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Interview with Top Taliban Leaders (NHK) 1

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Interview with Top Taliban Leaders (NHK) 1 Annex I 1 Interview with Top Taliban Leaders (NHK) Some parts of the interview were broadcasted in Today’s Close-Up on September 6, 2012, in Japan and September 11, 2012, on NHK WORLD TV in English. Sohail Shaheen, member of Taliban Negotiation Team in Qatar Syed Rasool, member of Taliban Negotiation Team in Qatar Interview with S ohailS haheen NHK : How many members of the political office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan are talking to United States? SOHAIL SHAHEEN : When there are talks or meeting with the politi- cal office, they decide how many members will take part in the talks and according to that decision members of the political office participate in the talks but this occurred before the suspension of the talks. But now there is no contact between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the United States of America. There were confidence building measures which reached an understanding but they weren’t implemented because the talks were sus- pended and postponed. So, there are now no meetings and talks. NHK : Why were they suspended? SOHAIL SHAHEEN : It was because of the confidence building measures. We had meetings with the Americans, several meetings, and at the end of those meetings, we came to an understanding that the American side should take steps regarding confidence building measures like the opening of the office and also exchange of the prisoners and also delisting. But we have bypassed the delisting. To show a sign of flexibility we have bypassed it but two conditions are still there – exchange of prisoners and also the open- ing of the office. These two conditions which we agreed upon and we had reached understanding about, were not implemented as agreed upon by the United States. So, that was the reason for the suspension of the talks and we said we are abiding by the understanding we reached. If the American side implement the conditions which they agreed upon, there is no problem, no obstacle for the talks to resume. We are still abiding by that rule. 126 ANNEX I NHK : The last talk with United States was held in Qatar in January, I believe that Mr. Grossman came here because at that time I was in Kabul and we had a press conference in Kabul and he said he would go to Qatar to talk with the Taliban. Was that the last talk? SOHAIL SHAHEEN : Yes, before the talks were suspended, there was meet- ing. But after that there was no meeting, after suspension of the talks. NHK : So, the last talk, how long did it take? Did it take three days or four days in Qatar? SOHAIL SHAHEEN : No, not four days’ talks. It was just one meeting. NHK : And then Mr. Grossman discussed the conditions with you? SOHAIL SHAHEEN : Yes, the condition was we had reached understanding and the office was to be opened and the exchange of prisoners to take place as was agreed upon. Then they brought some new conditions. NHK : What are the new conditions? SOHAIL SHAHEEN : And now the new conditions . you know, the Afghan issue is two dimensional – external and internal. External dimension or external side of the issue is that we, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, will talk with the United States about ending the occupation of Afghanistan and all issues related with occupation and also some concern of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan of the United States, they will resolve those issues because this is external. It is not in the power of the Kabul administration. They do not have power. They do not have power to end the occupation. These are the external dimensions. When we complete the external dimen- sion, then we come to the internal side of the issue and the internal side is all Afghans sit together to consult each other about the formation of Afghan inclusive and Islamic government in Afghanistan which is based on the aspirations and will of the people of Afghanistan so all the people will feel their participation in the government. So, that’s the internal side. If you bring the internal side before the external side of the issues completed, it will not resolve the issue. Rather it will complicate the issue because the occupation is there. So, it will complicate and create more differences and it will not be resolved. So, as a principle, yes, all Afghans who are living in Afghanistan, they have right to serve their country and also participate in the government but that is the internal side of the issue. So, that was the reason of difference and that was the reason for postponement of the talks. NHK : So, The new condition which Mr. Grossman presented is the participa- tion of the Karzai government? SOHAIL SHAHEEN : Yes. NHK : That’s it? Or are there any other conditions he presented? SOHAIL SHAHEEN : No, there was some condition about the office and also about the Karzai government and those things which is internal phase. So, we told that we had reached the understanding that we will complete first the external side of the issue. Then we will go smoothly and confidently to the internal side of the issue. So, when we bypassed the external and brought the internal which was in violation of the understanding, that’s contradicted the understanding we had reached with them. So, that’s one of the reasons postponement of the talks. NHK : Is there any other issue that you are not satisfied with, I mean, in terms of the US government’s attitude? ANNEX I 127 SOHAIL SHAHEEN : I think in these talks sincerity is very important, honesty, sincerity. And the American side should adopt resolution of the Afghan issue through peaceful means and diplomatic means as a strategy, not as a tactic, a fluctuating tactic – today is one tactic, one remark and tomorrow other kind of assertions. There is backtracking understanding on the points agreed upon because these things complicate the issue. Then the talks will not go forward. Both sides, I mean the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and also the United States, should adopt the solution of the Afghan issue through diplomatic ways as a strategy. We are abiding by the understanding we reached, we are abiding by that but when they have new conditions, I think we can say it was not kind of their strategy. They should be stable, constant in their approach to the issue and they should abide by the understanding or agreement which we reached. That will be I think a good thing for the resolution of the Afghan issue. NHK : In terms of exchanging prisoners, is there no disagreement between the US and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) ? SOHAIL SHAHEEN : There was disagreement, yes, but that this disagree- ment after the understanding was finished and that is that they will give us our five prisoners and we will give them their prisoner, the American prisoner. NHK : In the US, especially the US congress is concerned that if they are transferred from Guantanamo to Qatar, they then might go back to the battlefield again and the US would like to get assurances that they are kind of under house arrest. What did you talk about that with the US? SOHAIL SHAHEEN : I think they should not be concerned about that because the Americans have released before that prisoners from Guantanamo jail and they released them on their own, without any understanding with any sides. So, when these five people are released, they are released on the basis of understanding, agreement with Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. So, it is a kind of assurance, a kind of guarantee. So, this is different from the other releases that they did. So, based on that assurance, I think there will not be any violation of the understanding reached between the two sides. NHK : As for the US prisoner which you are holding, what’s his condition? Is he in Afghanistan? SOHAIL SHAHEEN : Yes, he is in Afghanistan, he is in good health condi- tion. NHK : Because he has been held for almost 3 years and you released a video about him before, but not recently. So, some people are very concerned about his whereabouts and his condition. Can you give them the guarantee that he is in good condition? SOHAIL SHAHEEN : As far as I know, he is in good condition, yes. NHK : And you had a dialogue with the US not only in Qatar but also in Germany. What was the atmosphere of the talks with the US before the suspension? SOHAIL SHAHEEN : The diplomatic way is one of the options to obtain out rights, legitimate rights. The Afghan people, they are not struggling for something which is illegal. We want just independence of our country which is the right of every people which is also mentioned in the charter of the United Nations. We want a government based on the will of the people and the aspiration of the people. These are legitimate things and rights 128 ANNEX I of the people. We are the people who are trying to obtain these rights through diplomatic ways, through peaceful ways. So, we tried hard but it was not tense atmosphere, maybe hard talking. NHK : Is it business like? SOHAIL SHAHEEN : Yes, you can say that. If you are talking for your own <<inaudible>>, then at the end you reach a mutual point which is agreed upon. That is the way of the talks. NHK : While you were holding the talks with the US, the leader of the Al-Qaida, Bin Ladin was murdered in Pakistan.
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