DOCSLIB.ORG

General George S. Patton Jr

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
General George S. Patton Jr General George S. Patton Jr. Tyler Krantz Junior Division Historical Paper Word Count: 1955 “A good plan today is better than a perfect plan tomorrow.” General George S. Patton Jr. In the midst of the chaos of World War II the world waited for a leader to navigate the Allied forces to victory against the Axis powers. General George S. Patton Jr. rose to this challenge with his offensive leadership style. “We shall attack and attack until we are exhausted, and then we shall attack again” declared Patton to his troops before the North African Landings (“Patton’s Career”). Patton was integral in the Allied victories in Africa and Europe, including the Battle of the Bulge where he relentlessly drove his Third Army over 100 miles, under impossible conditions to relieve a surrounded unit. General George S. Patton’s military prowess was the result of his obsessive desire to remain on the offensive and tenacious ability to keep the enemy off balance. Often seen as a loose cannon and hothead that put political stress on his superiors, Patton’s unorthodox leadership style had a dynamic effect on the battlefield. The same characteristics that made Patton, at times, an embarrassment to his superiors were also the characteristics that made him such a superb war leader that helped lead the Allied forces to victory. Although controversy surrounded General Patton, his fierce leadership style and offensive war plan cemented his legacy in military history. As a child George Patton felt destined to become a military leader. George Patton loved war. He got this passion by listening to his family members telling old war stories throughout his childhood. Patton’s ancestors fought in many wars including the Mexican American War and the Civil War (Pettinger). Patton’s first attempt to carry on this family tradition was when Patton was admitted into U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1909. His first year ended in failure. Not an intellectual stand-out, Patton was prone to academic struggles. He needed a military conflict for his leadership traits to unveil themselves. He was designed to lead troops through grit and determination and to strike first in an offensive strategy. (Hogg 332) Patton first experienced military conflict in March 1916, during the Poncho Villa Expedition. Initially left out of the conflict Patton pleaded to Commander John J. Pershing to participate in the operation. Pershing, impressed by Patton’s determination, appointed him to be his personal aide. By mid-April Patton was in command of troops where he led the first motorized attack in the history of US warfare which resulted in the killing of Julio Cardenas henchman of Poncho Villa (Hickman). Patton’s leadership styles started in the first Great War. While commanding troops during World War I Patton was shot in the thigh. Instead of receiving medical attention and leaving the battlefield Patton commanded his troops from a shell hole. (Klein) The years between World War I and World War II were very hard on the Army of the United States because of severe lack of funding and the drastic reduction of forces. Patton along with the majority of Army leaders was discouraged but continued to develop tactics that would be instrumental to the coming war effort. He was particularly adept at recognizing and conducting groundbreaking work on armor tactics (Interview). World War II erupted when Nazi Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. The Nazi’s continued their campaign to transform Europe into a totalitarian state of a master Aryan race by sweeping through most of Europe and crushing nearly everyone in their path. Germany went on to invade Russia in June 1941. Although hesitant to join the Second Great War the United States of America quietly supported their allies, Great Britain. However, the United States was forced to declare war on Japan after the attack on Pearl Harbor and war on Germany shortly afterwards due to the alliance between Japan and Nazi Germany. The United States decided that the best way to engage the Germans and enter continental Europe was by going through Africa and driving out the Nazi forces. In June of 1940 the United States was part of the North African Campaign that was fought between the Allies and Axis Powers. The first major operation by the U S forces against the Germans included the Battle of Kasserine Pass. This battle was a humiliating defeat for the American II Corps led by Major General Lloyd Frendendall. “Their first major clash with Germans, the battle showed an enemy with superiority in experience and equipment as well as exposed several flaws in the American command structure and doctrine” (Hickman). The US soldiers were too confident in themselves and they were led poorly by General Frendendall. Following the defeat at Kasserine Pass, General George S. Patton, a West Point and Virginia Military Institute graduate, was appointed by the supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower as Commander of II Corps. With a take charge leadership style he was sent to Africa to inspire his soldiers. “Patton diligently worked to restore discipline and fighting spirit to II Corps” (Hickman). General Patton would prepare quickly and go on the offensive. He believed, that in the long run being on the offensive would create fewer casualties. He also believed he could end the war sooner by continually driving the enemy back and not being on the defensive and holding territory. “The hill was Patton's most advanced position at one point on the Gafsa-Gabès road. U.S. troops who had fought without sleep for 48 hours seized it, then barely had time to scratch out shallow foxholes before 88-mm. cannon began blasting at them from German tanks in the pass below and from artillery in overlooking hills.” (Djebel el Kreroua) Unlike British Field