Governmentality Rationales and Calculative Devices: the Rejection Of

Governmentality rationales and calculative devices:

the rejection of a territorial barter

proposed by the King of Spain (XVII century)

Alessandro Lai♥, Giulia Leoni♦ and Riccardo Stacchezzini♣

♥ Alessandro Lai, Full Professor of Accounting, Dipartimento di Economia aziendale (Business Administration Department), University of Verona (Italy), tel. +39.045.8028574, fax +39.045.8028488, [email protected], corresponding author

♦ Giulia Leoni, Ph.D. Student in Business Administration, Dipartimento di Economia aziendale (Business Administration Department), University of Verona (Italy), tel. +39.045.8028296, fax +39.045.8028488, [email protected]

♣ Riccardo Stacchezzini, Assistant Professor of Accounting, Dipartimento di Economia aziendale (Business Administration Department), University of Verona (Italy), tel. +39.045.8028186, fax +39.045.8028488, [email protected]

Alessandro Lai is the author of paragraphs 1 and 3, Giulia Leoni wrote paragraphs 2 and 4, while Riccardo Stacchezzini is the author of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7.

Date of submission: April 7th, 2010 (paper submitted for the 6th Accounting History

International Conference, Wellington, 18‐20 August 2010); revision: June 25th, 2010.

Governmentality rationales and calculative devices:

the rejection of a territorial barter

proposed by the King of Spain (XVII century)

Abstract

Almost 400 years ago, a territorial barter proposed by the King of Spain was refused by Ferdinando Gonzaga, Duke of Mantova and Marquis of Monferrato. The barter would have stated the exchange of Monferrato with the Isle of Sardinia, a Vice-Reign of the Spanish kingdom. It was the 1618 when a Duke’s advisor drafted a report (“Relatione dell’Isola di Sardigna”) to highlight the financial and governmental matters of the island. This “Relatione”, together with the written correspondence among the governors and their advisors engaged in the deal, let us investigate the information that allowed the Duke to take his decision about the barter by considering the effects on the duchy welfare as well as the risks related to at-a-distance government. Drawing on the Foucauldian governmentality framework, we demonstrate that the barter denial has been the output of a rational behaviour driven by territorial governability aims.

Keywords: governmentality; territorial barter; accounting and the state; accounting practices; political rationality; kingdom; duchy.

Governmentality rationales and calculative devices:

the rejection of a territorial barter

proposed by the King of Spain (XVII century)

1. Introduction

This paper analyses a territorial exchange that was near to occur in Europe, during the XVII century. The Isle of Sardinia, a Spanish domain, was supposed to be exchanged with the Marquisate of Monferrato, a possession of the Duchy of Mantua: its strategic position made it desirable by the King of Spain, who wanted to get it in order to improve travels and trades from Genoa to Milan and to empower his domination in

Northern Italy. Thus, the King of Spain proposed a barter transaction in which he offered to the Duke of Mantua the Isle of Sardinia.

As the Duke of Mantua needed information about the Isle of Sardinia to decide about the territorial barter, a Duke’s advisor, Don Ottavio Gentili, had been on the

Island for about six months in order to deepen its main features. The information he gathered was reported in the “Relatione sull’Isola di Sardigna” (“Report about the Isle of Sardinia”), an interesting example of territorial evaluation to be used to support government decisions.

The Duke of Mantua needed broader information than financial ones; actually he had to integrate the financial calculation with governability information concerning people and resources, in order to verify the possibilities to govern them. From this perspective, the document was useful to understand both the actual contribution of the

exchange to the welfare of the whole duchy and the future opportunities in governing and exploiting that Island, that was so far from the “ground Duchy” of Mantua.

We study the “Relatione” and other documents connected to it to highlight the reasons that might have led the Duke to the denial of that barter, by assuming that this decision was rationally based. In particular, we offer a methodological contribution within the stream of “new” accounting history (Napier, 2006) by showing how the

Foucault’s concepts can be used to demonstrate the rationality of a governor decision, that in our research is the decision that led to deny the barter of a territory with an apparently more wealthy one.

Our research proposal is supported by different sources.

As primary sources, together with the “Relatione”, we considered a collection of letters among the Duke Ferdinando, the King of Spain Philippe III, the Duke’s advisor

Don Ottavio Gentili, and the ambassador of Mantua in Madrid Don Giovanni Ottavio

Gonzaga. Our secondary sources are mainly the “Registro delle spese della Ducal camera di Casale in provisionati” (“Accounting book recording the expenses of the

Duchy government in Casale [of Monferrato]”), presented by Giorcelli (1893) and some papers concerning the negotio del baratto (barter deal), which helped us to denote the key-characteristics of territorial barters in XVI and XVII centuries.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section regards the theoretical framework to which we refer, that is the governmentality theory (Foucault, 1978) as developed in sociological and (critical) accounting studies (Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose and Miller;

1992; Murdoch and Word, 1997; Dean, 1999). Latour’s contribution (1987) on governing at-a-distance is considered as well. In the third section, the historical situation conducting to the barter proposal is described in order to explain the complexity of the assessment. In the fourth section the financial information about the territories to be

bartered are presented. Then, in the fifth section, the matters to be faced to govern the

Isle of Sardinia are described in order to denote the Duke’s reasons of denial and to verify whether the denial can be considered rationally based. Finally, the two last sections discuss our findings and conclusions in respect of the theoretical framework and in compliance with the methodological contribution we aimed to offer.

