67-12,290

LIE, Kai Olaf, 1934- AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGING ROLE OF NORWAY IN THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE IN THE NORTH SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

The American University, Ph.D., 1967 Political Science, international law anti relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan Copyright hy Kai Olaf Lie 1967 AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGING ROLE OF NORWAY IN THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE IN THE NORTH SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR

by

Kai Olaf Lie

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Signatures ofCommLttoe:

Chairman:

D ate: Dqfin of the School

>ate: 'I; June, 1967 AMERICAN Ui'xi'/Erdrjp

The American U n iv ersity Washington, D. C* 1 ? 196? PREFACE

This dissertation was written in the United States and Norway during the period 1962-1966 and is based mainly on Norwegian source material.

I should like to record my indebtedness and grati­ tude to Dean Charles 0. Lerche, who inspired, guided, and encouraged me in my endeavor u n til h is sudden death in 1966.

Professor Abdul A. Said deserves not only my grati­ tude because he inspired me to enroll at The American

University, in the first^place, but because it was upon him that the burden fell of talcing over the chairmanship of the dissertation committee.

I am most grateful for the aid and advice extended from the other members of the committee; Professor Nary E.

Bradshaw, P ro fe sso r Oliver Peterson, and P ro fessor Lawrence

W. Wadsworth.

The expert advice of Mr. Ketil B6rde of the Norwegian

Embassy in g o in g through the fin a l d r a ft o f the d issertation has been most valuable.

Mrs. Virginia E. MacHale has been of great help in editing, typing, and proofreading the dissertation.

Miss Inger Anchersen, Miss Olaug Bjerland, Miss Karin

Johnsen, and Miss Trine Walther also deserve my thanks for

the typing of the draft. r I 4 i l l

Lastly, but not the least, I would like to express my appreciation to my wife, Suzanne Lie, whose interest, patience and, perhaps above all, impatience made the comple­ tion of the dissertation possible. table of contents

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

The Major Problems Defined ...... 1

Major Assumptions of the S tu d y ...... 5

Limitations of the Study ...... 6

Importance and Value o f the Study ...... 8

Methods ...... 8

Primary Sources ...... 9

Organization of the Study...... 11

I I . THE BACKGROUND TO THE REORIENTATION OF NORWAY’S

ROLE IN THE POSTWAR WORLD...... 16

Introduction ...... 16

Towards Independence ...... 19

The Problem of N e u t r a l i t y ...... 20

The Formulation of a New Foreign Policy . . . 24

The Period of "Bridgebuilding" ...... 32

Conclusion ...... 41

I I I . THE SCANDINAVIAN DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS ...... 55

Introduction ...... 55

The Departure from the Bridgebuilding Role , 58

The Swedish I n i t i a t i v e ...... 61

The Scandinavian Defense Committee ...... 64

The Scandinavian Meetings at Karlstad,

Copenhagen and Oslo in January 1949 .... 71 V

CHAPTER PAGE

C o n c l u s i o n ...... 80

IV. NORWAY'S ADHERENCE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT . 93

Introduction ...... * ...... 93

The Approach to Washington and London

February 5-14, 1949 ...... 97

The Question o f Timing ...... 101

The Role of the N ational Labor Party

Congress February 17-20, 1949 ...... 104

Norway Joins NATO...... 114

Conclusion ...... 117

V. A CRITICAL REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS

FOR THE FAILURE OF CLOSER SCANDINAVIAN

INTEGRATION IN 1949 ...... 126

Introduction ...... 126

Soviet Reactions to the Idea of a Scandina­

vian Defense P act ...... 130

American Policy toward the Scandinavian

Defense Pact E ffo rts ...... 140

The Nori^egian Reaction to the I n i t i a l _

Proposals for Closer Cooperation in the

W e s t ...... 148

The Impression of Imminent Danger to

Norway ...... 151 v i

CHAPTER PAGE

The Norwegian Rejection of the Swedish

O f f e r ...... 158

A Question of American Military Supplies or

of Norwegian Policy ...... 163

Conclusion ...... 171

VI. AFTER NATO; NORWEGIAN BASE ANDATOMIC

POLICY ...... 169

Introduction ...... 189

Norwegian Base Policy ...... 190

The Bulganin-Gerhardsen Exchange of

Letters in 1957 ...... 199

S oviet Air Space and Norwegian T erritory . . 207

The Rejection in 1961 of Atomic Weapons on

Norwegian Territory ...... 214

The Norwegian R eaction to the Kekkonen Plan . 219

The Special Problem of Spitsbergen ...... 222

C o n c l u s i o n ...... 236

VII. NORDIC BALANCE...... 255

Introduction ...... 255

The Paasilcivi Line of Finnish Foreign I P o l i c y ...... 256

The Fenno-Soviet Friendship Pact o f1948 . . 259

Soviet-Finnish Relations After the 1948

P a c t ...... 261 vii

CHAPTER PAGE

Kekkonen's Foreign Policy ...... 264

The 1961 C r i s i s ...... 266

The Kekkonen P l a n ...... 271

The Baltic: Mare Clausum or Mare Liberum? . 2 79

C o n c l u s i o n ...... 286

V III. CONCLUSIONS...... 306

BIBLIOGRAPHY - . , . . 316

APPENDIXES...... 361

I. Declaration by the Soviet Embassy, Oslo, of

January 29, 1949 ...... 362

II. The Norwegian Reply of February 1, 1949, to

the Soviet Declaration of January 29 .... . 364

III. Note to the Norwegian Government from the

Soviet Ambassador of February 5, 1949, Con­

stituting the Soviet Answer to the Norwegian

N ote of February 1, 1949 ...... 366

IV. The Norwegian Government's Reply of March 5,

1949, to the Soviet Note of February 5, 1949 . 368

V. The Svalbard Treaty Signed February 9, 1920 . . 371

VI. Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual

Assistance between the Republic of Finland

and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Signed on April 6, 1948 ...... 380 v i i i

APPENDIXES PAGE

VII. Statement by the President of the Republic of

Finland Urho Kekkonen at the Meeting of the

P a a sik iv i S o c iety on May 28, 1963 384 " CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I . THE MAJOR PROBLEMS DEFINED

The decisive battles in the struggle for mastery in

Europe in the last centuries have usually taken place in

C en tral and Eastern Europe. With the growth o f the United

States as a world power and the development of technology, especially air and submarine warfare, new strategic factors have been brought to bear upon the fate of Europe. The supply lines across the Atlantic and the control of them have made previously outlying regions of Europe important strategically. This has been especially true of the Nor­ wegian coast and adjoining regions.

Thus, after the Second World War, it was clear that fundamental changes had taken place in the strategic impor­ tance o f Norway and of Northwestern Europe gen erally. A r e l a t i v e l y o u tly in g corner of Europe before th e turn of the century, Norway became, especially since 1940, a region that attracted great attention in the political and mili­ tary planning of the powers. The development of transpolar flights and missiles after the war added to the strategic importance of the country, because of its location across the great circle route between the two power centers of the w orld. 2

The territorial changes that took place on the East and South Baltic shores, as a result of the Second World

War, whatever else their implications, must also be seen in r e la tio n to the growing importance o f Norway fo r sea and air operations in the North Atlantic and the Arctic. The

Baltic Sea entrances, like the Black Sea entrance, are a well-known traditional problem for the Soviet Navy, having always had implications for the nations guarding these entrances. After the war, when the German Navy disappeared, the situation in the Baltic area changed radically. The

Soviet Union emerged as the predominant power in the area.

It was here mainly that the Soviet Union constructed her postwar navy, a greater navy than ever before in her his­ tory. Already, in 1953, it surpassed the British Navy in tonnage.'*' I t i s a lso w idely accepted th at the S o v ie t Union, since the war, has by far the largest fleet of submarines in 2 the world.

This Navy, as long as it has its major mission in the Atlantic, must, for the most part, be based in the

Soviet Baltic and Arctic waters. These waters are also areas where Western seapower can come the c l o s e s t to many of the major Soviet industrial centers* Thus, Norway’s geographic location at the entrances to both of these mar­ ginal seas has given the country a commanding strategic position in relation to the Soviet Union. 3

However, Norway, as its history has amply shown, has been at the mercy of whoever controls her own coasts* In the past, that power has been Great Britain, whose vital interest Norway always has taken great care not to oppose.

Another noteworthy factor in this connection is the struc­ ture of Norway's trade and economy, which has made the country, also in this respect, very sensitive to the politi­ cal leadership excreted from the West. This explains why

Norway was able to stay neutral in the most formal sense only in the First World War and, in the opinion of many, departed from neutrality even before the German invasion in 3 the Second World War.

As the Second World 'War ended, a return to neu­ trality seemed possible for Norway. Only in Central Europe were the areas of influence of the great powers clearly d efin ed ; in Northern Europe, there was no such sharp demar­ cation line of great power influence and, with the with­

drawal of the Soviet troops in Northern Norway and Bornholm

and of the Western m ilitary missions in Oslo and Copenhagen,

there was no direct foreign military presence in the area.

In the first postwar years, Norway played the role

of "bridge-builder" between East and West—a role apparently

accep ted by both s id e s and sym bolized by the appointment of

a Norwegian as Secretary General to the United Nations in

1946. 4

Soon, however, the country was asked to make a choice between a neutral alliance with Sweden or join the

United States in the Atlantic Alliance* The latter course was followed, but with important reservations regarding

Norway's commitments in the Alliance, excluding her terri­ tory for use by the West in time of peace. It seems that these reservations which meant the establishment of and maintenance of an area of actual disengagement in Northern

Europe were compatible with Norway's role as member of the

Atlantic Alliance, They may, in fact, have been a pre­ condition for Norwegian membership because of the nature of the Fenno-Russian relationship.

This study w ill endeavor to make a critical analysis of the evolution of Norway's role in the postwar world; it will focus on the process which resulted in the Norwegian adherence to NATO and examine the reservations which were made regarding this membership.

In spite of the obvious connection between the Fenno-

Russian relationship and Norway's relationship to the West, they have in the past mostly been treated as separate prob­ lems* This study w ill, however, attempt to show how the

Norwegian decisions regarding foreign military bases taken during the crucial months of 1949 and later decisions regarding the stationing of atomic weapons on Norwegian territory must be seen related to the position of Finland, the Fenno-Soviet Pact of 1948, and the later development of the Finnish policy of "active'1 neutrality, including the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe.

I I . MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY

■ — The major theoretical assumption underlying this study is that the character of international politics may be largely determined by and may, thus usefully, be ex­ plained by the nature of man as a political being in search for power—by ''interest defined in terms of power.This concept has been widely held as too much of an oversimplifi- 5 cation. But no more useful concept seems as yet to have been formed.

Generally, political geography has been discredited g by students of international politics. The area, or the stage upon x^hich international relations take place, must, however, somehow influence the course of these relations, though not much is known, as yet, about this causal relation­ ship in history. But this thesis also will attempt to evaluate the strategic factors as determinants for Norway's role in international politics.

As problems in in te r n a tio n a l r e la tio n s are more or less regional in character, it will be very useful to intro­ duce the concept of the Nordic Balance to make it easier to explain the role of Norway In Northern Eurone especially 7 in relation to the position of Finland.

While Northern Europe la no sub-system in the inter­

national system since the Second World War, a balance seems to have been established in the area between the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. This balance, which may be said to be based on or to turn on the armed neu­

tr a lity o f Sweden has, as i t s major elem en ts, the Norwegian base policy rejecting foreign troops or atomic weapons on

her te r r ito r y in peacetime and the n e u tr a lity p o lic y of

Finland as laid down in the 1948 Treaty with the Soviet

Union and executed by the Paasikivi-K ekkcnen lin e o f fo r ­

eign policy.

While the bdance that was created between the roles

of Finland and Norway might have been p reca rio u s, both

powers seemed tc have been reconciled, at least until the

rearmament o f Germany, to th e s itu a tio n as i t p r e v a iled in

the area. But the re-emergence of Germany as a military power

introduced a new element influencing this balance, the end

effect of which had not been seen as of 1967.

I I I . LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study will be limited to the role of Norway, but

as mentioned above, it must, of necessity, also examine the 7

Fenno-Soviet relationships since the war. The role of

Sweden will also require extensive discussion, especially its foreign policy during the Scandinavian defense negotia­ tions. Denmark's role in the formation of the foreign relations of Scandinavia has, however, been unimportant in

the postwar period. During the crucial Scandinavian defense negotiations, she played a passive role preferring neu­ trality but following Norway wherever this would lead.

The most decisive period of consideration is the time around the Scandinavian defense negotiations and the

Norwegian adherence to NATO in 1948-1949. Subsequent

developments of interest will be limited to the Norwegian

policy regarding the question of bases and the stationing of atomic weapons on her territory and related problems, g especially the position of Finland.

Although the relations of the powers to Norway have been dominated by strategic considerations, Norway's for­

eign relations have been dominated traditionally by ques­

tions of economics and trade. The absence of adequate

assessment of the commercial considerations in the Norwegian

postwar foreign policy decisions is a serious drawback.

This study will attempt, however, to assess economic factors

whenever appropriate even though the subject matter of neces­

sity must be limited to political relations. 8

IV. IMPORTANCE AND VALUE OF THE STUDY

I t i s hoped that the study w i l l throw additional light on international relations in an important strategic area* No doubt, because of the stable political conditions of the area, it has not attracted such attention from students of international relations as it otherwise might h a v e .

Small states, however, play an increasingly-important role as the international system becomes less monolithic in nature giving them greater room for maneuver and thereby influence. The policies of the Scandinavian countries in the postwar period is an excellent example of how skillful diplomacy has preserved and maximized this room for maneuver in spite of the bipolarity of the international system; it has, in fact, since the Second World War, been an area of actual disengagement. It is hoped, therefore, that this study also will throw additional light on the mechanism of disengagement and its contribution to peace.

V. METHODS

Neither in international relations nor in foreign policy have there yet developed methods to such a degree as to be acceptable and agreeable to all students, although

there is a general tendency to distinguish between foreign policy and international relations, between the process of 9 foreign policy formation and the interaction problems and processes. This study can be said to fall in the latter category. It may also be characterised as an empirical analysis of Norway’s role in international politics in a limited period of history,

VI. PRIMARY SOURCES

Except for Norwegian Soviet relations that must be assumed, for the most part* to be a matter of public record, the research will often have to be based on secondary sources, as the diplomatic archives concerning the period are not yet available for research. Especially, many facets of Norway's relationship to NATO and the United

States are still highly classified. This, no doubt, is a 9 handicap for the present inquiry.

Nevertheless, the problem in question seems quite suitable for academic research as it is in an area with advanced democratic processes and, therefore, of public records, abundant statistical and other economic source material, vital research activities and institutions, libraries, etc. All these factors have facilitated re­ search in the field. One is justified in saying that the essential raw material for meaningful research is available.

When public documents are. available, these will be used as primary sources. But because the foreign ministry files are not yet available, these have to be limited to treaties, published notes, whitepapers, and other special c o ll e c t i o n s of documents, records of parliaments and their foreign relations committees. Diplomatic notes are useful as primary sources as concise expression to the positions of the nations involved— just as statistical material may give a concise picture of trade relationships and activi­ ties. Memoirs of the major decision makers of the area and period in question must also be considered important primary so u rc es.

The research has been aided especially by the flare- up after the Norwegian parliamentary elections in the fall of 196 5, o f an e x te n siv e p u b lic debate concerning the Nor­ wegian adherence to NATO, a debate which also spread to

Sweden and Denmark and resulted in the publication of several memoirs and statements of vital interest to this ...... study. Among the most notable are an account by the then

Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange of the diplomatic events surrounding Norway1 s adherence to NATO^ and a book by one of the opponents of NATO membership within the Labor

Party on the presumably irregular manner in which the matter was handled by the Government and the Labor Party 11 leadership. As testimony by the actual participants in the policy-making process of the period in question, these books must be considered primary sources. As a result of 11 this debate the Norwegian Government, in August, 1966, decided to publish as a whitebook the history of the nego­ tiations in 1948-1949 together presumably with documenta- tion*. * 12

VII. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Initially, the dissertation will place Norway’s postwar foreign policy and relations in context geographi­ cally and historically* Chapter II will discuss the back­ ground to the reorientation of Norway’s postwar foreign policy since the Second World War* Then, the special problem of the country’s major foreign policy decisions in the postwar period will be analyzed with special attention to the decision to join NATO and the conditions related thereto regarding foreign bases and atomic weapons.

Chapters III and IV will trace the developments resulting in the failure of the Scandinavian defense nego­ tiations and the decisions leading to the Norwegian adher­ ence to NATO*

Chapter V is an attempt at a critical review of the

Norwegian policies toward the attempt at closer Scandinavian integration. It will endeavor to direct a closer inquiry into the process of choice between the alternatives offered by Sweden and NATO. In th is connection, the r e a c tio n s and policies of the powers will also be considered* 12

The next two chapters will be devoted to an analysis of the role of Norway’s policy regarding foreign bases and atomic weapons for the stability of the area and the role of F in lan d . Chapter VI c e n te r s on the co n d itio n s Norway made regarding her commitment in NATO as far as the ques­ tion of foreign troops and atomic weapons are concerned.

The special problem of Spitsbergen also will be examined in

this chapter. In Chapter VII, an attempt will be made to come to grips with the problem of the relationship between

the role of Norway and the foreign policies of Finland, and

the developments in the Baltic area generally-

The study w ill con clu d e w ith an attem pt to g iv e a critical analysis of Norway's role in the struggle for

power and peace in Northern Europe. 13

FOOTNOTES— CHAPTER I

1 Clifton Daniel, 'Active Soviet Navy Rated over B ritish ," The New York T im es, March 17, 1953, pp. 1 and 6. 2 Hanson W. Baldwin, The Great Arms Race (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958J, p. 20. For further details, see: Jane1 s Fighting Ships 1965-66 (London: Sampson, Low, Martson & Co., Ltd., 1965V; and O. P. Araldsen, "Sovjets Sjgimakt i Nord." Norsk M ilitaert Tidskrift. Vol. 136 (4), 1966, pp. 150-160. For a further discussion of Soviet sea- power generally, se e H. G. Dudley, "The Future of S o v ie t Sea Power," Unjited States Naval Institute Proceedings, XCII (May, 1966), 60-70. 3 Olav Riste explains it this way: "Looking in a longer perspective, two factors emerge to explain why the country could remain neutral in the First World War but not in the Second. There is, firstly, the changing concept of neutrality itself. With her heavy dependence on overseas trade and the fortunes of the merchant navy, as well as thie increasingly Westward orientation of her economy, Norway's neutrality was only conceivable in terms of the nineteenth- century variety, in which the state could uphold the fic­ tion of impartiality while the rest of the nation was working almost exclusively for one belligerent party.

"Since the First World War, the progressive involve­ ment of the State in the nation's affair soon made this variety obsolete. Indeed, even if the distinction between state affairs and private business could be maintained, the total nature of wars in the twentieth century made it all the more difficult to retain the measure of moral disen­ gagement which seems necessary if neutrality is to be com­ bined with self-respect,—unless the preservation of a nation's neutrality can be construed as some higher obliga­ tion and offers recognized advantages to all belligerent p a r t ie s ."

The other reason he finds to be the changing stra­ tegic position of the country in the naval strategy of the powers. Olav Riste, The Neutral A lly, Norway's Relations with Belligerent Powers in the First World War (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1965), p. 228. 4 This concept has been developed by Professor Morgen- thau. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 5, 14 5 See Arnold Wolfers, ’'The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," World Politics, IV (1952), 39-63. Morgen- thau is also criticized by Stanley Hoffman. See, for in­ stance, Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War. Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. viii and 7-6. Hoffmann finds that Morgethau's concept of power is not clear and that Morgenthau "confuses the quest for power which is the consequence of a human instinct common to all men in all societies, and the structure of the international milieu," Then Hoffmann says: "He also confuses power as the object or goal of politics and power as the means used to achieve a whole range of goals." This, however, does not seem to be entirely justified, as Morgenthau maintains that: "Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics poiver is always the immediate aim." See Morgenthau, _o£. c it. , p. 27.

most dramatic and sweeping, but interesting, generalization about the influence of the geographic envi­ ronment upon the course of world history has been made by the Scottish geographer Mackinder. See Sir Halford J, Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1943). Mackinder's American and German contem­ poraries, Admiral Mahan and General Haushofer, both saw in location and distance and in the distribution of land and water the keys to the destinies of countries and empires. Only Mackinder, however, seems to have foreseen the effect of technological development. Great emphasis on the natural environment as determinant in world affairs is also made by later authors. See for instance about this, Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Geography and International Politics in an Era of Revolutionary Change," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, IV (1960), 145-161; and Harold Sprout "Geo­ political Hypothesis in Technological Perspective," World Politics, Vol. XV, Ho. 2 (1963), pp. 187-217, 7 This concept of the Nordic Balance is now widely accepted in Scandinavian writings in international rela­ tions. This author will, however, limit its context to nothing more than a realization that the roles of the coun­ tries in Northern Europe are interrelated. 8 The period under study coincides with the duration of the Norwegian Labor Government that was in power in Norway since the Second World War until it lost in the elections in 1965, being replaced by a conservative-liberal c o a l i t i o n . 15 9 But even after the relevant documentation is available, it is often difficult to test one's hypotheses. The decision makers' perception of a situation or their motives or intentions are of less interest than the conse­ quences of their actions—only the consequences of their actions can be a safe startingpoint for trying to surmise what their intentions might have been. Thus, even the most secret state documents might not be decisive proof of what the decision makers' intentions or motives have been. The only hard facts available for examination are the conse­ quences of their political acts.

Conclusions regarding their intentions reached after examination of the consequences of their acts might be con­ firmed by secret state papers—if they are not, the conse­ quences of their acts must be allowed to speak louder as a witness to their intentions than even their own pronounce­ ments .

^°Halvard M. Lange, Horqes vei til NATO (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1966), This was first printed as a series of articles in the Labor Party organ in Oslo, Arbeiderblade11 October 12-15, 1966. 11 Johanne Amlid, Ut av Kurs (Oslo: Pax F orlag, 1966). 12 This w ill be done by the noted Norwegian h is to r ia n Magne Skodvin who expects to complete the work in 1968. Research on Government i n i t i a t i v e and based on sources which only the researcher himself can check may be consid­ ered of less scientific value as source material irrespec­ tive of the general standing of the scholar. CHAPTER I I

THE BACKGROUND TO THE REORIENTATION OP

NORWAY'S ROLE IN THE POSTWAR WORLD

I . INTRODUCTION

This chapter will put Norway's postwar role in his­ torical perspective; it will examine and trace the country's diplomatic history since the achievement of independence in

1905, through the German invasion in 1940, and the "bridge building" period of the immediate postwar period.

It will attempt to demonstrate how besides the economic considerations the political foundation for Nor­ way's adherence to NATO was laid already during the Second

World War when, in f a c t , through the cooperation with the allies her traditional policy of neutrality was abandoned.

Until Norway achieved complete independence in 1905, her role as an actor on the international scene had been consistently obscure and insignificant in contrast to that of Denmark and Sweden; since the end of the Viking era until independence, Norway was a prize to be held by either of these two co u n tries, depending upon which one was on the victorious side of the larger European theater.

When the Kalmar Union of the three countries, that was enacted in 1397 came to an end in 1521, Norway became a 17 part of Denmark. She remained so for three hundred years, u n til 1814 when Denmark l o s t Norway to Sweden. This was a result of the Napoleonic wars which constituted a most sig­ nificant turning point for the history of Norway as well as for Scandinavia and the rest of Europe.'*'

At the Treaty of Kiel in 1814, Norway was united with Sweden as a reward from Tsar Alexander for Sweden's participation in the coalition against Napoleon of 1812 and as a compensation for the loss of Finland to Russia in 1808.

Sweden d id , however, have to accept some Norwegian demands, in clu d in g her own c o n s titu tio n as a free country, only 2 united with Sweden through one king.

When the Napoleonic wars were over, British seapower was unchallenged also in the waters in Northern Europe, and a ll th e Scandinavian co u n tries» -b u t above all, Norway— saw 3 their destinies tied to that of Great Britain,

During the F ir s t World War, a ll three Scandinavian c o u n tr ie s managed to sta y n eu tra l, and increased their trade and prosperity. After the war, the military and political situation in Northern Europe was calm. Germany was disarmed, and the Soviet Union also needed years to recuperate after defeat and revolution. The newly-created states of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland formed a new barrier between Russia and the countries across

the B a l t i c . The Fenno-Russian border across the Karelian 18

Isthmus was defined to the strategic advantage of Finland,

and here the Finns built their defense worts— the "Manner- helm Line.M

On the whole, the First World War left Norway in an

improved position, economically and politically.

However, as early as the First World War, there were

sign s th at the Norwegian Coast was to play an im portant

role in the control of the Atlantic lifelines in any future

conflict. It also became increasingly clear in the inter-

war period that major issues between the Soviet Union and

Germany were to be found in the Baltic Sea area. The

annexation by the Soviet Union of the Baltic republics, at

the beginning of the Second World War, was the first major

challenge to German control in the Baltic. It must also

be remembered that the first major issue in the Second

World War was the B a ltic harbor of Danzig.

With the Soviet attack on Finland and the German

occupation of Norway and Denmark, the northern c o u n tr ies'

privileged position as spectators to the European theater

had disappeared.

After the Second World War, political and territorial

changes together with new technological advances created an

e n tir e ly new s itu a tio n . Norway and Denmark, tog eth er with

the Federal Republic of Germany, were included in the

'Western defense system. The Baltic States had been 19 incorporated into the Soviet Union, and the Soviet posi­ tions along the Baltic shores were pushed westward to the

Bight of Lubeck. There were no Russian soldiers in occupa­ tion of Finnish soil, but Finland, in 1348, joined the

Sovet Union in a defence pact. Only Sweden, who had tried to form a Scandinavian bloc but failed, has pursued a per­ sistent neutral line and stayed out of the alliances.

Thus, the Northern countries split among diverging politi­ cal interests, and Nordic integration efforts have had to be made on secondary levels.

I I . TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

Norway had been unable to gain complete independence in 1814 but managed to have the Act o f Union with Sweden to read "... free, independent and indivisible kingdom, 4 united with Sweden under one king.'1 What finally caused the dissolution of the Union in 1905 was the question of a separate Norwegian consular service abroad. This was a consequence of the growth of the Norwegian merchant marine greatly stimulated by the repeal of the British Navigation

Acts in 1849.

At the same time, however, there was, especially in

the rest of Scandinavia, but also in Norway, a tendency

towards Scandinavian cooperation and a growing search for 5 Scandinavian unity. 20

It was during this period that King Oscar of Sweden and Norway said:

Henceforth a war between Scandinavian brothers is an impossibility- This irrevocable decision is im­ printed with indelible letters in the hearts of the two Northern Kings and in the bosoms of the three Northern peoples . . . * Our swords stand ready for mutual defense.”

It is generally held that the political union move­ ment stranded more than anything on the failure of Sweden

and Norway to come to the aid of Denmark during the war with Prussia in 1363-1864 over the Schleswig Holstein ques- 7 t i o n .

By the turn of the century, Norwegian nationalism

and its national economy had grown strong enough to force a

separation of the personal Union with Sweden. It was

accomplished by peaceful means, but this dispute also was a

reversal for the Pan-Scandinavian movement* Norway became

the third Scandinavian nation state with the dissolution of

the Swedish-Norwegian Union in 190 5.^ With Norwegian inde­

pendence, however, better conditions were created for an

improved relationship with Sweden even though the union had

f a i l e d .

III. THE PROBLEM OF NEUTRALITY

After independence, Norway sought great power guar­

antees for her neutrality of the kind that had been achieved 21 by Switzerland in 1815, Belgium in 1839, and Luxembourg in

1867.9

Recognition as a neutral was seen as a prerequisite for protecting her commercial interests, especially her world-wide shipping interests.

In 1907, she did receive a guarantee of integrity directed against Sweden from France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom, but any guarantee of n e u tr a lity was never forthcoming.^ Neutrality had, in fact, been better assured by the Swedish-Norwegian Union in the previous century when it also had substantial military power to sus- tain, . i..11 t .

Perhaps because of this experience, the Swedish con­ cept of neutrality to this day is different from that of

Norway* Traditionally, Sweden has been powerful enough to define successfully her own neutrality, while Norway has 12 had no such experience except in the Union with Sweden.

As an independent nation, Norway has, in contrast to Sweden, had to seek guarantees from the powers for her neutrality or her security as the case may have been. This guarantee has been sought in the West rather than in Sweden, for reasons which will be discussed in another chapter.

The three Northern countries issued identical neu­

trality declarations and, upon Swedish initiative, the 22

th ree k in gs met in Copenhagen in th e winter of 1914 to demonstrate their will to neutrality.

Norway, like the rest of Scandinavia, succeeded in 13 keeping out of the war, mainly because there were no major issues at stake in Northern Europe in that war. But,

in Norway, it was interpreted to be due to some other

reason than the absence of great power interests in the

area:

The majority of the Norwegians felt that this stood in connection with other nations' special respect for Norway as a small, peaceloving, and highly cultured nation. ^

It was thought that it was the w ill of the nation to stay

neutral that made the difference.'*"'*

Norway especially, but also the other Scandinavian

countries were, in reality, at the mercy of the allies who

c o m p lete ly dominated th eir trad e.

The northwestern corner of Europe emerged from the

war years with great economic and political gains; their

security had greatly improved. The weakening of the Soviet

Union through war and revolution brought independence to

F in la n d in 1917, and the defeat o f Germany gave g rea ter

s e c u r it y to Denmark,

In the first part of the interwar period, Norwegian

foreign policy was based on membership in the League of

Nations. But after the Italo-Ethiopian War, when the

Norwegian leaders found that the League could not provide 23 security for a small state, security was again sought in neutrality declarations with the other Scandinavian coun- 17 tries. Unlike Sweden, however, who had made preparations for defense, Norway limited her efforts to verbal declara­ tions. Typical is the remark by the Foreign Minister

Halvdan Koht, to the effect that it was now as before the w ill to stay neutral th a t was important:

.... There is one primary condition absolutely indispensable to the possibility of remaining neutral, and that is the firmly stated will of the nation, even before the war to maintain perfect neutrality•

Thus, while the nations of Europe armed themselves with increasing speed from 1933 onward, Norway did not fol­ low suit, trusting that it would once again be possible to stay neutral. This time, however, in contrast with World

War I, there were real issues at stake in Northern Europe:

Danzig, the Polish Corridor, Finland, and Swedish Ironore.

Norway was no longer on the periphery of world affairs; the

Russo-Finnish War in 1939 and the German occupation of

Denmark and Norway in 1940 demonstrated this and shattered

the hopes that were tied to the neutrality proclamations.

These developments constituted a shock, the effects of which

have been felt until the present day as a determinant in the 19 formulation of Norwegian foreign policy. 24

IV. THE FORMULATION OF A NEW FOREIGN POLICY-,

The new approach to the problem of Norwegian security away from n e u tr a lity could be discerned before the Second

World War.

In 1935, the Norwegian Labor Party came to form the new Norwegian government under the leadership of Nygaards- vold as Prime M in ister and Koht as Foreign Minister. Koht, who was also a leading Norwegian historian, was a paci- f4T- i s t . 2 0

H itler’s rise to power complicated somewhat the problem of a national consensus of foreign policy; there were certain groups in the country with sympathy for the

Nazis, some also had a quite strong anti-Bolshevik atti- 21 tude. Furthermore, among the members of the Norwegian

Labor Party, there were also some adherents to the idea of collective security; during a national meeting of the Nor­ wegian Labor Party in May, 1931, Halvard Lange, who was to become Norwegian Foreign Minister after the war, presented a proposal in favor of the idea* It was, however, rejected 22 after Koht had voiced strong opposition to it.

As the League system broke down in the thirties, the political and economic cooperation with the other Scandi­ navian countries took on increasing importance, and several meetings took place between their Foreign Ministers. There 25

resulted no mutual defense obligation, however; only Sweden

seemed to be really interested in such an arrangement.

— Norway found that the British Navy neutralized the German

power on the continent, and Denmark was cautious not to

antagonize her strong neighbor. Finally, none of the

others would take on any obligation for the defense of Fin­

land in case of involvement in a war with her Eastern

neighbor.

Thus, when war broke out between Finland and R ussia

on November 30, 1939, it was not unexpected that neither 23 Norway nor Sweden came to her aid . When the League, in

December, 1939, discharged Russia from the organization as 24 aggressor, the Scandinavian countries abstained. In this

connection, however, the Hitler-Stalin pact and the German

involvement in Finland must be recalled.

There was a lso in creasin g pressure on Norway and

Sweden from France and Great B ritain to permit the passage

of troops to reach Finland from the North across the Narvik-

Kirung railroad. This meant not only Western control over

the Swedish iron ore but was, at the time, a threat to the

Soviet Union's Northern Flank. Scandinavian refusal to

permit this might, therefore, have prevented the West from

being at war with Germany and the S oviet Union at th e same 25 tim e. 26 While pressure and neutrality violations occurred both from the German and the British side, Norway kept assuring herself and the world that she was intent upon preserving her neutrality. Koht was, however, determined not to get Norway into the war on the wrong side as she did, for instance, in 1807-1814 when the British blockade had such grave effects. He clearly saw that now, as before, Norway was at the mercy of whoever controls the waters off her coasts. Thus, under no circumstances, was the country to be involved in a war against Great Britain, though it was felt that she should remain neutral as long as possible.

It is this underlying partiality that indicates the tradi­ tional guiding principle of Norwegian foreign policy and points to the departure from Norwegian neutrality after the 26 war.

This Norwegian policy was later confirmed by Koht.

In discussing the question after the war, he wrote:

But I can now tell how it actually was. I did not believe that we should treat violations of our neutrality in the same manner irregardless from which side it came. I did not want to see a British neutrality violation bring us into war with Great Britain. If we were unable to stay neutral, then under no circumstances should we join the German sid e.^ '

The invasion of Norway, on April 9, 1940, came as a surprise to everybody except the Germans, it seems. Norway had assumed that the British Navy both protected and 27 dominated Norway strategically. It turned out that it did 2 8 not on the day of the invasion- One of the wartime decision makers summarizes the o fficial explanation for t h i s :

The Norwegian governm ent was not aware o f the military-technical revolution and therefore did not consider the possibility of a German invasion* On the other hand, they did not want under any circum­ stances to come into war with Great Britain. This together with the pacifistic view of the government's leading members explains why the m ilitary defense aspects were ignored.^9

Even after the German a t ta c k and th e G overnm ent's exile in England, Koht tried to maintain Norwegian neu­ trality and independence from too close an entanglement 30 with the allies. His stand was, however, not agreeable to the British Government and to an increasingly powerful 31 circle around the Norwegian Government in London-

On July 10, 1940, they signed a petition to the

Government advocating a more active policy on the side of 32 the allies- In this connection, it is important to note th a t th e Norwegian Government was n ot e c o n o m ic a lly dependent 33 of their hosts. The Norwegian gold reserves had been saved and brought out o f the c o u n tr y b e fo r e th e German ad­ vance- Thus, the Bank of Norway could function in London.

The merchant navy of more than four million tons was also a great asset economically as well as politically. The In­ come from fees and taxes levied on the merchant fleet paid 28 for the operation of the entire Government, and the train­ ing of Norwegian troops in British service. In addition, a surplus was built for the immediate postwar expenses.^

In spite of these favorable conditions, Koht had to g iv e up h is concept o f the r o le o f Norway in the war. The formal departure from neutrality began in November, 1940, when Koht took "leave," and Trygve L ie replaced him as

Foreign Minister, Koht resigned January 27, 1941.

On December 15, 1940, the new Foreign Minister had made a radio address over BBC and, for the first time, publicly expressed the new foreign policy line of alliance with the West* He advocated the close association of Nor­ way with "the Nations with whom the seagoing traditions of

Norway would most naturally associate:—Great Britain and

the British Dominions, Holland and Greece, and the United 35 States of America." He implied that such cooperation

"must and shall endure after the war." In his opinion,

there were economic, as well as ideological, reasons for a

closer Norwegian association with the West, in particular with the United Kingdom and the United States. He con­

cluded with a warning to his countrymen that their influ­

ence on the postwar settlement would depend on their efforts

to win the war.

This was a very clear departure from the Scandi­

navian neutral line; now Norway placed the emphasis on 29 36 cooperation with the Atlantic powers. Norway formally entered the Western a llia n c e on May 26, 1941, by sig n in g a 37 m ilita ry agreement with Great B ritain.

When the Soviet Union entered the war by the German attack on June 22, 1941, Norway again had to re-evaluate her alliance relationships.

In an article in The Times on November 14, 1941, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Trygve Lie, reaffirmed and formulated in writing what he had said in the radio address the year before. This time he also emphasized that good relations would have to be maintained with the Soviet Union, but security would have to be sought in closest association 3 8 with her Atlantic partners. A Scandinavian solution was evidently not contemplated.

Even during the war, a Northern Defense Pact was discussed in Sweden where such ideas always have found the strongest support.

0sten Und^n, who, at the time, was chairman of the

Swedish foreign relations committee, favored the idea of a defense pact which?

. . . should folloiv the path of strict neutrality. But should any power v i o l a t e the n eu tra lity of one o f the Scandinanvian states, the other states in the neu­ trality league should come to its aid.39

The major objective of the Swedish proposal was to avoid 40 any future entanglement between the Great Powers. 30

The Norwegian Government, however, had already re­ jected the idea of neutrality even in a pact with the other 41 Scandinavian countries and rejected the Swedish proposals.

The reason given was that the strategic positions were too different to make a defense pact possible between

the Northern countries. Norway, as an Atlantic nation, belonged first of all with the Atlantic world. Cooperation with Sweden was possible, but neutrality for Norway could 42 no longer provide security.

In May, 1942, the Norwegian Government in London worked out a survey entitled: "Main Lines in Norwegian

Foreign Policy," in which neutrality was denounced as Nor­

wegian policy.^ Instead, support was given to the idea of

a world organization as the best guarantee for peace.

Scandinavian military and political integration was re­

jected. A European organization was also rejected as too

narrow, besides Norway did not want to assume any obliga­

tions for the defense of central or southern Europe. Nor­

way's ties were with the countries of the northwestern

corner of Europe and with the Atlantic. Norway wanted an

alliance with the Atlantic powers, and included Sweden,

Denmark, the Benelux c o u n tr ie s , and France.

The "main lines" were approved by the Government,

but the document was not made p u b lic . I t was se n t to the

underground in Norway where Halvard Lange, who was later to 31 become F oreig n M in is te r , commented upon i t . From those comments, it seems that the Government-in-exile, placed more emphasis on the cooperation with the Western allies than the p eo p le a t home deemed prudent*^ It seems that the underground le a d e r s h ip in Norway did not want to make any commitments at the time. Foreign Minister Lie’s views pre­ vailed, however. In a speech of January 1, 1943, he said:

We believe in Nordic cooperation but we are opposed to Nordic isolation. The Nordic countries’ freedom i s dependent on the United Nations’ v ic to r y and we will not in the future be able to exist as self-sufficient nations if we do not seek coopera­ tion with other free people.45

As has been seen, the wartime experiences far from furthered the idea of Scandinavian political and military cooperation. The Swedish policy of ''flexible" neutrality was even protested by Norway several times during the war, but the Swedish F oreig n M inister Sandler replied: "What we can do we are doing, and when we refuse something it is because we cannot do it." 46 It must be remembered that

Sweden was neutral not only between Germany and the West but, as recognized by Koht, Western interference in Sweden, in the early stage of the war, might have constituted a 47 threat to the Soviet Union in a very sensitive area. The alliance between the two continental powers put Sweden in a very precarious position. Only after the German attack on

Russia, was a more favorable balance established and Sweden was able to resist more forcefully the German pressure. 32

V, THE PERIOD OF "BRIDGEBUILDING"

In the first postwar years, it appears that Norway tried to resume the prewar policy line of nonalignment; she embarked on an effort to play the role as "bridgebuilder" between East and West in the United Nations organization.

The Norwegian position, however, could not really be con™ sidered as one of neutrality. As one observer has put it in discussing Norwegian policy in the United Nations:

”. . . neutrality presupposes a conflict between other nations, whilst the Norwegian delegation were acting as if 48 no conflict existed," which, it might be added, would have made bridgebuilding superfluous in the first place.

Her role as "bridgebuilder" was conceived as tem­ porary; for the duration of the growing pains of the new world order only. Her diagnosis of the world situation was wrong, however; the conflict already existed, and Norway was a lso a pawn in i t .

With the disappearance of Germany’s military power, a power vacuum had been created in Northern Europe which

Sweden by herself could not fill. Both the powers mutually excluded each other from involvement in the North; and be­ cause of the stability of the area, the need and opportunity for Great Power involvement did not exist as it did, for instance, in the Balkans. Neither were the stakes as high 33 in the North as in Central Europe where the real object in the struggle between East and West—Germany—was located.

Thus, although the Soviet Union filled the vacuum created by the German collapse in Eastern and Central

Europe, she withdrew from Northern Norway and Bornholm and abstained from occupying Finland. Shortly thereafter, . . 49 Amencanand British troops were also out of Norway.

It seems, therefore, that the conditions now were favorable for a united effort by the Scandinavian countries to f i l l th is power vacuum in Northern Europe. Sweden saw this opportunity, but the Norwegian Government, at this

time, seemed more interested in the role of the United

Nations. In addition, wartime resentment against Sweden

also may have been a contributing factor in this connection.

A Swedish proposal for a Scandinavian defense alliance had been suggested by the Swedish Foreign Minister GUnther in a

speech on May 4, 1945, It was rejected by the Norwegian

Foreign Minister Trygve Lie, who explained that reliance was

being placed on the newly-created United Nations. The Nor­

wegian role as a ,:bridgebuilder" between East and West was

given the appearance of success by Lie’s appointment as the

first Secretary General of the United Nations; he took the

oath as Secretary General on February 3, 1946.

Upon assuming his appointment as Foreign Minister in

the beginning of February, 1946, Halvard Lange reaffirmed 34 the Norwegian Government’s role of ,:bridgebuilder” in the

United Nations and its desire to remain free of bloc- 50 formations. Although he recognized the value of Scandi­ navian cooperation, he maintained that this was too narrow as a framev?ork; Norwegian foreign policy should, first of all, work for the strengthening of the United Nations, and

Norway would ''for this reason cooperate with all, without 51 joining any bloc—formation, " Vie said.

At about this time, however, Winston Churchill made a speech in Zurich in which he urged unity of the West.

These thoughts were later expanded upon in his famous "Iron

Curtain'1 speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, of March 5, 1946. The United States, at the time, seemed less enthusiastic about the idea; Secretary Byrnes answered

Churchill, on March 16, to the effect that the United

States did not want to see an alliance with Great Britain against the Soviet Union—the reliance was placed on the 52 United Nations.

Nevertheless, in the fall of 1946, the United States and Great Britain coordinated their policies and created 53 economic unity o f th e ir occu p ation zones in Germany. At that time, the U nited S ta te s a ls o made another im portant move in the struggle between the victors over Germany by declaring that she would support a realignment of Germany's eastern border. 35

When the four-power negotiations over Germany 54 started in Moscow in March, 1947, the differences between

East and West had become clear. Two days after the opening of that meeting, President Truman introduced the concept of containment and announced the aid program to Greece and

Turkey. In a speech before Congress on March 12, 1947, he declared that the security of the United States was threat­ ened !lif free peoples are forced into totalitarian regimes through direct or indirect aggression" and that it must be

American policy to aid the peoples that resisted such 55 aggressron.

Norway s t i l l was not d ir e c tly a ffe c te d , however, as the issues between East and West were confined mostly to the problems of South and Central Europe. The issues in

Northern Europe had been settled by the Fenno-Soviet Peace

Treaty of February 10, 1947. But the Truman Doctrine was followed by Secretary of State Marshall's famous speech at

Harvard on June 5, 1947, calling for a European Recovery

Program.D m 56

With the introduction of the Marshall Plan, Norway's position in East-West relations changed radically. The

Marshall Plan was clearly a change in American policy towards Norway and the other Western European countries, and its political character was evident in the Soviet reactions. While American aid previously had been given to 36 each country individually, it now became conditioned by a 57 greater cooperation between the participating countries.

It was clear that, in spite of the attempted role as rrbridgebuilder" Norway was economically firmly planted in the Western world—unlike Sweden, who was in a relatively much stronger economic position after the war. Although

Sweden had lost her trade with Germany, amounting to almost one fourth of her foreign trade, she found compensation in a five-year, 250-million-dollar trade agreement with the

Soviet Union in 1946. Norway seemed, however, in no posi­ tion to trade anything with anybody at this time because of the war; in contrast to the First World War, Norway had emerged from the Second World War in a greatly-weakened position economically, with much of her industry and half C Q of her important merchant marine destroyed. At the end o f the Second World War, how ever, Norway did have 2H b i l l i o n kroner in foreign exchange reserves, earned mostly by the merchant marine during th e war. But i t was e s tim a te d , in

1946, that another two b illion kroner were needed in order

to complete the reconstruction program within the five- year time period envisaged. It was held that, if help was

not forthcoming, Norway would suffer serious economic and 59 social setbacks. But Marshall aid would enable the coun­

try to carry out its reconstruction plans. In July, 1947,

th ere s t i l l were reserv es o f 1 .6 billion kroner in the 37 country, and the country planned to reconstruct without external assistance. Put this appears to have been a mis- 60 calculation.

From July 12 to September 22, 19 47, Great Britain,

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland,

Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,

Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey held meetings in Paris to draw up the cooperation in the committee on European

Economic A ssista n ce ,

That the Marshall Plan also had consequences for the foreign policy of the country was clear. It should be noted that in his report from the Paris meeting to the

Parliament, on February 7, 1948, Foreign M inister Lange mentioned that "our delegation accepted, after consulta­ tions with the government, solutions which in certain rer 61 spects differed from what we had worked at0M

Aid was now to be channeled through an organization whose aim was to u n ite Western Europe. Attem pts at in c lu ­ ding; Czechoslovakia and other countries in the Soviet orbit, therefore, were destined tc fail* The lines of cleavage had already been drawn in Europe. With the establishment of the Ccminform on October 6 , 1947, and the collapse of the four-power talks in Germany in London in December,

1947, the crisis intensified,

A speech by the Norwegian Foreign M inister on 38

December 11, 1947, however, still defined the Norwegian role as a bridgebuilder between East and West. But at this

stage, a difference of emphasis in the presentation of the

fo r e ig n p o l i c i e s o f Sweden and Norway can he seen. The

Swedish F oreig n M in is te r , Unden, in an interview in Morgon-

tidningen, on December 31, 1947, declared that Sweden would

not choose sides in the conflict.

During the foreign policy debate in the Norwegian

Storting. on January 20, 1948, over the Foreign Minister's

report of December, 1947, the question of a re-examination

o f Norwegian fo r e ig n p o lic y was put to the Norwegian For­

eign Minister. Mr. Lange restated his earlier foreign

policy line of wait and see, and declared that he hoped for

an agreement between the East and West and the prevention

of sharpened international tensions. He said that to choose

s id e s would mean th e accep ta n ce of the assumption that war

is inevitable, which must not be the foundation of Nor­

wegian foreign policyj but he implied that, if war seemed 62 unavoidable, Norway could be forced to choose sides.

Two days later, on January 22, Bevin, the British

Foreign Secretary, in his famous speech to the Lower House

of Parliament, proposed that the time had now come for a

c o n s o lid a t io n o f W estern Europe. He proposed a union

between Great Britain, France, and the Benelux countries 39

as the immediate goal( but it was clear that all of Western

Europe now was involved . 6 3

In a speech by Mr. Lange in the S to r tin g on February

12, 1948 (Trontaledebatten), Norwegian policy of neutrality

seemed to have been reaffirmed, however. Assertions of neutrality had been given by the Danish Prime Minister,

Hedtoft, in a speech over Denmark Radio on January 30, and by the Swedish Foreign Minister, Unden, in the Swedish

Riksdag on February 4. A closer examination of these

speeches reveal significant differences in the Scandinavian

reactions to the Bevin speech. The Swedish Foreign Minister,

Unden, in his speech of February 4, promised that "we would

not in advance surrender our right and chance to remain 64 aloof from a new war." Mr. Lange, in his speech on

February 12, after having ascertained that Norway belonged

to Western Europe, pointed out that Unden, in his speech of 6 5 February 4, had not spoken for all of Scandinavia*

Prime Minister Hedtoft, in his radio address said

that:

Denmark w ill attach i t s e l f n eith er to an East b lo c nor a West bloc .... I t cannot be in S can d in avia1s interest to patronize the unfortunate contradictions which today prevail between the great power groups.

If it was not clear before, these speeches now clearly

showed that the Norwegian alliance-free policy was built on

certain conditions; whereas, the Swedish position, as formu­

lated by Mr. Unde#n was unconditional. The Danish view 40

seems to have been closer to that of Sweden. In this period, when Norway clearly parted company with Sweden and

the neutral line, it became clear that a greater consolida­

tion of Western Europe was under way.

The response to the Bevin speech had been immediate

and, by February 19, 1948, the Draft Treaty for the Western

Union was completed. On March 17, 1948, the Brussels

Treaty was signed by Great Britain, France, and the Benelux 6 7 countries. On April 3, 1948, came the European Recovery

Program; and, on A pril 16, 1948, Norway joined the other

West European members in the OEEC Treaty.

These developments were connected with two crises

which had profound effect on political opinion especially

in Norway; the coup in Czechoslovakia, February 23, 1948,

and the Soviet Union's proposal to Finland for a Soviet-

Finnish mutual assistance pact on February 27.

The danger to Scandinavia, during this period, was

painted as imminent by most news media. The New York Times,

for instance, in an editorial March 5, 1948, entitled,

’Barrage of Fear," found that Soviet accusations against

Norway and Sweden for planning to hand over bases to Great

Britain and the United States might be signs that Russian 68 moves were imminent in these countries as well.

President Truman also, in a speech on March 17, 1948,

said: "The tragic death of the Republic of Czechoslovakia 41 has sent a shock throughout the civilized world- Now pres­ sure is being brought to bear on Finland, to the hazard of 69 the entire Scandinavian peninsula . . . ."

In the Norwegian Foreign M inister's response to these developments in his speech of April 19, 1948, a new approach can be seen: the rejection of closer ties to the

S o v ie t Union and the in d ic a tio n o f preparedness to contem­ plate closer political cooperation with the West. The 70 period of ^bridgebuilding" can be said to be over.

VI. CONCLUSION

Norway is most intimately connected with her Scan­ dinavian neighbors strategically, culturally, and politi­ cally. They form the "Northern Flank" in Europe in more than one respect. But because of the structure of her trade and economy, Norway has been closely tied to and is more sensitive to the policies of the Western powers both in war and peace than any of her Northern neighbors.

When Norway gained her independence in 1905, the

Scandinavian union movement f a ile d ; but a b e tte r foun dation was laid for increased understanding between Swedes and

Norwegians. This relationship received another setback during the Second World War, however, during the first part of the war when Sweden was forced to give in to the German demands because of the unfavorable balance for Scandinavia created by the Hitler-Stalin pact.

In contrast to Sweden, Norway not only became an object in that war but also a participant in it. During this period, the foundation fcr the foreign policy line of alliance with the West was laid^ it seems that Norway already, at that time, was determined to reject a closer political cooperation with Sweden*

Immediately after the war conditions seemed to favor closer Scandinavian integration, but perhaps mainly because

Norway’s preoccupation with her role as "hridgebuilder" in this period, no really concerted effort was made in this direction. When the attempt was made in 1948, the condi­ tions were not as favorable any more. By that time, the

Norwegian decision not to get involved with Sweden but to seek a larger Atlantic partnership was faciliated by the

American decision to create the North Atlantic Pact. 43

FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER II

^It is interesting to note that the spheres of in­ terest that were discussed by Napoleon and Alexander in 1807 were almost identical to those discussed between Hitler and Stalin's foreign ministers, Rippentrop and M olotov, in 1939. They concerned the question of Poland, the Balkans, and Finland. At that time also, the balance of power in Europe was altered to the disadvantage of Scan­ dinavia just as after the Rippentrop-Molotov pact. 2 A similar development towards independence can be seen in Finland about the same tim e; when Tsar Alexander entered Finland in 1808, he did not make it a conquered province, but gave the country a free constitution and semi-independence. For the history of the union between Norway and Sweden see: Raymond E. Lindgren, Norwav-Sweden: Union, Disunion, and Scandinavian Integration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959) ; and Magnus Jensen, Norqes Historle, Unionstiden 1814-1905 (Oslo: Universitets- forlaget, 1963), Vol. III. 3 During the Crimean War, when the Western powers tried to persuade the Northern countries to start pressure on the Soviet Northern flank, and on November 21, 1855, Sweden entered the anti-R ussian b lo c with France and Great Britain—called the November treaty. Officially, all the Scandinavian countries were neutral in that war. But, under the threat of an attack in the North, the Russians asked for peace. According to one Norwegian h isto r ia n , Jens A. Christophersen, "Norden i den europeiske maktbalanse, " Internesjonal politikk (1964), pp. 2-3. He also discusses how, during the prelude to the Crimean War in the years 1836 and 1855, a considerable body of opinion in Scandinavia came to see great danger in the Russian threat especially against the Flnmark province in Northern Norway. This had a lasting impact; only of late have these rumors been dis­ closed as groundless. They had their sources in English diplomatic circles and later also in leading circles In Stockholm which desired to find an excuse to break with Leningrad and join the West. These legends werq prior to and during the Second World War, eagerly embraced by German historians. See for example, V italis Patenburg, Russland G r if ft um Nordeuropa (Leipzig: Schwarz H&upter V erlaq, 1938).

A further discussion of these rumors about the Russian danger to Northern Norway can be found in Johan 44

Vogt, Partisan Forpost. Legender fra Virkeliqheten (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1965}, pp. 84-114. He points out that they are still very much alive in Norway and the Western World. An example of this is T. K. Derry, A Short History of Norway {London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957). a Norwegian author, Nils 0rvik, supports the same rumors in an article in Xnternasional Politikk, in 1962, when he wrote: "The border regulation in the 18h> and 19ti? century were not to the advantage of Norway. But the Russians s t i l l were not satisfied. Their demands in the 1830-18401s resulted as we know in the November treaty of 185 5 in which the Western Powers for the f i r s t time guaranteed a g a in st a Russian expansion on the Northern cap. ' 1 See Nils 0rvik, "Nord- kalton-«Konf lik t eller sameksistens? , " Internas jonal Politikk. 3:318-356 (1962).

