DISKUSSION & DEBATT

To What Extent did Intelligence Contribute to Maintaining its Non-belligerence throughout World War Two? by Jens Aklundh, George Burnett and Sean Harrison

the evolution and activities of the Swed- mentary and entirely overt until the autumn ish intelligence community throughout the of 1939, when the secret G-section was cre- Second World War have been documented ated, headed by Carl Petersén.1 These two by historians, most notably, Wilhelm Carl- departments grew exponentially from 1939 gren and C.G. Mackay, yet the importance to 1942, when a large reorganization of the of intelligence has remained ambiguous. Swedish defense and intelligence commu- The was a rude awaken- nity occurred. The G-section was renamed ing for the Swedish intelligence services, and the C-bureau, and the cryptanalysis sec- the German invasion of Norway and Den- tion of Adlercreuz’s office was created as a mark in April 1940 caught Sweden wholly separate agency, the FRA.2 Furthermore, all unprepared. Though Sweden was militarily other Swedish Intelligence activities, exclud- and diplomatically limited by the tides of ing the FRA, were now organized under the the war, she successfully managed to remain leadership of Daniel Landquist. Through- outside of the battlefields of Europe. As will out the war, all of Sweden’s intelligence was be demonstrated, Sweden, far from being a under military control. Swedish intelligence pawn the strategic development of the war, remained small by international standards was capable of safeguarding her non-bellig- though it did grow significantly, and was by erence. This was to a certain extent the re- 1945 an experienced community. sult of accurate intelligence combined with shrewd foreign policy assessment. Though Sweden’s ability to maintain its neutral- ity was dependent on events outside its Sweden is often considered as a ‘neutral’ 3 state of World War Two, her failure to ad- control. here to the rules of international neutrality This statement from Wilhelm Carlgren renders the term ‘non-belligerent’ far more constitutes the basis of our investigation. applicable for this study. Though we recognize the inherent strategic Before we construct our argument it will limitations of a small, neutral state trapped be useful to provide an outline of the evo- within a far reaching conflict, the conviction lution of Swedish Intelligence. After World of Carlgren’s argument is debatable. This War One, the Swedish Intelligence commu- paper proposes the argument that within nity largely faded away and only in 1937 was the parameters of her influence, Sweden Colonel Carl Adlercreutz given the mission proved herself capable of manipulating the to establish an official military Intelligence strategic situation to her own advantage. bureau. Swedish Intelligence remained rudi- The first part of this paper will thus be de-

137 NR 1 januari/mars 2011 voted to demonstrating the success of Swe- the Riksdag of ’s refusal to seek den’s policy of active management in secur- peace therefore directly jeopardizing Swe- ing her non-belligerence. Following this, we den’s widely supported policy of neutrality. will assess the significance of intelligence to The Finns had accepted defeat and were the success of ‘active management’. Without persuaded under Swedish guidance to seek directly quantifying the impact intelligence peace, which in turn thwarted Allied plans had on Sweden’s strategic situation, we will for invasion. Essentially; “[Sweden] was argue that its role was indeed significant. able to postpone a military move until the Sweden’s active management during the ostensible reason for it could be removed 1939–40 between the Soviet through peacemaking…Sweden was able to Union and Finland demonstrated at an early prevent the allies from making a disastrous stage her willingness to engage and manipu- mistake by precipitating a fighting alliance late events to suit policy goals. Short of of- between Germany and the .”6 ficial intervention, Sweden sent supplies and The Midsummer Crisis of 1941 was to volunteers to aid the Finnish in their fight present Sweden with the “most serious chal- against the Red Army. Finnish appeals for lenge to its neutral tradition” of the war.7 direct intervention in the Swedish press res- Neutrality was a policy that had served the onated amongst public opinion, yet Sweden country well and was almost unanimous- was already offering the most it could with- ly supported by the general public. For a out infringing its own policy of neutrality. small state to risk its internal unity in war- Meanwhile intelligence reports had come in time was to relinquish one of its most im- from Paris suggesting possible Allied inter- portant assets. The crisis was sparked by vention in Scandinavia.4 An Allied attack on the German request for the transit of a di- the Soviet Union, in aid of Finland, risked vision from southern Norway overland to enhancing the Soviet-German alliance. Swe- Finland.8 The request had multiple impli- den’s non-belligerence would be jeopardized cations for Sweden. Firstly, it undermined and Scandinavia would inevitably become if not contravened Sweden’s official policy a strategic battle ground. Foreign Minister of neutrality. Secondly, with the onset of a Christian Günther foresaw the implications new war against the Soviet Union, political for Sweden if the Allies were to mount an sensitivity would be heightened presenting expedition. Therefore, the only option was “[a] considerable risk of dissension aided to prevent conflict by encouraging a quick from abroad.”9 Historian Carl Gustav Finnish surrender. When presented with Al- Scott is however right to draw into focus lied plans, Günther adopted a threatening the deliberation and decision to put the re- stance, clearly asserting Sweden’s view on quest through parliamentary process when the proposed invasion. He reminded the Al- a similar request had been granted without lies of Finland’s dependence on Sweden, and approval in June 1940.10 that a withdrawal of materiel would “surely King Gustav V stated his “unreserved undermine Finland’s military position and support for compliance (with Germany)” force it to the negotiating table.5” In order and that “he personally would not be will- to out manoeuvre Allied attempts at capi- ing to bear the consequences if the govern- talizing on the sentiments of pro Finnish ment refused the request.”11 This statement public opinion in Sweden, he suggested that has been the subject of much historical de- the government would be willing to inform bate but it was Hansson’s interpretation of

