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Natali, Determinism Tr. 30.3.2020 1 C. Natali Determinism and deliberation in Alexander of Aphrodisias [traduzione rivista 31.3.2020] I In this paper I defend a minority position in contemporary scholarship on Alexander of Aphrodisias with regard to the theme of determinism and his theory of what is up to us. Many modern scholars agree about the following basic points. The first point is that Aristotle did not develop a specific stance on the problem of determinism, given the fact that at the time this problem was not considered a central theme in the philosophical debate. Second, Alexander’s position on indeterminism was influenced by the debate in the imperial period rather than that he offers an exact account as to what Aristotle had maintained. In the third place, indeterminism is a slightly embarrassing position to hold; therefore, it is better to liberate the ancient philosophers from it, in so far as possible. What is more, a strong tendency can be discerned to attribute some form of compatibilism to most of the ancient philosophical schools – which cannot be easily reconciled with the polemics that existed between the schools. As for me, I think that already in Plato’s Academy philosophers began to reflect on the problem of determinism, freedom and human responsibility, starting out from certain statements in Plato’s Republic and in book 10 of the Laws.1 As far as Alexander is concerned, I think that his position can be characterised as a kind of ‘creative orthodoxy’, which consists in trying to show the vitality of the Aristotelian view point in the debate in imperial times. In order to make this clear, I will concentrate on the problem of deliberation and the Peripatetic notion of causality, particularly in relation to chapters XI-XV in Alexander’s De fato. Moreover, I would like to make the point that the fact that in contemporary theory of action some form of determinism prevails should not be a reason for having at least an historical interest in a different position held by ancient philosophers.2 Few philosophers today accept the independent existence of ideas, but that does not prevent us to study Plato’s doctrine of the Ideas with profit. Hence, without wanting to give even a preliminary judgment on the theoretical value of Peripatetic indeterminism, I think that it might be interesting to offer a reconstruction of certain elements in the ancient debate on necessity and what is up to us, in order to get a better understanding of the underlying reasons for the clashes between the different schools and for their opposing views. 1 I argued in favor of this point in Natali 2014, pp. 39-57 2 See for instance Davodson 1992, pp. 127-28. 2 In this paper I will not deal with all problems relating to the texts I mentioned above. I will more in particular not deal with the question whether the account Alexander gives of Stoic thought is reliable, such that what he states is trustworthy. Here I will restrict myself to describing the logical structure of Alexander’s argument, for the simple reason, so it seems to me, that many of the objections put forward in modern scholarship against his position follow from the fact that the internal logical structure of his argumentation has not been taken into account. On this theme it would already be a step forward if one were to accept that Alexander does not contradict himself as often as some commentators are inclined to think and that his critique of determinism follows a certain logic which can be understood better if placed with an Aristotelian framework (see Natali 1994). II In chapter VII of De fato Alexander starts the second part of his discussion of fate, thus: «A clearer foundation (κατασκευή) of what has been stated will be obtained if we place the absurdities (ἄτοπα) that follow for those who say that all things come in accordance with fate alongside the preceding demostration of our position» (171,18-20).3 (tr. Sharples) He continues with a series of refutations of the views of the determinists; he starts with an analysis of the notion of τὰ ἀπο τύχη τε καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ‘the things that occur by luck and by accident’; he continues with the notion ‘of the contingent, and of the fact that some things happen ‘in wichever way’, (to; ejndecovmenon) or ‘the possible’ (dunatovn), which cannot be saved by the determinists, unless in a Pickwickian sense;4 the third notion, which cannot be saved by the determinists is that of βουλεύεσθαι (‘to deliberate’). Here arguments are presented, which as Alexander states himself in his commentary on the Topica are most suitable to the theme at hand. Commenting upon a passage from the Topica he puts it thus: «Clearly, then, an argument is not open to the same criticism when taken in relation to the proposed conclusion and when taken by itself. For there is nothing to prevent the argument being open to reproach in itself, and yet commendable in relation to the problem, or again, vice 3 Ἡ δὲ κατασκευὴ τῶν εἰρημένων ἔσται φανερωτέρα παρατιθέντων ἡμῶν ταῖς προηγουμέναις τῶν κειμένων ἀποδείξεσιν τὰ ἑπόμενα ἄτοπα τοῖς πάντα καθ᾿ εἱμαρμένην γίνεσθαι λέγουσιν. The text is Sharples (1983). 