Nordic formal neutrality in case of war. The British cooperation, as opposed to Atlantic, i.e. great "implicit guarantee" nevertheless remained the power cooperation, continued to appeal to groups cornerstone of its security policies. of Norwegians abroad and also to parts of the In the interwar period the Scandinavian coun­ Home Front leadership in Norway. Schemes of tries (from the mid- I 930s including Finland) Nordic cooperation were often linked to broader developed a system of frequent and regular consul­ schemes of European cooperation as propagated tations on the highest political level. Cooperation in by Polish premier Wladyslaw Sikorski and Norwe­ economic and cultural matters brought significant gians in . results, but there was also a high degree of coordi­ This article discusses the schemes of European nation of their activity in Geneva and of their and Nordic regional cooperation together with the foreign policy in general. In the military field, Atlantic policy and the bridge-building ideology as however, collaboration was limited to a few areas they appeared in Norwegian foreign policy discus­ of peacetime preparation, and the results were sions during the Second World War. Why did the meagre.' Attempts at staff consultations and policy-making bodies in London consistently reject cooperation in the production and procurement of all ideas of regional solutions in Europe, propagat­ weapons and munitions had few results. In Nor­ ing either schemes of cooperation with the western way the idea of some sort of Nordic or great powers or "non-allignment" in the form of Scandinavian military union or common security Norway as a "bridge" between the East and the arrangement found support only in military, and West? some conservative, quarters. Among the leading politicians of all the major political parties such ideas were rejected out of hand 6 Taking into Prewar Norwegian attitudes to Nordic account their rejection of Nordic cooperation, it is and European regional cooperation hardly surprising that Norwegians were even more negative towards any involvement on the European After the First World War Norway opted for continent. Polish and Baltic attempts, perceived or membership in the newly created League of real, to develop contacts with Scandinavian coun­ Nations. The decision was far from undisputed in tries met with no response in Norway. Norway; not only the argued that The prevailing Norwegian attitudes towards the Norway should continue the policy of neutrality notion of Nordic and European regional coopera­ which had served its purpose during the First tion were influenced and reinforced by what they World War. Neutrality or non-allignment, it was perceived to be Soviet preferences. The Norwe-

6 IFS lnfo 1/96 gians felt that the Soviet Union disapproved of all allied cause. In this connection it i.s noteworthy kinds of regional arrangements in the immediate that Koht, some weeks after his arrival in London, vicinity of their borders.' Halvdan Koht, minister of took the opportunity to assure I van Maisky, the foreign affairs from March 1935, consciously Soviet ambassador to London, that the Norwegians played down the significance of his Baltic and had not asked for allied help after the German Polish contacts in order not to antagonise Mos­ attack. !van Maisky, according to Koht, attached cow. This argument reappeared in the wartime due importance to his communication. 9 discussions. The attitude of the foreign minister may be further characterised by a remark he reportedly made during another interview with the Soviet Summer 1940: reorientation of ambassador. According to Maisky, Koht spoke of Norwegian foreign policy attitudes Norway as "still remaining 'neutral' though at war with Germany"." Some of the members of the When the Norwegian government established itself Norwegian cabinet were of the opinion that Koht in London in June 1940, the attention and criticism wanted Norway to be "a belligerent neutral". The focused on Halvdan Kohl, minister of foreign minister of justice, Terje Wold, returned on various affairs, who was strongly identified with the occasions to a discussion of Kohl's views on prewar foreign policy and its ultimate failure. foreign policy in his diary. According to Wold, Mounting opposition against Koht' s conduct of the Koht held the view that "our position in relation to government's foreign affairs led to his replacement Russia will be better [ ... ] the less we have to do by Trygve Lie in November the same year. with England"." It would be wrong to present Koht as simply Kohl's opponents rejected his policy of stress­ being in favour of a continuation of the prewar ing Norway's independence vis-a-vis the British in policy of neutrality; an obviously non-existent order to preserve and cultivate the Soviet connec­ alternative at a time of war and emigration. Discus­ tion. A memorandum signed in mid-July by a sions in the summer of 1940 focused on Norway's group of five intellectuals of the inner circle role in the alliance and the character and scope of surrounding the government gives a clear picture relations with the United Kingdom as the main of their thinking.!' "The five" pointed out that all belligerent power. attempts at effective wartime cooperation between The Soviet Union played an important role in Norway and its allies would be seriously hampered Kohl's thinking at this point. If the war ended if Norway prepared for the worst alternative by without the allies achieving a clear-cut victory the building up its relations with a great power which result could be some sort of compromise peace. In was supporting the allies' adversary in the war. this situation the Soviets would be in a position to Norway must avoid being suspected of cultivating exert decisive influence when the shape and order friendship with "the foe of its ally". This argument of postwar Europe should be decided. lt would went to the core of Kohl's foreign policy doctrine, then obviously be in Norway's interest to be able and "the five" were probably hinting at the foreign to draw on a reserve of Soviet goodwill and, if minister's conversation with Ivan Maisky a few possible, on a Soviet commitment to restore some days earlier. Secondly, "the five" argued that the sort of Norwegian statehood.' Fundamentally Soviet Union, because it did not want to see Kohl's view was based on the assumption that the Norway completely dominated by Great Britain, Soviets would be favourably inclined towards a must view favourably all attempts to make Norway Norwegian foreign policy which set limits to the an active participant in the war. A policy of active wartime cooperation with Great Britain. The cooperation with the allied powers in the struggle government-in-exile should therefore stress its for the allied cause was Norway's only chance of independent stance, although Koht never argued in asserting the country's position as a sovereign favour of a complete disentanglement from the power, thereby avoiding "complete dependence on

