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AC Vol 44 No 23 www.africa-confidential.com 21 November 2003 Vol 44 No 23 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL ANGOLA 3 ZIMBABWE Holding the cash Big questions are to be decided Marching to Masvingo when the MPLA holds its congress President Mugabe’s exit plans are prompting unrest ahead of the in Luanda on 6-10 December: the ZANU-PF party congress selection of the party’s flagbearer and whether the party can tackle History is catching up with President Robert Gabriel Mugabe as he prepares for the party congress in graft in what bankers and diplomats Masvingo next month. Even political allies concede that Mugabe is well into extra time and must use the regard as one of the world’s most congress to set out his exit plan. First, he must find reliable candidates for two key posts: the vice- corrupt regimes. presidency of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) to replace Simon Vengesayi Muzenda, who died on 20 September, and a Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Force to ANGOLA 4replace 60-year-old General Vitalis Zvinavashe, who retired this month. The appointments are not entirely in Mugabe’s gift but unfriendly occupants could sabotage his efforts to secure legal protection Luanda’s money-go- and an acceptable successor in State House. Opposition optimists are convinced that Mugabe will use ZANU-PF’s congress in Masvingo to round announce his retirement. Yet that would leave a lame-duck leader presiding over the world’s fastest Mystery surrounds the ‘social shrinking economy: not an appealing prospect for Mugabe and his shrewd political planners. Sending bonus fund’ set up from proceeds the riot police to break up anti-government and anti-poverty protests was vintage Mugabe, as was the of the oil licence downpayments. Touted as proof that oil investors arrest and brutalisation of more than 100 demonstrators. There’s no sign that Mugabe is tiring of wielding could nudge the government the rungu (big stick, as brandished by chiefs). towards development spending, If Mugabe does decide to cut and run at Masvingo, he looks unprepared for the aftermath. As soon as the fund should total $100 million. he lost presidential immunity, as military commander-in-chief Mugabe would face legal suits holding him responsible for torture – as well as for his alleged role in commissioning the Operation Gukurahundi NAMIBIA 5 massacres by the Fifth Brigade in Matebeleland in the early 1983. Then some 10,000 people, mainly Ndebele, were killed. Attempts to negotiate ‘protection clauses’ for Mugabe are key to any settlement No melting pot between the ruling ZANU-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change but despite a wave of secretive talks between the two parties, there has been little progress on terms for Mugabe’s departure. President Nujoma’s most likely successor, Foreign Affairs Minister Hamutenya, is seen as the Accounting for the Matebeleland massacres architect of policies that have made Most probable is the phased departure option, allowing Mugabe to use the Masvingo congress to promote his own people, the Oshivambo, his loyalists, purge the senior ranks of troublemakers and prepare the ground for his exit well ahead of ever more powerful in government the presidential election due in 2008. He wants to negotiate a gracious exit from power after heroic and business. Minorities now demand a federal constitution achievements. That will be difficult, given the corruption and economic chaos accompanying the land offering them some protection resettlement programme. Efforts by Deputy Minister Flora Buka and former Secretary to the Presidency against Oshivambo domination. Charles Utete to identify abuses uncovered a web of corrupt allocations and party in-fighting (AC Vol 44 Nos 4 & 22). This meant that thousand of hectares of formerly productive areas such as Mashonaland SOUTH AFRICA 6 West are lying idle – just as many Zimbabweans face chronic food shortages. Embarrassingly for Mugabe, some officials named are among his key allies. BEE is for business An exiting Mugabe also wants international endorsement – not from the Anglo-Saxon duopoly of Britain and the United States but from fellow African leaders and leaders in Europe, Asia and Latin Foreign investors are asking America. Even that hasn’t worked out as planned. Although France delights in cocking an occasional whether the ANC government’s plans promoting black snook at Britain’s ineffectual attempts to bring Mugabe to heel, it has signed up to the mildly punitive empowerment and transfer of European Union restrictions on top-ranking ZANU-PF officials and senior military officers. shares to black-owned African leaders regard EU or Commonwealth sanctions as an ugly precedent which one day might hit conglomerates will be compatible them but few of them (bar Namibia’s Sam Nujoma) show much enthusiasm for Mugabe’s brand of with Pretoria’s conservative ‘Afro-Catholic Stalinism’, mainly because of the economic damage it has wrought in Southern Africa. market-led economic strategy. Mugabe scores