DISKUSSION & DEBATT To What Extent did Intelligence Contribute to Sweden Maintaining its Non-belligerence throughout World War Two? by Jens Aklundh, George Burnett and Sean Harrison the evolution and activities of the Swed- mentary and entirely overt until the autumn ish intelligence community throughout the of 1939, when the secret G-section was cre- Second World War have been documented ated, headed by Carl Petersén.1 These two by historians, most notably, Wilhelm Carl- departments grew exponentially from 1939 gren and C.G. Mackay, yet the importance to 1942, when a large reorganization of the of intelligence has remained ambiguous. Swedish defense and intelligence commu- The invasion of Poland was a rude awaken- nity occurred. The G-section was renamed ing for the Swedish intelligence services, and the C-bureau, and the cryptanalysis sec- the German invasion of Norway and Den- tion of Adlercreuz’s office was created as a mark in April 1940 caught Sweden wholly separate agency, the FRA.2 Furthermore, all unprepared. Though Sweden was militarily other Swedish Intelligence activities, exclud- and diplomatically limited by the tides of ing the FRA, were now organized under the the war, she successfully managed to remain leadership of Daniel Landquist. Through- outside of the battlefields of Europe. As will out the war, all of Sweden’s intelligence was be demonstrated, Sweden, far from being a under military control. Swedish intelligence pawn the strategic development of the war, remained small by international standards was capable of safeguarding her non-bellig- though it did grow significantly, and was by erence. This was to a certain extent the re- 1945 an experienced community. sult of accurate intelligence combined with shrewd foreign policy assessment. Though Sweden’s ability to maintain its neutral- ity was dependent on events outside its Sweden is often considered as a ‘neutral’ 3 state of World War Two, her failure to ad- control. here to the rules of international neutrality This statement from Wilhelm Carlgren renders the term ‘non-belligerent’ far more constitutes the basis of our investigation. applicable for this study. Though we recognize the inherent strategic Before we construct our argument it will limitations of a small, neutral state trapped be useful to provide an outline of the evo- within a far reaching conflict, the conviction lution of Swedish Intelligence. After World of Carlgren’s argument is debatable. This War One, the Swedish Intelligence commu- paper proposes the argument that within nity largely faded away and only in 1937 was the parameters of her influence, Sweden Colonel Carl Adlercreutz given the mission proved herself capable of manipulating the to establish an official military Intelligence strategic situation to her own advantage. bureau. Swedish Intelligence remained rudi- The first part of this paper will thus be de- 137 NR 1 JANUARI/MARS 2011 voted to demonstrating the success of Swe- the Riksdag of Finland’s refusal to seek den’s policy of active management in secur- peace therefore directly jeopardizing Swe- ing her non-belligerence. Following this, we den’s widely supported policy of neutrality. will assess the significance of intelligence to The Finns had accepted defeat and were the success of ‘active management’. Without persuaded under Swedish guidance to seek directly quantifying the impact intelligence peace, which in turn thwarted Allied plans had on Sweden’s strategic situation, we will for invasion. Essentially; “[Sweden] was argue that its role was indeed significant. able to postpone a military move until the Sweden’s active management during the ostensible reason for it could be removed Winter War 1939–40 between the Soviet through peacemaking…Sweden was able to Union and Finland demonstrated at an early prevent the allies from making a disastrous stage her willingness to engage and manipu- mistake by precipitating a fighting alliance late events to suit policy goals. Short of of- between Germany and the Soviet Union.”6 ficial intervention, Sweden sent supplies and The Midsummer Crisis of 1941 was to volunteers to aid the Finnish in their fight present Sweden with the “most serious chal- against the Red Army. Finnish appeals for lenge to its neutral tradition” of the war.7 direct intervention in the Swedish press res- Neutrality was a policy that had served the onated amongst public opinion, yet Sweden country well and was almost unanimous- was already offering the most it could with- ly supported by the general public. For a out infringing its own policy of neutrality. small state to risk its internal unity in war- Meanwhile intelligence reports had come in time was to relinquish one of its most im- from Paris suggesting possible Allied inter- portant