2. Theoretical framework

Government, in Foucault’s thought (1991, p. 95), “is a right manner of disposing things so as to lead [...] to an end which is «convenient» for each of the things that are to be governed”.

Foucault enlightens in one of his famous discussion that governing a state means the “triangle [of] sovereignty, discipline and government”, where economy had a main role in increasing the knowledge of things that have to be governed. In fact, “the art of government is just the art of exercising power in the form and according to the model of the economy” (Foucault, 1991, p. 102). Economy and government are strongly interconnected; so the main concern of a governor is knowing the reality of the state through its economic matters. Furthermore, to form a broad economic knowledge the governor needs informative instruments: the “governmental technologies” (Rose, 1991;

Rose and Miller, 1992). These instruments are a complex of calculative practices, techniques of notation, computation and calculation, procedures of examination and assessment essential to fulfil the political rationality of the governor and his political programmes (Miller, 1990; Gordon, 1991; Rose and Miller, 1992; Spence, 2009).

Accounting, as a governmental technology and practice, provides information which

makes the reality calculable and the economic issues visible, in order to control and manage the state. Accounting practices constitute the main technologies of government in the hands of the governor (Miller, 1990; Miller and Napier, 1993). Moreover, that can be used in order to translate governmental polices into practice (Neu and Heincke,

2004; Jones, 2010).

Actually, through the application of these practices, governors are able to control their domains (Neu, 2000; Alvarez-Dardet Espejo et al., 2002), even if they govern them at a distance (Latour, 1987).

The financial information about the reality that has to be governed is essential in order to enlighten the area of intervention of government, to dispose things, to reach the welfare of the state (Murdoch and Ward, 1997; Riccaboni et al., 2006; Di Pietra and

Magliacani, 2006; Sargiacomo, 2008). The financial perspective is central even in evaluating the possibility of governing a “new” territory, that may be a territory near to be conquered or acquired by a “new” governor. In fact, as for an already owned land, also in case of a potential new one, financial matters are useful to form a political rationality (Dean, 1999). Moreover, the government of a territory “requires an understanding of what the territory consists of, and what the objectives of government should be” (Murdoch and Ward, 1997, pp. 309).

Financial and governmental information about a territory to be govern help to explain the rationality that drive the governor’s choices. Such choices can be explained by many rationality perspectives, as “there exist «multiple rationalities» in «the doing of research» [...] (Latour, 1987)” (Lodh and Gaffikin, 1997, p. 439), and rationality is situational (Wittengstein, 1972). The concept of rationality linked to the governmentality framework is the so-called “political rationality”, which can be interpreted as “the relatively systematic, explicit, discursive, problematisation and

codification of the art or practice of government, as a way of rendering the objects of government in a language that makes them governable” (Dean, 1994, p. 187). Such concept of rationality, designed by Foucault (1977, pp. 27-28) and deepened in the accounting literature by Miller and Rose (Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose and Miller,

19921) is particularly helpful for the development of our paper: it allows to understand the ways in which the welfare information about a territory is fused together with the one about uncertainties related to the territorial governability.

Our contribution, within the socio-historical accounting research stream (Napier,

2006), adds findings to those studies about the role of accounting in shaping the governmental behavior. We offer a governmental view of historical events that can be also compared with those that have studied the Italian contexts with the same theoretical framework (Di Pietra and Magliacani, 2006; Sargiacomo, 2006 and 2008).

3. The historical context of the barter and the “Relatione”

As we said in the first section, our paper deals with a prospective barter of territories, between the Kingdom of Spain and the Duchy of Mantua, that was near to occur in XVII century. The practise of barters was not so strange in Italy, during the

Period of the Courts; governors of Italian regional little states seemed a kind of

“owners” of territories (Belfanti and Romani, 1987): they acquired, conquered and even exchanged them, as a result of military treaties, political agreements and trade deals.

1 Rose and Miller (1992, p.175) described political rationalities as “the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualized, the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, military and familial sectors”.

This might find an explanation into the attempt to perceive different aims, some of these were clearly financial, but there were others connected with supremacy strategies, growth, international endorsement and political permanence (Fochessati, 1912; Quazza,

1922; Lai, 1997).

The objects of the exchange were Monferrato, a Marquisate of Mantua situated in

North-West of Italy, inside the region nowadays named Piemonte, and the Isle of

Sardinia, a Vice-Kingdom of Spain placed in the Mediterranean Sea right in front of the western coast of Southern Italy and under the Isle of Corsica (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1 – Europe in the XVII century.

The barter proposal is justified by the intricate boundaries in Northern Italy during the XVI and XVII century. The county of Monferrato passed under the Gonzaga’s domain from the Paleologi Family in vague circumstances (Belfanti and Romani, p.

115) and these were the reasons why the case was object of international judgment by the Emperor Charles V (the resolution occurred on the 3rd November 1536). This land represented an enclave (a “buffer area”), being placed inside the Savoia Family’s

domains and between the region of Liguria and the State of Milan (in the Northwest of

Italy), both Spanish domains (Raviola, 2003).

On one hand, the Emperor’s resolution granted to the Gonzaga the domain on the county, but on the other hand it did not stop every expectations of Savoia Family. The

Savoia, actually, were still hoping to acquire Monferrato, relying on the strong opposition the county population shown to the Gonzaga Family; Monferrato would have meant higher protection of Savoia’s lands and wider extension of their domains, as far as the River Po Valley.