138 DISKUSSION & DEBATT it that was important. Hansson portrayed unity and thus negotiate the potentially divi- the King’s statement as an abdication threat sive transit of German troops over Swedish if the government did not comply. There was soil. much disagreement amongst the coalition Sweden’s internal actions had a demon- government and even within parties them- strable effect upon her relations with, and selves regarding how best to deal with the her perception by the Great Powers. This German demand. Suggestions were made was largely achieved through wartime es- regarding the way in which the government pionage laws, unrelenting counter-intelli- should sell the decision to the public. K.G gence and intelligence liaison. The objective Westman proposed “that if Sweden volun- was to prevent hostile views or intentions tarily conceded to the German petition, the against Sweden in order to persuade the bel- effects would be less demoralizing, than if ligerents that a neutral Sweden was in their it were forced to comply.”12 It was impor- interest. The Freedom of Press act was res- tant that the decision must be perceived by urrected which allowed the government to the public and the world as one made by a confiscate, without trial, any publication united coalition government. Finally a con- that could be seen as prejudicial to Swe- sensus was reached with only a handful of den’s interest.15 The treatment and condi- dissenters. tions in Norwegian prison camps, fervently Gustav-Scott underlines Sweden’s sub- described by outspoken anti-Nazi journal- ordinate geopolitical position as being the ist Torgny Segerstedt, would inevitably in- main driver of consensus, yet the impact cite hostile feeling amongst Swedish public of the King’s abdication threat cannot be opinion towards Germany. German protests disregarded due to the fact that internal to the Swedish Foreign Office resulted in a unity was salient. During the Winter War, ‘mass seizure’.16 Seventeen newspapers, all Hansson frankly stated Sweden’s position, having printed the same article concerning underlining the limitations of its support the conditions of Norwegian prison camps, for Finland. His statement was not well were apprehended.17 As Zetterberg asserts; received by the public, believing him to be ‘this action, though not very elaborate had unsympathetic towards Finland. However, a deep symbolic value to the German au- days later “King Gustav…reiterated much thorities’.18 Through instances such this, of what the prime minister said approving Sweden was able to shape Hitler’s percep- of his policy, openly sympathizing with Fin- tion of them to a more favourable view of, land, but explaining that there was no other “ein Volk im Pension,”19 diminishing their alternative other than war. He succeeded in apparent strategic significance. re-establishing wide support for the admin- In combination with symbolic measures, istration’s foreign policy.13” Sweden’s counter intelligence and wartime Thus the German demand for transit laws obstructed a great deal of was a crisis that had serious potential im- foreign intelligence work.20 British press at- plications. “Hansson’s attitude during these taché and SOE member Peter Tennant not- troubled midsummer days must be regarded ed; “as a result of the Swedish Police Sur- as an essential contribution to the successful veillance of our organization and myself we outcome of Swedish wartime policy.”14 The were able to compile descriptions and a list government had manipulated the King’s ab- of the registration numbers of no less than dication threat in order to maintain internal 15 Swedish secret police cars”.21 This is evi-