How more recent stories about the Russian threat to Northern Norway get into circulation has been demonstrated by Professor Johan Vogt in an article in the Oslo daily, Daqbladet (Liberal), October 18, 1966, entitled, "Historian om en ldgn, en t&lmodig kommentar t i l Dr. Hoff og Dr. Hinterhoff." He has found that Dr. Trygve J. B. Hoff in the business weekly, Farmand, of September 17, 1949, had printed an article, entitled "Randbemerkninger om Rand- stater," to the effect that "it was just barely that not all of Northern Norway was left to the Soviets after the war." His reference was an article in a Swiss periodical by Dr. jur. Eugene H interhoff, 11 Problems an der NATO Nord- flanke," Schweizer Monatshefte, September, 1S66. Dr. Hinterhoff writes: "The Norwegian Government * . . did not forget (in 1949) that the Russians in 1938 already made art attempt at being granted the harbor of Hammerfest* It also remembered that President R oosevelt in accordance with its pro-Soviet policy, in 1943, had attempted to per­ suade the Norwegian government in exile to give in to the Soviet wishes to get a naval base around Narvik or the Skibotn-f jord." Dr. Vogt explained that he, in a letter, had asked Dr. Hinterhoff where he had his information, and the answer was that he thought it was "in a little book written by the Norwegian professor Olvik (if I remember the name correctly) and prefaced by professor E. Kissinger." Dr. H interhoff meant Dr. 0rvik who did not make th a t s t a t e ­ ment in that book, but in Arbeiderbladet. March 6, 1964. The book in question is, Nils 0rvik, Europe 1 s Northern Cap and the Soviet Union (occasional papers in International Affairs; Cambridge: Harvard Center for International A ffairs, 1963), No. 6. Professor Vogt points out that what is true in the story, as presented by Dr. Hinterhoff, is that the Russians did in 1937 (not 1938) ask to have a freeport or storage facilities for their Spitsbergen coal 45 in TromsgS (not Hammerfest). The first public confirmation of this was presented in 1951 by the former Norwegian For­ eign Minister Dr. Halvdan Koht in connection with a defense of a Ph.D. d is s e r t a t io n . Koht has commented further on the matter in his book, For fred oq fridom under Kriqstid, pub­ lished in 195 7, saying that the Soviets asked a private firm in Tromsgi to store their coals for them, but this was also refused by the Norwegian Government. Professor Vogt also points, out that Egil Daniel sen, in his book, Norqe- Sovjetunionen 1917-1940, published in 1949, has revealed that he asked Koht about this, and that "Koht did not con­ sider the Soviet approach as an attempt to acquire stra­ tegic positions in Northern Norway." See Egil Danielsen, Norqe-Sovjetunionen 1917-1940 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1964), p. 59.

P ro fe sso r Vogt has concluded th a t the sources of both Hinterhoff and 0rvik1s misinformation must be a grossly misleading reinterpretation of the account in the Norwegian F oreign M in ister Trygve L ie 's memoirs of the meeting with Roosevelt on March 12, 1943, when he mentioned a Soviet wish to acquire some free ports in Northern Norway after the war. As Trygve Lie himself reveals, however, there was no Soviet request to this effect. See Trygve Lie, Hjemover (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1958). 4 Rowland Kenney, The Northern Tangle (London: J. M. Dent, 1946), p. 43. For further discussion of the Swedish- Norwegian union, see Jensen, o£. c it. . Vol. Ill, pp. 11-32; and Lindgren, ojg. c it. , pp. 8-131. 5 Theodore J&rgensen, Norway *s R elation to Scandi­ navian U nionism , 1815-1871 (N o r th fie ld , Minnesota: St. Olaf College Press, 1935). g Pronounced in June, 1856, quoted in Eric Bellquist, "Inter-Scandinavian Cooperation," Annals, 168:183-196; July, 1933, p. 183. 7 For further discussion on this, see Lindgren, op. cit. , p. 49; and Kenney, ojo, cit. , pp. 58-63. g Norway became a heriditary constitutional monarchy; the King as executive can only exercise power through a parliamentary supported cabinet. The parliament, or as it is called, Storting, is unicameral, consisting of 150 members, elected for four-year terms. The two major politi­ cal parties are the Labor Party and the Conservative Party. 46

See, Tonnes Andenaes (ed.), The Constitution of Norway (Oslo: Norwegian Universities Press, 1962); it contains ■ the Constitution and other documents in English translation. Frede C astberg, Norway and the Western Powers (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957), discusses the historical background of the Constitution. How the Government works i s exp lain ed in K ristia n Bloch, Konqens RSd (Oslo: U ni- versitetsforlag, 1963).

After the election in 1965, the Labor Party, for the first time since the war, lost their absolute majority and the Conservative Party, together with the other non­ socialist parties, formed a coalition government. The result of the 1965 election was as follows: Labor Party, sixty-eight representatives; Conservatives, thirty—one; Liberal Party, eighteen; Center Party, eighteen; Christian Peoples, thirteen; and Socialist Peoples Party, two. News of Norway, September 16, 1965, p. 109. g Nils 0rvik, The Decline of Neutrality (Oslo: Johan Grundt fanum Forlag, 1953), p. 29.

"^Kenney,

^ A rn e Ording, "Norsk U te n r ik sp o litik k, 11 in Sverre Steen (ed.), Norqes Kriq (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1947), Vol. I, pp. 51-52. 15 Paul T. V igness, The N eu tra lity of Norway in the World War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932T^ p. 172.

1G01av Riste, The Neutral Ally, Norway *s Relations with Belligerent Powers in the First World War (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1965), p. 228; also, gfrvik, The Decline of Neutrality, op. cit. . p. 50. 17 Halvdan Koht, Norway Neutral and Invaded (London: Hutchinson, 1941), pp. 14-15. 47 19 Halvdan Koht, ''Problems of Neutrality," Le Nord, XI (1939), 136. 19 The fear of another invasion like the German one m 1940 from the Soviet Union has been strong in the postwar period. But the German invasion in Norway and the Soviet invasion of Finland, for that matter, might well be explain­ able in terms of defensive considerations and a 'Very dubious neutrality policy on the part of both of these nations: Norway in favor of England, and Finland in favor of Germany, rather than as purely expansionist policies which they may have conducted other places and at other times.

It was demonstrated that the Russians had reason to believe that Finnish territory could be used as a spring­ board by the Germans. As far as Norway goes, the his­ torians still do not agree as to whether the German inva­ sion was welcomed by Great B ritain whose naval power might have been able to prevent the diversion of that many German divisions to the Norwegian mountains just at a time when they were needed most badly in the offensive against England. 20 Arne Ording, MDet U te n r ik sp o litisk e F o r s p ill," in Steen, _op. cit. , p. 628. Koht’s view of the League inter­ estingly contrasts to that of Foreign Minister Lange's view of the United Nations later. Koht viewed any development of the League into a collective security system as nothing but an instrument of the West against the Axis powers. He was against Norway joining any alliance. In case of a new war, he wanted the country to stay outside and follow the same course as during the First World War. 21 For an account of Norwegian fascism m the interwar period, see Hans Fredrik Dahl, "Fascismen i Norge 1920-40," Kontrast, Vol. V, No. 2, 1966. 22 Koht, "Problems of Neutrality," o£. c it. . p. 135. 23 Volunteers, however, were permitted to join the Finns. 24 For an authoritative discussion of the policies during that war, see Max Jakobson, The Diplomacy of the Winter War: An Account of the Russian-Finnlsh Conflict 1939-1940 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961). 25 This has been suggested by Hans J. Morgenthau, P o li t i c s among Nations (New York: A lfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 12. 48 2 6 A leading Norwegian critic of Norwegian policy in this period, Dr. Scharffenberg, finds this partially to justify the German attack, at least on legal grounds. See, Johan Scharffenberg, Norske Aktstykker t il okkupasionens forhistorie (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanura, 1950), p. 9. This has been refuted, however, by Koht himself in two articles in the Norwegian Labor Party paper, "Arbeiderbladet," February 9 and 10, 1951, entitled "Var vi ndytrale?" (were we neutral?.) ■ An excellent critical examination of the foreign policy of Koht is found in Clark S. Shoffy, "The Diplomacy of Norway 1939-1945" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta­ tion; The American University, Washington, 1960). 27 Halvdan Koht, Norsk Utenrikspolitikk frem til _9 april 1940 (Oslo: Tiden, 1947), p. 43. 2 8 Either because it did not want to or because of the superiority of the German forces, especially perhaps the air f o r c e . 29 Ording, "Det ubenrikspolitiske Forspill," ojo. c it.. Vol. I, p. 86 .

^Ever since 1939 with the Fenno-liussian War, there must have been uncertainty about Soviet designs in Norway. This was alleviated when, on May 16, 1944, the big powers signed an agreement to respect Norwegian sovereignty. See Trygve Lie, Med England i Ildlinjen (Oslo: Tiden, 1956), p. 103; and Instilling fra undersgSkelseskommisjonen av 1945 (Oslo: H. Aschehoug, 1948), Vol. XI, pp. 40-41, 31 T h is group included among o th e r s th e fo llo w in g individuals: Dr. Arnold Raestad, Professor 'Wilhelm Keilhau, Dr. Arne Ording, Professor Alf Sommerfelt, Jacob Werm- Mtlller, and C. J. Hambro. 32 Lie, Instilling fra unders^kelseskommisjonen av 1945, o p . c i t . , p. 102,

3^ ie, Med England i Ildlinjen, op. c it. . p. 115.

340ivind Lorentsen, Norway» Norwegian Shipping and the War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 21- 25. See also, Kenney, ojo. c it. t pp. 150-151 and 233.

3^The Times /London", December 16, 1940.

3^ Ib id . His speech was commented upon in an e d i t o r i a l 49 in The Times the next day w ith the observation th a t Norway was the first country to recognize that the war had vir­ tually destroyed "the reality of neutral status." Many consider the Atlantic Pact idea to have been conceived by Norwegians in London during the war. In late 1940; Dr. Arnold Raestad, then governor of the Bank of Norway in London, discussed it with friends in official circles, and soon it had become an acknowledged principle of Norwegian foreign policy.

The new Norwegian foreign policy line was not lost on the East European exile groups in London, especially the Poles who did not like to see an Atlantic world from which they would be excluded. Trygve Lie in his memoirs de­ scribes several attempts by the Poles to discourage the idea and how they instead promoted several European regional pacts, including one for Northern Europe under Swedish leadership. See Lie, Hiemover. op. cit., pp. 56-57. 37 Lie, Med England i, Ildlinjen, op. cit. « p. 147. 38 Trygve Lie, "A Community of Nations, Plans for a Lasting Peace after Victory, the Bankruptcy of Neutrality," The Times _/Londoji7, November 14, 1941. This was la te r elaborated upon by spokesmen for the Norwegian Government discussing the possibilities for closer Nordic cooperation. Arne Ording, "Problems of Nordic Foreign Policy," Free Europe, May 22, 1942. Jon Jonasen, "V&r kamp og Nordens Fremtid," Norsk Tidend. No. 42, July 15, 1942. Arne Ording, "Sverige og Norge," Norsk Tidend. No. 56, July 22, 1942.

390sten Unden, Svensk Ordninq och Nyordninq (Stockholm: Tidens Fttlag, 1943), p. 163.

^See Kenney, ojd. c it. . pp. 221-223.

^A member of the British Government, Sir Stafford Cripps, also advocated Scandinavian unity, but as a means of controlling the Baltic entrances. Norway rejected all such ideas. Ording in Steen, _0£. cit., Vol. II, p. 228. 42 Ministern ftfr Utrikesaerandarna 1941-45, Sveriqes fbrhailande t ill Danmark och Norge under Kriqs&ren.(Stock- holm: P. A. Norsted & Stfner, 1945), p. 192.

^For this and other expressions of the Norwegian policy, see also, Utenriksdepartementet, Norqes Forhold til Sverige under kriqen 1940-1945 (Oslo: Gyldendal" 1950), III, pp. 153-180. Ording in Steen, 0£« cit.. pp. 229-231.

^Ording, in Steen, o£. cit. . p. 230. 50 45 Ording, in Steen, _ojd. c it* , Vol. II, p. 230.

^Utenriksdepartementet, op. c it. * I, p. 17.

^^Note from Koht to British and French governments on May 19, 1940, in ibid*, Vol. I, pp. 21-23. 48 Wilhelm Keilhau, ''Norway and the Atlantic Pact,” The Norseman, March-April, 1948, p. 81. See also the sp eech by Trygve Lie before F i r s t G eneral Assembly, quoted in Einar Lttchen and Rolf N. Torgersen, Norway^ Views on Sovereignty {Bergen: Chr. Michelsens Institutt, 1955), p. 39. 49 For an account of the Finmark campaign, see Lie, Hiemover, op. cit., p. 224, In September, 1945, both the Russian and the allied troops were leaving Norway. On Septem ber 28, the Russian troops were o u t of Finmark, and by th e f i r s t 'two weeks of O ctober, a l l American troops were o u t o f Norway. Many of the B r it is h tro op s remained u n til the next year. For this, see also, ”The Quarters History,” The American Scandinavian Review, V ol. XXXIII, No. 4 (Decem­ ber T945T7” 359-360; and "The Quarters History,’’ The American Scandinavian Review, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (March, 1946), 74. 50 Radio speech of February 4. Quoted in Halvard Lange, Norsk Utenrikspolitikk siden 1945 (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum, 1952), pp. 6-7 and 13. 51 Ibid. , pp. 106-131. In an interview in January, 1946, Trygve Lie had also rejected a Scandinavian bloc. See Norway Digest, January 18, 1946. A proposal for a Scan­ d in a v ia n defense arrangement based on th e assumption th a t Soviet foreign policy in Northern Europe was aimed at pre­ venting the area from becoming a springboard for attack can be found in Johan Vogt, Russland og Nor den (Oslo: Aschehaug, 1945). He argues that the Scandinavian countries ought to find a common defense system without any anti-Russian ele­ ment. For a further discussion of Norwegian foreign policy in th e immediate postwar period, se e , John Sannes, "Norway, An Outsider at Paris," Norseman, 4:431-35 (November-December, 1946); Brita Scottsberg Aahman, "Scandinavian Foreign Policy, Past and Present," in Henning Friis, Scandinavia Between East and West (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1 9 5 0 ), p. 295; Wilfred Ryder, "The End o f Nordic N e u tr a lity ," Soundings, 24:15 (March, 1959); Jon Midgaard, A Brief History of Norway (Oslo: Nicolai Olsens Boktrykkeri, 1965); Leroy Karlstrom, "Beginning and End o f Norwegian N e u t r a li t y ,” Norseman, 9:293 (September-October, 1951); and Nils 0rvik, The Decline of Neutrality, pp. c it. 51 52 The New York Times, March 17, 1946. 53 Prance followed in 1948. 54 They were continu ed in London in November, 1947* 55 ’’Message of the President to Congress on March 12, 1947, Recommendations on Greece and Turkey,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XVI, No* 40 31, March 23, 1947, pp. 534-537. This was th e Truman D octrine.

The course that was followed had not had unanimous support in the Cabinet. Commerce Secretary Henry Wallace, for instance, in a speech in New York on September 12, 1946, had advocated, in effect, that the United States recognize the Balkans as a Soviet sphere of influence. The New York Times, September 13, 1946. On September 20, 1945, Wallace resign ed .

for a general d is c u s s io n of the Truman A d m in istra­ tio n 's foreign p o lic y , see C obell P h i l l i p s , The Truman Presidency (New York: The Macmillan Company,1966) arid Barton J. B ernstein and A llen J . Matusaw, The Truman Admin­ istration (New York: Harper & Row, 1966). c 6 Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XVI, No. 415, June 15, 1947, pp. 1159-1160. 57 The position of the United States regarding UNRRA had been expressed by acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson over the NBC network on December 8, 1946, when he found it dissatisfactory because ”... some countries don't put it to the right use . . .," Department of State Press Release 881 of December 7, 1946, Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XV, No. 389, December 15, 1946, pp. 1107- 1108. 58 More than any other nation, Norway is dependent upon foreign trade and shipping. The country has a great asset in an abundance of waterpower which is cheaper than in any other industrialized country. Other natural re­ sources of note are rich fishing grounds, large coniferous forests, and some mineral ores. But the country's insuf­ ficient agricultural production and the absence of mineral fuels make the country highly dependent upon foreign sup­ plies. Thus, Norwegian commodity imports generally greatly exceed exports. The balance is accounted for by the gigantic merchant fleet, ranking as the third largest in the world with more than seventeen million tons in 1965. 52

This is the most spectacular economic asset of the country. It is not only of direct economic value for Norway, hut also of great strategic importance, as demonstrated during World War II when it was of indispensable service to the A l l i e s .

On a per capita basis, Norway has by far the world's largest merchant fleet. The shipping industry, therefore, plays a larger part in the Norwegian economy than in any o th e r co u n tr y . More than 90 per cen t of the merchant f l e e t is engaged in international trade. In 1963, approximately 42 per cent of the total income of foreign exchange through e x p o r ts o f goods and s e r v ic e s accrued from the gross freight earnings. Since total exports amount to more than two-fifths of the gross national product, shipping is thus a decisive factor in Norway's external balance.

Norway has also a large foreign trade in relation to the population— second only to New Zealand. The most im­ portant export products, after the Second World War, have become the electrometalurgical--above all aluminum and electrochemical, such as nitrogen fertilizers. They are very power hungry industries based on the abundance of inexpensive water power. But they are also very capital extensive and the country depends heavily on capital im­ ports for their development.

The traditional export industries are the wood- processing and finishing industries, both of which have reached the lim it of their expansive capacity, however, and are of increasingly less relative importance. Exports of metals and metal goods has come to form the largest single group of export commodities after 1960. The most important trade partners have traditionally been Great Britain and Germany j but since the creation of the European Trade Asso­ ciation, Sweden has become an increasingly-important p a r t n e r .

For almost a century up to 1932, with the exception of the years 1915, 1916, and 1918, Norway had a continuous deficit on her current balance of payments.

The im port of c a p i t a l from abroad has taken the form partly of foreign loans, partly of direct foreign invest­ m ents .

During the first post-war years, the deficit was financed by drawing on the country's foreign exchange holdings and later by Marshall aid. In the 1950fs and 53

1960*s, Norway has continued importing foreign capital which has manifested itself in large current deficits ex­ cept for a few years. Borrowing on ships have taken the larger share of capital imports.

The best history of foreign investment in Norway is Arthur Stonehill, Foreign Ownership in Norwegian Enter­ prises , For further information on Norwegian trade, see In v e s to r 1s Guide to Norway (Oslo: Norges Banks S ed d el- trykkeri, 34 edition, March, 1965), A good history of the Norwegian economy is Langtidslinjer i_ norsk dkonomi 1865- 1960 (Oslo: Samfunns^Skonomiske Studier Nr, 1G, S t a t i s t i s k SentralbyrS, 1966), It has a summary and tables in English, 59 Erik Brofoss, Norway1s Economic and Financial Problems (Oslo; Oslo University Press, 195GTJ p^ 32.

k^Ibid. , p, 33. From April, 1948, to June 30, 1953, Norway rec eiv ed economic a id from United S ta te s valued a t 460 million, including both direct and indirect economic aid but not military deliveries under the military aid pro­ gram, By the time Marshall aid ended in 1956, Norway had received more than three billion kroner in direct aid from the United States, Brofoss, o£. cit., p. 34. For a further description of these problems, see Per Kleppe, Main Aspects of Economic Policy in Norway since the War (Oslo; Uni­ versity Press Oslo, 1960), pp. 1-12; and Erik Brofoss, Survey of Economic Developments and of Economic Policies in Norway sin ce Wor1d War II (OsYo: Oslo U n iv e r sity , O slo International Summer School, 1963), pp. 5-18.

^ 5 tor tings tidende, No. 8 (1948), p. 20. £ p Stortingstidendet No. 8 (January 20, 1948, p. 43. "Debatten om Utenriksministerens rededjizirelse 11.12.47." 6 3 See Halford Hoskins, The Atlantic Pact (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1949), p. 22. For a chronology of events, see NATO, Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Paris; NATO, Information Service, 1966), pp. 188—202.

f* A ■ I Osten Unde*n, Sverlqes Utriksnolltikk (Stockholm: Tidens Fdrlag, I960), pp. 29-30. See a lso , The New York T iroes, February 5, 1948. 54

Lange, op. cit.

66 —* Politiken /Copenhagen/. January 31, 1948. For fur­ ther discussion of Danish foreign policy in this period, see Erik Nielsen and Erik Krag, Atlantpakten og Danmark 1949-1962 (K^benhavn:Atlanterhavssammensetningen, 1952), p. 44; and Sven Henningsen, '’The Foreign P o licy of Denmark," in Joseph E, Black and Kenneth W. Thompson ( e d s .) , Foreign Policies in .a World of Change (New York: Harper and Row, 19G3), pp. 100-3.

^7For the text, see NATO, ojs. c it. , pp. 206-208. r Q The Hew York Times, March 5, 1948. 69 "Toward Securing the Peace and Preventing War," Address by the President to the Congress on March 17, 1948. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVIII, No. 455 (March 28, 1948), pp. 418-420. During the Soviet-Finnish negotia­ tions, there were rumors in Oslo about alleged Soviet inten­ tions to request a non-aggression pact with Norway (the so-called Easter Crisis of 1948). On this see, Ryder, op. c it. , p. 17; and Keith Hutchinson, "Scandinavia between the Blocs,'1 Nation. 167:57-69 (July, 1948). For a discussion of the terms of the Fenno-Soviet treaty see, Erik Castren, "Peace Treaties and other Agreements made by Finland," in R isto Hyv&rinen, _et ad., Finnish Foreign Policy (Helsinki: Finnish Foreign Policy Association, 1963); Rolf T^rngren, "The Neutrality of Finland," Foreign Affairs. 39:601-609 (July, 1961). 70 The speech is printed in Lange, _o£. c it. , pp. 62-65. CHAPTER III

THE SCANDINAVIAN DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS

I . INTRODUCTION

In this chapter w ill be traced the events during the

Scandinavian defense negotiations in 1948-1949, culminating in the Norwegian d e c is io n to adhere to the North A t la n t ic

Treaty Organization,

From late April, 19 48, until January, 1949, a series of negotiations took place between the three Scandinavian countries concerning the possibilities of establishing a formal and neutral defense cooperation between them.

Because Norway seemed not to have contemplated mem­ bership in the Brussels Pact, such Scandinavian military and political cooperation seemed possible. However, a sig­ nificant difference between Swedish and Norwegian views concerning the nature of the postwar political situation had already found public expression and was a forewarning that Norway did not accept the Swedish proposal.,

Vfhy the Scandinavian defense talks took place anyway, in spite of the divergence between the Swedish and Norwegian views, critics have explained in terms of the internal poli­ t i c a l conditions in Norway*

While the Norwegian Labor Government evidently wanted to join the Western alliance, the fact that there 56

initially was far from unanimity about this within the

Labor Party, has led some to propose that the proponents of the Atlantic Pact first had to prove that the Scandi­

navian solution was impossible in order to reach a large

enough consensus in favor of the Atlantic Pact.

Norway’s strategic, economic, and cultural ties tc

Great Britain are easily explained, as we have seen, by her

geographic location and her traditional dependence upon 1 seaborne trade. But a wider A tla n tic community was a d i f ­

ferent matter. For instance, the relationship to the United

States, even after the war, had to overcome many obstacles

in spite of the oft-repeated fact that there are more people

of Norwegian descent in the United States than the whole

population of Norway. The doubts about the internal social

system and political processes in the United States, to­

gether with her diplomacy, were formidable obstacles,

though somewhat eased by the Truman A dm inistration’ s so c ia l

programs.

The overriding consideration of the time, however,

in the minds of statesmen and laymen alike must have been

the American nuclear monopoly. That the Soviet Union was

close to breaking this supremacy was not generally known at

the time. 57

Another factor of primary importance was the enor­ mous economic power of the United States which easily con­ trolled the economy of the Western world in the postwar era. Cooperation with, if not aid from, the United States was needed, at least if Norwegian rearmament was to take place without disruption of the economic reconstruction programs.

Thus, also in t h is r e s p e c t, Norway appears t o have been in a definitely more dependent position than Sweden.

It appears also that only American sources of aid were con­ templated in Norway and not, for instance, Swedish aid or a combination of both.

From the statements of Norwegian and Swedish states­ men, however, emerges a lso the im pression of d e f i n i t e differences as to the conception of the degree of danger which threatened Scandinavia. It appears that Norway be­ lieved the threat from the East against her territory to be 2 an immediate danger and rearmament an immediate n e e d .

Sweden, on the other hand, while concerned about the general trend, did not seem to believe that the danger was of an immediate nature and directed against any of the

Scandinavian countries. Humors also circulated in Oslo to

the effect that Norway soon would receive an offer from the

Soviet Union similar to the one made to Finland. President

Truman, it will be recalled, in his speech of March 17, 58

1948, had warned that the Soviet pressure on Finland repre- 3 sented a danger for the entire Scandinavian Peninsula.

Perhaps, not by coincidence, this warning was given the day before the Scandinavian Ministers met in Stockholm for the first time to discuss their security problems.

XI. THE DEPARTURE FROM THE

"BRIDGEBUILDING1' ROLE

In March, 1948, after the coup in Czechoslovakia and with the rumors about a threat to the Scandinavian coun­ tries, it looked as if a situation had been created as described by Foreign Minister Lange on January 20, 1948, in which Norway had to choose between an alliance-free policy and an alliance with the West.

It was in this atmosphere that a meeting between the

Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish Prime Ministers was held in

Stockholm March 18, 1948. On th a t o c c a sio n , th e Norwegian and Swedish Premiers, stressed only the importance of Scan­ dinavian consultation in foreign policy, but not much more came of t h is m eeting.

It was clear, however, that Sweden did not share the

Norwegian sense of immediate urgency. In speeches of April

4 and 13, 1948, Finance Minister Wigfors and Foreign Minis­ ter Undin, respectively, expressed the opinions that there was no need to re-examine Sweden's foreign policy. Wigfors 59 was skeptical of any danger of war for Scandinavia, and the

Foreign Minister emphasized that there was to be no re- evaluation of Sweden's alliance-free policy*

A d i f f e r e n t view was expressed by the Norwegian For­ eign Minister Lange in his speech of April 19, 1948, to the

Oslo Military Society, in which he explained that increased tensions between the powers had made it necessary for Nor­ way to make its position clear. Peace was a presupposition fo r Norway's very e x is te n c e , but Norway was in a dangerous strategic position if war should break out. Norway wished for as friendly relations as possible with the Soviet Union; but referring to the rumors that circulated, the Foreign

Minister rejected, in advance, the idea of joining the

Soviet Union in a military pact. But he did not exclude the possibility of closer political cooperation with the

West. Regarding the Western Union, he said:

. . . such a consolidation can become a step in the direction of stabilizing relationships, a contribu­ tion to the shaping of a new equilibrium and basis for an independent contribution which can be able to counteract the severe tensions between the two leading great powers.^

Only extreme conditions could persuade NorwaVi however, to adopt a p o lic y which would lea d away from both Denmark and

Sweden or one o f them. "On the other hand," said Lange,

"one had to keep in mind th a t th e politico-m ilitary problems

and s e c u r ity problems th a t each of the Scandinavian states 60 are facing are not identical, and that this fact might lead to certain difficulties in finding a common solution to them*"^

Lange, in his speech, revealed that he did not be­ lieve in any pressure for a military pact from the Soviet

Union and did not characterize Soviet policies as aggres­ sive. But without clearly defining his reasons for bring­ ing up the subject, he rejected the idea of a pact with the

Soviet Union. This speech represents, in many ways, a departure of the Norwegian postwar foreign policy line in the direction of the West and away from the previous "bridge- g building11 role.

Lange's warning to Sweden that Norway might be forced to turn to the West was underlined by Norwegian newspaper commentaries; especially, the conservative press urged th a t Norway now o f f i c i a l l y take step s to jo in the

Western camp*

The Swedish expressed wish to avert a split in Scan­ dinavia was officially shared by the Norwegian Government; but Lange, again in a speech April 30, 1948, in mentioning the Bevin plan, stressed that Norway would not exclude the possibility of negotiations for a closer political or eco- 7 nomical cooperation in the West.

C learly, Norway now had parted company with the 61 other two Scandinavian countries regarding the evaluation of the political developments in Europe.

I I I . THE SWEDISH INITIATIVE

It appears that, at this time, Norway already wanted to influence Sweden and Denmark in the direction of the

Western alliance; while Sweden, on her part, wanted to pre­ vent Norway from stepping into the Western bloc, at least before a Scandinavian solution could be fully explored. It was Sweden, therefore, that took the initiative to the g Scandinavian negotiations.

The preliminary negotiations can be said to have started May 3, 1948, when the Swedish Foreign Minister,

Unden, made a private visit to Oslo, and presented the 9 Swedish proposal to his Norwegian colleague. Later, dur­ ing the Swedish social democratic congress in Stockholm

May 9-11, 1948—where the Norwegian and Danish Premiers,

Gerhardsen and Hedtoft, also took part—the question was

discussed publicly for the first time. During the meeting,

the Swedish Foreign Minister explained the Swedish proposal

for a neutral defense pact envisaged as both formally and,

in reality, free of ties to the great powers.

Among those today who are interested in a Scandinavian agreement on cooperation are some who think that co­ operation shall really mean the inclusion of the 62

Scandinavian as a regional group in a West bloc, but it is clear that the Swedish government, which does not wish to join a Western bloc, is no less unwilling to do so via a S can d in avia n a l l i a n c e * ^

Sweden held consistently to this concept and Unden never recognized the validity or relevance of the official Nor­ wegian objections to such a neutral pact*

Lange spelled ou t th e se o b je c tio n s in a sp eech in

Malm^ on June 4, 1948, by pointing to the different experi­

ences of the three countries during the war and the differ­

ence in strategic location* He, therefore, saw no basis

for a common Scandinavian foreign policy line.*^-

These were evaluations which were not shared by the

Danes, Like the Swedes, they reacted differently to the

events in 1948 and did not find the danger to be imminent.

Ever since th e war, Denmark was g r e a t ly in fa v o r o f

a Scandinavian solution to her security problems in case of

failure of the United Nations* She became the mediator

between Sweden and Norway. As expressed by the Danish For­

eign Minister Rasmussen early in June, 1948:

The Government regard s i t as i t s fo re m o st task to try to further Northern understanding and ensure that the ways of the Scandinavian countries shall not separate.

Denmark, however, w ith her lo c a tio n a t th e B a lt ic e n tra n ce s

was in a much more precarious position than Norway and

Sweden. She belonged strategically to the continent- In

the view of one of the Norwegian foreign policy makers: 63

"Denmark cannot be defended .... Discussions concerning a

Northern alliance should therefore in reality be confined to 13 Norway and Sweden." There seems, however, not to have been any official attempts at any exclusive Swedish- 14 Norwegian arrangement. As will be developed later, such an arrangement would be even more dominated by Sweden and, thus, so much less acceptable to Norway than an alliance between all three of the countries. Even though it would be more favorable strategically, its political objections would be of greater concern.

In spite of the differences between the Norwegian and Swedish public views regarding the threat to the Scan­ dinavian countries and their chances to remain aloof from a new world war, the Scandinavian consultations about the possibilities for a closer defense cooperation continued

through the summer of 1948.

By that time, it had become clear that the Soviet

Union was opposed to any military cooperation in Scandinavia.

The same attitude prevailed in Washington as far as a

purely neutral bloc was concerned. The Vandenberg Resolu­

tion passed by the Senate on June 11, 1948, had outlined

the direction of U. S. policy in-Western Europe, including

Scandinavia, by calling for collective security arrange­

m e n ts.^ 64

S h ortly afterwards, the ta lk s concerning the A tla n tic 16 P a ct opened in Washington.

IV. THE SCANDINAVIAN DEFENSE COMMITTEE

In September, 1948, the Scandinavian consultations had resulted in a decision on the part of all three govern­ ments, "to initiate a joint exploration of the possibili­

ties and pre-conditions for Scandinavian cooperation in the 17 f i e l d of defense." The decision was made during the

Scandinavian Foreign Ministers meeting in Stockholm Septem-

8-9, 1948. It was agreed that explorations would be

made concerning the p o s s ib ilitie s o f a Scandinavian d efen se

alliance. That the talks were to be based on the Swedish

proposals for a neutral Scandinavian bloc was not to be 18 made p u b lic until much later, in February, 1949. The

communique from the meeting only mentions that there "was a

certain difference as to the security problem," but, "there

was a basis for making a common inquiry regarding a closer 19 c o o p era tio n between the three c o u n tr ie s," Because

nothing was mentioned as to the further conditions that,

in fact, were set regarding the inquiry, it thus appeared

to be unconditional while, in reality, the inquiry was

based on the Swedish alliance-free position. The partici­

pants had further pledged themselves, as was later revealed,

not to take up the question of defense-cooperation with 65 20 other powers while the inquiry took place. This latter provision was certainly a Swedish condition, while the con­ dition that the inquiry be limited to the Swedish proposal was not to be made public until it was completed must have 21 been of Norwegian origin.

The Scandinavian Defense Ministers first met in Oslo on October 15, 1948, to start their explorations for the possibilities of a closer defense cooperation. To carry out the investigation, they appointed a Scandinavian 22 Defense Commission. As was rev ea led la t e r , the in s t r u c ­ tions to the committee provided that;

. . . the Committee should take under consideration two alternative forms of defense cooperation between the three countries, namely on the one hand a defense union, and on the other hand a partial defense coopera- tion in peacetime without a union. As a basis for the inquiry into the alternative of a defense union, the instructions contained the stipulation that the coun­ tries must not give up any part of their territory to an aggressor without armed resistance, and that any military attack should be met with resistance by armed force. It must also be assumed for the study of this alternative that the countries were agreed that they would seek to keep out of war and that they had not in advance entered into any military pacts with other pow ers.2^

For some reason, the Scandinavian defense studies,

as can be seen from the above, were delayed for a month

after the decision had been taken to make them. The weeks

that followed the decision to explore the possibilities of

a Scandinavian defense cooperation were important for later 66

developments of the Scandinavian explorations, and deserve

to be examined in detail*

Norway, in her d e sir e fo r some form of orientation

Westward, was primarily concerned about her traditional

political ties with Great Britain* Although Great Britain was receptive to this orientation, her commitment in the

Western Union could not have allowed her to provide the

needed military aid for Norway- During the summer and fall

of 1948, when, after the Vandenberg Resolution of June 11,

1948, it became clear that the United States was prepared

to enter a collective security pact with Western Europe,

the situation for Norway changed appreciably; for the first

time, an alternative to a Scandinavian security pact pre­

sented itself. This alternative was soon explored. In

October, 1948, during the U.N. General Assembly Session in

Paris, the Norwegian Foreign Minister approached Secretary

of State Marshall. The purpose of the meeting was, accord­

ing to Prime Minister Gerhardsen, "to get information on

questions of interest for evaluation of the international

situation and to be personally able to inform the American 24 Secretary of State about Norway's position." According

to press reports, Lange pointed out to Marshall that a 25 Scandinavian defense alliance would be desirable. He

also reported that he probed the question of U.S. military 2 g aid for such an alliance. But Washington made it clear, 67 at that time, that aid could not be expected by those nations which were not tied to the United States by collec­

tive security arrangements. This became an important argu­ ment against the feasibility of a Scandinavian Pact.

A meeting was also held between Marshall and the

Swedish Foreign Minister Und^n on October 14, but nothing

is known of what took place at that meeting. It was the

next day that the Scandinavian Defense Ministers held their

first meeting.

By this time, the nations negotiating what was to

become the Atlantic Pact had not yet come to any agreement 2 8 as to Scandinavian participation in such a pact. France,

in particular, did not like to see the Western Alliance

extended; a further spread of American aid might reduce the

amount of aid which France hoped would help make her the

strongest nation in Europe. For these and other reasons,

Marshall could not yet take a definite position on the

question of aid to Scandinavia. When Lange made his report

to the Storting on October 30, 1948, he could, therefore,

not bring any definite clarification of what Norway would

expect. He merely pointed out that it would be easier to

come to a decision concerning a Scandinavian defense co­

operation after the report from the defense committee was 29 com pleted. 68

Lange this time, however, voiced support for the

Western Union as "entirely defensive” and ''shaped by the fear of Soviet expansion,” and went a little further than before in implying that a risk of war was present:

There is reason to hope that the fear of the dis­ aster which will attend another war will be strong enough to secure peace, but there is always the risk of an unexpected and unpredicated explosion.

He also repeated what he had said often times before that, even though a Scandinavian solution was desirable, their strategic positions, as well as their experiences 31 during the war, were d iff e r e n t.

On December 10, 1948, the same day th at the p relim i­ nary negotiations on the pact started in Washington, the question of possible Norwegian participation in the Atlantic 32 Pact was debated in the Storting. But at that meeting,

Lange pointed out, as he had on October 30, that it would be easier to make a decision after the Scandinavian defense committee had submitted its report. But, he said that, in the event the country decided to join the Atlantic Pact, it was desired that the decision be made promptly in order that Norway could participate in the formulation of the pact., 33

The leading Labor Party paper, Arbeiderbladet. next day went further and stated that security could be won only through a wide defense cooperation with the Western powers and not in n e u tr a lity . 69

The paper rejected the policy of neutrality "which led to the shipwreck of 1940" and. added reference to the debate in the Parliament:

The debate showed that there exists doubts as to the value of an isolated defense cooperation, or more correctly a Northern cooperation isolating Norway from lands to th e West .... It must be clear to all that Norwegian public opinion makes it absolutely impossible to extend the Swedish neu­ t r a l i t y p o licy to in clu d e Norway as w e l l . 34

Prior to the Presidential elections in the United

States in the fall of 1948, the Atlantic Pact negotiations had been in suspense awaiting the results of the elections.

When, on November 2, P resid en t Truman won an un­ expected victory, the negotiations were speeded up consid­ erably j there was no change of administration to slow up th in g s.

This development was also reflected in the atmosphere of urgency surrounding the Scandinavian defense negotia­ tions. At a meeting between the Scandinavian Premiers at

Uddevalla on December 17, 1948, it was decided to speed up the completion of the defense commission's work. The political negotiations would be resumed when the report 35 from the commission was ready.

When the first draft of the North Atlantic Pact was completed on December 30, Norway was forewarned th a t she soon would expect an invitation to join the talks. Accord­ ing to what Lange later revealed, Norway was informed ". . . 70 one week after the meeting in Uddevalla" that it would be invited to take part in the discussions on the Atlantic 3 6 Pact. This was sooner than expected.

But Sweden wanted to prevent Norway from d estroyin g the chances of a Scandinavian defense cooperation by reject­ ing the idea before it even had a chance to be explored.

The Norwegian Government, on the other hand, whose spokesmen had repeatedly ascertained that it was desirable and important to take part in the initial rounds if Norway wanted to become a member of NATO, suggested that repre­ sentatives of the three governments should meet even though 37 the defense committee's report was not yet completed.

But the main points and conclusions of the report of the committee were known to the governments by then. 38

It had agreed that military cooperation among the three countries would be to their advantage and would strengthen their total defense capability. The defenses of

Norway and Denmark needed stren gth en in g, however. Thus, external material aid would be needed for these two coun- 39 tries. Such aid Sweden would hardly be able to provide.

These conditions have been referred to later as a major stumbling block for the attempted Scandinavian defense co­ operation. But, as later revealed by the Swedish Foreign

Minister, Sweden would have been willing to see the pact 71 put into effect immediately without first waiting for

Norway and Denmark bringing their defenses up to the de-

■ -m ,40 sired level.

The real difficulty , however t was revealed by the

Norwegian Foreign Minister in an interview with Arbeider- b la d e t on January 3, 1949; h is u n w illin g n e ss to see a

Scandinavian arrangement without some ties to the West, if not formally so, at least in reality. He said:

The more we think of these questions, the clearer it appears to me that if we are to draw the full advantage of modern technology and its possibilities, we must have to expand the cooperation with those peoples we feel related to, even outside the confines o f the North. We hope Sweden and Denmark on their part reach the same conclusions so that we can stay together as we now do in the European Economic Recovery Program. ^

Thus, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, for all practical purposes, had sealed Norway’s negotiating position even before the political discussions with Sweden had started.

This was what Sweden had feared.

V, THE SCANDINAVIAN MEETINGS AT KARLSTAD,

COPENHAGEN, AND OSLO IN JANUARY, 1949

The Scandinavian defense pact negotiations were opened in K arlstad, Sweden, on January 5-6, 1949. The record from the meeting, that was attended by the Prime

M inisters, Foreign Ministers, and Defense Ministers of the

three countries, is classified, but enough is known by now 72 to get a relatively reliable picture of the stands taken by the delegations during the meeting.^

The principal Norwegian objection to the Swedish idea was that a Scandinavian defense union could not be a satisfactory solution for her security problem unless it became a part of a wider security system, such as the

Atlantic Pact intended to provide. The Swedish attitude had not changed; a Scandinavian defense union would be an acceptable solution to Sweden’s security problem only if it was aimed at neutrality in case of war. The Danish atti­ tude corresponded more to that of Sweden.

The problem for Sweden was to p resen t an a lt e r n a t iv e to Norway which would be a satisfactory solution to the

Norwegian security problem. Sweden, therefore, offered a military alliance to Denmark and Norway on the condition that they refrain from joining the Atlantic Alliance. It was in this connection that the question of Norwegian and

Danish armaments played a key role. It is known that the defense committee had reported that the Norwegian and

Danish defenses needed strengthening. But this was no

Swedish condition for the pact to take effect. The problem of how to acquire the necessary arms supplies, however, was represented by Norway as a major one and was sharpened by the repeated assertions in Washington that arms would be forthcoming only to allies. Norway took these assertions 73

at face value. Sweden argued, on the other hand, that, as

soon as a Scandinavian pact was an accomplished fact,

Washington would reconsider its condition for military sup­

p l i e s to a Scandinavian defen se b lo c . I t was decided that

not enough was known about the co n d itio n s the United States

would set for arms purchases and to meet again in Copen­

hagen in order to try to reach an agreement after further

information had been obtained through the countries1 ambas- a 3 sad ors in London and W ashington.*

In the United States meanwhile, Acheson had taken

office as Secretary of State on January 7, 1949, and in

this connection, there were rumors of a softening of the

American attitude toward neutral countries, including the

question of military supplies.

But Washington again, on January 14, stressed the

same conditions for American arms deliveries. On that day,

the Department of State publicly announced the intention to

form the Atlantic Pact and advised nations to join if they

expected American military aid. The Hew York Times reported

on the event:

While this policy statement was being issued, however, the department's press officer, Michael J. McDermott, made clear to reporters . . . and to the Scandinavian countries, to which his statement was really directed . . . that the United States was not likely to supply arms to nations that did not join in mutual defense arrangements with the United S ta te s .... United States officials made it clear that if there were to be any priorities of arms 74

shipments they would go first to those who were pre- pared to accept the risks as well as the advantages o f the Worth A tla n tic P a c t .^

On the same day) the Scandinavian defense commission held its final meeting at Holmenkollen, outside Oslo, and submitted an optimistic report about the possibilities for a Scandinavian defense pact. The Government paper,

Arbeiderbladet, the next day, calmed the optimism by point­ ing out that the Department of State Press Officer McDermott had warned that weapons would only be forthcoming to 45 allies of the United States. But more important was the fact that Norway actually differed fundamentally with

Sweden regarding the political conditions for a Scandinavian defense bloc* On January 18, 1949, Und^n told the Swedish

Parliament that the Swedish condition for any Scandinavian bloc was neutrality; Lange, in a debate in the Norwegian

Storting the next day, answered, in effect, that he con­ sidered this condition unacceptable.

Meanwhile, events moved swiftly toward an Atlantic

Pact. In his inaugural address on January 20, 1949, Presi­ dent Truman sa id :

.... We are now working out with a number of countries a joint agreement designed to strengthen the security of the North Atlantic area. Such an agreement would take the form o f a c o ll e c t i v e defense arrangement within the terms of the United Nations charter*1^

The Scandinavian Ministers met again in Copenhagen on January 22-24, 1949. This time, representatives from 75

the Parliamentary Foreign Relations Committees were also

p resen t.

According to a later account by the Swedish Foreign

Minister, during this meeting, the differences between the 47 Swedish and Norwegian views were made clear. But as it

seems that the Swedish views were clear all along, one may

get the impression that it was actually during this meeting

that Norway, for the first time, clearly rejected the Swe­

dish concept of a neutral defense pact. The official

communique from the m eeting at any rate lea v es l i t t l e doubt

that there was disagreement as to the degree of neutral ity 48 of such a pact.

The Scandinavian Defense Committee report had found

that common military planning would enhance the three coun­

tries* total defense capability--especiallv in the form of

a defense union, A precondition for this, however, was a

considerable expansion of the Norwegian and Danish defenses.

It appears that Sweden, at the time, did not have

the resources to furnish the other two partners in a Scan­

dinavian defense alliance with all their needed war

materials. Neither would Sweden be able to extend such 49 credits as were needed* Only the United States could

furnish the needed defense materiel immediately.

At the conference, however, the decisive questions

were: "the conditions for and the consequences of the 76 alliance free union." These questions were connected with the question of military deliveries, because of Norway's insistence that there would be no aid forthcoming if the

Scandinavians did not take into account "the political and military realities." Clearly, Norway did not change its concept of a Scandinavian defense pact: that it should somehow be tie d to the W est.

Sweden still wanted a Scandinavian bloc to be neu­ tral not only formally, but also in reality. Norway, on the o th e r hand, wanted a la r g e r W estern r e g io n a l s e c u r it y pact* Although Norway was willing to abstain from joining the Atlantic Pact formally, she still wanted to be tied to the West in some fashion. But, in Copenhagen, it was al­ ready quite obvious that the Norwegian and Swedish views could not be reconciled* Nevertheless, it was agreed to make a last attempt at reaching a compromise.

Lange, however, i n a speech to th e S to r tin g on

January 27, 1949, again reiterated the Norwegian position

that any inquiry in the West for weapons would have to in­

clude questions of foreign policy*

He explained that, at Karlstad, both the Norwegians

and the Swedes had made great concessions. The Swedes had

been willing to modify their policy of non-alliance in

favor of an alliance with Norway and Denmark, and the

Norwegians made "substantial concessions" by accepting "a 77

Scandinavian defense alliance without formal ties to a 50 larger regional security system. . . ."

He then d iscu ssed what the communique fo llo w in g the

Copenhagen meeting called the "prerequisites for and con­ sequences of the alliance-free pact" and found that differ- 51 ences still existed as to the "character" of the pact.

He repeated that this had its reason in the different geographic location and the differences in experience during the last war, and said:

We can best render our contribution to the sta­ bilisation of our part of the world, and thereby the peace of the world on the basis of a concept of the solidarity among the democratic peoples and of joint regional cooperation within an area which is suf­ ficiently large to represent a bonafide power fa c to r .

He added:

It is therefore our view that an isolated defense pact among Denmark, Norway and Sweden, even in the absence of formal ties to a broader security system in its character and substance must build on the more comprehensive concept of security.53

This view was not shared by the Swedes, he said, and ex­ plained that in Copenhagen they insisted that the proposed pact "must be genuinely alliance-free and not in any way rely on the concept of a security policy of regional solidarity outside the borders of the three participating 54 c o u n tr ie s."

The parties met again in Oslo on January 29-30, 1949.

This time, the Scandinavian Ambassadors to London, Washington, 78 Moscow, and P a ris were also present, in ad d ition to the

D anish and Swedish Ambassadors to Oslo and the Norwegian

Ambassador to Stockholm, There was considerable pressure for time; Washington expected Norway to consider an invita­ tion to participate in the Atlantic Pact negotiations by

February 1, 1949, and on the 29U> the fir st Soviet official inquiries as to Norway’s intentions with the pact were r e c e i v e d ,

During the meeting, the Swedish d eleg a tio n in an eleventh-hour bid to save a neutral Scandinavia submitted a

draft of an agreement in which it was prepared to drop the

im m ediate rearmament of Norway and Denmark as a condition

for a pact. It appears, however, that the proposal was

never discussed during the meeting. Unden later disclosed

t h i s proposal in his report to the Riksdag on February 9,

1949.

The only result from the meeting in Oslo was to

establish the fact that negotiations had broken down.

Nevertheless, even during the conference in Oslo, the

Truman Administration cabled a warning to Oslo that only

a l l i e s o f the United States would be e l i g i b l e for m ilitary

aid.^k There was no doubt that Norway now would consider

W ashington's in v ita tio n to p articip ate in the planned

Atlantic Pact. 79

The communique after the meeting in Oslo stated that

discussions have now* revealed that for the present it is not possible to reach the necessary concordance as to the prerequisites for and consequences of the alliance-free defense league which has been under discussions* Therefore there is insufficient basis for entry into such a mutually binding league at the present time.

Prime Minister Gerhardsen declared, during the termi­ nation of the Oslo meeting, that

the reasons the discussions today did not lead to a positive result is that our security problems are inherently different, or that in any case today we evaluate them differently . ^ 8

This is another variance of the theme that Lange had repeated often; the reason was different strategic location s and d iffe r e n t lesso n s drawn from h is to r ic a l ex- 59 perience.

After the meeting in Oslo, Norway immediately de­ cided to accept Washington*r invitation to participate in the planned Atlantic Pact,

A common inquiry in Washington regarding the condi­ tions for purchase of weapons to a Scandinavian pact was never made. Halvard Lange alone was to make this inquiry*

It is generally recognized that the American negative response was influenced by the fact that it was a Norwegian 60 and not a united Scandinavian inquiry.

Swedish, as well as Danish, sentiment about this can be summed up in th is way: 80

Furthermore it is much that indicates that when the attempts to build an alliance-free nordic defense union with weapon aid from West failed so badly, it has its reasons to a certain degree in a somewhat panicky hurry on the part of the Norwegians. Much indicate, that if the case had been treated with the customary calm on the part of the nordic countries, the outcome might have been different. Now the prob­ lem was put before Dean Acheson at a time when he was in the middle of current problems and had not time to take on new ones.61

VI. CONCLUSION

I t i s s i g n if i c a n t th a t i t was Sweden that took the initiative to start the Scandinavian defense negotiations.

Her proposal was based on the idea of a neu tral Scandinavian defense pact, envisaged as both formally and in reality free of ties to the great powers.

Though Sweden was willing to make concessions to create a Scandinavian defense pact, there was never any agreement with Norway on the question of the relationship of such a pact with the Nest. The discussions between the

Scandinavian countries in 1948-1949 actually turned into a discussion of the general political conditions for closer military cooperation between them rather than an explora­ tion of the practical feasibility of such cooperation as it was intended to be. Sweden had made it clear that she would take part in a defense alliance only if it would in­ crease the prospects of avoiding involvement in a war.

This meant a Scandinavian alliance entirely free from ties 81 w ith any of the b ig powers, Norway desired such t i e s , but the defense negotiations took place anyway. Critics have suggested that the reason was that, although the Government wanted to join the Atlantic Pact there was a certain appre­ hension within the Labor Party. The Government, therefore they suggest, first had to pay hommage to the Scandinavian solution and demonstrate that a Scandinavian defense pact was unfeasible.

It was maintained, especially in Norway, that, to have an effective Scandinavian Fact, arms had to be secured from abroad, and such aid could come cnly from the United

States. From this, it would seem that the fate of the pro­ posed Scandinavian Pact must have been decided in Washing­ ton; the United S ta te s had to make the d e c isio n whether it would be in the American interest to supply a neutral Scan­ dinavian bloc with arms or whether she shculd refuse any military aid and, thereby, prevent the realization of a

Scandinavian Pact. The latter course would then leave

Norway, and moot likely Denmark, no other choice but to join the proposed Atlantic Pact. It was this course that was chosen. But it appears that this choice would have made no difference because of Norwayfs insistence on some form of American acceptance of the pact. The issue of aid was only a symbolic issue, even though it may have served to give Norway another argument for her rejection of the

Swedish proposal. 82

An examination of the events in 1948-1949 shows that the Norwegian official views, from the outset, differed from the Swedish views both regarding the conclusions drawn from the experiences of the two countries in the Second

World War as well as regarding the contemporary political environment.

Sweden thought i t f e a s ib le for the Scandinavian countries to remain outside a future conflict and that a united effort in a defense pact would enhance these chances further. Norway evidently did not.

Furthermore, in Norway, it was held that the threat was imminent and directed against the country. Thus, imme­ diate guarantees for protection were sought. The reasons why they were sought in the Western powers rather than in

Sweden have both economical and p o l i t ic a l reason s.

Because of Norway’s lack in diplomatic traditions, her foreign policy, as we will see, has been characterised

traditionally by a preoccupation with morality and inter­

national law. This may account for the basic differences

in outlook and the conception of the nature of the politi­

cal reality between the Norwegian and Swedish decision

makers, and must, no doubt, be taken into account in examin­

ing the outcome of the Scandinavian defense negotiations in

1948-1949. 83

This difference in tradition and historical experi­ ence perhaps also explains the different lessons that

Norway and Sweden seemed to have drawn from the Second

World War; in Norway, the Second World War was pointed to as proof that neutrality was impossible, in Sweden it proved the contrary.

The psychological factor of bitterness for the

Swedish policies during the war might also have been a con­ tributing factor but hardly could it have been decisive.

On the other hand, the more long-term consequences of a closer defense association with Sweden perhaps were.

The Norwegian economy not only was Western oriented to a much greater degree than was the economy of Sweden, but much inferior in strength. A greater alliance where the economic and political influence of the leading country would be dispersed among all the alliance partners and where the cultural influence would be much less may have been preferable to the much stronger and culturally closer related neighbor. To what degree Norway’s choice was actu­ ally influenced by such considerations is not clear. But in this connection, it must be mentioned that Scandinavian negotiations about a customs union took place parallel with the defense negotiations. Norway had the strongest objec- G 2 tions also here and finally rejected the proposal* 84

As we have seen, Norway was, because of the war, much in need of trade and even aid, and in a much more closely-tied position in relation to the West than was

Sweden. The Marshall Plan was thus more significant for

Norway and for the above-mentioned reasons had a political purpose which Norway, though reluctantly at first, accepted to a larger degree than Sweden; already, at this stage, can there be discerned a different role for Norway in the con­ solidation of Western Europe.

Whatever the considerations, it seems that the deci­

sion not to join a Scandinavian alliance on Swedish terms was taken because of Norway's own choice and not because of

the American conditions for aid. 85

FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER III

^An additional factor at the time, not to be forgot­ ten, was the tie between the governing parties in the two c o u n t r ie s 5 in the postwar period, the Labor Party was in power in Great Britain also, as in Sweden and Denmark. 2 The S t o r t in g , on March 12, 1948, had reacted by providing an extraordinary defense appropriation of one hundred m illion kroner {$20,000,000), and the Norwegian Government decided on partial mobilization on March 19, 1948. The Storting, at this time, also appointed a "Spe­ cial Committee for Foreign Policy and Defense Preparedness" which, in reality, replaced the regular Foreign Affairs Committee in order to exclude the communists from discus­ sions of foreign policy and defense matters. The committee was abolished in January, 1950, after the decision to join NATO and the defeat of the communists in the 1949 parlia­ mentary e l e c t i o n s . See Einar Ltichen, Norway in European and A t la n tic C ooperation (Oslo: U n iv e r s ite ts fo r la g e t, 1964), pp. 73-74. 3 Supra, pp. 40—41.

^Lange's speech in Oslo Militaere Samfund, April 19, 1948, in Halvard Lange, Norsk Utenrikspolitikk siden 1945. Foredrag og debatinnelegq (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum, 1952), pp. 62 -6 5 .