The Savoias tried hard to occupy the county through juridical and military means but the Gonzaga succeeded in gaining reliability towards the Monferrato population: they were aware of the difficulties in governing at-a-distance a far domain, thus they arranged every means to get esteem and appreciation from the inhabitants of

Monferrato. They reduced the internal opposition and suppressed every institution pertaining to the Paleologi’s domination (Belfanti and Romani, 1987, p. 131).

Also the King of Spain had interests on the county: he aimed to merge its domains in North-western Italy, but with more diplomatic means than Savoia Family’s. So, the lands of the most important towns of Northern Italy would have been linked without interruption as far as the Mediterranean Sea, opening a new connection by sea to reach

Spain, the mother house.

The several attempts of deal from 1560, between Spain and Mantua, showed the complexity in meeting such different interests2. On one hand, the first barter proposals from the Duchy concerned the exchange between the county of Monferrato and the region of Cremona, another Spanish domain. The proposal was rejected by Spain, even though Mantua tried to prove with documents and assessments that Cremona offered a

2 There have been several studies concerning the barter issue (Valerani, 1911; Fochessati, 1912; Quazza, 1922; Belfanti and Romani, 1987). Moreover we studied other works concerning Gonzaga Family and the city of Mantua (Amadei, 1954-1957; Coniglio, 1967; Lazzarini, 1996).

welfare contribution higher than that of Monferrato3. After sixty years of diplomatic impasse and violent wars for the county of Monferrato4, the claim by the Duke of

Mantua for a new proposal of barter led the King of Spain to make new offers: Sardinia,

Abruzzo (except its harbours), some lands of the Kingdom of Naples or some others of

Portugal, in exchange with the Duchy of Mantua or Monferrato5.

In order to obtain adequate information about the Isle of Sardinia, the Duke

Ferdinando appointed Don Ottavio Gentili to an evaluation of the Island. Gentili’s assessment is documented in the “Relatione dell’Isola di Sardigna”, completed on the

16th of May 1618, whose object was: “Descrittione dello stato et qualità dell’Isola di

Sardigna”6 (“Description of conditions and quality of the Isle of Sardinia”). This document, nowadays located in the Gonzaga’s Archive of Mantua, is organized in 13 sheets (recto and verso)7.

3 This first proposal of barter came from the Duke Guglielmo III, who sent to his Agents at the Spanish Court the “instructions” and the “memorial” concerning the deal. But the King of Spain suspended any negotiation, answering that the proposal “were not of use for him”, as reported in Fochessati (1912). 4 Since 1615, the Duke Ferdinando resumed the project of bartering the marquisate: he charged his ambassador in Madrid – Don Giovanni Ottavio Gonzaga – with the issue. But the King of Spain knew he had the free use of Monferrato to the detriment of Mantua; thus Spain offered as counterproposal only its smallest domains of no great concern, such as Correggio, Sabbioneta, Bozzolo (Quazza, 1922). Moreover, in 1612, Savoia Family asserted that Maria Gonzaga, daughter of Margherita of Savoia and Francesco Gonzaga, was the apparent heiress of Monferrato. They objected to the new Duke Ferdinando, successor of Francesco Gonzaga, for preventing the return of Margherita and Maria to the Duchy. Thus, this led Carlo Emanuele di Savoia to occupy the lands of Monferrato, starting a long and violent war, which ended in 1617. 5 On the 30th of July 1618, Duke Ferdinando replied to his Ambassador about the Spanish proposal of barter and outlined only three possibilities: 1. accepting the barter; 2. accepting the help of Spain to defend Monferrato; 3. coping with Savoia Family. 6 Don Ottavio Gentili in the “Relatione” wanted to be the more accurate he could and presented several information which we can summarize in a brief list of topic: 1) description of the Island, 2) description of the Clergy, 3) Cagliari, 4) Oristano, 5) Sassari, 6) other places, 7) scholars, doctors and other professional men, 8) money and mint, 9) description of the features of the Island and the country life, 10) house and wild animals, 11) rivers, 12) mines and print, 13) minor islands, 14) government of the Island, 15) cash in-flows, 16) classification of the population, 17) summary of the total revenues, 18) information sources and 19) final notice. Later on, in section 3 and 5 we will deepen the principal topics of the “Relatione”, that are central for the aims of our study. 7 At the end of the document, Gentili explained his information sources. “This is all the information I could find out about the conditions of this Island, a piece of it from a Sardinian gentleman, named Don Francesco Pasce, the other piece from Mister Sebastiano di Martini, a Genoese merchant, who have been in this Island for twelve years and traveled around it more than once […]. I relied on them, but I provided always clearer information” (Gentili, 1618, sheet 16 verso – 17 recto). 10

The “Relatione” constituted the main collection of data and information the Duke obtained with the purpose of estimating the convenience of the exchange. It is a document that contained a great amount of information about the Isle of Sardinia8.

Fig. 2 – An image of the front page of the document: “17 maggio 1618 – Relatione dell’Isola di Sardigna di Don Ottavio Gentili (translation: “17th May 1618 – Report of the Isle of Sardinia by Don Ottavio Gentili).

Besides the main document, we found out Duke’s opinions and doubts about the exchange in several letters among the Duke himself, Don Ottavio Gentili, the King of

Spain, and the Duke’s ambassador in Madrid. From these other documents, we fulfilled our information about the territorial exchange, understanding Duke’s doubts about the deal, before and after the reading of the report by Don Gentili.