IFS lnfo 1/96 7 England in case of a German defeat". Summing up: adviser to the Norwegian government in matters of the principal concern of "the five" was the neces­ foreign policy. 14 Rrestad was concerned with sity of developing a more active and whole-hearted creating a set of "security combines" which cooperation with the British. together would be strong enough to eliminate the possibility of renewed aggression on the part of Germany or Japan. 15 Rrestad made no hints about Trygve Lie and the introduction having to safeguard against Soviet expansion as of the "Atlantic Policy" well. The area of responsibility of each of the "combines", together with its system of military Trygve Lie's instalment in office as minister of bases, was to constitute "a strategically complete foreign affairs in November 1940 signalled a field of defensive operations". 16 In Rrestad's radical departure from the "Kohl doctrine" in opinion, the countries bordering on the North Norwegian foreign policy. The new foreign policy Atlantic constituted such a regional entity, and he philosophy, presented as "the Atlantic Ocean consequently argued in favour of the creation of a policy", or simply the "Atlantic policy", repre­ "North Atlantic Security Combine". 17 Neither a sented a fundamental departure from the traditional purely European nor a Nordic system would be Norwegian policy of maintaining a distance to great strong enough to give Norway the sufficient power politics. Some isolated voices, for instance degree of security against aggression from an the Norwegian envoy to Moscow, Einar Maseng, expansionist great power. Within the framework of continued to argue in favour of a more "indepen­ each of the regional organisations should be dent" foreign policy line. For the time being, created "a permanent military machinery, suffici­ however, the representatives of the old line of ently manned and alertly watched", which was to neutrality had lost their influence. dispose of "massed air and sea forces". 18 Lie developed the idea of Atlantic cooperation in The "Atlantic policy" was not unequivocally a series of speeches and articles commencing in welcomed among the allies or influential Norwe­ the autumn of 1940. The general idea of continuing gians at home and abroad. British and American cooperation between the allies after the war might reactions were cautious and uncommitted. They seem a logical outcome of the new solidarity and did not reject the idea, but were unwilling to enter realisation of common interests among the great into discussions of its practical implementation. and small comrades-in-arms. It is equally obvious The Home Front leaders in Norway were highly that the introduction of the "Atlantic policy" was sceptical about the idea of giving priority to coop­ partly motivated by the acutely felt need to enhance eration with the great powers rather than with Norway's standing as a fully committed member Sweden and the other Nordic neighbours. They of the alliance. Of greater interest is the operational also stressed the importance of the coming world content Lie gave his ideas even at this early stage organisation, and emphasised the necessity of of their elaboration. He wanted to offer Great including the Soviet Union in any future security 1 Britain and the USA military bases in Norway even arrangement in the region. ' Yet another challenge in times of peace. Lie aired this idea for the first to the foreign policy orientation of the Norwegian time in the autumn of 1940 when he was still government was introduced by the Polish govern­ minister of supplies and returned to it on several ment-in-exile of General Wladyslaw Sikorski. occasions in the following years. This shows that the new foreign minister and his advisers had a frame of reference that differed radically from the Wladyslaw Sikorski and the idea of dominant prewar doctrine." a Central European Confederation The first to introduce Lie to the idea of Atlantic military-political cooperation was Or Arnold Early in the war the new Polish government RFstad, a specialist in international law and an revived the idea of a Central European confedera­ tion, made up of Poland, Czechoslovakia and

8 IFS Into 1/96 possibly other countries "with which the vital strain.:24 In a longer perspective, the scheme interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia are linked threatened to add an element of friction between up"." Continuing prewar Polish foreign minister the Atlantic great powers and the Soviet Union in J6zefBeck's political thinking, Sikorski's idea was postwar Europe. Thus, the Norwegians based their to create "a politically solid bloc of Slav states opposition to Sikorski 's ideas of a unified Central extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Europe on a fundamentally correct evaluation of Adriatic"." The Polish-Czechoslovak confederation the ultimate Polish motives for launching the was envisaged as the core of a Central European project: the Poles were concerned wilh creating system of cooperation between states. Discussions security for the Central European countries against between Eduard Benes and Sikorski began in both the Soviet Union and Germany. At the same October 1939, and on 11 November 1940 the two time the Norwegians were unable or unwilling to governments declared that Poland and Czechoslo­ take into account specific Central European vakia after the war would enter as independent and security concerns, and evaluated the plan primarily sovereign States into a closer political and eco­ within the context of future East-West great power nomic association, which would become the basis relations. The Poles thought of small state coopera­ of a new order in Central Europe, and a guarantee tion as a means to counter possible future Soviet of its stability." and German demands. The Norwegian govern­ Although negotiations between the Poles and ment, on the other hand, consistently rejected the Czechoslovaks continued until 1942, the plans participation in schemes of cooperation which the for a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation ultimately Soviets might perceive as being directed against failed. This failure was due to the two countries' themselves. divergent attitudes towards the Soviet Union, their The Atlantic policy was conceived as a system conflicting ideas about !he nature of the proposed based on the participation of Great Britain and the confederation, and a virtual Soviet veto on the plan. United States, within which smaller states would A declaration of23 January 1942, outlining the inevitably act as junior partners. The Norwegian basic principles of !he confederation, did not government felt !hat the Polish ideas about small receive Benes' signature, and turned out to be the and medium state cooperation pointed in the climax of the Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations. opposite direction, by emphasising small state Relations between the two governments became cooperation and independence from the great increasingly strained. powers in matters of security. Their reasoning was The Norwegians were alarmed at the idea of a never made explicit, but it appears that the Norwe­ "central zone" in Europe, although Norway was gian government perceived Sikorski's schemes as hardly designated as a participant in the system. competing with their own Atlantic proposals. They What was it then that motivated the Norwegian to were anxious Jest the Polish ideas should receive resist Sikorski's scheme for the solution of the support in British and American circles and thereby security problem of eastern continental Europe, a weaken their own favoured scheme for Atlantic scheme which only indirectly touched Norwegian cooperation. After the war Lie argued rather interests? unconvincingly !hat the Poles feared that the When the Norwegians in London discussed Norwegian "Atlantic" initiatives would impair Sikorski's ideas in beginning of 1942, they did not Poland's position in the alliance, which was why rule out their future realisation in some form or the Poles launched their own initiatives." other." Neither did they doubt their basic anti­ Military-strategic factors pulled in the same Soviet leaning. They were therefore convinced - direction. Norway's position as an Atlantic power, and rightly so - that the Soviets would oppose its sparse population and its Jack of an industrial schemes of small state cooperation in the eastern base for large-scale production of military equip­ part of Europe. In the short term, therefore, the ment and weapons, made the country fundamen­ Norwegians felt that a discussion of the Polish tally dependent upon the Atlantic powers, Great scheme would expose the alliance to additional Britain and the USA, for its security. Thus the