5Ibid* g Xn the Swedish Foreign Minister's report to the Riksdag on February 9, 1949, about the Scandinavian nego­ tiations, Lange's speech is also seen as a change in the Norwegian foreign policy. The document is printed in Nils Andren and Aake Landquist, Svensk utriksespolitikk efter 1945 {Stockholm: Almquist and Wicksell, 1966), pp. 101-112. Hereafter referred to as Unden's report of February 9. 7 Lange's speech, "Trondhjems Handelsstands Forening 30 april 1948," see Aftenposten. May 2, 1948. Q The Swedish Advisory Council on Foreign Relations su g g ested such a pact to the Swedish Parliam ent in late April, 1948. According to Union's report of February 9, 1949: "The problem was further discussed in the Swedish F oreign P o lic y Committee with the resu lt th a t i t was agreed that the investigation was to be limited to the problem of 86 defensive cooperation on the condition that our countries should strive, in case of war, to keep out of the conflict. Another condition agreed upon was that our countries should not, during the course of the investigation, start negotia­ tions with any outside power regarding military cooperation.1’ Andren, ojs. c it. , p. 102. Also discussed in Barbara Haskell, ’’The Attempt to Create a Scandinavian Defense Pact” (unpublished manuscript, Department of Political Science, The University of Stockholm, May, 1963). This is also pub— lished in Norwegian; Barbara G. Haskell, "ForseJket p& & skape et skandinavisk forsvarsforbund," Internasjonal Politikk, Nr. 2, 1965, pp. 92-131. 9 Halvard Lange, Norqes vei til NATO (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1966), p. 23; see also Wilhelm Keilhau, "Norway and the Atlantic Pact," Norseman, 7:83, March-April, 1949; and Haskell, _ojo. c it. , p. 15.

"^Sveriges Sosialdemokratiske Arbetarpartis Kongress, Protokoll, May 9-14, 1948, p. 124. Sweden never compromised its principle of neutrality in relation to the big neutral bloc. For a discussion of the Swedish non—alliance policy, see Ake Sandler, "Sweden's Post-War Diplomacy: Some Prob­ lems, Views and Issu es," in Andrew Tyorgy and Hubert S. Gibles (eds.), Problems in International Relations (Engle­ wood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962), pp. 179-191. (Re­ printed from the Western Political Quarterly. Vol. XIII, December, 1960.)

"^Halvard Lange, Norsk Utenrikspolitikk siden 1945, op. cit. , pp. 69-70. 12 Address in the Lower House (F o lk e tin g e t) o f the Riksdag. June 2, 1948 cited in Politiken, June 4, 1948. For a survey of the "Scandinavianism" of the Danish Prime Minister, see Carlo Christensen, "Hans Hedtoft," American Scandinavian Review, 43:136-140, June, 1955* 13 Hans Engen, "Disagreement in the North," Norseman, July-August, 1948*

■^Haskell, c£>. c it. . p. 21,

■^Senate Resolution 239, June 11, 1948. (Reported in the Senate on May 19, 1948, by Arthur H. Vandenberg of the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Dept. 1361, 801b Cong., 2d Sess.) Text reported in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIX (July 18, 1948), pp. 79-80. Also printed in NATO— Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Paris: NATO Information Service, 1965), p. 209. 87 16 A press release of July 6, contained the following information about the negotiations between the United States, Great Britain, Prance, canada, and the Benelux countries: "The Under Secretary of State on July 6, re­ ceived the ambassadors of the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the Benelux countries for an informal and ex­ ploratory exchange of views concerning problems of common interest in relation to the Senate resolution of June 11, 1948, These conversations are expected to continue for some time. Since they are purely exploratory, no informa­ tion concerning the substance of the conversation will be made public until such time as decisions may be reached." Department of S ta te B u l l e t i n . Vol. XIX, No. 472 (July 18, 1948), p. 80.

17 O fficial Joint Scandinavian Communique of September 10, 1948; text in Viktiqe Storpolltiske Dokumenter 1945-50 (Bergen: Chr. Michelsens Institutt, 1950), pp. 89-90. IB t Undenr s report of February 9, 1949, in Andren, op. cit., p. 105. 19 .... See Communique in V ik tiq e S to r p o litis k e Dokumenter 1945-50. op. cit. . p. 90.

20 t Andren, ££. cit. , p. 105. 21 Lennart Forsman, "Skandinaviske Forsvarsforhand- linger 1949-och 1969," Tiden, No. 3, 1965, p. 151. 2 2 j Unden*s report of February 9, 1949, in Andren, op. cit. , p. 105. See also, News of Norway. Vol. VI, No, 3, October 23, 1948, p. 2. The Norwegian members were Forret- ningsfdrer Trygve Bratteli, Statssekretaer Dag Bryn, DirektgJr W. Munthe Kaas, and Lt. General Ole Berg. The New York Times of October 23, 1948, under the heading "Moscow Charges U .S. T ie s," rep o rted from London that Radio Moscow had asserted that General William J. Donovan, Wartime Head of the United States Office of Stra­ tegic Service, was present in Oslo when the Scandinavian Defense Ministers met to discuss the creation of the pro­ posed Northern bloc. The New York Times. on October 26, repeated that Sweden made an effort to guarantee the terri­ torial integrity of Norway and Denmark if they would forego joining the proposed Atlantic Alliance. This was denied by the Danish Foreign Office the next day. See The New York Times, October 27, 1948.

^Und^n's report of February 9, 1949, in Andren, op. cit., p. 105. 88

OA — — 'Arbeiderbladet /Oslo/. October 14, 1948. 25 — — Aftenposten /Oslo/, October 15, 1948. 2 6 Lange, Norges vei til NATO, op. cit. , p. 26. 27 Lennart H irschfelt, Skandinavlen och Atlantpakten. De Skandinaviska Aliians Fdrhandlinqarna 1948*^1949 (Stock-* holm: Utenrikspolitiska Institutet, 1949}, p. 25. 2 n A communique of October 2 7 on the Atlantic Pact negotiations reads in part:

"The Foreign Ministers of the Five Signatory Powers of the Brussels Treaty met in Paris on the 25l-i) and 26t£ of October, 1948, for the third regular session of the Consul­ tative Council . 11

. . • The Council also made a preliminary study of the questions of Worth Atlantic Security and the con­ versations on this subject which took place in V/ashington during the summer. 11

’’This examination resulted in complete agreement in the Council on the principle of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic and on the next steps to be taken in this d i r e c t io n . 11 Department o f S ta te B u ll e t i n , V ol. XIX, No. 488 (November 7, 1948), p. 583. 2 9 "R edegjelse fra Utenriksministeren ora den uten- rikspolitiske situasjon," Stortinqstidende, October 30, 1948, p. 1982.

30Ibid., pp. 1984-1985. 31 Ib id , 32 The talks in Washington had resumed after the American elections, having been suspended in September. A release of December 10, 1949, on the "Conversations on Security Problems of North Atlantic" reads: "The acting Secretary of State this afternoon conferred with the Ambas­ sadors of Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the Minister of Luxembourg in a continuation of the talks, begun in July, on security problems of common interest in relation to the Senate Resolution of June 11, 1948. The conversations had been recessed in September. The resumed conversations are expected to continue for some time . . . ." Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XIX, No. 494 (December 19, 1948), p. 778. 89 33 ,fDebatt om Utenriksministerens redegjdrelse 30. oktober og 6. desember," Stortinqstidende, December 10, 1948, p. 2530. 34 Arbeiderbladet, December 11, 1948, quoted in News of Norway, Vol. VI, No, 12 (December 25, 1948), p. 46. 3 5 / Unden's report of February 9, 1948, in Andren, op. cit., p. 106. 3 5 ”Redegj^relse fra Utenriksministeren om forsvarsfor- bund,” Stortingstidende, February 3, 1949, p. 174.

3 rj ^ Unden’s report of February 9, 1949, in Andren, op. cit., p. 106. 3 8 I t had met at SaltsjizJbaden, Sweden, November 15-17 and in Hornbaok, Denmark, on December 15-19. The rep ort was submitted at a final meeting at Hohnehallen, Norway, on January 11, 1949. 39 The report of the commission is still classified, but the con clu sion s are g e n e r a lly known. In Norwegian, see Tim Greve, Norway and NATO (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1963), pp. 11-12j and Utenriksdepartementets Presset- jeneste, Norges Linje (Oslo: Tiden, 1949), pp. 19 and 28- 29. For Swedish sources, see Hirschfelt, ,op. cit. . and Unden's report of February 9, 1949, in And"rdn, o£. c it. , pp. 106-7.

^Unden's report of February 9, 1949, in Andren, op. cit., p. 107. 41 A rbeiderb lad et, January 3, 1949. The same day, on January 3, 1949, the acting American Secretary of State, Lovett, told the Norwegian, Danish, and Icelandic diplo­ matic representatives that their countries soon would expect an invitation to take part in the preparatory work on an Atlantic Pact. He wanted an answer by January 21, as to whether the countries wanted such an invitation. Shortly thereafter, Lovett sent instructions to the American ambas­ sadors in these countries to the effect that they would not expect weapons or guarantees if they did not join the Pact. The British Foreign Secretary, Bevin, was evidently in­ formed and agreed as he gave the London ambassadors of these countries the same messages. 42 Besides public statements and newspaper accounts, two good sources are Lange, Norges vei til NATO, o£. c it. . and H ir sc h fe lt, £ £ . c i t . 90

Und^n put it this way later in his report to the Riksdag: "The idea was that, if we agreed on other points, the three governments should, through their ambassadors in London and Washington ask for more detailed information regarding the interest of the American and the British governments in an independent Scandinavian defense union and regarding their willingness to permit the acquisition of war materials under the necessary terms of priority and on reasonable financial conditions." Unden’s report of February 9, 1949, in Andren, oja. c it. , p. 109. The Karl­ stad meeting also agreed to exclude Greenland, Svalbard, and the Faeroes, according to Wilfred Ryder, "The End of Nordic Neutrality," Soundings, 24:20, March, 1949. For another account of these meetings, see Haskell, 0 _ £ . c i t . , pp. 33-45. 44 The New York Times. January 15, 1949. 45 A r b e id e r b la d e t, January 14, 1949. 4G The New York Times, January 21, 1949.

4^Unden, in Andren, o£. c it . , p. 108. A D For text see, Viktiqe 5torpolltiske Dokumenter . op. c i t . , pp. 1 1 6 -1 1 7 . 49 It has even been suggested in Norway that this problem was r e a l l y never thoroughly ex p lo red by Sweden. See Tomas Torsvik, Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the brief conservative (Lyng) govern­ ment in 1963, writing in Samtiden, No. 10, 1963. 50 Utenriksdepartementets Pressetjeneste, Norges Linje, op. cit. , pp. 18-19. Also quoted in "Redegjdrelsen fra Utenriksminis teren on K0benhavn—forhandlingene, " Storting- stidend e, January 27, 1949, pp. 133-135.

51I b id . , p. 2 0 .

52I b id .

53Ib id .

54Xbid.

5 5 # * Unden’s report of February 9, 194 9, in Andren, op. cit., p. 109. 91

^ The New York Times, February 2, 1949.

^Cited in News of Norway, G:65, February 5, 1949. For text, see Viktiqe Storpolitiske Dokumenter, op. cit., p. 117.

^Utenriksdepartementets Pressetjeneste, Norqes Linj e, op. cit*, pp. 34-35. C"Statsminister Gerhardsens tale ved avslutningen av Oslo-m^tet 30. januar 1949.") 59 An account of the events in 1948-1949 was revealed in an article written collectively by Prime Minister Ger- hardsen, Defense Minister Hauge, and Foreign Minister Lange in Arbeiderbladet. January 8 , 1952. It was prompted by a critical article in the weekly Kontakt. by Johanne Aamlid, "Hvilke betingelser stilte Sverige under de nordiske fors- varsforhandlinger?," 5:1 (December, 1951), pp. 40-41. She argued that the Swedes never made arms deliveries from the United States a condition. The Swedish Prime Minister's view of the Scandinavian defense negotiations were given in January, 1952, as reported in Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy (Stockholm: Kngl-Boktryckeriet, 1957), pp. 7-9. He has also given an account of his views during the Norwegian Labor Party National Convention in 1949, substantially along the same lines. See Det Norske Arbeiderparti, Landsmdtet 1949. Frotokoll (Oslo: Arbeidernes Aktietrykkeri, 1950), pp. 174-176.

^Lennart Forsman, "Skandinaviske Forsvarsforhandlinger 1949-1959,fl Tiden, No. 3 (March, 1965).

61Foreign Editor Einas Skov in his monthly column in Politiken, February 28, 1949. G 2 The idea of a Scandinavian common market came up right after the war and was the object of a common report in 1950 concluding that such a market would be to the advan­ tage of all the countries. Norway, however, felt she needed protection both against Danish agriculture and Swedish industry.

Even in the Norwegian urge to join the European Common Market, or in her arguments in favor of a larger economic unit, there may be more than economic considera­ tions—even here a political choice between a larger group­ ing and a Scandinavian orientation may have been present.

Similar fears might have been behind the final 92

Norwegian r e j e c t i o n o f a Scandinavian Customs Union in 1958. The Norwegian fears have, however, later been dis­ pelled by the results of the integration of the Scandina­ vian economics in the European Free Trade Assocation (EFTA), when it became evident that Norway can compete suc­ cessfully with Sweden.

It should also be mentioned that a Scandinavian con­ ference in connection with the Aarosfair in V&ster&s, Sweden, in October, 1966, where also the Scandinavian Premiers were present, concluded that the Nordic area would be able to constitute an economic power if only the will is th e r e . A f t e n p o s t e n , October 31, 1966. chapter IV

NORWAY'S ADHERENCE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT

I . INTRODUCTION

This chapter w ill examine the developments immedi­ ately prior to Norway's adherence to NATO, with special attention towards the importance of the Norwegian Foreign

Minister's contacts in Washington and the subsequent deci­ sion by the National Labor Party Congress to join the

Atlantic Pact.'*1

The Bevin initiative had led to several conferences between the five WEU countries and the United States and

Canada; American p a r tic ip a tio n had been made p o s sib le

through the Vandenberg Resolution in the Senate, on June

11, 1948. Norway did not p a r tic ip a te in th ese i n i t i a l

negotiations about the Atlantic Alliance; but on September

9, when the first series of talks ended, Norway was in­

formed that different kinds of membership with different 2 obligations were envisaged. Initially, an association for

Norway, Denmark, I ta ly , and Icelan d — and perhaps, a lso sub­

sequently for Sweden and Portugal—was intended. Later

association was contemplated for Norway, Denmark, Iceland,

3 . Ireland, and Portugal. The same day that it was decided

that different kinds of membership were possible within the 94

Atlantic Alliance, agreement was reached on a Scandinavian defense commission.

These two facts are related: that in spite of the disagreement with Sweden, a Scandinavian Pact would be ex­ plored ; and that different kinds of membership were envis­ aged in NATO. After the Defense Commission had started its work, in October, it was, according to the Norwegian For­ eign Minister, clear that there were plans to include others than the seven original countries in the Atlantic 4 Pact; namely, Italy and Portugal. Late in the fall, it was a lso in q u ired in O slo and Copenhagen whether Norway and

Denmark wished to be invited to the talks going on in Wash- 5 ington. Both governments answered that they, together with Sweden, were about to investigate the possibilities for their own pact. No decision could be taken before

these investigations were completed. At the same time,

Norway asked to be kept continuously informed about the g talks in VJashington, however.

On February 3, 1949, the Norwegian Foreign Minister

Lange briefed the Storting on the Scandinavian defense

negotiations. In his report, Lange said that "... the

developments in the outside world have forced us to recon- 7 sid e r our s e c u r it y p o lic y ." He su ggested th at Norway seek

advance agreement about military assistance in the event of

war. He said: 95

In order to build up the defense of the country we must have supplies of weapons and other military provisions from abroad .... it is self-evident that we must seek such cooperation more or less within the framework of this democratic circle of s t a t e s . 8

The Scandinavian talks had failed, he explained, because of the inability of the Swedes and the Norwegians to agree on the political character of the alliance, their different views of the best means of preventing war, and , 9 the unavilability of weapons from the United States.

He said that, although Norway had been approached by the West regarding the possible participation in the pro­ posed Atlantic Pact, no invitation had as yet been received.

There were still a great many questions which needed clari­ fication in Washington and London before a position could be taken and the question presented to the Storting. It was not clear what economic obligations were involved, what kind of aid that could be expected, and what guarantees the country would receive. He also assured the Storting that a

last attempt was to be made to obtain aid to a Nordic

defense association. These were urgent questions, however,

as the negotiations on the Atlantic Pact were now progress­

ing fast and appropriations for American military aid for

1949-1950 were soon to be made. For this reason, he felt 10 that it was important that Norway make up her mind soon.

Subsequently, the 5torting approved his proposed inquiry in

Washington. 96

Before Norway had time to begin negotiations with the United States, however, she received a reminder that the interests of the Soviet Union also were involved in this connection. In the afternoon of January 29, during the Oslo conference, the Soviet Ambassador delivered a declaration to the Foreign Ministry. The Soviet Government desired to know the Norwegian Government's stand regarding

NATO. Norway was asked to

. . . clarify the stand of the Norwegian govern­ ment with respect to the question of the Atlantic Pact, particularly in view of the fact that Norway has a common frontier with the Soviet Union .... The Soviet government requests to be informed as to whether press reports to the effect that Norway will enter the Atlantic Union correspond to the facts and also requests to be informed as to whether the Nor­ wegian government is undertaking any obligations under the Atlantic Pact with respect to the establishment of military, air, or naval bases on Norway's territory.H

The Norwegian answer of February 1, 1949, explained

that the forms and conditions governing Norway's possible

participation in the Atlantic Treaty Organization will be

examined, but it assured the Soviet Union that Norwegian

territory would not be used for foreign bases. It was

expressed in the following manner:

The Norwegian government requests the Soviet govern­ ment to rest assured that Norway will never be a party to a policy with aggressive intentions. It will never permit Norwegian territory to be used in the service of a policy of this kind. The Norwegian government will not be a party to any agreement with other states involving obligations on the part of Norway to make available for the armed forces of foreign powers bases on Norwegian te r r it o r y , as long as Norway i s not attacked or subject to the threat of attack.1^ 97

This was the famous declaration that lays down the princi­ ples of the Norwegian policy with respect to foreign bases and will be dealt with in a forthcoming chapter.

On February 5, 1949, just a few hours before Lange's departure for Washington, the Soviet Ambassador gave a reply to the Norwegian note of February 1. The Soviet note focused on the Norwegian declaration on foreign bases and found it to be unsatisfactory. Instead, the Soviet Union offered Norway a t r e a t y of n on -agg ression . The S o v ie t statement concluded:

I f the Norwegian government n e v e r t h e le s s d ou b ts the goodneighborly intentions of the Soviet Union with regard to Norway, the government of the Soviet Union, with a view to eliminate all possible doubts concern­ ing the Soviet Union's intentions proposes to the Norwegian government to conclude a treaty of non­ aggression and, thereby, put an end to all doubts.^

The answer to this note was not to come until March 5.

Theoretically, when Lange left for Washington, there were three offers open to Norway: the Swedish, the Ameri­ can, and the S o v ie t .

I I . THE APPROACH TO WASHINGTON AND LONDON

FEBRUARY 5-14, 1949

It seems that any inquiry in Washington at the time could not produce much definite information about the contemplated Atlantic Pact. Just as Lange arrived, Con­ gress, traditionally jealous of its rights, was debating the nature of the pact, and made it plain to the world that it did not intend to compromise on its right to declare war.

It was under these circumstances that Lange met with Secre- tary of State Dean Acheson on February 7, 1949. According

New York Times, Lange asked the Secretary whether

Norway would have to make any commitments as to foreign bases on her territory when she joined the pact; whether

Norway, as a neighbor of the S o v ie t Union, would be en­ titled to certain privileges and exemptions in the pact; and what guarantees there would, be for military aid. He also wanted to know what protection could be expected from the United States during the period of negotiations and, if

Norway joined, whether she would have any assurance of 14 priority in the shipment of military equipment.

Acheson replied, during their next meeting on Febru­ ary 11, 1949, that Norway would not be asked to furnish bases but that there would be no privileges extended to the country. He, furthermore, could give no precise promise of aid at this time. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, conse­ quently, was not able to return to Norway with much precise information upon which to base a decision. Washington would make no demands regarding bases but could g iv e no promises.^ This was reflected in the Joint Statement by the Secretary of State and the Norwegian Foreign Minister, released to the press on February 11: 99

As the Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard M, Lange stated before his departure from Oslo, his purpose in coming to Washington was to obtain information concerning the proposed North Atlantic Pact .... No decisions were contemplated or reached during the discussions.1^

Lange's meeting in London apparently had the same results. The communique concerning the meeting with Bovin on February 14, 1949, said only that there was " fu ll under- 17 standing for the views of both governments.'’

This lack of precise information might have resulted in political difficulties in Oslo, where opinion within the

Labor Party was divided. Those within the party who were skeptical or who opposed Norwegian participation in the pact had joined the majority in the approval of Lange's v isit to Washington—a trip, it was contended, that by it­ self could not be interpreted as committing Norway to a certain foreign policy. However, a reversal, of course, at this time would have meant a considerable setback for the

Atlantic Pact as a whole and a complete repudiation of the

Norwegian Foreign Minister's policy.

A difficult situation could, therefore, have been easily created if, after the Foreign Minister’s return, more p r e c is e inform ation had been demanded w ith in the Labor

Party. With an uncertain commitment in Washington, a re­ opening of the Scandinavian t a lk s could not b e excluded; but perhaps because of the swift approval of the pact by the party, the question did not come up. The fear of the 100 consequences for a delay has been confirmed in a later 1 s account by Mr. Lange.

According to Lange's report to the Storting on

February 24, 1949, on his trip to Washington, he not only probed the questions concerning Norway's adherence to the

Atlantic Pact but also attempted in Washington and London to seek a solution which would enable Denmark, Sweden, and

Norway to hold together. He 'stressed the mighty considera­ tions that speak in favor of a joint Scandinavian solution 19 of the security problems of our three countries."

The inquiry in Washington about aid to a Scandi­ navian defense pact, as we have seen, was supposed to have been made jointly, according to the agreement made in Karl­ stad. The result might then have been different. Now, it did not produce "any change in the attitude which had been formerly indicated with respect to the alliance-free Scandi- 20 navian defense league alternative."

Since the allies of the United States would have priority, there would be no military aid to a neutral Scan­ dinavian bloc. Thus, Foreign Minister Lange's talks in

Washington did not produce any change in the American attitude

toward a neutral Scandinavian defense league:

The inquiries we have made clearly establish that a Scandinavian defense league . . . cannot count upon any political or material support from the West . . . . This alternative has ceased to be a politi­ cal possibility.^1 101

Thus T the impression is given that the United States, by its apparent conditions for military aid, left Norway no choice but to join the proposed Atlantic Pact or remain 22 neutral. When Lange, after his return to Oslo, presented these two alternatives, he argued in favor of the former.

The Government needed endorsement by the Labor Party of the foreign policy line it intended to pursue, however.

Without such endorsement, there would be no adherence to

the NATO Pact.

In this connection, the National Party Convention, in

Oslo, February 17-20, was of great, if not decisive, im­

p o rta n ce ■

I I I . THE QUESTION OF TIMING

The Foreign Minister who, together with the Defense

Minister, was on his way back from Washington on the eve of

the National Convention, thought that there was no particu­

lar reason for taking an immediate decision on the Atlantic

Pact:

The delegation left Washington strengthened in its conviction that the right thing for Norway was to j o in the t a lk s fo r the A t la n t ic P act. But i t was not decisive to join them from the start. The talks between the first seven participants had already pro­ gressed so far that there were very small chances if any for Norway as a newcomer to be able to influence the formulation of the Pact or the composition of its membership. ^ ^

The delegation, therefore, concluded that there was no 102

hurry and "that we could talce the time needed to inform the 24 Norwegian public thoroughly before joining the Pact*"

The impression that there was no hurry was confirmed in

London during talks with Ernest Bevin on the wav back to 25 Norway. "It is all a question of timing, and tactics

said Bevin.

In their report tD the Government, the delegation

recommended that Norway join NATO, but that sufficient time

is allowed to secure the broadest possible support for the 26 new foreign policy line.

The leaders at home must not have agreed on the 27 timing, however} Prime Minister Gerhardsen wanted the

Party to take an immediate decision to join the Pact during 28 the National Convention. Critics have related this to

the fact that an important wing in the Party was against the

decision the Government had taken to end the Scandinavian 29 defense negotiations and their influence was considerable.

According to what Lange later revealed, it was feared that,

if the Party postponed the decision,

. . , this would open up the possibilities for the Norwegian communists with .Soviet assistance--not least through their press and radio--to influence Norwegian opinion with threats and intimidation- propaganda, 0

The only serious opposition to the Atlantic policy

line, however, was to be found within the Labor Party it­

s e l f * the oth er p a r t ie s , excep t the Communist P a rty , were 103 more unanimous in support of the Norwegian Foreign Minis­ ter's policy than the Labor Party. Besides, the communists already had been excluded from involvement in foreign affairs matters through the creation of a "special parlia- 31 mentary committee for foreign policy and security affairs," replacing the usual foreign affairs committee. The reason is generally recognized: "The communists were to be ex­ cluded from participation in important foreign policy 32 m atters." Lange a lso la te r confirmed th is :

To exclude the communists from the discussions there was created in the Storting in April, 1948, a new preparedness committee to replace the extraordinary foreign affairs committee where the communists were represented.^3

How strong the support of the Scandinavian Pact and the opposition to NATO originally was within the Labor Party is not precisely known. A member of the Labor Party, writ- ing after the Scandinavian discussions had broken down, w ro te:

When Lange and Torn were in America, there was a violent public debate about Norway's adherence to the Atlantic Pact. Also within the Labor Party's group in the Storting there was strife, and at one point it was a question if not a majority of the group was against the Pact. Among those against were the Presi­ dent of the Storting, Natvig Pedersen, and the Presi­ dent of the Odeisting, Olav Olsvik.34

A Swedish commentator, writing at the end of January, 1949, maintained that 90 per cent of the Norwegian Labor Party was in favor of continuing the Scandinavian discussions, 35 and of these, 30 per cent were against joining the West. 104

The situation as to the support for the Government's new foreign policy line was so uncertain that a prominent mem­ ber, Olav Olsvik, just before the convention assured his

Swedish and Danish c o llea g u es that tw o -th ir d s o f th e c o n - vention would reject the new foreign policy line. 3 6 Even during the debate, the old-timer, Martin Tranmael himself, was concerned about the outcome because of the applause 37 received by the opposition speakers. During the conven­

tion, the opposition lost their support, however.

IV. THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL LABOR PARTY

CONGRESS FEBRUARY 17-20, 1949

It is generally recognised that it was at the Labor

Party Congress in 1949 that the real decision to join the 3 S A tlantic Pact, in reality, was taken. The Congress, which was held in Oslo on February 17-20, 1949, overwhelmingly 3 9 adopted the foreign policy of the Government.

Norway had three choices in 1949: (1) an alliance

with the West; £2) a pact with Sweden and Denmark; or (3)

the continuation of the alliance-free status. Out the

moment the opposition in the party had accepted to work for

a Scandinavian solution, they accepted im plicitly that Nor­

way needed outside military assistance and the last alterna­

tive was excluded. When the Scandinavian talks failed, 105 there was thus no place to go except Washington for such assistance.

Even a t t h is sta g e , Nordic co o p era tio n was not ex­ cluded, however. According to Premier Gerhardsen:

We will not close the door to anything, not close the door to Nordic coo p era tion . What you do by vo tin g for the national committee's proposal is to give your support to the principle that Norway is to try to solve its security problem in cooperation with the Western democracies.40

In the proposal to the Party Congress from the

National Committee, hommage is also given to Scandinavian

cooperation:

Norway cannot stay is o la t e d in the 'World. A planned and solidarical cooperation with the democratic coun­ tries in the economic, political and defense fields is necessary if we are to rebuild our own country and our part of the World, and to make a safe founda­ tio n for peace, s e c u r ity and democracy.

Within this framework the Norwegian Labor Party's National Convention finds that Scandinavian coopera­ tion is especially desirable and natural.

The National Convention supports the measures taken by the Government to expand Scandinavian cooperation and attempt to create a Scandinavian mutual defense pact, but must conclude that at the present time it has not been possible to reconcile a Scandinavian defense pact with general cooperation between the democracies in the field of defense.

The National Convention thinks that Norway must solve its security problems in joint and binding collaboration in the sphere of defense policy with the 'Western dem ocracies. This co o p era tio n must be based on the United Nations pact and in form as well as in content be a purely peace-and-defense coopera­ t i o n .1^ 106

The Foreign Minister further emphasized that sup­ p o r tin g t h i s prop osal was not really tantamount to support­ in g the adherence to the A tla n tic Pact:

Some speakers have maintained that the National Congress is asked to take a stand for or against adherence to the Atlantic Pact. That is of course not the question* That is not a matter that can be d ecid ed by the N ational Convention of a s in g le party* That must be done by the Government in cooperation with the Storting. What we ask this National Convention to do and which we think the National Convention ought to do, is to give its support to our foreign policy in principle as out­ lined in the majority report from the National Com m ittee.

The Foreign Minister was correct, when speaking quite for­ mally, that the National Convention could not take a deci­ sion as to membership in the NATO Pact, but as to the political realities of the matter, his statement is mis­ leading. In reality, the National Convention's vote was

p r o b a b l y decisive; it would decide the action the party would take in the Parliament, where all the other demo­ cratic parties were in favor of NATO* Thus, it was within

the Labor Party itself that the matter was decided and the

Convention was the forum where the decision was taken.

The d e le g a te s to the Convention were not asked spe­

cifically to take a position on the Atlantic Pact, the full

contents of which were not known and which was not mentioned

per se, but were asked to support a resolution which con­

cluded that: :,Norway must solve its security problems in joint and binding collaboration in the sphere of defense policy with the Western democracies."1^

At the time there was, in fact, no final text of the pact. The U.S. Senate had still so many objections to the draft that several changes had to be made. It would there­ fore take some time before it v/ould be cleared through the 44 Congress.

During the meeting, on February 19, the Foreign Min­ ister gave a detailed account of the Nordic defense nego­ tiations and the results of his trip to Washington.

He first discussed the still-unanswered Soviet offer of a non-aggression pact and the crisis in Berlin. He gave the Soviet Union responsibility for the paralysis of the

United Nations and for preventing other attempts toward international cooperation, but he said that he had "no intention of one-sidedly citing the Russians as the bogey in international politics," and that the Russians alone did not bear the responsibility for the course of events after the war.

I am fully aware that there have been errors and seriou s errors also by the 'Western g rea t powers. I am also aware that the Russians have good reasons for th e ir su sp icion s of the 'Western c o u n tr ie s,/15

He noted the experience of the Soviets during the Revolu­ tion, the Civil 'War, the policies of the Western powers toward the USSR during the interwar period, and H itler's

a tta c k . 108

He explained that, in spite of this, and notwith­ standing the great aid extended by the Russians during the liberation of North Norway, the Soviet Union's conduct in

Eastern Europe was the primary cause for the international tensions which forced Norway to look to review her foreign p o lic y . But he did not say th a t Norway was threatened directly by Soviet aggression, instead he put it this way:

No great power today desires to start a v.’orld war; on the other hand it is also evident that danger is to be found in an unwanted and unintentional war occurring anyway. “

Because of this danger of an unpremeditated war and because the United Nations could not function, Norway turned to a consideration of regional arrangements: first, to Scandinavia and, then, to the evolving Western Alliance.

In discussing these actions, Lange said:

After the alternative of a non-committed Scandinavian association had been dropped, it was essential that our standpoint should be clear. In view of the ten­ sion in the international situation, we cannot allow Norway to lie m ilitarily impotent and open to attack. To allow Norway to continue to be a military and political vacuum increases not only the risks for our­ selves, but it also helps to increase the uncertainty and insecurity of the entire international situation, and is therefore contrary to that which is the main aim of gur entire policy in the international sp h e r e .

The real need, in his view, was to create ;,a power 48 sufficiently strong to deter all from attack,' and ex­ plained that neither Norway nor Scandinavia was sufficiently 109 large to take full advantage of modern military and civilian technology.

The Defense Minister spoke also during the conven­ tion. He emphasised the fear of the Soviet Union, however:

First will I say that we must have the courage to recognise and express that we fear the expansionist foreign policy of the Soviet Union, whatever the motive is. This fear is the primary motive in our foreign p o l i c y .^9

Lange, later, also took occasion to speak about this fear, hut again carefully avoiding to define the reason for this fear:

Let me say a few words on our evaluation of the risks in relation to the Soviet Union. The Govern­ ment sees it such that we do not think that the Soviet Union w ill purposely take the step, here or any place else in the world, with the aim of begin­ ning a new war. Precisely because we do feel such about the Soviet, do we think that an explicit and formally anchored solidarity with the Western democracies will give us the greatest degree of security whjLch is possible to attain in this imper­ fect world.

It has been maintained that, in spite of the fact that no draft was available to see and no decision had been made by the U.S. Senate as to the American commitments, considerable pressure was put on the members to make a decision on the p a c t.

The speed and urgency have also been criticized by some of the participants in the meeting itself. Johanne jlmlid, a participant in the meeting, has leveled particular

strong criticism against its democratic processes, and 110 finds that considerable pressure was employed against the opposition.

I myself had a strange thing happen to me during the National Congress. I had been forward enough to submit a proposal to have the meeting postponed and reconvened la te r (when we could know more about the pact, which was not yet available, and find out which co u n tries would be members. Germany was not even mentioned in this connection if it had been, the oppo­ sition to the pact would have been quite different). Afterwards Martin Tranmael came over to me and told me I ought to realize how serious the situation was because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had received a d isp atch to the e f f e c t that Norway would be the next country after Chechoslovakia to be attacked or occupied by the Soviet Union* No postponement was possible, it was urgent to join the Atlantic Pact so that we could acquire assistance from the United States. The dispatch was of course secret, but he assured me that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had in fact received it. This made a strong impression on me naturally, and I was unable to verify it. From Swedish politicians I later learned that the same dispatch had been sent to the Swedish and Danish foreign ministries shortly after the coup in Czecho­ slo v a k ia . In Sweden and Denmark, however, i n v e s t i- r i gations had then revealed the warning to be false.

Hcr views are summed up in a book about the Congress:

Contrary to usual practice . . . the elected repre­ sentatives were not informed about the fact that the Atlantic Pact would be put on the agenda. All such important matters are usually presented to the local groups two months in advance of a National Congress so that it could be discussed in the local groups. This was not done in this important case.

The representatives to the National Congress had one day to discuss the matter. That was February 19. But first around noon were the documents distributed including the proposals from the National Committee.

The Parliam ent members were not adm itted to the meeting because among the Parliament members there were majority against the Atlantic Pact. It had never happened before th at the Parliam ent members Ill

had been excluded. Usually they come as guests with right to speak but not to vote.

Two rumors were sp re a d — both fa lse . One t h a t Norway was the next country after Czechoslovakia to be occupied by the Soviets. This was based on '“good information*1 received by the Foreign M inistry. The other rumor was that Sweden had torpedoed the Nordic defense negotiations by setting impossible condi­ tions for Norwegian rearmament, and thus had to join NATO. The Swedish prime minister has refuted this.

Lange was in a hurry. He returned from Washington one day prior to the National Convention and main­ tained that the United States had set a short dead­ line for membership in MATO in spite of the fact that the Pact had neither been formulated nor ap­ proved by the US S e n a t e .52

Jacob F riis, another member of the Labor P arty and a member of Parliament, has also leveled sharp criticism against the general processes in connection with the debate about

Norway's adherence to NATO:

For one who has had direct part, not in the creation, but in the parliamentary control and criticism of our foreign policy, the hindrances immediately become obvious. The debates on these questions have for the most part taken place in closed meetings in the ex­ panded foreign policy committee, in the Government Party's group meetings and in the Storting. The records of the foreign policy committee and the closed Storting meetings are strictly secret (one docs not even get a copy of the record of o n e 's own contribution), and in group meetings no records are made. Any documentation of the development of ideas with the determining parliamentary organs is as a result impossible to give. That will first be pos­ sible in fifty years or so, if any records still exist. Even now there has been no publication of the secret negotiations of 1905 or of the Integrity Treaty of 1907. Doth for the participants in the debate and for the general orientation of the public this parliamentary order undoubtedly has its weak­ nesses . ^ J 112

The Labor politician and for many years the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Storting, Finn Hoe, has disputed Johanne Amlid’s contention that the decision at the National Labor Party Congress was maneuvered through without proper democratic procedure. He does, however, admit that the matter was raised unexpectedly 'because one 54 was pressed for tim e .11

After Lange had returned from Washington arguing that a Scandinavian defense pact would have to be discarded as an alternative because of the American conditions for aid, the position of the opposition v/ithin the Labor Party regarding the Atlantic Pact had clearly become untenable.

It has been argued that the Government had failed to give sufficient information concerning Sweden's position, thereby creating the impression that the Swedish demands for Norwegian rearmament as a condition for a Scandinavian defense pact were such that the whole civilian reconstruc­ tio n program in Norway would s u ff e r .

Premier Erlander of Sweden, who was also a guest at

the Congress, made the Swedish position clear, however.

The Swedish Premier told the Congress that Sweden was w ill­ ing to join in a Scandinavian defense union regardless of

the present state of Norwegian armaments. But it was too

late to reopen the debate on this issue, and the National

Convention of the Labor Party ended with a complete victory

for the government's foreign policy line. 1 1 3

In this connection, the role of the Foreign Minis- 55 ter himself has often been emphasised, Aa observed by one author:

Lange early saw the Western line as the solution, and obtained the agreement of Prime Minister Ger- hardsen, Trade M in iste r Brofoss, Defense M inister Hauge, and othegg in the Government, but some were against , . , .

A fte r Norway joined NATO, a we] I-known American commentator wrote:

More than any other man he has been responsible for shifting Norwegian attention away from neutrality to collective security and from the Baltic to the Atlantic,57

Another author has observed: "Nndoubtedly it was Lange who 5 8 led Norway from neutrality to a new era in foreign policy,”

It is the latter commentator that is most correct in hie characterization of the role played by the Norwegian For­ eign M inister during this period because Norway always has 59 been an Atlantic nation. The degree to which Norway actually belonged to the Western World was never the issue, either in the Labor Party or in the Storting, even though

i t m ight have been employed in the polemics during the debate about the North Atlantic Pact, The issue, though

it may also at times have been discussed in terms of

"solidarity” with the West, and "conditions for aid," etc,, was whether the country was to choose a larger Western

A llia n c e w ith the economic and p o litic a l advantages that 114 would entail for Norway or a narrow Scandinavian pact stro n g ly dominated by Sweden.

V. NORWAY JOINS NATO

A week after tho Labor Party Convention, the Govern­ ment obtained endorsement from the Storting for its course.

On February 24, 1949, the Foreign Minister outlined his foreign policy before the Storting and proposed that

Norway, as soon as possible, join the negotiations on the

Atlantic Pact that were going on in Washington in order

'’that our views could be brought to bear on the formulation 61 of such a regional Pact."

The Foreign Minister repeated all his major argu­

ments in favor of the pact and emphasized the need to pre­

vent war by the creation of a "real power factor in world

politics," and that

A solidarity which is limited to small entities which are otherwise neutr il cannot have the effect necessary to prevent war. .2

The Foreign Minister also explained why the Scan­

dinavian Alliance was not a "practical political possi­

b ilit y " :

It can not be reconciled with the solidarity in rela­ tion to the democracies in Western Europe and North America, which we during the entire period of the Scandinavian defense negotiations thought necessary to secure peace.63

Lange also reminded the Storting of the unanswered Soviet offer of a non-aggression pact which would be answered at a later1 4 . jdate* . 64

In a closed meeting on March 3, 1949, the Storting 65 supported Lange's view with a large majority (118 to 11).

The Government thereupon informed Washington th a t Norway was prepared to accept an invitation to take part in the

Atlantic Pact negotiations. On March 4, 1949, the Nor­ wegian Ambassador to Washington joined the talks; on the same day that the Storting for the first time publicly debated the Foreign M inister's proposal tojoin the United

States in the pact.^

The n ext day, on March 5, the Norwegian r e p ly to the

Soviet note of February 5 was conveyed to the Russians. It

contained a rejection of the Soviet offer of a non—

aggression pact and a reiteration of Norwegian base poli- 67 e x e s .

Later in the month, on March 22, the Government

drafted a bill to sanction Norwegian accession to the

Atlantic Pact.°^ This was presented to the Storting on

March 29, 1949, where i t was approved by a vo te o f 130 to 6 9 13. On April 4, 194 9, Norway signed the Atlantic Pact in

Washington.^

This was the predictable outcome of the Scandinavian

defense negotiations. As Balvard Lange remarked at the

signing ceremony of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington 116

Our first thought, naturally, was to turn to our neighbors and friends in the North of Europe to see what the three of us could do. As we could not fully agree, however, on the basis for such a Scan­ dinavian defense union and on the necessity of establishing solidarity with a broader and stronger regional defense grouping, the logical solution for Norway was to join the North Atlantic Pact * « . * ^

Norway’s choice in 1948 and 1949 has been explained not only by economic considerations but also in terms of 7 2 11 strategy." Another factor, however , which is often overlooked in this context, was the American monopoly of the Atomic bomb. Before the Soviet Union acquired the

Atomic bomb, the United States could use the ultimate weapon for the protection of any area without any danger of retaliation. The United States in this weapon possessed the most credible deterrent for the protection of its smaller allies. This changed when the Soviet Union acquired the same weapon, even though it might have taken some time 7 3 before this was generally recognized. But the Scandi­ navian break was then already a fact, leaving Sweden iso­ lated from Norway and Denmark as far as military policy and security goes. Scandinavian cooperation was left to oper­ ate in other fields; in the Nordic Council, in the

European Free Trade Association, and in the United 74 Nations. 117

VI. CONCLUSION

The course that Norway chose in 1949 was staked out by historical experience and dictated by long-term economic and p o litic a l consid eration s. Already in 1941, when Norway actively entered the war, it seems clear that the country had abandoned neutrality or association with the other

Scandinavian countries in favor of association with the

West in one form or another;, the adherence to NATO was a natural result of this development.

As was demonstrated during the Labor Party Congress, the Norwegian political leaders favored Norwegian adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty. When the Scandinavian alternative was dfecussed in the Storting its rejection was expected* A reversal cf policy at that late hour by a failure to join the Atlantic Alliance, it must be remembered, would have required the Labor Party to completely discredit its Foreign Minister, in itself, as we have seen, a considerable political factor in the Norwegian political system.

It appears that there was great uncertainty as to

the support of a Scandinavian Pact in the Labor Party:, further contemplations, at this stage, about the Swedish offer--that now did not envisage prior Norwegian rearmament, but could take effect immediately--may have weakened the 1 1 8

Government'a position. The opposition has proposed that t h is explains why the d e c is io n was taken to have the

Labor Party endorse the Government's foreign policy line immediately, in spite of the fact that, for instance, even in Washington, the F oreign M inister had been assured that there was no immediate urgency against Norway.

The Norwegian Foreign M inister's inquiery in

Washington at any rate did not result in any change in the

American attitude towards the Scandinavian pact efforts and demonstrated that the Swedish alternative was unworkable.

Security had to be sought in the West and only v ery few at the Labor Party Congress or in the Storting disputed that. 119

FOOTNOTES— CHAPTER IV

1 The question of the decision-making process in Norway in the postwar period has been discussed eloquently in Phillip M. Burgess, "Norway, the North and NATO. A Study of the Elite Perceptions as Related to Foreign Policy" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, Washington, 1965). 2 Ingmar Dtirfcr, "Stalin's Nordiska Balans," Internas- jonal Politikk. No. 2, 1965, pp. 140-141. 3 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. Years of T r ia l ana Hope (Garden C ity, New York: Doubleday, 1956), pp. 246-258.

^Halvard Lange, in Arbciderbladet, October 13, 1966.

5Ib id .

° I b id .

^Utenriksdepartementets Pressetjeneste, Norqes Llnje (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1963), p. 25.

8Ibid. 9 Ibid.

^For text of the Soviet Declaration, see Appendix I.

12 For text of the Note, sec Appendix II. 13 For text of the Note, see Appendix III.

14The New York Times, February 8, 1949. See a lso , Halvard Lange, Norqes vei til NATO (Oslo: Pax F o r la g , 1966), pp. 46-48. 1 s This is confirmed by Mr. Lange several years later, Lange, Norqes vei til NATO, op. c it. , p. 48.

^ Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XX, No. 503, February 20, 1949.

^ Arbeiderbladet. February 15, 1949. 1 R Lange, Norqes vei til NATO, op. c it., p. 120 19 Utenriksdepartementets Pressetj eneste, _oj2* c i t . , p . 39. 20 Ibid. , p. 39. 21 Ibid. , p. 40; and MRedegj?Srelse fra Utenriksminis- te r e n om fo rh a n d lin g en e i Washington og London/' S tortin g- stidende. February 24, 1949, pp. 288-293, Debate, pp. 293- 335. 22 This impression, however, according to many critics, may have been the Norwegian Foreign Minister's own doing. The effect of a joint Scandinavian inquiry into the problem o f American a id to a Scandinavian bloc might well have proved to be different than the result of Lange's own talks in Washington. From certain critical accounts in the American press, at the time, the impression, in fact, is given that the United States might have been willing to re­ examine its stand if Norway had displayed more determina­ tion to remain united with the other Scandinavian countries. 23 Lange, Norqes vei til NATO, op. cit., p. 51.

24I b i d . 2 ^ 1-1 Ib id - 1 P * 52.

26t , . . I b i d . 2 7 There were Gerhardsen, Lange, Nordahl, and Tranmaet. 2 8 Lange, Norqes vei til NATO, op. cit., p. 53. 2 9 . Under leadership of Olav Olsvik, Natvig, Pedersen, and Trond Hegna. 30 Lange, Arbeiderbladet, October 15, 1966. 31 Thereaf ter referred to as the ’Special Committee."

^2Chr. S. Oftedal: Daqliqliv i Norqes Storting (Oslo: Gimnes Forlag, 1950), p. 67. 3 3 Lange, Arbeiderbladet. October 13, 1966. When, a f t e r th e e l e c t i o n in the f a l l of 1949, the communists were so heavily defeated that they disappeared from the foreign relations committee, the special committee was disbanded in January, 1950. 121 34 Henning F riis, Scandinavia between East and West (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), p. 175, fn. 3 5 C. 0 . Hedstrsim, w riting in Stockholms T idn in gen, January 29, 1949, 3 6 Lange, Arbeiderbladet, October 16, 1966. The sup- port a c tu a lly was 33 to 4. 37 I b id . 38 The Norwegian political party is a highly central” ized organization, the party leader and general secretary wielding a great deal of power. Thus, decisions, for instance, regarding foreign policy are taken by the party leadership with the endorsement of the National Party Con­ vention. For more on this, see Henry Valen and Daniel Katz, P o li t i c a l P a r tie s in Norway (Oslo: I n s t it u t e for S o c ia l Research, 1963), pp. 31-32; James A. Storing, Norwegian Democracy (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1963), pp. 129-130; for p o l i t i c a l groups in Norway, see a lso Harry E ck stein , Division and Cohesion in Democracy. A Study of Norway (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966).

The Norwegian newspapers are also controlled by the p o l i t ic a l p a r tie s , and most of them by th e two la r g e s t parties. The Storting exercises its competence in foreign affairs in plenary session. It is the Standing Foreign Affairs Committee that prepares the cases. The Foreign Affairs Committee also acts as a consultative body for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs* For a discussion of the Nor­ wegian parliamentary system in the postwar period see: Per Stavang, Par1amentarisme oq Maktbalanse (Oslo: Uni- versitetsforlaget, 1964); Einar Lichen and Rolf H. Torger- sen, Norway1s Views on Sovereignty (Bergen: Chr, Michel- sens Institutt, 1955), pp. 13-20. For the competence of the Storting in foreign affairs: Erik Colban, Storting oq Utenrikspolitikken (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1961), pp. 18-48; Einar Lichen, Norway in European and Atlantic Cooperation (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1964T; for the problem of parliamentary control with foreign policy during the 1948-1949 period, see LsJchen, Norway in European and Atlantic Cooperation, op. cit*, pp. 67-83. For a history of the Norwegian foreign service, see Reidar Omang, Uten- rikstjenesten (Oslo: Utenriksdopartementet, 1954).

In the postwar period of Norwegian history with which this dissertation is dealing, foreign affairs has been in the hands of the Labor Party, being replaced by a coalition of the other parties in 1965. 122

According to a research project on the Norwegian parties, the divergences between the Labor Party leadership and its rank-and-file on foreign policy questions have been consid­ erable. Another study has concluded that the most important decisions in the Labor Party were, in fact, taken by the Labor Union and not by the party membership. Stein Rokkan, Norway, Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism. In Robert Dahl, Political Opposition in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). This is""dis^ _ cussed by P ro fe sso r Thomas Chr, W yller in Daqbladet / O s lo /, September 7, 1966, in an article entitled, ,:Den Politiske Opposisjon.” 39 Opposition within the Party was led by Natvig Peder­ sen and Olav Oksvik. Others in opposition were Friis, Fostervoid, Hegna, Lgibak, Rystad, Westerlund, and Amlid. Present at the meeting also were the Swedish and Danish p rem iers. /i o Det Norske Arbeiderparti, LandsmySte 1949 Protokoll (Oslo; Arbeidernes Landstrykkeri, 1950), p. 188.

Ibid. , p. 154.

42 Ibid. , p. 188. 43 Ibid., p. 135. This resolution had been adopted by the National Committee of the Party by a vote of 34-4 on February 18.

^Wews stories to this effect reached Oslo as the convention voted on the issue. Afbenposten, February 2, 1949.

45 Det Norske Arbeiderparti, _0 £. cit., p. 119. 4 6. ^ b i d . , p . 12 5.

4 7Ibid. , p. 131.

48_Ibid., p. 132.

^Ibid. , p. 158.

50Ibid., p. 187.

Johannc Amlid, rA-pakt landsmtftet i 1949,,r Orien- tering, Oslo, No. 14 (April 10, 1965). This she later expanded on in a book about the National Labor Party Congress; Johanne Amlid, _Ut av Kurs (O slo: Pax Forlang, 1966)* 123

53Jacob Friis, Ubenrikspolitisk omprdvinq (Oslo: Saertrykk av Samtidcn~ 1949) , p. 168. 54 Finn 1-toe, "Hvern or ut av Kurs?," Arbeiderbladet, October 22, 1966. 5 5 In fact, he belonged to a small group in the Labor Party that already before the war had advocated collective security. At a Labor Party meeting in May, 1936, Lange presented a proposal for collective security. But after opposition from Foreign Minister Koht, the proposal was rejected. According to an interview with Arne Ording on April 10, 1950. Leron Karlstrdm, "The Scandinavian Ap­ proach to Political Integration,” (unpublished Ph.D. dis­ sertation, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1952), p. 332,

Chr. Christensen,"Norge i 1949," Nordisk Tidskrrft, V ol. XXVI, No. 1, 1950. 57 James Reston in the Hew York Times. August 1, 1949. 53 0. L. Karlstrsrfm, "Beginning and End o f Norwegian Neutrality,1' The Norseman, IX, No. 4 (July-August, 1951), pp. 217-231.

'59 Even Europe has always been rejected as too narrow an entity, according to Norwegian economic interests. In 1944, a close adviser to the Norwegian Government, Jacob Wortn-Mttller, wrote regarding Churchill's suggestion for a council of Europe: "Undoubtedly there are many common tasks for states on the European continent, but this must not lead to a weakening of the wider organisation and above all, must not separate us from the United States." Quoted in G. K. Gathorne-Hardy: Norway and the VJar (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 32. C See "Redegjc^relse fra Utenriksministeren om for- hanalingene i V/ashington og London,1 Stortincistidende. February 24, 1949, pp. 283-293, Debate pp. 293-335; also Utenriksdepartementets Pressetjeneste, _o£. c it. , pp. 36-45.

°*Utenriksdepartementets Pressctjeneste, ojq. c it. t p. 44. This is contradicted by his later account to the effect that the talks had come so far that Norway could not hope to exert any influence. See supra, p. 101. r P Utenriksdepartementets Pressetjeneste, _o£. c it. , p. 39. 124

63Ibid. . p. 40.

k^Ibid. , pp. 44-45.

G 5The minutes of the meeting were released in 1964, "Stortingets behandling av innstilling fra Spesialkomiteen for s a e r lig e spfdrsmSl angSende utenriks og sik k e r h e ts- politikken" (Innstilling, S. nr. 43 for 1949), Stortings- dokument No. 4. 6 S "Utenriksministnrens redegj^relse 24. februar," March 4, 1949, pp. 283-335, in Stortingstidende. G 7 Utenriksdepartementets Pressetjeneste, ojo, c it. , pp. 62-64; also in English translation in Tim Greve, Norway ana NATO (O slo: Norwegian U n iv ersity P ress, 1963), pp. 28-31. For text, see Appendix IV.

S®0fflcial invitation to join had been received on March 15. 69 For the debate see, "Samtykke t i l r a tifik a s jo n av Atlanterhavspakten,11 Stortingstidende. March 29, 1949, p. 712. The dissenters included the eleven Communist members plus two d is s id e n t members of the Labor Party (Sverre L^berg and Carl Henry). 70 When Norway la te r committed h e r s e lf to defend Greece, Turkey, and West Germany in NATO, it may have been more than she i n i t i a l l y had contem plated. Norway may a lso have had reservations as to the process of integration that later took place, at least according to one author: "Whilst France's lack of cooperation with NATO is fairly well docu­ mented, it is less widely recognized that the Scandinavian members of NATO have certain reservations vis-a-vis the military aspects of the Atlantic alliance." See, George Sch^ pflin, "NATO and the Nordic Balance," The World Today, XXI (1966) 114-122.

The change that NATO has undergone, especially after the ninth session of the MATO council in Lisbon in February, 1952, when the pact completely changed character has been discussed in Louis 33. Sohn, "The Development of the Atlantic Community," Acta Scandinavica Jutis Gentium, 23:27-31, 1953.

A discussion of the legal consequences of the pact, especially for the Scandinavian countries, can be found in, Erik BrUel, '■ Atlantpaktens juridiske Betydning," Acta Scandinavica Juris Gentium, 23:69-81, 1953. 125

^ Department of State B u ll e t i n , Vol. XX, No. 511 (A p ril 17, 1949), p. 478. 72 5. Abrahamsen, Sv;edcn*s Foreign Policy (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957). He finds that ,:Nor\"/ay . . • f e l t unwilling to assume commitments in respect to the B a ltic Sea,’1 p. 80. For a g e o p o lit ic a l view, see, ,TNor- wegen und die Nordische Einheit,:t Zcitschrift fUr Geopolikk /Hamburg/, XXIV (July, August, 1953), pp. 363-364. 73 This has been seen by some as a reason fo r the hurry with which Washington pushed the pact. The Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb shortly after the pact was signed, and sooner than publicly anticipated.