The “Relatione” had not been studied for centuries. The most interesting aspect of it is that the information it gave was not only from a financial point of view, but also dealing with non-economic and political variables (Lai, 1997). The financial

8 Luzio (1922), in its The Gonzaga’s Archive in Mantua, underlined the importance of this document, even though it inexplicably remained undiscovered for centuries. More over, other elaborations about the Gonzaga’s Archive exist: The Gonzaga’s Archive of Mantua by Torelli (1920) and Researches on Gonzagas by Vaini (1994).

contribution for the governor, calculated by Don Ottavio Gentili, was based on Spanish accounts and constituted the result of the Spanish government. But the Gonzaga Family was concerned about the possibility to sustain that cash flows in the future, through an effective governmental action. The document underlined as well the prospective risks and governmental challenges the Duke was supposed to face in case of the acquisition of Sardinia.

The following section offers an explanation of the financial contents of the

“Relatione” and it highlight the contribution that Sardinia was capable to generate in terms of welfare when it was under the Spanish domain.

4. Financial matter in judging the barter convenience

The expected welfare contribution of the Isle of Sardinia and its distribution among the clergy, the cities and especially the sovereign is one of the main topic of the

“Relatione”. The annual cash in-flows and out-flows of the clergy existing on the

Island – composed of the archbishoprics and the bishoprics – are clearly detailed, to give a complete view of their contribution not only to the religious aspects, but also to the civil ones: the principal expenditure for clergy were the construction of churches and cathedrals, but also the subsidies for “unmarried women, sick people and poor prisoners” (Gentili, 1618, sheets 10 recto and 10 verso)9. Furthermore the main contribution from the clergy to the sovereign is quite expressed: “the clergy is required to maintain four vessels as defence of the Island and the pay them to the King (of

9 We translated the “Relatione” in modern English even if it has been written in an ancient Italian. 12

Spain), who store them in Sicily” (Gentili, 1618, sheet 6 recto). A part of the navy was in charged of the clergy.

The second financial matter is about Sardinian currency and its weakness: it seemed not to be valuable and exchangeable outside the Island, due to its little gold component.

Actually, for trades, foreign money was often used.

Besides the coinage problems, an economic institution was charged with the administration of the King’s wealth. It was organized as a council of three representatives, each one of them respectively from the nobles, the clergy and the citizens: they had the responsibility for “the pays to the guards of the towers and fortifications and to the other King’s officers, and they had to check on works and the payment of their dues” (Gentili, 1618, sheet 13 recto).

The taxation system constituted the deepest financial information provided by the advisor. As the main income of the governor in that period was formed by tax revenues, data about taxes and duties would have enlightened the contribution of the barter to the welfare of the duchy. As regard to the taxation system, under the domain of Spain, the sovereign of the Island “controls and has in his hands the taxation system of the whole

Island” (Gentili, 1618, sheet 15 recto). Taxes were distributed among the governor and the cities: “The other things been exported pay duties and taxes. All duties are due to the governor, the taxes are shared between the governor and the Cities in this way: the taxes are calculate as the 11 and 2/3 per cent of the value of import and export; of these, 5 per cent is due to the governor and the 6 and 2/3 per cent are due to the cities”

(Gentili, 1618, sheet 14 verso - 15 recto). Information obtained from people living on the Island allowed calculating the cash in-flows from taxes on exported products, such as wheat, cheese, tunas, salt, leathers, wines and wool.

Tab. 1 – Sardinian ordinary cash in-flows and out-flows estimated by Don Ottavio Gentili in his “Relatione”.

Rental fees Duties Taxes Total Ordinary cash in-flows Cereals trading 148.500 148.500 Cheese trading and its taxes 20.000 12.500 32.500 Fishing 4.000 4.000 Salt stock 3.000 3.000 Leather trading and its taxes 30.000 30.000 Wine and wool trading and its taxes 10.000 10.000 Taxes on import 18.000 18.000 Total ordinary cash in-flows 7.000 168.500 30.500 246.000

Ordinary cash out-flows Maintenance of towers, fortification, guards -50.000 Total ordinary cash out-flows -50.000

Total net cash flows 196.000

On the other hand, also the main expenditures which were in charge of the King of

Spain, due to the maintenance of towers, fortifications and guard, had disclosure. As we can see, despite the four vessels from the clergy, there were not other expenses for the maintenance of the navy, because the Kingdom of Spain provided the coast defence making use of the navy of the Kingdom. The cost of the fleet was not fully reported in the “Relatione”, since this information pertained directly to the Kingdom of Spain. The

Duke received by Gentili only descriptive information. Actually, the King of Spain already had a fleet to watch over the boundaries of his Reign – and the boundaries, except for France, were coasts – and this fleet might be easily used also to protect

Sardinia. Gonzaga Family, even if Mantua was surrendered by the lakes, had no fleet and if Sardinia would have been bartered with Monferrato, the Duke would have built, arranged and maintained his own fleet.

The net cash flows of Sardinia, based on the Spanish government of the Island, was

196.000 scudi (i.e. the ancient currency unit). Don Ottavio Gentili himself observed that the government of the Island created great advantages to the previous governors of

Sardinia: “all the governors, when leaving, leave wealthy, and the last secretary

brought back to Spain 70.000 scudi along three years; thus from this amount it is possible to assume the value of this Island” (Gentili, 1618, sheet 16 recto).

Fig. 3 – The total amount of cash in-flows and out-flows of the Isle of Sardinia.

