The Three Swords STAVANGER – NORWAY

Summer/Autumn 2011

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 1 THE THREE SWORDS STAVANGER – NORWAY

Summer/Autumn – Issue No: 20 The Three Swords Front Cover _ Major General Jean Fred Berger photo by MSgt Herbert Berger, photo collage by Brandon Chhoeun

Back Cover _ JWC’s World News Today (WNT) photo by CONTENTS Inci Kucukaksoy

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 1

Flowers were Norway’s first and immediate 4 response to terror. Flowers in front of the Oslo Cathedral in the aftermath of the Oslo and Utøya Island tragedies.

Photo by CDR (Sg) Helene Langeland, Royal Norwegian Navy, Chief PAO, Joint Warfare Centre.

Unless mentioned otherwise, all photos in this magazine are by JWC Public Affairs Office.

2 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 The Three Swords CONTENTS Summer/Autumn 2011 • Issue No 20 26

5 Commander’s Foreword

6 JWC Change of Command by Inci Kucukaksoy 13 Remarks: Prof. Ole Lislerud PAX - Peace and the Art of War 14 An Interview with Major General Jean Fred Berger

18 Cyberspace: Implications for NATO 40 Operations and the Joint Warfare Centre by Lt Col Todd Waller 26 Hybrid Threat: Countering Hybrid Threat Experiment, May 2011, Talinn, Estonia by Adrian Williamson 34 Observations from OUP by Maj Martijn van der Meijs 40 ISAF TE 11/01 and Interviews By Inci Kucukaksoy 47 Exercise STEADFAST Joist 11 47 By Lt Col Heiko Hermanns 50 Gender Dimension By Lone Kjelgaard 55 Making Your Idea Stick: Uses and Abuses of PowerPoint (Part III) By Paul Sewell 58 Neo-Taliban and Information Environment By Hope Carr 62 New Multimedia Capabilities at JWC By Pete and Laura Loflin DuBois 50 65 Press Desk Within JOC By RRC-FR PAO

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 3 JWC Public Affairs Office PO Box 8080, Eikesetveien 4068 Stavanger, Norway Tel: +(47) 52 87 9130/9131/9132 Internet: www.jwc.nato.int

FROM THE EDITOR Dear Reader, I am honoured and pleased to I choose to think that there are things we can do to protect our be back at the Joint Warfare democracies from acts of terror and I believe that what we are doing Centre. It is a privilege to work here at the Joint Warfare Centre continues to represent a small but with so many dedicated and important contribution towards responding to that challenge. WELCOME highly skilled people to support To our new readers, welcome! NATO forces in their training To our returning readers, welcome back! and preparation for operations. I hope this new issue of The Three Swords, the magazine of the Ten years ago, the United Joint Warfare Centre, will be of interest to all. States was struck by the most CDR (SG) Helene M. W. Langeland gruesome terrorist attack. Like Royal Norwegian Navy most of you, I still remember JWC Chief PAO watching in disbelief live foot- age of the surreal assaults and their devastating results. The first questions that came into my mind were, “How could this happen?” and “Why would anybody want to attack America?” To think that somebody would consider launching an attack on the U.S. mainland was something totally unexpected to me, and probably to most other people as well. What happened served as an effective wakeup call, bringing into focus, among other things, the massive vulnerability of our open, multicultural democratic societies. Overnight average citizens started voicing concern about the safety and security of their society. On 22 July of this year, the unthinkable happened to Norway. All of a sudden, my small, peaceful country was shaken to its roots by a hor- rifying terrorist attack, and my and most other people’s view of Norway as the incarnation of a safe and peaceful corner of the world was shat- tered forever. Again and again, we asked ourselves how this could happen. This time, however, that question quickly turned into: “Is it at all possible to defend our societies against terror? Or is terror the price we One minute’s silence for Norwegian victims at NATO HQ, have to be willing to pay for living in open, multicultural democracies?” 25 July 2011. Photo by NATO.