IFS Into 1/96 9 pursuit of credible guarantees of support from the emphasised that he had taken an "initiative" and western great powers remained the core of Lie's done "what [he] could" to obstruct Sikorski's Atlantic policy, and plans for the future organi­ proposal, thereby preventing the formation of "an sation of central Europe were naturally peripheral anti-Russian coalition of small occupied states".31 to the primary interests of the Norwegian govern­ ment. The Norwegian hostility to schemes of exclu­ The Nordic alternative sive cooperation between smaller states, and the concomitant awareness of possible Soviet misgiv­ Norway would not have been directly affected by ings, were revealed when General Sikorski in the Polish plans for Central European cooperation, January 1942 proposed drafting a declaration of and the aborted declaration of the occupied states the exiled governments, outlining their position in Europe remained a minor episode in the history with regard to the postwar order in Europe. The of the alliance. Trygve Lie certainly exaggerated his ostensible primary purpose of the declaration was own role in preventing the realisation of Sikorski's to reach agreement on a joint policy towards plan. Nevertheless, the Russians were pleased with postwar Germany. 26 the Norwegian attitude. In April 1943 Bogomolov Lie was far from enthusiastic. He pointed out to told a member of the Norwegian cabinet that the General Sikorski that Norway's interests were Soviet government was aware that Norway wanted "mostly directed towards the West", and that any cordial relations with the Soviet Union: scheme for postwar cooperation had to be dis­ cussed with the great powers - Great Britain, USA, He [i.e. Bogomolov] added that the Soviet the Soviet Union and- China." In conversations government had noticed with satisfaction that with the British and the Americans he pointed out the Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian governments that Norway favoured cooperation with Great had distanced themselves from the Polish Britain and the United States, while the Polish plans intrigues, which were directed against the seemed to be inspired by an ideology of small Soviet Union. 32 power cooperation. 28 Lie's most direct concern, however, was the Lie's emotional engagement and Bogomolov's reaction of the Russians. When J6zefRetinger, praise notwithstanding, Norway played a peripheral who was one of Sikorski's closest advisers, role in Sikorski's plans for European cooperation. returned to the proposal a week after Sikorski first The Nordic alternative, which became the object of presented the idea, Lie was still of the opinion that heated Swedish-Norwegian discussions in the the whole project was rather nebulous and lacking spring and early summer of 1942, presented a in constructive purpose. He told Retinger that the more conceivable alternative in terms of Norway's Norwegian government would not participate in an postwar foreign policy and security orientation. action that could "incite Russian suspicions". 29 Lest The Norwegians in Stockholm, centred around the affair should trouble Norway's reasonably Labour party leader Martin Tranmrel, voiced the good relations with the Soviet government, Lie told most clearly expressed opposition to the Atlantic Alexandr Y. Bogomolov, Soviet minister to the orientation of the London government. Signs of governments-in-exile in London, that he had been diverging views also emanated from the leadership approached by the Poles, but that the Norwegian of the Home Front in Norway, and there were government was sceptical about the idea.30 significant differences of opinion within the Nothing came of the planned small state decla­ government itself." ration. Trygve Lie, who never suffered from Beginning in the winter of 1942 there was a excessive modesty, accorded to himself a major discussion about the nature of future Nordic role in blocking the idea. In a letter to the Norwe­ cooperation in the Swedish, Norwegian (London), gian minister to Moscow, Rolf Andvord, Lie and to some degree British press. The argument

10 IFS lnfo 1/96 culminated in a harsh attack on the Swedish point fundamental reorientation of Norwegian foreign of view in the official Norwegian newspaper Norsk policy. The experiences of war and occupation Tidend on 15 July." The Norwegians were ex­ tended to place security concerns uppermost in tremely upset when Sir Stafford Cripps came out government planning for Norway's place in the in support of the idea of a future Scandinavian postwar world. Any schemes of Nordic coopera­ "federation" in an interview in the Swedish weekly tion, according to the propagators of the Atlantic Vecko-Journalen,35 and were also alarmed by the policy, would not suffice to give Norway an appearance in Sweden of a booklet titled Nordens acceptable level of security. , an Forente Staler (The United States of the North)." influential advisor to Lie in London, argued that The preparation and discussions in the government basing Norway's security policy on schemes of in April and May 1942 of the policy document Nordic cooperation would mean the continuation "Hovedlinjer i norsk utenrikspolitikk" ("The princi­ of the prewar policy of non-alignment. No group pal features of Norway's foreign policy") were of smaller states would be able to keep out of a partly motivated by the need to present the Norwe­ future conflict between the great powers, if only gian point of view in face of the propagation of a one of the belligerent parties found reason to draw ''Nordic" solution. 37 their territories into the conflict. There could be no The strained relationship between the two real security for small states except in cooperation governments during the two years following the with one or more of the great powers. The ques­ German attack on Norway complicated any talk of tion was not whether Norway should engage in postwar Norwegian-Swedish cooperation. In cooperation with other powers, but with whom to Norwegian circles in London there was a wide­ cooperate, and whether to undertake joint prepara­ spread feeling of bitterness towards the Swedish tions for war in times of peace." government, resulting from what the Norwegians There was general agreement about the need to regarded as excessive Swedish accommodation to seek security for Norway in cooperation with other German demands. Of equal importance was the countries. Lie favoured military cooperation with, need to demonstrate Norway's uncompromising principally, Great Britain and the USA. Sweden's stand as a member of the fighting alliance - consid­ and Denmark's adherence to an Atlantic system erations of alliance commitments and solidarity would be welcomed, without being essential. were always present in the foreign policy thinking Tranmrel and the group in Stockholm, on the other of the Norwegian government during the war. hand, viewed a Scandinavian bloc as the northern After Lie took over as foreign minister in Novem­ link in a set of European regional systems. They ber 1940, he introduced the "Atlantic policy" partly too rejected participation in a neutral Nordic bloc to dissociate his own foreign policy from the as an option for Norway after the war, if neutrality neutrality oriented approach of his predecessor implied the rejection of any form of security Halvdan Koht. Lie felt that an open discussion arrangement with groups of states outside Scandi­ during the war of a future partnership between navia and Finland. As opposed to the Norwegians Norway and the neutral Sweden would cause the in London, they viewed future Norwegian and western powers to question the sincerity of Nordic foreign policies primarily in the context of Norway's Atlantic commitment. Finland's partici­ an extensive system of European cooperation, pation in the war against the Soviet Union - and within which the smaller powers would together Finland was traditionally closer to Sweden than to seek security in regional arrangements. The Norway - also contributed to the erosion of the Stockholm group accordingly rejected exclusive traditional feeling ofNordic unity and solidarity, reliance on the Atlantic great powers for support and made easier the transition to an Atlantic, or and security. great power, orientation. The Swedish arguments in favour of a neutral Nonetheless, the Norwegian government's Nordic bloc were rejected out of hand in London. attitude to future Nordic cooperation reflected a Such a solution, for one thing, seemed to guarantee

