Caroline Werner University of Helsinki Faculty of Social Sciences Political Science Master’S Thesis April 2014
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A WIDE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR POLITICISATION IN TIMES OF THE EUROPEAN DEBT CRISIS – A CASE STUDY OF THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG’S PLENARY Caroline Werner University of Helsinki Faculty of Social Sciences Political Science Master’s Thesis April 2014 Tiedekunta/Osasto – Fakultet/Sektion – Faculty Laitos – Institution – Department Faculty of Social Sciences Department of Political and Economic Studies Tekij – Frfattare – Author Caroline Werner Tyn nimi – Arbetets titel – Title A Wide Window of Opportunity for Politicisation in Times of the European Debt Crisis – A Case Study of the German Bundestag’s Plenary Oppiaine – Lromne – Subject Political Science Tyn laji – Arbetets art – Level Aika – Datum – Month and year Sivumr – Sidoantal – Number of pages Master’s thesis April 2014 97 Tiivistelm – Referat – Abstract This thesis explores the politicisation of EU affairs in the German parliament, the Bundestag, in spring 2010. The key objective of the case study is to examine the nature, extent and manner in which the increased potential for politicisation of EU affairs at the national level in the course of the Lisbon Treaty and the euro crisis has materialised in the Bundestag. The relevance of these questions lies in the normative implications for parliamentarism in Germany and the democratic legitimacy of the EU. The theoretical framework discusses the Europeanisation of the Bundestag, that is, the parliament’s adaptation to the emerging and continuously evolving EU multi-level polity, from the viewpoint of politicisation; and a theoretical model is developed by drawing the conceptual links between Europeanisation, reparliamentarisation and politicisation. The Europeanisation process is seen as facilitating increasing political contestation of EU issues at the member state level. It will be argued that the European sovereign debt crisis provides a widened window of opportunity for politicisation, despite the executive’s inclination towards depoliticisation. This thesis draws on the single-case study design, placing special emphasis upon contextuality and ‘thick analysis’. The principal unit of analysis is the plenary assembly of the Bundestag, and embedded units of analysis include the government and legislative actors (five parliamentary groups, government MPs and opposition MPs). The case study covers three plenary debates between March and May 2010, amounting to five hours of discussion. Altogether, 30 speeches have been analysed, following a mixed-method approach of qualitative content analysis (claims analysis complemented by framing analysis) combined with quantitative representations of issue salience. The coding was conducted using Atlas.ti software as a tool. The study finds supporting evidence for all three indicators of politicisation: awareness of, mobilisation around and polarisation of EU affairs. The empirical analysis reveals that polarisation of opinions and demands has occurred on three dimensions, namely ‘policy’, ‘polity’ and ‘politics’, despite a clearly evident cross-partisan pro-European consensus in the Bundestag and despite the tendency of executive actors to employ depoliticising tactics during times of crisis. EU-relevant debates in the Bundestag’s plenary show political contestation on the left/right dimension and, to a lesser extent, on the pro-/anti- EU dimension. Furthermore, we observe international conflict framing (pitting member states against each other) and transnational conflict framing (based on party political, majority–opposition and executive–legislative cleavages). Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords Bundestag, claims analysis, conflict framing, European debt crisis, Europeanisation, Germany, politicisation, qualitative content analysis TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables and Figures ............................................................................................ 1 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 2 2 Literature Review and Conceptual Framework .................................................... 8 2.1 Parliaments, Parties and Representation ...................................................... 8 2.2 National Parliaments and the Democratic Deficit ..................................... 12 2.3 Europeanisation ......................................................................................... 15 2.4 Politicisation .............................................................................................. 17 2.5 Theoretical Model...................................................................................... 20 3 Case Study........................................................................................................... 23 3.1 Research Design ........................................................................................ 23 3.2 Data ............................................................................................................ 25 3.3 Methods ..................................................................................................... 32 4 Analytical Findings ............................................................................................. 37 4.1 Overall Distribution of Claims .................................................................. 40 4.2 Debates ...................................................................................................... 42 4.3 Financial Transaction Tax ......................................................................... 47 4.4 Government ............................................................................................... 50 4.5 CDU and CSU ........................................................................................... 54 4.6 FDP ............................................................................................................ 58 4.7 SPD ............................................................................................................ 61 4.8 The Left ..................................................................................................... 66 4.9 The Greens ................................................................................................. 69 5 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 73 6 Appendices .......................................................................................................... 79 Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 90 LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES Table 3.1: Debates ...................................................................................................... 27 Table 3.2: Distribution of speeches ............................................................................ 30 Table 3.3: Average length of membership by October 2009 (in years) ..................... 32 Table 3.4: Main categories of the coding frame ........................................................ 34 Table 4.1: Frequency distribution of claim categories by actors ............................... 38 Table 4.2: Frequency distribution of ‘policy’, ‘polity’ and ‘politics’ by actors ........ 39 Table 4.3: Frequency distribution of ‘policy’, ‘polity’ and ‘politics’ by claims ........ 39 Table 4.4: Frequency distribution of claims by debates ............................................ 42 Table 4.5: Frequency distribution of ‘policy’, ‘polity’ and ‘politics’ by debates ...... 43 Table 4.6: ‘Lack of alternative’ speech ...................................................................... 53 Table 6.1: Speaker profiles ........................................................................................ 82 Table 6.2: Claims making on the Europe 2020 strategy ............................................ 85 Table 6.3: Government critique concerning the financial transaction tax ................. 86 Table 6.4: Pro-financial transaction tax claims making by the CDU/CSU................ 87 Table 6.5: Critique of the former red–green coalition government ........................... 88 Table 6.6: Explanations of speculation to ‘ordinary citizens’ by the Left ................. 89 Figure 3.1: Distribution of speeches .......................................................................... 31 Figure 6.1: Distribution of seats in the Bundestag as of October 2009 ..................... 81 1 1 INTRODUCTION Until the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009, national parliaments have only been mentioned in declarations and protocols appended to European Union (EU) treaties, ensuring that national members of parliament (MPs) have effective and timely access to all relevant EU documents. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the role of national parliaments has for the first time been acknowledged in an actual treaty article (Article 12 TEU1). More specifically, the Treaty introduced an early-warning mechanism for subsidiarity control, thereby giving national legislatures the formal right to comment on EU legislative proposals in view of compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. In Germany, the process of ratifying and implementing the Treaty of Lisbon turned out more controversial as probably anticipated. Even though both houses of parliament (the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) approved the Treaty by comfortable majorities, the process was largely dominated by the Federal Constitutional Court, whose decision of 30 June 2009 ruled the Treaty compatible