The Three Swords Magazine

JWC PAO: The Three Swords is the authorized unofficial CDR (SG) Helene Langeland, RNOR N publication produced by the JWC Public Affairs Thanks Lt Col Markus Beck, DEU A Office. It represents a compilation of articles, MSgt Herbert Berger Inci Kucukaksoy, NATO Civilian reports, news and general information related to CPO Wtr Garry A. Braddock Bente Heill Kleven, NATO Civilian JWC personnel and their families. The articles and David Keane opinions expressed in this publication are those Editors: Tudor Jelescu of the authors and do not necessarily represent Inci Kucukaksoy the official policy of NATO. The Editor reserves Bente Heill Kleven the right to edit or shorten submissions. Layout: PUBLISHED THREE TIMES A YEAR Inci Kucukaksoy

4 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 FOREWORD

Major General Jean Fred Berger French Army Commander, Joint Warfare Centre

am honoured and very pleased NATO’s operational headquarters to assume the command of are well trained, highly capable NATO’s Joint Warfare Cen- and ready to successfully execute tre. When I succeeded Lieu- and win our battles as Operation tenant General Wolfgang Korte Unified Protector HQ recently Ion 17 June 2011, I knew that I was demonstrated. taking over an experienced and mo- I would also like to take this op- tivated headquarters which is com- portunity to thank our Host Nation posed of thoroughly professional of Norway for her continuing com- and efficient personnel from the mitment and devotion to NATO. distinguished Nations of our Alli- As a NATO Commander, I am ance. The Joint Warfare Centre has very keen to achieve a more sus- an excellent reputation and being tained dialogue with our local part- part of such an outstanding team ners in Stavanger and maintain this and to be given the opportunity of strategic relationship at a higher leading that team makes me very level. This relationship is a matter of proud. It is a privilege for me to be major importance for me. I would in command of this Centre, espe- like to thank Norway for the kind- cially now that we are on track to ness and hospitality extended to us assume new capabilities to enhance here in Stavanger. and complement our core mission. With this foreword, I would like I know that together we will suc- to express, once again, my deepest cessfully manage the future chal- sympathies to the families, loved lenges we will undoubtedly face and promote transformation ones and colleagues of the victims of the Oslo and Utøya trag- within the NATO Alliance. I am looking forward to working edies. We honour the memory of those who died in the at- with all of you and together we will see our reputation grow. tacks. I know that the people of Norway stand united and will A significant contributor to our future impact is the cur- not let the acts of one individual harm the Nation’s solidarity; rent development of the new “Skolkan” setting for the NATO we stand shoulder to shoulder with them. Response Force (NRF). In autumn 2012, the first NRF ex- We do have an ambitious agenda ahead of us training ercise with this new exercise scenario will be executed. With NATO headquarters and staff and one thing is guaranteed: our new training facility in Jåttå, the Joint Warfare Centre is the last quarter of this year will be the Joint Warfare Centre’s One minute’s silence for Norwegian victims at NATO HQ, well prepared to provide an efficiency enhancement for our busiest ever. However, I am sure the hard work and dedication 25 July 2011. Photo by NATO. training events and exercises. With NATO’s most advanced of our team will surpass our responsibilities and obligations IT platform and state-of-the-art facilities, as well as the adding significant value as we collectively play our parts en- best trainers available in NATO, the Centre is making sure suring the continued success of the Joint Warfare Centre.

NATO Headquarters Brussels (© NATO) and the JWC Training Facility Norway.

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 5 JWC welcomes new Commander The Joint Warfare Centre welcomed French Army Major General Jean Fred Berger as its new Commander and bid a fond farewell to outgoing Commander Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte during a Change of Command ceremony held on Friday 17 June 2011.

