United Nations SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 742nd GENERAL MEETING ASSEMBLY Friday, 4 December 1970, at 10.55 a.m. TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION Official Records NEW YORK
Chairman: Mr. Abdul Samad GHAUS actually delayed making its suggestion as long as there had (Afghanistan). seemed to be some hope that sufficient contributions would be forthcoming at the pledging conference. Under the existing circumstances, however, it saw no other AGENDA ITEM 35 possible solution. He expressed his delegation's gratitude for the constructive reactions of all the representatives it United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine had approached in the matter. Refugees in the Near East: report of the Commissioner General (continued) (A/8013, A/8040, A/8084 and 4. In conclusion, he asked for priority to be given to the Add.1, A/SPC/140, A/SPC/141, A/SPC/L196, A/SPC/ draft resolution he had just submittf:d; he had expressed his L197, A/SPC/U 98, A/SPC/L199, A!SPC/l.200) intention to do so at the preceding meeting, realizing that that procedure might create difficulties for some delega 1. Mr. THYNESS (Norway) said that he now wished to tions and desiring to minimize those difficulties to the introduce draft resolution A/SPC/L.200, in pursuance of greatest possible extent. However, the draft would have to the suggestion he had made at the 740th meeting. He had be submitted to the Fifth Committee before being voted originally had in mind the creation of a working group on upon by the General Assembly, so that time was indeed of the question of the over-all financing of the United Nations the essence. It would be extremely helpful if the Special Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near Political Committee's decision on the draft resolution was East, to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth not unduly delayed. session. However, as the representative of Jordan had pointed out (740th meeting), the United Nations was also 5. The CHAIRMAN said that if there were no objections faced with the immediate task of preventing a crippling he would take it that the Committee agreed to consider reduction in the services of UNRWA in 1971. If such a draft resolution A/SPC/L.200 as a matter of priority, as had working group was set up at once, it could also be of service been suggested by the representative: of Norway. in finding a solution to that immediate problem. It was so decided. 2. His delegation had therefore expanded the proposal into a draft resolution which requested the President of the 6. Mr. OLEANDROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Repub· General Assembly, in consultation with the Secretary lies), speaking in explanation of his vote before voting on General. to designate a working group composed of the draft resolution before the Committee, said that his member States, and charged it with the twofold task of delegation felt it essential to reaffirm its fundamental reporting before the end of the current session on ways of position with regard to the Palestine refugee question, a maintaining UNRWA 's services in 1971, and then with position to which it had firmly adhered for some twenty continuing its work by assisting the Secretary-General and years. The problem had been created and still remained the Commissioner-General with the financial problems of unresolved because of Israel's aggressive, expansionist the Agency. Finally, the group was to report to the policy towards the Arab States and its refusal to carry out twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly on measures Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and General which would give UNRWA a more secure financial basis for Assembly resolution 194 (III). Under the terms of the latter as long as the problem of the Palestinian refugees continued resolution, it was Israel that was required to offer the to exist. All delegations, of course, hoped that an equitable refugees the possibility of repatriation, and to return to political solution would soon be found, bringing to an end them the property they had lost as a result of armed the refugee problem in the Middle East. Nevertheless, his conflict or, if they did not wish to return to their homes, to delegation felt that even under the most favourable offer them full compensation. The position taken by the circumstances, more than a stop-gap solution was called for Government of Israel, with its allies' support, impeded any with respect to the Agency's finances. effective solution of the Middle East refugee problem. Israel's aggressive policy must be resolutely condemned, 3. His delegation hoped that the draft resolution would and Israel must withdraw its troops from the occupied meet with the Committee's approval; if it did, there might territories as required by Security Council resolution be some hope of the adoption of emergency measures 242 (1967). The refugees and other victims of Israel's which would enable UNRWA to continue its work in 1971 aggression must be compensated for their losses at the more or less on the current scale, and of a comprehensive expense of the aggressor, in accordlance with the principles report on the matter being submitted at the twenty-sixth of international law and justice. That was the most effective session. His delegation was not unaware ·of the doubts way of solving the problem of the Palestine refugees and which might be raised by the draft resolution, and had other similar humanitarian problems. The Soviet Union had