Marshall Montgomery, of the British Forces, who would wait until everything was perfect (weather, air support, artillery, etc.) before attacking, General Patton would attack as fast and as soon as possible (“Patton’s Career”). Although General Patton demanded that his soldiers were in top fighting condition, conveyed through profane language and strict conduct rules he was often seen visiting injured soldiers at their bedside in military field hospitals. He would talk, comfort, and often times cry with his wounded men. They realized that Patton was a serious soldier who had one mind set and that was to win with the least amount of casualties as possible. Patton’s perception of a wartime injury was a physical not mental wound and that if you were not injured you should be fighting on the front lines. A prime example of this leadership style was exhibited in August of 1943 during the allied invasion of Sicily. As General Patton was touring the hospital tents talking to the wounded he saw Private Paul G. Bennett without any visible injuries. When Patton asked him what was wrong with him, Pvt. Bennett said: “It’s my nerves, I cannot take it anymore.” Patton slapped him twice and called him a coward. General Patton told the staff that he was not to be treated anymore and to immediately transfer him back out to the front lines. Patton also said that the Private might get shot back out there on the front lines and that he (Patton) might as well shoot him right then and there (Perzo). Having left the hospital Patton made his way to General Bradley’s headquarters where he simply explained “Sorry to be late, stopped off at a hospital on the way, there were a couple of malingerers there; I slapped one of them to put some fight back into him (Hogg 400). Widely criticized for slapping the Private, General Patton was required to apologize for his actions. General Dwight Eisenhower, his superior, relieved him in Sicily and sidelined him from the front lines for nearly a year. Infuriated, Patton became a decoy sending false intelligence to Nazi Germany. General Patton was put in command of a ghost army, while the actual invasion force was being formed and trained elsewhere. The ruse was extraordinarily effective and was instrumental in tying up a huge German force away from the actual battle area. The Germans could just not believe that a General of the caliber of Patton would not be leading the main effort. The Allied invasion of France took place in June 1944 with a huge landing force and although successful the assault quickly bogged down and General Eisenhower realized that Patton would have to be brought out of “retirement” to restore the initiative to the battlefield. General Patton was given command of the 3rd Army and immediately went on the offensive and began pushing the German forces out of France. The Germans, however had one more, great offensive in them and it would be known as the Battle of the Ardennes Forest, better known to the Allies as the Battle of the Bulge. The American and Germans met at the Battle of the Bulge in the Ardennes Forest in December of 1944. Germany launched an offensive attack on the American positions while the Americans counter-attacked. Although the fight was in doubt for weeks, the Americans ultimately gained the upper hand. The win at the Battle of the Bulge was a direct reflection of General Patton’s leadership and offensive mindedness. As Patton was attacking in the Saar Basin he had to redeploy his troops to save the crumbling 101st American Airborne Division on the south side of the bulge. He redeployed his troops in amazing speed across cold unforgiving land (“Patton’s Career”). Patton moved 250,000 men and 133,000 vehicles 50 miles in freezing weather, major snowstorms and ice frozen roads (Hogg455).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • American Armies and Battlefields in Europe
    Chapter v1 THE AMERICAN BATTLEFIELDS NORTH OF PARIS chapter gives brief accounts of areas and to all of the American ceme- all American fighting whi ch oc- teries and monuments. This route is Thiscurred on the battle front north of recommended for those who desire to Paris and complete information concern- make an extended automobile tour in the ing the American military cemeteries and region. Starting from Paris, it can be monuments in that general region. The completely covered in four days, allowing military operations which are treated are plenty of time to stop on the way. those of the American lst, 27th, 30th, The accounts of the different operations 33d, 37th, 80th and 91st Divisions and and the descriptions of the American the 6th and 11 th Engineer Regiments. cemeteries and monuments are given in Because of the great distances apart of the order they are reached when following So uthern Encr ance to cb e St. Quentin Can al Tunnel, Near Bellicourc, October 1, 1918 the areas where this fighting occurred no the suggested route. For tbis reason they itinerary is given. Every operation is do not appear in chronological order. described, however, by a brief account Many American units otber tban those illustrated by a sketch. The account and mentioned in this chapter, sucb as avia- sketch together give sufficient information tion, tank, medical, engineer and infantry, to enable the tourist to plan a trip through served behind this part of the front. Their any particular American combat area. services have not been recorded, however, The general map on the next page as the space limitations of tbis chapter indicates a route wbich takes the tourist required that it be limited to those Amer- either int o or cl ose to all of tbese combat ican organizations which actually engaged (371) 372 THE AMERICAN B ATTLEFIELD S NO R TH O F PARIS Suggested Tour of American Battlefields North of Paris __ Miles Ghent ( î 37th and 91st Divisions, Ypres-Lys '"offensive, October 30-November 11, 1918 \ ( N \ 1 80th Division, Somme 1918 Albert 33d Division.