While this, at the time, was not really comprehended, on that occasion, suddenly vanished the major military .foundation for the MATO membership of the smaller allies; it inaugurated the nuclear stalemate and changed the useful­ n ess of alliances as defense measures for small powers. Not until the Soviet demonstration of her carrying capacity for the atomic bomb by the Sputniks in 1957 was this point clearly revealed, however. It was this profound change which de Gaulle had so eloquently spelled out in the early 19G0's but which, for a long time, seemed to have had little effect, for instance, upon the Norwegian policy makers. Nevertheless, i t i s e x a c tly this change which inspired the French independent nuclear deterrent and the idea of a MATO nuclear force and thereby increased specula­ tion of a German or mixed-manned nuclear submarine fleet in the Baltic, threatening to change the Nordic Balance.

74 Scandinavian cooperation in the United N ations i s dealt vrith in Tormod P. Svennevig, ’The Scandinavian Bloc at the United Nations and I t s Hew Outlook,:| Norseman, XIII (Hay, Juno, 1955) 146-150; and Thomas Hovet, Bloc P o lit ic s in the United Nations (Cambridge: Harvard U n iversity, 1960), pp. 73-76, CHAPTER V

A CRITICAL REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS

FOR THE FAILURE OF CLOSER SCANDINAVIAN

INTEGRATION IN 194 9

I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will attempt to make a closer analysis of the policies regarding the Scandinavian defense negotia­ tions in order to ascertain to what degree the outcome of these efforts was a result of Norwegian policies. In this connection, a closer examination of the views and reactions of the two powers w ill a ls o be made.

Many authors have found in the influences and inter­ ests of the powers the most prominent causes for the fail- 1 ures of attempts at Scandinavian unity throughout history.

A prominent Swedish politician has made the observa­ tion that the split of the Swedish-Norwegian Union in 1905, besides failure of Swedish leadership to satisfy Norwegian national aspirations, also must be explained in terms of

. . a purposeful English policy for the benefit of the 2 dissolution of the Union." In his opinion, what Great

Britain was afraid of was German influence in Sweden which then would be extended to Norway. He also finds that the failure of the Scandinavian defense negotiations, in 1948-

1949, can be accounted for in terms of big power pressure 127 because a Scandinavian bloc "went against the policy that 3 they had decided to follow."

The p olitical consequences of German defeat and w ithdraw al from Norway and Denmark, was during the war a l­ ready the subject of open concern in Sweden and the Soviet

Union, in contrast to Washington especially, where the pre­ occupation, it seems, was more with winning the v/ar over

Germany on m ilitary terms. The debate in Sweden during the war on the question of a Nordic defensive alliance and the

Soviet early reaction to such plans were reflections of thrs concern* 4

It was Sweden that took the initiative to open talks v:ith Norway and Denmark w ith a view towards forming a 5 defense pact. Norway never took any initiative in that direction— on the contrary, more often than not she had rejected such ideas in the past.

Many reasons have been sought for why Norway re­ jected the Swedish offer of a defense pact and, undoubtedly, many questions w ill still be raised as to the way in which

this was done.

As we have seen already, Norway was solidly anchored

in the Western World, not the least because of the struc­

ture of her trade and economy, and may, in reality, have

had l i t t l e c h o ic e . But the ch o ice th a t was taken, i t seems,

may have been directed as much away from Sweden as it was 128 in the direction of the United States. This is the "psycho­ logical" factor so often referred to—the fear of Swedish domination—which found its expression in the preference for a larger grouping of states. This may have been the overriding consideration for Norway in 1948-1949. The dif­ ference in "historical experience" between Sweden and

Norway, however, may also have been an important factor causing Norway to interpret the political reality after the war and her chances to stay outside another great power conflict in a different light than Sweden.

As has been seen, Norway compared to her Scandina­ vian neighbors is lacking in diplomatic tradition; this lack of tradition has found expression in her preoccupation with g morality and international law. It may be that the basic difference between the Norwegian and the Swedish foreign policy can be explained in terms of this difference between the Kantian and the Machiavellian view of the purpose of 7 the State as it were.

Typical is the confidence in the moralistic approach reflected in the attitude of leading Norwegians who felt that their chances to stay out of the war resulted from a special respect the world had for "Norway as a little, g peaceful minded and highly cultured nation."

Thanks to her isolation, but perhaps also because of the unfortunate experien ces made in Norway with g rea t power 129 politics, and her affiliation with the "less democratic and 9 progressive" Sweden, Norway came to find a major national objective in the support of liberalism, legalism, arbitra­ tion treaties, inter-parliamentary conferences, international conferences, international law, adjudication, etc. Not the least as a recognition of this, the Swedish industrialist,

Alfred Nobel, designated the Norwegian Storting to award the annual Nobel peace prise.^

The question o f why Norway took the d e c isio n of jo in ­ ing NATO cannot be fully explored in Scandinavia only, however, but must also be pursued particularly in Washing­ ton and Moscow.

Traditionally, Oslo, as we have seen, has looked to

London in foreign policy questions. While much has not changed in this respect, the leadership of the West as a whole has been transferred to Washington. The United

States, however, in the first months of the postwar period seemed to withdraw from the European scene. Great Britain was greatly weakened by the war and still had world-wide commitments.

In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union consolidated her

gains in the war by methods which appeared very ominous.

The Swedish offer of a Scandinavian defense coopera­

tion, therefore, was an important consideration for Norway 130 in this period before another alternative was presented through the political consolidation of the West.

II. SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE IDEA OP A

SCANDINAVIAN DEFENSE PACT

As seen by the Soviet Union, the alliance with the

West was only a temporary arrangement for the purpose of the war against Germany. After the war, the primary prob­ lem for the Soviet Union was s t i l l to secu re her w estern borders, not the least those in Northern Europe, against possible renewed dangers. In this respect, the outcome of the Second World War enabled her better to do so. In the

Soviet view, the postwar period was otherwise not marked by 11 any r a d ic a l change in S o v ie t r e la t io n s to the W est. I t seems that Soviet policy still was thinking in terms of a cordon sanitaire in East Europe, as in the interwar period .

It follows that she would be most concerned about the immediate neighboring areas rather than the West as such. Sweden, for example, was in Northern Europe seen as the heir to Germany as an anti-Bolshevik state. Soviet policy in the area, therefore, was primarily designed to prevent the rest of Scandinavia from joining Sweden. This can be understood better if it is kept in mind that the

Soviet Union, until the very end of the war, charged Sweden 131 with an immoral pro-German form of neutrality. Not until after 1950 did her neutrality become acceptable.

Initially, the Soviet Onion did not seem concerned about the p o s s i b i l it y of Norway and Denmark jo in in g the

West in an Atlantic Alliance. The only major uncertain question for the Soviet Union in Northern Europe after the war was Sweden, upon which, she, therefore, concentrated her efforts.13

It must also be remembered, however, that the Scan­ dinavian area was of secondary importance to the Soviet

Union as well as for the West. It was in Central Europe- more s p e c if ic a lly Germany— where the major in t e r e s t s were

at stake. The development in Northern Europe was more than

anything a function of the developments in Central Europe.

Except for Finland, the Soviet Union, in contrast to

the United States, had little political influence in Northern

Europe in 1949. Diplomatic notes were practically the only

direct means with which she could seek to influence poli­

c ie s in Norway, as w e ll as Sweden and Denmark.

The Soviet Union before the war did not openly ob­

ject to a Northern military alliance consisting of Finland,

Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.1^ But the Winter War between

Finland and the Soviet Union demonstrated that Northern

Europe was a sensitive flank and its attitude toward a

Scandinavian pact changed. The sending of volunteers tc 132

F in lan d and the rumors of plans for fu r th e r Swedish and

Norwegian aid to Finland aggravated this and caused the

S o v ie t Union to react sharply. Sweden was accused of pur­ suing a policy which could be explained "only, if she were at war with, or preparing for war against, the Soviet 15 U n io n .”

The question of a Scandinavian defense pact was brought up again by Finland during the peace negotiations w ith the S o v ie t Union.

The idea was supported by Germany, as well as Great

Britain where it was seen as a useful "barrier against the 16 barbarians from the East.” The Soviet Union, however, regarded a Northern alliance, at that time, as directed against Soviet interests:

This should be stressed particularly . . . the Soviet viewpoint decidedly rejects any and all attempts to revive the policy of "cordon sanitaire" against the S o v ie t Union, whatever forms they m ight be masked b eh in d . Some of the federation p r o je c ts put forth lately in the West, openly smell of the rotten spirit of this policy. Such is the Soviet position on the question of federation of smaller states in Europe* This viewpoint was positively stated at the Moscow conference,^

A Scandinavian bloc was no exception.

When Sweden, at the end of the Second World War, again raised the question of a Nordic defense alliance, the Soviet Union reacted in a now predictable manner. An article in Pravda, in July, 1945, is typical in this 133 respect. It is formed as an answer and rebuttal to the

Swedish Foreign Minister GUnther's address of May 4, 1945, in which he proposed Nordic defense cooperation. The arti­ cle describes what it calls "Hordism" as a manifestation of an old Swedish urge towards the domination of Scandinavia:

The idea of "Northern cooperation" in the Swedish interpretation has inevitably amounted, as experience has shown to the attem pts to i s o l a t e the Northern countries and force upon them a policy potentially directed against the Soviet Union. Discussions on "Nordic cooperation” have not ceased. The idea put forth by GUnther concerning the creation of a ,Tdef encive” bloc of the North has not been given up. Moreover, the evolution of the idea . . . in the Swedish interpretation has historical roots and rep­ resents specific strivings on the part of Swedish reactionaries.

Thus, it seems that initially the Soviet Union did not set a Scandinavian alliance in connection with a greater Western bloc; the concern seemed to have been mainly with a militarily-strengthened Scandinavia under

Swedish leadership and the consequences such a bloc would have for Finland's relationship to the Soviet Union.

Only after the United States displayed its interest in Europe was such a Scandinavian bloc set in the context of the American political objectives, as reflected in a paper in Leningrad in November, 1947:

Lately the penetration of American capital in Denmark, Sweden and Norway has in c re a se d .... Not satisfied with the Islands the Americans now attempt to estab­ lish air bases on Norwegian and Swedish territory. The dollar diplomats now try to exploit the economic difficulties of these three countries to form a 134

"Nordic defense bloc" in which the United States is to play the role of the horseman . . . , and the Scandinavian countries the horse.

The decision by the Scandinavian governments to par­

ticipate in the European Recovery Program was also seen as having grave political implications. The Soviet Union held

that "the attempt to draw a line of distinction between the economic provisions of the Marshall Plan and its military 2 0 and political aims is illusory," and that

the American imperialists try to retain their mili­ tary bases in Greenland and even to establish full control over this Danish Island .... In Norway they want to get hold of the Sola airfield near Stavanger . . . with the intention of turning it into a base for American "transarctic cruises" . . . . It is known, that the war departments of the Scandinavian countries and those of Great liritain and the United States have a secret agreement con­ c e r n in g th e s ta n d a r d is a tio n s o f arms, the supply of jet planes to Denmark and Norway and so on . . . .'■*■

C le a r ly th en , the S o v ie t Union now saw the Scandi­

navian area as potentially, if not actually, within the

Western sphere of influence.

Thus, when in 1948, Sweden officially proposed the

Scandinavian defense pact to Norway and Denmark, the Soviet

Union im m ed iately opposed i t as a forerunner of complete

adherence of these countries to the Western Alliance system.

It was seen as, in fact, a creation within this system, 22 inspired by the United States.

The Soviet views of the Scandinavian defense pact

efforts is well summarized In an article in the Soviet 135 newspaper, Trud, of October 23, 1948, commenting on the meeting of the Scandinavian Defense Ministers of October 15, 1948:

Swedish political circles assure that the talks dealt with the setting-up of a commission to study "purely technical questions," without taking stand on the issue of a Scandinavian military bloc. With such an explanation the Swedish official circles wanted once again to stress their negative attitude to the policy of military blocs, which, according to Sweden's for­ eign minister Unden, would create tension in the relations between the Scandinavian countries and the Soviet Union, and would be in conflict with Sweden's traditional policy of neutrality. But the results of the Oslo conference show, however, that these phrases were merely invented in order to distract the attention of Swedish public from the military agreement which is being prepared among the Scandinavian coun­ tries on American order. ^

Evidently, the creation of a Scandinavian military pact

was regarded as an objective of American policy:

The only concession the Anglo-American godfathers of the Scandinavian military alliance have extended to the stubborn Swedes, was that they permitted the organization of a separate Scandinavian military staff. But nobody can doubt that both the Scandi­ navian and the Western bloc are to be directed by American observers.^4

It further contends that:

Though the Scandinavians would be granted the privi­ lege of setting up a separate arrangement, it is based on United States military guarantees and on the subsequent inclusion of this Scandinavian bloc in the North Atlantic Union . . • which is to stretch from Norway to Spain and Portugal, and from the Baltic coast to the American Atlantic coast.2 5

Sweden's assertions of neutrality as well as her ability or

will to influence the policy of the other two Scandinavian

governments in this respect was not trusted: 136

. . . it was the viewpoint of the Norwegian and Danish military cliques, which long ago had tied their countries' fate to the Anglo-American plans in Europe, that prevailed .... The Norwegian and Danish politicians have persuaded their Swedish colleagues to give up international cooperation and neutrality and to join the Scandinavian military bloc under Anglo-American protection.25

Much of those Soviet assertions must have been fos­ tered by the fact that American policy with regard to

Europe was la r g e ly undefined at th is sta g e . From the Van- aenberg Resolution, it was not clear exactly to what extent the United States was willing to commit itself. From the

Soviet point of view, however, it was, nevertheless, alarm­ ing and to a great degree determined the Soviet reaction to the Scandinavian Pact. The Swedish plan instead of being regarded as an alternative for the other Scandinavian coun­ tries to political and military ties with the West, as

Sweden c le a r ly designed i t to be, was p ictu red as in e v it a ­ bly leading to the inclusion of Sweden and the other

Scandinavian countries in the Western Alliance, as was the initial American goal, thus making a Scandinavian Pact nothing but a sub-pact under NATO.

It must be recalled that not until February 9, 1948,

after it was clear that the Scandinavian Pact was given up,

did the Swedish Foreign Minister reveal the secret but ex­

pressed condition for the Scandinavian defense talks—that

the pact would not be a sub-system under NATO. But as long

as the Scandinavian defense negotiations were still going 137 on the Soviet Union evidently did not preclude the possi­ bility. It will be recalled that Sweden had not objected to the purchase of weapons from the West to such a pact, and as late as February 7-10, 1949, the Norwegian Foreign

Minister Lange had attempted to convince Washington of "the strong considerations in favor of a solution to our security problems which would enable Norway, Denmark and Sweden to 27 stand together in mutual solidarity.11

Around December 24, 1948, or a fortnight after the last part of the NATO negotiations had started in Washing­ ton, Norway got a warning about an impending invitation to partake in NATO. Lange promised an answer by February 1.

But the interview Lange gave Arbeiderbladet on January 3, did not leave much doubt as to what the answer would be.

It was in this situation that the Soviet Union de­ livered a warning to Finland, undoubtedly also designed as a warning to Sweden and to cou n ter Norway's a c tio n .

As we have seen, the Soviet Union had abstained from taking direct control over the internal political develop­ ment in Finland and perm itted the country to make i t s own treaty relationship to the Soviet Union—different from the other countries in Eastern Europe.

Two days after the meeting in Karlstad, January 5-6,

Pravda had introduced a demand for a change in Finland’s status. The Finnish Ambassador to Moscow was called in and 138 notified that the Soviet Union would be forced to re- 2 g evalu ate i t s p o lic y towards Finland i f Sweden jo in ed NATO.

Soviet official reaction to Norway's NATO membership came remarkably late; on the day of the last meeting be­ tween the Scandinavian countries, the Soviet Ambassador in

Oslo submitted a declaration in the Norwegian Foreign

O ffic e , exp ressin g h is Government's concerns for Norways reported intention to join a "grouping of states which are 2 9 pursuing aggressive aims." Norway was asked to:

Clarify the stand of the Norwegian government with respect to the question of the Atlantic pact, par­ ticularly in view of the fact that Norway has a common frontier with the Soviet Union .... The Soviet government requests to be informed as to whether p ress rep orts to the e f f e c t that Norway w ill enter the Atlantic Union correspond to the facts, and also requests to be informed as to whether the Norwegian government is undertaking any obligations under the Atlantic Fact with respect to the estab­ lishment of military, air, or naval bases on Norway's territory. ^

On February 1, 1949, Norway answered to the effect that

"Norway never will contribute to a policy with aggressive aims" and w i l l not permit "that Norwegian te r r ito r y i s used 31 in the service of such a policy." On February 5, 1949, the Soviet Ambassador submitted a second statement which 32 termed the Norwegian reply to be "insufficient." The

Soviet statement concluded:

. . . . If the Norwegian government nevertheless doubts the goodneighborly intentions of the Soviet Union w ith regard to Norway, the government of the Soviet Union, with a view to eliminating all possible doubts concerning the Soviet Union's intentions, pro­ poses to the Norwegian government to conclude a treaty 139 of non-aggression and, thereby, put an end to a ll d ou bts. 3

This second Soviet note was d e liv e r e d a few hours b e fo re

Mr. Lange boarded the plane for his conferences in Washing­ ton, and was not answered until after Norway had o fficia lly decided to join the pact.

The Soviet Union had addressed the note to Norway, but it may also have been designed as a warning and an attempt to strengthen the Swedish determination not to fo llo w the example of Norway. Perhaps, because Denmark had played the role of mediator between the opposing views of

Sweden and Norway, Moscow might a ls o have hoped to preven t, 34 at least, the Danish inclusion in the Atlantic Pact.

Assuming that the basic aim must have been to lim it, as far as possible, the political and military influence of the West in Northern Europe, and keeping in mind the Soviet conception of a Scandinavian bloc as another arm of the

Western Alliance system, a split in Scandinavia was, un­ doubtedly, preferred even if this meant Norway and Denmark as members of NATO. I t was the l e s s e r of two e v ils in the

Soviet view, probably.

The agreement may be made th a t the Soviet Union may have made a major miscalculation in 1949 by rejecting a

Scandinavian Pact as an inevitable part of the Atlantic

Alliance; a Scandinavian bloc would have been more compati­ ble, perhaps, with Soviet interests in Northern Europe than 140

Norway committed m i l i t a r i l y and p o l i t i c a l l y to the W est.

Considering the problem of Finland, however, this might not be s o .

No doubt, the Soviet Union also rejected the Scan­

dinavian defense pact because it was believed to be or to

become a complement to NATO. But the threat to the special

Fenno-Soviet relationship, it seems, would be no greater—

and perhaps less from such a pact than from a truly neutral

Scandinavian pact. The chances for Finland’s association

to such a neutral arrangement was much greater than an

association with a Western alliance, since she was, in fact,

excluded from any direct membership in a Western pact; it

was recogn ised by a l l th a t she was w ith in the S o v ie t o r b it .

Membership in a neutral Scandinavian regional organization,

on the other hand, would not be, so clearly, a breach of

the Finnish pledges not to conduct a policy which endangered

the interests of the Soviet Union. Thus, perhaps, the prob­

lem for the Soviet Union was not so much a question of the

neutrality of a Scandinavian pact but to prevent its forma­

tio n no m atter v/hat i t s r e la tio n s h ip to the West.

I I I . AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE SCANDINAVIAN

DEFENSE PACT EFFORTS

President Truman's speech before Congress, on March

12, 1947, definitely confirmed that Washington had taken 141 35 over the role of Great Britain on the continent. The problem for both East and West was, however, Germany, where both sides after the war had rapidly consolidated their gains; towards the end of 1946, the United States and Great

Britain had created economic unity of their occupational zones. A speech at that time by Secretary Byrnes in Stutt­ gart to the effect that the United States would support a revision of the German borders in the East was an important move in the s tr u g g le between the v ic to r s over the allegiance of the Germans. When the four power negotiations over

Germany started in March, 194 7, the struggle had already been evident for months.

A fter th e Moscow con feren ce, Marshall, in his famous speech at Harvard on June 5, 1947, announced his plans for a European recovery program o u tsid e the United Nations , . 36 system and p recon d ition ed on European economic cooperation.

The East European nations were also invited and some ex­ pressed willingness to consider participation as, for in­

stance, Czechoslovakia. But it was clear that such a move would dim inish and endanger the S o v ie t cordon sanitaire which had just been won in the Second World War. The Soviet r e a c tio n was thus p r e d ic ta b le — as was the action against

Czechoslovakia when it did not follow the example of, for

instance, Finland, in turning down the invitation from the 37 West to join the Marshall Plan. 142

It is not clear whether the United States, who at the time of the formation of NATO possessed a monopoly of the atomic bomb, was primarily concerned about the m ilitary 3 8 strategic value of the Scandinavian countries proper.

But they may have played their role in connection with

Germany’s integration in the West more for political and cultural reasons. The Northern countries brought into the pact social systems that gave the alliance a better balance and a broader base. Such factors must have been of some importance in those countries in Europe and, especially, in

Germany where support was needed or p referred a ls o from the socialist and liberal parties.

The impression is often given that the reason for the failure of the Scandinavian defense negotiations was the question of arms supplies which could only come from the United States and which the United States plainly 39 refused to deliver to a- truly neutral bloc. Thus, it is popularily held that it was the United States that held the key to the Scandinavian defense talks.^ The failure has been attributed even to direct pressure exerted upon the

Scandinavian countries to join the W est.^ While American policy may have tried to influence the decision that was taken, there seems to be no foundation for believing that any pressure was used. Norwegian official statements, emphasizing that there was no pressure exerted by the United 143 states arc undoubtedly correct. The Norwegian Ambassador to Washington wrote, at the time:

When we decided to join the North Atlantic Pact we did not because we have been under pressure from the United States , . , the repeated intimations to this effect are ngt true . . . but entirely for reasons of our own.

However, it is the American influence upon Norwegian foreign policy which merits the greatest attention in trying to ascertain how important was the American policy not to deliver arms to a Scandinavian Pact. Denmark only followed the Norwegian lead.

It seems clear that it was the policy of the United

S ta tes to have Norway included in the Pact and was thus opposed to a neutral bloc on the Swedish pattern. President

Truman, in his Memoirs, has written;

On July 2, I approved a policy statement which said that the Vandenberg Resolution should be implemented to the fullest extent possible and that the Depart­ ment of State should now go ahead with the preliminary conversations which the Brussels Pact powers had sug­ gested .

Furthermore, the Department of State was to explore the p o s s ib ilit y of in clu d in g Norway, Denmark, Iceland, I t a ly and perhaps Portugal and Sweden in the proposed arrangement and suggest for later adherence of Spain, Germany and Austria, or the Western zones of the last two cou n tries.

This question was also taken up in connection with the first Brussels Pact conference on the North Atlantic Pact, 144 on July 6, in Washington. President Truman writes in his

Memoirs about this:

The n e x t step was what c o u n t r ie s sh o u ld be a s s o c i ­ ated in such a system. It was pointed out that enemy occupation of the territories of Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland and Portugal (with their dependent territories in the Atlantic area, such as Greenland and the Azores) would represent a threat to the security of Western Europe. The conference took note of the fact that all of these nations might not be willing or prepared to assume the com­ mitments of such an association. It was suggested, therefore, that there might be different classes of a s s o c ia t io n , with varying d eg rees o f o b l i g a t i o n . 44

The exact shape and composition of the organization was not clear at this time, but it was very early made clear that a neutral Scandinavian Pact could not count on

aid from the United States. As the Norwegian Foreign

Minister, at a later time, revealed:

As foreign minister I had talks with the foreign ministers Bevin and Marshall partly during the OEEC meetings and partly during the UN general assembly session which this fall was held in Paris. The D efense Department was in co n tin u o u s c o n ta c t w ith Washington and London, among other things to find out about the possibilities and conditions for d e liv e r y of equipment to th e Norwegian d e fe n s e . These contacts made it clear that Norway would not be among the fir st c o u n tr ie s th a t ivould g e t d e fe n se materiel from the United States on reasonable eco­ nomic terms. It was already early in the fall evi­ dent that the countries in Europe joining in the mutual defense cooperation and who were w illing to commit themselves to the United States would get priority.4^

As he points out, however, there were influential

circles in the United States that advised against including

Scandinavia in the Atlantic Pact for among other reasons 145 not to provoke the Soviet Union. They were, however, not able to change American policy in this respect.4^

During the crucial weeks in January, 1949, between the Karlstad m eeting, January 5—6, when Sweden made i t s offer to Norway, and the meeting in Copenhagen, January 22-

24, when Norway r e je c te d the Swedish Pact, the United

States made it clear that one of the basic Norwegian condi­ tions for a Scandinavian Pact, the delivery of war materials from the United States, would not be met.

The New York Times had reported that the meeting, to be held in Copenhagen, was "in reality the first step toward a joint Scandinavian Parliament."' But on January

14, 1949, a week prior to the Copenhagen meeting, the State

Department announced "it is natural that such supplies as may be available should go to countries associated with us 4 S in collective defense arrangements."

Walter Lippmann, in his column in the New York

Herald Tribune. in discussing the State Department press officer’s remarks, said: "It is known that Mr. McDermott's remarks were addressed immediately to Sweden, Norway and 49 Denmark."

Lippmann further advised a g a in st the American p o lic y of trying to prevent the formation of a Scandinavian neutral bloc in order to have these countries join the

Atlantic Pact. 146

Another polumnist, James Reston of The New York

Times. speculated that the State Department announcement was intended to test the aims of several of the prospective

A t la n t ic Pact members in Europe, including Denmark, Portu­ g a l, Ic e la n d , E ire, Norv/ay, and Sweden, "'all of whom have certain facilities necessary to an effective Atlantic 50 s e c u r it y system ." Reston, after the f a i l u r e of the Scan­ dinavian talks, also questioned the wisdom of the American 51 policy toward the Scandinavian countries. He observed t h a t :

. . . some State Department officials are for creat­ in g a Scandinavian Unity, but this q u estio n has been discussed in the President’s National Security Coun­ cil . . . and the feeling there definitely was that the North A tla n tic Pact would d e f in ite ly be weakened in strategical and psychological terms if Norway and Denmark did not join with the United S ta t e s , Canada and the B ru ssels Treaty Powers.52

But he suggests that the United States had overemphasised

the m ilit a r y value of having these co u n tries in the Pact as compared to the political value of a neutral Scandinavian b lo c .

P olitical considerations rather than concern with

strategy may have been more decisive for the initial Ameri­

can reaction to the Scandinavian defense negotiations,

however. Undoubtedly, the United States had strategic

interests in Northern Europe, also* Norway, for instance,

held a key position in the naval strategy of the Baltic

entrances, ana the Arctic and her merchant marine was an 147 important asset. 53 But Denmark must have been of the greatest strategic interest, at the time, because of Green­ land and the Baltic entrances. Considering that Denmark was willing to follow Norway wherever she went, it was thus important for the United States to have Norwegian partici­ pation in the Atlantic Pact.

As for Iceland, it appears that the choice was made only after, and perhaps due to Norway's decision to adhere to the Pact* The organ of Iceland's Social-Democratic

Party wrote, on February 22, 1949:

The attitude now taken by Norway will have great influence on the view on the North Atlantic Union in many countries, and particularly so in Denmark and Iceland which now have to take a stand toward the question of eventual participation in it .54

This was a lso , by the way, a r e c o g n itio n of the f a c t th at the Norwegian decision to enter NATO, in reality, had been taken by the National Labor Convention.

An article by James Reston, in The New York Times.

February 13, 1949, asserts that an attempt had been made in

Stockholm, on the part of the United States, to reconcile the principles of the Atlantic Pact with the terms of a 55 Scandinavian Defense Pact as proposed by Sweden.

In Washington it was disclosed that efforts had been made to reach a compromise between the proposed Atlantic and Scandinavian defense pacts. The posi­ tion of the United States was that it had no objec­ tion to a Scandinavian Pact and would not deny arms to i t s members, but th at United S ta te s arms would go in the first instance to nations associated with the United States in security plans.56 148

An article by Harold Callender in The New York Times of February 16, 1949, makes a similar observation:

The Swedes felt that in view of the developments in recent weeks, the Western powers more fully under­ stood the peculiar relationship that existed between Swedish neutrality and the continued independence of Finland. In view of this situation, therefore, the Swedes reportedly hoped that they would encounter no obstacles in buying American arms . • . .

The National Security Council had, however, according to

The New York Times, decided to have all the Scandinavian C Q countries included in NATO.

L ittle is known about what prompted the decision in

Washington to refuse aid to a neutral Scandinavian bloc;

perhaps it was perceived as a demonstration for the benefit of Norway and as a disapproval of the Swedish concept of

the Scandinavian Pact. It seemed, at any rate, hardly meant

literally; after the Norwegian decision to join NATO was

actually taken, one may read in a press release about the

Atlantic Pact of March 18:

A m ilitary assistance program is now being considered by the executive branch of the Government. This pro­ gram—^ nvi sages aid to the members of the pact as well as other friendly states of the free world.

IV. THE NORWEGIAN REACTION TO THE INITIAL

—PROPOSALS FOR CLOSER COOPERATION IN THE WEST

It has been seen from the preceding discussion that,

more so than any country on th e c o n tin e n t, Norway i s an

Atlantic country. Her economic interests and political sympathies have always been found in the West, above all in

Great Britain; the Second World War only served to streng­

then these ties. It was Soviet troops that liberated the first Norwegian territories during the war, but it was in

London that the Government-in-exile was in close contact with the British Government; it was from Great Britain that i the Norwegian underground got all their supplies; and it was in the battle of Great Britain that the Norwegian

Merchant Marine did its greatest service for the Allied 60 c a u s e .

The Norwegian foreign policy decision makers in

London, after Koht, rejected the idea of a Scandinavian regional political arrangement following the war as too narrow in scope to provide sufficient security.^ Instead,

they repeatedly emphasized the role of Norway as an Atlan­

tic nation, looking toward a larger Atlantic partnership.

After the United Nations was created, such a regional

arrangement was seen as a supplement to the United Nations.

There 'was, however, concern for the position of the Soviet

Union. Even during the Marshall Plan negotiations, Norway

still seemed undecided as to the degree of political commit

ment to the West—evidently because of the reaction of the

Soviet Union.

This Norwegian reluctance and doubt regarding the

Marshall Plan has been revealed in a history of the 150

Norwegian National Bank: "Originally the Norwegian Govern­ ment was q u ite sk ep tica l . . . and the request o f 500 m il­ lio n kroner in aid which Norway reported i t needed was fa r below corresponding figures from the other countries in­ volved. " ^

This attitude soon changed; and during the four-year period of M arshall aid, Norway received between f iv e and six times as much as originally requested.

According to Lange, it was Bevin's speech in January

1343, about a closer economic and military cooperation that signaled the re-evaluation of Norwegian foreign policy

Shortly after BevinTs speech the Swedish Foreign M in ister commented on i t in the Riksdag. He empha­ sised that even if Sweden participated in the Marshall Plan, it was completely unthinkable to join any such defense cooperation as Bevin had advocated. In the press Unden's address was interpreted as rep­ resenting the Scandinavian position. That was the reason for why I found it necessary to present a more comprehensive interpretation of the Norwegian view­ point in the debate in the Stortinet on February 12, 1348.65

But the Foreign Minister would not then take a stand on the

is s u e o f jo in in g the West, because, as he sa id , Norway had

not received any invitation to join. Thus, the initial

Norwegian reaction to the Bevin Plan was non-committal.

But i t gradually became more p o s itiv e ly in c lin e d . In h is

speech on April 19, he revealed that the question of "ex­

panded cooperation with Western Europe" had also been dis­

cussed in the Cabinet—but "not beyond the purely economical 151 cooperation." But then he added: "It i s q u ite c le a r th a t neither in the B r it i s h government nor among o th e r p a r t ie s to the Brussels treaty are there any plans to urge us to join this treaty if we don't ourselves express a positive desire to join."^®

Clearly, this was no rejection but a preparation for the invitation to join, and marks a departure from the previous line.

When on April 30, Lange again discussed the Bevin

Flan, he said: "We do not want to exclu d e o u r s e lv e s from negotiations concerning closer cooperation with the West both politically and economically." But he now reiterated that there were no plans to invite Norway to join the 6 7 Brussels Pact "if she did not express a desire to join."

From these speeches emerges the impression of a gradual change from a wait-and-see attitude to a cautious acceptance of a closer Western integration.

V. THE IMPRESSION OF IMMINENT DANGER

FOR NORWAY

By April, 194S, it would seem that the time had come

to take a stand on the problem of closer association with 6 8 the 'West. The public debate was already intensified, and

the atmosphere was loaded with rumors about great dangers 6 9 for Norway* The Norwegian defense minister in his report 152 to the Storting in early February on the defense plans for the next five-year period had made the assumption that

Norway was threatened.

On February 29, Prime Minister Gerhardsen, in a

speech in Fredrikstad, reacted sharply against the role the communists had played in the coup in Czechoslovakia and 70 warned of the same danger from the Norwegian communists.

The news media, except for the communist papers, echoed

this sentiment and interpreted the events in Finland and

Czechoslovakia as danger signs for all small countries in

Europe.

Apparently indications of danger were also received

from Norwegian diplomatic posts abroad. The Norwegian For­

eign Minister has later confirmed this:

. . . during March 5-7 (1948) dispatches were received from the Norwegian diplomatic posts in Moscow, Warsaw and Helsingfors to the effect that Norway must be pre­ pared to receive a Soviet proposal of a similar nature to that which was contained in Stalin's letter to Paasikivi. On the background of those negotiations which Norway had conducted with the Soviet Union in the fall of 1346 about the Soviet wishes regarding Svalbard, the Government thought such a Soviet offer possible and thought it could be accompanied by a certain amount of pressure.7^-

Truman's warning in h ie speech o f March 17, 1948, must a ls o

be recalled. The apprehension was underlined when, on

March 10, 1S48, the 5tor ting granted a Government request

for an extraordinary defense appropriation amounting to 100 7 2 million kroner. That these rumors also resulted in an 153 increased state of Norwegian military alert on March 19 has also later been confirmed by the Norwegian Foreign Minis- ■73 74 ter. This was the so-called Easter crisis*

S im ila r m easures were taken in Swedenj b u t rath er because of the general political situation and not because of any imminent danger directed against Scandinavia* The

Swedish Prime Minister Erlander, in a later newspaper interview about the rumors of any such danger in 1948, said:

"We considered the Norwegian nervousness on this point as 75 entirely groundless." The chairman of the Norwegian For­ eign Affairs Committee at the time, Finn Hoc, has later admitted that rumors to this effect, which later proved to be false, were circulated, but finds they were of much less importance than the general fear that spread in the West 7 6 because of what happened in Czechoslovakia.

While the general political atmosphere at the time of the coup in Czechoslovakia and later in the spring of

1948 may have appeared frightening and can explain many m easu res, i t s t i l l i s not clear why rumors of imminent danger to Norway found much more credence than sim ilar rumors in Sweden, for instance, and why they evidently played a prominent role a year later during the decision to

e n te r NATO.

A Norwegian professor, Johan Vogt, writes about his

experiences in this regard in the spring of 1948 and 154 concluded that: "We now know that these rumors originated 7 7 78 in Washington.M His source was William L. Shirer.

After investigations in Oslo ana Washington, Shirer had come to the conclusion that:

Our timely and effective intervention in Scandinavian affairs on this occasion had been preceded by an in­ teresting incident which was not made known to the public on either side of the Atlantic. Shortly after the Soviet-backed communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February of 1948, the Department of Defense in Washington received intelligence that the Soviet Union intended to invade Norway over their common frontier in the far north. The information was promptly passed along to the Norwegian Government, which became greatly alarmed— especially in view of what had just happened in Prague.

Later it was ascertained in Washington that the in tel­ ligence was faulty and that in fact, the Kremlin did not contemplate an attack on Norway. The Norwegian Government was so informed, but it had been given a bad scare. Years later I found more than one highly placed official in Oslo, who in looking back, won­ dered if the United States had not exaggerated the Soviet threat for its own good purposes. So far as I can ascertain, the Pentagon at first fully believed its faulty intelligence and was considerably alarmed. In fact, it was one of the reasons, I am told, for president Truman’s urgent request in the spring of 1948 for a drastic increase in size of American armed f o r c e s ,

Another possible source of these rumors may have been an allegedly secret dispatch from the British Foreign

Secretary Bevin to Secretary of State Marshall in the beginning of March, 1948, to the effect that there was every reason to fear increased pressure against Scandinavia

and that Norway could expect an offer of a pact with the SO Soviet Union. 155

General Clay also, in one of his reports to the

Pentagon during the Berlin Blockade, mentioned the threat to Norway; on April 10, 1948, he told his superiors: "We have lost Czechoslovakia. Norway is threatened. We re­ treat from Berlin, when Berlin falls, Western Germany will he next . . .

The impression of danger to Norway thus seems to have been a widely-held notion in the spring of 1948. What dispatches and reports the Norwegian Government received about this at the time and what it estimated the danger to S 2 bo a year later is not clear, however. ^

The question of possible influence of outside pres­ sure upon the Norwegian policy-making process prior to the establishment of NATO came up for discussion after the elections in 1965 when the Labor Party lost to a conserva­ tive liberal coalition. In a farewell interview, in the

Norwegian National News Agency, on October 7, 1965, Prime

Minister Gerhardsen explained his policy of joining NATO in terms of the Soviet threat referring to Czechoslovakia.

In an answer to a question as to what he would say was the most difficult during his time in office, Mr. Gerhardsen

a n sw er ed :

The period after the coup in Czechoslovakia with direct pressure from the Soviet Union, threatening notes, threatening language in Moscow, dangerous demands. We 'were often in meetings day and night. I had then actually the feeling that it was a 155

question of Norway’s peace and freedom* Under such conditions, it is an immense strain to have the main rcspons ibility, ^

In a newspaper interview later, he explained that the io v ie t th rea ts a g a in st Norway which he had referred to were those known to the p u b lic — the Soviet d ec la r a tio n s 84 and notes* C r itic s have poin ted out that th ese came a year later. Soviet papers also joined the debate and maintained that the threats the Premier talked about in his

interview could refer to one thing onl^— hamelv, the dec! a- 35 ration by the Soviet Embassy of February 5, 19 49.

During the foreign policy debate in the Norwegian

Parliament, on November 9, 1965, Prime Minister Gerhardeen was accused of having employed rumors about Soviet threats

in promoting membership in NATO during; the National Tabor

Party Congress in 1949* He refuted the accusations:

I referred to the request of a Soviet-Finnish noa-aggression pact and said that there were dis­ patches to th e e f f e c t that Norway would r e c e iv e a similar request. This and nothing more was being sa id . ®

According to the record from the National Labor

Party Congress, Prime Minister Gerhardsen said:

In spite of the wishes of the majority in Czechoslo­ vakia even this country came under Soviet influence. I t was only natu ral that when we got the hews about the oppression of this proud people who for so long and so bravely had fought for their freedom and inde­ pendence, we felt that we were entering a new period of op p ression . I t made a serio u s im pression on a l l 157

freedom loving peoples in the world. What made us feel increased alarm was Stalin’s proposal to Finland of a pact. Immediately afterwards came the dispatches from abroad to the effect that Norway was next. This was not generally lenown, but where it was one thought came to mind: We had to seek security for Norway, support and aid where we knew it was effectively available, and that was first of all the United States and Great Britain.®7

The Foreign Minister has also been accused of having taken part in the fabrication and dissemination of rumors, and demands mounted in November, 1965, to clear up what foundation there really was in the Norwegian Foreign Minis- 88 try at the time for the evaluation of a possible threat.

In trying to answer some of these questions, Foreign Minis­ ter Lange, in an interview on Norwegian T. V. the following week, said there had been no report from American quarters

to the Norwegian Government about a concrete threat of

Soviet military action against Norway in 1948. Regarding

the claim attributed to author-journalist William Shirer, in

the above-mentioned newspaper article by Professor Johan

Vogt, Mr, Lange said his personal investigation of Ministry

files had failed to disclose any reports that would sub­

stantiate such a claim. He added that, following the coup

in Czechoslovakia, the Foreign Ministry was in constant

touch with Norwegian, as well as British and American diplo­

mats, about the tense situation. The gist of these evalua­

tions, however, was that Norway might expect a new Soviet S9 advance on the establishment of a military pact with USSR. 158

Lange confirmed in the interview that the more important information reaching his Norwegian M inistry during this period came from the legations in Warsaw and H elsinki, in 90 addition to Moscow."

Lange does not recall that any rumors or other un­ democratic tactics were employed "on the part of the majority*1 in connection with the Labor Party Congress where the decision to join NATO actually was taken. But he said,

. . . there is no doubt that a large number of the participants who had arrived determined to hold fast with the Scandinavian neutral line became convinced by the argumentation from the spokesmen of the cen­ tral committee and the Government.^

The impression of imminent danger may also have been a contributing factor for the rejection of the Scandinavian

P a c t.

VI. THE NORWEGIAN REJECTION OF THE SWEDISH OFFER

The fir st offer to Norway which would have- enabled her to increase her security came from Sweden. On Kay 3,

1948, the Swedish F or a ign Minis t e r came to Cslo on a p ri­ vate visit arid proposed to the Norwegian Foreign Minis ter

that Sweden, Norway, and Denmark "together prove the ways

in which the throe countries might give each other mutual 92 support, possibly through a defense pact." For the pur­

pose of keeping the three nations out of a future conflict,

Norway was, however, not willing to accept unconditional 159 neutrality in case of war as a basis for these inquiries.

Sweden wanted a pact "w ithout c o n n e c tio n s to any grouping 93 outside the North except the United Nations." Lange later explained that the Norwegian Government could accept

that the inquiry had no conditions but that some form of understanding with the West was reached* The Government could, however, dispense with the demand that the Scandi­ navian Pact be tied to the West through a formal treaty.

But it wanted to be sure that whatever we did in Scandinavia was understood and accepted by the West as a reasonable and purposeful solution from the standpoint of general security. That was neces­ sary if we would count on receiving the material aid which was needed. Beyond that we wanted politi­ cal backing against the reaction we could expect from the Soviet Union.^4

It is not clear when and to what degree Norway made

th is Norwegian c o n d itio n known to the Swedes. According to

the Swedish Foreign M inister's report on the negotiations,

Norway, as late as during the crucial Karlstad meeting of

January 5-6, 1949, did not reject the Swedish offer: "The

thought of an independent or alliance-free Scandinavian 95 defense pact was not rejected by the Norwegian side."

This rejection seems not to have been made clear until the 96 meeting in Copenhagen on January 22. But as has been

shown above, it seems clear that Norway from the outset did

not accept the Swedish proposal to investigate the possibili­

ties for a Scandinavian Pact without conditions: that Norway, 160 in any case wanted some form of ties to the West if not outright Western guarantees.

There can be no doubt, however, that the Swedish

concept of neutrality remained unchanged throughout the

negotiations. When Sweden appeared to abandon its policy

of non-alignment, to offer Norway and Denmark a defense

pact, it was, in effect, not a change in its neutral or

alliance—free policy, only an attempt to make sure its

policy was extended to the whole area. The concept of

"alliatice-free" when defined in terms of relationship to a

large power did permit a Scandinavian "alliance-free" pact.

This would, in the Swedish view, be an alternative neutral

policy but which might serve to restrain Denmark and Norway 97 from joining the Alliance of the Western Powers.

Sweden would never have been able to join a larger

power bloc in any form, not the least because of Finland.

If this had not been clear before, it was no reason to

doubt this after the Swedish Riksdag, on June 21, 1548, 98 explicitly came out against it.

The Swedish foreign policy has thus consistently

been one of "non—alliance*1 or "alliance-free" interpreted

by the Swedish Foreign Minister to mean the rejection of

any commitments to any great power or groupings, but com­

patible with an alliance with the Scandinavian countries

provided they accepted the same concept of "non-alliance,11 161

The Swedish Foreign Minister Und^n has later ex­ plained his concept of a neutral Scandinavian Pact in this w a y :

Such a pact can from one standpoint be seen as a deviation from neutrality since it would mean that Sweden, by an attack against any of the other coun­ tries' territory, would be brought into war. From another standpoint it can be said that a Scandinavian defense pact of this type means that all of Scandi­ navia is considered as a unit in relation to the belligerents .... If the Swedish government accepts the idea of a Scandinavian defense pact, a further condition is that the union stand outside the larger power groups in the world, and attempt, in case of conflict, to stand outside the war.

The Swedish offer of a mutual defense pact with its

two neighbors did not have any conditions except that it

was non-aligneoi • - ■in relation -» I + Ito any groat , power. 1 0 0

it was thought that the combined military effort of

the three countries would be sufficient to deter attack on

the Scandinavian area proper. That this area was not a

prime target and, thus, would have chances to remain out­

side in any renewed conflict between the powers appears

also to have been confirmed by the findings of the Scandi— 101 navian defense committee.

Experience of over a century had taught Sweden the

feasibility of avoiding involvement in war—by employing a

flexible neutrality and keeping a high state of military

preparedness. The powers had found no primary objective in

Sweden and -was deterred from involvement for fear of spread­

ing their forces too thin. Sweden calculated that this 162 would work again If the area could bo kept out of the big power alllan.ee system. An instrument to prevent this would be the creation of a Scandinavian Pact which also 'would add considerably to the m ilitary strength behind the traditional

Swedish alliance—free policy.

Norway, whose only major foreign policy experience since independence v/as the involvement in the Second World

War, interpreted this, officially at leas L, as a lesson which refuted the Swedish idea of the feasibility of neu-

sirc y.

j.avus, there was a clear and f undamon sal drzforcnce fa tween tlv_ Norwegian and the Swedish concept of the nature of foreign policy ana of the political reality is che post- i 0 2 war world."" Though both proclarmec the communecy or values among the Western democracies, Sweden did not let that become the basic for her foreign policy decisions.

While insisting on an alliar.ee—free course for Sweden, the

Swedish Foreign Minister explained that this did not mean neutrality in the "spiritual conflict between democracy and 1CP dictatorship." " but while recognizing her own ana Scan­ dinavia* a dependence upon the VJest, bvroden did not feci

that the fate of Scandinavia inevitably be linked to that of the West in case of war. Instead, Sweden sought ways to

increase the chances to remain outside in any now conflict bo tv/con the powers. Though an alliance with Norway in­

directly would involve Sweden closer to the West, she found 163 that this disadvantage- would be outweighed by the advan­ tages of keeping the whole area neutral and m ilitarily well prepared.

V II. A QUESTION OF AMERICAN MILITARY SUPPLIES

OR OF NORWEGIAN POLICY

By December, 194S, the Scandinavian defense commis­ sion agreed on the need for obtaining military hardware for t o r a y and Denmark in the West in order to bring th e ir ILQ'I defenses up to a comparable level of that of Sweden.

But an we ’nave seen, Sweden would not let this stand in the v,-uy of the realisation of the Pact. Because of Norway’s in sisten ce, on some t i e s , g u a ran tees, or at le a s t some form of approval in the Nest, it must have been this political problem for Norway that really stood in the way of a Scan­ dinavian defense pact and not the question of rearmament of

Norway and Denmark. But i t was on th is la t t e r m atter th a t the debate both then and later has focused as a major reason for the prevention of an agx'eement. How important this was we are prevented from knowing for certain, because as it turned out, it ’was Norway alone that was to seek an answer to this question in dashington.

When the three prime ministers met at Uddevalla, on

December 17, 1948, they agreed to meet as soon as the re­ port from the defense commission was completed according to 164

the Norwegian Foreign Minister, "to reach agreement on the p o l i t i c a l b asis for a defen se p act. As Norway had a l ­ ready made clear, she could not accept the Swedish alliance-

free proposal. She had thus made her d ecisio n , even before

the political discussions actually had started between the

Scandinavian countries, Besides, the rapid progress of the

Atlantic Pact talks made "the Norwegian Government take the

initiative to have the Scandinavian meeting pushed up tc 106 tne re ginning of February 134 9.’' Karlstad was set as

the meeting place. The main conclusions of the defense

commission ’would be available by Ll.cn evon if the official 107 report was not.

By that time, conditions for military aid under the

new ly-created American Mutual B^fcuiuc A ssistan ce Program

'.vac maoo known, and Langs has la te r explained th a t;

This was the reason -why defense m inis ter Ilaugc and I in our New Year interviews in Arboidcrbladet oxprocoed the view that the solution to the Norwegian defense problem must be found in solidarity with, the large Western ccmccracres* .a-uo1 0 P

This was clearly a Norwegian rajaction of the Beundinavian

L act and led to a question by the Swedish Prime Minister

Brlander tc the Norwegian i- rime Minis ter Gerhardsen whether 109 111ore now was any use tc meeting an Karlstad. For v;hat-

ever re as or., it was agreed to make an attempt to react.

Scandinavian agreement anyway. They met on January 5 in

strict secrecy. 165

At the meeting in Karlstad which lasted two days,

Norway maintained that the pact

. . . at least in reality had to be tied to the West iii solidarity against the Soviet Union. To fill the power vacuum the three countries could not manage alone and thus needed help from the Western democra­ cies. To get this it was necessary to give assur­ ances of solidarity beyond those given in the UN.-*-0

The Danes agreed that it was necessary" to obtain aid in the

West, but agreed with Sweden on the main question; they

thought that if the three countries stood together and pre­

sented this common viewpoint, for the Western powers, "we would obtain the understanding and support we needed without t i l having to take on any added obligations.’1’

It appears also from this that the problem of whether

or not military hardware could be purchased in the West was

a decisive question. Sut for Norway, the refusal of the

United States to deliver hardware to a neutral pact could

bo taken as disapproval of a Scandinavian Pact and, thereby,

the pact did not fu lfill the Norwegian condition. 'Whether

or not the three countries together might be able to obtain

the desired arms deliveries was thus not relevant any

longer. Norway officially held to the view that the Ameri­

can statement on conditions for arms deliveries had to be

taken at face value and concluded from thin that a pact was 112 no longer possible. The Swedish and Danish argument was

that, if the United States faced the accomplished fact of a 113 Scandinavian Pact, weapons would be forthcoming anyway- 166

This majr have been a correct asessmont but it was, as we have seen, irrelevant,

Norway also disagreed tc present a united front be­ cause, as Lange has explained, the main concern was not the matter of arms to the Scandinavian Pact, but Norway’s rela­ tionship to the West:

It would be irresponsible to follow the line that was determined in Karlstad; to decide on the pact first, and then make a representation to the West. If then as it was indicated, they turned down our request for political material support and thereby ruined the foundation for the proposed Scandinavian defense pact, this would create an atmosphere in. Norway directed against the W est--against those that were our friends.

When this position was presented in the next Scan­ dinavian meeting in Copenhagen on January 22 , it resulted in "deep disapocintment in the Swedish as well as the 115 Danish delegation," Lange was then, as he later ex­ plained, strengthened in his impression that:

The Swedes had their concept cf a defense coopera­ tion so closely tied to that of neutrality that it would be impossible to bridge the gap to the Nor­ wegian position, °

Critics have maintained that this Swedish concept of a

Scandinavian defense cooperation had been clear from the start and that it was Nonray that, in Copenhagen, made its stand clear for the first time.

It was agreed to meet again in Oslo in a week but

", * ■ nobody really believed it would be possible to reach 167 117 an agreement on a defense pact," Thus, the meeting in

Oslo, January 29 and 30, was nothing but a summing up of the respective national positions. The reason given by

Lange f o r r e j e c t i n g th e n eutral line was that: it w ould not work in Denmark and Norway because they were of such stra­ tegic importance and that none of the two countries would on their own be able to keep a defense strong enough to resist aggression. He finds that;

Both in Denmark and in Norway the war-time experi­ ences had removed the foundation for the belief that they could remain outside in a new war between the pow ers •

And points out that:

Already during the war a part of Danish territory, Greenland, had become an important base for the US airforce, and the treaty about this had not been terminated after the war. There was no such tie in Norway, but the concept of the last century about the "conflict of interest between large and sma"* 1 states” had through the fight against the totali­ tarian nanism been replaced by "solidarity between the democratic states” the only thing that could protect against new totalitarian aggression,

But Denmark it seems was in a different position and did not reject the Swedish concept of a poet. During the war, Denmark had looked forward to closer Scandinavian cooperation, much more so than Norway and was not the least, b e c a u se o f th e n atu re o f i t s economy, much le s s con cern ed about the long-term effects of an alliance with Sweden. 168

Lange has made the interesting revelation that, during the end or the Scandinaviar: negotiations, the Danish standpoint which in itially agreed with the Norwegian view of the conditions for increased military preparedness had

"changed over and given the effort to consolidate and ox- 119 panu Scandinavian cooperation decisive priority." This means that Norway, toward the end of the negotiations, was isolated even regarding the question of military supplies.

The reason then for the failure of Norway to join the other

two countries, according to Lange, was:

For the responsible spokesmen in the Government and the Party in Norway, the thought of Nordic coopera­ tion! did not have so strong appeal that it could outweigh the risks, Vic estimated the risk in a free and independent Scandinavian defense pact to be bigger than in association w ith the Western defense system. 'We saw also in this wider form of coopera­ tion more possibilities to contribute to the preven­ tion of war than we saw in an alliance.-!rce Scandi­ navian Lnion.

Thu alleged Swedish conditions of extensive rearma­ ment in Norway were refuted by the Swedish Prime M inister,

j. ag c Liluw^,.. , ouemg the Luuui ear ■—-e wucional n g4 - e ■. ■ n .

1949. The- Swedish offer of a pact did not i.avo such condi­

tion.:- :

I v/ant . . . first to emphatic^ that the Sv/cdir,h of f or a t K arls tad was made w it h o u t c o n d i t i o n .- . A defense pact was oifared from Sweden to b e e f f e c t i v e immediately and no conditions ware made as to Am eri­ can weapon.a uolxvery * A d'-cision as so the grauu^l rearmament o f Norway and Denmark according to t h e ir economic ability was desired, however .... Our N orw egian friends maintained t h a t th e possibilities 169

of Norwegian rearmament with their own resources were very small, and that for this reason, but above all because of the desirability of having American ap­ proval for the defense pact, it was desired that Norway and Denmark rearm with American aid even if the pact was alliance-free and had as its purpose to avoid war. In Sweden, we accepted this Norwegian demand. V/e were therefore quite astounded when dur­ ing the meeting in Copenhagen it ’was asked from the Norwegian side if American weapons deliveries was an absolute condition for the Swedish offer of a pact. We had originally accepted the American weapons deliveries as a concession to Norway. After this reply from us the Norwegians did not return to the question, and for that reason I got the impression that this was of rathec theoretical interest. There were, however, those in the Swedish delegation that wanted the matter cleared up. Thus the question was taken up in the Government where hence it was unani­ mously declared that the Swedish offer had no condi­ t i o n s .1 2 1

In a newspaper interview, in 1906, Erlander answered

" i i r i unequivocal no” to the question as to whether the

Swedes set conditions for Norwegian and Danish rearmament, and that this was decisive for the break in the negotia­ tions. He said that

. . . the idea came up in the Scandinavian defense committee but for the Swedish Government a promise to work toward a strengthening of the Norwegian and Danish defenses was all that was desired. This was "3 **) ^ not the reason for the break in the talks.