139 NR 1 januari/mars 2011 dence for the extensiveness of the Swedish ing unable to alter its own position in the counter intelligence effort. war, an active domestic agenda was pursued During the early stages of the war the to alter and monitor the perceptions of the focus was clearly on Allied intelligence ac- Great Powers towards Sweden. tivities, particularly the British. The Swed- This essay does not refute the claim that ish security services had arrested nine-hun- Sweden could have avoided war or even have dred and thirty-five Allied agents compared militarily defeated a Great Power had war to two-hundred and eighty-four German become necessary. It is, however, possible to agents.22 In addition, Sweden started to argue that Sweden operated a brilliantly as- place restrictions on the movements of tute foreign and domestic policy that effec- aliens.23 An illustration of their strategic tively managed the way she was perceived importance and a response to the attempt- by the great powers and thus reduced the ed sabotage by SIS agent A.F. Rickman the likelihood of war. The Swedish government northern region of Sweden was made out of took an active role in influencing the poli- bounds to all aliens except Finns.24 Further- tics of the region. Neutrality, it had been more, intelligence activities conducted by realised, was no longer a right and as a re- foreign powers were made more difficult by sult had to be negotiated.28 The continually the enacting of new espionage law, Chapter changing political landscape in Scandinavia 8, Section 21a; meant that Swedish foreign policy had to be flexible and adaptive. Within the parameters A Swede who with the purpose of assist- of her influence Sweden was able to pres- ing a foreign power collects or allows to ent herself in a way that convinced all con- be collected information about the armed cerned belligerents “that the cost of using forces of the realm or about other matters coercion against (her) more than offset the the communication of which to a foreign 29 power can injure the defence of the realm gains. ” In what follows this essay will pro- or with the aforesaid purpose has any pose that intelligence played an important dealings with such collected information, role in Swedish efforts to actively manage is to be punished according to this chap- her strategic situation and thus influenced 25 ter, with prison. the execution and direction of Swedish For- eign policy. Intelligence liaison played an important role Swedish foreign policy relied on accu- in helping to shape Germany’s perception rate intelligence derived from a variety of of Sweden. Swedish security services coop- sources. Open source intelligence from dip- erated with the German SS Security Service lomats and attachés was timely, accurate Reichsicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) on dis- and throughout the war compensated for mantling Allied and Soviet agent networks the limited reach of Sweden’s secret intelli- and clandestine radio communications.26 gence organizations. Moreover, it was most Indeed, it was used as medium to pay hom- likely to be used in foreign policy decisions age with the hope that further German re- because there was constant communication quests would relent. Wilhelm Agrell fittingly between the embassies and Stockholm. It describes the purpose in which intelligence therefore limited the bureaucracy and se- liaison was employed as, ‘keeping the in- crecy that hindered the effectiveness of Swe- trusive guest seated at the dinner table with den’s intelligence organizations. another glass of wine’.27 Thus, far from be- Sweden’s foreknowledge of the German

140 DISKUSSION & DEBATT invasion of Norway in April 1940 came gain the understanding of the Americans from detailed reports by three of its mili- who were less patient and sympathetic to tary attachés, Forshell, Juhlin-Dannfelt and her position than the British had been dur- Enell. The government resisted Supreme ing the negotiations of 1940. Commander General Thornell’s demands However, as Annette Baker-Fox correctly for full mobilization because these reports asserts: did not indicate that Sweden was in immi- nent danger.30 Only after German troops They (Sweden) also recognised that with had landed in Norway did the government the Russians circling the Baltic there could order a partial mobilization. Germany’s in- be no further traffic with Germany any- way. This knowledge was far more in- terests in Finland grew exponentially after fluential than the American references to the Winter War of 1939–40, as a result of favourable or unfavourable treatment of its intention to invade the Soviet Union. In Sweden when the war ended.32 April 1941, the Swedish military attaché in Helsinki reported that the Finnish and Ger- Depending on the strategic situation and the man General Staff were “now collaborating available intelligence coverage at the time, on a technical level.31” Furthermore, Swe- open source intelligence provided policy den’s military attaché in Helsinki was well makers with reliable and accurate informa- informed on the German’s order of battle. tion which foreign policy decisions could be Two German divisions were to attack Mur- based upon. It maintained a sense of being mansk and two would attack Kandalaksha well-informed which allowed Sweden to de- in the north eastern region of the Soviet cide how and when to act. Union. This intelligence provided one of For the Swedish government, no other the first warning signs that German troops source of intelligence was as effective at in- in Norway would be used in the invasion, fluencing foreign policy as the information placing Sweden in a precarious situation. derived from (SIGINT). Open source intelligence in this instance The significance of SIGINT is neatly provided the Swedish government with ad- summed up by Thornell, who described it vanced warning of German military designs as “a strategic barometer.”33 Precise strate- and the possibility of German troop transit gic understanding is a prerequisite for any through Sweden. Although it is hard to pin- neutral state looking to conduct an effective point the exact influence of this information foreign policy during wartime. on Swedish policy, as Miguel de Cervantes The primary purpose of signals intelli- says, “forewarned is forearmed.” gence and more specifically cryptanalysis, During economic negotiations with the was to provide Sweden with warning of any Allies in 1942/3 demands were placed on impending attacks on her territory. Success- Sweden to cease trading with Germany and ful decryption of the Soviet naval codes dur- to bring an end to the transit agreement. ing the Winter War combined with knowl- Long drawn out economic negotiations edge shared with the Finnish intelligence would not bode well for a country trying to services meant that the Swedes were in- persuade the expected victors of its chang- formed of Soviet intentions and movements ing stance in favour of them. Although eco- during the period. The real success however nomic negotiations were at times tedious, came following the German invasion of Sweden’s aim was to present its case and Norway in the spring of 1940. German tele-