* * *

In order to have some basis to judge the rationality used in the barter rejection, the net cash flows had to be compared to that one pertaining to the Marquisate of

Monferrato. We went deeply into the Archives and we found data comparable to the ones of the Gentili’s “Relatione”. We gathered information about the net cash flows of

Monferrato from the “Registro delle spese della Ducal camera di Casale in

provisionati” (“Accounting book recording the expenses of the Duchy government in

Casale [of Monferrato]”), represented in Giorcelli (1893). To confirm our data, we studied also other sources like the one prepared by Marcaurelio Tartaglioni (1600)10. He wrote a report, entitled “L’entrata di un anno di quello stato [del Monferrato]” (“The revenue of a year of duel that State”), showing the cash in-flows pertaining to the

Marquis of the Monferrato. In particular, he calculated “ordinary revenues coming from salt taxes, mills, rents and other revenues, which amounted to 171.460 scudi”. He also denoted “an extra revenue of 46.450 scudi from the “Cittadella” [a specific area of the

Marquisate, aimed for defence]”. Thus the total amount of the revenues were about

217.910 scudi, measuring cash in-flows and representing the wealth the Governor of the

Marquisate could gain. This source provided a comparable cash flow pertaining to the

Marquisate and dating at almost the same period. Throughout these data, we compared the cash flows concerning Sardinia and Monferrato in order to understand the financial reasons of the rejection of the deal by the Duke Ferdinando.

Tab. 2 – Comparison between the cash flows pertaining to Sardinia and Monferrato*.

Territory Sardinia Monferrato Monferrato Advisor/Author Don Gentili Giorcelli Tartaglioni Cash in-flows 246.000 167.866 217.910 Cash out-flows 50.000 56.528 - Net cash flows 196.000 111.338 -

* Our development by considering the assessment prepared by the advisors/authors.

At first sight, the comparison between the territories and their net cash flow seems to highlight that the most wealthy domain was Sardinia. Actually we have to take into account the lack of some expenses, as we already said. The Island did not have any

10 We also considered the work by De Maddalena (1961) about the Duchy Finance in 1600, during the government of Guglielmo Gonzaga. 16

independent navy, but it depended from the provision of naval defence by the Kingdom of Spain. After the supposed exchange, the Duke should have provided a new navy for

Sardinia, incurring in high expenses, for two main reasons. First, the Duke did not have any fleet, as its lands were not placed on coast, and it should have acquired a whole navy; secondly, the Duke did not have any knowledge and experience in defending coasts. Considering this fact, the real expenses for Sardinia should have been estimated higher11.

Anyway, we have to consider that the net cash flows calculated for Sardinia was based on a Spanish governmental perspective, while the Monferrato values were calculated as a result of the government of Mantua.

Moreover, the net cash flows was the result of the past government, but the Duke

Ferdinando needed to fulfil his knowledge through the analysis of the future opportunities of the Island in order to estimate the “sustainability” of those cash flows.

Such “sustainability” had to be considered even in terms of risks and uncertainties related the government of the “new” territory. In the next session we deepen such government issues.

5. The barter convenience under the governmentality lens

The Duke’s advisor had the duty and the possibility to offer his point of view on the problematic the Duke would have had to face to govern the Isle of Sardinia. The

“Relatione” that he drafted was useful to present to the Duke a perspective on how the

11 Lai (1997) underlined these two reasons in his analysis: “the defence costs of the Island were not comprised in the expenses report, because the clergy provided four vessels to protect Sardinia. Furthermore, the defence apparatus took advantage indirectly form the Spanish navy, which controlled the Western Mediterranean, as far as Genoa”.

territory should have been governed (Murdoch and Ward, 1997) and would have favoured his aims by mean of governmental activities12.

By using Foucault’s concept of governmentality, we proceeded to analyse the report prepared by the advisor along three research paths:

– the territorial constituents to be governed (sovereignty), in terms of “men” and

“things” (Foucault, 1978) that were available in the territory and for which

government matters had to be selected and solved;

– the existence or the implementability of systems and rules to control and to defend

the territorial “men” and “things” (discipline);

– the attitudes of “things” and the willingness and capabilities of “men” that, under

the sovereignty and the discipline of a governor, have to be aligned and managed to

favour the welfare of the territory (government).

Tab. 3 – The problematic of a territorial governmentality: the conceptualization used to analyse the rejection of the proposed barter.

Governmentality issues ↓ ↓ “what is to “how government

be governed” should be conducted”** ↓ ↓ ↓ Sovereignty* Discipline* Government*

Territorial “Men”* Territorial Territorial Territorial constituents “Things”* availability controllability manageability

* Foucault (1978) ** Murdoch and Ward (1997)13

12 We refer to the governance analysis as the one that“takes as central not so much amounts of revenue, size of court, expenditure on arms, miles marched by an army per day, but the discursive field within which these problems, sites, and forms of visibility are delineated and accorded significance” (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 177). 13 “The government of a territory entails somehow knowing that territory; requires an understanding of want the territory consists of, and what the objectives of government should be. This raises the general question of how government should be conducted, a question directly addressed through Foucault’s concept of governmentality” (Murdoch and Ward, 1997, p. 309). 18

The information reported in the “Relatione” is explained in compliance with

Foucault’s concepts. This way is helpful to test our hypothesis about the political rationality of the Duke’s decision to deny the barter proposal. In a methodological perspective, the analysis shows the possibility to use the Foucault’s concepts to verify such political rationality.

In accordance to our “model of analysis” (Table 3), we separated the information about “men” and “things”, considering these latter as “resources” that were present in the island and that were apt to contribute to the territorial wealth and attractiveness.

