2014 Public Opinion Survey in Ukraine

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2014 Public Opinion Survey in Ukraine Findings from the IFES 2014 survey in Ukraine Fieldwork conducted Public Opinion in Ukraine from April 8 - 1 5 , 2 0 1 4 Sample size, n=2039 2014 Funding provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Methodological Details • 1respondents representing the voting-age population in Ukraine (18 Sample size: years+). Margin of error: • ±2.2% within a 95% confidence interval. • All the administrative divisions of Ukraine; observations were Sample area coverage: allocated proportionately at the national level with an over-sample of observations in Kyiv. Fieldwork dates: • April 8-15, 2014 • IFES contracted with the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) Survey firm: to conduct fieldwork and data processing for the survey. • The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Funding: provided funding for this survey. • Data was weighted by age, region and gender to bring the realized Weights: sample in line with target population parameters in order to be nationally representative of the adult (18+) population of Ukraine. Unity in Ukraine 3% 5% 7% 5% 6% 5% 2% 4% 5% 4% 5% 6% 22% 35% 33% 35% 30% 46% DK/NR Neither 47% Completely Divided 29% Somewhat Divided 38% 39% 43% Somewhat United 34% Completely United 17% 22% 15% 17% 9% 10% <0.5% 10% 4% 2% 2% 4% Ukraine North + Kyiv Center South East West “Please tell me how you would characterize the current situation in Ukraine with regard to the unity of division of the country? Do you think Ukraine is currently…” (n=2,039) Stability of Current Situation in Ukraine 2% 4% 1% 1% 1% 1% 70% 67% 71% 74% 78% 80% 24% 23% 20% 24% 19% 13% 3% 4% 2% 5% 2% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% Ukraine North + Kyiv Center South East West Very Stable Somewhat Stable Somewhat Chaotic Very Chaotic DK/NR “And how would you characterize the current situation in Ukraine in terms of stability? Do you think the current situation in Ukraine is…” (n=2,039) Level of Control Exercised by Ukrainian Government 6% 6% 6% 6% 5% 7% 10% 13% 27% 27% 8% 42% 5% 56% 55% 38% 45% 37% 25% 26% 27% 21% 25% 14% 2% 3% 2% 1% 2% 2% Ukraine North + Kyiv Center South East West Full Control Significant Control, but Not Full Not in Much Control No Control at All DK/NR “How much control do you think the current Ukrainian government exercises in the country?” (n=2,039) Government of Prime Minister Yatseniuk 15% 17% 17% 21% 18% 21% 15% DK/NR 24% 18% Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree 26% Somewhat Agree 26% Strongly Agree 31% 26% 18% 9% The government is carrying our its The Yatseniuk government is the The government represents all responsibility in a transparent legitimate government of Ukraine regions and people of Ukraine manner “Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements about the current government led by Prime Minister Yatseniuk?” (n=2,039) Legitimacy of Yatseniuk Government (in the East) Kharkiv East 12% 7% 19% 19% 17% 18% 22% 36% 14% 34% Donetsk 3% Luhansk 8% 9% 4% 17% 28% 28% 52% 31% 20% Strongly Agree Somewhat Agree Somewhat Disagree Strongly Disagree DK/NR Does Government Represent All Ukraine? (in the East) Who does the government represent (n=526): Western Ukraine (51%) Kharkiv East Oligarchs (41%) 5% 4% Maidan (20%) 18% 18% 14% Nationalists (18%) 21% Kyiv (16%) 12% 23% 44% 41% Central Ukraine (14%) Radicals/Fascists (13%) Donetsk 1% Luhansk 8% 8% 3% 8% 9% 27% 56% 23% 57% Strongly Agree Somewhat Agree Somewhat Disagree Strongly Disagree DK/NR “If Presidential election were held today, in your opinion would they be:” (n=2,040) Likelihood of Voting in Presidential Election 1% 3% 2% 5% 5% 5% 1% 3% 1% 6% 3% 3% 5% 7% 5% 2% 5% 12% 16% 4% 8% 5% 8% 26% 31% 6% 25% DK/NR 25% Definitely Will Not Vote 27% Very Unlikely Not Too Likely Somewhat Likely 78% Very Likely 63% 56% 57% 50% 41% Ukraine North + Kyiv Center South East West “How likely are you to vote in the May 25 presidential elections?” (n=2,039) Presidential Election Preference among Likely Voters Anatoliy Olha Bohomolets Gritsenko 3% 3% Mikhailo DK/NR Dobkin 6% 3% Oleh Liashko 4% Not Sure, 26% Petro Poroshenko 35% Others 3% Yuliya Serhiy Tihipko Tymoshenko 5% 10% Petro Symonenko 2% “If the presidential elections were held today, which declared candidate would you vote for?” Perceived Integrity of Presidential Election 13% 12% 17% 19% 18% 23% 4% DK/NR 13% 8% 18% 20% 22% Not free and fair at all 21% 18% 24% So flawed would doubt accuracy of results 26% 29% Flawed but reasonably free and fair 45% 53% 43% Completely free and fair 39% 33% 27% 12% 8% 8% 7% 4% 5% UKRAINE North + Kyiv Center South East West “How likely