4.4.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 81 E/65

(2002/C 81 E/075) WRITTEN QUESTION E-1816/01 by Antonio Di Pietro (ELDR) to the Council (21 June 2001)

Subject: Council statement on the Italian government deficit issued following the meetings of 2 and 3 May 1998

Several authoritative sources such as the -based Osservatorio Immobiliare Nomisma, Scenari Immobiliari, and the -based Reddy’s Group have revealed that the market value of fixed assets in the form of commercial and residential property in Italy has been continuing to fall substantially since 1993.

Although it does not lay down a specific method for calculating property values, as Mr Bolkestein acknowledged in his answer to Written Question P-0729/01 (1), the Fourth Directive (Directive 78/660/ EEC) (2) imposes an obligation to correct the initial book value of land and buildings when their value at on the date of closure of a financial year is lower than the book value first entered less depreciation.

Contrary to what happens in some Member States, for example the United Kingdom and Ireland, which each have their RICS, Italy has not adopted any official method, nor does it have an independent institute able and authorised to determine the revised value for tax purposes of land and buildings owned by individual companies. The fall in value described above cannot be recorded in the profit and loss account under the heading of ‘other depreciation of fixed assets’, because it is not recognised for tax purposes. The Fourth Directive has not, de facto, been implemented in Italy.

Ever since 1993 the taxable income of property-owing Italian companies has thus continued to be calculated in a manner not in accordance with the legislation in force (Article 2426 of the Code of Civil Law), and the amount of such income is, moreover, higher than their real earned income.

As a result, the tax levied since 1993 from national companies by Italian central government, on the current terms, is to some extent unlawful, and the aggregate tax revenue that could be attained if the situation were restored to a completely legal footing would be much lower than the declared amount, and the government deficit correspondingly higher.

Could the Council confirm that the statement issued following meetings held on 2 and 3 May 1998 (Ecofin) Council and Council of the European Union), to the effect that the Italian government deficit was not excessive, was made with full knowledge of the facts set out above?

(1) OJ C 235 E, 21.8.2001, p. 243. (2) OJ L 222, 14.8.1978, p. 11.

Reply (26 November 2001)

The Council adopted the Decision of 3 May 1998 in accordance with Article 109 j (4) of the Treaty (98/317/EC) where it is stated that Italy was not subject of a Council decision on the existence of an excessive government deficit. This decision was adopted having taken into account, inter alia, the report from the Commission, the report from the European Monetary Institute and the opinion of the .

(2002/C 81 E/076) WRITTEN QUESTION E-1825/01 by Esko Seppänen (GUE/NGL) to the Council (27 June 2001)

Subject: Decision-making and constructive abstention in defence matters

Title V, Article 23 of the Treaty of Amsterdam [Treaty on European Union] states that ‘Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously.’ This article also enshrines the principle of ‘constructive abstention’. How does the Council interpret this passage? Should the Treaty be interpreted as meaning that even a single Member State may  in accordance with the requirement for unanimity  prevent the deployment of the Crisis Management Force for particular duties if it votes against the decision and does not favour abstaining from taking a decision?