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Statement to a Popular Rally in Tanta, Egypt

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Statement to a Popular Rally in Tanta, Egypt ld t- n- ADDRASS v by is PRTJSIDENT ANTVAR EL SADAT .o at the popular rally fy held in Tanta IE .fanuary L, l{t7t t- n Fellow-citizens, l- The mobilisation of the political leader- t- ships present at this meeting in which we |S participate today constitutes a grear power in its representation of the faithful, patient d and struggling masses cf our rvorking people n who are capable by their work, faith, patience l! arrd sifu"uggleto face the big test which is im_ posed on them and on our nation. I have not coroe to you, brclhren, t(i ,r con- duct an enlightenment canrpaign, for the strug- g gle is t}at of the people, and the people are the force which leaCs and. directs it. I t tt "rr* not come to you, brethren, in a campaign n of full mob'ilisation cf our masses beeause our g7 peoltlc do ttot masses are fully rlobiiised' The They feel need enlightenment or mobilisation' part of his the pain as any man does when cotrntry is occuPied. or Our people do not need enlightenment fathers of mobilisation because' they are the history, its motive lruwer and crcator' to acl- I have not come here, brethren' them"' I dress the people but to hear from peopie of a have not come here to inform the future previomsty ad-optecl clecision concerning for steps; I have corne to receive inspi.ration Themeasure of our fr a,rai t d.tcision from them' lh- determination of tb'e people' uttq I il;; l the will of the measure of our capacity is I this PeoPle I Brothers, that the Ganral Abdet Nasser alwa'ys sa!d" this na= lr people are the lead'ers ancl teachers of in my minC' tion. This was nevcr so clear fi as it is now with all that it means to me' plact:d' lne in the rvhen circumstances have I was psition of responsihility after him' -"*"t" goes of it, but nor'v the rvhole matter it is the prac' t"Vo"a feelings and emoiii'rns' tieal eccperienceof tnte rcsponsibility'' 98 lleople do nol Practical experience has shovm that no ion. They feel leader or leadership can take a decision and n'part of his be sure of that decision, whatever may be its imgcrtance, except on one condition, namely, ightenment or its fuil awareness of tlie rvill of the people. he fathers of lreator. Brethren, lthren, to acl- OnIy in this way can ihe leader and.leader- 'om them... I ship take any decision... a,ncithe responsibility re people of a increases by tJre very nature of the overall rerning future war. The overall war is not merely an army nspiration for fighting ariother arrny, or a fighting front leasure of our confronting anothe,r front... an overall war is re people, and a w:Lr everywhere. Weapons in this rvar are not r the will of limited to' machine-guns, rifles, submarines and planes, they also include rnachines in the fac- tories, ploughs in tJ:e fields, and exten,l to human behaviour itself, and the feelings said.that the of eaqlr one in every house... Ii is the war- lrs of this na- -of the er:tire nation... the war of the whole in my mind, people. Danger is evr:rywtiere and each person it is no"v as is exposed to it. d rne in the him. f was The final decision remains in the hands I matter goes of the people because the land, the freedom t, is the prac- and the will-power is, theirs, and theirs too bility.' is the fight and, God willing, the victory. 99 I have corne to you, brethren, to listen to you, to sense what you want and to be im- bued with further energy and hope... At tlte 196€ same time, I want you to know all that is n0co taking plaee... Gamal Abdel Nasser taught us eda that the people are the bearers of the respon' dag leade,rs encl "'ve munt sibility... They are the 204'. put the facts before the peop'le. all eSgr President El Sadat said : < I came i.o , inth Tanta irr 1969 rvhen Gamal Abdel Nasser ho' noured me by asking me to come here and eo<- I p'lain to you the coming stage for 7970... the of to ob;'ectives and the plan of the enemy, as well ton as our objectives and our plan. We met here unds in Tanta and talked with all the leaderships fight of Lo'wer Egypt and what we extrncted for home 1970 took place. The Israeli enemy, with Ame' militr r{can support, a.ttempted to