assets. The crisis was sparked by vention in Scandinavia.4 An Allied attack on the German request for the transit of a di- the Soviet Union, in aid of Finland, risked vision from southern Norway overland to enhancing the Soviet-German alliance. Swe- Finland.8 The request had multiple impli- den’s non-belligerence would be jeopardized cations for Sweden. Firstly, it undermined and Scandinavia would inevitably become if not contravened Sweden’s official policy a strategic battle ground. Foreign Minister of neutrality. Secondly, with the onset of a Christian Günther foresaw the implications new war against the Soviet Union, political for Sweden if the Allies were to mount an sensitivity would be heightened presenting expedition. Therefore, the only option was “[a] considerable risk of dissension aided to prevent conflict by encouraging a quick from abroad.”9 Historian Carl Gustav Finnish surrender. When presented with Al- Scott is however right to draw into focus lied plans, Günther adopted a threatening the deliberation and decision to put the re- stance, clearly asserting Sweden’s view on quest through parliamentary process when the proposed invasion. He reminded the Al- a similar request had been granted without lies of Finland’s dependence on Sweden, and approval in June 1940.10 that a withdrawal of materiel would “surely King Gustav V stated his “unreserved undermine Finland’s military position and support for compliance (with Germany)” force it to the negotiating table.5” In order and that “he personally would not be will- to out manoeuvre Allied attempts at capi- ing to bear the consequences if the govern- talizing on the sentiments of pro Finnish ment refused the request.”11 This statement public opinion in Sweden, he suggested that has been the subject of much historical de- the government would be willing to inform bate but it was Hansson’s interpretation of 138 DISKUSSION & DEBATT it that was important. Hansson portrayed unity and thus negotiate the potentially divi- the King’s statement as an abdication threat sive transit of German troops over Swedish if the government did not comply. There was soil. much disagreement amongst the coalition Sweden’s internal actions had a demon- government and even within parties them- strable effect upon her relations with, and selves regarding how best to deal with the her perception by the Great Powers. This German demand. Suggestions were made was largely achieved through wartime es- regarding the way in which the government pionage laws, unrelenting counter-intelli- should sell the decision to the public. K.G gence and intelligence liaison. The objective Westman proposed “that if Sweden volun- was to prevent hostile views or intentions tarily conceded to the German petition, the against Sweden in order to persuade the bel- effects would be less demoralizing, than if ligerents that a neutral Sweden was in their it were forced to comply.”12 It was impor- interest. The Freedom of Press act was res- tant that the decision must be perceived by urrected which allowed the government to the public and the world as one made by a confiscate, without trial, any publication united coalition government. Finally a con- that could be seen as prejudicial to Swe- sensus was reached with only a handful of den’s interest.15 The treatment and condi- dissenters. tions in Norwegian prison camps, fervently Gustav-Scott underlines Sweden’s sub- described by outspoken anti-Nazi journal- ordinate geopolitical position as being the ist Torgny Segerstedt, would inevitably in- main driver of consensus, yet the impact cite hostile feeling amongst Swedish public of the King’s abdication threat cannot be opinion towards Germany. German protests disregarded due to the fact that internal to the Swedish Foreign Office resulted in a unity was salient. During the Winter War, ‘mass seizure’.16 Seventeen newspapers, all Hansson frankly stated Sweden’s position, having printed the same article concerning underlining the limitations of its support the conditions of Norwegian prison camps, for Finland. His statement was not well were apprehended.17 As Zetterberg asserts; received by the public, believing him to be ‘this action, though not very elaborate had unsympathetic towards Finland. However, a deep symbolic value to the German au- days later “King Gustav…reiterated much thorities’.18 Through instances such this, of what the prime minister said approving Sweden was able to shape Hitler’s percep- of his policy, openly sympathizing with Fin- tion of them to a more favourable view of, land, but explaining that there was no other “ein Volk im Pension,”19 diminishing their alternative other than war. He succeeded in apparent strategic significance. re-establishing wide support for the admin- In combination with