4 At lines VIII 171,18-174,28; IX,174,30-176,13; X,176,14-178,7. 3 versa, being commendable in itself, and yet open to reproach in relation to the problem» (161b38-39).5 (tr. Pickard-Cambridge) He maintains that several instances of this rule can be given, including that of an argument that may not be worthy of criticism in itself, but which becomes so if applied to a certain problem. For example, so Alexander adds, the argument on the basis of which it is established that praise and blame happen in vain is not bad in itself, but becomes bad if it is used to establish that not everything happens necessarily and by destiny. «The argument that does away with the generation of all things in accordance with fate and reason on the basis the praise and blame will be in vain […] in relation to the question at issue would seem inadequate. The question at issue can be demonstrated by using more premises and more accepted, as the thesis that everything that is contingent is done away with that position as is also what depends on us, so that deliberating too is in vain (in Top. 570,4-10)6 (transl. Sharples, modified). Alexander appears to criticise Carneades’ position on fate, while proposing a better antideterminist strategy.7 In On fate he starts with the arguments he considers to be strongest, and thereafter adds the weaker ones. He thus begins to discuss the question of the contingent, then moves on to deliberation, and finally also argues that if fate exists, praise and blame are in vain. The argument about deliberation occcupies four chapters, XI-XIV, with chapter XV as an appendix, that is eight pages in Bruns’ edition; on the contrary there are two and half pages for the first refutation and a little over three pages for the second one. It is a really long section, which shows Alexander’s interest for this argument, and the importance he attributes to it. III 5 Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι οὐδὲ λόγῳ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιτίμησις πρός τε τὸ προβληθὲν καὶ καθ' αὑτόν· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει καθ' αὑτὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν λόγον ψεκτόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πρόβλημα ἐπαινετόν, καὶ πάλιν ἀντεστραμμένως καθ' αὑτὸν μὲν ἐπαινετόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πρόβλημα ψεκτόν. 6 Alex. in Top. 570,8-11: ὁ γὰρ ἀναιρῶν τὸ τὰ πάντα καθ' εἱμαρμένην γίνεσθαι καὶ λόγον διὰ τὸ μάτην εἶναι τούς τε ἐπαίνους καὶ τοὺς ψόγους [...] οὐκ ἂν ἄξιος ἐπιτιμήσεως φαίνοιτο. εἰ δέ τις αὐτὸν ἐξετάζοι πρὸς τὸ πρόβλημα ἐνδεεστέρως ἂν ἔχειν δοκοῖ τῷ διὰ πλειόνων καὶ ἐνδοξοτέρων δύνασθαι τὸ προκείμενον δείκνυσθαι· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀναιρεῖσθαι πᾶν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀναιρεῖται, ὡς μάτην εἶναι καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι. 7 The argument based on the inutility of praise and blame are at the core of Carneades’ critique, according to Amand (1945, pp. 143-148); Alexander uses these arguments as well, but only in a subordinate way (De fato XVI-XXI) 4 Modern scholars usually confront Alexander’s position with Aristotle’s in his Nicomachean Ethics, underlining the differences between Alexander and his master (Long 1970, Donini 1974, Sharples 1983, Bobzien 1998), but ethics is not Alexander’s starting point. It is very likely that the starting point of De fato is a part of his lost commentary of Aristotle’s De interpretatione, and that the Nicomachean Ethics plays a somewhat subordinate in the treatise. In other words, Alexander also uses doctrines from the Nicomachean Ethics, but does not start out from the ethical-political problems, which with it deals; on the contrary: he starts out from the logical and ontological questions that lie at the core of the argument in De interpretatione. In chapter 9 of De interpretatione Aristotle states: (1) These and others of the same kind are the absurdities that follow if it is necessary that of every affirmation and negation, either about universals spoken of universally, or about individuals, (2) that one of the opposites must be true and the other false, and that nothing of what happens is as chance has it, but everything is or takes place by necessity. (3) So, there would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble, thinking that if we do this, this other thing would follow, while if we did not, it will not follow […] (4) for we see that both deliberation and action are principles of the future events, (5) and that, more generally, in those things which are not always actual there is the possibility of being and not being, and consequently of coming to be and not coming to be.
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