289 A/SPC/SR.742 290 General Assembly -Twenty-fifth Session -Special Political Committee given assistance to the Arab States and would continue to Arab countries by the USSR was nothing but the assistance do so, in order to erase the aftermath of Israeli aggression to victims of aggression which all States were obliged to and restore the lawful rights of the Arab people of provide under the Charter. The missiles to which the Israeli Palestine. The Soviet Government and voluntary organiza representative had referred by implication were in fact tions provided such assistance on a bilateral basis to the defensive weapons located some two hundred kilometres Arab States which were the victims of aggression. That within the frontiers of the United Arab Republic, and were being so, there was no need for his country to direct its intended only to protect schoolchildren, factory workers assistance through UNRWA, and its position in that respect and other civilians in the area. would remain unchanged. His attitude towards the Nor wegian draft resolution would be in keeping with that 9. Mr. OLEANDROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Repub policy, but he stressed that his delegatiOn welcomed and lics) speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that applauded the assistance provided to the victims of aggres history could not be rewritten, It was a historical fact that sion by other countries. the refugee problem had been created by Israel's expan sionist policy and its occupation of Arab territories. Israel's 7. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right aggression against the Arab States had been repeatedly of reply, said that one of the main reasons for the condemned by the Security Council. For over twenty years continuance of a state of war in the Middle East, and for Israel had refused to comply with General Assembly the fact that no solution had been found to the refugee resolution 194 (III), which provided for a just settlement of problem, was that the USSR, while it provided no the refugee problem, and for the past three years it had assistance to the Agency, was helping the Arab States to been sabotaging the implementation of Security Council continue their warlike activities against Israel. When it came resolution 242 (1967). Israel could not escape its responsi to rewriting history he was unable to compete with the bility for those actions, or for its defiant attitude towards Soviets, whose Encyclopaedia provided ample evidence of the resolutions of the United Nation~. It must fulfil its their talents. He wished to point out, however, that the obligation to permit the Palestine refugees to return to their origin of the refugee problem actually lay in the war of homes and to restore their property or pay them compensa aggression against Israel waged by the Arab States in tion, in accordance with Security Council resolution defiance of the resolutions of the United Nations. At the 194 (III). outset of that conflict the representatives of the USSR actually agreed that that was the case, as was confirmed by 10. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that state their votes on a number of resolutions. Unfortunately, ments in exercise of the right of reply were generally made political changes had led to revisions in their view of at the end of meetings, after other business had been history. The refugee problem would be solved when peace concluded. was established between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The continuance of the conflict was due to the refusal of the Arab States to end their war against Israel. Only m the few 11. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan), speaking on a point of years since 1967 had some Arab Governments given order, said that the Committee had decided to consider the consideration to bringing about a just and lasting peace. Norwegian draft resolution as a matter of priority. Its The belligerent attitude of the Arab States was largely due discussion should therefore now be confined to the draft to the role played by the USSR in the Middle East. The resolution itself. The draft contained no reference to position of the Soviet Union was one of identification with questions of war and peace or to any other aspect of the the most extreme Arab points of view, and the Soviet question under consideration; it dealt only with the question of the refugees and means of remedying UNRWA's Government had continued to provide unlimited assistance to the Arab States in the form of arms for use in their war financial situation. Those were matters of great urgency, and any attempt to divert attention from them was against Israel. It was that policy which stood in the way of inconsistent with the decision taken by the Committee. He a peaceful solution to the conflict and the refugee problem. therefore requested that the Chairman should rule out of If the USSR was really concerned for the destiny of the order any statements which were not of direct relevance to refugees, it would contribute to UNRWA and work for peace in the Middle East by urging the Arab States to the draft resolution before the Committee. co-operate in the search for a peaceful solution. 