To the question as to whether Sweden had any objection to obtaining weapons from tire United States for such a pact,

Erlander answered:

That depends what is meant by military aid. Sweden has throughout the post-war period purchased m ili­ tary material on the world market not at least from the United States. The same rul^,would of course apply to a Nordic defense pact. 170

At the same time, Lange explained his side of the story

th is way: It has been, maintained that the informat ion given by prime minister Erlander during his address to the national convention about the Swedish governmentts position during the defense negotiations, brought up a new point which had not been brought out by the Norwegian government* Erlander pointed to that the Swedish government p r io r to th e m eetin g in O slo on January 29 and 30, had decided not to make it a Swedish condition for a pact, that Norway and Denmark rapidly increase their m ilitary preparedness tc the level of that of Sweden. It was sufficient to have a pledge by the two countries to be willing to soon strengthen their defenses* The important point for the Norwegian government was that we thought it to be irresponsible from the viewpoint of Norwegian security interests to enter a pact which would not be able rapidly to f ill the power-political vacuum in the North. It could not be done by a pact between a military strong Sweden and such m ilitary weak partners as Norway and Denmark. What could give Nor­ way in its exposed strategic position, the security it needed, was that it was made clear to all that a move against Norway' would be met by the total power of the Western Alliance. ^

Here again, it seems that the question of arms was of deci­

sive importance* The crucial point tc be made is that, in

spite of the fact that the Swedish offer was without con­

ditions, Norway could not accept it because Norway had from

the start decided that it would net adopt the alliance-free

Swedish foreign policy. As has already been pointed out

above, it seems that this Swedish concept of the Scandi­

navian Pact was clear a ll along. Perhaps Sweden made a

major concession in not making public that this was the

agreed basis for the inquiry. 171

VIII. CONCLUSION

The Scandinavian defense pact efforts were of great interest to the powers who displayed their concern in vari­ ous way lest the Swedish effort should bo s u c c e s s f u l , b u t thoir policies seem not to have been decisive for the ou t-, come of the Scandinavian defense negotiations.

To the United brutes, a neutral and non-aligned

Scandinavia would v;cak.cn or altogether prevent the comple­ tion of a North Atlantic defense system, as envisaged. It would then only extend through Germany and Mediterranean curope and not include Greenland, the dal tic entrances, and the Norwegian coart. The Soviet Union saw in it a threat to the northern Flank. A Scandinavian Pact would represent a strong pull on Finland and thus endanger its coraon s a n i t a i r o .

Forcibly, the Uniced boater could have made the

Scandinavian Fact a reality if it had been willing to offer

Norvmy its approval of such a pact, which it was not. This was considered by many to be a mistake by the United States and it was possibly a disagreement in trio American Govern­ ment on this point.

It has also been maintained that the boviet Union miscalculated the results of its policies toward a Scandi­ navian Pact. This may be so if the Soviet Union, at the public pronouncements indicate, was primarily concerned 172 that a Scandinavian Pact would be realised only on Norwe­ gian terms and for this: reason concluded that she did not desire any pact in Scandinavia even if it should result in

NATO membership for both NorvJay and Denmark* What is per­ haps more likely is that the Soviet Union found the posi­ tion of Finland to be of greater interest to her than the position of Norway where she would have very lim ited in flu ­ ence on the course of events, anyway. Thus, in relation to her interests in Finland, the question of whether Norway 12 5 and Denmark joined MATO was of secondary importance. At least, provided that this did not involve any American bases in the area— a condition which it seems was clear already during the negotiations of the pact in Washington and about which Norway assured the Soviet Union in advance.

In spite of the interest they displayed, it seems that neither of the powers were decisive in the outcome of

the Scandinavian defense negotiations, however. The Soviet

Union had no power in the area sufficient to influence the outcome, and the United States did not seem to have employed any direct pressure vdnich it, undoubtedly, could have done.

It seems that the outcome was more than anything a result of the decision taken in Norway to join the 'Test— an oppor­

tunity that presented itse lf when the United States decided

to engage itself in the consolidation of Western Europe and

to form NATO. It must also be recalled that Scandinavia _ 173 was an area of secondary importance to the powers in rela­

tion to Central Europe; their policies must be seen in

light of the struggle for the future of Germany.

Historical and other conditions might have appeared

f a v o r a b le fo r a Scandinavian defense pact when the Scan­

dinavian countries agreed to explore that possibility

to g e th e r , but dorway had, at that time, already departed

from tile traditional neutral line and had decided to join

the W est. While Sweden s t i l l h e ld that her primary

national foreign policy o b j e c t iv e War to ansure that the

country had optimal chance of avoiding a new war, Horway

rue1 h er dcs t i ry as inevitably tied to the preservation of

tin, i.itegrity of the Wes tarn World as a w h o le . The problem

for her, it rcorns, was not so much any longer to stay out­

side any possible future war, but tc be :.:urc to e n te r the

'.vcr ter: i Alliance cya ten in time. fhis was nst-- the more

Lurg^nc oy sne rtiyjrus acii ei r3mnj*non i d a n g e r u*cr ceb e ei

against Kurwuy itself, created by she events in Chechoslo­

vakia and rinland the year refote.

Sweden must have inter pro ted th'.ue events differently,

one cvrueutly uiu not see any em inent danger to ueuuumu—

v i e . c t li- r w ir e , how could she make hex offer of a pact

w ith twobadly-armed countries- • As the I’crvugiar. Foreign

hinisecr has revealed later, the dr.lied States shared the

Swedish appreciation of she 174

In retrospect it appears that the speculations in

Norway in Ih48 that Finland would follow the example of

C z e c h o s lo v a k ia w ere w ith o u t fo u n d a tio n , they were not

in comparable political situations and, as it turned out,

the pact which the Soviet Union made with Finland was of

an entirely different nature than the pact the Soviet

union made with the other East Suropean countries. Most

important was the fact that the Soviet Union did not have

any further strategic needs in Finland as long as Finnish

foreign policy respected the consequences of the defeat of

Finland in the FennD-Russian VTar. Czechoslovakia, on the

other hand, had an entirely different strategic location

in. relation to Germany which was the main political

objective in Europe.

The events in Finland and Czechoslovakia, together

with the Swedish offer of a Scandinavian neutral pact,

forced a re-evaluation of Norwegian foreign policy.

But no Scandinavian pact built on the Swedish con­

cept was possible^ Norway could net have hoped to change

the Swedish concept of neutrality which had been, sc

vehemently and clearly defined before and during the

negotiations. But in spite of the fact that the prerequi­

sites for a Scandinavian Pact never did exist, almost 175 continuous negotiations between the countries took place between September, 1948, and January, 19 49, C ritics have suggested that the reason why Norway engaged in the exercise at all must be sought in domestic political considerations, especially the opposition within the

Labor Party and the possibility this created for a Scandi­ navian Pact.

The American refusal to sell arms supplies to a

Scandinavian bloc, which by many is seen as a reason for failure of the Scandinavian defense talks, was, as we have

seen, probably not of decisive importance.

Sweden made it clear that Norwegian rearmament was

no condition for the pact to take effect. Besides, a com­ mon Scandinavian representation in Washington on the

question, it was argued, would have resulted in arms pur­ chases. One would expact that such a common approach would have been made if the question Df arms supplies was

really decisive, which it was not, because Norway was never

committed to a neutral Scandinavian Pact.

Subsequent developments seem to have supported the

Swedish argument that there were other criteria than

alliance relationships which determined the conditions for

American m ilitary aid. The American argument did not have

to be taken at face value it was argued. But this 176

question was really irrelevant. The question of material supplies only tended to obscure the real difficulty: the

Norwegian preference for an association with a broader grouping of states than a Swedish-dominated Scandinavian

b lo c .

It appears that it was Norway’s own preference, more

than anything else, that was instrumental in the rejection

of the Scandinavian Pact. Neither Soviet nor American

policy, it seems, would have been able to stand in the way

of a concerted effort by the Scandinavian countries to

create a defense pact. 177

FOOTNOTES— CHAPTER V

Henning Nilsen, Nordens Enhed qennem Tiderne (3 vols.; Kjtfbenhavn: Nytt Nordisk Forlag, 1938), I; Halvdan Koht, "Dei Nordiske Statane i Storm akt-spelet," Nordisk Tidsskrift. XXII (1946), 161-172; Halvdan Koht, "Den Norsk- Svenske Unionen, 1814-1905," Nordisk T idsskrift. XXV (1949), 1-17; and Koht, "Dei Nordiske Statane i Stormakt-spelet, 11 op* cit., p. 160. 2 Per Edwin Sktfld, "Den fasta grunden foSr nordisk samarbete," Tiden, XLI (October, 1949), 501.

3Ibid. 4 For a further discussion of the wartime Swedish proposals for a Scandinavian defense cooperation, see Karl Birnbaum, Swedish Foreign Policy (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute, "1962), pp. 1-5; and Charles O. Lerche, "Sweden: Neutralism or Neutrality?," U*.S. Naval Institute Proceed­ ings . 87:68-75, January, 1961. 5 A good analysis of Swedish foreign policy up to 1950 is found in J. Wickman, "Sverige och Atlantpakten," Tiden. XLII (October, 1950), 466-474.

^Only two Norwegian authors in the postwar period have, for instance, examined Norway's present problems in historical perspective with the problems of the 19th century: Johan Vogt, Russland og Norden (Oslo: Aschehaug, 1945); and Einar Maseng, Utsikt over de nord-europelske staters utenrikapolitlkk over de slste^Srhundrer (Oslo: Tanum Forlag, 19S4). 7 The noted Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal writing during the war about the irrationality of Norwegian foreign policy warned against having too great hopes for Scandina­ vian cooperation in the postwar world. Gunnar Myrdal, Yarning fair fredsoptimism (Stockholm: Natur och Kultur Bokftfrlag, 1944), pp. 342-343. g Sentiment as expressed by a prominent member of the decision-making group* Arne Ording, "Det Utenrikspolitiske Forspil," in Sverre Steen (ed.), Norges Kriq. 1940-1945 (Oslo: Gyldendahl Norsk Forlag, 1947), p. 51.

The same appreciation was held by the opposition as, for instance, Dr. Scharffenberg— a champion of a Scandina­ vian neutral bloc: "Norway and the small peaceful states 178 did not have any responsibility for either the first or the second World War, both equally unnecessary results of Large Power stupidity and lawlessness. Therefore the small states had no moral duty to take part in the war as a part of the large power action. They served humanity best as the refuge of nationality and humanity in a crazy world*" Johan Scharffenberg, Norske aktstykker til okkupasponens forhistorie (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum,~"l§50), p. 9. _ g This is a widely-held notion in Norway. 10 The question of Norway's qualifications is dis­ cussed in Mortimer Lipsky, The Quest for Peace, The Story of the Nobel Awards (South Brunswick and New York: A. S. Barnes & Co., 1966). He finds them wanting because Norway is engaged on one side in the cold war.

^See I. F. Ivashin, "The Periodization of the History of Soviet Foreign Policy,"International Affairs (July, 1958), p. 62, On the other hand, in the West, it seems to be a change in 1947, at least in the official interpreta­ tion of the relationship to the Soviet Union. This is seen in th e Truman D o c tr in e i n March and th e M a rsh a ll P lan in June, 1947. See Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade—and After, America 1945-1960 (New York: Vintage Books, i960), Chapter IV. 12 Discussed in Miloven Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962). 13 The thought comes to mind that the powers already before the end of the war against Germany may have agreed on the postwar shape of Northern Europe as they had in the rest of Europe, and committed Finland to the Soviet orbit and Norway and Denmark or, at least, Greenland to the West. Such an agreement could, however, hardly have been kept entirely secret.

"^Jfr., Innstillinq fra Undersdkelseskommisionen av 1945. Bilag I, p. 163. Scandinavian communists hailed the idea of a Northern defense alliance as a contribution to the policy of collective security. See also, Herbert Tingsten, The Debate on the Foreign Policy of Sweden. 1918-1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 3^3-337. 15 For the text of the Soviet note to Sweden, see Svensk Utrikspolltik under Andra Y&rldskriaet (Stockholm: Internasjonell Politik 24 Skrifter utgivna av Utrikespoli- t is k e I n s t i t u t e t , 1 9 4 6 ), p . 191. German w arnings w ere a ls o 179 forthcoming* The Deutsche Nachrichtsenburfi reported, on March 25, that Germany "had le t no doubt to exist that both transit of the British-French troops and an intervention on the part of the two countries in accordance with England's wishes would have been the fir st step in an extension of war, with unpredictable consequences, and would contain a threat to Germany from the North- That Germany was ready to react immediately was known to both these countries." Svensk Utrikspolitik under Andra VSrldskriqet, op. c it. , p . 245. 16 Lord Halifax to Norwegian Minister, see Innstillinqen. op. cit.. p. 227. 17 "To the Question of Federation of 'Smaller States, tir Izvestia. November 18, 1943. This article is reproduced in the information bulletin of Soviet legation in Stockholm, Nyheter fr&n Soviet Unionen. November 23, 1943. Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain at that time, Maisky, must have been mistaken when he told Eden, during the war, that "his government probably would not oppose a . . . Scandinavian federation which excluded Finland." Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins—An Intimate History (revised edition) New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 714. 18 P. Rysakov, "Northern Cooperation in Swedish Ver­ sion," Pravda. July 25, 1945. 19 —»■ — From Zyezda /Leningrad/, quoted by Ingnar N. H. DjSrferr, "Stalin's Nordiska Balans," Internasional Politikk /O slo/i No* 2, 1965. 20 P- Rysakov, "The Marshall Plan and the Scandinavian Countries," New Times /Moscow7. No- 8, February 18, 1948,

21Ib id. 22 In fact, on September 19, 1948, Moscow radio accused Sweden of having signed a m ilitary aid pact with the United States; quoted in an article in The New York Times. September 20, 1948. The report was categorically denied by the State Department, and Pravda of September 22, published a denial by the Swedish foreign office on such a pact. Reported in The New York Times. September 23.

23"Accord in Oslo," Trud, October 23, 1948, as quoted in extenso in Friheten. October 28, 1948. Also quoted in The New York Times, October 24, 1948 and New Tim es. October 2 7 , 1948. 180 24 "Accord in Oslo," loc. c it.

25I b id .

26 I b i d . 2 7 Utenriksdepartementet Pressetjeneste, Noraes Lin je (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1963), p. 39. 28 According to C. L. Sulzberger, writing in The New York Times, July 9, 1949. 29 For a text of the Soviet statement of January 29, 1949, see Utenriksdepartementet Pressetjeneste, ^0£ . c i t . . pp. 5 5 -5 6 .

30I b id .

31 I b l d .

32I b id .

33I b id .

34Denroark played no major part as far as the ultimate outcome of the Scandinavian crises was concerned, but her own choice was of considerable importance to both great powers involved, on the one hand, in view of Soviet inter­ ests in the Baltic area, and on the other, in terms of the availability of Greenland to the strategic planning of the West. It is interesting to note that Poland presented, in the end of February 1949, a statement to the Danish Foreign Ministry to the effect that Poland was gravely concerned, in its position of a Baltic State, lest the policies of the countries' "imperialist plans." 35 The theoretical foundation for the postwar American foreign policy may have been largely influenced by the analysis of the policies of the Soviet Union by the State Department expert, George F. Kennan. His argument was that the Soviet foreign policy was conducted on ideological premises and were expansionistic. See, George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1957). His first views were given in the famous "Mr. X" article in Foreign Affairs in 1948. 3 6 By voting UNRRA out of existence and introducing the Marshall Plan, the effect was to give the United States greater direct economic and political control in Europe, at 181 least these were the foreseeable consequence of this act, and thus it can reasonably be presumed that such were also the intention. The Norwegian fishing industry had been a supplier of food for the UNRRA programs in Central Europe while, at the same time, Norway was a recipient of aid under that program. 37 The German question also in relation to the Marshall Plan seems to have been the dominating one. A precondition for German allegiance was her integration into Western Europe. A suitable vehicle for this was the creation of the economic cooperation by as many countries as possible in Western Europe under the Marshall Plan. This again was a p r e c o n d it io n f o r German m em bership in NATO and fo r German rearmament. 38 This must, however, have changed after the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb which occurred unexpectedly soon. It was then that the Norwegian base policy perhaps also became an important American problem. 39 The Communique is printed In Viktiqe Storpolitiske Dokumenter 1945-1950 (Bergen: Chr. Michelsens Institutt, 1950), pp. 116-117. 40 See, for instance, Lyman Burbank, "Scandinavia and NATO," Current H istory. Vol. XXIII, No. 131 (July, 1952), p p . 2 0 - 2 3 . 41 B rita Skottsberg Ahman, "Scandinavian Foreign Policy: Past and Present," Scandinavia Between East and West (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950), edited by Henning F riis, pp. 2 56-305. Franklin D, Scott, The United States and Scandinavia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 305. The Soviet version can be found in the editorial, "How the Scandinavian Countries were Dragged into the North Atlantic Pact," New Times ^/Moscow/ (May, 1949), pp. 132-135.

^W ilhelm Munthe Morgenstierne, "The Atlantic Pact, A Norwegian Point of View," Proceedings of the Academy of P olitical and Social Science. Vol. XXIII, No. 3 (May, 1949), p . 1 0 3 .

4^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Vol. II, Years of Trials and Hope: Garden C ity, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), p. 246.

44Ibid., p. 248. 182 45 Halvard Lange, "Forhand 1 ingene om et Skandinavo.sk Forsvarsforbund,M Arbeiderbladet /0slo"7, October 13, 1966, p. 1 0 . ”

46I b id . 47 The New York Times, January 8, 1949. 48 James Reston in The New York Times, January 15, 1949. 49 Walter Lippmann in New York Herald Tribune. January 18, 19 4 8 . 50 Reston in og. c it. . January 19, 1949.

5]Tbid. . February 11 and February 20, 1949.

^2.Ibid- , February 11, 1949. 53 As expressed by a previous officer of the American Embassy in Oslo, it is an "important item in NATO planning." See Richard J. Kerry "Norway and Collective Defense Organi­ zation," International Organization. XVII (1963), 865.

54AlItidebladet. February 22, 1949.

^The New York Times. February 13, 1949.

56I b id .

^^Ibid. . February 16, 1949.

58 I b id .

58Pepartment of State Bulletin. Vol. XX, No. 507 (March 20, 1949), pp. 342-350.

58See Wilhelm Keilhau, "Britain and Norway: A Survey of Mutual Relations," Norseman, 11:6-7, January-February, 1953. 51 See su p ra .

8^More than any country on the continent, Norway can be called an Atlantic Nation, but to contend as Keilhau does that the Atlantic Pact was inspired by Norway is hardly in keeping with the political realties, Wilhelm Keilhau, "Norway and the Atlantic Pact," The Norseman VII (March- 183

April, 1949), pp. 80-85; On p. 80: "The Atlantic policy was in its origin a Norwegian idea. It dates back to November 1940. During that rather gloomy month it was put forward by Dr. Arnold Raestad, then governor of the Bank of Norway in London. He discussed it with his intimate friends, arousing real enthusiasm among them, and ere long it became an acknowledged principle of Norwegian foreign policy." But, as he observes, when the Soviet Union came into the war it changed and the support was now for a new League of Nations. Trygve Lie in a New Year speech to the Norwegian people over radio in 1944 said: "From the Norwegian point of view it would be natural to attach the greatest importance to an international organization, which later on might be supplemented by regional agreements." Norway's interests would be served best by agreement between people of North Atlantic Ocean, but, taking care not to alienate the Soviet U nion. 63 Gunnar Jahn ( e d .) , N orges Bank alennom 150 &r (Oslo: Norges Banks Seddeltrykkeri, 1966). Not much is known about this period, however, and the documents concern­ ing the decision to participate in the Marshall Plan nego­ tiations in Paris would be of considerable interest for the history of postwar Norwegian foreign policy. 64 Halvard Lange, Arbeiderbladet. October 12, 1966.

65I b id . 66 Halvard Lange, Norsk Utenrlkspolitikk siden 1945 (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum, 1952) , p. 6Cf.

67I b i d - , P- 71. fifi Regarding the public debate in this period, this interesting study should be noted: Stein Seeberg, "En argumenta^jonsanalyse av debatten i Verdens Gang forah Norges tilslutning til Afclanterhavspakten" (Master's thesis, University of Oslo, 1962); a condensed version appears in a series of newspaper articles, Stein Seeberg, "Da Norge Dis- kuterte NATO," Aftenposten XVIII (July, 1962), 20. Tore Lindbekk, "Et kommunikasjonssystem under krise, en empirisk og teoretisk studie over pressedebatten 1947/52 om Norges forsvar—og utenrlkspolitikk (unpublished thesis, Institutt for Presseforskning, Oslo, 1961); Barbara G. Haskel, "The Attempt to Create a Scandinavian Defence Pact as Reflected in the Public Statements of the Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish Members of Government during 1948-49 (unpublished thesis, University of Stockholm, Institutionen for 1 8 4

Statskunnskap, Mai 1963) ; and Arne Olav Brundtland, "Hvor- for ikke Skandinavisk For svars for bund? , Argumentene slik de ble presentert i Stortinget ," Integnas j onal Politikk, Nr. 2-3, 1964, pp. 179-198. 69 Halvard Lange in a series of articles in the Labor Party organ, Arbeiderbladet. October 12-15, 1966, about Norwegian adherence to NATO has revealed his considerations in re-evaluating Norway's foreign policy. He tells of the impact of the coup in Czechoslovakia, the letter from Stalin to Paasikivi, and the dispatches from diplomats in Moscow, Warsaw, and H elsinki to the effect that Norway should be prepared to receive the same kind of proposal as that which had been received by Finland. 70 Quoted in "The Quarter's H istory,'1 American Scandi­ navian Review. Vol. XXXVI, No. 2 (June, 1948T,1 p.' 152. 71 Halvard Lange, Norges vei t il NATO (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1966), p. 19.

72Ibid., pp. 21-22.

73 Halvard Lange, "Norway's Foreign Policy and the International Situation," The Norseman. VI (May-June, 1948), p . 1 4 2 . 74 In Denmark, t h e r e was an a tm o sp h ere o f c r i s i s in the spring of 1948. According to a Danish Professor, Jttrgen Dick, in an article in Politiken on March 23, 1964, this was produced by a m isinterpretation of the events in Czechoslovakia and Berlin and by a dispatch from the Danish M ilitary Attache in Washington to the effect that Soviet troop movements indicated a danger tooDenmark. This inci­ dent is further described in Johanne Amlid's book, Ut av Kurs (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1966) in which she on p. 65 reveals extracts from a letter from Professor Dick about the matter.

7^jDagbladet, October 15, 1966.

75Finn Moe, "Hvem er ut av Kurs," Arbelderbladet. October 12, 1966. It is however possible that also the events in Czechoslovakia were m isinterpreted in Norway where the traditions were so strongly legalistic-liberal- istic. Soviet actions in Eastern Europe only solidified a control that already was established with the collapse of Germany. In this sense, the coup in Czechoslovakia changed nothing. In the words of two well-known observers: "The Czechoslovakian coup seemed to herald the threat of imminent 185 war, although there is now considerable evidence that war was the last thing Stalin wanted then*,r Morton A* Kaplan and Nicholas de B* Katzenbach, "The Patterns of International Politics and of International Law," The American Political Science Review, LII (September, 1959*5"^ 706*' 77 - Johan Vogt, Partisan pft Forpost—Leaender fra Vlrkeljqheten (Oslo: Pax Forlag” 1965) , p. 113. 78 William L. Shirer, The Challenge of Scandinavia (Boston and Toronto: L ittle, Brown and Company, 1955), pp. 15-16. In this connection, Professor Vogt, during the debate in Norway in the fall of 1965, asks: (1) When were these rumors conveyed to the Norwegian authorities, and what was the verbatim text of these dispatches? (2) When did the State Department in Washington retract them? Johan Vogt, Arbeiderbladet, November 12, 1965. 79 Shirer, op* cit-. pp. 15-16. But in a footnote to this, he writes: "It now seems probable that the Soviet government itself planted the false tip about a Russian attack on Norway in order to distract American attention from Greece, where a communist revolt threatened the inde­ pendence of that country. Incidentally, in answer to my inquiry, the State Department denies any knowledge whatso­ ever of the incident, though I am told on good authority that General Marshall, then Secretary of State, was fully aware of it. At any rate, it was confirmed to me by un­ impeachable sources in the Norwegian Government and by a trustworthy private source in Washington. In 1951, the Foreign Policy Association published a brief report on it, which, so far as I know, was never denied by the State Department.11 80 This incident is referred to in a publication of the officially-sponsored organization for support of the Norwegian defense establishment "Folk og Forsvar," (People and Defense), Kontakt Bulletin, No. 2, 1966, p. 9. 81 Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1950), p. 361. 82 On December 10, 1948, the Storting provided, upon Government request, another extraordinary defense appropria­ tion in excess of the 100 million ekstra appropriated on March 10, 1948.

83Arbeiderbladet. October 8, 1965. 186 84 Morqenbladet. October 10, 1965* 85 — V* Beresjkov, in Mew Times /Moscow/, November 7, 1 9 6 5 . Sfi Arbeiderbladet. November 10, 1965. ft 7 Det Norske Arbeiderparti, Landsmtltet 1949, Protokoll (Oslo: Arbeidernes Atkietrykkeri, 1950). Q O Johan Vogt, Arbeiderblade t , November 12, 1965; Sigurd Evensmo, Orientering. November 20, 1965; Ragnar Void, "Norge og NATO 1948-49," Daqbladet, November 10, 1965; Amlid, Ut av Kurs. op. cit. The theory that the rumors origin a tedTn Washington is presented in Vogt, Partisan p S Forpost. op. cit.. p. 113. QQ — Aftenposten. December 3, 1965; Mews of Norway ^Washingtqn/7 December 13, 1965. 90 These reports are not yet available. What they con­ tain would be of great interest in this connection as would be their timing and sources as w ell as the time for their retraction. 91 Halvard Lange, Arbeiderbladet. October 16, 1966.

92Ibid., October 13, 1966. This is also explained in the Swedish Foreign M inister's report of February 9, 1949, in N ils Andren and Ake Lindquist, Svensk Utrikspolitik efter 1945 (Stockholm: Almquist, W iksell, 1965) , p. 104. 93 Halvard Lange, Arbeiderbladet. October 13, 1966.

94I b id .

"unden's report in Andren, cit.. p. 108.

96Ib id .

97H. Wigfors, "Sweden and the Atlantic Pact," Inter­ national Organization. No. 3, 1949.

go f f Unden's report in Andren, ££• cit. . p. 105.

990sten Und^n, utenrikspolitlska Institutets Kalen- darium. January 18, 19'49p". 43. (Hereafter called UIK) .

■^88The proposal may, however, not have included the Danish and Norwegian Arctic possession in the area of 187 defense covered by the pact as these areas most likely would be involved in conflict between the powers* Not much credibility, however, can be put in the claim made by John T. Teal, Jr., that "among the primary reasons for why these negotiations broke down was the refusal of the Swedes to include Svalbard in any such arrangement," p. 2 73 in John J. Teal, Jr., "Europe^ Northernmost Frontier,1' Foreign Affairs. January, 1951, No. 2, Vol. XXIX.

■^^Unden's report of February 19, 1949, in Andren, op. cit.. p. 108. Also discussed in Lennart Hirschfelt, Skan— dinavlen och Atlantpakten. De Skandinaviska Allians Fflr- handlinqarna 1948-1949 (Stockholm; Utenrikspolitlska Institutet, 1949), p. 30; Wickman, op. c it. . p. 474. 102 As observed by the Director of the Swedish Insti­ tute for Foreign Affairs, at the time: "While Unden had emphasized that Sweden by no previous agreement would lim it her right to stand outside war, Lange had stated that Norway, if war seemed unavoidable, could be induced to choose sides." Hirschfeldt, ££. cit. . pp. 8 ff.

^O30sten UndeV, Sveriges Utrikespolitik (Stockholm: Tidens Ftfrlag, 1948), p. ■ 24T.

^^Halvard Lange, Arbeiderbladet, October 14, 1966.

105I b id .

106I b id .

107I b id .

108 I b i d .

109l b i d .

110I b id .

111I b l d .

^^Ibid. Lange explained later that: "We had in the meantime found that the United States would give priority to aid to countries tied to her in a defense pact. This was considered in Oslo as a definite matter and we did not have any hope to have it changed." 113 Ibid. Lange himself has admitted that Norway alone held this view and that Denmark agreed with Sweden on t h i s . 188 114 Ibid, He said that not the least because of the Labor P a r ty Chairm an, O scar T orp, th e Norwegian Government delegation concluded that they would make adherence to a free and independent (free standing meaning neutral doubt­ ful as it was already rejected) part conditioned on whether it was in advance clear that the "political understanding and m aterial supplies from the West was forthcoming."

1 1 5 I b i d .

116 I b i d .

1 1 7 l b i d .

l l 8 i b i d .

1 1 9 I b id .

l 2 0 I b id . 121 The Swedish and Danish leaders were guests at the meeting. The minutes from the meeting are printed in, Det Norske Arbeiderparti, ojd. c i t .

^22Daqbladet. October 15, 1966.

1 2 3I b i d .

124Halvard Lange, Arbeiderbladet. October 15, 1966. 125 There is no reason to believe that a Scandinavian Pact is any more acceptable to the Soviet Union in 1967 than it was in 1949. An article in Isvestiia of September 9, 1966, by its Scandinavian correspondent, Juri Golosjobov, rejects the idea of a Scandinavian defense pact, but argues in favor of neutrality for these countries on an individual basis. Izvestiia. September 9, 1966, quoted in Aftenposten. September 12, 1966. CHAPTER VI

AFTER NATO: NORWEGIAN BASE AND ATOMIC POLICY

I . INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapters, we have seen that the first major change in the position of Norway between the

United States and the Soviet Union took place in 1948-

1949 with the inclusion of Norway In the Western defense system. The other major issue affecting Norway's relation­ ship to the powers since the Second World War has been the question of the degree of Norway's commitment to NATO—or more specifically the question of bases on Norwegian terri­ tory. This chapter will seek to come to grips with all the relevant aspects of this problem.

First, the initial decision and the subsequent re­ affirmations of the Norwegian base policy and related problems, such as the U-2 incident, will be examined. The status of Spitsbergen w ill be dealt with as a special prob­ lem within the context of Norwegian-Soviet relations. The problem of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory is also a special aspect of the base problem and will be analyzed together with the Norwegian reaction to the Kekkonen Plan for a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe. 190

IX . NORWEGIAN BASE POLICY

The Norwegian base policy was, as we have seen, laid down even before Norway officially joined NATO in an ex- change of notes with the Soviet Union in which Norway assured the Soviet Union of her intentions not to let for­ eign bases be established in the country in peace time.

These were reservations which the United States had accepted in advance and which were officially transmitted to the Soviet Union by Norway, in February, 1949, during the exchange of notes in connection with Norway's entry into NATO. These reservations have been restated on several occasions since then.1 The other major reservation Norway has made in NATO, but which in reality is im plicit in the first, is the ban on nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory, adopted unanimously by the Storting in April, 1961.

The base policy, as we have seen from the discus­ sions about Norway's adherence to NATO, was a condition which Norway made before membership. It may have been the concern for Finland's relationships to the Soviet Union and the effect any change in this relationship would have for the position of Sweden and Norway that decided the question both in Washington and Oslo. That the Norwegian base declara­

tion must be viewed on the background of the then recently completed treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland has

since been amply confirmed. 191

The base policy, undoubtedly, also can be partly explained in terms of the fact that public opinion in

Norway was not prepared to accept foreign troops or bases in the country. It was thus a matter of domestic policy, but closely connected to the new foreign policy. As one

sem i-official publication on NATO puts it:

There could be no doubt that the stationing of for­ eign troops in Norway would encounter strong opposi­ tion in wide circles. The government believed that this might create psychological and political d iffi­ culties which might undermine general support for the new security policy.^

When it was evident that Norway was about to accept an in­ vitation to participate in the concluding negotiations on

the Atlantic Pact, the Soviet Union in a declaration of

January 29, 1949, wanted to know whether Norway intended to

do so and if so whether Norway intended to permit the estab- 3 lishment of foreign bases on Norwegian territory.

The Norwegian answer was already clear; no bases were

contemplated. In discussing his trip to Washington, in

February, 1949, Lange later revealed that the United States

did not want any bases in Norway because of its closeness

to the Soviet Union and because they "did not think there

was any immediate danger of a m ilitary attack there any- 4 way." He explained that:

Through the contacts that we had had with the West during the last months we thought we could be sure that this standpoint would not prevent us from 192

adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty provided con­ ditions otherwise would permit it.^

Norway, in her answer to the Soviet declaration of

January 29, therefore, could reassure the Soviet Union on this point. The Norwegian reply, which is dated February 1,

1949, emphasized that it was not prepared to cooperate in a policy which had aggressive aims and assured the Soviet

Government that Norway w ill not undertake obligations to

"make available bases for the armed forces of foreign powers on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is not g attacked or exposed to threats of attack." This was the first formulation of the oft-repeated Norwegian base declara­ tion. There is definitely a commitment in it not to permit foreign bases in the country unless Norway is attacked or threatened by attack. But the phrase, "exposed to threats of attack" is a formulation which leaves it up to the coun­

try to decide when she wants to invite foreign troops into

the country.

It must be kept in mind that the Soviet Union had reason to be in doubt about the consequences of NATO member­

ship for Norway regarding foreign bases; there was general

uncertainty about this question. Walter Lippmann, for in­

stance, in an article on January 21, 1949, stated that the

Atlantic Pact would be more than a mere association, for to

Denmark and Norway it would mean deliveries of weapons and

". • ■ the development of Anglo-American sea and air 193 7 installations in Scandinavia." He had, in his column on

January 18, 1949, warned against provoking the Soviet Union by insistin g on having the Scandinavian countries included in the NATO Pact:

The strategic advantages to the West in case of war are evident. But what we have to consider, before we in sist upon them, is what Russia can do, and is likely to do . . . •

It is difficult to suppose that Russia will do nothing, once the Scandinavian countries have entered into ”collective defence arrangements" to create sea and air bases on the northern flank of the Soviet Union. For these bases would open the Baltic to allied naval forces and would advance the bases of allied air power very near to vital areas of the Soviet U n io n .

He finds that the obvious Soviet reply would be to invoke

her treaty with Finland and advance to the Swedish border g which he finds would not serve the interest of the West.

The Soviet reply to the Norwegian declaration on

bases appeared already February 5, 1949. It deemed the

Norwegian answer insufficient:

It cannot gloss over the fact that the Norwegian Government has not given a clear answer to the Soviet Government's question as to whether or not Norway's entry into the A tlantic Alliance will lead to her undertaking obligations in regard to the establishment of air or naval bases on Norwegian t e r r i t o r y .

The note reminded Norway of the special significance this

question has to the Soviet Union since the two countries

have a common frontier. It pointed out that it was the

Soviet Union that liberated Northern Norway in the last war

i 194 and that Soviet troops were withdrawn from Norwegian terri­ tory voluntarily, and earlier than the Norwegian Government itself desired. As proof of its good intentions, the Soviet

Union offered Norway a non-aggression pact:

If the Norwegian Government, nevertheless, doubts the Soviet Union's good-neighbourly intentions, the Soviet Government, in order to remove any doubt whatever concerning its intentions, proposes to the Norwegian Government to conclude with the USSR a pact of non-aggression, and thus put an end to all doubts.I®

The Soviet note was delivered on the eve of the departure of the Norwegian Foreign M inister for Washington and London and was not answered until some time after his return to Oslo on February 16, and after it had been de­ cided in the National Convention of the Labor Party on

February 19 and confirmed in the Storting on March 3 that

Norway was to adhere to the NATO Treaty.

During Lange’s v isit to Washington, it was confirmed that the United States completely rejected a Scandinavian

Pact without some kind of ties to the West, but Washington accepted the Norwegian conditions for entering the Atlantic

P a ct:

We did however clearly get acceptance by the Ameri­ cans for our conditions regarding foreign bases ^ be­ cause as he said/ . . . the possible Soviet reaction to the North Atlantic defence alliance had been care­ fully evaluated by the British and American Govern­ ments, who agreed to avoid challenging Soviet Union in any way. Therefore there were no plans for m ili­ tary bases so close to Soviet territory as in Norway, where they besides that did not expect any immediate danger of a m ilitary move.11 195

The Norwegian answer to the Soviet offer of a non­ aggression pact was given on March 5. It repeated the declaration on foreign basest

• . . . It therefore reiterates most categorically that it w ill neither cooperate In a policy which has aggressive aims, nor grant bases for foreign m ilitary forces on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is not attacked or subjected to threats of a t t a c k .

Then, the Government added this clarification:

It desires, moreover, to state that the appraisal of factors pertaining to a possible threat of attack against the country w ill in no instance be built on loose and provocative rumors. Pacts will form the basis for deciding which steps shall be taken in defence of our country, and it is self-evident that such appraisal rests solely with the Norwegian Government.

The note goes on to reject the Soviet offer of a non­ aggression pact on grounds that by adhering to the U.N.

Charter "the two countries have already pledged themselves 12 not to attack one another."

The Norwegian assertion about not permitting the

establishment of foreign bases in Norway has had to be repeated often. A notable occasion occurred when after the

d e c is io n t o e s t a b l i s h a j o i n t command fo r NATO in Europe,

the Soviet Union expressed strong objections. Such objec­

tions were also voiced vis-a-vis Norway. In a note of

October 15, 1951, the Soviet Government first took up the

question of Spitsbergen's status in such a joint defense

command, and m a in ta in e d t h a t th e Norwegian Government had 196 actually agreed to

. . . make Norwegian territory available for use by the armed forces of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc and likewise declared its willingness to place the Norwegian armed forces under the American com­ mand of the North Atlantic bloc, under whose leader­ ship and according to whose plans all m ilitary preparations in Norway moreover now are carried out.

Reference was also made to the building of "military, naval, and air bases on Norwegian territory, including areas in

North Norway abutting on the Soviet Union.'1 The note con­ cluded that Norway was pursuing a policy which violated the base declaration of 1949.^

Foreign Minister Lange, in an address on October 16, explained that there would be no change in the Norwegian base policy and that Svalbard would remain dem ilitarized.

The official Norwegian reply was made in a note of

October 30. It referred to a statement Defense Minister

Hauge had made in the Storting on February 21, 1951, when he s a id ;

The Norwegian base policy does not prevent Norway making bases available for Allied armed forces in the event of an armed attack on the North Atlantic area, or at a time the Norwegian authorities consider themselves exposed to threat of attack and summon Allied armed forces to the country.

Nor does Norwegian base policy prevent Norway in prescribed constitutional forms from entering into conditional agreements with our A llies, having a situation of this kind in mind.

Our base policy cannot prevent Norway from develop­ ing her military installations according to a pattern which w ill make them capable of receiving 197

and effectively maintaining Allied armed forces transferred to Norway in order to assist the defense of the country. Our base policy cannot prevent Norway from participating in joint Allied exercises or being visited for short periods by the naval and air forces of our Allies even in peacetime.15

These were important conditions giving the Norwegian base policy a great deal more flexibility. As it no longer has reference only to attack or threat of attack in rela­ tion to Norway but to "the North Atlantic Area," This was a consequence of the closer integration in NATO.

In a sharply worded note of November 12, 1951, the

Soviet Government expressed dissatisfaction with the Nor­ w egian answer and d e c la r e d th a t NATO's a g g r e s s iv e aims were evident . .in the setting-up of American military bases on foreign territory and above all close to the Soviet Rus- 16 sian border, including Norwegian territory." The Norwe­ gian authorities sent no reply to this note.

After the Lisbon meeting in February, 1952, when

agreement had been reached on jointly-financed infrastruc­

ture installations for defense, Communist newspapers in

Scandinavia reported during the summer that the United

States were going to obtain bases in Norway. According to

these reports—repeated in Moscow—a secret agreement had been concluded between Norway and the United States. This

agreement was supposed to entitle the United States to

bases practically all the way round the coast of Norway.

The Finnish paper Tvttkansan Sanomat of June 26, 1952, wrote 198 of an agreement which was to be implemented in three s t a g e s :

The third and last stage begins after the Storting has sanctioned the agreement. Large American con­ tingents of "fighting troops" w ill then arrive in Norway in order to be stationed in the strategically most important parts of the country. ^

In the press, also outside Scandinavia, there was IS lively speculation on Norwegian bases.

On December 28, 1953, Pravda reported that a Soviet note had been sent to Oslo complaining that the air base 19 at And^ya was being used by NATO. The Norwegian Foreign

Minister repudiated these allegations in an address in the

Storting January 16, 1954, and pointed out that Andtfya air­ field was a necessary part of the defenses of Northern Nor­ way and that it, in any case, was more than three hundred 20 miles from the Soviet border.

In the autumn of 1954, there were again rumors both in the Soviet and American press about the NATO financed infrastructure installations in connection with the deci­ sion in December, 1954, to base the NATO defense on the use 21 of nuclear weapons.

The Norwegian Prime M inister Gerhardsen made a v isit to Moscow November 10-November 22, 1955. On that occasion, the Norwegian assurances with regard to bases, it seems for the first time, was trusted by the Soviet Union. The policy was accepted for what it appeared to be and in accordance 199 with both the national interests of Norway and those of universal peace* "There are,1' it was said, "no longer any insoluble problems between the USSR and the Scandinavian 22 countries." The statement by Gerhardsen on that occasion emphasized, however, that there was no changing in Norwe- 2 3 gian NATO policy.

No doubt, this development must be seen in connection with the general thaw not only in Northern Europe with the return of the Porkala base and the Finnish membership in the Nordic Council, but also the development in the rest of

Europe.

Soviet policy with respect to Northern Europe was changed. The Soviet view of the Nordic Council, for in­ stance, had previously been viewed as a tool for drawing

Sweden into NATO. Now, it was seen as an organ "suitable to solve problems connected with strengthening the peace in the North."^4

In spite of—or perhaps it was exactly because of— the German membership in NATO, the Soviet-Scandinavian relations seemed greatly improved.

I I I . THE BULGANIN-GERHARDSEN EXCHANGE OF

LETTERS IN 1957

The tension following the Balkan and Middle Eastern

crisis in 1956-1957, also in the North, had an adverse 200 effect. As a first in a series of letters to heads of states in the West, Marshal Bulganin wrote the Norwegian

Prim e M in is te r Gerhardsen on March 22, 1957, demanding th a t

the Norwegian declaration not to permit foreign bases on her territory though satisfactory was no longer enough under present circumstances. The Soviet Union pointed to

"plans to locate special American units equipped with

atomic weapons . . . in the countries which are members of

NATO." I n s te a d , i t proposed a n o n -a g g r e ssio n pact and

suggested making a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe.

It seems clear from this and subsequent letters that

the question of nuclear weapons in NATO had caused renewed

concern in the Soviet Union for the security of her Northern

Flank. It is about this time that the concept of the

B altic as "a sea of peace1' or 11 the B altic peace zone11 is

introduced-

The Soviet Union wished, said Bulganin in his letter,

to raise the question of ways and means of developing fur­

ther the relations between the two countries. He added

that he wished to present his views with particular frank­

ness, since he addressed himself to the head of a Labor

Party Government. He dealt with several international

developments and mentioned:

. . . the plans to locate special American units equipped with atomic weapons . . . in the countries 201

which are members of NATO, and to equip with atomic weapons the West-German army ■ * . .25

Marshal Bulganin welcomed the Norwegian Government's previous assurance that it would "not contribute to any policy with aggressive aims" and would "not place bases at the disposal of foreign armed forces on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is not exposed to an attack or threat of attack." While welcoming these assurances, and noting with satisfaction that Norway had kept her promises not to per­ mit foreign bases on her territory, Marshal Bulganin added:

In the present situation this is not sufficient to solve the question entirely. For the first time in history Norway is in a military alliance directed against a great power which is her neighbor .... The fact is that Norway's territory is ready to be used at any moment by the Atlantic Pact forces against the Soviet Union, while there are today no foreign bombers on the airfields which have been built in Norway in recent years on NATO orders . . . the situation can change tomorrow . . . and one cannot avoid taking into consideration the lessons of the not-so-distant past. We are not calling upon your Government, either today or tomorrow, to renounce the North Atlantic Treaty although our attitudes toward this treaty which is directed toward the Soviet Union is well known, but the interests of both our countries demand that there should be nothing unclear or unspoken in important questions concerning Soviet-Norwegian r e l a t i o n s . °

In the passages that followed, the Soviet Prime

Minister gave a detailed exposition of his government's view on the plans to locate atomic weapons on the terri­

tories of the West European members of NATO. He asserted

that Norway was of value to the "Atlantic Bloc" primarily 202 because she had a common frontier with the USSR, and that

the leaders of NATO were not interested in "the fate that would befall Norway in the event of war." But, he added:

. . . the Norwegian people might have to pay dearly for the bases which are being built in Norway with foreign money, if it is NATO's, strategists' plans are carried out. The Soviet Union has no intention of attaching anyone, but obviously, in response to aggressive actions against the Soviet Union, we would be forced to undertake the most energetic measures in order to in flict a destructive blow against the aggressor and also against the bases which are located near our borders .... The destructive power of modern weapons is so great that the blow which would be directed against the aggres­ sor' s bases would inevitably hit much greater areas which would mean a catastrophe even for countries with a larger territory than Norway. Tests show that one hydrogen bomb can produce destruction within a radius of up to several hundred kilometres. One might ask what would happen if several such bombs were used . . • .27

After a statement on the Soviet Union's desire for disarma­

ment, Marshal Bulganin said that his Government regarded

the strengthening of relations with the Scandinavian coun­

tries and the maintenance of lasting peace in Northern

Europe as "one of its most important tasks," He continued:

With Norway we have a centuries old tradition of friendship and good-neighborly relations* In the not too distant past this friendship was streng­ thened in a common struggle against the Hitlerite in v a d e r s .... Between Norway and the Soviet Union there exist no issues whatsoever in which the inter­ ests of our two countries can collide. If there should be factors making for difficulties in our re­ lations, they are introduced from outside. I assure you that the Soviet Government sincerely desires to establish relations with Norway based on friendship and fu ll confidence .... An improvement in rela­ tions with Norway would in no way affect the existing 203

friendly relations between our two countries and other states—for example, Norway's relations with Great Britain and the United States ....

As you know, we have very good relations with Fin­ land. We value very highly our friendship with that country and its industrious people, the more so be­ cause there was formerly so much that divided us. The question arises: cannot relations between the USSR and Norway be just as good and friendly as between Finland and USSR?28

In the reply of April 11, 195 7, Prime Minister Ger­ hardsen repeated the 1949 statement on bases and said that he was "pleased to see that the Government of the Soviet

Union expressed its satisfaction with this statement." Mr.

Gerhardsen continued:

You say, however, that in the present situation this is not sufficient because, as you assert, Norway might, as a consequence of her membership in NATO, be forced to have foreign bombers, warships, and atomic weapons stationed on Norwegian territory against her own w ill and contrary to her national i n t e r e s t s .

Gerhardsen declared that this conception could only be due to a "misunderstanding," since it was "Norway's constitu­ tional bodies which, in the light of the existing inter­ national situation, will at any time decide whether our 29 country is exposed to a threat of attack."

The Norwegian Prime M inister further pointed out that the existence of large military formations, in general, and the introduction of new weapons, in particular, natu­ rally is a source of anxiety and uncertainty in all coun­ tries and that in this situation !'it must be the concern of 204 each individual government to ensure the defence of its country in the way it seems best," and explained that, in accordance with this, the Storting decided that Norway should have m issiles for use in air defense and short-range m issiles to supplement army artillery. Atomic weapons were, however, not to be stored on Norwegian territory.

Concerning the relations between Norway and the

Soviet Union, Mr. Gerhardsen pointed out that Soviet crush­ ing of the revolt in Hungary, which was an uprising of a nation for its freedom and independence, had caused a spon­ taneous and strong reaction among the Norwegian people and impeded a further development of the connections between organizations and institutions in the two countries.

Throughout 1957, the exchange of letters continued.

In one letter, Mr. Bulganin again stressed the consequences which atomic warfare would entail if United States nuclear bases were established in Norway, and said that:

The Soviet Government is convinced that if the Norwegian Government definitely would exclude the stationing of atomic weapons and their rockets from Norwegian territory this would be of considerable steps in the direction of normalizing the streng­ thening of peace especially in Northern Europe.’8

On June 6, 1957, the Norwegian defense minister told

the Norwegian Storting that the Norwegian Government had

accepted an American offer of buying American Honest John 205 and Nike Ajax missile weapons. These were m issiles that could take nuclear warheads.

In preparation for the Summit meeting, Bulganin, again In August and September, 195 7, sent notes to a ll West

European Governments. His notes to Norway and Denmark on 31 this occasion restated his earlier warning.

Shortly afterwards, in December 1957, the NATO coun­ cil decided to store atomic warheads in Europe for the use of the NATO forces in Europe with interm ediate—range bal­ listic m issiles capable of carrying these warheads. On that occasion, Prime Minister Gerhardsen, however, made clear that he disagreed and that there would, under no cir­ cumstances, be stationed atomic weapons on Norwegian terri­ tory. He said during the meeting:

In this connection I have to remind you that ever since the founding of NATO it has been Norwegian policy not to station foreign troops on our territory as long as we are not threatened with or subject to attack. We see no reason to change this policy. Neither do we in Norway have any plans to establish depots for the storing of atomic weapons on Norwegian territory or install launching facilities for inter­ mediate range ballistic m issiles (IRBM's).

The Chairman of the Norwegian Parliam ent's foreign affairs committee, at the time, thought that it was, no doubt, the possibility of disarmament and relaxation of te n s io n s

. . . which was in the mind of Prime Minister Ger­ hardsen when at the NATO council meeting in Paris in 206

December 1957 he advocated that nuclear armament in Western Europe should be postponed until the possi­ bility of reaching a certain degree of relaxation had been investigated. In this connection he men­ tioned disengagement in Central E u r o p e33 .

In a letter of January 8, 1958, Bulganin referred to the fact that Norway and Denmark "has turned down nuclear weapons on their territory, and that no such weapons are present in Finland or Sweden," and finds that this means

t h a t

. . . there is a basis for creating in all of Northern Europe a zone free of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which in turn might constitute a considerable guar­ antee for the preservation of peace and tranquillity in Northern Europe.

Bulganin did, however, criticize Norway for having accepted 34 certain types of American missiles for the Norwegian Army.

Similar notes were also sent to the other NATO nations con- 35 taining the idea of nuclear free zones.

In his reply of January 28, 1958, Prime Minister

Gerhardsen pointed out that m issiles of short range are

standard equipment in any army and said that it was unrea­

sonable to criticize Norway for having equipped her forces

with certain types of m issiles which could only be used

against an aggressor. At any rate, it was Norway's own

responsibility to decide which defense weapons she wanted.

Concerning Mr. Bulganin's proposals on the conditions for

changing Northern Europe into a zone free from atomic

weapons, he said, that it had aroused surprise in Norway 207

that nothing was said about similar measures in the part of 36 Northern Europe which is within the Soviet Union,

IV . SOVIET AIRSPACE AND NORWEGIAN TERRITORY

The U-2 and the R B-47 incidents of 1960 unexpectedly brought the Norwegian base policy to the forefront of Nor­ wegian Soviet relations.

The first specific reference to air flights over the

Soviet Union from Norwegian territory was in an article in

Izvestla on January 21, 1959, based on a report in a

Finnish communist paper. The article, entitled "Suspicious

F lights by American and British Planes from Norwegian Terri­

tory," contained a warning to the Norwegian Government con­

cerning the re-basing of British and American planes at 3 7 Bodrf. The planes originated in Great Britain and used

BodeS as a stop-over point. The Norwegian Ambassador to

Moscow was called in and warned that the American and

B ritish planes used Bodd airport for reconnaissance flight

in the vicinity of the Soviet Russian border. This was

regarded as a clear breach of the Norwegian assurances that

foreign troops would not be allowed to have bases in Norway

in time of peace.

Then, on the first of May, 1960, an American U-2

type reconnaissance plane piloted by Major Powers was shot

down over Sverdlovsk in the heart of the Soviet Union, 208

Premier Khrushchev first revealed the news in a joint meet- 38 ing of the Supreme Soviet on May 5, I960. On that occa­ sion, he made . • serious warnings to those countries which permit their territory to be used for aggressive 39 aims.11 Following Khrushchev's first statement, the

National Aeronautics and Space Agency announced that a weather reconnaissance U-2 plane was missing after the pilot reported difficulties with his oxygen over Northern

Turkey. Then, after Khrushchev, on May 7, in a speech announced, the pilot's capture the State Department admitted that a flight with an unarmed U-2 civilian plane had taken place "in effort to obtain information concealed behind the

Iron Curtain."40

In Khrushchev’s speech of May 7, he had revealed that the pilot was on his way to Norway and warned that cou n try:

From the rostrum of the Supreme Soviet we once again warn those countries that make their territory avail­ able for the take-off of planes with anti-Soviet intentions—do not play with the fire, gentlemen 1 The Gvmts. of the three countries—Turkey, Pakistan, and Norway—must be clearly aware that they were accomplices of this flight because they permitted the use of their airfields against the Soviet Union. This is a hostile act on their part against the Soviet Union. If the governments of these countries did not know—and I allow that in this case they were not informed——they should have known what the United States military authorities were doing in their territory. ^

On May 9, after the Soviet Union had informed the world of the p ilot’s capture, Foreign Minister Halvard 209

Lange, made a statement in the Storting to the effect that

Norwegian authorities knew nothing about the flights:

The Soviet Union, in reporting that an American pilot has been shot down over Soviet territory, quotes him as saying he was en route to Bod# air­ field. Norwegian civilian and military authorities have no knowledge whatsoever about this matter. Norway w ill take all necessary steps to clarify this question, and the Norwegian Embassy in Washing­ ton, D. C. has been instructed to take it up with the United States authorities. Norway has never given permission to use Norwegian airfields as starting points for flights that violated the terri­ tory of foreign nations. Allied planes, after advance permission have in some cases landed at Bod# to make reconnaissance flights over the Arctic Sea. But Norway’s condition for such flights has been that the planes must not violate the air space of other countries and ngt even get near the terri­ tory of foreign states.42

On May 13, Norway protested to the United States

against the U--2 rs planned landing at Bod# airfield, and requested all possible measures to prevent a recurrence.

The same day* a Soviet note accused Norway of complicity in

the United States provocative actions, warning that "appro­

priate counter-measures” would be taken "if similar provo- 43 cations are repeated from Norwegian territory." The

Soviet Union also sent very strongly-worded notes to

Pakistan and Turkey.