COMM F A O N

E D

J N

H C

C Centre Warfare Office, Joint Affairs Public I nci Kucukaksoy, by MSgt Herbet Berger, German Army, Joint Exercise Division, Joint Warfare Centre Division, Joint Warfare Joint Exercise German Army, MSgt Herbet Berger,

rt ic le h otos A P Rooted in military tradition, the Change of Command ceremony is a celebration of continuity of command while commending the outgoing Commander for his professional excellence. (Clockwise from top right): Outgoing Commander Lt Gen Korte, Gen Bieniek and incoming Commander Maj Gen Berger; media interviews; Mrs Régina Berger; Brig Gen and Mrs DePalmer; Maj Gen Berger with Lt Gen Clément-Bollée; State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence Mr Ingebrigtsen and unveiling of JWC’s work of art.

On 17 June, Major General Jean The programme began with a reception “Nothing is as volatile as Fred Berger, French Army, relieved in the New Building’s Dining Facility. success. New challenges Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Ms Bjørg Tysdal Moe, Deputy Mayor German Army, as Commander Joint of Stavanger, welcomed the new Com- keep emerging, asking Warfare Centre ( JWC). The ceremony at mander and fondly thanked Lieutenant for innovative ways Jåttå represented the conclusion of four General Korte for his friendship and to deliver innovative years’ of hard work and achievements for dedicated support. Guests then moved Lieutenant General Korte, who officially on to the Auditorium. The event started solutions.” retired on 31 July after a 42-year military with welcoming remarks by the Master career in the German Army. It warmly of Ceremonies for the Change of Com- for its gracious hospitality. Reflecting welcomed Major General Berger, whose mand, Wing Commander Mark Watson, “on setting conditions for success of the previous assignment was as General Of- Royal Air Force, and then continued JWC’s mission, such as training NATO ficer for International Relationships at with inspiring music, Marsch des Hanno- commanders and their staffs for ISAF the Chief of the Army Staff HQ, Paris. verschen Cambridge Dragoner Regiments, service, as well as ongoing efforts to de- Overall, the ceremony was flawless splendidly performed by the Royal Nor- velop the capabilities and structures of and definitely one to remember, bring- wegian Navy Band. The audience rose the NATO Response Force, the Lieuten- ing together many flag and general offic- as Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte ant General said: ers, high-ranking guests from the local entered. He was greeted by the JWC’s “We have always done our best to community, the Joint Warfare Centre’s Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Steven meet the expectations of our custom- international staff and family members J. DePalmer, U.S. Air Force and then ers and the Training Audiences, which and members of the local media. took his place centre stage. means we had to strike the right balance General Mieczysław Bieniek, Polish In keeping with the spirit of the cer- between our resources and deliverables. Army, Deputy Supreme Allied Com- emony, Brigadier Gunnar E. Gustavsen, But, success is no reason to rest on our mander Transformation based at Nor- Norwegian Army, Special Adviser to laurels. Nothing is as volatile as success. folk, Virginia, USA, presided over the Commander JWC, presented a bouquet New challenges keep emerging, asking JWC’s Change of Command ceremony. of summer flowers to Mrs Rosalia Korte for innovative ways to deliver innovative Mr Roger Ingebrigtsen, State Secretary and Mrs Régine Berger, respectively, who solutions. With new challenges, new tasks of the Ministry of Defence, was the took their seats among the audience. appear and with new tasks, new training guest of honour, representing the Host needs. New challenges and new concepts Nation. such as Comprehensive Approach, Cy- Don’t rest on your laurels ber War, Space Operations and Theatre Rain calls for Plan B. Not to anyone’s In his farewell speech, Lieutenant Gen- Ballistic Missile Defence, already impact surprise, early in the morning, the deci- eral Wolfgang Korte said he was honour training. Our Allies rightfully request sion was made to move the ceremony oured and privileged for the opportunity us to better cover collective defence and indoors due to persistent summer rain. to lead NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre high intensity warfare in our exercises. This was Plan B for the JWC’s Chief of for a term he referred to as “the most ex- “Dear comrades and colleagues, I Site Management, Commander Mark citing and stimulating years” of his mili- know you are aware of these challenges Irwin, Royal Navy, should the outdoor tary career. He expressed his gratitude to and stand ready to master them. And ceremony be rained off. He said: “Sta- NATO’s strategic and operational com- rest assured, as I am, that the Centre will vanger’s weather is notoriously diffi- manders, special friends and partners, continue to uphold its tradition of ex- cult to forecast. If it had been good, we the Joint Warfare Centre’s international cellence with Major General Jean Fred would have had a parade outside. But we staff for their competence and loyalty, Berger. Under his leadership, the Joint are prepared for capricious weather and Host Nation Norway for the warm wel- Warfare Centre will continue to set new the new auditorium is a great setting for come extended to himself and his staff, standards for accomplishment well into an event like this.” and the local community of Stavanger the future.” ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 7 “The JWC’s personnel all have different eniek highlighted the Major General’s tant operation in NATO’s history, or to responsibilities but background, noting with certainty that be set up as deployable headquarters on the Centre will remain in very capable a high-readiness posture in the NATO one common goal: to hands. “This level of experience and per- Response Force framework are very improve NATO’s combat spective will be an invaluable asset and I challenging tasks, which require full and effectiveness.” am confident you will find it very easy to permanent involvement at individual as engage on all issues from day one of your well as collective levels.” work as Commander of the Joint War- The Major General further under- The General’s speech was followed by fare Centre. I look forward to working lined that he was confident about the “an enthusiastic applause and a musical with you, Major General Berger, in this Centre’s ability to master the challenges interlude: Marsch der Finnischen Reiterei. new and exciting professional challenge. that lay ahead. He said: “I look forward The ceremony continued with the ar- And, I assure you that your appetite for to meeting and working with you. Each rival of Major General Jean Fred Berger, challenges and eagerness to succeed will of you is fully aware and conscious of the the incoming Commander, accompa- be well satisfied. Jean Fred, welcome challenges that the Joint Warfare Centre nied by the Presiding Officer, General aboard and congratulations!” the Gen- faces for continued success and in pre- Mieczysław Bieniek. The audience stood eral said. paring NATO’s future for years to come up as the Generals walked into the Au- Thanking the Joint Warfare Cen- on behalf of the Supreme Allied Com- ditorium and up to the stage, where they tre for continually meeting the mission, mander Transformation.” were welcomed by Lieutenant General General Bieniek also pointed out that The General went on to say: “It is Wolfgang Korte. All three exchanged sa- under Major General Berger’s lead, the called ‘train as you fight’... preparing lutes before Major General Berger took Centre’s mission will continue to expand realistic exercises, conducting challeng- a seat while General Bieniek walked and build new areas of expertise, in ad- ing scenarios, controlling, analysing, over to the speaker’s stand to deliver his dition to its core mission. He identified and mentoring objectively the Training keynote speech. those specialty areas as Space and Cyber Audiences from soldiers to high-rank- Defence, Knowledge Development and ing officers. In my mind, and history has Comprehensive Approach. The captivat- proven, it is the best way, maybe the only Past achievements and ing tunes of Der Große Kurfürst provided way, to enable individuals, troops and future ambitions a seamless transition between General headquarters to complete their Com- In his speech, General Bieniek thanked Bieniek’s keynote speech and the Change prehensive Approach-based missions Lieutenant General Korte for his out- of Command. Wing Commander Mark and finally to save the lives of soldiers standing service to Allied Command Watson requested all to rise and then and civilians alike.” Transformation and support to Allied pronounced the ceremonial phrase: “Ef- At the end of his speech, Major Command Operations. He praised the fective Friday 17 June 2011 Lieutenant General Berger praised Norway’s ex- Lieutenant General’s forward-look- General Korte relinquishes command ceptional support to the Joint Warfare ing leadership, spearheading the JWC of the Joint Warfare Centre and Major Centre, recognizing the special bond as an essential force for transformation General Berger assumes command of that exists between the military, their throughout NATO. This was demon- the Joint Warfare Centre.” The audience families and the community of Sta- strated, the General said, by the JWC’s continued to stand respectfully as the Na- vanger. He said: “Thanks to Norway for incredible effort and contributions in tional Anthems of Norway, Germany and providing support to the Joint Warfare terms of meeting the operational re- France were performed by the band, end- Centre by way of outstanding facilities quirements of the combatant commanding one chapter and starting another in here at Jåttå, Ulsnes or Madla, as well as ers and their staffs by training them to the history of the Joint Warfare Centre. personnel. Thanks for the hospitality ex- operate in expeditionary environments tended to us, not only here in this work- now and in the future. ing area, but also in our daily lives, and to “The Joint Warfare Centre’s person- In his first address as Com- our families. We already share more than nel all have different responsibilities, but mander of the Joint Warfare Centre, the ‘three swords’ and I intend to further one common goal – to improve NATO’s Major General Berger thanked Lieuten- strengthen our friendship. This is such a combat effectiveness. You have a crucial ant General Korte for his leadership and fascinating place to work.” role with the ISAF mission as well as the the staff for their dedication, adding that Major General Jean Fred Berger’s NATO Response Force.” it is an honour for him to be in charge speech received an enthusiastic round of General Bieniek then praised Lieu- of the Centre, which is recognized for applause, which concluded the Change tenant General Korte’s commitment to its professionalism, efficiency and adapt- of Command ceremony. The Norwe- establish good relations with Norway. ability. The Major General said: “I know gian Navy band performed the French Welcoming Major General Jean that training and preparing headquar- military march La Consulaire Part I as Fred Berger to take over the helm of ters, teams and individuals for the ISAF guests and participants departed the Au- the Joint Warfare Centre, General Bi- mission in Afghanistan, the most impor- ditorium, heading off to another special ►►►