Starting from the “men”, we can highlight that Sardinian inhabitants were about

500,000 – 600,000 in total, located in the inhabited places and areas (that were two third of the whole territory). They could have been divided into some groups as we show in

Table 4. For each of such groups, the Duke had the possibility to understand their numbers and characters as well as the classes of people to be to governed14.

14 The clergy was composed by groups of priests (“Padri Gesuiti”, “Padri Agustiniani”, “Padri Carmelitani”, “Padri Cappuccini”, “Padri di S. Domenico”, etc.), most of them quite rich, and nuns. The clergy exerted their influence in terms of belief and rules of conduct. The inquisitor, located in Sassari, had a wide range of people serving the discipline of the territory (“officiali”, “ministri”, “gentilhuomini”, servants). The inquisitor was a priest to whom a great power was recognized in the territory. The governors to whom temporal power were recognized lived in Cagliari and in Sassari. These governors were always in contrast for power reasons. Even some psychological aspects and capabilities of the inhabitants have been considered by the Duke’s advisor, which highlighted the indolent nature of the inhabitants of Cagliari and their little interest in trades and arts (like the ones barbers, shoemakers, joiners, tailors, etc.):

“There are no Arts apart from the essential ones, such as dressmakers, barbers, grocers, shoemakers, carpenters and some related others…the nobles could concern on trades, but prefer riding horses and hunting, someone is interested in studying laws in order to be in charge of administrative roles and also because [Sardinians] tend to be contentious” […] interested to hunting, but they seem avoiding any kind of industry, even someone is getting used to trading” (Gentili, 1618, sheets 8 recto and 9 verso).

Sassari inhabitants were more intelligent than the ones of Cagliari, as well as more capable in arts and in defence activities. Anyway, some other characters of these inhabitants, that limited the territorial manageability, were considered to be similar to the ones of Cagliari (i.e. low attitudes towards trades). The noble branch in Cagliari (formed by Dukes of Gandia, Terranuova and Pastrana) was not present in the isle but it exerted government power with the help of vassals. Few scholars, doctors and other professional men have been estimated to be present in the isle. The limited presence of such people confirmed the idea of the efforts to be done by the Duke if he would have been inclined to promote business activities. Even hunting was deemed a passion rather than an activity to improve personal or family wealth. The Vice-King governed all the “state affairs” with the help of a selected group of people: a regent of Spain, a lawyer, two judges (one Spanish, one Sardinian). Other people, engaged in government duties

Tab. 4 – “Men” groups in the Isle of Sardinia*.

– Clergy – Oristano inhabitants – Inquisitor – Scholars, doctors and other professional men – Governors – Soldier – Cagliari inhabitants – Whole isle inhabitants – Sassari inhabitants

* Our development following the sections of the “Relatione”

Moreover, the isle of Sardinia was described for its morphological characteristics as well as for the harbours, its fortresses with the ordnance, its rocky promontories, small isles around it. The description offered a view about the resources (“things”) that were available in the territory (territorial availability). In fact, as it is shown it Table 5, Don

Ottavio Gentili described many kinds of “things”.

Tab. 5 – Territorial “things” in the Isle of Sardinia*.

– Isle as a whole – Money and mint – Clergy places and possessions – Wild and tame animals – City of Cagliari – Rivers – City of Oristano – Mines and print – City of Sassari – Minor isles – Castles, fortresses and residences in other places

* Our development following the sections of the “Relatione”

For each of such groups, the report offered the possibility to understand the characters and typology of the resources to be exploited and to be defended in a government perspective15. The report also remarked the lack of many resources, which had to be imported16.

were the treasurer, the “maestro Rationale” (accountant), chamber deputies – who administered the King properties –. The deputies were one appointed by nobles, one by clergy, and one by the citizens. In the city of Cagliari, as well as in the city of Sassari, a judge (called “Vegher”) was appointed to pronounce on civil and criminal actions of the inhabitants. 15 The clergy places and possession were significant for archbishoprics (the ones of Cagliari, Sassari and Oristano), bishop’s palaces (Alghero, Boza, Castel Arragonese), and abbeys. The city of Cagliary had a good availability of hospital, churches, buildings, pieces of ordnance, gardens, vineyards, ponds, rabbits, citrus fruits, fish, while that Oristano was typical for its bad climate, due to marshes. Anyway, the city had availability of oranges, lemons and rivers with fish. In the city of Sassari buildings, churches, fountains, gardens, vineyards, melons, plums were present. A great number of castles, fortresses and residences are said to be present in places other than the cities of Cagliari, Sassari and Oristano. The mints were described for its capability to print golden and silver money, as well as other small coins. 20

* * *

By considering the territorial availability of “men” and “things” we now highlight the information that the “Relatione” offered in terms of controllability and manageability of the territorial constituents.

Focusing on the Sardinian “men”, the “Relatione” offered information useful in a territorial defence perspective: Sardinia had about 50,000 infantrymen, that were considered to be good in defence activities and that were governed by the King.

Three classes of “men” – clergy, army and mob – deserve particular remarks.

The first two classes would have favoured a discipline on the territory, thanks to their role and their ability in affecting opinions and habits.

The mob could have been able to offer an important contribution to the activities oriented to improve the wealth creation of the territory, even if there were very few educational institutions (such as universities and study centres)17 and even if they were not willing to do that.

