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GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 7 42Nd United Nations SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 742nd GENERAL MEETING ASSEMBLY Friday, 4 December 1970, at 10.55 a.m. TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION Official Records NEW YORK Chairman: Mr. Abdul Samad GHAUS actually delayed making its suggestion as long as there had (Afghanistan). seemed to be some hope that sufficient contributions would be forthcoming at the pledging conference. Under the existing circumstances, however, it saw no other AGENDA ITEM 35 possible solution. He expressed his delegation's gratitude for the constructive reactions of all the representatives it United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine had approached in the matter. Refugees in the Near East: report of the Commissioner­ General (continued) (A/8013, A/8040, A/8084 and 4. In conclusion, he asked for priority to be given to the Add.1, A/SPC/140, A/SPC/141, A/SPC/L196, A/SPC/ draft resolution he had just submittf:d; he had expressed his L197, A/SPC/U 98, A/SPC/L199, A!SPC/l.200) intention to do so at the preceding meeting, realizing that that procedure might create difficulties for some delega­ 1. Mr. THYNESS (Norway) said that he now wished to tions and desiring to minimize those difficulties to the introduce draft resolution A/SPC/L.200, in pursuance of greatest possible extent. However, the draft would have to the suggestion he had made at the 740th meeting. He had be submitted to the Fifth Committee before being voted originally had in mind the creation of a working group on upon by the General Assembly, so that time was indeed of the question of the over-all financing of the United Nations the essence. It would be extremely helpful if the Special Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near Political Committee's decision on the draft resolution was East, to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth not unduly delayed. session. However, as the representative of Jordan had pointed out (740th meeting), the United Nations was also 5. The CHAIRMAN said that if there were no objections faced with the immediate task of preventing a crippling he would take it that the Committee agreed to consider reduction in the services of UNRWA in 1971. If such a draft resolution A/SPC/L.200 as a matter of priority, as had working group was set up at once, it could also be of service been suggested by the representative: of Norway. in finding a solution to that immediate problem. It was so decided. 2. His delegation had therefore expanded the proposal into a draft resolution which requested the President of the 6. Mr. OLEANDROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Repub· General Assembly, in consultation with the Secretary­ lies), speaking in explanation of his vote before voting on General. to designate a working group composed of the draft resolution before the Committee, said that his member States, and charged it with the twofold task of delegation felt it essential to reaffirm its fundamental reporting before the end of the current session on ways of position with regard to the Palestine refugee question, a maintaining UNRWA 's services in 1971, and then with position to which it had firmly adhered for some twenty continuing its work by assisting the Secretary-General and years. The problem had been created and still remained the Commissioner-General with the financial problems of unresolved because of Israel's aggressive, expansionist the Agency. Finally, the group was to report to the policy towards the Arab States and its refusal to carry out twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly on measures Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and General which would give UNRWA a more secure financial basis for Assembly resolution 194 (III). Under the terms of the latter as long as the problem of the Palestinian refugees continued resolution, it was Israel that was required to offer the to exist. All delegations, of course, hoped that an equitable refugees the possibility of repatriation, and to return to political solution would soon be found, bringing to an end them the property they had lost as a result of armed the refugee problem in the Middle East. Nevertheless, his conflict or, if they did not wish to return to their homes, to delegation felt that even under the most favourable offer them full compensation. The position taken by the circumstances, more than a stop-gap solution was called for Government of Israel, with its allies' support, impeded any with respect to the Agency's finances. effective solution of the Middle East refugee problem. Israel's aggressive policy must be resolutely condemned, 3. His delegation hoped that the draft resolution would and Israel must withdraw its troops from the occupied meet with the Committee's approval; if it did, there might territories as required by Security Council resolution be some hope of the adoption of emergency measures 242 (1967). The refugees and other victims of Israel's which would enable UNRWA to continue its work in 1971 aggression must be compensated for their losses at the more or less on the current scale, and of a comprehensive expense of the aggressor, in accordlance with the principles report on the matter being submitted at the twenty-sixth of international law and justice. That was the most effective session. His delegation was not unaware ·of the doubts way of solving the problem of the Palestine refugees and which might be raised by the draft resolution, and had other similar humanitarian problems. The Soviet Union had 289 A/SPC/SR.742 290 General Assembly -Twenty-fifth Session -Special Political Committee given assistance to the Arab States and would continue to Arab countries by the USSR was nothing but the assistance do so, in order to erase the aftermath of Israeli aggression to victims of aggression which all States were obliged to and restore the lawful rights of the Arab people of provide under the Charter. The missiles to which the Israeli Palestine. The Soviet Government and voluntary organiza­ representative had referred by implication were in fact tions provided such assistance on a bilateral basis to the defensive weapons located some two hundred kilometres Arab States which were the victims of aggression. That within the frontiers of the United Arab Republic, and were being so, there was no need for his country to direct its intended only to protect schoolchildren, factory workers assistance through UNRWA, and its position in that respect and other civilians in the area. would remain unchanged. His attitude towards the Nor­ wegian draft resolution would be in keeping with that 9. Mr. OLEANDROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Repub­ policy, but he stressed that his delegatiOn welcomed and lics) speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that applauded the assistance provided to the victims of aggres­ history could not be rewritten, It was a historical fact that sion by other countries. the refugee problem had been created by Israel's expan­ sionist policy and its occupation of Arab territories. Israel's 7. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right aggression against the Arab States had been repeatedly of reply, said that one of the main reasons for the condemned by the Security Council. For over twenty years continuance of a state of war in the Middle East, and for Israel had refused to comply with General Assembly the fact that no solution had been found to the refugee resolution 194 (III), which provided for a just settlement of problem, was that the USSR, while it provided no the refugee problem, and for the past three years it had assistance to the Agency, was helping the Arab States to been sabotaging the implementation of Security Council continue their warlike activities against Israel. When it came resolution 242 (1967). Israel could not escape its responsi­ to rewriting history he was unable to compete with the bility for those actions, or for its defiant attitude towards Soviets, whose Encyclopaedia provided ample evidence of the resolutions of the United Nation~. It must fulfil its their talents. He wished to point out, however, that the obligation to permit the Palestine refugees to return to their origin of the refugee problem actually lay in the war of homes and to restore their property or pay them compensa­ aggression against Israel waged by the Arab States in tion, in accordance with Security Council resolution defiance of the resolutions of the United Nations. At the 194 (III). outset of that conflict the representatives of the USSR actually agreed that that was the case, as was confirmed by 10. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that state­ their votes on a number of resolutions. Unfortunately, ments in exercise of the right of reply were generally made political changes had led to revisions in their view of at the end of meetings, after other business had been history. The refugee problem would be solved when peace concluded. was established between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The continuance of the conflict was due to the refusal of the Arab States to end their war against Israel. Only m the few 11. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan), speaking on a point of years since 1967 had some Arab Governments given order, said that the Committee had decided to consider the consideration to bringing about a just and lasting peace. Norwegian draft resolution as a matter of priority. Its The belligerent attitude of the Arab States was largely due discussion should therefore now be confined to the draft to the role played by the USSR in the Middle East. The resolution itself. The draft contained no reference to position of the Soviet Union was one of identification with questions of war and peace or to any other aspect of the the most extreme Arab points of view, and the Soviet question under consideration; it dealt only with the question of the refugees and means of remedying UNRWA's Government had continued to provide unlimited assistance to the Arab States in the form of arms for use in their war financial situation.
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