12. Mr. AHMED (India), speaking on a point of order, 8. Mr. EL-ERIAN (United Arab Republic) said it was prcposed that draft resolution A/SPC/L.200 should be put regrettable that the representative of I.srael had taken to the vote immediately, and that any statements in advantage of the Committee's consideration of the Nor exercise of the right of reply should be deferred until after wegian draft resolution to repeat what he had said at great the Committee had voted. length in the preceding meeting, with the addition of a few new falsifications. It was well known that Israel was 13. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel), speaking on a point of order, obstructing the achievement of a peaceful settlement, said it was beginning to appear that his delegation was to be persisting in its denial of the rights of the Palestinian people prevented from exercising its right to speak. He had not and refusing to implement a resolution unanimously been first to engage in general political comment, but had adopted by the Security Council. While the Israeli represen merely attempted to reply to another representative. He tative alleged that the refugee problem still existed as a agreed that it was important to vote on the Norwegian draft result of Arab belligerence, the real reason was Israel's resolution as soon as possible, but he did not feel that a refusal to implement General Assembly resolution brief statement in exercise of the right of reply would 194 (III), which had been reaffirmed by the General appreciably delay matters. He did not wish to be the only Assembly at every session. The assistance provided to the representative deprived of his right to speak. 742nd meeting- 4 December 1970 291 14. Mr. SMIRNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Repub delegation would abstain from voting on the Norwegian lic) said that his delegation would like to speak in draft resolution because of its firm belief that the financial explanation of its vote on the draft resolution under consequences of the refugee problem must be borne by the consideration. If, however, the Israeli representative was countries which were responsible for making refugees of the given an opportunity to speak in exercise of the right of Palestinians. The Committee had heard hypocritical expres reply before the vote, his delegation would be obliged to sions of concern on the part of the representative of the request a similar opportunity. aggressor; but no one with the most elementary knowledge of human nature could believe that the Palestine refugees 15. Mrs. GAVRILOVA (Bulgaria), speaking on a point of had fled from a situation which was favourable to their order, said that the Committee, in accordance with its interests. decision, should proceed to vote on the draft resolution, and only afterwards should hear statements in exercise of 23. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel), speaking on a point of order, the right of reply. said that the Chairman's suggestion that the Committee should hear only explanations of vote, rather than political 16. Mr. AHMED (India), speaking on a point of order, statements, had been accepted w1thout challenge. If the proposed the closure of the debate in accordance with Byelorussian representative was permitted to continue with article 118 of the rules of procedure of the General his diatribe against Israel, which was based upon neurotic Assembly. He had no objection to hearing the Israeli hatred for the Jewish State, he would be compelled to representative's views; he wished merely to ensure that a exercise his own right of reply. It was not his desire to decision was taken on the draft resolution as soon as delay the vote on the Norwegian draft resolution, but it possible. There would be ample opportunity to hear should be clear to all that polemics concerning the general statements in exercise of the right of reply after the vote. situation in the Middle East and a1tacks on Member States did not constitute explanations of vote on a draft resolu 17. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia), speaking on a point of tion which dealt only with the financing of UNRWA. He order, reminded the Committee of the general rule laid therefore appealed to the Chairman to rule the Byelorussian down by the President of the General Assembly for the representative out of order. debates at the current session, to the effect that statements in exercise of the right of reply should be made at the end 24. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia), speaking on a point of of meetings. That rule had not been rigorously applied, but order, said that he did not wish to embark on a debate with in general had been fairly well observed, and his delegation the representative of Israel. However, it should be evident felt that it was a good one. He supported fully the views that no delegation could tailor its statements to suit all expressed by the representative of India. The representative other delegations. The Israeli representative should exercise of Israel should in all fairness be given an opportunity to his patience and allow the Byelorussian representative reply to statements by other delegations; it was evident, sufficient time to explain his vote; he would have an however, that his reply would lead to further replies, and opportunity to reply later if he felt it necessary. Freedom the result would be to delay the Committee's decision on of speech was essential in an explanation of vote as in any the draft resolution in question. other statement. He hoped the Chairman would not compel the representative of the Byelorussian SSR to conform to 18. Mr. OLEANDROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Repub standards established by any individual delegation; it was lics), speaking on a point of order, said that he was in customary to allow a certain latitude in explanations of general agreement with the views expressed by the represen vote. tative of Saudi Arabia. In accordance with existing practice, the right of reply should be exercised at the end of the 25. The CHAIRMAN observed that at the 73 7th meeting meeting. Explanations of vote, however, were an entirely he had refused to rule the Israeli representative out of different matter, and could be offered either before or after order, appealing to members of the Committee to appreci the vote. ate the realities of the debate and emphasizing the difficulties which would result if any attempt were made to 19. The CHAIRMAN suggested that until the draft resolu place rigid limits upon the terms of the discussion. He tion had been put to the vote the Committee should hear hoped that the Israeli representative would co-operate by statements in explanation of vote, and that statements in allowing the Byelorussian representative to proceed with his exercise of the right of reply should be heard only after all explanation of vote; the representative of Israel would have such explanations had been made and the voting had been ample opportunity to exercise the right of reply later in the completed. course of the meeting. 20. Mr. AHMED (India), speaking on a point of order, said 26. Mr. SMIRNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Repub he supported the Chairman's suggestion, but felt that a lic) said he found it perfectly understandable that some time-limit should be set for explanations of vote to be Governments should provide assistance to the Palestine heard before the vote was taken. refugees through UNRWA. It was less understandable that the aggressor should make accusahons against a State which 21. The CHAIRMAN suggested that explanations of vote provided such aid through bilateral channels. He did should be limited to five minutes. however realize that the aggressor was irritated by the direct Soviet assistance to the Arab peoples which were the It was so decided. victims of the aggression.
22. Mr. SMIRNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Repub 27. His delegation would have to abstain in the vote on lic}, ~peaking in explanation of his vote, said that his draft resolution A/SPC/L.200, because it believed that the 292 General Assembly - Twenty-fifth Session - Special Political Committee financial consequences of the Palestine refugee problem which would make peace impossible; should they be should be borne by those through whose fault the problem endorsed, it would take years to overcome the damage had been created. done. The positions taken by States on the draft resolutions in question would therefore be indicative of their position 28. Mr. RIOS (Panama) said that he found the draft concerning the possibility of future peace between Israel resolution under consideration extremely constructive. The and the Arab States. working group proposed could do effective and useful work, and its report might form the basis of a solution to 34. Replying to the representative of the Union of Soviet the problem of the refugees. The main reason why no Socialist Republics, he said that General Assembly resolu solution had yet been found to that problem, which was tion 194 (III) had more than one operative paragraph. Only becoming more serious daily, and why none was in sight, paragraph 11 dealt with the question of the refugees, and was that the question had not been treated with due that predicated the solution of the refugee problem on the impartiality and concern to arrive at a positive humani establishment of peace, to which the remaining operative tarian settlement. paragraphs were devoted. To single out one individual paragraph from a resolution was to distort the facts and 29. His delegation's only doubt related to the question of thus history. Furthermore, for twenty-two years