are you to vote in the May 25 presidential elections?” (n=2,039) Experiences with Corruption in Ukraine 59% 79% 93% 89% 90% 92% 88% 41% 21% 7% 11% 11% 7% 12% Police officer Pay a bribe to Pay money Pay a bribe at Pay a bribe to Pay a bribe in Pay a bribe at asked for a bribe avoid a traffic above that school (n=763) the courts order to be seen work (n=1,044) (n=1353) citation required by law (n=517) in a hospital or a (n=1,303) to local clinic (n=1,431) government to process a document (n=1,383) Yes No “Now we want to talk about your experience with things that happen in everyday life. In the last twelve months have you…” Corruption in Ukraine “Do you agree or disagree with this statement: ‘Ukrainians “Do you think that given the way things are in Ukraine, consider corruption as a fact of life.’?” (n=2,039) sometimes paying a bribe is justified?” (n=2,039) DK/NR DK/NR 14% Yes, to a great 15% Yes No, not at extent 28% all 21% 13% No, to a Yes, to very some No limited extent 57% extent 35% 18% What Can be Done about Corruption? Survey Focus Groups: Do you think it is possible for ordinary people to live a life in Ukraine without corruption or bribery? - Better salaries [If Yes] What actions or policies do you think can - Sufficient legislation be taken by the government to achieve this? - Independent authority to pursue corruption - Public information/socialization • No (26%) - Punishment for public officials, especially • Don’t know (29%) higher levels - Several mentions of examples set by Georgia Yes (electronic records) and Belarus (strict • Strict punishment for corruption (29%) punishments) • More transparency (26%) • Change those in power to those who will fight - People will not stop paying bribes because it is corruption (10%) necessary, and they need to see some action • Changes in legislation (10%) by the government to show that it is serious • Change people’s attitudes toward corruption (9%) • Ban corruption officials from public office (7%) • Better salaries for public officials (5%) • Other (9%) Values Most Closely Associated with Ukrainian Way of Life DK/NR Differences by Region 17% Russian Both East – 51R 9W 11B 33% 9% North – 25R 25W 6B Neither Center – 37R 26W 6B 16% Western 25% South – 44R 12W 14B West – 7R 53W 18B “When you think of the Ukrainian way of life, do you associate it more closely with Western values or with Russian values?“ (n=2,039) Values Ukraine Shares with Russia/West “What values does Ukraine share with the West?” “What values does Ukraine share with Russia?” (n=499) (n=675) Rights and freedoms 28% History, traditions 46% Democracy 27% Culture 23% Rule of law 14% Ethnic heritage 18% Respectful of people 14% Religion, morality 15% Economic devp. 12% Language 12% Social protection, services 4% Same outlooks, interests 9% Stability 4% Kinship, friendship 8% Respect for traditions 3% Language 12% Independent, patriotic 3% Economic relationships 5% Peaceful 2% Other 6% Other 13% DK/NR 11% DK/NR 16% Opinions on the European Union Treats Ukraine with respect 59% 14% 27% Promotes democracy in Ukraine 58% 16% 26% Tries to impose its culture on other countries 30% 19% 51% Has a culture and values that Ukraine should aspire to 61% 17% 22% Interferes in the affairs of other nations for its own 40% 19% 41% economic benefit Agree DK/NR Disagree “I’ll read you several statements, and you tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each. To what extent to you agree or disagree that the EU…? Opinions on Russia Treats Ukraine with respect 21% 10% 69% Promotes democracy in Ukraine 16% 13% 71% Tries to impose its culture on other countries 53% 15% 33% Has a culture and values that Ukraine should aspire to 30% 19% 51% Interferes in the affairs of other nations for its own 71% 10% 24% economic benefit Agree DK/NR Disagree “I’ll read you several statements, and you tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each. To what extent to you agree or disagree that Russia…? Future Orientation of Ukraine DK/NR, 5% West – Eur. (82%), Rus. (2%), Both (9%) Center - Eur. (59%), Rus. (4%), Both (17%) Both, 21% North - Eur. (50%), Rus. (8%), Both (22%) Europe, 44% East - Eur. (16%), Rus. (46%), Both (26%) Neither, 9% South - Eur. (27%), Rus. (24%), Both (28%) Russia, 21% “Do you think that Ukraine would be better off if it had closer economic and political relations with Europe or Russia?” (n=2,039) Opinions on Discrimination against Russian Language in Ukraine 6% 8% 63% 64% DK/NR Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree 19% 17% 9% 9% 3% 2% The Russian language is discriminated against Some government services are not provided in Ukraine for Russian speakers in Ukraine (e.g.
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