    [Show full text]
  • BATTLE-SCARRED and DIRTY: US ARMY TACTICAL LEADERSHIP in the MEDITERRANEAN THEATER, 1942-1943 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial
    BATTLE-SCARRED AND DIRTY: US ARMY TACTICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER, 1942-1943 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Steven Thomas Barry Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2011 Dissertation Committee: Dr. Allan R. Millett, Adviser Dr. John F. Guilmartin Dr. John L. Brooke Copyright by Steven T. Barry 2011 Abstract Throughout the North African and Sicilian campaigns of World War II, the battalion leadership exercised by United States regular army officers provided the essential component that contributed to battlefield success and combat effectiveness despite deficiencies in equipment, organization, mobilization, and inadequate operational leadership. Essentially, without the regular army battalion leaders, US units could not have functioned tactically early in the war. For both Operations TORCH and HUSKY, the US Army did not possess the leadership or staffs at the corps level to consistently coordinate combined arms maneuver with air and sea power. The battalion leadership brought discipline, maturity, experience, and the ability to translate common operational guidance into tactical reality. Many US officers shared the same ―Old Army‖ skill sets in their early career. Across the Army in the 1930s, these officers developed familiarity with the systems and doctrine that would prove crucial in the combined arms operations of the Second World War. The battalion tactical leadership overcame lackluster operational and strategic guidance and other significant handicaps to execute the first Mediterranean Theater of Operations campaigns. Three sets of factors shaped this pivotal group of men. First, all of these officers were shaped by pre-war experiences.
    [Show full text]
  • HMSO Chapter09.Pdf
    CHAPTER IX NORTH WEST AFRICA. (OPERATION "TORCH") The following map and plate are relative to this chapter:— Page Sketch Map 9. North West Africa and the Western Mediterranean 259 Plate 1 at end > 27. Algeria 1:200,000 of book J SECTION 1. SURVEY ORGANIZATION AND NARRATIVE Historical background From the time when the United States entered the war in December, 1941, the possibilities of an Allied expedition to French North West Africa had been considered. During 1941 and 1942 the following factors tended to strengthen the desirability for such an operation:— (a) The German offensive against Russia not only endangered the whole existence of the Russian Armies but involved such a deep thrust into southern Russia that it formed a dangerous threat to the Caucasus oilfields and the Middle East itself. Russia was pressing the Allies for the opening of a second front to relieve the strain. (b) The German and Italian forces in Libya produced a growing threat against Egypt and the Middle East generally. (c) The increasing difficulty of passing convoys through the Mediterranean, and the Axis threat against Malta were of serious moment to the Allies. The decision to undertake a joint British-U.S. operation in North West Africa to clean up all the German and Italian forces in North Africa, to open up the Mediterranean and relieve Malta, and to relieve indirectly the strain against Russia was made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by the two Governments concerned on 24th July, 1942. The code name for the operation was "Torch." Strategical and military considerations Rommel's offensive against the British forces in Libya was launched in May, 1942, and by early July had reached the El Alamein area and was threatening the Nile Valley.