high marks for anti-Anglo-American rhetoric, beating even his ally, Libya’s Colonel Moammar el Gadaffi. Concern for his international standing has led Mugabe to pressure Presidents POINTERS 8 Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki to lift the ban on him attending the Commonwealth summit in Abuja, Nigeria, on 5-8 December (see Pointer). Nigeria’s Obasanjo and South Africa’s Mbeki make up Commonwealth, the troika of Commonwealth leaders, along with Australian Premier John Howard, which has been Congo-Kinshasa/ delegated the task of assessing whether Mugabe’s government has made enough political progress for the modest sanctions to be lifted. Rwanda & France/ Obasanjo and Mbeki dislike Howard, whose posturing can appear racist, more than they like Mugabe. Africa They were looking for reasons to lift sanctions but Mugabe’s tactics – pressing treason charges against 21 November 2003 Africa Confidential Vol 44 No 23 June 2000 parliamentary elections: speakers. They believe it’s their turn at the top. The Ndebele and ZANU-PF majority related Kalanga, who are now core opposition supporters, make up MDC majority KOREKORE some 20 per cent, with the remaining 5 per cent consisting of the ultra- 100 kilometres Mashonaland minorities, the Shangaan, Tonka, Venda and whites. Mashonaland Central Late Vice-President Muzenda was a kingmaker in Masvingo 50 miles West t as E Province, leading one of the two main Karanga factions. Current crises ZEZURU d A n K la have exacerbated tensions among the Chishona-speaking groups and N Harare a O n T o h with the Ndebele-speaking groups, which formed the unified ZANU- s a PF in 1987 when the leader of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, M Matabeleland Joshua Nkomo, signed a unity pact with Mugabe. North ZIMBABWE MANYIKA NDEBELE Midlands Manicaland Under that pact, the unified party would have two vice-presidents, KARANGA one from each party, ZANU and ZAPU, making up the new ZANU- Bulawayo PF. Historically, Muzenda was a ZANU man so his replacement must K A Total population: L be drawn from the ZANU wing of the party. That rules out the busy A NDAU 12 million N Shona-speakers (75%): G Masvingo Minister for Special Affairs, John Nkomo, who as National Chairman KARANGA, KOREKORE, A of ZANU-PF ranks third in the party hierarchy currently. MANYIKA, NDAU, ZEZURU Matabeleland Ndebele and related South Highly regarded by South Africa’s Mbeki, John Nkomo wants SHANGAAN groups (20%): VENDA KALANGA, NDEBELE Pretoria’s backing for a deal with the opposition MDC. Nkomo is Others (5%): being flown around Southern Africa in a jet belonging to Anglo SHANGAAN, TONKA, VENDA, WHITES American and explaining the Mugabe endgame to anxious South opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai, closing down the independent African businessmen. Daily News and crushing protest demonstrations – don’t help them. In domestic politics, Nkomo has a mountain to climb (mainly Shona However, Obasanjo, who has assured some of his ministers that prejudice against his Ndebele ancestry) to get the presidency. His best Mugabe will not be excluded from the summit, knows he will look an chance is that his studiously loyal but pragmatic stance may make him Uncle Tom if he excludes Mugabe. Under Obasanjo’s military the safest pair of hands and least bad alternative to other frontrunners. government in 1978, Nigeria won plaudits from front-line states for Barring such an upset, the battle for the vice-presidency and for the nationalising the Nigerian assets of British Petroleum, whose Rhodesian Mugabe succession is between the big battalions: sanctions-busting operations had been revealed to Nigerian diplomats ● The Zezuru group – former ZDF Commander Lieutenant Gen. by (not entirely altruistic) executives from Roland ‘Tiny’ Rowland’s Tapfumanei Solomon Mujuru (aka Rex Nhongo); his wife Joyce Lonhro conglomerate. Mujuru (aka Spill Blood); the Air Force Commander, Air Marshal Perence Shiri; Minister of Defence Sydney Sekeramayi. Gay gangster rapper ● The Karanga groups – one led by ailing firebrand Eddison Zvobgo So Obasanjo would be embarrassed to uphold a British and Australian and Air Marshal Josiah Tungamirai and the other, bigger and richer, veto on Mugabe. The combination of Britain’s failed Zimbabwe led by parliamentary Speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa, Zvinavashe policy, Mugabe’s rampant homophobia and recent rumour-mongering and Foreign Minister Stan Mudenge. about the British royal family conjure up a nightmare for Whitehall’s The strongest contenders from each group respectively are diplomats. Sekeramayi and Mnangagwa. Sekeramayi owes his ascendancy to his We hear a compromise was discussed during Obasanjo’s visit to friends and backers, particularly Mujuru, as much as his political Harare on 17 November: either Mugabe turns up late at the skills. Although he’s held the State Security and then the Defence Commonwealth summit in Abuja, avoiding handshakes with Queen portfolios, Sekeramayi has kept a surprising number of friends.
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