the Arab the designation of the members of the working group. If States had made the refugees an instrument of war against the group's work was to be fruitful, its members must be Israel; they had , 'Bde no attempt to promote their designated in a totally impartial manner; it should not awareness of the poo .. bility of peace. consist of members whose Governments had political interests in the Middle East. · 35. The similarity of the positions taken and the language used by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the 30. Mr. HERNDL (Secretary of the Committee), speaking United Arab Republic inevitably underlined the complicity with reference to the administrative and financial implica of the Soviet Union in the continuance of Arab aggression tions of draft resolution A/SPC/L.200, said it was expected against Israel. The two delegations had accused Israel of that meetings of the working group could be fitted into the refusing to comply with Security Council resolution normal programme and that no elaborate documentation 242 (1967). It should be re.called however that while would be required. On that understanding, the activities of certain Arab States had rejected that resolution in the the working group could be financed from existing re Security Council Israel had vote for it, and its acceptance sources and would not necessitate additional appropria had been reaffirmed by the Prime Minister and Foreign tions. Minister of Israel and by himself both in the Israeli Parliament and in the United Nations. 31. The CHAIRMAN put draft resolution A/SPC/L.200 to the vote. 36. As could be seen from a report of the Secretary The draft resolution was adopted by 85 votes to none, General to the Security Council in March 1968, Israel had with 9 abstentions. tried to persuade the Arab States to agree to the holding of meetings between the parties to the conflict, as suggested 32. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right by Ambassador Jarring, Special Representative of the of reply, said he wished to point out to the representative Secretary-General. It was the refusal of the Arab Govern of the United Arab Republic that it was the Arab States ments to meet with the Israeli Government, despite the which had launched a war of aggression against Israel in precedents for doing so, which had delayed the implemen 1948; they had defied the United Nations and announced tation of Security Council resolution 242 (I 967). Their their intention of launching a war of extermination. Ever argument that they were unable to meet with the Israeli sitce, they had consistently refused to negotiate peace with Government was nothing more than a myth. In 1948 Israeli Israel. They had defied the Security Council resolutions and Arab representatives had met to negotiate armistice designed to ensure freedom of navigation through the Suez agreements, which had been signed in 1949. Even more Canal. They had signed armistice agreements with Israel and recently, Jordan and Israel had concluded and signed yet waged a war of terror against Israel's civilian popula agreements concerning the return of a number of persons tion. They had set off the chain of events leading to the displaced as a result of ti,~ 1967 hostilities. The Committee 1967 hostilities by driving out the United Nations Emer could see for itself where the responsibility for the gency Force; during the same year they had closed the non-implementation of the relevant Security Council reso Straits of Tiran and positioned tanks, aircraft and troops on lutions lay. the borders of Israel in order to strike the final blow at the existence of a State Member of the United Nations. In 1969 37. One indispensable element in all international rela they had repudiated the cease-fire which they had accepted tions, and in the question of the Middle East in particular, in June 1967, and former President Nasser had announced was truth. It was perfectly understandable that members of the beginning of a war of attrition against Israel. the Committee coming from distant parts of the world who were not acquainted at first hand with the situation should 33. They were still refusing to discuss peace with Israel; as accept the interpretations of the facts given by the Arab to the present attitude of the Arab States and their representatives, but States which were parties to the readiness to conclude a peace agreement, members could conflict, at least, should avoid distorted pictures and work draw their own conclusions from the debates in the on the basis of the true facts. Without truth there was no Committee. Through their efforts, elements had been hope for agreement and understanding between the parties introduced in the draft resolutions before the Committee to the conflict in the Middle East. 742nd meeting- 4 December 1970 293 38. Mr. EL-ERIAN (United Arab Republic), speaking in tated attempt to compel other delegations to make exten exercise of the right of reply, said that he had replied on sive statements ·in exercise of the right of reply in order to previous occasions to many of the charges made by the delay the Committee's proceedings. Although the Israeli representative of Israel, and that his replies were clearly set statement appeared at first sight to be an appeal for peace, out in the records. The records also made it clear who was closer examination revealed it to be a tactical manoeuvre. It responsible for the aggression against Palestine in 1948 and consisted of a series of counter-truths and falsifications. for the subsequent refugee problem. 