    [Show full text]
  • 48, Patton and Rommel
    THE FORTY-EIGHTH HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURE IN MILITARY HISTORY Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the 20th Century Dennis Showalter United States Air Force Academy 2005 1 PATTON AND ROMMEL: MEN OF WAR IN THE 20TH CENTURY DENNIS SHOWALTER THE HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY NUMBER FORTY-EIGHT United States Air Force Academy Colorado 2005 2 THE HARMON LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY The oldest and most prestigious lecture series at the Air Force Academy, the Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History originated with Lieutenant General Hubert R. Harmon, the Academy's first superintendent (1954-1956) and a serious student of military history. General Harmon believed that history should play a vital role in the new Air Force Academy curriculum. Meeting with the History Department on one occasion, he described General George S. Patton, Jr.'s visit to the West Point library before departing for the North African campaign. In a flurry of activity Patton and the librarians combed the West Point holdings for historical works that might be useful to him in the coming months. Impressed by Patton's regard for history and personally convinced of history's great value, General Harmon believed that cadets should study the subject during each of their four years at the Academy. General Harmon fell ill with cancer soon after launching the Air Force Academy at Lowry Air Force Base in Denver in 1954. He died in February 1957. He had completed a monumental task over the preceding decade as the chief planner for the new service academy and as its first superintendent.
    [Show full text]
  • The AAF in Northwest Africa
    DISTRIBUTION STATEMEFNT A Approved for Public Release Distribution Unlimited Wings at War Series, No. 6 The AAF in Northwest Africa AN ACCOUNT OF THE TWELFTH AIR FORCE IN THE NORTHWEST AFRICAN LANDINGS AND THE BATFLE FOR TUNISIA An Interim Report Published by Headquarters, Army Air Forces Washington, D. C. Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence New Imprint by the Center for Air Force History Washington- D- C- 1992 20050429 005 Wings at War COMMEMORATIVE EDITION Originally published shortly after key air campaigns, the Wings at War series captures the spirit and tone of America's World War II experience. Eyewitness accounts of Army Air Forces' aviators and details from the official histories enliven the story behind each of six important AAF operations. In coopera- tion with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Center for Air Force History has reprinted the entire series to honor the airmen who fought so valiantly fifty years ago. ,.' Celtrfor Air Force History Washington, D.C. DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved REPORT OMB No. 0704-0188 The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, Including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302.
    [Show full text]
  • Patton and Logistics of the Third Army
    Document created: 20 March 03 Logistics and Patton’s Third Army Lessons for Today’s Logisticians Maj Jeffrey W. Decker Preface When conducting serious study of any operational campaign during World War II, the military student quickly realizes the central role logistics played in the overall war effort. Studying the operations of General George S. Patton and his Third United States Army during 1944-45 provides all members of the profession of arms—especially the joint logistician—valuable lessons in the art and science of logistics during hostilities. Future conflicts will not provide a two or three year "trial and error" logistics learning curve; rather, the existing sustainment infrastructure and its accompanying logisticians are what America’s armed forces will depend on when the fighting begins. My sincere thanks to Dr. Richard R. Muller for his guiding assistance completing this project. I also want to thank the United States Army Center of Military History for providing copies of the United States Army in World War II official histories and Lt Col (S) Clete Knaub for his editing advice and counsel. Finally, thanks go to my wife Misty for her support writing this paper; her grandfather, Mark Novick for his wisdom and guidance during the preparation of this project; and to his brother David, a veteran of the Third United States Army. I dedicate this project to him. Abstract George S. Patton and his Third Army waged a significant combined arms campaign on the Western Front during 1944-45. Both his military leadership and logistics acumen proved decisive against enemy forces from North Africa to the Rhine River.
    [Show full text]
  • The Operational Role of British Corps Command on the Western Front, 1914-18
    The Operational Role of British Corps Command on the Western Front, 1914-18 Andrew Simpson University College, London Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy © Abstract British corps command having been neglected in the literature, this thesis sets out to assess what British corps did, and how they did it, on the Western Front during the Great War. It attempts to avoid anecdotal sources as much as possible, drawing its evidence instead as much as possible from contemporary official documents. It is a central argument here that Field Service Regulations, Part 1 (1909), was found by commanders in the BEF to be applicable throughout the war, because it was designed to be as flexible as possible, its broad principles being supplemented by training and manuals. Corps began the war in a minor role, as an extra level of command to help the C-in-C control the divisions of the BEF. With the growth in numbers and importance of artilleiy in 1915, divisions could not cope with the quantity of artilleiy allotted theni, and by early 1916, the corps BGRA became the corps artilleiy commander (GOCRA). In addition to its crucial role in artillery control, corps was important as the highest level of operational command, discussing attack plans with Armies and divisions and being responsible for putting Army schemes into practice. Though corps tended to be prescnptive towards divisions in 1916, and Armies towards corps, a more hands-off style of command was generally practised in 1917, within the framework of FSR and the pamphlet SS13S (and others - to be used with FSR).