141 NR 1 januari/mars 2011 communications were reliant on the ‘west- the intelligence services of the German situ- coast cable’, a wire that ran from Oslo to ation in other theatres around the world. Gothenburg to Berlin. This wire was imme- From this they were able to alter their stance diately tapped and the codes for the encrypt- on matters of debate and negotiation in ac- ing ‘Geheimschreiber’ (G-Schreiber) were cordance with the strategic situation. For quickly broken by Arne Beurling and his example, during the first two months of team. Information gleaned from this source , orders and direc- and many other similar intercepts provided tives for the German operation in Russia led the basis for Swedish policy toward Ger- the Swedish foreign office to realise that the many during the years of Norwegian occu- campaign would not be the blitz victory gen- pation. The Swedish decrypt team was able erally expected.37 “This allowed for a more to paint a clear picture of German troop restrictive attitude toward the demands of movements and intentions. “Indeed, the the Germans than had been the case in the fact that traffic was being deciphered meant first few weeks of the campaign.”38 E.g. dur- that troop movements and formations that ing the Swedish-German trade negotiations may have been deemed aggressive could in of December 1941 the Swedish delegation fact be safely discounted.”34 Furthermore, was able to extract a 4% interest rate in- Sweden was able to avoid potentially costly stead of the proposed 3.5% due completely and bellicose mobilisations which may have to the knowledge derived from German in- brought Sweden’s non belligerent status tercepts. Emboldened by the knowledge that into question. The Midsummer Crisis ex- this figure would be acceptable to the Ger- emplifies the salience of SIGINT decrypts to mans and aware that the situation in Russia foreign policy. The reason behind Swedish made the threat of retaliation unlikely the government’s “symbolic protests”35 against Swedes were able to benefit to the value of the German demand for troop transit was 20 million Kronor. This figure paid for the a decoded telegram detailing that “Sweden Intelligence organisation at Karlbo ten times would not be presented with an ultimatum over.39 to join the German war effort...and that By reading the majority of German codes Germany had no aggressive plans against and certain diplomatic codes from the conti- Sweden.”36 As a consequence, Hansson and nent, Sweden was able to hone even further Günther were able to manage the ‘crisis’ her understanding of her position on the with a degree of composure. strategic map of Europe40. Peter Calvocor- The constant supply of high quality in- essi, discussing the significance of Bletchley formation meant that, should Germany plan Park – “to feel you know your enemy is a an invasion of Sweden, the Swedish military vastly comforting feeling. It grows imper- believed that it could rely on two weeks no- ceptibly over time if you regularly and in- tice at the very least. By the time that the timately observe his thoughts and ways and Germans were aware that the Swedish were habits and actions. Knowledge of this kind reading G-schreiber transcripts in 1943, the makes your own planning less tentative and German army had suffered sufficient revers- more assured, less harrowing and more es to ensure that the probability of Sweden buoyant.”41 becoming involved militarily had subsided As Carlgren affirms, SIGINT represented dramatically. the Intelligence community’s best achieve- Intercepts between embassies informed ments throughout the war. However certain