46. One particular incident in 1948 was still vividly 39. There had been no peace because of Israel's denial of remembered in diplomatic circles; that was the assassination the human rights of the Palestinian people and its expan of the most neutral of envoys, Count Bernadotte, which sionist policy. The way to peace was clearly laid out in had destroyed any possibility of peaee. The Arab States had Security Council resolution 242 (1967). His country would reposed great hopes in the mission of that United Nations be willing to negotiate peace when .Israel demonstrated in Mediator, who had died at the hands of a terrorist group action as well as words its readiness to withdraw from the which included a former Israeli repre-sentative to the United occupied territories, to accept the inadmissibility of terri Nations and one of the present Tel-Aviv leaders. torial conquest by war and to ensure respect for the rights of the Palestinian people in any peace agreement. 4 7. The Cyprus peace formula hadl been a success largely thanks to the efforts of Mr. Bunche. It should be remem 40. The cease-fire had been violated by Israel, which had bered, however, that the situation in 1967 was not attacked petroleum installations along the Suez Canal. comparable with that of 1948. It was essential that in any Israel had always maintained that the cease-fire was a negotiations national dignity should be preserved; and as a necessary preliminary to peace, thereby in fact endeavour result, in view of the conditions imposed by Israel, several ing to obstruct peace by consolidating its territorial States had not found it possible to engage in a dialogue acquisitions. with Israel. Israel should recognize the dignity of its adversaries. To accept any agreement arrived at under 41. The reason for the similarity between his language pressue through negotiations undertaken in conditions and that of his Soviet colleagues was simple: both based imposed by the enemy was tantamount to capitulation. themselves on the provisions of the Charter of the United That was why the Arab nations had refused to negotiate Nations prohibiting the use of force and aggression. with the Israelis.
42. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan) said that the Committee was 48. For several years Israel had been talking of peace entitled to know the whole truth concerning the meetings without explaining what it meant by peace. The appoint which had been held and the agreements which had been ment of Ambassador Jarring as Special Representative of signed between Israel and the Arab States. Mr. Bunche, the the Secretary-General had caused great apprehension in Under-Secretary-General, could testify as to how those many circles in view of his nationality; it was feared that agreements had been negotiated and what had happened to for a second time a man of diplomacy might be sacrificed them subsequently. The Government of Jordan had signed or punished for his efforts to secure peace. Israel's the Protocol of Lausanne in May 1949 and had accepted interpretation of the relevant Security Council resolutions the obligations resulting from it. The same could not be left no doubts as to its attitude towards peace. It had used said for the Government of Israel. That Government should procrastinatory tactics to delay the opening of the dialogue honour its obligations under past agreements before advo proposed by Ambassador Jarring and imposed conditions cating the conclusion of new ones. which had made it impossible for the Arab States to agree to such a dialogue. Ambassador Jarring's task had never 43. The representative of Israel had more than once been easy, but Israel had made it more difficult because it referred to the agreement concerning the return of dis did not want peace. The Israeli Government had in fact placed persons. In a report on the matter, the International given no real proof that it wanted the dialogue to be Committee of the Red Cross had described the many opened, let alone to succeed. obstacles raised by Israel to the return of the displaced persons. Jordan, on the other hand, had offered the Red 49. The Israeli representative had said that his country Cross every assistance. In order to obstruct its work, Israel wanted peace; yet it had not accepted even the Rogers had even offered to accept the return of the father without peace plan, devised by a friend whose sincerity Israel could the son, the wife without the husband and the brother not doubt. The Arabs, on the other hand, had said that without the sister. It should be remembered that while the they were ready to accept the plan in principle and would truth should not be hidden, half truths were often most welcome preliminary discussions on that basis. The Israeli misleading. representative had not been allowed to meet Mr. Jarring at the United Nations, but had been recalled to Israel by his 44. Mr. SAYEGH (Kuwait) said he deplored the filibuster Government on the pretext of changes in the military ing which had taken place in order to sabotage the vote on situation. the draft resolutions still before the Committee. He therefore wished to postpone exercising his right of reply 50. The Israeli representative's statement could be ex until after the vote on the draft resolutions. plained only in the context of international developments, including the visit his country's Minister of Defence was to 45. Mr. BENHIMA .