    [Show full text]
  • World War II Participants and Contemporaries: Papers
    World War II Participants and Contemporaries: Papers Container List ACCETTA, DOMINICK Residence: Fort Lee, New Jersey Service: 355th Inf Regt, Europe Volume: -1" Papers (1)(2) [record of Cannon Co., 355th Inf. Regt., 89th Inf. Div., Jan.-July 1945; Ohrdruf Concentration Camp; clippings; maps; booklet ”The Story of the 89th Infantry Division;” orders; song; ship’s newspaper, Jan. 1946;map with route of 89th Div.] AENCHBACHER, A.E. "Gene" Residence: Wichita, Kansas Service: Pilot, 97th Bomber Group, Europe; flew DDE from Gibraltar to North Africa, November 1942 Volume: -1" Papers [letters; clippings] ALFORD, MARTIN Residence: Abilene, Kansas Service: 5th Inf Div, Europe Volume: -1" Papers [copy of unit newspaper for 5th Inf. Div., May 8, 1945; program for memorial service; statistics on service and casualties in wars and conflicts] ALLMON, WILLIAM B. Residence: Jefferson City, Missouri Service: historian Volume: -1” 104 Inf Div (1) (2) [after action report for November 1944, describing activities of division in southwest Holland; this is a copy of the original report at the National Archives] 1 AMERICAN LEGION NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS Residence: Indianapolis, Indiana Service: Veteran's organization Volume: 13" After the War 1943-45 [a monthly bulletin published by the Institute on Postwar Reconstruction, Aug. 1943-April 1945] American Legion Publications (1)-(11) [civil defense; rights and benefits of veterans; home front; citizenship; universal draft; national defense and security program; Americanism; employment manual; Boy Scouts-youth program; G. I. Bill of Rights; peace and foreign relations; disaster; natural resources; law and order; UMT-universal military training; national defense; veterans’ employment; 1946 survey of veterans; reprint of two pages from The National Legionnaire, June 1940; instructors manual for military drill; United Nations; junior baseball program] Army-Navy YMCA Bulletin, 1942-44 Atlas of World Battle Fronts [1943-45] China at War, 1939 [four issues published by the China Information Publishing Co.] Clippings [submarine war; Alaska; U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Air Power for Patton's Army
    AIR POWER FOR PATTON’S ARMY The XIX Tactical Air Command in the Second World War David N. Spires Air Force History and Museums Program Washington, D. C. 2002 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Spires, David N. Air Power for Patton’s Army : the XIX Tactical Air Command in the Second World War / David N. Spires. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. World War, 1939-1945—Aerial operations, American. 2. United States. Army Air Forces. Tactical Air Command, 19th—History. 3. World War, 1939- 1945—Campaigns—Western Front. 4. Close air sup- port—History—20th century. 5. United States. Army. Army, 3rd—History. I. Title. D790 .S65 2002 940.54’4973—dc21 2002000903 In Memory of Colonel John F. “Fred” Shiner, USAF (1942–1995) Foreword This insightful work by David N. Spires holds many lessons in tacti- cal air-ground operations. Despite peacetime rivalries in the drafting of service doctrine, in World War II the immense pressures of wartime drove army and air commanders to cooperate in the effective prosecution of battlefield opera- tions. In northwest Europe during the war, the combination of the U.S. Third Army commanded by Lt. Gen. George S. Patton and the XIX Tactical Air Command led by Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland proved to be the most effective allied air-ground team of World War II. The great success of Patton’s drive across France, ultimately crossing the Rhine, and then racing across southern Germany, owed a great deal to Weyland’s airmen of the XIX Tactical Air Command. This deft cooperation paved the way for allied victory in Westren Europe and today remains a clas- sic example of air-ground effectiveness.