IFS lnfo 1/96 11 Sweden a dominant position - and the Norwegians completely dependent on one of the great pow- were extremely apprehensive about possible ers. "43 Martin Tranmrel made the same case in Swedish motives and objectives." But the London letters to Lie and Nygaardsvold." The group in Norwegians' opposition to the Swedish point of Stockholm did not object to the idea of continued view was also of a more fundamental nature: the security cooperation with the western powers after option of a Nordic bloc independent of great power the war, but were of the opinion that only a united support directly contradicted the security arrange­ North would be in a position to play an independent ment that the government preferred. role in a security arrangement with great power Arne Ording also suspected the Swedes of participation. preferring some sort of Soviet-German balance of Tranmrel and the group in Stockholm did not power in the Baltic area,40 while the Norwegians elaborate in any detail their vision of future based their policy planning on a definitive allied Scandinavian or Nordic cooperation, but their victory, which would leave the Soviet Union as the thinking pointed in the direction of cooperation in only remaining great power in that region. During security and economic affairs, which could the war the Norwegian government could not gradually develop into "a possible Nordic union of engage in discussions about a future Nordic states"." The nature of this hypothetical Nordic system which could be expected to assume a union was left open. The concept at this stage "neutral" position between the Soviet Union and hardly constituted more than a policy statement Germany. couched in very general terms. It shows, however, For all these reasons, the Norwegian govern­ that the Norwegians in Stockholm envisioned far­ ment was extremely sensitive whenever they felt reaching Nordic or Scandinavian military, eco­ that the question of Nordic cooperation gained nomic and political cooperation in the future. In a some degree of consideration or acceptance in the letter to Trygve Lie in August I 942, Tranmrel alliance. Lie therefore protested to the British when reiterated that a Nordic defence union, and coop­ Sir Stafford Cripps in the interview in Vecko­ eration in economic and foreign affairs, could be Journalen expressed support for the idea of a the first steps towards a political union." future "Scandinavian federation", powerful enough The Norwegians in Stockholm were aware that to allow the Scandinavian countries to remain Nordic cooperation would be complicated by a independent of great power support.41 number of factors: fear of Swedish domination; the "The principal features of Norway's foreign uncertain future status of Finland; Denmark's policy" discussed the nature of the future relations strategic dependence on the dominant power in between the Scandinavian states only iil general continental Western Europe. All these factors made terms, but rejected out of hand the idea of a Nordic the idea seem risky. A vision of a united North as "bloc" conducting foreign and military affairs an element in a postwar European system of jointly. The emphasis in the document was on federations or confederations motivated Tranmrel Atlantic cooperation and participation in a new and the Stockholm group to pursue the idea despite global security organisation. these obvious difficulties. Nordic cooperation was The group in Stockholm, on the other hand, "one step" towards a "rational" European order of held that "the western orientation should not be at regional units, which might ultimately be trans­ the expense of the Nordic cooperation"." They felt formed into some sort of "United States of Eu­ that Norway must avoid the position of a power­ rope"." Nordic cooperation, according to less junior partner in an alliance of great powers. "Diskusjonsgrunnlag om vilre fredsmill", a docu­ Anders Frihagen, a member of the cabinet who ment of June 1942 which expressed the views of openly supported the Nordic orientation, expressed the Stockholm group, could exist and develop only this point of view in a letter to prime minister "in a broader European and international context". : "A strongly[ ... ] united North Although the Norwegians in Stockholm supported will be a real power factor. In isolation we will be the idea of a global security organisation, they

12 IFS lnfo 1/96 maintained that the world organisation must be Tranmrel was pessimistic about Norway's chances supplemented by regional groupings of countries. of remaining on good terms with the Soviet Union They envisaged "very far-reaching" forms of after the war. Soviet foreign policy would reflect cooperation within the "federations or unions", and "harsh realities", and he expected Germany to the future world organisation should be based on present less of a problem than the Soviet Union. sz regional agreements. 48 Anders Frihagen argued that defence against a Tranmrel argued that foundations of a federal possible future Soviet attack from the east de­ organisation of Europe must be laid during the manded cooperation with Sweden and Finland, war." "Diskusjonsgrunnlag" praised the idea of a while Lie's system of Atlantic cooperation prima­ Central European confederation of Poland and rily aimed at defending Norway's coast line. Czechoslovakia with the possible participation of Frihagen also accorded importance to Finland as a Roumania and Hungary. The document further "barrier against Russia". 53 envisaged a "federation" of the Balkans, and a system of close cooperation between the Nether­ lands, Belgium and the United Kingdom. Germany, The Soviet Union in Norwegian France and Italy were expected to assume their wartime foreign policy planning traditional role of regional great powers. The Norwegian government in London, on the The "Atlantic policy" was conceived and originally other hand, was of the opinion that Norwegian propagated when the anti-Hitler coalition was still participation in a European system of small state dominated by Great Britain, heavily supported by cooperation might complicate the country's the United States. The growing stature of the relations with the Soviet Union, and quoted Soviet Soviet Union in the alliance after its entry into the opposition as one reason to reject the idea. Al­ war soon began to challenge some of the basic though the Norwegians in London were concerned assumptions behind the Atlantic policy. about possible Soviet territorial or other demands The Norwegians did not envisage that their on Norway in the future, considerations of alliance scheme for Atlantic cooperation should include the solidarity made them play down these concerns, Soviet Union. In fact, in the early war years and government papers and discussions of Nor­ Norwegian foreign policy thinking seemed largely way's future foreign policy and security orientation to ignore the existence and potential of the Soviet barely touched the topic.50 The Norwegians in Union. In the final years of the war, however, Stockholm were more outspoken in their fear of an planning for the future could no longer disregard expansionist or imperialist Soviet foreign policy the Soviet Union. after the war. Tranmrel pointed out the· need of The dilemma was highlighted in the autumn of creating a "balance of power" on the European 1942 when the Soviets signalled that they might continent, rejecting the idea of placing Germany demand a role in a future North Atlantic security under occupation and stripping the country of its system. Lie was far from delighted. "If only", he armed forces after an allied victory. Tranmrel told Laurence Collier, British ambassador to the perceived clearly the need to create a counterpoise Norwegian government, "your authorities had not to the Soviet Union on the European continent: taken such a long time to consider my original proposals, we might have avoided this danger".54 [ ... ] what is the alternative to a real Germany? Although the "Atlantic policy" was primarily Should the Soviet Union be allowed to become designed to safeguard against a renewed threat the supremely dominant great power on the from Germany, after June 1941 Lie and his advis­ European continent? Don 'tthey understand in ers made it clear on occasions that some sort of London the dangers inherent in this massing of Atlantic regional cooperation could be needed to power around Stalin's imperialist bolshevism?51 safeguard against Soviet territorial claims as well. Traditional Norwegian "russophobia", fear of

