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The Ukrainian Weekly 2003, No.11

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The Ukrainian Weekly 2003, No.11 www.ukrweekly.com INSIDE:• Congressional Ukrainian Caucus on proposed radio cuts — page 8. •A prairie church is preserved, and moved — page 13. • The unique artworks of Rem Bahautdyn — page 15. Published by the Ukrainian National Association Inc., a fraternal non-profit association Vol. LXXI HE KRAINIANNo. 11 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, MARCH 16, 2003 EEKLY$1/$2 in Ukraine 20,000T demonstrateU in Kyiv against KuchmaW administration by Roman Woronowycz Kyiv Press Bureau KYIV – The four long columns of marchers came from different directions – a strong symbolic gesture of dis- parate political ideologies uniting behind a common cause – before merging on the Khreschatyk and proceeding down Kyiv’s broad, main thoroughfare, past Independence Square, past the Lenin Memorial and on to Shevchenko Park. And it was unity that organizers’ stressed on March 9 as they held the latest in a series of demonstrations across Ukraine in protest against what they describe as the authoritarian rule of the administration of President Leonid Kuchma and alleged criminal acts they associate with his heavy hand. The action came on the 189th anniversary of the birth of Ukraine’s national bard, Taras Shevchenko, and was part of similar protests in Lviv, Kharkiv and Symferopol, all associated with the “Arise, Ukraine” movement. At Shevchenko Park in Kyiv the 20,000 or so demon- strators who had spilled onto the Khreschatyk minutes earlier rallied. They watched the four leading opposition figures – Our Ukraine’s Viktor Yushchenko, Socialist Party leader Oleksander Moroz, Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko and Yulia Tymoshenko of the epony- mous political bloc – lay flowers before the huge monu- ment to the Ukrainian bard and heard them exhort Roman Woronowycz (Continued on page 3) Viktor Yushchenko, flanked by Hennadii Udovenko (left) and Ivan Pliusch, lead Our Ukraine protesters. Slava Stetsko, nationalist leader, Cardinal Lubomyr Husar describes changes Verkhovna Rada deputy, dies at age 83 in the life of formerly clandestine Church by Roman Woronowycz by Alexandra Hawryluk ties. All in all, we now have 10 eparchies Kyiv Press Bureau Special to The Ukrainian Weekly and three exarchates [working] in KYIV – Ukrainian National Deputy Ukraine.” OTTAWA – Undoubtedly the These structures are, in fact, the basis Yaroslava Stetsko, perhaps the most Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has prominent Ukrainian female political for the creation of a self-sufficient, patri- come a long way since its underground archal Church. Although there was much leader of the 20th century, died in days. When one considers that in 1989, talk about the creation of such a Church Munich, Germany, on March 12 after a at the time of the legalization of the in the past, the realization of those plans short illness. largest Eastern rite Catholic Church, was hampered by the fact that the mother Last week Mrs. Stetsko, 83, had flown there were no Catholic educational facili- Church was an underground Church with to Munich, which she had called home ties in Ukraine, no evangelization pro- neither a fully functioning synod of bish- for more than 40 years, after Ukrainian grams and no viable eparchies, there is a ops, nor any means for maintaining a doctors failed to successfully treat a lot to be thankful for in 2003. During a normal exchange of ideas with its diaspo- heart ailment. She died of heart failure recent visit in Canada, the leader of the four days after being hospitalized there. Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, ra communities. She was a founder and chairman of Cardinal Lubomyr Husar, described the Today, the Church is ready to move the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists changes in the life of his Church. toward the realization of these dreams (CUN), the political party that was estab- “First of all, we should be aware that “because, we have all the necessary ele- lished in Ukraine on the basis of the this Church had existed well before the ments: our own homeland – the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists Soviet era, that it had its own bishops, its Ukrainian state – and our own ecclesias- tic territory with more than 4.5 million (OUN), which she also led for the last AP/Efrem Lukatsky own priests, its own history and its own decade. In addition, she was a former faithful ... Today in Ukraine we have: a faithful.” Cardinal Husar said during an Yaroslava Stetsko in a 1998 photo. leader of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Ukrainian Catholic University, five semi- interview at the Holy Spirit Ukrainian Nations (ABN) during the Cold War. naries, four Catholic schools, our own Catholic Seminary in Ottawa. President Leonid Kuchma, mourned the Mrs. Stetsko, whom friends and close Christian press and Christian radio, a “What is more, the said territory is loss of a person who most agreed could associates referred to as Slava, was the well-organized religious instruction pro- now covered with a network of our exhibit a sweet grandmotherly