US Logistical Support of the Allied Mediterranean Campaign, 1942-1945
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Syracuse University SURFACE Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public History - Dissertations Affairs 2011 Victory's Foundation: US Logistical Support of the Allied Mediterranean Campaign, 1942-1945 David D. Dworak Syracuse University Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/hst_etd Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Dworak, David D., "Victory's Foundation: US Logistical Support of the Allied Mediterranean Campaign, 1942-1945" (2011). History - Dissertations. 95. https://surface.syr.edu/hst_etd/95 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in History - Dissertations by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ABSTRACT From November 1942 until May 1945, the Allied nations fought a series of campaigns across the Mediterranean. Ever since, historians have debated the role and impact of the Mediterranean theater upon the greater war in Europe. Through analysis of official archival documents, unit histories from the period, and personal memoirs, this dissertation investigates the impact of US Army service forces on each of the campaigns and operations conducted across the Mediterranean theater. Additionally, this study examines how the campaigns of the Mediterranean shaped and informed the 1944 landings in France and the subsequent drive into Germany. This dissertation argues that the Normandy invasion of 1944 and victory over Germany did not just happen. The success that the Allied forces enjoyed in France and Germany had its foundation set in the learning and experiences of the Mediterranean that began in November 1942. Additionally, the Allies (particularly the US) would not have achieved victory as quickly as they did if it were not for the development of the administrative and logistical systems, organizations, equipment, and doctrine that occurred within the Mediterranean. Simply put, the Mediterranean was an essential Petri dish that allowed US service units to test new concepts and develop the experience necessary to win the war against Germany. This was the laboratory in which the US military, particularly the support units, could learn and adapt with minimal risk. Considering the alternatives, the Allied strategy of conducting operations in the Mediterranean and then shifting the priority to the European theater proved the approach that produced the shortest end to the war. This indirect approach provided the time to train a conscript army and modernize the military. Most importantly, the US Army learned how to support ground and air forces deployed in an overseas theater. VICTORY’S FOUNDATION: US LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ALLIED MEDITERRANEAN CAMPAIGN, 1942-1945 By David D. Dworak B.A. University of Texas at Arlington, 1984 M.S. Florida Institute of Technology, 1993 M.S.S. U.S. Army War College, 2006 DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the Graduate School of Syracuse University May 2011 Copyright 2011 David D Dworak All rights reserved iv Table of Contents List of Illustrative Materials ........................................................................................................................ vii Chapter I: Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1 Significance of the Military Theater ......................................................................................................... 6 Review of Literature ............................................................................................................................... 10 Chapter II: Lessons not Learned- The First World War and Interwar Years .............................................. 26 Evolving Warfare .................................................................................................................................... 28 Theater Support and the First World War ............................................................................................... 30 Interwar developments: the US Army before Pearl Harbor .................................................................... 39 The German Approach to Support .......................................................................................................... 47 Conditions Leading to Torch .................................................................................................................. 49 Assessment .............................................................................................................................................. 57 Chapter III: The Invasion of North Africa .................................................................................................. 60 Planning the Invasion .............................................................................................................................. 64 Inexperience and Consequences of a Fateful Decision ........................................................................... 73 More Consequences ................................................................................................................................ 88 Chapter IV: Establishing the US Theater in the Mediterranean ................................................................. 95 Cleaning up the Rear ............................................................................................................................... 96 Establishing the Communications Zone ............................................................................................... 103 Building up the Theater ........................................................................................................................ 122 Logistics on the Other Side of the Hill ................................................................................................. 126 Rearming the French ............................................................................................................................. 128 Chapter V: The Fight for Tunisia, 1943 .................................................................................................... 134 Strategic Setting .................................................................................................................................... 135 Positioning the Force ............................................................................................................................ 140 Lessons Learned from North Africa ..................................................................................................... 153 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 163 Chapter VI: Pantelleria and Sicily, Supporting the Island Campaigns ..................................................... 168 Strategic Setting .................................................................................................................................... 170 Pantelleria: Operation Corkscrew ......................................................................................................... 174 The Planning of Husky ......................................................................................................................... 178 Mounting the Force ............................................................................................................................... 189 v Invasion and Initial Support .................................................................................................................. 197 The Other Side of the Hill ..................................................................................................................... 212 Support of Seventh Army and the Drive towards Palermo ................................................................... 216 The Race for Messina ........................................................................................................................... 220 The Fall from Grace .............................................................................................................................. 231 Evolution of the Island Base Section .................................................................................................... 234 Assessment of the Engineer Special Brigade Concept ......................................................................... 237 Changes in North Africa ....................................................................................................................... 241 The Fall of il Duce ................................................................................................................................ 244 Lessons Learned.................................................................................................................................... 247 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 255 Chapter VII: Operation Avalanche and the Invasion of Italy, September 1943 to June 1944 .................. 260 Strategic Setting .................................................................................................................................... 262 Planning Avalanche and the