If the Duke had to judge the convenience of the territory barter only by considering

“men” (i.e., the Sardinian inhabitants), he would have considered that a disciplinary system were already present for two of the main classes in which “men” are classified: clergy and army. More problematic would have been the manageability of such “men”

A detailed description of wild and tame animals was given in the report of the Duke’s advisor. The rivers were described for their fish. It is also reported the presence of gold, silver and iron mines, not exploited at those times in term of business activities and wealth creation. Minor isles around Sardinia were described in terms of their width and presence of wild and tame animals, churches, rivers, woods. 16 In particular, it enlightened the case of some products used to be imported even if they could have been produced locally. This fact occurred “even though they do not need oil, since they could produce it, if the inhabitants were more industrious” (Gentili, 1618, sheet 14 verso). 17 “There are no other studies a part from those schools directed by the Gesuiti, which study all they can, and Sardinians, after they had studied, left toward Pisa or Bologna to finish their studies” (Gentili, 1618, sheet 10 recto).

for the “new” governor, which would have needed to exceed the resistance of such classes.

Moreover, Don Ottavio Gentili warned the Duke about some government overlappings and separations, to be considered in order to have a clear understanding of territorial controllability18. A government system already existed, with its roles and rules defined by the Spanish Vice-King; then the Duke would have had the need to verify the opportunity to introduce some changes in such government structures.

Considering the third class of “men” described by Don Ottavio Gentili, it was quite evident that mob were not as controllable as clergy and army, even if a system of justice already existed and worked effectively. In fact, people of the main cities were quite litigious and seemed not willing to change their habits to work more than they need for their survival.

To summarise the advisor’s perceptions about the Isle of Sardinia, we filled up a table aimed to highlight non problematic issues and the main governance issues to be solved for the “men” government (Table 6).

18 “The King [of Spain] owns the cities and two Marchesati, instead the Baroni and the population hold the rest of the Island; conversely the King controls and have in his hands the taxation system of the whole Island” (Gentili, 1618, sheet 15 recto). 22

Tab. 6 – Issues to be solved (–) and non problematic issues (+) in territorial “men” governmentality, interpreted according to the Don Ottavio Gentili’s description.

“how government

should be conducted” ↓ ↓ Discipline Government

Territorial Territorial

controllability manageability ↨ ↨ – Clergy + + – Inquisitor + + – Governors + – – Cagliari inhabitants – – – Sassari inhabitants – –

“men” – Oristano inhabitants – – – Scholars, doctors and other professional men + – – Soldier + – – Whole isle inhabitants n.a. n.a. n.a.: issue not described in depth by Don Ottavio Gentili.

* * *

By considering the resources (“things”) that were present in the Isle of Sardinia, we can state that: i) clergy places and possession represented resources that were useful to control the

territory through the action of the clergy; ii) in the cities there were natural and manufactured resources through which the Duke

should have driven the territory in terms of defence and exploitation of such

resources for people subsistence; iii) the castles, fortresses and residences depicted resources for the territorial

controllability, in term of existing “things” apt to run discipline activities; iv) the presence of mint would have allowed the territorial manageability; v) the wild and tame animals represented resources that should have to be governed to

favour sustainability or improvement of the wealth, and especially horses to be

used by the army.

To summarise the advisor’s perceptions about the Isle of Sardinia, we filled up a table to highlight the main governance issues to be solved for the “things” government

(Table 7). If we look at Table 7 we find that the Duke would have had to solve some manageability issues because the Isle inhabitants were very little inclined to allow others to govern their resources.

Tab. 7 – Issues to be solved (–) and non problematic issues (+) in territorial “things” governmentality, interpreted according to the Don Ottavio Gentili’s description.

“how government

should be conducted” ↓ ↓ Discipline Government

Territorial Territorial

controllability manageability ↨ ↨ – Isle as a whole n.a. n.a. – Clergy places and possessions + + – City of Cagliari + – – City of Oristano + – – City of Sassari + – – Other castles, fortresses and residences + n.a. – Money and mint + + “Things” – Wild and tame animals n.a. – – Rivers n.a. – – Mines and print n.a. – – Minor isles n.a. n.a. n.a.: issue not described in depth by Don Ottavio Gentili.

* * *

Tables 6 and 7 offer a systematic representation of the “men” and resources

(“things”) governability by interpreting the “Relatione”, which had the aim to offer a view of single “things” and “men” forming the Isle of Sardinia and to help the Duke to take his decision through a clear understanding of the main matters concerning territorial availability, controllability and manageability.

We now wonder whether this barter denial has been rational in accordance with the concept of rationality we selected (i.e. the political rationality as defined by Foucault and developed by Miller and Rose). Actually, we can state that: i) on one side, becoming the governor of Sardinia meant achieve the sovereignty of a

territory, rich of “men” and “things” which were appreciable by the Duke for their

kind and variety; ii) on the other side, the territory had structured rules which stated and guaranteed

clerical power, the respect of the rules and the security of the territory.

Anyway, the possibility for the Duke to run the discipline activities did not have to be taken from granted: some of the Gentili’s descriptions highlighted the existence of a structured power of some local people, that the perspective governor of Sardinia needed to consider and respect. In fact, in the territory of Sardinia already existed rules and codes of conduct which permitted the governors to exploit the territorial resources in the sense of gaining more power or enlarging their wealth.

The possibility to run these governmental activities to “manage” the territory requested significant efforts for the resistances of “men” engaged in breeding and agriculture activities. Such groups of people already acted in their activity in a very repetitive ways, so they avoided any efforts to make their business to progress.

Putting together the available financial and govermental information and being aware of the Duke’s final decision, in the next section we finally judged the rationality of such choice.