personali- oldest member of Ukraine’s Verkhovna gram for the young with a new adult reli- [Ukrainian Catholic] structures, that is, ty, but could also show an equally steely Rada, which twice gave her the honor of gious education program being devel- eparchies, monasteries, seminaries, disposition when it came to matters of leading newly seated lawmakers in tak- oped, a number of new bishops, priests, parishes. In short, we have all the ele- principle – especially political matters. ing the oath of office, in 1998 and 1992. nuns and monks. I believe that currently ments in place that the Eastern canon law “I always thought of her as the most She was first elected to the Ukrainian there are 19 women’s and six men’s reli- and ecclesiastic tradition require. We also outstanding Ukrainian woman. I sat next Parliament in 1994, three years after gious communities in Ukraine. In the have 1.5 million faithful engaged in the to her in this new Parliament and can returning to Ukraine after spending 40 eastern regions of Ukraine, east of the living, well-organized Church outside still feel our elbows touching,” said years in both forced and self-imposed Zbruch [River], presently there are 104 Ukraine. So, in terms of structure, there National Deputy Volodymyr Yavo- exile. registered Ukrainian Catholic communi- (Continued on page 5) Ukrainian political leaders, including (Continued on page 4) 2 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, MARCH 16, 2003 No. 11 ANALYSIS NEWSBRIEFS Anniversary of Volodymyr Scherbytsky NEWSBRIEFS Rada approves national anthem’s lyrics Philippe de Suremain told Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych on March 11 that is celebrated for the first time in Ukraine KYIV – The Verkhovna Rada on March France is ready to take part in a planned 16 voted 334 to 46 to approve a bill on international gas-transport consortium that by Taras Kuzio currently the head of the presidential Ukraine’s national anthem proposed by is now being considered by Ukraine, Russia RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report administration, the Union of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, Interfax report- and Germany, Ukrainian news media Lawyers, and the oligarchic Social ed. The bill stipulates that the national reported. The ambassador said France’s In January, Ukrainian Vice Prime Democratic Party-United (SDPU). The anthem consists of the music composed by interest in the project is explained by the Minister for Humanitarian Affairs Stus connection is sufficient reason for Mykhailo Verbytsky in 1863 – the music fact that gas supplies to European Union Dmytro Tabachnyk signed a government many national democrats to continue to had been approved as the national anthem member-countries, including France, resolution to celebrate the 85th anniver- dislike Mr. Medvedchuk. Worse still, the of Ukraine back in 1992 – and the lyrics, depend to a large degree on Ukrainian sary of the birth of the longest-running “battle lines” of the Brezhnevite era of including the first stanza and the refrain of pipelines. He added that France’s largest leader of the Communist Party of stagnation and the late Soviet era have the patriotic poem “Sche Ne Vmerla gas company, Gaz de France, might take Ukraine (CPU) Volodymyr Scherbytsky. not changed. Opposed to Medvedchuk Ukraina” written by Pavlo Chubynsky in part in the consortium. (RFE/RL Newsline) Mr. Scherbytsky became first secretary and his centrist oligarchic allies is 1862. President Kuchma had proposed that of the CPU in 1972, after Moscow today’s Rukh, which has been reincarnat- the first line of the poem be changed to Georgia keen on single economic space removed Petro Shelest, accusing him of ed as Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine. “Sche ne vmerla Ukrainy i slava, i volia” “national deviationism” (a Soviet euphe- Both former President Leonid (Ukraine’s freedom and glory have not yet SOCHI, Russia – During his talks in mism for nationalism). Shelest’s removal Kravchuk and current President Leonid perished). The bill was opposed by Sochi with Russian President Vladimir was accompanied by what became Kuchma were born in the 1930s and Communist Party lawmakers, while the Putin, Georgian President Eduard known as the Great Pogrom of Ukrainian experienced their most important career Socialist Party caucus did not participate in Shevardnadze expressed interest in the dissidents and the cultural elite. Shelest advancement in the 1970s and 1980s the vote. (RFE/RL Newsline) agreement signed last month by Russia, was accused of being too supportive of under Scherbytsky. Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakstan on creating national communism because of his sup- Mr. Kravchuk became head of the Leaders call for consolidation a single economic space within the port for the Ukrainian language and cul- Commonwealth of Independent States, CPU Central Committee in 1980, thus KYIV – The tens of thousands of people ture, and his glorification of the putting him in charge of ideology and Russian news agencies and Caucasus Press Ukrainian Kozaks in his book “O who gathered at an anti-presidential rally at reported on March 7.
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