The Soviet note to Norway said that the confiscated

map showed the U-2 fligh t was to have terminated at Bod#;

and that, according to Pilot Francis G. Powers' testimony,

he had made an advance study of landing conditions at the

airfield. Previous Norwegian assurances, denying any 210 knowledge of Allied planes flying over Soviet territory from Norwegian airfield s, were branded as 11 attempts to pro­ tect Norway's partners in the aggressive NATO bloc and to 44 white-wash their actions*'1 The flight, according to the

Soviet note

. . • proves indisputably that the Norwegian Govern­ ment has not only failed to heed the warning of the Soviet Government, but actually has become a partner of the United States in its actions against Norway's neighbors.^5

The n o te c o n c lu d e s i

The Soviet Government finds it necessary to warn that if similar provocations are repeated from Norwegian territory, it w ill have to take appropriate counter­ measures* It is known that the Soviet Union has the means to destroy m ilitary bases used for aggressive actions against the Soviet Union, in case this should become necessary. Needless to say, responsibility for the consequences would rest on both the govern­ ments of states committing aggression against other nations and on the governments which participate in such actions*

Foreign M inister Halvard Lange on May 13, referring

to his statement of May 9, told the Norwegian Parliament:

Since I made the statement, it has been ascertained that the United States Lockheed U-2 plane, which according to Soviet reports was shot down over the Soviet Union on May 1, should have continued to Bodd according to plan. I have today summoned the United States Ambassador and, on behalf of the Government, protested against the planned landing at Bodd, at the same time, I requested that United States of America take all necessary measures to prevent plans for similar intermediate landings in the future.

As for the Soviet reaction to, the overflight I wish to add: We can well understand that the Soviet Govern­ ment is bitter over the incident. But I must protest against the threats against Norway which have been 211

made in this connection by responsible political quarters in the Soviet Union.

The Ambassador of the United States on May 19, called on the Foreign Minister, on instructions of the

United States Government, to answer the Norwegian Govern­ ments oral protest and to give assurances, as had been requested by the Government, that no such landings would be 47 made in the future.

The Government of Norway, in a note handed to the

Soviet Ambassador in Oslo on May 27, denied Soviet allega­ tions that United States Air Force planes are permitted to use Norwegian a i r f i e l d s fo r p e n e t r a tio n in t o USSR. At th e same time, the Government protested against Soviet warnings 48 about possible actions against Norwegian territory.

In the course of a debate in the Norwegian Storting on May 30, the Foreign Minister told Parliament that since the U-2 plane was downed over the Soviet Union on May 1, no plane of this type has been permitted to land in Norway.

In the future, he said, landing permits for Allied recon­ naissance planes will not be granted without special Govern­ ment approval. A committee of experts was set up to study what measures are required to enforce compliance with the 49 presuppositions applicable to landing permits.

Two months after the U-2 incident—on July 1, 1960,

an RB-4 7 based in Great Britain, in Brize Norton, Oxford­

shire,50 was shot down by the Soviet Union while flying the 212

Barents Sea. The Soviet Government claimed that the plane had permission to land in Norway. A note of July 11 accused Norway of being "an accomplice in an act of aggres­ sion undertaken by the American Air Force against the 51 Soviet Union," and maintained that

. . . the Government of Norway displays an absolutely incomprehensible complacency toward the United States aggressive actions against the Soviet Union and the consequence they may involve for the cause of peace in general and for the people of Norway in particu­ lar.52

The next day, on July 13, 1950, Premier Khrushchev discussed the incident during a press conference:

The question also arises as to whether credence should be put in the statement of the Norwegian Government, which promised in a note of May 27, to take steps to preclude the use of Norway's territory by the United States for purposes of aggression against the Soviet Union. In the light of the known facts, in the position of the Government of Norway is, to say the least, unwise, and dangerous for the Norwegian people.55

In the reply from the Norwegian Government of the twenty-second of July, the Soviet allegations were rejected as groundless. It denied that it had given permission for its territory to be used by the plane in case it found it necessary to land in Norway. No special arrangement was made for reception by Norwegian radio stations and no con­

tact with Norwegian radio and rescue stations had, in fact, 54 been made.

The RB-47 incident ended with a sharply-worded note 213 from the Soviet Union of August 10, which the Norwegian 55 Government did not answer.

To a question in the Storting afterwards, as to whether Norway through these verbal threats was in reality faced with the threat of an attack, the Foreign Minister replied that he did not think so. But then, he discussed the possible effects of continued Soviet pressure:

. . . the Government would make it clear that offen­ sives of the kind we have recently been exposed to, can result in a demand to the Government to recon­ sider whether our present policy, adequately meets the national security requirements of our country.56

It was, thus, in their internal effect that the threats were considered serious. The Norwegian Government did also appeal to the allies to show restraint, however. On Sep­ tember 13, 1960, the Prime Minister addressed the Socialist

Youth Association and asked that allies not strain the relationship between the Soviet Union and Norway by inci- 57 dents such as the U-2.

Undoubtedly, the U-2 and the RB-47 incidents did

strain the relationship between the United States and Nor- 58 way and did seriously best the Norwegian base policy.

There has, however, from responsible political quarters in the United States, been public acceptance and 59 understanding for the Norwegian base policy. As we have 60 seen, the Truman administration approved it. The

Kennedy and Johnson administrations also approved this 214 fil policy as well as the policy regarding nuclear weapons.

The Eisenhower administration, however, did not always approve, it seems. During the NATO council meeting in

Paris, in December, 1957, there is supposed to have been sharp disagreement on the issue between Prime Minister Ger- 6 2 hardsen and Mr. Dulles*

Also, in some military quarters both at home and abroad, dissatisfaction has been expressed. General Alfred

M. Gruenther, for instance, once said that it caused 11 con- siderable headache for the military planning in NATO.11

The domestic opponents of the base policy have argued that it makes it more difficult to defend the country if the bases are not manned by foreign troops already in peace-

. * 64 tim e .

V. THE REJECTION IN 1961 OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

ON NORWEGIAN TERRITORY

Though the Norwegian policy against the stationing of atomic weapons on Norwegian territory was implicit in the base policy of 1949 and in the later statements by

Premier Gerhardsen, it was never made explicit by the

Storting until much later when the plans for a NATO nuclear force were being aired. & 5

In a report to Parliament of December 9, 1960, on defense, the Government expressed the opinion that nothing 215 should be done to change the situation regarding atomic weapons on Norwegian territory— but emphasized that the country as a sovereign state at any time can reconsider its position if it so desires.^

But the report explained that the Chiefs of Staff had advocated the introduction of nuclear warheads for Nor­ wegian rocket establishments. The Government on their side, the report went on, had taken into consideration that the introduction of such weapons raised problems of foreign policy. The aim of Norway's policy and that of the NATO countries was to work for relaxation of tension and disarma­ ment, and Norway had tried to conduct its policy in such a way as not to increase tensions in Northern Europe. That was why she had sought to avoid any accumulation of mili­ tary potential within her territory, and the Government thought that the same argument supported the continued maintenance and development of an effective conventional defense. The report contains the following passage!

The question of adopting nuclear weapons in the Norwegian defence system concerns peace time. Allied defence plans provide that Norwegian forces might receive aid from forces abroad. These forces will.also have nuclear weapons for their own use and for use by Norwegian units in case conditions should permit the transfer of such weapons to Norwegian units equipped with the carriers for the weapons. Use of atomic weapons on Norwegian territory re­ quires permission by the Government.^7

The Government emphasized that Norway, as a sovereign nation, has the right to evaluate whether its defense 216 policy at any given time meets the nation's security needs under changing world conditions. Security measures, it declared, must, at all times, be based on an overall evalua­ tion of the international situation.

Conceding that the absence of nuclear weapons weakens defense in certain circumstances, the Government observed that:

Our security rests primarily on the fact that Nor­ wegian defences is part of a binding joint defence system which possesses the necessary military force, and went on to explain that it rejected nuclear weapons be­ cause it wanted to prevent the spread of such weapons. The report added:

Norwegian authorities are aware that increased mili­ tary activities in the North-Western part of the Soviet Union must be viewed against the background of the global balance of power. In our security policy, however, we have emphasized that Norway should not do anything that might increase tension in Northern Europe- Therefore we have avoided a military buildup.

This policy was finally laid down in the speech from the

Throne of October 6, 1961; it declared: 11 Atomic weapons 69 will not be stationed on Norwegian territory."

It was, it must be noted, in the midst of the crisis in Finland over the obligations according to the 1949 pact that the Norwegian Storting finally made its decision not to allow the stationing of atomic weapons on her terri- 217

In spite of the Norwegian categorical rejection of nuclear weapons, the Soviet concern over the effect of the

Nassau communique about the creation of a multilateral nuclear fleet in NATO had its effect also on Norwegian-

Soviet relations. The Soviet Union repeatedly mentioned the possibilities of Norwegian bases for allied atomic sub­ marines and over the consequences for Norway of the process of integration of the NATO nuclear force.

The Norwegian Prime Minister stilled, to a great degree, these fears during his visit to Helsingfors on

March 31, 1963, when he emphasized that Norway did not want to create a new military situation in Scandinavia and that 71 this included seaborne atomic weapons as well. He saidt

. . . Norway joined NATO in 1948 for reasons in political reality. Our geographical location, our economic interests and our whole political heritage make us feel as part of the larger Atlantic society. In this there is no negation of the Nordic feeling of solidarity. This is still a viable factor in the formulation of our foreign policy.

In the field of security policy this has perhaps most clearly been expressed in our base policy and in the attitude we have taken towards stationing of atomic weapons in Norway. We have concluded it to be in both our own interest and in the interest of our Nordic neighbors that our membership in NATO did not lead to any military buildups on Norwegian terri­ tory, In accordance with this reasoning our base policy thus means that we do not permit foreign troops in Norway in time of peace. This is a policy laid down already at the time when we joined NATO, and we do not intend to depart from it unless we are attacked or consider ourselves subject to the threat of attack. 218

We have looked at the question of permitting atomic weapons for the Norwegian defence in the same man­ ner. We do not wish that a new military situation is created in the Scandinavian peninsula and have therefore rejected atomic weapons in Norway. Our stand also means that atomic weapons carried by sea belonging to NATO or allied countries will not in peace time be permitted bases in Norway or in other ways be able to establish themselves in Norway or within Norwegian territorial waters. X mention this because in the foreign press there has of late been much speculation around these questions.

As far as we can see, the policy of the Nordic coun­ tries have resulted in a stability of our part of the world. There is today in this area established a balance of forces that take the interests of all parties into account.

I think in this connection also of our common larger eastern neighbor. During the present tense international situation this is both desirable and necessary if we are to preserve the North as a peaceful corner of Europe. Here we have a common goal. For it is a deeply ingrained tradition among our peoples that peace is the basic condition for natural and political freedom and cultural and social growth.

Our democratic Nordic way of life is impossible without peace. We secure it best by preserving the stability of our societies and in our mutual rela­ tionships. This is perhaps also the best contribu­ tion we in the North can make to the preservation of world peace.

That this declaration was given in Helsinki was no coinci­ dence; it must also be seen as a reassurance for the bene­ fit of Finland that there would be no change in the politi cal developments in Northern Europe detrimental to the interests of the Soviet Union. 219

VI. THE NORWEGIAN REACTION TO THE KEKKONEN PLAN

Shortly after Gerhardsen's appearance in Helsinki, during a meeting in the Paasikivi Society in Helsingfors, on May 29, 1963, President Kekkonen presented his proposal for the creation of a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe.

The proposal is related to the proposals made by the

Swedish Foreign Minister Unden in 1961 and the Polish For­ eign Minister Rapacki in 1957, but much narrower in scope.

Only the countries of Northern Europe would be included in 73 his nuclear free club.

The plan was acclaimed and wholeheartedly endorsed by Moscow as a great contribution to peace in Northern

Europe.

The other Scandinavian countries rejected the idea, though, to different degrees. The Norwegian Foreign Minis­ try on June 6, 1963, published the Norwegian position on the proposal. It referred to Prime Minister Gerhardsen's speech of March 31 in Helsinki and continued:

The North today is an area that internationally has achieved a high degree of peace and stability- The foreign and military policies conducted by these countries, that have created and still represents the basis for this stable situation, is recognized and respected by all countries. It must be in the interest of all countries that nothing be done to change these conditions.

The Government intends to follow this policy. 220

In its content the proposal by President Kekkonen is generally identical to the Unden plan. As the Swedish Government emphasized lately this plan was based on the assumption that a testban treaty had been con­ cluded. The view of the Norwegian Government is also that the question of nuclear free zones in Europe ought to find their solution in connection with the negotiations about a nuclear testban treaty and dis­ armament.*^^

It is noteworthy that the Foreign Minister brings in

the argument that the Scandinavian countries have, through

their policies, created a stable situation, "recognized and respected by all countries,'1 and that any change would undo what has been achieved. This was also addressed to Finland who, in the Norwegian view, did not serve the interests of

her own or those of her neighbors by promoting the elimina­

tion of the important element in the balance which the

Norwegian "conditional" base declaration represented.

After the Moscow test-ban treaty, the Soviet Union

and Finland maintained that some of the obstacles for Nor­

way's commitment to the creation of a nuclear free zone in

Northern Europe had been removed. But Norway did not, in

any way, indicate any willingness to reconsider the Finnish

idea.

During the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers Meeting in

Stockholm in September, 1963, a Finnish initiative to dis­

cuss the Kekkonen Plan was turned down by Norway, referring

to the tradition of these Scandinavian meetings that for­

eign policy questions not be discussed. Thus, there was 221 no mention of the Kekkonen Plan in the communique after the meeting.

The Norwegian Foreign Minister again, during the foreign policy debate in the Norwegian Storting on October

29, 1963, rejected the idea, this time also maintaining that nothing should be done to upset the equilibrium in

Northern Europe:

Norway is today located in an actual nuclear free zone insofar as none of the Nordic countries possess nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it is well known that our big neighbor has such weapons in great numbers. We have no plans to change things, but when we have been unwilling to enter a formal agreement about this state of affairs irrespective of a general international agreement about practical steps towards disarmament, it is because a part of the balance that has been created in the Northern area, is based on Norwegian and Danish rejection to binding commitments in this field.

The Norwegian, as well as the Danish view, is that

Northern Europe is already a nuclear free zone, and that no

part of Soviet territory is envisaged included in such a 76 zone. Such a pact is thus not only unnecessary but, in

their view, it would threaten to disturb the established

balance of power in Northern Europe, A nuclear free zone

must be extended to Central Europe and must be based on a

certain relaxation of tensions and a complete test-ban

treaty. 222

VII- THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OP SPITSBERGEN

The Spitsbergen Archipelago presents a special prob­ lem for the Norwegian base policy because of the strategic location of the islands and their special status under international law*

The status of Spitsbergen, which had been in dispute between the Soviet Union, Sweden, and Norway since before the First World War, was settled in favor of Norway during the peace conference following that war.

The Svalbard Treaty of 1920 which gave Norway con­ trol over the islands does, however, provide that the islands are to remain demilitarized and neutralized and gives all nations adhering to the treaty equal rights with 77 the Norwegians to exploit the resources of the territory.

In 1925, Svalbard became an integral part of the 78 Kingdom of Norway by a decision of the Storting. Thus, all treaties to which Norway is a part also apply to Sval­ bard, provided they do not run counter to the Svalbard

Treaty. The Constitution of the country would also apply in full in the islands. This decision of the Storting was later to have consequences for the status of the islands in 79 NATO. 3

On July 24, 1941, Svalbard was discussed between

Foreign Minister Trygve Lie and the Russian Ambassador to 223

London. Lie rejected a Soviet offer of a mutual aid agree­ ment. The Soviet Ambassador emphasized respect for Norwe­ gian sovereignty over Svalbard and assured him that the

Soviet Union did not have any territorial claims on Norway.

The same assurance seems to have been given to the British 80 Foreign Minister Eden.

Svalbard did not play any important role in the war.

The coal mining installations were destroyed and the Rus­

sian and Norwegian miners were evacuated in August, 1941.

A Norwegian garrison, supported by the British and with

British liaison officers, was maintained there from early

1942 until the end of the war. The Germans did, however,

simultaneously operate several radio stations on the 81 islands. As was observed by one expert:

Viewed in a broader perspective, Svalbard did not play any important part during the war. It was never used as a base— either by naval or air forces; nor was it of great value to the convoys sailing on North Russian ports .... If it had been considered to be of paramount importance, the Archipelago would probably have been fortified in spite of the hesita­ tion of the Norwegian Government; but the climatic conditions must by necessity greatly reduce the stra­ tegic value of the island. The stop of coal shipping did worsen the fuel situation in Norway, but it is difficult to say whether it hampered German naval operations in Northern waters very much. It should, however, not be forgotten that both the Allies and the Germans made meteorological observations of great value.

After the Russians advanced into Northern Norway in

October, 1944, the Germans were denied the use of their 224 83 airfields there and the danger to the Arctic convoys to

Murmansk were thereby greatly reduced. The only major

threat against the shipping to Murmansk was the submarines

based further south on the Norwegian coast. Shortly there­

after, in November, 1944, during the visit of the Norwegian

Foreign Minister Trygve Lie and the Minister of Justice

Terje Wold to Moscow, the Russians raised the "Svalbard

question1' for the first time. The Russian Foreign Minister

Molotov explained that the Soviet Union desired a revision

of the Svalbard Treaty. It was unsatisfactory from the

Soviet point of view, because the Soviet Union had not been

able to take part in the negotiations about the treaty. Mr.

Molotov said that when the Soviet Union had adhered to it

anyway, in 193 5, it was because circumstances forced them 84 to. The Russians held that prior to World War I,

BjpSrndya was considered Russian while Spitsbergen was no

man's land and proposed a bilateral Norwegian-Russian

treaty for the defense of the Spitsbergen islands, while

Bjdrndya was to be ceded to the Soviet Union. The condo­

minium would, according to Molotov, be based on the mili­

tary as well as the economic interests of the Soviet

Union, He explained that both the Dardanelles and the

Baltic entrances can be closed for the Soviet Union. Only

in the Arctic was there an opening which, however, as the

war had proven, is also vulnerable. In this connection, 225 85 Svalbard was of the greatest importance. Trygve Lie was, at the time, not prepared to discuss the Russian proposals, and referred the matter to his Government upon his return to London.

In its reply in December, 1944, the Norwegian Govern­ ment expressed willingness, on the condition that this was agreeable to the other signatories, to discuss an amendment of Article 9 of the Treaty so that fortification would be made possible. While this question could only be decided by the Storting and thus would have to be decided after the war, the Norwegian Government was now willing to start pre­ liminary talks with a view towards finding a solution which 87 would safeguard the interests of the Soviet Union.

The answer was, in fact, a promise to attempt to revise the Svalbard Treaty to the advantage of the Soviet

Union, but it must be recalled that, at this time, the

Norwegian Government was under considerable pressure be­ cause of the fact that there were Soviet troops in another part of Norwegian territory. The Norwegian tactic was, therefore, as Trygve Lie also reveals in his memoirs, to 88 stall the Russians until the war was over. When the Nor­ wegian reply was transmitted to Foreign Minister Molotov by the Norwegian Ambassador to Moscow, Andvord, Molotov re­ marked that the Norwegian answer though sympathetic to the

Soviet view did not go far enough to be satisfactory. 226

During the next months, until the end of the war, conversa­ tions between Molotov and Andvord took place In Moscow 89 about the Treaty*

The Russians finally renounced their claims to

BydrnaSya and, in April, 1945, there was an agreement reached. Pending consultations with the other signatories and subject to approval by the Storting, the Norwegian

Government decided to agree to a joint declaration with the following content;

The defense of the archipelago of Svalbard is a joint concern of Norway and the Soviet Union. The defense measures shall be in accordance with arrange­ ments which may be made by an international security organization of which both parties are members. All permanent installations shall be situated on land belonging to or which will be expropriated by the Norwegian State, With regard to their relations in military affairs the two parties will observe the principles of equality on all points. The two parties will make agreements on the nature, extent and equipment of the permanent installations and the composition of the forces who are to man them, on question of command, on war establishments, etc. The two parties will also make agreements on the distribution of the costs. As the means which safe­ guard the defense of the archipelago will not be used for aggressive purposes, the fact that the defense is undertaken in the particular interest of either Norway or the Soviet Union, will not in itself imply that the other party is to be considered a belligerent.

The two Governments agree that the abrogation of the treaty of 1920, concerning which negotiations will later take place, will eventually be carried out in accordance with the rules of international law, and the powers which in the present world conflict have fought against Norway or the Soviet Union or their allies, shall not be consulted on the abrogation of 227

the treaty or be invited to take part in negotia­ tions about the treaty.

According to the Norwegian Government, no joint declaration 91 was actually signed, however.

The same impression is given., in the memoirs of

Trygve Lie:

When Andvord received his instructions to convey this Norwegian proposal to Molotov, it was already April 1945. The San Francisco conference and the German capitulation set aside the matter for the time being.

During the Paris peace conference in August, 1946,

Molotov raised the question of Spitsbergen with Foreign

Minister Lange. When they met again, during the United

Nations General Assembly Meeting in New York three months later, Lange promised that the matter would be submitted to 93 the Storting* It was expected to come up early in 1947.

Again Norway stalled for time, however,

The United States, who must have been vitally inter­ ested in the status of Spitsbergen, was, at the time, engaged in securing her interests on Greenland where she wanted to keep her wartime bases that had been acquired through a special agreement with the Danish envoy to Wash­ ington during the war. It was, in fact, a similar arrange­ ment for Spitsbergen that the Soviet Union had requested from Norway. Greenland could be said to be in a similar position in relation to the North American continent as 94 Svalbard was to the Soviet Union. The United States had 95 early in the war stationed troops on Iceland, and estab- lished bases on Greenland, in accordance with the so-called 96 Kaufmann agreement.

The agreement stipulated that it should be discon- tinued when the parties agreed that the present danger to the American continent had ceased. When hostilities were over, the United States tried to establish a new agreement with Denmark to take the place of the Kaufmann treaty; but

Denmark wanted the United States to evacuate Greenland entirely. The American Secretary of State said about this:

I am informed that the Danish Government will probably publish either today or tomorrow the text of a note requesting the United States to enter into consultations in connection with the agreement regarding the defense of Greenland concluded with the Danish Minister in Washington on April 9, 1941. This agreement, at a time when Denmark was powerless because of the Nazi occupation, to act in its own behalf, made it possible to preserve Danish sover­ eignty over Greenland and prevent the Nazis from gaining foothold in the Western Hemisphere. The 1941 agreement was unanimously ratified by the Danish Parliament following the liberation of Den­ mark in 1945 .... We have informed the Danish Government that, as stated by Secretary Byrnes to the Danish Foreign Minister in December 1946, we . . some new agree

Though the question of Greenland was not then settled to the

satisfaction of the United States, American troops remained

on the island. 229

On September 2, 1947, Greenland was placed within the Western Hemisphere Security Zone as stipulated in Arti­ cle 4 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assist- 98 ance. The United States found it necessary, however, to add in a statement to the treaty that

. . . the United States of America wishes to record its position that the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro has no effect upon the sovereignty, national or inter­ national status of the territories included in the region defined in Article 4 of the Treaty.

When the Russians publicly opened the Svalbard issue again in a communique of January 11, 1947, the Norwegian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a summary of the nego­ tiations with the Soviet Union about Spitsbergen during

1944-1945,and a lively public debate ensued. In the

Russian press, the American expansion in the Arctic was held up as one of the reasons for the Russian interest in

Svalbard. It was again ascertained that the status of

Spitsbergen had been settled without Soviet participation or consent and that the Svalbard Treaty fails to recognise

Soviet interests. That By^rndya prior to 1920 was consid- 101 ered Russian territory was also mentioned.

This time the United States also publicly expressed 102 its interest in the question. The cold war had already started and Svalbard was a pawn in it*

It has been suggested by one author that the Norwe­ gian Government had initially gone further in expressing 230 its willingness to accommodate the Soviet Union regarding

Svalbard than they could stand by in a political situation 103 as it prevailed when the issue came to a head. What

Norway did, however, was dictated by the military situation in Northern Norway at the time. Only later could the

Soviet requests be safely rejected.

Thus, meeting in secret session on February 15,

1947, the Storting» by a vote of 101 to 11, turned down the

Soviet request in a resolution embodying the revised Norwe­ gian views regarding joint Norwegian-Soviet defense of the island. The conditions, which had earlier prompted the joint wartime declaration in which defense of Svalbard was described as a joint concern of the two countries, were recognised in the resolution. It continued to note, how­ ever, that those conditions had changed after the war; not least as a result of the resolution of the United Nations with regard to disarmament which was initiated by the

Soviet Union.

Regarding joint Norwegian-Soviet defense of the island, the resolution noted that

. . . opening of negotiations of a military character with any single foreign power concerning the defense of a region under Norwegian sovereignty would be contrary to the foreign policy which the Government In concert with the Storting has since the libera­ tion. 104

What the Soviet Union, in fact, did in 1947 was to apply the rebus sic stantibus clause; because of the 231 weakened position after war and revolution, the Soviet

Union had to adhere to the Svalbard Treaty, but did not denounce the Treaty in spite of the Norwegian rejection of the Soviet proposals, some of which Norway had been very close to accepting if not actually accepting. Norway did, however, get a warning about how important the Soviet Union considered its strategic interests in the Arctic, including the Spitsbergen, to be.

After the Norwegian rejection of the revision of

Spitsbergen's status, and when by the Danish-American

Treaty of 1951, the Soviet attempts to prevent the further

American involvement on Greenland failed, the Soviet Union could now only concentrate on preventing the military use 105 of Spitsbergen by the West.

While the United States became only indirectly in­ volved on Spitsbergen through Norway's participation in

NATO, the USSR was actually and physically present in the 1 OS area based on their mining operations. In 1951, Sval­ bard and the Bear Island were -integrated into the NATO defense system and placed under the Supreme Allied Comman- 107 der Atlantic. In the Norwegian Government’s proposition to the Storting about Norway's approval of the establishment of the North Atlantic Command, it was also mentioned that the defense of Svalbard and Jan Mayen would be the respon- 103 sibility of this command. 232

It was not unexpected, therefore, that the Soviet

Union again brought up the status of Spitsbergen in a note to Norway of October 15, 1951. The note was a strongly- worded protest referring to the decision of January 19,

1951, to place Spitsbergen and BytfrntfJya under NATO and the

"large scale measures tending to implement the aims hostile to the Soviet Union, of the Atlantic Pact." It charged that Spitsbergen and Bear Island had been placed "under the competence of the North Atlantic Command" and that the islands were being used as NATO naval bases. As in 1947, the strategic importance of the islands for the Soviet

Union was emphasized. The note also protested against the construction of military bases in Northern Norway and 109 warned against the "consequences of such a policy."

This was the first of a series of exchanges of notes which also clarified the Norwegian position on foreign bases, in general.

The Norwegian Government in its reply of October 30, to the Soviet note, stressed that the creation of a common command system for NATO in no way altered the defensive character of the North Atlantic Pact and had no consequence for the question of bases. In the Norwegian note, the

Soviet Union was given the following assurance about

Spitsbergen: 233

By virtue of her sovereignty over these areas, Nor­ way will safeguard all her legitimate interests on Spitsbergen and the Bear Island, and will protect the status of the islands under the Treaty. She is confident that all other states bound by the Treaty similarly adhere strictly to their obligations. HO

The Norwegian answer resulted in a sharp Russian reply. In a note of November 12, 1951, the Soviet Union contended that the very fact that Svalbard was placed under the North Atlantic Command was in itself a violation of the demilitarization clauses of the Treaty of 1920 and incom­ patible with Norway's obligation under that Treaty.

There never appeared a formal answer to the latest

Soviet note, but the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard

Lange, declared in the Norwegian Storting that there had been no violation of the Svalbard Treaty and that no action was being contemplated that might involve such a viola- , . 112 tion*

Soviet protests about the status of Svalbard have

since then involved installations of allegedly military

value.

In a note of November 29, 1958, the Soviet Union

protested proposals which had been discussed in the press,

of possible airfield construction on Spitsbergen:

The assertions of the Norwegian side that the airfield on Spitsbergen would allegedly be purely civilian in purpose are not convincing and cannot dispel the apprehensions of the Soviet Union that this airfield could be utilized for the aggressive aims of the North Atlantic bloc.1!3 234

Both in the Norwegian reply of January 10, 1959, and in a speech by the Foreign Minister on January 27, 1959, it 114 was denied that such plans existed.

Another exchange of notes between the Soviet Union and Norway took place in October-November, 1960, again con­ cerning renewed reports about airfield construction on the island. Both Norwegian and British papers, in September,

1960, had carried reports alleging that an expedition under

the leadership of a Norwegian Lieutenant Colonel, G* S.

Petersen, but financed from the United States, in the summer

of 1959, had made extensive surveys of the possibility of

constructing airfields for heavy jet bombers in Spits- 115 bergen.

The avowed purpose of the expedition was scientific

research. The Russian note of October 26, 1960, p r o te s te d

such activities, asked the Norwegian Government to either

confirm or deny them, and concluded:

The Soviet Government cannot ignore reports on American-Norwegian cooperation in building airfields on Spitsbergen, which is close to the northern fron­ tiers of the Soviet Union, especially in view of recent events involving the intrusion of American military reconnaissance planes into the air space of the Soviet Union with Norway's complicity. These flights have dearly shown that the American military is trying to utilize opportunities to base US air­ craft on Norwegian territory for aggressive ends against the USSR, thus endangering the security— not only of the USSR— but of Norway as well.116 235

The Norwegian reply, of November 9, explained that the press reports were based on the report about a Norwe­ gian expedition which, with the economic support of the

Arctic Institute of North America, had carried out scien­ tific research in the summer of 1959. It pointed out that, as soon as it was clear that the expedition undertook to investigate possibilities for airfields, the authorities 117 had halted the activities, in January, 1960,

The note concluded:

The Norwegian Government wishes to declare in this connection that it still maintains the position expressed in the note of January 10, 1959, to the Soviet Government and that the January 27, 1959, statement of Mr. Lange, Foreign Minister, in the Storting that, at present the Norwegian authorities in general have no plans for the construction of air­ fields on Spitsbergen or for assisting in such con­ struction, remains valid.118

From the above, it must be concluded that, since the war, the Soviet Union clearly has almost exclusively stra­ tegic interests in the archipelago of Spitsbergen. The coal mining became of much less economic significance after the electrification of most of the Soviet railroads and cities of the north, the transition to diesel engines in

the merchant navy, and the development of the Pechora coal 119 mines. The mining, however, is a symbol of Soviet inter­ ests in the area and will most likely be continued as long

as that interest persists. 236

The growing economic development of the Soviet

Arctic and the opening up of the Northern Sea route through

atomic ice-breakers have increased the importance of these 120 areas for the Soviet Union. Svalbard, together with the

coast of Northern Norway, as the Second World War amply

showed, command important strategic positions for the

security of these areas.

The strategic Importance of the Archipelago will,

however, also change with changing technology. As the con­

troversy in the discussions around the Norwegian base

policy, in the mid-lSGO’s, concerns a communication instal­

lation for submarines, so does a similar controversy about

Spitsbergen center around the construction of a satellite- 121 searching station, the so-called ESRO station. The

Soviet Union protested the plans to establish this tele­

metering station on Svalbard in a note of February 18,

1965. It maintained that the station could and would be

used for military purposes in violation of the Svalbard

Treaty. Norway rejected the protest and promised to keep 122 the station under complete Norwegian control.

Undoubtedly, there is a relationship between track­

ing facilities for scientific satellites and guidance

systems for missiles. In this latter respect, the Arctic

is in a prominent position.

The Svalbard Treaty was put to a hard test in World 237

War II when the importance of Svalbard for the Northern Sea

Route was demonstrated. It could very well be put to a test again in the missile age.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The Norwegian base policy was defined even before the country entered the North Atlantic Pact; in fact, it appears that It was a Norwegian condition for entering the pact in the first place. The acknowledgment of this condi­ tion was secured from the United States and made clear to the Soviet Union as early as February, 1949, two months before the pact was signed.

This Norwegian policy, which springs from a recogni­ tion of the interests of the Soviet Union and consideration of the position of Finland, has had to be repeated often and, in the process, has become one of the basic lines of

Norwegian foreign policy. It has later also been defined as not permitting atomic weapons on Norwegian territory nor nuclear submarines in Norwegian fiords. But it has also— because of the integration in NATO— been modified to be conditioned on a threat of attack on the "North Atlantic

Area" and not merely on Norway as originally defined.

Spitsbergen has been a special problem for Norwegian foreign policy because of its demilitarized status under international law. Military installations, which would be 238 permitted in Norway, could not be permitted there, but even civilian installations of potential military’ value have given cause to Soviet protests*

The Norwegian base policy seems not to have been accepted as credible by the Soviet Union until 1955. The

U-*2 and RB-47 in cid en ts, how ever, some few y e a rs l a t e r put

the Norwegian base policy on a severe test, but one which

it seemed to have been able to withstand.

A more long-range test for the Norwegian base and

atomic policy, however, has been the pressure exerted by

Finland for the creation of a nuclear free zone in Northern

Europe. The other Scandinavian countries have not accepted

th e id e a , however, and Norway r e j e c t e d i t arguing th a t

Northern Europe is already a de facto denuclearized zone,

and that such an agreement would be detrimental to the

balance of power in the area unless it also Included adjoin­

ing areas of the Soviet Union. Such a declaration would

a ls o be unthinkable f o r Norway o u ts id e the c o n tex t o f a

general European denuclearization} it would deprive the

country1 of an advantageous flexib ility in its foreign

policy. This would serve neither the interests of Finland

nor of Norway, it is argued*

The Norwegian base and nuclear policy has, under the

circumstances, successfully maximumized the Norwegian free­

dom of maneuver in international affairs and w ill not 239 voluntarily be given up without comparable concessions in return. Parallels can be drawn between the Soviet concern about the Norwegian base policy after World War II and the

Soviet concern about Finland before the war. Northern

Europe has always been a sensitive area for the Soviet

Union, but it was Finland that was her gravest concern on her Northern Flank before the war. After the Second World

War and, especially, after Norway's adherence to NATO,

Norway took over that role. While it was the use of Fin­ nish territory by the Germans that was feared before the war, after the war the use of Norwegian territory by the

West came to be seen as a major threat on her Northern

Flank.

The base concept itself is always changing, however;

at the time when the Norwegian base policy was laid down

and before the inclusion of nuclear weapons in NATO, it was

a relatively simple matter to recognize foreign bases.

This was complicated, for instance, by the emergence of

nuclear submarines, which could be stationed off the coast

without actually involving on-shore bases, a possibility,

it should be noted, which was also excluded in the Norwe­

gian definition.

But technological developments and new weapons have

changed the whole character of the base problem, however;

the growing importance of communications and tracking 240 facilities for submarines and missiles have made the con­ cept of bases extremely difficult to define.

The conclusions drawn for the position of Norway from the changing strategic considerations brought about by the new weapon carriers; the missile and the missile carry­ ing submarine, are widely in variance with each other. Xt seems that many authors have grasped the overwhelming im­ portance of these new weapons for the strategic role of certain points in Northern Europe and seem to think that

this also is bound to change things, either giving the area 123 more or else less strategic importance. It has been con­

tended that the containment of the Soviet Union, of which

the NATO system was a part, has been broken by technologi­

cal changes, by the advent of the long-range missile and

the missile carrying atomic powered submarine. These weapons carriers are not as dependent on forward bases as

the more conventional delivery systems, and have had their

effect upon the strategic position of Norway— if not actu­

ally changing her importance, it has changed her potential

and actual utility in time of war.

It must be remembered that the Baltic entrances and

the Arctic coasts of Norway always remain the only access

routes between the Soviet harbors and the Atlantic Ocean

and that the area between the Baltic entrances and Spits­

bergen stretches across the larger part of the flight-

paths between the Soviet Union and the United States. What 2 41 has changed is the utility of this area as a potential base for air and naval operations to a potential base for mis­ sile and submarine guidance and navigation systems* /

242

FOOTNOTES— CHAPTER VI

^It should be pointed out that the Norwegian or Scandinavian concept of base is the stationing of any for­ eign troops on the country's territory whether within for­ eign controlled real estate or not. This is the reason why Norway has been careful not to designate the foreign mili­ tary personnel stationed at the NATO Northern Command outside Oslo as "troops." They never received troop status. 2 Tim Greve, Norway and NATO (Oslo: Norwegian Uni­ versity Press, 1963), p. 23. 3 For full text see Appendix I. 4 H alvard Lange, "Norges v e i t i l NATO," Arbeider- bladet, October 15, 1966. Last in a series of four articles of Norway's adherence to NATO in Arbeiderbladet of October 12, 13, 14, and 15 by Halvard Lange.

5Ib id . £ For full text, see Appendix II. 7 Walter Lippmann, in New York Herald Tribune. January 21, 1949.

®Ibid., January 18, 1949.

9Ib id .

^For full text, see Appendix III.

^^Lange, loc. cit* That this was clear to the Nor­ wegian Government, as early as February, 1948, has not been previously confirmed. Earlier, a semi-official publi­ cation confirming that the United States had accepted the Norwegian reservations in joining the pact stated; "The responsible Norwegian authorities, however, have made their decision on the basis of an overall appreciation of the political and m ilitary-strategic situation. The Norwegian attitude has received the fu ll support of NATO's supreme organs. In reality, it was clear to the Norwegian authori­ ties, as early as March, 1949, that neither the American Government nor the other Western A llies would insist that Norway sh ould a c c e p t fo r e ig n tro o p s in time of peace." Greve, _o£. cit., p. 23. As we have seen, this was, in fact, c le a r in e a r ly February even b e fo r e the Norwegian Labor Party and the Storting considered the pact. 243 12 For complete text, see Appendix IV.

“^Arbeiderbladet. October 16, 1951; also Keesinqs Contemporary Archives. 1951, K 11853.

14 I b id .

^ Aftenposten. October 31, 1951. For Lange's state­ ment, see Forhandlinqer Stortinqet. February 21, 1951, p. 286. 1 s Aftenposten. November 13, 1951. 17 Tydkansan Sanomat. June 26, 1952. 1 8 In 1952, there had been recurring rumors of a pos­ sible return of Finnish Karelia for certain Finnish terri­ tories in the North Cap area on the Norwegian border, possibly all the way to Sweden. An article in Berliner W itschaftsblatt. of March 13, 1953, by its Stockholm corres­ pondent, Hilding Bengtson, describes Soviet plans about the establishment of samoied republic in the area, north of the 68th parallel, and an expansion of the Korelian republic. It says: "Eine gewisse Agitation fUr die Lappenrepublik ist auf Konferenzen in Murmansk und Petrosawodsk gestartet und mit propagandaschriften unter den nomadischen Lappen bewerkstelligt worden.11 In March, 1953, there were, especially in Swedish press, renewed rumors. The source seems to be the Hamburg correspondent of the Stockholms Tidinqen. Christer J^derlund, who, on March 25, 1953, started them. An article in Stockholms Tidlnqen. March 27, says the rumors have come "from the west." In this connec­ tion, the paper speculates about the construction of the a ir b a se a t Anddya in Norway* 19 Keesinqs Contemporary Archives. February 21-28, 1953, K 12777. 20 Arbeiderbladet. January 17, 1954.

^Stortinqsmeldlnq, No. 7 for 1955. 2 2 Keesinqs Contemporary Archives, 1955, K 14586. 2 3 O fficial communique of November 15, 195 5. pA Another more concrete result of the "Spirit of Geneva"came from Iceland where the Parliament adopted a *

244 resolution demanding a revision of the defense pact of 1951 and the withdrawal of U. S. troops from the country. There are several reasons for this move besides the general reduc­ tion of tensions. There had, for a long time, been fric­ tions between the local civilian population and the American in uniform, this being an election issue. Another argument against the American troops, however, was that both Norway and Denmark were w ith ou t them.

With the crises in Hungary, Suez, and Lebanon, ten­ sion increased again late in 1956; the return visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to Scandinavia were postponed in­ definitely, and on Iceland the American troops were per­ mitted to remain without further political difficulties. 25 Keesinqs Contemporary Archives. 1957, K 15625. 2 6 , . , I b id .

27I b id .

28Ib id . 29 Keesinqs Contemporary Archives. 1957, K 15629.

3Qlb i d .

3^Keeslnqs Contemporary Archives, 1957, K 15978.

32Stortinqsmeldinq nr. 25 for 1958 and 1960—1961* 33 See Finn Moe, "Norwegian Foreign Policy Today," The Norseman. Vol. XVI, No. 6 tNovember-December, 1948), pp. 307-373.

3^Keeslnqs Contemporary Archives. 1958, K 15978.

38It had, on October 3, 1957, in the United Nations General Assembly, originally been put forward by the Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki* 36 Aftenposten. January 29, 1958.

37Current Digest of Soviet Press. Vol. XI, No. 3, p. 26. 38 Keesinqs Contemporary Archives. May 21-28, 1960, K 17405. 245 39 Keesinqs Contemporary Archives, I960, K 17425.

4 0 I b id .

4 1 Ib id . 42 r,The Quarters H istory,” The American Scandinavian Review. Vol. XLVIII, No. 3 (September, 1960), pp. 296-297,

4 3 lb id .

4 4 I b id . 45 i b i d .

4 6 I b ld . 4 7 I b id . 48 _. . , I b id . 49 I b id . 50 Keesinqs Contemporary Archives , July 30—August 6, 1960, K 17549-17550. 51 "The Quarters H is to r y ," l o c . c i t . 52 Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Vol. XII, No. 28, p. 24; Pravda, July 12, 1960. 53 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XII, no. 28, p. 8. 54 It should be noted that, whether or not the planes were within the 12-mile lim it according to the so-called sector principle, they were within the Soviet Arctic sector. The Soviet Union has subscribed to the sector principle, at least since 1926. The principle was first conceived by the Canadian Senator Poirier in 1907. It implies that the Arctic states have full jurisdiction over all the territory and airspace within an area that has the pole as the apex. The tacit agreement between Canada, Den­ mark, and Norway, in 1924, t h a t s e c t o r s were to be c o n s id ­ ered as under the sovereignty of the corresponding state was accepted, in fact, by the Soviet Government when, on April 15, 1926, it declared "that all lands and islands, both those discovered and those which might be discovered later, lying between the coast of the USSR on the Arctic Ocean, the North Pole and the meridian of longitude 32 246 degrees 4 minutes 35 seconds East and 168 degrees 49 minutes 30 seconds West were proclaimed Soviet territory-" A Soviet decree of September 8, 1931, included in this definition of the far north all the islands of the Arctic Ocean and of the Okhotsk, Bering, and Kamchatka Seas. An exception was made in the West to exclude that part of the eastern Spitsbergen Archipelago which lay inside the Western line of demarcation. 55 For a summary of Russian claims, see C. J. Webster, "The Growth of the Soviet Arctic and Subarctic,'1 Arctic, May, 1951, pp. 27—45•

"*^Af tenposten. September 12, 1960. 57 The Mew York Times. September 14, 1960, p. 15. 5 8 The problem of the Norwegian base policy has also been complicated by the construction of communication systems for submarines or a V.L.F. (Very Low Frequency) station which the Soviet Union has objected to. The sta­ tion was first reported in the press in December, 1964 (Aftenposten. December 30, 1964). It is part of the NATO infrastructure program, whose purpose is to maintain communi­ cations with submerged submarines and has been constructed on the Helgoland Coast in Northern Norway. The station has been long in the planning stage, however, as witnessed by the following sentence in a b ill about the NATO infrastruc­ ture program's part 14: "It will also be set aside a smaller sum for studies in connection with a radio station under the European command." Stortings, prp* nr. 95 (1962- 1963). The Parliament's military committee supported the bill, /innst. S. nr. 176 (1962-1963J/. The bill about the NATO infrastructure program part 15 contains the following proposal: "Radio station for communications between opera­ tive centers ashore and submarines: 98, million kroner" .... "There is still more studies needed of a technical and legal character before construction can start." Stortings, prp. nr. 17 (1964-1965). " c q Even though the concern for Finland has never been officially mentioned. 50Halvard Lange, Norsk Utenrikspolitikk siden 1945. Foredraq oq debattinnleg'g TOslo: Johan Grundt Tanum, 1952), p. 128.

^Arbeiderbladet, March 26, 1963.

*^See Aftenposten. December 17, 1957; and The Norseman. Vol. XVI, No. 1 (January-February, 1958), pp. 1-3. 247 6 3 Af ten p o sten . September 12, 1956. 64 One of the most notable of these opponents is Nils 0rvik * See, fo r example, Nils 0rvik, Europe * s Northern Cap and the Soviet Union (occasional papers on International A f f a i r s , No. 6; Cambridge: Harvard U n iv e r sity , Center for I n te r n a tio n a l A ffa irs, 19631. 6 3 At the NATO council meeting in Paris, on December 16, 1960, Herter, according to the communique at the end of the m inisterial session, suggested the creation of a medium- range b allistic missile force under NATO control. This, he said, seemed a logical extension of the decision taken by NATO in 195 7. Secondly, Nr. Herter announced that, as a f i r s t ste p toward meeting the requirements of SHAPE, the United States Government intended to commit to NATO, before the end of 1963, five Polaris submarines which would be employed in accordance with existing procedures; they would be p u t a t the disposal of the Supreme Commander, Europe, in time of war, and the technical conditions for their use would be drawn up by the Standing Group and the military com m ittee. However, United States exp ected other members to c o n tr ib u te to the cost of about one hundred medium-range m issiles under multilateral control. If the allies agreed to the purchase of these missiles, the five Polaris subs would be committed "irrevocably11 to NATO. General Norstad had announced already on March 2, 1960, that it was pro­ posed to establish a multi-national allied task force, with nuclear weapons. It had also been confirmed by the State Departm ent on A pril 14, 1960, that plans were under discu s­ sion between the United States and other NATO members to station large numbers of Polaris m issiles in West Europe, if possible, by 1963, when the Soviet superiority in long- range m issiles might be the greatest.

The State Department disclosure followed the British d e c is io n to abandon the Blue Streak M is s ile . Further statement to this effect had come from Bonn on October 19, when spokesmen for the Federal Republic said that a United S t a te s plan fo r NATO nuclear weapons would be put to the NATO c o u n c il in December*

The outline of proposals for establishment of NATO as a " fo u rth nuclear power" had been made p u b lic by General Norstad at the annual conference of NATO Parliamentarians in P a r is on November 21, 1960. On the o cca sio n , he quoted the 1957 d e c is io n "to estab lish stocks o f nuclear warheads . . . m issiles for the Supreme Allied Commander.11 It was su b seq u en tly announced in Bonn, on December 10, 1960, that General Norstad had finally requested Federal German 248

Government to supply a contingent to this force. Strauss, on December 17, said they were prepared to and would supply twelve hundred paratroopers.

^Stortinqsmedling, nr. 28 (1960-1961); Giennom- fghrinqen av m&lsettinqen ^i Stortlngets prp. nr. 26 for 1957 om hovedretningslin1ene for Forsvaret^i Srene fremover. It should be mentioned that the Chief of Staff had, in a com­ prehensive report, recommended tactical nuclear weapons. See also,"The Quarters History," The American Scandinavian Review. Vol. XVLX, No. 1 (March, 196li, pp. 80-81. See also, Keesinqs Contemporary Archives, January 7-14, 1961, K 17857.

^Stortlngsmeldinq nr. 28 (1960-1961). 68 See also, "The Quarters History," The American Scandinavian Review. Vol. XLIX, No. 1 (March, 1961), pp. 80-81,

Aftenposten. October 7, 1961. 70 It was at this time that the Swedish Foreign Minis­ ter Und^n in the United Nations presented his proposal for a so-called nuclear free club in which members not already possessing nuclear weapons should undertake to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquire them or receive them on their territory on behalf of another country.

The Swedish idea was that this would be the basis for making larger nuclear free zones in, for instance, East, Central, and Northern Europe together. It was not in any way meant to be an invitation to one-sided declarations from, for instance, the countries in Northern Europe alone according to a briefing given by Prime Minister Erlander during the meeting of the Nordic Council in Stockholm in February, 1964. 71 Lange later on commenting on the Kekkonen proposal for a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe referred to Gerhardsen's speech in Helsinfors*

^ A rb eid e r b la d e t. March 31, 1963. 73 For full text, see Appendix VII, 74 Press release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 6, 1963, quoted in Arbeiderbladet, June 7, 1963.

^ Aftenposten. October 30, 1963. 249 7 6 T his p o in t was s tr e s se d by Prime M inister Gerhard- sen in an interview in Arbeiderbladet. January 21, 1964, and Foreign Minister Lange in a speech in the Folk; oq Forsvar Association, February 18, 1964, text in Af tenposten, February 19, 1964. 77 For a complete history of the Svalbard Treaty nego­ tiations, see Trygve Mathiesen, Svalbard in International Politics 1871-1925 (Oslo), pp. 136-143. A discussion of the r o le o f the North Norway and i t s A rctic possession s in international politics is also found in Helge Giverhold, "North Norway in International Politics," The Norseman, XII CJanuary-February, 1954), 1-6* The role of Spitsbergen is also discussed in Anthony Martin, "NATO's Arctic Flank," The Norseman, Vol. XII, No. 1 (January-February, 1954), pp. 7-10; and in A. J. Fischer, "Spitsbergen," Contemporary Review. No. 1080 (December, 1955), pp. 399-401.

For text of Svalbard Treaty, see Appendix V. 78 "Odeltingetsforhandlinger," Stortinqsforhandlinqer, 1925, p. 538; and "Lagtingets forhandlinger," in ibid., p. 228. 79 The administration of the Svalbard is the responsi­ bility of a governor or a "sysselmann" answerable to the central Norwegian authorities. The mining operations are supervised by a government inspector. 80 On September 3, 1941, BBC announced that the Soviet Ambassador without any invitation from the Norwegian side had declared that the Soviet Union had no territorial or other claims on Norway. See Trygve Mathiesen, Svalbard in the Changing A r c tic (O slo: Gyldendahl Norsk Forlag, 1954), p. 34. This is the best account of Svalbard's wartime and postwar history. See also, I. G. Elbo, "The War in Spits­ bergen," The Polar Record, Vol. VI, No. 44, pp. 485-486. 81 Rupert Holzapfel, "Deutsche Polarforschung 1940- 1945," Folarforschunq. Band III, Heft 2 (1951), pp. 90-91, Elbo, 0 £>* c it. , No. 42, pp. 185-226. 82 Mathiesen, Svalbard in the Changing Arctic, op. c it.. pp. 44-45, For discussion of the use of the Arctic generally during the war, see also, "German Attacks on Shipping Along the Northern Sea Route 1942-1944," The Polar Record. Vol. VI, No. 44, pp. 822-825; and C. J. Webster, "The Growth of the Soviet Arctic and subarctic," Arctic, Vol. IV, No. 1, pp. 27-46. 250 83 Banak and Hdybuktmoen. 84 See Trygve Lie, Hiemover (Oslo: Tiden, 1958), pp. 156-161; a lso Arne Or din g , "Norway and World A f f a ir s ,'1 American"Scandinavian Review, No* 43 (June, 1955), pp. 159— 168. For a detailed discussion of the circumstances sur­ rounding the Soviet adherence to the Treaty, see Mathiesen, Svalbard in International Politics. 1871-1925, op. cit. , pp. 159-168. 0 0 Lie, _o£. cit. . p. 159. 88 Ibid. A committee with Lie as chairman, and made up of Ambassador H. C. Berg, President of the Storting, C. J . Hambro, Dr. Arne Ording, and Dr. Arnold R aestad, was formed to consider the matter. 87 L ie, 0£, cit., p. 164. This was revealed in an announcement by the Norwegian Foreign Minister to the press on January 17, 1947, when the matter was brought up again. Arbeiderbladet, January 17, 1947.

®®Lie, op. c i t . , pp. 170 and 172. 89 Andvord has written about this in his memoirs, see R o lf Andvord, Med H&nden p Sl Hlertet (Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag, 1964),pp. 257—258.

A more comprehensive account, however, is to be found in the memoirs of the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Trygve Lie. Lie, o£, cit. , in the chapter entitled "Andvord og Molotov forhandler om Svalbard," pp. 162-172. 90 The T im es, January 11, 1947, p. 4. 91 Ibid. , January 18, 1947, p. 5. 92 Lie, op. cit., p. 171. 93 Shortly afterwards, the other signatory powers— Denmark, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands--were informed of the Soviet-Norwegian negotiations. 94 In the Inter-American Defense Pact, Greenland was declared to belong to the "Western Hemisphere" and thereby a part of that defense area* This is discussed in Vitalis Patenburg, "Das arktische Mittelmeer," Aussenpolitik. Vol. II (1951), Heft 8, November, p. 563. On page 567, Paten­ burg reveals that he knows from his wartime experience that 251

the Soviet Union had similar plans for the Arctic posses­ sio n s o f Norway a fte r the Russian in v a sio n o f Northern Norway in 1944. 95 It is interesting to note that in 1940 the United States Government discussed with the Icelandic Prime Minister a proposal to include Iceland in the Monroe Doc­ trine area. See, Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), I, p, 354. The interest on the part of the powers con­ tinued after the war. Thus, on March 3, 1946, the organ of the Soviet Navy, Krasnyi Flot. March 3, 1946, carried an article which stated that giving bases on Iceland to the United States might lead to a situation in which other powers might demand specific rights in the area, since, according to the newspaper, the maritime routes in the North Atlantic are of importance not only to the United States. Quoted in Nordlsk Tidskrift for Internationell Ret. No. 1, 1946. Among the Soviet political counter-moves was the offer on the part of Moscow to buy the larger part of the year's fish catch from Iceland at prices more advanta­ geous than those offered by American or British buyers, according to The New York Times of June 20, 1946. It will be recalled that withdrawal of United States forces from Greenland raised soon after the war by the Danish Govern­ ment remained an open question until Denmark's adherence to the NATO Treaty. As for Iceland, the United States was granted, on the basis of a mutual agreement in October, 1946, the right to use Keflavik Airfield for a period of five years "in connection with the fulfillment of the United States obligations to maintain control agencies in Germany." 96 On April 9, 1941, the year after the German inva­ sio n of Denmark, the Danish M in ister in Washington, Henrik Kaufmann, had proclaimed himself the representative of the King of Denmark on Denmark's behalf concluded an agreement with the United States giving the United States bases on Greenland. In fact, it made Greenland a temporary protec­ torate of the United States. This was an agreement of dubious validity as the Danish Government, which functioned during the war in Copenhagen, repudiated his steps and dis­ missed him. The agreement is published in The Polar Record. V ol. VI, No. 43. 97 Position on Possible Revision Agreement on Defense of Greenland Statement by the Secretary of State." Released to press on August 29. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XVI, No. 414 (June 8, 1947), p. 1130. 252 98 rrThe Rio Pact." See also, J. C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs 1947-1948, pp. 109 and 120. Text of the "Rio Pact11 in Department of State, American Foreign Policy. 1950-1955. Basic Documents. Vol. I, Depart­ ment of State Publication 6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117, released July, 1957, pp. 789-795, or in Annual of the Organization of American States. Vol. I, pp. 87-90. 99 Department of State, op. c it.. p. 796. The inclu­ sion of Denmark to NATO solved the problem of the Danish- American Treaty of April 9, 1941. The final regulations about American troops on Greenland were made in April, 1951, within the framework of NATO. Text published in Polar Record, Vol. VX, No. 43.