142 DISKUSSION & DEBATT attaché and individual activities on location tus meant that her diplomatic representa- were important to affirm the validity of the tives were not as a matter of course made decrypts. Second Lieutenant Stig Synner- privy to important strategic information gren worked alone as a civilian in Narvik, from the great powers. The Allied distrust Norway to discover as much as possible of Sweden in the first years of the war was about the German positions in Scandina- precipitated by the 1940 trade negotiations via. Acting as a local courier he was able to with Germany and the historic cultural ties assess the German force disposition in de- between the two nations.45 This meant that tail. Similarly, he persuaded a cafe worker the flow of information between attachés in Narvik to phone and inform the military and diplomats relied heavily on personal fortification in Boden (N. Sweden) when friendships and political sympathies rather German soldiers stopped drinking at the than established diplomatic allegiances. Fol- cafe. The call coincided with German troop lowing suggestions of German collusion, movement toward Finland from Norway.42 the Swedish military attachés were expelled During the months preceding Operation from Moscow in December 1943.46 Barbarossa, human intelligence (HUMINT) Signals intelligence also faced difficulties. complemented the information extracted At no stage of the war did Sweden have a from coded messages. Juhlin-Dannfelt, the comprehensive understanding of all relevant Swedish military attaché in Berlin, had a codes and ciphers. The German high level valuable contact in Warsaw code-named diplomatic codes and Russian army codes “Herslow,” who often travelled between remained unbroken for the duration of the Sweden and Berlin. He was able to provide war. The sensitivity of the information un- primary accounts of the German prepara- earthed through cryptanalysis made for an tions in Poland which Juhlin-Dannfelt then awkward situation when the Finnish intel- reported to Stockholm.43 Lennart Frick ar- ligence community informed the German gues that instances such as these generated a government of the leak. This fact alone ‘clearer picture of the German positions.’44 threatened the political balance between the It must be said that the value of HUMINT two states. Most important is the fact that by no means exceeded the importance of the the dissemination of the information de- cryptology department and it is question- rived from SIGINT was sporadic and heav- able whether their intelligence would have ily influenced by organisational rivalries. had much impact as isolated pieces of infor- The FRA and C-Bureau did not get along mation. Nevertheless along with Beurling’s well and the C-Bureau’s desire to retain deciphered telegrams, the sources combined control led to them limiting the amount of to provide a more tangible source of intel- intelligence that could be passed to policy ligence, as one served to validate the other. makers.47 This paper has presented the argument This reflects the most significant short- that intelligence played an important part in coming of the Swedish intelligence organ. the effective active management of Swedish This paper may thus far have presented the non-belligerence. It does not however wish image of a highly coordinated and synchro- to suggest that intelligence was the corner- nised intelligence community, this could stone of Swedish foreign policy, neither was not be further from the truth. Swedish in- it a flawless art. Intelligence in all its forms telligence constituted a series of disparate had many limitations. Sweden’s neutral sta- and unconnected organisations. Coordina-