    [Show full text]
  • North Africa American Cemetery and Memorial American Battle Onm Uments Commission
    Bangor Public Library Bangor Community: Digital Commons@bpl Books and Publications Special Collections 1960 North Africa American Cemetery and Memorial American Battle onM uments Commission Follow this and additional works at: https://digicom.bpl.lib.me.us/books_pubs Recommended Citation American Battle onM uments Commission, "North Africa American Cemetery and Memorial" (1960). Books and Publications. 112. https://digicom.bpl.lib.me.us/books_pubs/112 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Special Collections at Bangor Community: Digital Commons@bpl. It has been accepted for inclusion in Books and Publications by an authorized administrator of Bangor Community: Digital Commons@bpl. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 2 Rorth 2lfrira 2lmrriran Q:cmtttrH and mrmorial LOCATION well as in the vicinity of the cemetery North Africa American Cemetery and at Carthage. It is likely to be quite Memorial is situated 10 miles northeast hot during the summer months, and of the city of Tunis, Tunisia, and 5 cold on occasion during the winter. miles northeast of its airport (El Aouina). It may be reached by taxi­ THE SITE cab from the city or the airport. There The cemetery site covers 27 acres of is also an interurban streetcar from the plateau lying between the Mediter­ Tunis-the nearest stop is at Amilcar ranean and the Bay of Tunis, both of station, from which the cemetery is which are a mile or so distant. It is only two or three hundred yards located in close proximity to the site distant. There are hotels in Tunis as of the ancient Carthaginian city, de- View of Memorial and Garden From Burial Area.
    [Show full text]
  • Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II
    1/ U.S. AR MY MILITARY Hl!3TORYtl$jTlWTE WCS CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5008 CIC Wwk!OUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS I’ HISTORY AND MISSION IN. WORLD WAR II COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS SCHOOL FORT HOLABIRD BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND . Special Text BISTGRYAND NISSION \ - IFJ woB[D WARII - - - CIC School Counter Intelligence Corps Center LlU, a‘.* ,’ ARMY WAR COLLEGE - ~Ai%WyE BARFiAdI@, PA, THE CORPSOF INTELLIGENCEPOLICE - CHAPTER1. FROM1917 TO WORLDWAR II Paragraph Page- Purpose and Scope. 1 The Corps of Intelligence Police . 2 : - CHAPTER2. ORGANIZATIONFOR WAR The Corps of Intelligence Police is Geared for Action ....... 5 The Counter Intelligence Corps .............................. 5 Personnel Procurement ....................................... 5 The Problem of Rank......................................... 6 1; CBAPIER3. TBE COUNl’ERITVI’ELLIGENCE CORPS IN THE ZONEOF TIE INTERIOR, 1941-1943 The Military Intelligence Division . ..*.......... 7 13 - PARTTWO _I OPERATIONSOF TIE COWTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS IN THE PRINCIPAL TBEATERS CHAPTER4. OPERATIONSIN NORTHAFRICA The klission . ..*.........................................* 8 The Landing . ..*...........****............. 9 Organization for Operation with Combat Troops . 10 Operations in Liberated Areas . Liaison with United States Intelligence Organizations....... Liaison with Allied Intelligence Organizations.............. 13 Lessons Learned Through Experience . ..*...... 14 Counterintelligence During the Tactical Planning Phases..... 15 Counterintelligence During Mounting Phase of Tactical Operations
    [Show full text]
  • British 21 Infantry Division on the Western Front 1914
    Centre for First World War Studies BRITISH 21ST INFANTRY DIVISION ON THE WESTERN FRONT 1914 - 1918 A CASE STUDY IN TACTICAL EVOLUTION by KATHRYN LOUISE SNOWDEN A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Modern History School of Historical Studies The University of Birmingham March 2001 i University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT This MPhil thesis is a case study of the British 21st Infantry Division on the Western Front during the First World War. It examines the progress of the division, analysing the learning curve of tactical evolution that some historians maintain was experienced by the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). 21st Division was a New Army division, typical of those raised after the declaration of war, and its performance throughout the war may be regarded as indicative of the progress or otherwise of these units within the BEF. The conclusions are drawn through an assessment of 21st Division in four battles during the war. The achievements of the division are analysed using a series of performance indicators, taking into account variables such as the weather, the terrain, and the enemy.
    [Show full text]