IFS Into 1/96 13 Soviet designs on Spitsbergen, rumours that the The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Soviets wanted a "free port" in Northern Norway, was aware of the possibility of Soviet objections and the possible Soviet role in the liberation of to Norway's participation in a western-domi­ Norway all served to increase Norwegian fear and nated defence system in the Atlantic. Arne apprehension. In November 1941 Lie alluded to a Ording, commenting in June 1942 upon a Dutch possible future Soviet threat during a conversation proposal of similar content, indicated Norway's with the Dutch and Belgian ministers offoreign special position vis-B-vis the Soviet Union. After affairs. He indicated Norway's primarily western the war and as the result of Soviet-Finnish orientation, and added that peace treaty, Norway and the Soviet Union would in all probability become direct neigh­ Germany is not necessarily the only possible bours. Ording did not exclude the possibility that source of threat to Europe. Even though the the Soviets might approve of Norwegian partici­ Soviet Union has declared that it has no pation in a defence system together with Great territorial demands [on Norway], Russia's Britain and the USA. "This is, however", Ording policy towards Finland in the last years points continued, "the most sensitive question arising in a western direction, and it has been written as a result of the proposed agreement". that Russia would like to have a port on the The British Foreign Office was acutely aware Atlantic. 55 that the Soviet Union was likely to put obstacles in the way of the realisation of Lie's plans for a If this was part of the motivation behind Lie's North Atlantic defence system. The Russians Atlantic policy, it could hardly have been the inten­ were expected to raise objections to discussions tions of the Norwegian government to include the of the plan between Norway and the western Soviet Union in the system. He had been thinking of powers unless the Soviets participated. Eden Russia, Lie told Eden at about the same time, emphasised the need to avoid elements of friction in the relations between the great po­ but he did not want Russia in the North Atlan­ wers." Consequently, the Soviet Union must be tic; though he also thought Russia would want invited to participate in the discussions, though to be there. Part ofhis purpose in proposing an Eden feared that its contribution would be Anglo-Norwegian and, ifpossible, American "entirely destructive": defensive plan for the North Atlantic was to be all prepared were Russia to present any de­ It is probable that !heir [i.e. The Soviet Un­ mands.56 ion's] line would be that it is also a Russian interest to participate in the defence of the Arne Ording argued along similar lines, pointing to Atlantic, and that for this purpose Russia must the exposed position of Northern Norway in have an ice-free base in Nonhern Norway. 60 particular if the Soviets should instigate an aggres­ sive Soviet foreign policy leading to "a new period A speech by the South African Field Marshal! Jan of arms race and formation of alliances". Ording Christiaan Smuts in November 1943 provoked a concluded that only Great Britain and the USA discussion about certain aspects of Norwegian were in a position to provide security for Norwe­ foreign policy. It throws light on the implications gian independence. "No other form of absolute of Lie's Atlantic policy. Smuts argued in favour of security exists, at least not in the foreseeable organising close cooperation between Great Britain future."" An official committee planning Nor­ and the other West European countries, in order to way's postwar defence concluded in March 1942 counterbalance the power of the Soviet Union and that an the Soviets might resume an aggressive the United States by shaping a "trinity" of forces. 61 policy after the war. Norway's defence would An editorial in Norsk Tidend objected to this part of consequently have to be planned with an eye to Smuts' speech. Smuts, the paper held, was this alternative as well." obviously influenced by the ideology of"balance of

14 IFS lnfo 1/96 power and spheres of interest". Norsk Tidend had his mind. The only commentator who felt that to admit, however, that Smuts' scheme bore some Lie's statement did not signizy a change of his resemblance to the Norwegian Atlantic policy. But views was G.M. Gathome-Hardy. He maintained it was argued that the resemblance was a superfi­ that from the vel)' introduction of the idea the cial one, because the Norwegian schemes had Soviet Union had been ascribed a role in the North always envisaged American participation, and the Atlantic cooperation. In his opinion the Norwegians planned defence system in the North Atlantic was, were particularly opposed to the idea of creating a according to Norsk Tidend, to be organised "in third bloc to counterbalance the power of the intimate cooperation with the Soviet Union".62 This United States and the Soviet Union. last part of the argument, as we have seen, was In the Foreign Office, Lie's rejection of Smuts' hardly part ofthe rationale behind the "Atlantic ideas was seen as yet another sign of a growing policy". Norwegian fear that the Russians had their own The article in the official Norwegian newspaper designs for Northern Norway. This anxiety might was precipitated by a conversation on the matter dispose the Norwegian government towards between Lie and Collier. The Norwegian minister downgrading its advocacy of the Atlantic policy, of foreign affairs deplored the public presentation which would in fact imply some sort of alliance of the idea of grouping smaller West European between Norway and Great Britain and the United states around Great Britain. According to Lie, such States." plans were bound to incite Soviet suspicions. At approximately the same time, Lie, in a conversation with Collier, left the impression that Lie went on to say that there were now more the idea of an Atlantic security system was not signs [... ]that/he Russians would be likely to abandoned at all. After the signing of the Soviet­ take a suspicious and unhealthy interest in Czechoslovak treaty of friendship, mutual assist­ Norwegian foreign policy, if it showed signs of ance and postwar cooperation on I 2 December linking up with that of this country and that of !943, Lie feared that the Soviet government might America. [ ... ] demand a similar agreement with Norway. He continued his argument: He did not himself actually fear Russian territorial designs on any part ofNonvay; but He would not like such a request to come fi'om he didfem·thatthe Soviet Government might the Russians before agreement had been try, for reasons of their own, to prevent the reached with the British and the Americans on Norwegian Government.fi'om conducting their the question ofAtlantic security, and he foreign affairs in the way in which he would thought we might not like it either. 65 like to see them conducted, and that was the main reason why he regrel/ed the publication of The British, however, were bent on avoiding any Smuts' speech 63 discussion of Lie's Atlantic projects. The Norwe­ gian minister of foreign affairs was accordingly to Lie's statement provoked an exchange of opinions be told to shelve the idea of Atlantic defence for within the British Foreign Office. One official held the moment.66 the view that the statement was contradictory to At this point, the Atlantic policy was no longer Lie's own cherished idea: the Atlantic Ocean an expression of the official foreign policy doctrine policy, which would involve Norway in close of the Norwegian government. The Norwegians collaboration with Great Britain and the United continued, however, to argue in favour of an States: "If Mr. Lie is afraid of Norway taking this Atlantic regional arrangement within the frame­ course, then why does he proclaim [ ... ] in favour work of the future worldwide security organisa­ of it?" It was held that the rising power of the tion. As late as April I 944, Norsk Tidend, obvi­ Soviet Union had obviously forced Lie to change ously expressing the government's official view,

IFS Into 1/96 15 argued that Norway wanted to participate in a Atlantic cooperation after the Soviets had voiced defence system together with the Atlantic powers, their opposition to the idea if the Soviet Union were although "with the consent of the Soviet Union". not invited to take part in the system. 70 But the Norsk Tidend knew perfectly well that the idea of Norwegian attitude "as to the necessity and advan­ regional arrangements was not unequivocally tage of a regional agreement between the Atlantic endorsed: countries, now called Western Europe, has surely not changed"." Although Norwegian foreign policy In some quarters there has been fear that a remained highly ambiguous when the Atlantic system ofregional cooperation thus envisaged policy gradually receded, the declaration of a policy might give rise to spheres of influence and of"bridge-building" meant the rejection of both an alliances. But this will depend completely on alliance with the Atlantic great powers and Euro­ the degree ofcooperation between the great pean regional cooperation as official Norwegian powers. If this succeeds, the great powers will foreign and security policy options. What remained have no need for spheres of influence, and of the ideas and the reality underlying the Atlantic regional security agreements will not have the policy, and why did the Norwegian government character of alliances, but will serve as a consistently reject the notion of regional Nordic or supplement to the obligations within the frame­ European cooperation? work of the international organisation."