143 NR 1 januari/mars 2011 tion was limited and inter-agency rivalries placed liaison with the allies at the heart of reduced their effectiveness. The success of her policy goals. The framework for HU- Swedish intelligence lay in the brilliance and MINT and SIGINT remained in place but motivation of small, isolated groups of indi- yielded less influential information, focus- viduals combined with the aptitude of com- ing instead on other areas of Swedish po- petent policy makers. litical interest. By autumn 1943, the threat to Swedish This essay has evidenced the important non-belligerence had significantly decreased. role of intelligence during Sweden’s wartime Germany and the Soviet Union were thor- foreign policy. Sweden was not a paradigm oughly involved in Operation Barbarossa of intelligence machinery but an interesting and the Allies had now set foot on mainland case in which theory can help uncover its Europe. Essentially this allowed Sweden to success in achieving its policy objective. Regi- employ a bolder stance against Germany, nald Hibbert’s view on the bias attributed to but it also meant that the Swedish Intelli- secret intelligence in assessments appropri- gence community’s contribution to foreign ately depicts the way in which intelligence policy decreased. Swedish Intelligence was was used in foreign policy.51 Transcripts however allowed more room for maneuver from the decoded ‘G-schreiber’ were used as it adapted to a less constrained Swedish in confirmatory manner which allowed bal- policy. As the Allies gained the upper hand anced assessments to be made. In addition, of the war, there developed a liaison between its application was in acknowledgement of the Swedish Intelligence community and the difference between tactical and strategic the various Allied organizations. The OSS intelligence. ‘G-schreiber’ transcripts were was permitted to use airfields in Bromma used tactically by Foreign Office representa- for various aerial activities in Scandinavia, tives to modify their position in accordance and the SOE was allowed to place a flight with German perceptions. Moreover, Swe- navigation system in Malmö to facilitate den’s astute navigation of the surrounding the bombing of Germany.48 The C-bureau strategic environment was predominantly essentially became a maverick intelligence based on open source intelligence derived agency, operating almost wholly without from attachés. However, Sweden as a case government consensus, though always act- study does bring into question Herman’s ing to secure what it believed to be in Swe- argument regarding the separation of the den’s interests. An example of this was the policy maker from the intelligence process. organization of the ‘travels to the Baltic’, us- Foreign Minister Christian Günther’s prox- ing refugees to strengthen the Swedish HU- imity to the intelligence, in particular open MINT network in preparation for the com- source intelligence, allowed him to shape ing Soviet occupation.49 Operation Stella it in order to better serve policy. As Mark Polaris demonstrated that the C-bureau was Lowenthal correctly asserts; “without ref- willing to take matters into its own hands erence to policy, intelligence is rendered by providing for the re-allocation of the meaningless.”52 Incidentally, this fortunate entire Finnish Intelligence community into state of affairs was by accident rather than Sweden in 1944.50 Thus intelligence adapt- design. The agencies tasked specifically with ed to the geostrategic changes of the war. By gathering, assessing and disseminating intel- the autumn of 1943, the demands of policy ligence were in fact poor at communicating altered the significance of intelligence and with each other. This reduced the value

144 DISKUSSION & DEBATT of their work. The disconnected nature of vided the most valuable information, it was intelligence organisations in Sweden was verified by other sources, most notably mili- a symptom of their autonomy. The state’s tary attachés and covert agents. This essay role was limited to that of funding which agrees with Carlgren on these conclusions, had the effect of distancing intelligence from but has challenged his assertion that Sweden policy.53 was strategically unable to alter its position. Wilhelm Carlgren asserts in his official Conversely, Swedish policy successfully history of the Swedish Intelligence during pursued a course of ‘active management’ in World War Two, that the impact of intel- order to secure her non-belligerence. Intelli- ligence was threefold.54 Firstly, and largely gence did play an important but limited role as a consequence of Beurling’s deciphered in influencing the Swedish government’s messages, intelligence allowed policy mak- ability to maintain her non-belligerence, ers to pursue a bolder stance in negotiations as it allowed Swedish policy-makers more with Germany. Secondly, and perhaps most room to manoeuvre. critically, it generated a unique sense of se- curity. Finally counter-intelligence restricted The authors are students at the Department the efficacy of foreign intelligence agencies of War Studies, King’s College London un- in Sweden. Though signals intelligence pro- der the supervision of Dr Joseph Maiolo.