(Morocco), speaking in exercise of the make to Washington the follmving week and the Prime right of reply, said he was convinced that the statement Minister of Israel's recent statement on the Middle East. In made by the representative of Israel constituted a premedi- that statement the Prime Minister had again outlined her 294 General Assembly - Twenty-fifth Session - Special Political Committee country's conditions for peace, which included assurances to Count Bernadotte. For 2,000 years, the Jewish people that the United States would continue to supply arms and had suffered untold persecution and humiliation because of political support to Israel throughout the negotiations and the killing of one man; they were now being held would bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union to collectively responsible for killing another man, Count prevent it from intervening in the Middle East. To insist on Bernadotte. The Moroccan representative would do better Israel's desire for peace, on the eve of the resumption of to concern himself with the many problems confronting his negotiations, was a very clever diplomatic move, but the own country, rather than with those between Israel and the value of such statements had to be considered in the light neighbouring Arab States. It was difficult for him not to of Israel's many objectives. use strong words, knowing as he did that Morocco had been the driving force behind one of the draft resolutions before 51. The Israeli representative repeatedly stated that the the Committee which might make understanding between Arab countries were using the refugees as an instrument of Israel and the Arab States impossible and, by creating havoc war. Were the Israelis to allow them to return to their and chaos in the region, prevent any hope of the establish homeland, it would no longer be possible for them to be ment of a just and lasting peace. used in that way. Throughout history refugees had returned to their homes once the reasons for their flight had ceased 56. He appealed to the representative of the United Arab to exist. The Biafrans, to whom the Israeli representative so Republic and to representatives of the neighbouring Arab often referred, had now returned home, and so had most States not to engage in the game of semantics, but, as Europeans after the downfall of Hitler. representatives of Governments which might move nearer to understanding with his country during the forthcoming 52. Mr. Y AZID (Algeria) said that after careful study of months, to realize that Israel was not interested in the statements made by the representative of the Tel Aviv perpetuating the present situation. A cease-fire was a poor authorities. he had reached the conclusion that his aim was substitute for peace, which his country had been seeking to distract attention from the essence of the matter under even apart from the United Nations. In 1949, the United discussion by referring to the more general aspects of the Nations had incorporated in the armistice agreements with Middle East question which had already been discussed in each of the Arab States provisions to the effect that the plenary by the General Assembly. The agenda item allo armistice should eventually lead to permanent peace. In cated to the Committee concerned one specific aspect of accordance with article I of those agreements, Israel and the Middle East question-that of the Palestine refugees, the Arab Governments assumed a solemn obligation' to whose plight had been brought about by the expansionist progress towards peace. policies of Israel. The existence of the Palestinian people, which was an essential factor in the Middle East question 57. The record of the Arab Governments' attitude to and in the discussion of the question had been recognized agreement was clear. The representative of Jordan had by the United Nations and by most of the world. Their referred to the agreement between Israel and Jordan, which existence as a people having bP.en recognized, their right to had led to the granting of 21 ,000 permits for the return of self-determination must be recognized also. The Committee refugees to the west bank and to Gaza. Only 14,000 of should not waste time in discussing the diplomatic, military those permits had been used. There was no doubt that most and political aspects of the entire Middle East question or of the people concerned had left the west bank and the the confrontation between expansionist Israel and the Arab Gaza strip for another part of Palestine, the Kingdom of States, but should vote on the draft resolutions before it, Jordan, because their sources of income were in the east within the framework of the broader discussion which had and they had relatives living in other Arab States whom it taken place in the General Assembly. would be easier to visit from an Arab country than from Israel. While his country had fully carried out its obligations 53. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel), speaking in exercise of the right under that agreement with Jordan, the same could not be of reply, said that he did not intend to reply to the said of tfie attitude of the Arab States towards their representative of the Barbary Coast authorities, whose international obligations. In declaring war on a State which progressive character was reflected in their denial of the was about to become a Member of the United Nations the right to nationalism and independence to a people which Arab States had violated their obligations under the had existed 3,000 years before the Arabs conquered North Charter. The same applied to their refusal to accept the Africa. resolution of the General Assembly calling for the establish ment of a Jewish State. Not satisfied with rejecting that 54. In reply to the Moroccan representative's remarks resolution, the Arab States had said they intended to concerning the return of the refugees to their homes, he undermine it. would quote General Nasser's statement on I September I961 that if the refugees returned to Israel, Israel would 58. As to the suspension of the Jarring talks, the first cease to exist. It was surely not an international obligation agreement reached within the framework of that mission, for a people or State to commit suicide. that between Israel and the United Arab Republic, had been broken on the very night on which it came into force, 55. In a debate on another subject, he would have enjoyed when the United Arab Republic had violated the stand-still the Moroccan representative's brilliant use of the French clause by moving the missile sites closer to Israel's borders. language, but the present matter was too serious for No intelligent person could be deceived by the claim that semantic adornments. He did not know from what anti the missiles were defensive rather than offensive weapons; Semitic school the Moroccan representative had graduated, the whole world knew that Israel's only resort was the use but he had replied to a plea for harmony, agreement and of aircraft, which was effectively prevented by the moving peace by innuendos concerning assassination and references of the missiles. 742nd meeting--- 4 December I 970
59. Since it was hard to cleny that ls~ael had done understand his answer. J-l<· bari b·cen brol!gh! np m m everything possible withm the past two years to demc,n atmosph~re of s~mitllcl tolerance anr! t:nJgl.t ro rcganl JIJ strate its desire fo1 peace, the Arab States wen~ now st8ting children of AlHah3!11 .1~ ht:- bmtJwr~ '.Vh;on t],!c Prophrt h.1d that Israel wished to impme its own type of pcacr-, a> if brought h1s n,,~ssagc' t•J lslan'. he 'lad :;aid :J,c, i ;,e w:r; peace was something to be imposed rather than striven for. completing the m.~~s!lge or' l11\ prede:·~ssm:~- ~;!,,sf~' :111el th•' Israel had no drSJre or intention to 1mpose conditions on Jewish people ,)f Jsr2E.l. SLHc: 1t~ ori?m the Mn:~iew rrli~tll!l the Arab States. Had the Arab Governments been wiliing_ had recoCJFll<'Jidecl thaj- hrcad 5bc.,dd b•' ~ha•ed n2t•;,een there could have been peace in the region 18 01 :2(1 yevrs those who heliP-v~~d i•t the 1\'orri -J Abr~haw. :1Prl noilm:g eadier. Having re3Jized that those Governments were not had happePed to cnntrarlict tJ.at sccr~tl f)(ec·ept. /io'lJSn', yet ready for pca,;e, Israel had suggested tlte conclusion of on the ott.CJ hand. was 3 ckniaJ •1f :11~t piec<;:pL aihi he non-aggression agreements, so as to put an end to fwntier rfgret~ed that the f:;r;tr:li rciJ ..~S·~nia!Jv~ h:1d h.::cn hrougl:t violatiOns and prevent inn1rsions into its ternto.-y. Israel up m that anti-Arab sehouL desired a peace ·.vhich 1hould benefit all the pt::ople~ in the are
64_ Mr. BENHIMA I MofOI'W ), speaking in exerci~e of th~ o8. l\!r_ GHORRA ( Le~1:JDOP ), SJXakjng :lll :1 p,1;nt of right ot- reply, saHi th<•t he h:td not intended to make the onbr. said that zs the Chuiman i1~:cl Jr>;.l'm'd Jt tht' end nf representat1ve or Israel lose hi~ customary serenity. The the previous meeting that th·:c dehnc: on tll<" ugcllda Item Israeli rt'piesentative had ask.od from what anti-Semitic under •:rm.;;iderat.on w,1s ronrhid.~d. ltt· JS&ar•ed 1f~1t !h·:> sch•Jol he had gFJduat<'d. He hoped that despite the followiPg meeting wnulct h,• dC'vcted t 70. The CHAIRMAN said that as the Committ~e had just It was so decided. adopted a draft resolution recommending that a working group should present an interim report to the General Assembly not later than 14 December 1970, he suggested The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.