Until the end of the war and the conference in San Conclusion: great power guarantees Francisco in the spring of 1945, official proclama­ or small power cooperation? tions of Norwegian foreign policy views were increasingly adamant in their support of the ideas Although the idea of an Atlantic alliance which was underlying the new world organisation. The inherent in Lie's Atlantic policy towards the end of emphasis on an Atlantic regional agreement was the war was suspended in favour of "bridge­ correspondingly downgraded. Towards the end of building" as the declared Norwegian foreign policy the war it was admitted that such an agreement doctrine, this did not mean that the basic assump­ might constitute an element of tension between the tions about the need for some kind of American great powers. Nonetheless, the Norwegians and British commitments to Norway's security continued to assert the interest of the small states were abandoned altogether. Towards the end of in regional systems with great power participation, the war and in the early postwar years, the imple­ within the framework of the incipient "United mentation of the original plans for Atlantic coop­ Nations Organisation"." The main currents of eration was not seen as indispensable. On the one Norwegian foreign policy during the period from hand functional ties, especially in military matters, Dumbarton Oaks to the Conference in San Fran­ could be further developed independently of cisco were marked, however, by the Norwegian political declarations or agreements. On the other government's willingness to support every attempt hand the Norwegians were convinced that the to solidify and further develop the cooperation western powers viewed Norway as belonging to between the great powers.69 their sphere of interest. Thus they expected the The declaration towards the end of the war of Western great powers to take an interest in the "bridge-building" as the Norwegian foreign policy defence of Norwegian independence in their own doctrine did not mean that the Atlantic orientation interests. was abandoned altogether. Trygve Lie himself Thus the policy of bridge-building bears some apparently never became a fully convinced bridge obvious similarities to the neutralist sentiments of builder. In October 1944 he told ambassador the 1930s and the traditional reliance on Britain's Lebedev that the Norwegian government had alleged "implicit guarantee". On the declaratory deliberately chosen to avoid propagating the idea of level, however, Norwegian foreign policy after the

16 IFS lnfo 1/96 Second World War was more ambitious than the of force by one of the remaining great powers. In policies of the 1930s. Prior to the war, Norwegian case of a threat to Norway's security or integrity, foreign policy initiatives, the country's active role the assumption of the "implicit guarantee" was still in the League of Nations notwithstanding, reflected valid, and ideas of an "Atlantic policy" could easily Norway's desire to keep the world of "great power be revived. politics" at a distance. Concomitant with the The Norwegian government's opposition during increasing international tension in the I 930s, the war to schemes of European regional coopera­ moreover, Norway's policy in the League became tion reflected Norwegian foreign policy traditions. increasingly dominated by efforts to limit the During the war, however, the Norwegian attitude organisation's effective instruments of power. clarified and some of the assumptions underlying Norwegian policy in the was Norwegian policies were made explicit. The different. The Norwegians took an active part in Norwegians did not oppose regional arrangements the process leading up to its creation and later in as such, but they rejected the idea of purely the organisation itself, and in some crucial issues European or even continental solutions. For them the Norwegian point of view departed from that of the most important thing was to secure the partici­ most of the other smaller powers. 72 But the real pation of the major Atlantic power. Before the war differences between Norwegian foreign policy this role was assigned to Great Britain; towards the before and after the war should be sought some­ end of the war and afterwards to the United States. where else. In both periods involvement in the In the discussions about Nordic cooperation, world organisation was only part, and not neces­ the Norwegians feared that a partnership with the sarily the most important part, of the overall economically and militarily stronger Sweden would Norwegian foreign policy strategy. create an unequal alliance with Norway in the role In the course of the war the Norwegian gov­ of a junior partner. It may seem paradoxical that ernment established close political and military ties the Norwegians seemed to be more apprehensive with the two western great powers. The declara­ about being dominated by Sweden than about the tion of a policy of bridge-building towards the end obvious inequality inherent in schemes involving of the war did not bring an end to these contacts. the major great powers. The "Atlantic policy" made operational would have Strategic considerations, as discussed in this meant the "implicit guarantee" of the prewar years article, provide part of the answer to this apparent was made explicit. The Norwegians stopped short paradox. The Nordic countries, it was argued, of this, but political cooperation and strong "func­ could not muster the strength to present a credible tional ties" in the military field with Britain and the deterrence or the ability to repel an aggressor. United States created an environment radically Further elements of the answer may be sought in different from the semi-neutrality of the I 930s. the nature of the security arrangement the Norwe­ The "implicit guarantee" of the I 930s lacked gians wanted. Nordic cooperation would have backing in the form of peacetime preparations for meant a system of mutual obligations and commit­ military assistance in times of war. After the ments of principally equal partners. The Norwe­ Second World War, the step from "bridge-build­ gians felt, however, that the equality would be ing" and non-aligned status to fully fledged partici­ symbolic rather than real, and that Sweden would pation in the North Atlantic alliance was facilitated want to capitalise on the system to secure for itself by the continuation of extensive cooperation and a dominant position in the region. They feared, contacts, political as well as military, between moreover, that Norway could be drawn into Norway and the western powers. possible conflicts in the Baltic region. In this lay the attraction as well as the limita­ At the core of the Atlantic orientation, on the tions of the Norwegian version of "bridge-build­ other hand, was the search for great power ing". It was not designed to provide security for security guarantees, i.e. a fonnalisation of the Norway, i.e. to safeguard against the threat or use prewar assumptions about the interest of

IFS lnfo 1/96 17 the Atlantic great powers in upholding Norway's most probably more so than if it opted for coop­ sovereignty and integrity. This did not necessarily eration with smaller countries, this limited input entail the kind of mutual obligations, commitments would still be multiplied by the strength of the and involvement which would be preconditions for alliance and produce enhanced security for the a Nordic arrangement. Norway did not want to country. The relatively greater influence in coop­ engage itself in the affairs of other small or me­ eration with the other Nordic countries would not, dium-sized powers, nor did it want its neighbours it was thought, pay off the same way. The Norwe­ to interfere in the political routine of day-to-day gians preferred the position of a junior partner in an affairs. And although Norway's relative influence influential organisation rather than that of one in a great power alliance would be strictly limited, among equals in an inferior system.