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Sources 12. Op. cit. note 7, p. 381 13. Op. cit. note 2, p. 40 Denham, Henry: Inside the Nazi Ring; A Naval 14. Ibid. p. 118 Attache In Sweden 1940-1945, John Murray, 15. Mackay, Craig G.: From Information to In- London 1984. trigue: Studies in Secret Service based on the Frick, L. W.: Det Vakande ögat, (Lund:2004) Swedish experience, 1939-1945, Routledge, Hinsley, Francis H.: British Intelligence in the London 1993, p.119 Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy 16. Hugemark, Bo: I Orkanens öga 1941: Osäker and Operations, Volume 1, HMSO, London Neutralitet, Svenskt Militärhistoriskt Bib- 1979. liotek, Stockholm 2007, p. 22 Levine, Paul A.: "European neutrals and non-belli- 17. Ibid, p. 22 gerents during the Second World War" in Eu- 18. Ibid, p. 22 ropean Neutrals and Non-Belligerents During 19. Op. cit. note 6, p.137 The Second World War, Cambridge University 20. Molander, Pia: "Intelligence, Diplomacy and Press, Cambridge 2002. the Swedish Dilemma: The Special Operations Mackay, Craig G.: "The Krämer Case: A study in Executive in Neutral Sweden, 1939–45", In- three dimensions", Intelligence and National telligence and , Volume 22, Security, Volume 4, issue 2, 1989, pp. 268- Issue 5, October 2007, p. 733 294 21. Cruickshank, Charles: SOE in Scandinavia, Montgomery, Vernon R. C.: The dynamics of Bri- 1986, p. 66 tish Policy towards Sweden 1942/1945, (PHD 22. Tennant, Peter: Touchlines of War, Hull Aca- demic Press: Hull 1992, p. 31 Thesis: 1985 ) 23. Op. cit. note 15, p. 9 24. Ibid. p. 9 25. Ibid. p. 14 Notes 26. Agrell, Wilhelm: "Sweden and the Dilemmas of Neutral Intelligence Liaison", Journal of 1. J, Ottosson, J. and Magnusson, L.: Hemliga Strategic Studies, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2006, p. Makter (Secret Powers) p. 77 638 2. Carlgren, Wilhem M.: Svensk Underrät- 27. Ibid. p. 639 telsetjänst 1939–1945 (Swedish Intelligence 28. Op. cit. note 2, p. 4 1939–1945), Helsingborg 1985, Liber, Stock- 29. Op. cit. note 6, p. 5 holm 1985, p. 103 "Försvarets Radio Anstalt 30. Frick, Lennart W. and Rosander, Lars: Bakom – FRA. The Defence Radio Agency." Hemligstämpeln: Hemlig verksamhet i Sverige 3. Carlgren, Wilhem M.: Swedish Foreign Policy i vår tid (Behind the Secret Stamp), Historiska During the Second World War, 1939–1945, Media, Lund 2004, p. 80 Ernest & Benn, London 1977, p. 6 31. Op. cit. note 3, p. 102. 4. Op. cit. note 2, p. 29 32. Op. cit. note, 6, p. 139. 5. Ibid. p. 48 33. Beckman, Bengt and MacKay, Craig G.: 6. Baker-Fox, Anette: The Power of Small States: Swedish Signal Intelligence 1900–1945, Frank Diplomacy in World War 2, University of Chi- Cass, London 2002, p. 169 cago Press, Chicago 1959, p. 126 34. Beckman, Bengt: Codebreakers: Arne Beurl- 7. Gustav-Scott, Carl: "The Swedish Midsummer ing and the Swedish Crypto programme dur- Crisis of 1941: The Crisis that Never Was", ing World War Two, American Mathematical Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.37, Society, Providence R.I 2003, (Translated by No.3, July 2002, p. 371 Kjel-Ove Widman), p. 189 8. Commonly known as the "Englebrecht Divi- 35. Op.cit. note 7, p. 373 sion" 36. Ibid. p. 377 9. Op. cit. note 2, p.118 37. Ibid. p. 190 There was evidence to suggest foreign powers 38. Ibid. p. 190 were playing Swedish politicians off against 39. Op. cit. note 33, p. 162. Karlbo, central Stock- one another holm home of the Swedish cryptanalysis unit. 10. Ibid. p. 373 40. Ibid. p. 164. Refers specifically to one famous 11. Ibid. p. 380 incident: The Swedes were naturally able to

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compare the quality of the reporting of the meetings they had been involved in. E.g. Prince zu Wied, German foreign minister used to bun- gle and embellish the messages he sent to Ber- lin. Thus, in order to prevent misunderstand- ing, the Swedes opened up a second channel of correspondence with the more able Werner Dankwort. 41. Ibid. p. 213 from Calvocoressi, P.: Top Secret Ultra 42. Op. cit. note 30, p. 250 43. Op. cit. note 3, p. 63 44. Frick, Lennart W.: Det vakande ögat, Histo- riska Media, Lund 2004, p. 251. 45. Op. cit. note 2, p. 135 46. Ibid. p. 163 47. Ibid. p. 89: “Messages containing statements from Swedish officers with the rank of colonel or higher will not be allowed to be dissemi- nated to any department outside the Defence Staff” – Chief of Defence Gen Staff Akerhielm 48. Op. cit. note 30, p. 179 49. Ibid. p. 187 50. Operation Stella Polaris comprised the extrac- tion of HUMINT and SIGINT capabilities to prevent them from being scrutinized by the So- viet Union. 51. Hibbert, Reginald: "Intelligence and Policy", Intelligence and National Security, Volume 5, Issue 1, 1990, p. 111 52. Lowenthal, Mark M.: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, Washington DC Press, Wash- ington 2000, p. 9 53. Op. cit. note 26, p. 640 54. Op. cit. note 2, p. 182

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