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Angola: Parallel Governments, Oil and Neopatrimonial System Reproduction

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Angola: Parallel Governments, Oil and Neopatrimonial System Reproduction Institute for Security Studies Situation Report Date issued: 6 June 2011 Author: Paula Cristina Roque* Distribution: General Contact: [email protected] Angola: Parallel governments, oil and neopatrimonial system reproduction Introduction Over the last 35 years, the central government in Luanda has not only survived a potent insurgency, external intervention, international isolation, sanctions and economic collapse, but it has also managed to emerge victorious from a highly destructive and divisive civil war, achieving double-digit economic growth less than a decade after the cessation of hostilities. Hence the state in Angola may be regarded as resilient and even effective. However, closer examination of the Angolan political order reveals a very distinct reality of two parallel ruling structures: the formal, fragile government ruled by the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the more resilient ‘shadow’ government controlled and manipulated by the presidency, with Sonangol, the national oil company, as its chief economic motor. While these structures are mutually dependent, their internal functions are sometimes at odds with each other. Recent changes to these structures reveal the faultlines the ruling elite has tried to conceal, as well as new opportunities for engagement with the ruling structures of Angola by African and international policymakers. The Angolan The Angolan state displays several aspects of failure and resilience that, in its oil state: Two hybrid configuration, combines formal and informal operating procedures, is governments highly adaptable and able to survive great difficulties. Reforms in Angola are between more a reflection of the need to adapt to change as a means to maintain control democracy of the state – and to control the rate at which any change occurs – than a genuine and hegemony opening of the political space to ideas of good governance, let alone popular (2008–2010) accountability. Although the MPLA understands that change is inevitable, and in the past reacted tactically, it now has a strategically oriented state apparatus that strives to control the pace at which change occurs, while guaranteeing party rule for another 30 years. The president has effectively appropriated this strategy and uses it to control and weaken the party. Since the 2008 legislative elections,1 which saw the MPLA achieve an 82 per cent victory over the opposition, the regime has claimed its democratic credentials and finally imbued the formal state with a measure of legitimacy and international credibility. However, José Eduardo Dos Santos has opted to avoid presidential elections and not risk subjecting his shadow government to an electoral contest that could compel him to share power with the MPLA within the confines of formal structures, should he prove less popular than the ruling party. * The opinions expressed in this Situation Report do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute, its Trustees, members of the Council, or donors. Institute research staff and outside contributors write and comment in their personal capacity and their views do not represent a formal position by the ISS. 1 These parallel governments have, nevertheless, managed to maintain undisputed a political order and post-war stability, which have allowed for economic growth and the expansion of a centralised patronage network, which further contributes to the stability of the existing political order. The structures of this hybrid resilience are the most difficult to reform because they have been moulded to advance the interests of a few individuals. Dismantling them will present great difficulty for the new leadership of future governments in Luanda – which may attempt to rule through these institutions, but will eventually have to reform them. This will be difficult, as the regime in Luanda mimics not only democracy, but also a functioning state – in which a carefully orchestrated social engineering process creates the illusion of a modern and rehabilitated society – with its own middle class and rising entrepreneurs. The shadow government: The presidency and Sonangol The presidency today is the most powerful institution in Angola. Dos Santos is not only the head of state, but also the president of the party, the commander-in- chief of the armed forces, and the principal ‘adviser’ to all other actors involved in running the country. Over the past 32 years, Dos Santos has kept the MPLA and the government in check by expanding a highly efficient system of patronage that rewards a loyal elite of politicians, family members and the military. Many, including General Helder Vieira Dias Kopelipa, also previously held important portfolios, such as the Office for National Reconstruction (GRN), which supervises the China Investment Fund. Public Works Minister General Higino Carneiro controls the holding Caduta Organizacoes with interests in banking, insurance, tourism and agro-industry. Angola’s largest mobile phone company, Unitel, is partly owned by the president’s daughter Isabel and by the head of communications in the presidency, Brigadier General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento.2 Dos Santos has also sustained a functioning dual-structure of government (shadow and formal), which has ensured that no collective action could threaten his rule. Angola’s shadow government operates autonomously and is accountable only to the presidency. It is responsible for: • formulating international policy independently of the established government and the foreign ministry given the importance of the country’s external image and that of its president. To a certain extent, Sonangol is the vehicle used to control the international image of Angola, investing internationally in the strategic areas of telecommunications, gas and petroleum as well as the banking sector (examples include the acquisition of oil concessions in Iraq or major shareholding positions in leading national companies in Portugal and Brazil); and exercising control over institutions and people through intelligence, information and security services using various internal and external organs; • exerting control over money supply, through its own shadow financing mechanism that operates outside the budgetary process, accounting and the ministries; • providing its own security. The presidential guard, a completely autonomous entity of the security apparatus run only by the president, consists of 7 000 Cuanhama and Gambo tribesmen. These tribes are from the south of Angola and have no political power in Luanda and are, therefore, no threat in terms of constituency mobilisation. In this second tier of power, Sonangol, and, to a lesser extent, Endiama (the national diamond company), play a central role in the management of the state and in the MPLA’s financial strategy. They are at the centre of the mismanagement of funds and of corruption.3 More importantly, Sonangol feeds the vast patronage machine with oil revenues. Throughout the war, Sonangol operated effectively, grew steadily and supported the government in its war effort. It has been acclaimed as the country’s most competent institution, with offices in Texas, Hong Kong, Singapore, London and Brazzaville. Acting as a sovereign wealth fund, this state-owned enterprise has made several international acquisitions 2 Angola’s shadow state – ‘All the president’s men’ President Dos Santos The President’s unelected advisors: key generals and civilian loyalists, including head of security services and counter-information services Information services are more powerful than the cabinet and provincial government, given that the former have proven more effective in extending state administration and controlling the population. Functions: to serve the president manage all necessary resources needed to guarantee operational success Two coordinating structures of the state And… Sonangol chief motor of Civilian House Military House shadow government (run by Carlos Feijó) (run by Gen enables President to Kopelipa) operate vast patronage network The intelligence services State Security and External Intelligence Service for Military Information Services Service (SIE) Intelligence (SIM) (SINFO) Run until recently by Previously run by General Run by General José Maria Sebastião Martins Miala, currently headed by André Sango Principal functions: Principal functions: Principal functions: collects intelligence mandated to guard over crucial in determining the serves as ‘political police the individual and political configuration of force’ collective loyalty of the the region (in particular coordinates provinces, the military and the different the 2 Congos) private sector, civil units protects the interests of service the President abroad creates wide network of informers in Portugal, Brazil, Iraq, Cuba, Venezuela and Mexico, in sectors as diverse as banking, telecommunications, media and energy. Sonangol president, Manuel Vicente, announced earlier in 2011 that the company had achieved record profits of $3 billion in 2010.4 Vicente, appointed chief executive officer of Sonangol in 1999, has announced that he will step down from his position voluntarily rather than be ‘forced to leave’.5 This may be connected to an alleged illegal transfer of shares from the oil company’s holdings into his name in 2008.6 However, Vicente 3 could be a potential successor to Dos Santos, as he has international credibility (domestically, he has no significant political or social support base). This shadow government is enmeshed in the formal government, duplicating
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