18 IFS lnfo 1/96 NOTES

I. , who first used the expression in Mel/om "russerfrykt" og "brobygging", this connection, defined the "implicit guarantee" as Sovjetunionen i norsk utenrikspolitikk, 1940-1945, '"the assumption, that one or more of the great unpublished thesis for the degree Cand.philo!, powers will not allow the territory and sovereignty University of , 1988. of a non-aligned state to be violated by another 9. Halvdan Koht, For fred ogfridom i krigslid power". Cf. 1. Sanness, "Norsk alliansefri politikk?" (Oslo 1957), p. 281 et passim. in the series Atlanterhavskomiteens skriftserie, nr. 44 (Oslo 1978). I 0. Public Record Office, London (hereafter: PRO), FO 371/29432, N 213/213/30, Dormer's minute, 2. For discussions of various aspects ofNonvegian October 26, 1940. foreign affairs during the Second World War, sec Olav Ristc, ''London-regjeringa ". Norge i 11. The diaries ofTcrje Wold are in the possession krigsal/iansen 1940-1945, 2 volumes (Oslo 1973- of his son, Einar Wold, who kindly placed them at 1979); and Nils Marten Udgaard, Great Pawer my disposal for the work on a previous study on a Politfcs and Nonvegian Foreign Policy. .4 Study of related topic. The quoted entry is from October 26, Norway's Foreign Relations November 1940- 1940. February 1948 (Oslo 1973). I 2. Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 3. Formally the change look place a few months Oslo (hereafter: MFA), 34.1/19,j.nr. 978/40, PM 10 July, 1940. later.

4. Pending the publication of the third volume of 13. ''The Atlantic Ocean policy" is discussed Norsk Utenrikspolitikks historic (The History of extensively in the first volume ofOlav Ristc's two­ Norwegian Foreign Policy), the most comprehensive volume work referred to above. A presentation in discussion of Norwegian foreign and security the English language of the subject is given in Olav policies between the World Wars is still Nils Orvik, Riste, "The Genesis of North Allantic Defence Sikkerhetspolitikken 1920-1939,2 volumes (Oslo Cooperation: Norway's 'Atlantic Policy' 1940- 1960·61). 1945", in Forsvarsstudier. Arbokfor Forsvarshistorisk Forskningssenter 1981 (Oslo 5. Finnish-Swedish relations were different but arc 1982). outside the scope of this article. 14. The historian Jacob S. Worm-Mi.lllcr, in his 6. C[ Tom Krislianscn & Svcn G. Holtsmark, "En preface to Amold Rrestad's posthumously pub­ nordisk illusjon? Norge og milita:::rt samarbeid i lished book Europe and the Atlantic world (Oslo Nord, 1918-1940", in the series Forsvarsstudier nr. 1958), attributed the idea to Ra:stad. So did Wilhclm 6/1991 (Oslo 1991). Keilhau, another member of the "brain trust" 7. In this they were only partly right. The Soviet surrounding Lie in London. Cf. UK-1945, box 33, altitude towards Nordic military cooperation tile 2, Keilhau's report. changed from rejection tm.. ·ards cautious encourage­ 15. The following presentation of R

IFS lnfo 1/96 19 under krigcn (Oslo 1948), no. 21, Legation in 36. Written by Karl Petander, Wilhelm Kleen and Stockholm to the MF A, 18 July, 1942. Anders Orne.

20. The Great Powers and the Polish Question 37. This is according to Arne Ording. The general 1939-1945, edited by AntonyPolonsky (London background of the document was growing opposi~ 1976), document no. 31, p. 98. tion to the Atlantic policy within the alliance, as exemplified by the Polish schemes of continental 21. From declaration issued in Angers on December cooperation, and within the Norwegian exile 20, 1939, as quoted in Piotr Wandycz, Czechoslo­ community itself. The final version of«The vak-Polish Confederation (Bioomington 1956), p. principal features'' was approved by the cabinet on 34. 8 May 1942. The discussions about Nordic 22. Antony Polonsk-y (ed.), op.cit., document no. cooperation were also reflected in a series of 13, p. 77. dispatches to the Foreign Office from the British legacies to Norway and Sweden. See for example FO 23. Cf. Arne Ording's remarks in Norges krig (Oslo 371/33062, N 1756/262/42, LaurenceCollier's 1948), vol. 11, p. 228. Ame Ording, a historian, was minute of3! March 1942; and FO 3 71/32808, N a one of Lie's principal advisers, and he was 3004/2954/63 Laurcnce Collier's minute of6 June instrumental in fonnulating the Atlantic policy. 1942. 24. Cf. Amc Ording's remarks in Norges krig, 38. For a representative argument, sec Ame op.cit., p. 229. Ording' s article "Sverige og Nordcn", in Norsk 25. Trygvc Lie, Hjemover (Oslo 1958), p. 55. Tidcnd, 22 July !942.

26. MFA, 25.112,j.nr. 2698/42, R.B. Skylstad's 39. See for example Lie's letter to of June minute of February 8, 1942. 30, 1942, in the MFA, Lie's archive, box 2, file 1!.20/20. 27. Ibid. 40. Norges krig !!, p. 228. 28. National Archives, Washington, D.C., 740.00119 EW 1939/1047, the Ambassador's Polish 41. MFA,25.!/2,j.nr.!4584/42, Lie's minute July Series despatch No. 119 of February 20, 1942, 14, 1942; and his minutes of July 22 and 27 in the pp. 31-32. same file. 29. MFA, 25.1/2,j.nr. 3623/42, Lie's minute of 42. The statement is from a document called February 21, 1942. "Diskusjonsgrunnlag om vare fredsm:il", dated 3 June 1942, which expressed the point of view of the 30. MFA, 25.l/2,j.nr. 4488/42, Lie's minute of group around Martin Tranmrel. A copy of the March 5, 1942. document is in Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv in Oslo 31. MFA, Lie's archive, box!, file !1.20/57, Trygve (Archives of the Noru:egian Labour Movement, Lie to Rolf Andvord, June 30, !942. Oslo), Frihagen's archive, box 5, file Rapporter 1942. 32. MFA,j.nr. 09070/43, Paul Hartmann's minute of Aprill2, 1943. Soviet satisfaction with the 43. Anders Frihagen to Johan Nygaardsvold, 2 Norwegian attitude was also signalled to Rolf April, 1942, in Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv in Oslo, Andvord in Moscow. Frihagen 's arkiv, box 3, file Nygaardsvold­ 33. For a discussion of the views ofNonvegian Frihagen. Labour party leaders in London and Stockholm 44. See for example Tranmrel's letter to Lie of about Norway's future foreign policy, see Kersti March 3, 1942, in MFA, Lie's archive, box 3, file Blidberg, Splittrad gemenskap- kontakter och 1!.20/8. samarbete inom nordisk socialdernokratisk 45. "Diskusjonsgrunnlag", op.cit. arbetarrorelse !93!-!945 (Stockholm !984), pp. 176-217. 46. Tranmrel's letter to Lie of August 14, 1942, as referred to in Blidberg, op. cit., p. 194. 34. Schanche Jonassen, "V:i.r kamp og Nordens fremtid'', printed in Norges forhold til Sverige under 47. This is according to "Diskusjonsgrunnlag". The krigen (Oslo !950), vol. lll, p. 163-166. concept of the "United States of Europe" appeared repeatedly in Norwegian foreign policy discussions. 35. No. 27, July 1942. In a letter to Lie, Tranmrel envisaged Europe organised in regional groupings, which in turn would