■^^Press Release by the M inister of Foreign A ffairs, January 17, 1947; also published in Arbeiderbladet. January 17, 1947.

^ ^Izvestia. January 17; and Pravda. January 19, 1947. Keesinqs Contemporary Archives, April 5-12, 1947, K 8529. 102 The United States views are expressed in the publi­ cation of the United States Information Service, News Bulletin (American Embassy, Oslo), January 27, 1947. 103 J. J. Teal, Jr., "Europe’s Northernmost Frontier,” Foreign A ffairs. January, 1951.

104|1The Quarters History,” American Scandinavian Review, Vol.XXXV, No. 2 {June, 1947), p. 160; and Stortinqs- forhandlinqer, VI a, S nr. 19 (1947).

After the war, the Soviet Union had, to no avail, put pressure on Denmark to have American bases withdrawn. In 1951, the United States succeeded in renewing the war­ time agreement— this time within the framework of NATO. Explained in "United States-Denmark Agreement on Defense of Greenland, April 2 7," Department of State B ulletin, vol. XXIV, No. 623 (June 11, 1951), p. 814. Text of Agreement on pp. 943-945. Text of Agreement with Iceland of May 5, 1951, in Department of State B ulletin. No. 620 (May 21, 1951), pp. 812-813.

As of 1947, however, no such defense alliance existed that would justify the special arrangement. Green­ land and Svalbard were then much similar cases* No doubt, joint Soviet-Norwegian m ilitarization of Svalbard would 253 have counterbalanced the American strategic advances on Greenland and Iceland. In this connection, it must be men­ tioned that a political adviser to the Norwegian Government proposed that the Svalbard question might be most effec­ tively dealt with if there was an agreement resulting in the neutralization of a greater part of the Arctic. See Professor Arne Ording, "Svalbard,11 Internasional Folitlkk 1947. No. 1, pp. 6-11. 105 To suggest, as some have done, that the Soviet Union, through the use of the sector principle intended to infringe upon the Norwegian rights in the area, seems, how­ ever, without foundation. A German author has written about this: "Der Vertrag vom 8. Juni 1951 trat dem Bemtlhen der Soviet-regierung entgegen, durch politische Einsprtlche in Skandinavien auf die Entwicklung der amerikanischen Luftbasen in GriJnland einzuwirken. Sie beschr&nkt sich darauf, den Massnahmen der USA durch eigene Unternehmen im Nordpolgebiet zu begegnen. Die in den Mitteilungen der Moskauer Akademie der W issenschaften vom November 1954 verbffentlichten Forschungsergebnisse des Akademikers D. Schtscherbakow denken darauf hin, dass Moskau vorsorglich vblkerrechtliche Argumente sammelt, um die Grenze des als sovjetisch proklamierten Nordpolargebietes bis etwa 50. LSngengrad nach Westen die nach dem Sektorenprinzip Norwegen und D&nemark zustehenden Rechte am Nordpol in Frage stellen und Spitzbergen, Island und Grbnland wieder in seine Skandinavien-politikk einbeziehen kbnnen." Werner von Harpe, Die Sovietunion. Finnland und Skandinavien 1945-1955 Arbeitgemeinschaft ftir Osteuropaforschung (TUbingen: BUhlan-Verlag, 1956), pp. 44-45* 106 At Barentsburg, Grumant City, and the Pyramides. i n 7 In December, 1950, the NATO Council, at its Brussels Meeting, had decided to establish an integrated command system including a North A tlantic Command. 1 Oft Stortinqsforhandlinqer 1951, Ha, St. prp. No. 20.

~^^The Times, October 17, 1951, p. 5.

^^Arbeiderbladet. October 31, 1951.

^^Tbid. . November 13, 1951*

Stortinqsforhandlinqer 1951, Stortingstidende. p. 2490. ii^ Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XII, No. 46, pp. 19-20. 254 114 Arbeiderbladet, January 28, 1959. 115 Keesinqs Contemporary Archives , January 7—14, 1961, K 17857. 1 X Current Diqest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XII, No. 4 6 , p . 20“

^ ^Arbeiderbladet. November 10, 1960. 118 Current Diqest of Soviet Press, Vol. XII, No. 46, p. 20; see also, "The Quarters History,11 The American Scandinavian Review. Vol. XLIX, No. 1 (Spring" 1961), pp. 8 0 - 8 1 . 119 For further discussion of the economic interests, see William Mandel, 11 Some Notes on the Soviet A rctic during the Past Decade,'1 Arctic, April, 1950, p. 61. 120 An excellent history of and discussion of the economic importance of the Northern Sea route is to be found in a series of articles by Arnljot Strdmme Svendsen, "Den Nordlige sjgSvei og den sjdverts verdenshandel, " Norqes Handels— oq Sjg5f artstldende, February 22, 24 and 27, and March 3, 1965. 121 An establishm ent of the European Space Research Organization of which Norway is not a member—only an o b s e r v e r . 122 The New York Times, February 20, 1965. The sta­ tion located in Ny Alesund will be operative in May, 1967, according to Af tenposten, October 28, 1966. 123 Regarding the Northern Cap Area, one author has expressed this opinion; "Here we should keep in mind that the main goal of the Soviets in this area, constantly fol­ lowed by Stalin was not to exploit the Northern Cap them­ selves, but to prevent others from doing so. It is reasonable to believe that this was their basic aim until the death of Stalin in 1953—and perhaps as late as the middle fifties." After that period, however, he finds that a quite different situation arises. See, 0rvik, _o£. cit.. p. 26. Another author thinks that "the creation of a sea­ borne nuclear force and long-range missiles in the late 1950's has made Norway's strategic position for air bases somewhat less important. The whole Atlantic is now stra­ tegic as the Norwegian nation once was." See, Victor Braden Moon, "Soviet-Norwegian Relations since 1945," The Western P olitical Quarterly, Vol. XXVII (December, 1964), p . 6 7 0 . CHAPTER VII

NORDIC BALANCE

I . INTRODUCTION

In order to understand Norway's role in the postwar world, a closer examination of the position of Finland and the Baltic area, generally! w ill be necessary.

Norwegian policy with regard to the attempts at a closer Scandinavian cooperation has sometimes been ex­ plained in terms of Norwegian objectives to stay out of the

influence of the policies of the Baltic area. However,

political developments in the Baltic, generally, and in

Finland, especially, have had direct bearing on the posi­

tion of Norway since the Second World War. This chapter

will try to come to grips with these problems.

The fate of Norway and the rest of Scandinavia has,

since the 17tit century, been a function of the larger Euro­

pean balance and, since the Second World War, of the world­

wide balance. But it seems that Norway in concert with the

other Scandinavian countries through accommodation and

skillful diplomacy has been able to create a situation of

equilibrium between the interests of the powers.

This balance was created in Northern Europe through

the Soviet commitment to a neutral Finland in the treaty of 256

1948 and the Norwegian rejection of foreign bases and nuclear weapons on her territory.

With the Soviet and American acceptance of the situation and with the foreign policy of the Scandinavian countries themselves stabilized and firmly defined, the only new dimension in this situation would most likely come from an expanded German influence in the area.

It was exactly such a development, coupled with the p ossib ilities of a German or NATO nuclear navy within the

Baltic Sea, that inspired the Finnish promotion among its neighbors of the idea of a nuclear free zone in Northern

Europe; it was an attempt to re-establish the balance in th e a r e a .

II. THE PAASIKIVI LINE OF FINNISH

FOREIGN POLICY

Finland is a Baltic state whose destiny to a much greater degree than the other Scandinavian countries has been determined by the power relationship across the

Baltic Sea—which sometimes was controlled by Sweden, some­ times by Russia, and sometimes by Germany, and never really by the West. After the Revolution in Russia and the defeat of Germany in the First World War, Finland emerged as an independent nation.^" As Germany increased her power in the

Baltic in the interwar period, Finland again became a 257 buffer— this time between the Soviet Union and Germany-

German influence increased in Finland and Russian fear of its borders in the North and especially Leningrad increased 2 proportionately. The Soviet demands on Finland for in­ creased security came to naught and the Soviet Union had to 3 take what they wanted. After the defeat of Germany in the

Second World War, the Soviet Union emerged as the most powerful Baltic State and Finland could no longer base her political independence on her role as a buffer state but only on the relationship to the Soviet Union.

It was the diplomacy of Joho K. Paasikivi as Premier from 1944 to 1946, and then as President until his death in

1956, that managed to preserve the independence of Finland steering a course that always avoided the violation of the interests of the Soviet Union.

He defined his foreign policy objectives, in an interview, in the Finland-Soviet Union Friendship Society,

in 194 7, this way:

We must maintain good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union and our foreign policy must never again be turned against the USSR. It is my policy to make the entire Finnish people supporters of this line of foreign policy .... If anyone in the future should want to attack the Soviet Union through our territory, we, together with the Soviet Union, will fight the aggressor as hard and as long as our strength per­ m its .^

This, in brief, describes the so-called "Paasikivi

Line” of Finland’s foreign policy. 258

The Paasikivi line makes the assumption that the

Soviet Union's interest in Finland springs out of concern for the security of her North Western frontier; the policy is thus a function of Finland's geographic situation. The peace settlement after the war is seen in this context.

Paasikivi recognized that the balance of power be­ tween two great rival powers would permit small states a certain room for maneuver. But he saw Finland after the

Second World War as located definitely well within the

Soviet sphere of influence. Neither Great Britain, the

United States, nor Germany could reach with impunity within that sphere. Even Finland's relations to her Scandinavian neighbors had to be conducted in such a way that it did not

threaten the interests of the Soviet Union.

Paasikivi also recognized that a small state stand­

ing in the way of a great power's interests could not count

on the heroism of its people or any moral or legal consid- 5 erations. He did not deny that such factors play a role, but he parts company with those both in Finland and in the

Western World who maintain that Finland has avoided the

fate of the Baltic or other of the East European States for

any such reasons.

In his view, Finland did not need to be occupied by

Russian troops in order to satisfy the Russian interests;

whereas the Baltic countries, geographically, m ilitarily, 259 and economically, traditionally were considered integral parts of Russia.

During the immediate postwar period, Paasikivi made a very important decision with the opposition of among others the Parliament's foreign affairs committee. He decided not to take part in the Marshall Plan meetings in

Paris. This was consistent with his foreign policy line of recognizing that Finland should not attempt to escape from the Soviet orbit*

I I I . THE FENNO—SOVIET FRIENDSHIP PACT OF 1948

Perhaps the most decisive event in the postwar

Soviet-Finnish relations, also from the standpoint of Nor­ way and the other Scandinavian countries, is the conclusion of the 1948 Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual

Assistance.

On February 22, 1948, two days after the coup in

Czechoslovakia, Stalin addressed a note to the Finnish

President stating that he desired a "radical improvement" in Soviet-Finnish relations and suggested a Soviet-Finnish mutual security treaty analogous to recent treaties that

the Soviet Union had concluded with Rumania and Hungary.

When the letter was made public, there were in many quar­

ters, not the least in Norway, expectations of some radical g change in the status of Finland. As it turned out the 260 treaty, which is above all directed against Germany, con­ firmed the Paasikivi theory about the Soviet security needs on her North Western border. The Pact that was signed in

Moscow, on April 6, 1948, was, in fact, based on the 7 Finnish draft. While providing a certain measure of in­ creased security and guarantees for the Soviet Union, it Q was also a guarantee for Finnish neutrality in peacetime.

In the preamble is an acknowledgment by the Soviet

Government of the right of Finland to remain outside the

great power conflicts. This implies guarantee of Finland’s

independence. Finland was assured of this when Stalin, six

days after the signing of the treaty, described it as a 9 "treaty between equals."

Article 1 which contains the central idea of the

treaty stipulates that, if either Finland or the Soviet

Union through Finnish territory, is attacked by Germany or

any of its allies, Finland must fight to repel the attack

and may ask for Soviet military assistance to do so. Thus,

Finland is committed to fight on Finnish soil only.

Article 2 stipulates that the two governments shall

confer "if it is established that the threat of an armed

attack as defined in article 1 is present*11

The treaty precludes any m ilitary alignment with the

West. But neither does it contain any obligation to join

any closer defense arrangement with the Soviet Union like 261

the Warsaw pact. It does, in fact, underline Finland’s right to stay out of conflicts of interest between the great powers. This is recognized in the preamble.

From the preamble and the first two articles, it is clear that the pact is not a treaty of military alliance

proper. Firstly, it is territorially delimited to Finland.

Finland, in the pact, has, in fact, committed itself to

defend only its own territory and to fight only within its

own borders. This makes it different from any m ilitary

alliance. In the event of an attack on the USSR by another

route than over Finnish territory, the country w ill not,

under the pact, be involved in war. Secondly, it does not

come into effect automatically. A prerequisite for the

consultations mentioned in article 2 is that both parties

consider the threat of an attack to exist.

T h is p a c t , w h ile i t does impose some comm itm ents on

Finland, also makes clear that Finnish neutrality is

guaranteed by the Soviet Union, This neutrality, as de­

fined by the Paasikivi line, later also came to be recog­

nized in the Western capitals.

IV . SOVIET-FINNISH RELATIONS AFTER

THE 1940 PACT

A new era for Finnish-Soviet relations and for

Soviet relations to Scandinavia started in 1952 after all 262 reparations had been paid to the Soviet Union and is characterized by the return of the Porkala base, Finland's admittance to the Nordic Council, to the United Nations, and finally to the European Free Trade Association. This coincides with the end of the much talked about ’’Stalin 10 era" in Soviet foreign policy.

After the Nordic Council had been constituted in

Copenhagen in 1953, Finland, at first, refrained from par­ ticipation. It was at that time not clear what the scope of the council would be, and the first Soviet reaction to 11 -*"* Finnish participation was negative. An article m

Izvestia. for instance, stated that attempts to drag Fin­ land into the Nordic Council were inspired by ,Treactionary and im perialist circles” in the West who wanted to damage 12 the friendly relations between the two countries. But from the fall of 1955, after Paasikivi's v isit to Moscow in September, when the Porkala base was returned, Finland

joined the Nordic Council without Russian objections. The

Mutual Assistance Pact, however, was extended for twenty 13 years. That year, Finland was also admitted to the

United Nations as a result of the Soviet-American agreement 14 not to veto each other's candidates for membership.

Paasikivi's speech in Moscow, on the occasion of the

return of Porkala, reflects the change in Soviet-Finnish

r e l a t i o n s : 263

I am here in Moscow for the seventh time for negotia­ tions on affairs of state concerning Finland and the Soviet Union. But this is the first time I return to our capital satisfied.3^

The most remarkable change in the status of Finland was, however, that she could permit herself to be associ­ ated with the other Scandinavian countries in the Nordic

Council and in EFTA without, in the Soviet view, endanger­ ing her neutral status.

At this time also, Norwegian policies regarding for­ eign bases were held out as a welcome reservation regarding her NATO membership. It seems as if the balance that

thereby had been created in Northern Europe, at least

tacitly, met with Soviet approval. Perhaps this change can

be seen as an attempt to bolster the cohesive forces in

Scandinavia at a time when Germany increasingly exerted her

influence in all directions. Evidently, this was regarded

as a greater threat to the interests of the Soviet Union in

the area than those coming from Finland's closer associa­

tion with the other Scandinavian countries.

In June, 195 7, when Bulganin and Khruschev made a

v isit to Finland, Soviet fears of increased German influ­

ence in Northern Europe was clearly demonstrated* In a

speech delivered to the Finnish Soviet Friendship Society,

he s a id :

The policy of your state . . . a policy of neutrality and independence, a policy of the struggle for peace 264

. . * favorably influences the setting in the Northern part of Europe. We are sure that in the future, also, your government and the whole Finnish nation w ill successfully act in such a way that in the north of Europe a lasting peace w ill reign and the zone of the Baltic Sea w ill be a zone of eternal peace. This is a great and noble mission*16

V. KEKKONEN f S FOREIGN POLICY

A new era in Fenno-Soviet relations, characterized by a more active role for Finland in Soviet-Scandinavian relations, was inaugurated when President Kekkonen took over the leadership of Finland's foreign policy in 1956*

He continued to follow the Paasikivi line but supplemented it with his own views regarding Finland's role and espe­ cially sought to engage the other Scandinavian countries to 17 a greater extent than before.

Kekkonen assumed that the more confidence the Soviet

Government has in Finland's neutrality, the closer can

Finland develop her relationships with the Scandinavian and 18 Western powers. What Kekkonen did was, therefore, to

promote h i s id e a s among F in la n d 's S ca n d in a v ia n n e ig h b o r s

also.

Kekkonen had first outlined his ideas in a much-

quoted "pyjama pocket" speech in 1952, in which he empha­

sized that the military articles of the Fenno-Soviet Pact

of 1948 were "territorially lim ited1.'; military cooperation

would take effect only if Finland or the Soviet Union were 265 subjected to armed aggression through Finnish territory.

Such aggression, he said is practicable only through Scan­ dinavian territory bordering Finland. A Scandinavian guaranteed neutrality would, therefore, be in Finland's interest. That would eliminate the theoretical menace of aggression against the Soviet Union through Finnish terri­ tory. He called, in effect, upon Norway and Denmark to adopt neutrality:

Due to geographic factors such an attack cannot— practically speaking—occur except through the terri­ tory of some Scandinavian country sharing a common border with Finland. Therefore, a realization and preservation of neutrality for the Scandinavian coun­ tries— such as Sweden has observed for nearly a century and a half—would be in accordance with Finnish interests because it would remove the threat of even a theoretical attack against the Soviet Union through Finnish territory. The goal of Fin­ nish policy is to preserve peace for the country in all circumstances, and peace in the Nordic countries is a necessary precondition for the achievement of this aim.19

His ideas were rejected and severely criticized by

the press in the rest of Scandinavia. It was clear that

this "active11 or "positive" neutrality of President

Kekkonen departed considerably from the Paasikivi foreign

policy line in that it actively promoted the withdrawal of

Norway and Denmark from NATO and, thereby, got involved in

the great power struggle. Kekkonen did, however, not change

his ideas about Scandinanvian neutrality. In an interview

with the Hamburg daily, Die Welt, in 1955, he referred to

neutrality and said: 266

In 1952 I dared to recommend this type of policy in the North. Now I can perhaps dare to think about its realisation also in a wider f r a m e w o r k . 20

In 1958, in a TV program, he again referred to his

Scandinavian policy and saidt

The more t r u s t in g ou r r e la t io n s are t o t h e E a s t, the better are our chances of increasing a bene­ ficial influence in the North.

VI. THE 1961 CRISIS

A test for the relationships between Finland and the

Soviet Union started in October, 1961, when the Soviet

Union, for the first time, requested consultations in ac­ cordance with the 1948 treaty with Finland, citing the emerging role of Germany in Northern Europe. Seen in the context of general East-West relations, it must be remem­ bered that this was a time of increased speculation around the problem of sharing nuclear weapons with Germany in NATO; some weeks earlier, the Berlin wall had gone up; the day before the Soviet request for military consultations with

Finland, the Soviet Union had exploded a record 50-megaton hydrogen bomb and, in July, the same year, had increased

Soviet arms expenditures 30 per cent.

The rearmament of West Germany and the plans for a so-called mixed manned nuclear fleet in the Baltic was seen as formidable a threat to the security of the Soviet Union

as any American nuclear fleet in the Atlantic. As an area 267 where atomic weapons can be placed closer to Soviet vital centers than any place in the West, the Baltic was, un­

doubtedly, of the gravest concern.

This is the background for the Soviet note of 1961

to Finland and the subsequent Finnish attempts at getting

atomic weapons barred from the Baltic-Scandinavian area;

the new German military power, it was felt, threatened to

upset the balance in Northern Europe.

That there were military strategic reasons behind

the Soviet move was confirmed by Foreign M inister Gromyko

in an interview in November, 1961, when he said that the

initiative to call upon Finland for talks in accordance

with the 1948 treaty came from the Soviet m ilitary and not 22 from the political leadership.

The crisis in 1961 resulted in a change in the

direction of a more "active" role for Finland's foreign

policy; she now came to see it as her purpose to influence

the course of the foreign policy of the other Scandinavian

c o u n t r ie s .

The crisis in 1961 was also the first test of the

Finnish policy of neutrality. As the crisis started, this

neutrality policy had just achieved recognition in the

United States and England during President Kekkonen's v isit

to these capitals. 268

Before Kekkonen's return, however, on October 30,

1961, the Finnish Ambassador to Moscow received the first note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry requesting the com­ mencement of m ilitary consultations between the two govern­ ments to prepare for the possibility of a West German attack on the Soviet Union through the Baltic area and

Finland. In the note, reference was made to a series of

German, Danish, and Norwegian military preparations, under

NATO auspices, which were threatening Soviet security in the Baltic area. Specifically, the note mentioned the creation of West German m ilitary depots in Denmark and

Norway, the shifting of German naval headquarters from the

North Sea coast to Flensburg on the Baltic, and the pro- 24 posed establishm ent of a German-Danish naval command.

The note maintained that, even in Sweden, the growth of

West German m ilitary influence in Northern Europe and the

B altic area was underestimated. This development, it was maintained, constituted a direct threat not only to Soviet security, but to the security of Finland as well, and in response, the two governments should begin military consul­ t a t i o n s a s p r o v id e d f o r i n the 1948 Agreement o f F r ie n d sh ip 25 Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

Because Kekkonen was in the United States, it was the Finnish Foreign M inister Karjalainen who went to Moscow f o r t a l k s w ith th e S o v i e t F o reig n M inister Gromyko. He returned on November 13 with a clarification of the Soviet views. It was suggested that instead of consultations the

Soviet Union would like to receive political guarantees 2.6 that the present foreign policy of Finland would continue.

There could, of course, be no better guarantee for this than the re-election of Kekkonen as President during the

January, 1962 elections. Thus, on November 22, after his return from the United States, when Kekkonen left Helsinki for a meeting with Khrushchev in Novosibirsk, Kekkonen*s rival in the election, Honka, announced that he would with­ draw from the election campaign, recognizing that a possi­ ble defeat of Kekkonen would strain Soviet-Finnish relations.

The subsequent election was an overwhelming demonstration in favor of Kekkonen, The Soviet Union thereby got the assurances it had sought; according to one author, the sub­ sequent agreement between Kekkonen and Khrushchev to cancel the m ilitary consultations was as much due to Honka* s sacri- 27 fice as to President Kekkonen*s diplomacy.

What role Norway*s position played during the crisis is not clear. But President Kekkonen, in a speech November

20 before his departure to Novosibirsk, criticizes the visit of the West German Defense Minister Franz Joseph 28 Strauss to Oslo as a disservice to Finland.

The Soviet note to Finland had no direct address to any other country than Finland, but it did involve her 270

Scandinavian neighbors also and contained especially sharp attacks on Norway. A Norwegian declaration was, therefore, forthcoming on October 31, rejecting the Soviet charges and maintaining that all Norwegian m ilitary installations were 29 defensive in nature* The Norwegian Foreign Minister, who was on an official visit to Moscow at the time of the

Novosibirsk meeting, rejected all the charges against Nor­ way and Denmark and warned that continued pressure might lead to a reappraisal of Norwegian security policy.

Similar warnings were given by the Norwegian Defense Minis­ ter Harlem in a speech in Copenhagen at about the same 31 time. Such threats may possibly have contributed to a strengthening of Kekkonen's arguments in Novosibirsk against any formal consultations with the Soviet Union.

The 1961 crisis, at any rate, clearly demonstrated the important position of Finland in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the other Scandinavian NATO members. This is reflected in the communique after the

Novosibirsk meeting. It reveals that President Kekkonen

"pointed out that the invitation of consultations as men­ tioned might cause a certain worry and war psychosis in the 32 . Scandinavian countries," " and that the best contribution the Soviet Government could make to the alleviation of ten­ sions in the Baltic area was to defer the military discus­ sions. It seems justified to draw the conclusion from this that Soviet concern about Scandinavian reactions must have been an important factor in the outcome of the crisis. The

Danish-German B altic Command was not prevented, however; the Danish Folketinq decided on it on December 7. President

Kekkonen has revealed that his agreement with Khrushchev included the proviso that in the future the Finnish, not the Soviet, Government would take the initiative to begin any military discussions and that involves obligations for the Finnish Government not only to keep an eye on the developments in Norway and Denmark but to encourage their 33 neutrality. But the outcome of the crisis was satis­ factory for Finland, who achieved another confirmation of

Soviet recognition of Finland's foreign policy. Further­ more, it seems that Finland was given greater latitude in the diplomatic relations with her Scandinavian neighbors as

long as she would follow the principles of the Paasikivi-

Kekkonen line: recognize the strategic interests of the

Soviet Union and live up to the terms of the 1948 agree- A J ment. It is against this background that the Kekkonen

plan for a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe must be

se en .

V I I . THE KEKKONEN PLAN

President Kekkonen, in a surprise move on May 28,

1963, speaking in the Paasikivi society, proposed to the 272 other Scandinavian countries the creation of a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe. This coincides with the wide­ spread but indecisive discussions and rumors about a so- called m ultilateral nuclear force for NATO, and a mixed manned fleet with nuclear weapons. The concern for any change in the strategic situation in the Baltic area was, 35 at least on one occasion, expressed by the Soviet press.

It must also be recalled, however, that the Norwegian Prime

Minister Einar Gerhardsen, in a speech in Helsinki on March

31, 1963, had definitely rejected any form of participation 36 by Norway in the planned NATO nuclear fleet*

In his proposal for a nuclear free zone, Kekkonen

first referred to the idea of a "non-nuclear club" put for­

ward by Mr. Unden, the former Swedish Foreign M inister, in

the autumn of 1961, under which members would pledge them­

selves not to acquire nuclear weapons or receive such

weapons on their territory.

□r. Kekkonen argued that an agreement on banning

nuclear tests had been considered a prerequisite for this

plan, and then added: "For this reason the plan has until

now remained in the background, but as the negotiations on

a t e s t ban seem to drag on, th e Und^n p lan i s now r e c e iv in g

more attention." Dr. Kekkonen continued:

I naturally have Finland's position in mind. Our own attitude is clear. We have already in our peace treaty committed ourselves not to acquire or manufacture 273

nuclear weapons. It follow s from our policy of neutrality that we refuse to receive such weapons on our territory on behalf of other powers. The security of Finland is closely connected with the situation of Scandinavia as a whole. The Scandina­ vian states have followed different paths in their search for security, Finland and Sweden having chosen neutrality, Denmark and Norway membership in NATO. Y et none o f them has s o u g h t to acquire n u c le a r weapons belonging to other powers on its territory. The Scandinavian states thus already in fact form a nuclear free zone. The act of confirming this through mutual undertaking would not require a change in the policies, but would significantly consolidate their own position and remove them un­ equivocally from the sphere of speculation caused by development of nuclear strategy . ^

President Kekkonen1 s proposal was received with reservation even in Sweden, and with definite rejection in

Norway. It seemed that Kekkonen now sought a guarantee from the other Scandinavian countries for the permanence of the conditions which Finland in 1961 appeared to have assumed responsibility for. The formalization of the exist­ ing conditions regarding nuclear weapons in Scandinavia might have enhanced the p o litica l freedom of movement in

Finland, but would impose unacceptable lim itations on the other Scandinavian countries without any tangible p olitical gain in return. It thus would have no chance of acceptance 38 which, no doubt, the Finns were aware of in advance.

Sweden set a general test ban as a first condition for accepting the plan, and pointed out that no part of

Soviet territory was contemplated to be included in the 39 plan. The Norwegian Foreign Minister published a 274 rejection of the idea, arguing that nothing should be done to disturb the equilibrium in Northern Europe and that "the question of nuclear free zones in Europe should find its solution in connection with the negotiations of nuclear 40 test ban treaty and disarmament."

Even though the Kekkonen Plan was rejected, Presi­ dent Kekkonen did not give up the idea or other efforts at 41 engaging Norway in a dialogue about security questions.

In a speech on November 29, 1965, he proposed neu­ tralizing the North Cap area through a Norwegian-Finnish 42 non-aggression pact. The Finnish President found that the nuclear stalemate between the United States and the

Soviet Union had changed the security considerations for the Soviet buffer states and the American alliance partners in Europe. Small states in the buffer area would seek to minimize the possibility of becoming a target. The Presi­ dent drew the conclusion that neutrality

. . . in the present stage of weapons techniques, seems to offer small states in favorable geographi­ cal position a better chance of survival in a gen­ eral war than does an alliance with one of the nuclear great powers, notwithstanding the fact that the purpose of such an alliance is precisely the achievement of maximum security in the event of war.

He seemed, however, not to contemplate any change in

Norwegian membership in NATO. Neither was any change in

the Fenno-Soviet relationship, as laid down in the 1948 pact, foreseen. Any plan for a neutral Fenno-Scandinavian 275 pact was thus unlikely; instead, he saw the possibility of neutralizing certain strategically-exposed areas such as

Lapland and the Baltic areas "where the Warsaw pact and the

NATO pact meet."*14

He found that the position of the Nordic countries had eased, not at least thanks to the new weapons carriers like the long-range m issiles which can pass over the terri­ tory of neutral countries* Defensive action can be concen­ trated in the immediate region of the points attached and satellites provide new means of observing the activities of the opponent. Thus, the value of buffer areas for defensive purposes was considerably diminished:

The importance of individual bases and of territorial claims of limited scope is lessening. An instance of the changed outlook and, incidentally, of the pro­ pitious development of Finnish-Soviet relations was the restitution of the Porkkala area, ten years ago*45

Even so, the situation could s till be improved and he, therefore, proposed a Norwegian-Finnish non-aggression pact for the North Cap region:

Although Finland’s position has been eased from the point of view of military policy, this does not mean t h a t we sh o u ld be e n t i r e l y s a t i s f i e d with the s it u a ­ tion as it is. It is natural that every State devotes incessant efforts to consolidate its politi­ cal position. At the best of times that position is never too good or even good enough. Therefore, it should be continuously kept in mind that Finland itse lf can put forward suggestions to further this end. Any such suggestion should depart from the basic fact that Finland w ill not, of its own will or on the strength of any treaty which it has signed, 276 attack another country, nor will it tolerate any such attack by another State through Finnish terri­ t o r y .

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is the main problem of international politics in our time. Five States now possess nuclear weapons; an increasing number of other States are acquiring the technical and economical means to procure them. Several political conflicts are still unresolved in various parts of the world, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons may increase the risk of a clash in which such weapons might be used, or their use threatened* Every State, therefore, if only in the interest of its own security, is duty bound to support the en­ deavours of UNO to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to put forward positive proposals to promote these endeavours. Senator Robert Kennedy, in his noted speech on October 13, 1965, in the US Senate, proposed six ways to move towards halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. His second point was the creation of nuclear-free zones.

There is reason, therefore, to revert once more to my proposal concerning a Nordic nuclear-free zone, in the hope that it may be taken as a step towards building up international security and reducing the risk of a nuclear war.

New treaty arrangements which may be proposed to consolidate Finland's security should be examined in this context. It would be in our interest that no repercussions of a possible conflict between the great powers should threaten our security. With this in mind, Finland is prepared to consider treaty arrangements with Norway that would protect the Finnish-Norwegian frontier region from possible m ilitary action in the event of a conflict between the great powers.

The agreement which I have outlined would be in the interest of both Norway and Finland as it would lessen military tension in the area of the Northern Cap in times of international crises and increase the possibilities of both countries to preserve their territorial inviolability in the event of a conflict between the great powers. Such an agree­ ment would be a link in the friendly co-operation between the Nordic countries and would put into 277

practice in this sector the line I proposed in my Stockholm speech.

Reflecting upon the position in which Finland would find herself in the event of war breaking out in Europe, it will be readily understood that my main concern has been the only zone of our land frontiers where' the NATO and Warsaw Pact spheres directly touch each other. It was Lapland's exposed position I had in mind when in my speech in Moscow, in' Febru­ ary last, I gave it as my somewhat pessimistic opinion, based on a realistic appreciation of the probabilities, that in the event of a general war breaking out in Europe we would not be able to main­ tain our neutrality. If the threat against Lapland were eliminated by an agreement between Norway and Finland, the main reason for pessimism would be removed. Finland’s land frontiers would then be safe as far as they can be made by treaties. With th e USSR, th e r e would be th e P a ct o f F r ie n d sh ip , Co­ operation and Mutual Assistance; with Norway, the treaty to maintain peace on both sides of the Finnish-Norwegian frontier, as for Sweden, its tra­ ditional and recognized non-alignment would suffice to ensure peace on our western boundary.

President Kekkonen pointed out that with such a Northern

Cap non-aggression pact with Norway there would only be one area left where Finland would desire a greater political stability: the Baltic.

The only remaining problem would then be to relieve the tension on the sea frontiers of Finland. At present, there is no procedure in sight by which peace could be guaranteed in the Baltic. The main difficulty is the unsolved problem of Germany, which is apt to maintain a state of tension in the Baltic a r ea .

On the other hand, there are unfortunately certain phenomena which may increase the risk of a conflict in the Baltic area involving serious consequences also for us. The spreading of nuclear weapons con­ trol, in any form and in any region, is a menace to world peace. A necessary condition for any easing of the situation in the Baltic is that no nuclear 2 73

weapons be placed at the disposal of either part of divided Germany, as such weapons might be used in an attempt to solve the German question by force.^

Kekkonen concluded that:

. . . if by political agreements ensuring security we could create guarantees for consolidating peace in those geographical areas; Lapland and the B altic, which are areas of immediate contact between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact groups, it seems logical that this would influence the role of national defense in our policy of neutrality.

These ideas, as his previous plan, were also rejected by Norway and Sweden.

From the above, it can readily be seen that Finland has performed an increasingly active role aimed at promoting the reduction of old, and the prevention of new, commitments 50 for Norway in NATO.

The Soviet objective has been to keep Finland from serving ao a base for hostile m ilitary powers. After the

Second World War, the Joviet Union was in a better position than ever to imp lament this policy. The cordon sanitaire was, in a sense, extended to the whole of Scandinavia, with

Finland through the policy laid down in the 19 46 friendship treaty and the Paasikivi-kekkonen line of foreign policy ensuring that an acceptable situation exists for the Soviet

Union. It is generally recognized that an important part of this tolerable balance is the absence of Western b a s e s in Norway or Denmark. I t i s in t h i s l i g h t

that we must see Soviet policy in Finland since the 279

Second World War. In fact, the foundation for Soviet for­ eign policy in the whole Scandinavian area is one of stra­ tegic consideration for her position on her North Western frontier, the Arctic and the Northern Cap area but perhaps

above all in the Baltic Sea.

VIII. THE BALTIC: MARE CLAUSUM OR

MARE LIBERUM

The traditional exclusion of Western sea power from

the Baltic has given the strongest navy in the Baltic 51 almost uncontested supremacy in that sea* In recent his­

tory, it has been German sea power that has dominated the

Baltic. In the German mind, the Baltic Sea is a body of

German water, and Germany is traditionally very conscious

of Mdas Strategische Raum Ostsee" and its vital importance

in German h i s t o r y . But a ls o in R ussian h is t o r y , th e B a lt ic

has a prominent place. Peter the Great’s building of his new

capital on the lower Neva River in 1703 has been seen as evi- 52 dence of the Russian "urge to the sea." It was both "spiri- 53 tual and geopolitical in purpose*" The city was to have an

extremely important influence in the formation of Russian

policy in the region. The return of the capital to Moscow

after the revolution did not mean political withdrawal from

the area- On the contrary, the hope was expressed that the 54 Baltic would become a "sea of the Social Revolution." 280

The apparent negation of this interest after the First

World War by Russia's recognition of the independence of the Baltic States and of Finland was the result of the weakened position of the country, after revolution and war*

As a warning to the West in 1919, during the peace

talks in Paris, a Scottish geographer, Sir Halford Mac- kinder, made an almost prophetic observation about the potential importance of the B altic for the Soviet Union:

The islanders of the world cannot be indifferent to the fate either of Copenhagen or Constantinople, or yet of the Kiel Canal, for a great power in the Heartland and East Europe could prepare within the Baltic and Black Seas for war on the ocean.

After World War I, the Baltic was practically dem ili­

tarized. Germany had defeated Russia and the West had

defeated Germany whose armaments were limited by the Ver­

sa illes Treaty. The Germany Navy was no more, and the

Russian Navy was rusting at Kronstadt. Peace reigned in

the Baltic realmj in German terms, the situation can be 56 described as "die Ruhe des Nordens." A power political

vacuum had been created favoring the Scandinavian countries,

which thus disarmed.

Soon, however, the German shipyards began the crea­

tion of a new German Navy. Especially the conditions

created by the Anglo-German Naval Convention in 1935, which

l e g a l i s e d a strong Germany N a v y , threatened a g a in to make 57 Germany the greatest naval power in the Baltic. During the Second World War, i t was the German Navy that had the last word in the Baltic. During the war, the

Baltic acquired increasing importance as a shipping lane for the Swedish iron ore to German ports, and for the sup­ port of i t s p o s itio n s in Denmark, Norway, P oland, and the

Soviet Union, free from the threat of Western sea power.

Only in the final stages of the war was the Baltic used by the Soviet Union for supply of its operations and only on a limited scale. Not until after the war, with the incor­ poration of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union and the elimination of the Germany Navy, was the position of the

Soviet Union definitely established. From then on, the

Soviet Union has been strong enough to put force behind its 58 claims in the Baltic.

There has developed in the East and West two schools of thought regarding the status of the Baltic Sea in inter­ national law. In the West, there is support for the idea 69 of an open Baltic Sea. The Soviet Union and her allies,

however, support the right of the Baltic nations to close

the entrances to outside powers.*^ The question is, how- 61 ever, one of power and politics and not of law. Besides

the legal arguments to make the Baltic a "mare clausum" a

political campaign for the creation of a Baltic "sea of

peace" was started in 1955. The idea was first voiced by

the East German leader, Walter Ulbricht, in an interview 282 with the Finnish paper, Tydkansan Sanomat. on April 15, 62 195 5. The idea has since been repeated often, especially 6 3 in Berlin and Warsaw.

During th e v i s i t o f Khrushchev, Bulganin, and

Gromyko to Helsinki in June, 1957, the Soviet delegation appealed for the creation in the Baltic of a neutral and peaceful zone for the benefit of "peace and security in 64 Northern Europe."

A joint communique of June 20, 1957, concluding the

P o lis h Prem ier Gomulka's o f f i c i a l v i s i t to East Berlin also 65 supported the idea of a neutral Baltic area.

On July 9, 195 7, Baltic neutrality was proposed by

the East German leader, Walter Ulbricht, in a speech at 6 6 Rostock* It was formed as an appeal to Denmark to reject defense cooperation with West Germany. It was also in

August of that year, during a trip by the Soviet Deputy

Premier Mikoyan to the East German Baltic coast, that the

idea of the yearly Baltic peace festivals was first pre­

sented. Mikoyan proposed this during a press conference in 6 7 S a s s n it z on August 12, 1957. In h is speech, he warned

against the setting up of a joint Danish-German naval com­

mand as a danger to the peace of the Baltic. At about the

same time, on August 20, the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn gave 68 th e German F oreign M in iste r th e same warning. 283

The press, at the time, carried stories about the rebuilding of the West German Navy, 69 per cent of which 69 was to be stationed in the Baltic- In addition, all of

West Germany’s new submarine fleet was designated for the 70 B a lt ic . The harbor of Korsgir was to become one o f the major bases for the West German Navy and several Baltic harbors were to become "bases for submarines equipped with

Polaris-type intermediate-range missiles." These m issiles have a radius of 2*500 km- and can be fitted with atomic 71 warheads. West German military leaders had made clear

they considered the Baltic entrances as a key strategic 72 position for NATO in Europe. It seems that, for the first

time since the Second World War, Soviet power in the Baltic 73 was about to be challenged. This development of German

military power and influence in Northern Europe relieved

Norway of some of her commitments of holding large standing

forces in Southern Norway. Norwegian defenses now could be 74 concentrated further North.

The campaign for the neutralization of the Baltic

was strongly rejected by all the Scandianvian countries,

including Sweden. Two articles of August 18 and 23, 195 7,

in the Government newspaper Morqontidninqen rejected the

idea and pointed out how the Baltic virtually has become a

Soviet lake. It discussed the historical, political, and

legal aspects of the problem and underlined that Sweden 284 considers the Baltic to be open to all, including non- 75 Baltic warships. The Swedish Foreign Minister Unden is 76 supposed to have been the author of these articles.

The first article examines several ways in which to neutralize the Baltic. One possibility is to keep it free from acts of war against the trade of the neutrals, as in the 18ib century when Sweden and Russia cooperated to this effect. Or, it could be made into a mare clausum in the sense that only the Baltic states would have access and exit for their naval vessels. The third possibility is to outlaw all belligerent acts in the area as, for instance, is the case with the Suez Canal. The paper finds that there must be other intentions behind the idea of a neutral

Baltic. Perhaps, it is to prevent the establishment of military bases in the area, it asks.

In the second article, the idea excluding third parties from access is rejected on the grounds that this would monopolize the power of the strongest navy in the

Baltic. The paper recognizes, however, the West German problem as paramount for the Soviet Union in this area.

The Swedish Foreign Minister later, in June, 1959, in a speech clearly explained the Swedish concept of the 77 Baltic as an international waterway, as a mare liberum.

In the mid-1950's, Germany had become the important issue even in the relationship between the Scandinavian countries 285 and the powers. Thus, the idea of the neutralization of the Baltic area must be seen in connection with the plan for the neutralization of Central Europe as presented by 78 the Polish Foreign Minister Rapachi in October, 1957.

This was later admitted by Rapachi himself in an inter- 79 view. At the same time, Premier Khrushchev launched the

Soviet campaign for a "sea of peace" in the Baltic.

The idea of a neutral Baltic sea was later tied to the concept of a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe. In a sp eech in Riga on June 11, 1 9 5 9 , Khrushchev sa id : "The USSR supports the idea of setting up an atom- and rocket-free zone 80 in the Scandinavian peninsula and the Baltic." The

Swedish Foreign Minister rejected this idea in a speech to 81 the Norden Association in Stockholm on June 26, 1959.

He said that Sweden had traditionally asserted, and would continue to assert, the freedom of the Baltic; from the point of view of international law, the inlets to the

Baltic were regarded as seaways connecting free waters, giving merchant vessels and warships of all nationalities free access to the Baltic Sea in peacetime. He could see no practical possibility of furthering peace in the Baltic by "neutralizing" its waters and prohibiting actions of warships or military installations in the area. Free access

to the Baltic was in the interest of Sweden and in accord­

ance with the general interests that seas should not be

monopolized by any state or group of states. As for a 286

Baltic Scandinavian nuclear free zone, he said that there is only one country in the area with m issile weapons; 8 2 namely, the Soviet Union.

IX. CONCLUSION

There is, as we have seen in this chapter, an inti­ mate connection between the international position of Fin­ land and Norway; without actually being a subsystem in the postwar international system, the problems of the area— from the Baltic entrances to the Spitsbergen archipelago— 83 are all intimately connected. They are also mainly strategic in nature and related to two overall important factors: the location of the area on the North Western

Flank of the Soviet Union, and its control of the sea lanes connecting Soviet waters with the Atlantic. 84

We have examined the Norwegian conditional member­ ship in NATO, her policy regarding bases, and found that it is of the greatest consequence for the relationship between

the Soviet Union on the one hand and the rest of Scandinavia, but Finland in particular, on the other hand. We confirmed

that Norway’s conditional clause in NATO is related to the

position of her Scandinavian neighbors and not only to

Norway's own relationship to the Soviet Union or to internal

political conditions. 287

From this relationship between the policies of, in particular, Norway and Finland has emerged the concept of a balance between interests and influences of the big powers in Northern Europe—which has been g en era lly held as a justification for and affirmation of the correctness of

Norwegian foreign policy.

The Norwegian ban on nuclear weapons or foreign bases on Norwegian soil in peacetime, as well as the policy regarding the Kekkonen Plan, has in Norway found its theo­ retical foundation in the concept of the so-called Nordic balance. This means that the Norwegian commitment to NATO must not go so far as to force the Soviet Union to streng­ then its influence in Finland. Norway has especially, by its base policy ever since 1949, been careful not to risk 86 such a development. Conversely, Norwegian NATO membership has here found its own inner justification; any change in

t h i s u p se ts the balance of power in Northern Europe.

The three elements of the balance—the Norwegian

base policy in NATO, the Faasikivi-Kekkonen line of foreign

policy in Finland, and the non-alignment of Sweden—have

remained unaltered and the situation has, as we have seen,

been accepted not only by the Soviet Union, but also by the

United States. As demonstrated, for instance, by the U-2

in c id e n t and the Fenno-Sovlet c r i s i s in 1961, the Western

powers, as well as the Soviet Union, have, in fact, accepted 288 a state of affairs in Northern Europe which oblige them to be careful not to infringe upon the area in any way. The

Nordic balance has been upheld, and it seems that the con­ cept was valid and useful as a guideline for Norway’s role.

The Kekkonen Plan for a Nordic nuclear free zone

conceived by President Urho Kekkonen in the spring of 1963

can, however, be seen as the Finnish concept of the Nordic

Balance. It was rejected by Norway precisely because it

threatens to upset the equilibrium in Northern Europe. The

Finnish and Soviet argument, on the other hand, is that, if

there, in fact, was a balance of sorts to start with, it

would soon be destroyed if Germany was permitted to expand

its political and military influence in Northern Europe.

This is exactly what Germany, according to the Soviet and

Finnish view, threatened to do starting with the early

1 9 5 0 's.

Assuming that Russian policy was aimed at creating a

belt of buffer states or a cordon sanitaire in East Europe,

the Baltic Sea, together with Finland, was an area of great

importance in this connection. Only here was there an open

body of water closer to the heart of the Soviet industrial

areas than any area in Western Europe. But as long as

th ere was no German Navy and the p o lic y of the W estern

powers was designed merely to contain the Soviet Union, she

did not need to feel any threat in the Baltic. The Soviet 289

Union could, therefore, withdraw from Bornholm in 1945 and the Porkala base in Finland in 1955. But with the revival o f German naval power in the B a l t ic and e sp e cia lly the pos­ sibilities discussed in the early 1960's that this naval power should be enhanced with nuclear capability, the Soviet

Union showed renewed concern for her position in the Baltic.

This emergence of a challenge to the Soviet supremacy in the Baltic Sea affected also the relationship between the Soviet Union and Norway. The character of this rela­ tionship and its dependence upon the general balance of power in Europe was clearly demonstrated by the crisis in

Finland in 1961. While the crisis can be seen as the first test for the Norwegian concept of the Nordic balance, it also became apparent how important a consideration the growing German p o l i t i c a l and m ilit a r y power was for the

Soviet Union in Northern Europe. In fact, the crisis can be seen and explained in terms of the emerging German role in Northern Europe.

It started with a Soviet note to Finland on October

30, 1961, r e q u e stin g m ilita r y c o n su lta tio n s because West

Germany's activity in the Baltic and Northern Europe con­ stituted a threat to the Soviet Union. This resulted in a meeting between Kekkonen and Khrushchev in Novosibirsk, but c o n s u lta tio n s never a c tu a lly took place; Russia did receive guarantees about the continuation of the Kekkonen 290 foreign policy line. In this connection the Soviet Union may also have considered the possibility of Norway revising her policy on foreign bases as a countermove ot any change in the neutral status of Finland. The Norwegian Foreign

Minister, at any rate, shortly afterwards addressed the

Norwegian Storting and responded, in fact, to the Soviet move by s t a t in g , in e f f e c t , th a t any change in the s i t u a ­ tion in Northern Europe might require Norway to review her defense pol.icies--meahihg, no doubt, her atomic and base p o lic y .

Also, Swedenfs status must have been a consideration for the Soviet Union. Sweden declared, at the time, ex­ plicitly that there would be no re-examination of Swedish foreign policy in the direction of NATO membership. In

spite of these assurances, however, the possibility of a re­ examination of Swedish foreign policy could not have been

excluded.

Whether because of the operation of the Nordic balance or not, the Soviet request had no further conse­

quences for Finland, Finland did, however, assume the

responsibility of keeping the Baltic-Scandinavian area

under surveillance and to request consultations with the

Soviet Union if she should find that "the peace in Northern

Europe" was threatened. 291

As has been demonstrated, President Kekkonen en­ visaged an even more active role for Finland to, in fact, preventing any such threat by actively promoting the neu­

tralization of the area. This role was demonstrated by the presentation in 1963 of the Kekkonen Plan for the estab­

lishment of a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe.

This idea was rejected by the other Scandinavian

countries arguing that the area was already, in effect, a

nuclear free zone. The rejection was not unexpected and,

it has been suggested that this may be an explanation why

Finland has so freely advocated the plan. Its realization would in the view of her Scandinavian neighbors not serve

Finnish interests either, because it would limit the means

which Norway and the other Scandinavian countries can

employ on behalf cf Finland^ the flexibility of their

alliance, as well as their base and atomic policy, would

be sharply curtailed* 292

FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER VII

■^During th e First World War, the communist movement was suppressed in Finland with the help of German troops, and the co u n tr y entered the war a g a in s t R u ss ia on th e German side. A peace treaty was signed with Soviet Russia at Dorpat (Tartu, Estonia) on October 14, 1920, when Petchenga (Petsamo) was ceded to Finland. 2 In the interwar period, sympathies in the leading political and military circles in Finland were, no doubt, pro-German. In this period, when the German Navy became the controlling factor in the Baltic, Russia again showed considerable attempts to obtain a greater measure of security for Leningrad,

On October 5, 1939, the USSR invited a Finnish delegation to Moscow to discuss political questions. Fin­ land sent Juho K. Paasikivi, Minister to Sweden, as a delegate to the peace conference of 1920. The Soviet Government asked for a thirty-year lease of the port of Hankt as a naval base and for the cession of part of the Karelian Isthmus and various smaller ports of Finnish territory. Soviet demands totaled 1.066 square miles in strategic locations, for which Finland was to receive as compensation 2,135 square miles north of Lake Ladoga. Fin­ land was also to dismantle its fortifications across the Karelian Isthmus. 3 Against the advice of Paasikivi, Finland did not give in to the Russian demands; and, on November 30, 1939, Soviet troops proceeded to acquire the desired territories. Promise of British and French aid for Finland and actual German aid was forthcoming; and, on December 14, 1939, the League of Nations expelled the Soviet Union from membership as an aggressor.

Most authors today, however, agree that Russia in 1939 was motivated by defensive military considerations in her policy toward Finland.

After the first Winter War and defeat when the 1940 Moscow agreement permitted Finland a precarious independence, Paasikivi was justified in his belief that certain terri­ torial concessions from Finland was sufficient for the Russian needs now—as in the past.

In the period between the wars until the outbreak of the continuation war in June, 1941, Paasikivi served as 293 minister to Moscow. He was working to implement the peace terms, but in Finland, the government was creating circum­ stances for a renewed struggle with the Soviet Union by opening F in nish t e r r it o r y fo r the German army.

When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Finland joined Germany hoping to regain their lost territories. Before being defeated, Finnish troops even went further and conquered Petrozavodsk on September 30, 1941.

Paasikivi, Finland's negotiator on 1920 and 1940, who had disagreed with this policy again had to start peace talks with the Russians in 1944. He went first to Stock­ holm where he met Madame Aleksandra Kolotay, the Soviet Minister, and at the end of March he went to Moscow. The USSR insisted on the re-establishment of the 1940 frontiers and, in addition, asked the secession of Petsamo, and a payment of $600,000,000 indemnity. Finland had to agree. Two modifications were, however, made. The Soviet naval base was moved from Hankfi to Porkala and the reparations were cut in half. A result of the armistice was the Fin­ nish engagement of German troops in the North, under Col. Gen. Lothar Rendulic who retreated into Northern Norway. Finland also had to disband all fascist or anti-Soviet organizations and try her wartime leaders for war crime. The newly-elected President Mannerheim appointed Paasikivi Prime Minister to implement the terms of the armistice which was also controlled by an allied control commission under de facto Soviet leadership of Andre Zhdanov.

For further studies, see John H. Wuorinen (ed.), Finland and World War II 1939-1944 (New York: Ronald, 1948')”, which defends the Finnish policies. A critical view i s found in Rolf Tj&rngren, "The N e u tr a lity o f F in la n d ,1’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXIX (July, 1961), pp. 601-609. 4 Otto Kuusinen, "Finland's New Foreign Policy," New Times /Moscow/. No. 15 (April 11, 1947), p. 3. g Writers have attempted to explain why Finland has not been forced to a complete subordination under the Soviet Union. Some authors have tried to explain it as evidence of Stalin's fond feelijigs for the Finns, who so courageously have stood up to him;_£for instance, see Hudson Strode, Finland Forever (New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1952), p. 45^7/ or of his indebtedness to Finland for refuge he found there in the revolutionary years; _/for instance, Arthur Spencer, "Finland Maintains Democracy,11 Foreign A ffairs. Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (January, 1953), p. 304^/- 294

A ccord in g to the memoirs of Arvo Tuominen, there was an a ttem p t by F in n ish communists to sta g e a coup at the time when the Finnish delegation was in Moscow to negotiate the treaty- It was only thwarted because of the communist M in is te r o f I n t e r io r , Leino, who warned the Army General S ik vo ab ou t i t , on March 19. See Arvo Tuominen, Maan Alla Ja P&&1M (Helsinki: Tammi, 1958), p. 206. 7 For f u l l t e x t , see Appendix V. Q Thus, it is hardly correct that the treaty was relatively "meaningless" as contended by, for instance, Stefan T* Possony, A Century of Conflict (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), p. 295. 9 Strode, _o£. c it., p. 45.

attempt w ill be made here to see any relationship between these two events,

11John H. Hodgson, "The Paasikivi L in e," The American Slavic and East European Review. XVIII (April, 1959), 166. 12 I z v e s t i a . September 19, 1954. 13 This has been seen as the price to be paid. See Roland P&lsson, varldskris och VSpnad Neutralitet (Stockholm: Tidens Fttrlag, 1957), p. 54.

■^It must be recalled that the Soviet also withdrew from Austria in August, 1955. The emphasis was trade and peaceful coexistence, and Finland was held out as an example.