make the firet six I months of 1970 a year of victoi'y for fsrael plrn and for America by wagrng a decisive battle its p taking advan:tage of their air superiority. They cemb il. began the air battle. We all remember the I Bar'L j meeting lvhich Prcsiderrt Gamal Abdel Nasser attend' smasl l called for late in 1969 and which was ed by ali politicians and military men. They in thr ili came to the conclusion that our enemy wottld tives. ,il attempt, through his air superiority, to etrike \ home-front. ,ll the ives ? rOSe I 100 , to llsten t to be im- i... At tho A shorl time later and on December 28, all that is 1969 when President Nasser was in Rabat, Mo- taught us rocco, lsrael did not wait for I9?0 and start- he respon- ed attacking us with its airdorce. On that I t;iremust day, December ZE, from g a.m. until 4.30 p.m. 264 Israeli aircraft raided us. fn the June 1g6? came io aggression only 220 fsraeU aircraft were userl Vasserhs- in the battle. re and eoc- On December 25, Lsrael dropped" thousands |'970...the of tons of bombs on our positions in the Canal, ry, as well to make its air-superiority felt, ir:" order to r met here under"mine the morale oi rtur forces on tfte eaderships fighting line prelimiirary to its move to the pected for home-front, to the people, after rlestroying ,;hc with Ame- military front. re first six for Israel President El Sadat e><plainedthe,enemy,s dve battle plan during that stage saying : < Israel built nity. Ttrey its pla"n on one declared vier,v-point. On De. mber the cember 31, 1969 the Israeli Chief-cf-Staff Haim lel Nasser Bar'Lev declared that fsrael succeeded. in 'as attend. smashing the military force of the Arab armies nen. They in the 1967 war but failed tr.r realise its objec- my would tives. ', to strike Why did Israel fail l,o realise its object- ives ? Because of the people who resisted and rose on g June and 10... the peopie who were 1.n1 i;. lt'' Before and oblig' determinecl to continue Lhe march missile bat position to lead ed Gamal to remain in his tions. SuE the battle. our so,nsw In L9?0, Bar'Lev said that the Arab peo- ry heroisrr ples' resistanee should be hit from within, in when w,g ci order to realise the political objectives of fs' Then rael. from Raba another sh At that time President Gamal Abdel and started answered him from the Khartnm stad' Nasser Tel El Keb during the celebrations of the Indepen- ium The lsraelit Day of the Sudan on January 1, 1970' > dence a distance r President El Sadat added : < With' the they said t beginning of 19?0 the air battle began to take they were i "rrott "" form. I remember that on December war, actual. 25, o'ur sons on the front recorded the most there was r glorious and magnificent examples of hero- use in cont ism.., Fon eight and a half hours o'ur forces found his I were subjected to raicis'.. ?64 planes comiqg second lines in suecessiver waves to raid us and not rlno have seen I person left his position on the front' third stage Its aimwas Wht:n the raids ended and f was inform- a large gat. ed of it '- because the Pvesident rvas then in damage so r Rabat -- I gave an order for the missile bat- ple antl spr teries to change their posi.tions because tons way Bar'L of still effective time and delayed action bo'mbs achieve viet were scattered. arou4d,the Ptace r02 Before the dawn olt' December 26 all the . :.t' . oblig- ' r,, missile batteries were moved from their posi- ;"1..i lead r'.'" .l o tions. Super-human efftlrts v!'ele €xeri"ed bry '' .. ; our sons rvhose endeavours exceed the ordina- i; rb peo' ry heroism of mankind. The day she.ll come 'i.. t:'',/ hin, iri when we can talk of these things in detail. of Is- Then President Abdel Nasser returned from Rabat and the bailie began to take another shape. The cnemy left the first line Abdel and started his attack on the second line... on n stad- A Tel El Kebir, fnshass, Wadi Houf and Helwan. rdepen- * The Israelis claimed that tley were hitting at 19?0.> a distance of 10 and 5 kms. fron Cairo. When ith the they said that Egypt's sky was open to them, to take they were in effect waging a hot psychologieal rember war, actually rvishing to make us believe that re most there was no furlher hope and no longen any f hero- use in continuing to resist.
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