20 IFS lnfo 1/96 combine into "something like the United States of 57. Festskriji ti/ Arne Ording (Oslo 1958), p. 121- Europe". Cf. Lie's archives, box 3, file 11.20/8, 123,1etter from London, 8 December 1941. Tranma:l's letter to Lie of 12 February 1942. Hardly more than a convenient slogan without definite 58. RA, FO arkiv H, XX-1-B-XIV, Redegjorelse far substance, the idea nevertheless illustrates the strong FD's utvalg Ill, as cited in Olav Riste, "London­ regjeringa" II, p. 348. European element in the foreign policy orientation of the Stockholm group. "The principal features of 59. MFA, 25.112,j.nr. 20405/41, Lie's minute, Norway's foreign policy", on the other hand, December 2, 1941. explicitly rejected the idea of the "United States of 60. FO 371/29422, N 6510/87/30, SirOnme Europe". The concept did not reappear as an Sargent'sminute, November 14,1941. element in foreign policy discussions in Norway after the war. 61. The speech is printed in L.W. Holbom, War and Peace Aims ofthe United Nations (Boston I948), 48. "Diskusjonsgrunnlag", op.cit. vol.ll, pp. 712-719. 49. Op.cit., Tranmrel's letter to Lie of February 12, 62. Norsk Tidend, 11 December 1943. 1942. 50. For a discussion of the place of the Soviet Union 63. FO 371/36889, N 74011421130, Collier's letter to Coote, December I 0, 1943. in Norwegian foreign policy planning, see Sven G. Holtsmark, Me/lom "russerfrykt" og "brobygging", 64. FO 371/36889, N 7401/421/30, various minutes, op.cit., pp. 134-148. December 1943 and January 1944.

51. MFA, Lie's archive, box 3, file 11.20/8, 65. FO 371/36868, N 7700/219/63, Collier's letter Tranmrel to Lie, January 16, 1942. to Waroer, December 17, 1943.

52. Ibid. As regards Norwegian attitudes towards 66. Ibid., Waroer's letter to Collier, January 2, 1944. the Soviet Union, my interpretation is slightly at 67. Norsk Tidend, 15 April 1944. variance with the view presented by Kersti Blidberg in her discussion of"Diskusjonsgrunnlag" and the 68. See Norsk Tidend, 14 October 1944, editorial position of the Tranmrel group. The Norwegian "Sikkerhetsorganisasjoner"; and ibid., 6 January Labour leaders in Stockholm, according to Blidberg, 1945, editorial "Veien rnot demokrati og inter­ were more optimistic than the London group about nasjonalt samarbeid"; and Norseman, No 2/1945, the future role of the Soviet Union in international Arne Ording's article "From Geneva to San politics. C( Blidberg, Splillrad gemenskap, pp. 193- Francisco". 94. 69. Olav Riste, "London-regjeringa" 11, p. 344. 53. See Frihagen's comments to the draft of"Thc 70. The Soviet position was set out in their principal features ofNorway's foreign policy", in response to "The principal features ofNon.vegian Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv in Oslo, Frihagen's foreign policy", delivered to Lie on 24 September archive, box 5; and his lelter to Trygvc Li~ of9 1942. MFA, 34.1/2. January 1942, in box 3. 71. MFA, 25.112,j.nr. 22241144, Lie's minute, 54. FO 371/32808, N 5097/978/G, Collier's letter to October 20, 1944. Eden, October 5, 1942. 72. Most significantly in the-question of the right of 55. MFA, 25.1/2,j.nr. 20068/41, Lie's minute, veto in the Security Council~ when Nonvay November 28, 1941. supported the view of the great powers. 56. FO 371/29422, N 7205/87/30, Eden's letter to Collier, December 2, 1941.

IFS Into 1/96 21 iFS Onfo • tDdiiOge~e lllltkommet:

1991: I. Div. forfattere: Perspektiver pa Norges sikkerhet. 2. Archer, C. Security Options for Denmark. 3. Div. forfattere: Perspektiver pa Sveriges sikkerhet. 4. Riste, 0. De Gaulle, Alliance, and Minor Powers. 5. Huitfeldt, T. Sovjet i nord etter CFE. T. Ries, & J .K. Skogan 6. Kristiansen, R Norsk forsvarsindustri ved en skillevei? 7. Ries, T. Consequences of START for the Nordic Region. 8. Rohne, N.A. Norwegian Attitudes Towards the Briand Plan.

1992: I. Riste, 0. Postwar security: Universal or regional? 2. Tamnes, R. Norges hemmelige tjenester under den kalde krigen. Et sammenlignende internasjonalt perspektiv. 3. Shevotsova, L. August 1991. The attempted coup and its consequences. 4. Kristiansen, T. Det fjerne og det farlige Baltikum. Norge og de! baltiske spmsmal 1918-1922. 5. Riste, 0. Eit 'minimumsforsvar' for Norge? FK90 og sp"rsmalet om alliert assistanse. 6. Wicken, 0. Kald krig i norsk forskning. 7. Hirsch, K. Den norske klagesaken mot Tyrkia i 1982.

1993: I. Liland, F. Culture and Foreign Policy. An introduction to Approaches and Theory. 2. Tamnes, R. Penetrasjon og polarisering. Nordomradene i et historisk perspektiv. 3. Sjursen, H. Gamle problemer i en ny klesdrakt? EFs utvidelsesproblerer i 1990-iirene. 4. Wladyka, W. Fortidens skygger i polsk politikk. Reformprosessens utfordringer etter valget. 5. Eriksen, K.E. & Norway and the Early Cold War: Conditional Atlantic Cooperation. H. Pharo, 6. L"chen, E. Norges mme med Europa, 1950-1964. 7. Berdal, M. United Nations Peacekeeping at a Crossroads. The Challenges of Management and Institutional Reform.

IFS-lnfo 6/1994 IFS Info 1/1996 .

Sven G. Holtsmark

Glieat. Power. GuaJanlees or .Small Stale Cooperation?

Atlanticism and European Regionalism in Norwegian Foreign Policy, 1940·1945

0[?@ INSTITUTT FOR FORSVARSSTUDIER