^5The New York Times, September 20, 1955-

^^Helsinqin Sanomat /Helsinki7, June 9, 1957, p. 12. 17 Pravda, April 6, 1960. During President KekkonenTs v isit to Great Britain in the spring of 1961 and in the United States in the fall the same year Finland gained recognition also in the West as a "neutral." The communi­ q u es r e f l e c t t h i s . Kekkonen saw i t as h is f i r s t major task to win general recognition for the neutrality of Finland, He succeeded in this. During the 20tb Party Congress in Moscow in April, 1956, Finland was mentioned together with Sweden and Austria as a neutral state. Later, more recog­ nition to this effect has been forthcoming, Pravda. for instance on the 12tli anniversary of the pact of 1948, wrote: "The agreement is an international juridical document which 295 confirms Finland's neutrality, and Finland's neutrality policy is one which stabilizes the situation in Northern Europe to the advantage of all the peoples living in the area -" 18 This has, for example, been recognized by the Fin­ nish Foreign Minister Tdrngren in a speech on June 17, I960. "Our country has won recognition for her policy of neutrality . . . greatly aided by the Swedish alliance-free policy . . . ." Hufoudstadsbladet« June 18, 1960. 19 — — Quoted in Maakonsa ./Helsinki/, January 23, 1952; and also in Pravda, January 27, 1952. 20 Quoted in Helsinqin Sanomat, April 26, 1955. 21 Ibid. , December 11, 1958. 22 Reported by Seymour Toppin in The New York T ime s , November 18, 1961. 23 Another important crisis in Soviet-Finnish relations occurred in 1958 when the Soviet Union, in effect, refused to accept a Social Democrat in the Finnish cabinet. This has been discussed in Kalevi J. Holsti, "Strategy and Tech­ niques of Influence in Soviet-Finnish Relations," Western Political Quarterly. Vol. XVII, No. 1 (March, 1964), pp. 63-82. 24 The Baltic command was then under discussion and was to be composed of German and Danish units. 2 5 Text in The New York Times + October 31, 1961.

Ib id . , November 15, 1961.

27Holsti, op. cit. . p. 79. ? ft Hufoudstadsbladet, November 21, 1961. 2 9 Arbeiderbladet, November 1, 1961. 30 See The New York Tim es, November 21, 1961. The Soviet note to Finland in 1961 started speculations as to the Soviet motives. Mr. Hanson Baldwin of The New York Times, for instance, found that the note was a Soviet re­ action to the strengthening of NATO in Northern Europe. See The New York Tim es, November 6, 1961. He b e lie v e d th a t its purpose was to discourage closer cooperation between 296

West Germany and the Scandinavian NATO members so th at Norway and Denmark would be discou raged from e sta b lish in g effective control over Skagerak and Kattegat; the strategi­ cally important connecting waters between the Baltic and the North Sea.

French observers saw it as an attempt to obtain recog­ n it io n o f E ast Germany or a warning a g a in st West German atomic rearmament, see France Soir. November 18, 1961. One expert believed that the crises were primarily used to influence the course of Finnish domestic policies— to ensure the re-election of President Kekkonen, see Holsti, op. cit.. pp. 77-81. 31 Arbeiderbladett November 22, 1961. 32 Full text of communique in The New York Times, November 26, 1961.

33The New York T im es, November 27, 1961. 34 For a more detailed discussion of the Presidential and Parliamentary election in 1961, see Kalevi J* Holsti, MThe USSR and Finnish Electoral P olitics."Canadian Forum. May, 1962, pp. 31-32. 35 Xavestia, on March 23, 1963, referred to an article in a Greek paper, according to which the United States and Germany had made an agreement about s ta tio n in g P olaris sub­ marines in German Baltic and North Sea harbors.

3^Arbeiderbladet, April 1, 1963.

3^The Times, May 29, 1963. 3 9 The conclusion is, therefore, near that the whole idea of a nuclear free zone may be an exercise for the benefit of Moscow— and an exercise that is relatively harm­ less to the other Scandinavian countries because rejection i s made e a sy . 3 Q Stockholms Tldninqen, May 29, 1963^ The Swedish position was given by Foreign Minister Unden already in a speech at a meeting of the Norden Society on June 26, 1959, where he rejected the idea of a neutralization of the Baltic. The speech is printed in Nils Andren and Ake Land- quist, Svensk Utrikspolitik efter 1945 (Stockholm: Alm- quist, Wiksell, 1965), pp. 253-257. 297

4^Press release, "Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 6, 1963,T1 printed in Arbelderbladet. June 7, 1963. 41 The idea was presented again during the Nordic For­ eign Ministers' meeting in Stockholm in September, 1963, when the Finns wanted it included in the communique—con­ trary to usual practice. Tomas Torsvik, "Tanker om nordisk samarbeid," Samtiden. Vol. LXXIII, No- 10 (Oslo, 1963), p. 654. 42 Speech delivered by the President of the Republic, Urho Kekkonen, to a meeting of the Foreign Policy Youth Society, on November 29, 1965, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki, Press Bureau, Mimeographed. 43 I b id . 44 * I b id . 45 Ibid.

46lbid.

47lb id .

48I b id . 49 The Washington Post, December 1, 1965. His idea was again presented in a speech in Vasa on January 6, 1967. A Norwegian Foreign Office press release the next day re­ jects the idea by asking how such ideas can contribute to peace and reduction of tensions. 50 This policy did not change after the Social Demo­ crats won the majority in the elections in 1966* V&ind L eskinen, member o f th e F in nish Riksdag and a s o c ia l demo­ crat had an interview with Arbeiderbladet. October 24, 1966, and confirmed this. Previously strongly critical of Moscow, he advocated an active role for Finland in improv­ ing the relationship between the Soviet Union and Scandi­ n av ia . 51 The Baltic Sea is also considered to include the waters around the Danish isles and thus includes the body of water between Denmark and the west coast of Sweden, called Kattegat. The kattegat and the channels around the Danish isle; the (Sresund; the Little Belt and the Great B e lt. 298

These Narrows are too shallow for easy navigation by larger ships. Evan 0resund, which is the most important channel, twenty-three feet deep, is not deep enough for larger ocean liners.

Because the outlets of the Baltic are so narrow and shallow, it is virtually a lake. The low salinity, thus, results in a long winter freeze-up of the ports. Even Stralsund in the southernmost portion of the Baltic and close to its entrance has on the average about one month of ice trouble. In the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia, the harbors freeze over for as much as three or four months during the winter.

For a good description of the ice conditions in the Baltic, see W. R. Mead, An Economic Geography of the Scan­ dinavian S ta tes and Finland (London: U n iv ersity of London P ress, L td ., 1958), pp. 51-67. 52 Robert J. Kerner, The Urge to the Sea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 1.

A criticism of this theory is put forth by John A. Morrison, "Russia and Warm Water," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXVII, No. 11, p. 117. “

His theory that there has been a conscious urge to the sea elsewhere from the core of the Valdai Hills is held as doubtful. The Cossacks of Yermak did have furs and gold as a driving force, and the Russians have never been taught that they have to expand until they reached the sea.

The Scandinavian legen d about the Russian aim of reaching the Norwegian coast stemming from the time Finland was ceded to Russia during the Napoleonic wars is discussed in V. Whitford (Rudolf H olsti), "Russia, Finland and Scan­ dinavia," Contemporary Review. CII (August 1912), 212-220. 53 A. J. Toynbee, A Study of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 283.

^Quoted by August Rei, Nazi Soviet Conspiracy and the Baltic States: Diplomatic Documents and Other Evidence (London: Boreas Publishing Co., 1948), p. 27, and drawn from Izvestia, December 25, 1948. 55 Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1942), pp. 172-173. In this book, first written as a warning to the peacemakers in 1919, 299 the Scottish geographer, Sir Halford J. Mackinder, outlined his theory about the pivotal importance of the East European plan, and the role of the Baltic in this connection. He saw the great improvement in land transportation inevitably leading to the unity of the interior of the Eurasian land- mass as sea transportation had done to the Western World. He foresaw a vast economic world here ''inaccessible to oceanic commerce," and this challenge to Western sea powers: 11 * . . but had Germany conqu ered, sh e w ould have established her sea-power on a wider base than any in history, and in fact on the widest possible base.'1 Mac- kinder, op. cit., p. 62. 5 6 Siewert Wulf, Per Ostseeraum (Berlin: B. G. Treubner, 193B ), p. 70. 5 7 Discussed in Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy and Soviet Russia (London: Chatto & Windus, 1947}, 1:133-134. The Aaland Islands, demilitarized through the Aaland Con­ vention of October 20, 1921, became the symbol of Soviet interest in the Baltic. With the growing strength of the German Navy in the winter war period, the Soviet Union became increasingly satisfied with the demilitarized status of the islands. Thus, when Finland partially fortified the islands in the early summer of 1939, it resulted in Soviet p r o te s ts. See Werner von Harpe, Die S o v ie t u n io n . F in la n d und Skandinavien, 1945-1955 (TUbingen: Btthlau-Verlag, 1956), p. 41.

When, during April and August of 193 9, British, French, and Russian negotiations were held in Moscow to discuss cooperation against Germany. The Soviet Union pro­ posed that Finland be persuaded to agree to make the Aaland Islands an allied base. How highly important the islands were considered by the Soviet Union can also be seen in the negotiations with Germany at the end of August, 1939, when, during the formation of the H itler-Stalin pact, Russia stipulated that, in case of war, she would never tolerate a German occupation of the islands. Finally, in connection with the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty of March 12, 1940, Finland was committed to demilitarize the islands completely. This ruling was reinforced in Article 9 of the peace treaty of September 19, 1944. r q She has, for instance, been able to enforce her claim of a twelve-mile territorial lim it in the Baltic by shooting down in 1952 an American plane that allegedly crossed her borders and shortly afterwards the Swedish planes that came looking for it. See about this, Sweden, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Attacks upon two Swedish 300

Aircraft over the Baltic in June 1952 (Stockholm: Bok- trykkeriet, P. A. Norstedt & SOner, 1952), New Series, 1 1 :2 .

Also discussed in Gene Glenn, "Soviet-Swedish Terri­ torial Sea Controversy in the Baltic," American Journal of International Law, Vol. L, No. 4 (October, 1956), p. 947.

Sweden has not accepted the S o v iet tw elve-m ile t e r r i ­ torial limit in the Baltic, but "has been forced to take de facto account of it," 0sten Unden in UtrikesfrSqor (Stock- holm: Tiden, 1952), p. 30. 59 See Hans-Albert Reinkemeyer, Die Sowietische Zwolf- meilenzone in der Ostsee und die Freiheit der Meere (Kdln- Berlin, 1955); Wollfgang Httpker, "Um die Neutraligierung der Ostsee," Ostenrapa. February, 1958, p. 106; and Walter Hubatsch, /m Bannkreis der Ostsee (Marburg: Elwert, Grdfe and Unzer, 1948). 60 Rudolf Arzinger, "Vtilkerrechtlicher Status der Ostsee und NATO-Strategie, 11 Deutsche Aussenpolitik No. 6, (Berlin, June 1958), pp. 550-558.

Further Eastern views are presented in two articles by A. Pogodin, "Concerning Danish and Norwegian Foreign Policy and Bonn's strategic plans for the Baltic," Inter­ national Affairs /Moscow/ for September and October, 1960. I In 1947, the Soviet Union presented a plan for the n e u tr a liz a tio n of the B a ltic in a handbook, Mezdmarodnve Pravo. in which the id ea o f a B a ltic "Mare Clausum" was expounded. This is discussed in Gene W. Glenn, "The Troubled Baltic," The American Scandinavian Review, XLIV, No. 2 (June, 1956), 139. Already in 1946, the Soviet Government had taken up the legal status of the question of the Baltic Sea with Denmark's Foreign Minister, then v isit­ ing Moscow in connection with the negotiation of a trade agreement. Moscow had also inquired in London as to the possibilities of control of the entrance to the Sea by the States concerned. According to the Copenhagen daily, Information, August 16, 1946, the British replied that the Danish Belts were subject to the existing international law governing the status of international straits.

The Soviet position was re-emphasized in a scholarly article by S. U. Molodotsov in 1950, in the magazine, Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i. pravo (Journal of the Law Institute of Soviet Academy of Sciences), No. 5, 1950. He maintains 301 that the countries around the Baltic possess both the his­ toric and legal right to blockade the Baltic entrances to all foreign warships. The author disputes the contention by Western legal experts that there is unlimited access to th e B a lt ic by a l l merchant and naval v e s s e l s and contends that the 0resund Treaty of 185 7, to some degree, gives the Baltic states a right to determine the position of the Sund and close it for naval ships from non-Baltic nations. It is not correct, according to the article, that Denmark has e x c lu s iv e r ig h t to regulate the c o n d itio n s of the Baltic entrances. The author says that the Soviet Union already in 1924, during the disarmament conference in Rome, proposed to close the Sund and the Belt for naval vessels o f a n o n -B a ltic power, which he sees as a le g a l h isto r ical right of the Baltic States. This article is discussed in von Harpe, 0 £. cit., p. 45. 6 2 German Democratic Republic, Pokumente zur aussen- politik der Reqierunq der DDR, Bd. 2 tBerlin, 1955), pY 520. 6 3 On May 7, 1957, a Danish newspaper, Berlinqske Tidende, In a dispatch from Vienna made known that East Germany was working on a plan for the neutralization of the B a l t i c . A ll cou n tries around the B a ltic sh ould , in common, guarantee the neutrality of the Baltic in case of another w ar. The im portant country in such a p la n would be Denmark, holding the key to the entrances. According to the article, the Danish Government would be told that its NATO member­ ship was no hindrance for participation in such a limited neutrality treaty. The treaty would be in accordance with the UN Charter. At about the same time, the Baltic, as a peace­ ful sea, was advocated in an article by Gdran von Bonsdorff, " S o v ie t F in n ish Relations and__Peace in N orthern Europe," International Affairs /Moscow/, No. 6, 1957.

The communique of the v i s i t o f June 13, 1957, does not, however, specifically mention the Baltic as a sea of p e a c e .

^ Neues Deutschland. June 19, 1957.

66Printed in ibid.. July 10, 1957.

^ I b id . , August 13, 1957,

^HeSpker, _o]3. c it., p. 110.

G9As a result of the outbreak of the Korean War, in th e summer o f 1950, the NATO council had decided, in i t s 302 meeting in Brussels in December, 1950, to create a common command system in Europe with one supreme commander. For a discussion of the constitutionality in Norway of this, see Einar Lichen, "Nasjonal Suverenitet og Internasjonalt Samarbeid," Internasional Politikk. No. 10 (1953), pp. 220- 229. SHAPE was created on April 2, 1951. In March, Eisen­ hower announced the division of his area of command into Northern, Central, and Southern regions under international commanders. Western Europe, General Eisenhower later ex­ plained, had been thought of as "an u ltim a te stron gh old flanked by two defended r e g io n s ,11 w ith "Norway and Denmark as the one buttress, Italy and adjacent waters as the other, and the central mass as the main structure." The Northern Command was assigned to a British Admiral, Sir Patrick Brind. First Annual Report of the Supreme Commander in Europe, in The New York Times, April 2, 1952. It should be noted that because of the fact that NATO is a regional multilateral pact defense, cooperation with any country in the pact is possible, such as, for instance, a Danish- German command. 70 _ Die Welt /Hamburg/, August 3, 1957.

7^Politikken /Copenhagen/, August 29, 1957. 72 General Heusinger in Das Parlament, September 5, 1956, and Vice Admiral Ruge in Die Welt, July 2, 1957, The leader of the West German Navy recognized the importance of the Baltic when he declared "dass die Ostsee weiter in den Raum eines mttglichen Gegeurs hinein ftihre und fUr ihn eine offen e Flanke b le ib e . Es ktinne entscheidend w ic h tig werden, wenn man gegendie offene Flanke aktiv werde, urn den ver- blAndeten SeamSchten den Eugang, zu diesem Gebiet offen- suhalten, damit sie hier ihire kampfmettel zum Einsatz bringen," Reqierunqs-Bulletin /Bonn/, November 11, 1954.

The importance of the Baltic entrances have also been appreciated in this quotation by Ruge, who points out: "As long as the Danish Straits remain in Western hands, no Russian submarines from the Baltic can threaten Atlantic shipping lanes, and 600 miles of Communist-dominated coast will remain under pressure from Western sea powers." From Friedrich Ruge, Per Seekrleq. trans. M. G. Sanders, R. N. (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1957), p. 40. 73 This development could have been anticipated already since October 23, 1950, when the Paris accords decided to make Germany the f if t e e n t h member o f NATO. Germany was to 303 contribute thirteen hundred tactical aricraft, twelve army d iv is io n s , and some naval c r a f t . What was contained in the term "some naval craft" was explained by General Gruenther in a Senate hearing on March 26, 1955. He said it was because "there would be only a few light craft that would generally operate in the Baltic." (p. 5). As to how the German forces could counterbalance the Soviet forces, the answer was not German forces alone, but "those forces plus the use of atomic weapons and not merely 12 German divisions /portion deleted7." (p. 6).

The United States concept, he said, is "to defend with a forward strategy . . . only possible when we have a German contribution. We should force Soviet forces to con­ centrate. . . . When German forces are effective in 3-4 years, we will be able to implement this kind of strategy. Thus there are two fundamental elements in our strategy: German contribution and atomic weapons."

That the Baltic must have been a central concern in con n ection w ith the rearmament o f Germany can a lso be seen from the communique of the NATO Council meeting in Paris in December, 1952: "Final Communique of Meeting of NATO Coun­ cil, Paris, December 15-18, 1952," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII, No. 706 (January 5, 1953), pp. 3-4.

In his remarks to the Council, Secretary Acheson said th a t, in September, 1950, a t the m eeting in New York, the suggestion of a unified command had been put forward: "At the same time it was pointed out by our military advisers th a t in order to have any e f f e c t iv e defen se of Europe it had to be a defense as far east as possible, and that was particularly important to the northern members of this organization— the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway . . . and in working on that plan it became perfectly clear that it was not workable unless Germany took part in its own d efen se and in the d efen se o f Europe. But the problem was how to do that and we adjourned that meeting without coming to a conclusion." Department of State Bulletin, op. cit., pp. 5-7. 74 Norway was the first country to ratify the decision to rearm Germany. It was ratified by the Storting on November 25, 1954, by France and Germany i t s e l f not before the spring of 1955. It has been suggested that the reason for the quick action was that an opinion against it in Norway was starting to consolidate. Thus, ratification was needed before that happened. In the Labor Party weekly, Kontakt, voices had been raised in opposition—then in the 304

fall of 1954 it ceased publication for economical reasons. D iscu ssed by Harald LtfvSs and Hans Stokland, "20 Lange &r," Radikal Debatt. No. 1, 1965, pp. 22-23. 75 M orqontidninqen. August 18 and 23, 195 7. 7 9 HgSpker, ^0£* cit., p. 107.

^^Utrikesf rgtqor, 1959, pp. 22-23. 7 Q The Rapacki Plan was presented in a revised version on March 28, 1962, by the Polish delegation during the dis­ armament negotiations in Geneva. It proposed a nuclear free zone of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and both Germanies— that other European states may join, however.

The s o - c a lle d Gomulka plan was f i r s t presen ted by Gomulka in a speech of December 28, 1963, and later in d e t a il presen ted to se v e r a l c o u n tr ie s—*to Norway in a memo­ randum o f February 29, 1964, I t c a ll s fo r fr e e z in g o f atomic armaments in the two Germanies, Poland, and Czecho­ slo v a k ia . 79 Die W elt, December 11, 195 7.

®°Neues Deutschland. June 12, 1959. SI Stockholms Tidninqen. June 27, 1959. This question is also discussed in AKe Jacobsen, "Fredssoner i Nordeuropa," Kontakt med Krigsmakten. Vol. XV, No. 5 (1959), pp. 5-9; and Anton Kalgren, "Svensk utrikespolitik i sovjetisk belysning," Svensk Tidskrift. Vol. XLVII, No. 1 (1960), pp. 38-39. QO Keesinqf s Contemporarv Archives. 1959, K 17038, 9 3 The concep t o f "B alto-Scandinavia" by many i s seen as a meaningful political concept also in the postwar world. As observed by the only surviving German geopolitician, Otto Maull: "Man kann die Gemeinsamheiten der Lender um die deutschen Meere leicht und auch theoretisch als so wirkningsvoll erkennen, dass man darauf eine politische Lebensgemeinschaft zu grUnden vermtichte." Otto Maull, Politische Geoqraphie (Berlin: Safari Verlag, 1956), p. 637.

QA The a c c e ss through the D ardanelles and the Medi­ terranean are excluded as practically irrelevant in this connection. The Dardanelles are too easily closed with 305 modern weapons and do, furthermore, not give immediate access to the Atlantic. For this reason, too, it seems that there is a definite northward displacement of naval strategy from the Dardanelles, Gibraltar, and Malta to the B e lts and Spitsbergen. 3 5 This has also been explained by the Norwegian For­ eign Minister, Halvard Lange, in T1 Scandinavian Cooperation in International Affairs," International Affairs, Vol. XXX, No. 3 (July, 1954), pp. 285-293.

It has been contended that this Nordic balance al­ ready amounts to a partial neutralization of the whole area. Richard J. Kerry, "Norway and Collective Defense Organiza­ tion," International Organization. XVII (1963), 860-871.

One Norwegian author finds that there is no balance at all. The reason he thinks that the country is a de facto neutral is because her base policy is no longer open for debate. He points to a threatening buildup of Soviet forces close to the Norwegian border, and concludes that the Soviet Union has a lot to gain by acquiring ice free ports in Northern Norway, which, he thinks, they can do by a quick strike before any reaction can be contemplated in the West. Nils 0rvik, "Norges sikkerhet og den nordiske balanse," Internasjonal Folitikk, II and III (1964), p. 233. His argument in favor of changing Norwegian base policy is also presented in English in, Nils 0rvik, Europe1s Northern Cap and the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Center for International Affairs, 1963). CHAPTER V I I I

CONCLUSIONS

The decisive period for Northern Europe after the

Second World War was the fifteen months between January,

1948, and April, 1949. During this period, the Scandina­ vian countries had their relationship to the great powers clearly defined. In this connection, Norway played a decisive role.

Sweden tried, in concert with the other Scandinavian countries, to fill the political vacuum created by the defeat of Germany In 1945, but it stranded on the Norwegian position. Initially, the conditions had seemed to favor the Swedish idea. The powers had withdrawn from the area*

But Norway directed her attention towards the newly-created

United N ation s and not to the I s s u e of a c l o s e r S ca n d in a ­ vian p o l i t i c a l and m ilitary co o p e ra tio n .

Sweden later offered the other Scandinavian coun­ tries a defense pact, hoping she would be able to provide a solution to the Norwegian defense problem and, thereby, avoiding great power influence close to her borders; she wanted to create an area in Northern Europe of armed neu­ trality and disengagement, A great power foothold in

Scandinavia, on the other hand, it was felt, would greatly reduce the chances of Sweden avoiding involvement in another great power struggle* Thus, Sweden wanted to re­ move the possibility of conflict as far as possible from her own territory* A Scandinavian defense pact would, in that sense, be Sweden’s own cordon sanitalre.

That this failed can be explained in terms of Norway’ preference for the broader Atlantic Alliance which, at that time, had presented itself* But, as it turned out, mainly because of the Norwegian rejection of foreign bases, an area of actual disengagement was created between the North

Sea and the Fenno-Soviet border. Thus, the Norwegian no 1 icy partial ly satisfied the Swedish wishes and was, in a sense, compromise with the Swedish proposal for a neutral Scandi­ navian Fact.

The examination of events in 19 48-19 49 has shown that the Swedish concept of a neutral pact was made quite clear to the Norwegian Government from the start of the negotiations. The Norwegian stand was more ambiguous, how­ ever, and critics have argued that it is not quite certain when the Norwegian demands for some form o f t i e s to the West were made absolutely clear to the Swedes* It has been asked why the Scandinavian defense negotiations could take place at all; a Scandinavian Pact, according to the Norwegian concept, would have defeated the purpose of the Swedish proposal. The explanation has bean offered by the oppo­ sition that many Labcrites may have preferred not to join the West and to join Sweden instead; thus to obtain the 308 necessary consensus, it had to be demonstrated that a Scan­

dinavian Pact was unfeasible.

The failure of the Scandinavian defense negotiations

have in Norway variably been explained in terms of either

the incom patibility of the Swedish and Norwegian views as

to the degree of neutrality of such a pact or, at other

tim es, in terms o f the American refusal to s e l l arms to a

neutral Scandinavian bloc.

The latter argument, however, as has been demon­

strated, is hardly credible; no serious attempt to obtain

such deliveries was ever made; besides, Sweden did not make

it a condition for the pact to come into effect that such

arms be obtained.

The argument, on the other hand, that the Norwegian

and Swedish concepts of such a pact were incompatible is

correct, but it shrouds in ideological terms the real issue;

in Norway a broader Atlantic grouping was preferred to a

pact dominated by Sweden with all the long-term conse­

quences that it would entail. This choice can easily be

explained in terms of Norway's recent political history and

by the s tr u c tu r e of her trade and economy.

The conclusion has, therefore, been drawn that, in

spite of the rejection both in Moscow and Washington of a

neutral Scandinavian Pact, this opposition could not have 309 prevented its realization if Norway had been willing to join a Scandinavian Pact on Swedish terms.

It has been argued by proponents of the Scandinavian

Tact that ■ , if the three countries had held together and bargained together in Washington in 194S-1P49, the result might have been different. But this argument misses the main point: what really was behind the breakdown of the

Scandinavian defense negotiations was that the Swedish pro­ posal was unacceptable to Norway. This may imply not only a rejection of the Swedish concent of neutrality but may also be seen as a r e je c tio n of c lo s e r lin k s w ith Sweden as such:,

the fear of Swedish domination perhaps outweighed any appre­

hensions about a pact dominated by the United States.

The events in Finland and Czechoslovakia the year

before had their effect on the decision taken in Norway with respect to the question of a Scandinavian defense pact,

though of course the assessment of the situation by the

decisionmakers themselves is often difficult to ascertain.

But the interpretation of these events must have been

different in Sweden:, it seems that she must not have seen

any imminent danger to Norway, otherwise her cffer of such

a pact would not have been made. Neither did the United

.States see anj? danger to Norway, as was later revealed by

the Norwegian Foreign Minister. It must be recalled that

the primary foreign policy problem for the Soviet Union, as 310 w e ll as the U n ited s t a t e s , was in Germany and not in Scan­ d in a v ia .

No doubt, the Baltic entrances and the Norwegian coast were areas of strategic interest, but, at the time, a solution to the problem of Greenland was probably more of an immediate need for the United States. Norway was, how­ ever, the country where both tradition, interest, and leadership pointed towards a Western solution. That Norway’s choice played a role in the decision of both Denmark and

Iceland to join the pact, is generally recognized; but whether this could readily have bean calculated in advance is another question.

doviet opposition to a Scandinavian Pact can be explained in terms of her concern for the position of Fin­ land. One might have thought that a purely Scandinavian defense cooperation would have been preferable to having

Norway and Denmark formalI;.’ tied to the West in NATO and that Moscow might have miscalculated the Norwegian reaction.

The latter possibility seems to be very unlikely, however, as Norway had already staked out her course to follow the

West. Thus, the .Soviet Union, most likely, was opposed tc a Scandinavian neutral bloc because such a bloc was not

trusted to be truly neutral in the sense that Swedish

neutrality was declared to be. Besides, however neutral

such a group would be, it would inevitably exert a strong 311 attraction on Finland. Such a development would be detri­ mental to Soviet interests in Northern Europe. Finland, it must be recalled, could not join the West directly, but a non-aligned grouping, such as a Scandinavian Pact, would present itself as a possible avenue for closer Finnish co­ operation with her neighbors.

The consideration of the position of Finland must have figured prominently when Norway, in 1949, in recogni­ tion of the interests of the Soviet Union, rejected foreign military bases on her territory. This qualification of

Norway's commitment to NATO has not only been of importance for the position of Finland but has preserved for all of these countries a good deal of flexibility in their deal­ ings with the powers.

The form of cooperation and coordination between the roles of the Scandinavian countries that emerged after 1949 has served them well or perhaps better than an alliance between them could have. They have, in fact, created an area of disengagement, built around the non-alignment of

Sweden and dependent upon the relationship of Finland and

Norway to their respective alliance partners. A balance

thus was created between the interests of the powers in

Northern Europe. One side of the scale of this so-called

Nordic balance was created by the Norwegian policy of

refusing to accept foreign troops or atomic weapons on her 312 territory, and the other by the role of Finland as laid down in the treaty with the Soviet Union of 1948.

It is generally believed that the stationing of for­ eign troops in Northern Norway, for instance, would most certainly have triggered Soviet moves in Finland designed to re-establish the balance* Conversely, a change in Fin­ land's neutral status may have resulted in an increase in the Norwegian NATO commitment.

A new dimension was added to the Nordic balance, however, in the late 1950's, when Germany again emerged as a military power, prompting the Finnish promotion of the idea of a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe* When it was clear that German influence in the North European NATO area was on the increase, and-the possibility of German nuclear weapons emerged, Finland could not but conclude that this might have detrimental effects on the interests of the Soviet Union, endangering her own position. To seek to minimize this influence by formalizing the nuclear free

status of these countries, thus became a professed primary foreign policy objective of Finland, defined during the

1961 crisis and attempted through the 1963 Kekkonen Plan for

a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe.

Norway rejected the idea by pointing out that the

whole area is a de facto nuclear free zone and that a com­

mitment on the part of Norway in this regard without a 3 1 3 general European settlement would alter- the balance of power in Northern. Europe. A formalization of the nuclear- free state iti Northern Europe would reduce the flex ib ility

these countries have achieved in. their relationships to the powers.

It is this uncertainty that makes the Nordic balance operative:, if, for instance, Norway, as suggested by Presi­ dent Kekkonen in his plan for a nuclear-free zone in

Northern Europe, committed herself in advance always to reject atomic weapons on her territory, the effect of this uncertainty would be gone, and the Soviet Union could, for

instance, make mcvea in Finland without running the risk of a balancing countermove in Norway, It is difficult to envisage

how such a situation would serve Finnish interests. It should

be noted, however, that the other Scandinavian countries

could be expected to r e je c t the idea*

No doubt, the growing role of Germany in Northern

Europe is of concern to the Soviet Union and gives a new

dimension to the power relationship o f the area, .Such a

development may not .adversely effect the position of the

Scandinavian countries as long as there is no understanding

between Germans and Russians about Northern Europe,

As the problem for the West since the Second World War

can be seen in terms of preventing a new Rapollo, so also 314 must the Scandinavians have dreaded the thought of an understanding between Russians and Germans at their expense.

Because it seems to be a lesson of history that,

unless there is such an understanding, there will be a balance of interest and influence in Northern Europe favor­

ing the Scandinavian countries.

A closer coordination of the policies of the Northern

countries themselves would undoubtedly further reduce their

vulnerability to outside political influence. But any

drawing together of these countries in the direction of

Sweden would be opposed by both the U nited S ta te s and the

S o v iet Union and meet grea t d i f f i c u l t i e s in both Norway and

Finland. In ste a d , Norway has in c o n cert with her neighb ors,

In effect, managed to create a situation that has served to

increase the stability of the area and reduce the need for

big power involvement. Even though the Swedish initiative

in 1948 failed because of Norway’s opposition, it seems

that these countries, in effect, have managed actual dis­

engagement of the area without any formal agreement.

As for Norway, she has, by her NATO membership,

achieved increased security while avoiding an alliance with

Sweden; she was ab le to b u ild a d efen se esta b lish m en t in

the 1950*3 at a lower cost than she could provide herself;

and through her base and atom ic p o lic y has helped preserve

the status of Finland and reduced her own risk of being a 315 prim ary t a r g e t . In th a t sen se, i t seems that Norway, at least, has been able to have her cake and eat it too. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Das Parlament

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France Soir /Paris/

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InformatgSr /Copenhagen/

Izvestiia /Moscow/

Maakonsa /H elsinki/

Morgontidningen /Stockholm/

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Tytikansan Sanomat /H e Is in k //

The Washington Post

Zvezda /L e n in g r a d / appendixes APPENDIX I

DECLARATION BY THE SOVIET EMBASSY, OSLO, OP

JANUARY 29, 1949

"The Soviet Government possesses sufficient grounds for asserting that the Atlantic Alliance now in process of preparation cannot serve to strengthen universal peace, but on the contrary represents a group of Powers pursuing ag­ gressive aims «... There are also sufficient grounds to assert that the initiators of the Atlantic Pact are trying to u tilize the establishment of this new international grouping in order to set up air and naval bases in various parts of the globe, and particularly on the territory of

Powers situated close to the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

11 In callin g the attention of the Norwegian Government

to t h i s s t a t e o f a ffa ir s , the S oviet Government deems i t

necessary to state that it regards the Atlantic Alliance as

a grouping of Powers counterposed to the U*N. Organization,

p u rsu in g aims which possess nothing in common w ith the

interests of consolidating peace. In view of the above,

the Soviet Government requests the Norwegian Government to

explain its attitude regarding the Atlantic Pact, particu­

larly bearing in mind the fact that Norway has a common

f r o n t i e r w ith th e Soviet Union. I t asks to be informed

whether reports that have appeared in the press to the 363 effect that Norway is joining the Atlantic Alliance corre­ spond to reality, and also to be informed whether the Nor­ wegian Government is undertaking any obligations under the

Atlantic Alliance regarding the establishment of air or naval bases on Norwegian territory*11 APPENDIX I I

THE NORWEGIAN REPLY OF FEBRUARY 1, 1949, TO

THE SOVIET DECLARATION OF JANUARY 29

"The Soviet Note gives the Norwegian Government a welcome opportunity to express its views on Norway's se­ curity and political problems to the Soviet Government.

"The Norwegian Government had hoped the U.N. Organi­ zation would be strong enough to maintain peace and security for all countries, but developments have shown that this hope is still unfulfilled. The Norwegian people's desire to secure their freedom has convinced the Norwegian Govern­ ment that it is necessary to seek increased security through regional defence cooperation. Such regional agreements are expressly anticipated in the U.N. Charter and are, in the

Norwegian Government's opinion, in accordance with the

Charter’s objectives in aiming at preventing aggression.

"Lately the Norwegian Government, together with the

Danish and Swedish Governments, has investigated the possi­ bilities of increasing the security of the three countries through a Nordic defence alliance. These investigations have shown that at present the necessary agreement on condi­

tions for such an alliance are lacking. In these circum­

stances the Norwegian Government, in consideration of

Norway's situation bordering the Atlantic Ocean, and her 365 position as a seafaring nation, will make closer investiga­ tion into the forms of, and under what conditions Norway might be a b l e to take part in, a regional security system comprising the countries around the Atlantic.

"The Norwegian Government asks the Soviet Government to be assured that Norway will never take part in a policy with aggressive aims. She will never allow Norwegian terri­ tory to be used in the service of such a policy. The Nor­ wegian Government w ill not join in any agreement with other

States involving obligations to open bases for the military forces of foreign Powers on Norwegian territory as long as

Norway is not attacked or exposed to threats of attack.

Norway and Russia have lived peacefully side by side as neighbours since time immemorial* The Norwegian Govern­ ment is convinced that the Soviet Government knows of our country's unbroken tradition in work for peace, and our desire to remain in friendly relations with all peace- loving nations." APPENDIX I I I

NOTE TO THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT BY THE SOVIET

AMBASSADOR OF FEBRUARY 5, 1949 CONSTITUTING

THE SOVIET REPLY TO THE NORWEGIAN NOTE

OF FEBRUARY 1, 1949

"The Norwegian Government's reply shows that it is considering the question of Norway's participation in the

Atlantic Alliance, believing that the U.N. has not yet become sufficiently strong to maintain peace and security for all countries. The Norwegian Government further de­ clares that the Atlantic Alliance should be regarded as a regional agreement provided for in the U.N. Charter. The

Soviet Government does not share this opinion .... Far

from promoting Norway' s security, Norway's inclusion in the

above grouping may, on the contrary, lead to her becoming

embroiled in the policy of a group of Powers pursuing ag­

gressive aims . . . The Norwegian Government gives assur­

ances that Norway will never assist in a policy pursuing

aggressive aims, and will not permit Norwegian territory

to be utilised to promote such a policy. The Soviet Govern­

ment accepts this statement, but considers it insufficient.

It cannot gloss over the fact that the Norwegian Government

has not given a clear answer to the Soviet Government's

question as to whether or not Norway's entry into the 367 Atlantic Alliance will lead to her undertaking obligations in regard to the establishment of air or naval bases on

Norwegian territory .... This is of special significance to the Soviet Union since Norway and the U.S.S.R. have a common f r o n t ie r .

"The Norwegian Government's reply says that Norway will enter into no agreement with other countries for granting them military bases on Norwegian territory unless

Norway is attacked or is threatened with attack . . . This transparently hints that the threat of attack may emanate from the Soviet Union. Such a hint is totally groundless, since the Norwegian Government has no reason or cause to doubt the Soviet Union's good-neighbourly intentions in regard to Norway, which preclude all and every possibility of attack. The Soviet Union has always maintained a friendly attitude toward Norway, and in the war made its contribution to the liberation of Norway from the Fascist invaders. The S o v ie t Union's troop s were withdrawn from

Norwegian territory voluntarily, and even earlier than the

Norwegian Government itself desired. If the Norwegian

Government, nevertheless, doubts the Soviet Union's good- neighbourly intentions, the Soviet Government, in order to remove any doubt whatever concerning i t s in t e n t i o n s p rop oses

to the Norwegian Government to conclude w ith th e U.S.S.R. a

pact of non-aggression, and thus put an end to all doubts." APPENDIX IV

THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT'S REPLY OF MARCH 5, 1949

TO THE SOVIET NOTE OF FEBRUARY 5, 1949

"The Soviet statement of January 29 gave the Nor­ wegian Government an opportunity to explain its views on

Norway's security problems. It said among other things that it had decided, in consideration of Norway’s situation on the A tla n tic Ocean and i t s p o s itio n as a seafarin g nation, to initiate an inquiry to ascertain the forms and conditions under which Norway might participate in a re­ gional security system comprising the countries around the

Atlantic Ocean. This inquiry has led to the result that the Norwegian Government, after the Storting has declared itself in agreement with such a step, now intends to take part in preliminary discussions of the details of the fram­ ing of an Atlantic Pact. The purpose of these discussions is to find a mutually binding agreement built on the prin­ ciple of solidarity and collective security within the original area constituting a natural unit. The Norwegian

Government is convinced that this Pact will not serve aggres

sive aims, and that it will be formed in accordance with the

U.N. Charter. Norway would not join the Pact under any

other condition. The final decision as to whether Norway

shall enter into the Pact will be made by the Norwegian 369

Government and the Storting when the Pact is available in its final form.

"The Norwegian Government has stu d ied th e Soviet

Union's statement of February 5 with a sincere w ill to understand and to meet the wish that there be clarity in the neighbourly relations of the two countries. It there­ fore reiterates most categorically that it will neither cooperate in a policy which has aggressive aims, nor grant bases for foreign military forces on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is not attached or subjected to threats of attack. It desires, moreover, to state that the appraisal of factors pertaining to a possible threat of attack against our country will in no instance be built on loose

and provocative rumours. Facts alone will form the basis

for deciding which steps shall be taken in defence of our country, and it is self-evident that such appraisal rests

s o l e l y w ith th e Norwegian Government.

"The Soviet Government alludes in its statement of

February 5 to the possibility of a non-aggression pact with

Norway if the Norwegian Government has any doubts about the

Soviet Government's good-neighbourly intentions. The good-

neighbourly relations between Norway and the Soviet Union

to w hich th e S o v ie t Government so c o r r e c tly r e f e r s in its

s ta te m e n t o f February 5 have deep h is to r ic a l r o o t s , and

Norway desires warmly to preserve and strengthen them. The 370

Norwegian Government is convinced that possible Norwegian adherence to an Atlantic Pact will not shake this desire, which runs through the entire Norwegian nation,

"By adhering to the U.N, Charter, which lays upon member-States the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde­ pendence of any S ta te, the two c o u n tr ie s have already pledged themselves not to attack one another. In these circumstances the Norwegian Government fails to see the need to reiterate this pledge by a special non-aggression pact.

The Storting has supported the Government's views in this matter. The Soviet Government, in its statement of February

5, reaffirmed its friendly disposition towards Norway. The

Norwegian Government wishes to take this opportunity to express its own and the Norwegian people's friendly feelings towards the Government and people of the Soviet Union." APPENDIX V

THE SVALBARD TREATY SIGNED FEBRUARY 9, 1920

"The President of The United States of America; his

Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the

British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; his

Majesty the King of Denmark; the President of the French

Republic; his Majesty the King of Italy; his Majesty the

Emperor of Japan; his Majesty the King of Norway; her

Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands; his Majesty the King of Sweden,

''Desirous, while recognising the sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Svalbard, including Bydrneiya Island, of seeing these territories provided with an equitable regime, in order to assure their development and peaceful utilisa­ tio n ,

"Have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries with a view to concluding a Treaty to this effect:

"Who, having communicated their full powers, found

in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

A r t ic le 1

"The High Contracting Parties undertake to recognise,

subject to the stipulations of the present Treaty, the full

and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of 372

Svalbard, comprising, with Bjsirn^ya, all the islands situ­ ated between 10° and 35° longitude East of Greenwich and between 74° and 81° latitude North, especially Vestspitsber- gen, Nordaustlandet, Barentstfya, Edgepiya, Kong Karls Land,

Hopen, and Prins Karls Forland, together with all islands great or small and rocks appertaining thereto.

A r t ic le 2.

‘Ships and nationals of all the High Contracting

Parties shall enjoy equally the rights of fishing and hunt­ ing in the territories specified in Article 1 and in their territorial waters.

’Norway s h a ll be f r e e to m ain tain , take or d ecree suitable measures to ensure the preservation and, if neces­ sary, the re-constitution of the fauna and flora of the said regions, and their territorial watersj it being clearly understood that these measures shall always be applicable equally to the nationals of all the High Contracting Parties without any exemption, privilege or favour whatsoever, direct or indirect to the advantage of any one of them.

"Occupiers of land whose rights have been recognised in accordance with the terms of Articles 6 and 7 wil /si c7 enjoy the exclusive right of hunting of their own land:

(1) in the neighbourhood of their habitations, houses, stores, factories and installations, constructed for the purpose of developing their property, under conditions laid 373 down by the local police regulations; (2) within a radius of 10 kilometres round the headquarters of their place of business or works; and in both cases, subject always to the observance of regulations made by the Norwegian Government in accordance with the conditions laid down in the present

A r t ic l e .

A r tic le 3,

"The nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall have equal liberty of access and entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of the territories specified in Article 1; subject to the observ­ ance of local laws and regulations, they may carry on there w ithout impediment a ll m aritim e, in d u s tr ia l, mining and com­ mercial operations on a footing of absolute equality.

"They shall be admitted under the same conditions of equality to the exercise and practice of all maritime, in­

dustrial, mining or commercial enterprises both on land and

in the territorial waters, and no monopoly shall be estab­

lished on any account or for any enterprise whatever.

’’Notwithstanding any rules relating to coasting trade

which may be in force in Norway, ships of the High Contract­

ing Parties going to or coming from the territories speci­

fied in Article 1 shall have the right to put into Norwegian

ports on their outward or homeward voyage for the purpose 374 of taking on board or disembarking passengers or cargo going to or coming from the said territories, or for any other purpose.

"It is agreed that in every respect and especially with regard to exports, imports and transit traffic, the nationals of all the High Contracting Parties, their ships

and goods shall not be subject to any charges or res trie- .

tions whatever, which are not borne by the nationals, ships or goods which enjoy in Norway the treatment of the most

favoured nation; Norwegian nationals, ships or goods being

for this purpose assimilated to those of the other High

Contracting Parties, and not treated more favourably in any

respect.

"No charge or restriction shall be imposed on the

exportation of any goods to the territories of any of the

Contracting Powers o th er or more onerous than on the expor­

tation of similar goods to the territory of any other

Contracting Power {including Norway) or to any other des­

tination*

A r t i c l e 4,

"All public wireless telegraphy stations established

or to be established by, or with the authorisation of, the

Norwegian Government w ith in the te r r ito r ie s r e fe r r e d to in

Article 1 shall always be open on a footing of absolute

equality to communications from ships of all flags and from 375

nationals of the High Contracting Parties, under the condi­

tions laid down in the Wireless Telegraphy Convention of

July 5, 1912, or in the subsequent International Convention

which may be concluded to replace it.

"Subject to international obligations arising out of

a state of war, owners of landed property shall always be

at liberty to establish and use for their own purposes

wireless telegraphy installations which shall be free to

communicate on private business with fixed or moving wire­

less stations, including those on board ships and aircraft.

A r tic le 5.

"The High Contracting Parties recognise the utility

of establishing an international meteorological station in

the territories specified in Article 1, the organisation of

which shall form the subject of a subsequent Convention.

"Conventions shall also be concluded laying down the

conditions under which scientific investigations may be

conducted in the said territories.

A r tic le 6.

"Subject to the provisions of the present Article,

acquired rights of nationals of the High Contracting Par­

ties shall be recognised.

"Claims arising from taking possession or from occu­

pation of land before the signature of the present Treaty i shall be dealt with in accordance with the Annex hereto, which w ill have the same force and effect as the present

T r ea ty .

A r t ic le 7.

"With regard to methods of acquisition, enjoyment and exercise of the right of ownership of property, including mineral rights, in the territories specified in Article 1,

Norway undertakes to grant to all nationals of the High

Contracting Parties treatment based on complete equality and in conformity with the stipulations of the present

T r ea ty .

"Expropriation may be resorted to only on grounds of public u tility and on payment of proper compensation.

A r tic le 8.

"Norway undertakes to provide for the territories specified in Article 1 mining regulations which, especially from the point of view of imposts, taxes or changes of any kind, and of general or particular labour conditions, shall exclude all privileges, monopolies or favours for the bene­ fit of the State or of the nationals of any one of the High

Contracting Parties, including Norway, and shall guarantee

to the paid staff of all categories the remuneration and protection necessary for their physical, moral and intellec­

tual welfare. 377

"Taxes, dues and duties levied shall be devoted ex­ clusively to the said territories and shall not exceed what is required for the object in view.

"So far, particularly, as the exportation of minerals is concerned, the Norwegian Government shall have the right to levy an export duty which shall not exceed 1% o f the maximum value of the minerals exported up to 100,000 tons, and beyond that quantity the duty will be proportionately diminished. The value shall be fixed at the end of the navigation season by calculating the average free on board price obtained.

"Three months before the date fixed for their coming into force, the draft mining regulations shall be communi­ cated by the Norwegian Government to the Contracting Powers.

If during this period one or more of the said Powers pro­ pose to modify these regulations before they are applied, such proposals shall be communicated by the Norwegian

Government to the other Contracting Powers in order that they may be submitted to examination and the decision of a

Commission composed of one representative of each of the said Powers. This Commission shall meet at the incitation of the Norwegian Government and shall come to a decision within a period of three months from the date of its first meeting. Its decisions shall be taken by a majority. 378

A r tic le 9.

"Subject to the rights and duties resulting from the

admission of Norway to the League of Nations, Norway under­

takes not to create nor to allow the establishment of any naval base in the territories specified in Article 1 and not to construct any fortification in the said territories, which may never be used for warlike purposes.

Article 10.

"Until the recognition by the High Contracting Par­

ties of a Russian Government shall permit Russia to adhere

to the present Treaty, Russian nationals and companies

shall enjoy the same rights as nationals of the High Con­

tracting Parties.

"Claims in the territories specified in Article 1

which they may have to put forward shall be presented under

the conditions laid down in the present Treaty (Article 6

and Annex) through the intermediary of the Danish Govern­

ment, who declare their willingness to lend their good

offices for this purpose.

"The present Treaty, of which the French and English

texts are both authentic, shall be ratified.

"Ratifications shall be deposited at Paris as soon

as possible.

"The present Treaty will come into force, in so far

as the stipulations of Article 8 are concerned, from the 379 date of its ratification by all the signatory Powers; and in all other respects on the same date as the mining regu­ lations provided for in that Article,

pf Third Powers w ill be invited by the Government of the French Republic to adhere to the,present Treaty duly ratified. This adhesion shall be effected by a communica­ tion addressed to the French Government, which w ill under­ take to notify the other Contracting Parties.

MIn witness whereof the abovenamed Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

"Done at Paris, the ninth day of February, 1920, in duplicate, one copy to be transmitted to the Government of

His Majesty the King of Norway, and one deposited in the archives of the French Republic; authenticated copies will be transmitted to the other Signatory Powers," APPENDIX VI

AGREEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND

MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF

FINLAND AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST

REPUBLICS SIGNED ON APRIL 6, 1948

"The President of the Republic of Finland and the

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R-!

"Desiring further to develop friendly relations be­ tween the Republic of Finland and the U.S.S.R.;

"Being convinced that the strengthening of good neighborhood relations and co-operation between the Republic of Finland and the U.S.S.R. lies in the interest of both c o u n tr ie s ;

"Considering Finland's desire to remain out of the conflicting interests of the Great Powers; and

"Expressing their firm endeavor to collaborate towards the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the aims and principles of the United

Nations Organization,

"Have for this purpose agreed to conclude the present

Agreement and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

"The President of the Republic of Finland: Mauno

Pekkala, Prime Minister of the Republic of Finland;

The Presidium o f the Supreme S o v iet of the U .S .S .R .: 381

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Vice-Chairman of the Coun­ cil of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and Minister for Foreign

A f f a i r s ,

"Who, after exchange o f th e ir f u l l powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

A r tic le 1

"In the eventuality of Finland, or the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, becoming the object of an armed attack by Germany or any State allied with the latter, Fin­ land w ill, true to its obligations as an independent State, fight to repel the attack. Finland will in such cases use all its available forces for defending its territorial integrity by land, sea and air, and will do so within the frontiers of Finland in accordance with obligations defined in the present Agreement and, i f necessary, with th e a s s i s t ­ ance o f , or join tly with, the S o v ie t Union.

"In the cases aforementioned the Soviet Union w ill give Finland the help required, the giving of which will be subject to mutual agreement between the Contracting Parties.

A r t i c l e 2

"The High Contracting Parties shall confer with each other if it is established that the threat of an armed

attack as described in Article 1 is present. 382

A rticle 3

"The High Contracting Parties give assurance of their intention loyally to participate in all measures towards the maintenance of international peace and security in con­ formity with the aims and principles of the United Nations

Organization,

Ar ti c 1 e 4

"The High Contracting Parties confirm their pledge, given under Article 3 of the Peace Treaty signed in Paris on 10U) February 1947, not to conclude any alliance or join any coalition directed against the other High Contracting

Party.

A r tic le 5

"The High Contracting Parties give assurance of their

decision to act in a spirit of co-operation and friendship

towards the further development and consolidation of eco­

nomic and cultural relations between Finland and the Soviet

Union.

A r tic le 6

"The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to

observe the principles of the mutual respect of sovereignty

and integrity and that of non-interference in the internal

affairs of the other State* 383

A r t ic le 7

nThe execution of the Present Agreement shall take place in accordance with the principles of the United

Nations Organization,

A r t ic le 8

"The present Agreement shall be ratified and remains

in force ten years after the date of its coming into force.

The Agreement shall come into force upon the exchange of

th e in str u m e n ts of r a t i f i c a t i o n , the exchange taking place

in the shortest time possible in Helsinki.

"Provided neither of the High Contracting Parties de­

nounces it one year before the expiration of the said ten-

year period, the Agreement shall remain in force for subse­

quent five-year periods until either High Contracting Party

one year before the expiration of such five-year period in

writing notifies its intention of terminating the validity

of the Agreement.

"In witness hereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed

the present Agreement and affixed their seals.

"Done in the C ity of Moscow on the sixth day of A pril

1948 in two copies, in the Finnish and the Russian languages,

both texts being authentic.

"The P le n ip o te n tia r y of the The Plenipotentiary of President of the Republic the Presidium of the of Finland: Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R

Mauno Pekkala V. Molotov1 APPENDIX VII

No* 4/63

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF

FINLAND URHO KEKKONEN AT THE MEETING OF THE

PAASIKIVI SOCIETY ON MAY 28, 1963

"Smal l- states have little power to influence the course of international events. The great powers possess­ ing the means of destroying the world bear the chief respon­ sibility for the maintenance of peace. The smaller states can and must constantly remind them of this responsibility.

But they can do more. They can in their own behaviour dis­ associate themselves from everything that is likely to increase tension.

"On the basis of such a line of reasoning the former

Swedish foreign minister, Osten Unden, in the autumn of

1961 put forward h is idea o f a "non-nuclear club" members of which would pledge themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons for themselves or to receive such weapons on their territory on behalf of other powers. The creation of such nuclear-free zones would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and thus limit the dangers of a nuclear war.

"It has been assumed that an agreement on banning nuclear tests should be considered a prerequisite for the realisation of the Unden plan. For this reason the plan has until now remained in the background. But, as the 385 n e g o tia tio n s on a t e s t ban seem to drag on, the Unden plan is now receiving more attention. I have noticed that, for instance, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U

Thant, has recently advocated the realization of nuclear- free zones regardless of whether a test ban is achieved. I believe one ought to pay attention to this view. If the spread of nuclear weapons cannot at present be arrested through an agreement on a test ban, all other available means to th a t end should be con sid ered .

"The enquiry conducted by the Secretary-General in

1962 on the attitude of member states to the Unden plan showed that the great majority of governments were unami- mous on the need of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Recent developments, for instance, the world crisis of last autumn, have made it clearer than ever that any step that appears to place nuclear weapons into areas where there have been none before or into the hands of states that have not previously possessed such weapons creates acute tension and unrest. Any proposal designed

to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons thus ought to be

seriously examined whatever its origins.

It is conceivable that all states that do not possess

nuclear weapons would commit themselves perhaps best on a

regional basis not to manufacture or receive such weapons

or the means of d e liv e r in g them and to seek; in te rn a tio n a l 386

recognition for such undertakings. Even states belonging

to military alliances might, in my view, join collective

undertakings of this nature. Theoretically speaking, the

end result could be that only the powers that today possess

nuclear weapons would remain outside the network of nuclear-

free zones.

|:A good beginning has been made with the joint dec­

laration issued on April 29ti by the Presidents of Bolivia,

Brasil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico in which they declared

their intention to work for a treaty creating a nuclear-

free zone including all of Latin America and to seek inter­

national recognition for it*

"When examining the Unden plan in this new light, X

naturally have Finland's position in mind. Our own atti­

tude is clear.1 As was stated in the Finnish reply to the

Secretary-General1s enquiry which I mentioned earlier, we

have already in our peace treaty committed ourselves not to

a c q u ir e or manufacture nuclear weapons. It follows from

our policy of neutrality that we refuse to receive such

weapons on our territory on behalf of other powers.

"The security of Finland is closely connected with

the situation of the North (Scandinavia) as a whole. The

- Scandinavian states for historical ana geographical reasons

have been diverted into following different paths in their

search for security, Finland and Sweden having chosen the 387 neutrality, Denmark and Norway membership in NATO. Yet none of them has sought to acquire nuclear weapons for it ­ self and none wishes to have nuclear weapons belonging to other powers placed on its territory.

nThe Scandinavian states thus already in fact form a nuclear-free zone. This however depends at present merely on unilateral declarations on their part. The act of con­ firming the present state of affairs through mutual under­ takings in the manner envisaged in the Unden plan would not require a change in the policies adopted by the Scandinavian states or impair their security. It would not affect the present balance of power in the world; thus it could not damage the interests of any outside powers. But I am con­ vinced that the Scandinavian states, by declaring them­ selves a nuclear-free zone, would significantly consolidate their own position. This would remove them unequivocally from the sphere of speculation caused by the development of nuclear strategy and insure that this area will remain out­

side international tension."