6. The barter rejection: discussion

At last, the Gonzaga Duke did not go through the barter. The rationales of such behaviour appear to be understandable by mean of the Foucaultian governmentality framework: it drove us to analyse the determinants of the barter deny in terms of possibility the Duke had to govern a territory and to improve his wealth.

The barter rejection can be understood and demonstrated as the output of rationales driven by governmental aims and supported by “techniques of government” like accounting and other calculative devices (Rose and Miller, 1992; Alvarez-Dardet

Espejo et al., 2002).

The accounting calculations developed at that time show that the territory to be acquired was able to generate a great amount of cash flows, bigger than that coming from the territory to be bartered. Anyway, these financial advantages were upset by the problematic that the Duke would have had to face and which were about: a) the need to consider the expenses the Duke would have incurred for the navy: the

territorial “things” to be acquired through the barter included only a fleet of four

vessels and the Gonzaga duchy did not own any navy, nor he had any attitude to

run one; b) the capability to enter in the government mechanisms already effective in the Isle

of Sardinia. The analysis of the territorial governability through the eyes of the

governmentality framework – i.e. through the analysis of sovereignty, discipline

and government matters – shows that many matters of territorial “men” and

“things” controllability and manageability had to be faced in case of the barter

acceptance: there were many risks about the possibility to run an effective

government of the isle.

So the barter rejection had in financial and government matters its main determinants. These issues had been the ones that the Duke decided to consider both when he appointed Don Ottavio Gentili to draft the “Relatione”, and when he took the ultimate decision to do not proceed in the barter bargaining. The framework of governmentality, “sought […] in all those attempts to know and govern the wealth, health and happiness of population” (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 174), appeared particularly useful to understand the behavior of the Duke, which considered important

“not the State-domination of society, but the «governmentalization» of the [territories]”

(Foucault, 1978).

All the information coming from the administrative state apparatus of the Gonzaga duchy has been used in a way that can be considered rational from a Foulcauldian point of view. If the Duke considered more reasons, like political stability, legitimisation, international prestige, dominance strategies and so on, he certainly has finally believed these latter reasons to be less important or, otherwise, supportive of his rationality based on governmental aims.

The Duke appointed Don Ottavio Gentili to draft the “Relatione” only after a long period of time in which the Duke himself received more than one proposal to barter the

Monferrato lands with other territories (Fochessati, 1912; Quazza, 1922; Lai, 1997).

The Duke asked for the “Relatione” because he finally considered not proper or not enough weighting up the barter without having considered governmental and financial attitudes of the isle. He could even have changed his rationales about the barter approach and evaluation, if he requested the help of an advisor only after a long time of offers and counterproposals.

The study of the documents we found during our analysis in the Archives supports this interpretation, which indeed offers evidence to the fact that uncertainty about both

the governance of the territory to be acquired and the welfare contribution of such territory to the State finances has been considered even if it could not have been measured through accounting or other calculative devices developed by the administrative system of the duchy. Much of such uncertainty found an explanation in the threats that the Duke perceived in terms of running an “action at a distance” (Latour,

1987) by mean of a new government system. As we assumed, the Duke’s decision to not proceed in the barter has been rational in respect of the context in which he would have had to control and manage the Isle of Sardinia.

The limitation of our analysis is given by the fact that the duchy government programme has not been formalised in documents available in the Mantuan Archives.

This lack means that we could not start our study from the government programme in order to understand how such programme actually oriented the duke final choice, contrary to what a full representation of the territorial governmentality would have required (Rose and Miller, 1992; Dean, 1999). Anyway, the Don Ottavio Gentili’s

“Relatione”, as well as the letters we mentioned in the previous sections of the paper, witnesses that the Duke has defined – formally or informally, it does not matter – a programme in which the government issues were expected to be put under control even with the use of “technologies of government” and “disciplinary techniques”19.

19 “It makes no sense to think about government only in terms of representing. In the same way, it is impossible to explain action without planning. […] Technologies of government allow shaping, normalizing and instrumentalizing the conduct of others in order to achieve the objectives the governors consider desiderable, always working in the name of a government programme” (Alvarez-Dardet Espejo et al., 2002, pp. 421-422). 28

7. Concluding remarks

The interpretation of some important documents analysed by many accesses to the

Mantuan State Archives gave us the opportunity to put some lights on the reasons why a prospective barter between the King of Spain and the Gonzaga family did not take place even if it has been discussed for a long time.

The finding of such documents let us reveal that the Duke Ferdinando Gonzaga considered financial and government issues when he rationalised his deny to let the

Monferrato lands in change of the Isle of Sardinia.

In particular, the analysis of the “Relatione” permitted to state that the rejection of the proposal of the King of Spain can be considered rational in the sense that Foucault suggested in his governmentality framework.

The context-dependent rationality (Wittgenstein, 1972) surrounding the government behaviours and actions that Foucault discovered and described in State contexts more

“modern” that the ones we presented here were already operating in the XVII century.

If other studies have already testified the existence of such rationality for ancient organizations and countries (Sargiacomo, 2008; Spence, 2009; Jones, 2010), our contribution is about the use of this “model of analysis” in situations – like the one of a barter – in which territorial sovereignty, discipline and government would have to be passed from a governor to a new one before becoming effective.

The Foucaultian sovereignty-discipline-government “triangle”, through which the management of a State can be thought analysed and explained, confirmed his role in shaping accounting history research (McKinlay and Pezet, 2009).

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