8 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 OMM C A F N The event set the scene to reflect upon and take pride in the JWC’s O

past achievements and future orientation. (Clockwise from top D

G right): Lt Gen Korte greeted by Brig Gen DePalmer; Mr Ingebrigtsen J

presenting a plaque to Maj Gen Berger; Ms Bjørg Tysdal Moe N

A C

H thanking Lt Gen Korte for his friendship and services; Lt Gen Korte, C who served as the Centre’s Commander for four years from 13 July 2007, speaking at the ceremony; media interviews; media spot with Maj Gen Berger, the new Commander JWC.

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 9 Major General Berger, Commander JWC mander of the Joint Warfare Centre, the State Secretary in his speech pointed out the need for more proactivity in responding to unique 21st century threats as well as the urgent need to invest in cyber security, citing the most dangerous weapon as “cyber”. He saw NATO as a key international security actor, adding that, faced with new threats NATO’s ability to reinvent itself makes the Al- liance more relevant than 50 years ago. “An attack on Norway will not be by hard power, rather, it will be by cyber,” Mr Ingebrigtsen said, adding: “The number one way to stop our enemies is to handle cyber defence, and I am very glad that you are eager to put cyber defence into practice here, as I think it will be a very important part of Joint War- fare Centre’s role.” Mr Ingebrigtsen on behalf of the Norwegian Prime Minister presented a plaque to the Norwegian Defence Es- tate Agency’s Senior Advisor Mr Reidal Bringedal for his superior performance in handling the building project. He also presented a plaque to Major General Berger before the official handover. The handover ceremony culminated with the unveiling of a 3.5 x 11 metres work of art named “PAX – Peace and the Art of War” by the Norwegian ce- ramicist Ole Lislerud, given to the Joint Warfare Centre as a token of congratu- lation by the Norwegian Government. Major General Jean Fred Berger thanked the State Secretary, confirming that the state-of-the-art facility will give the JWC an opportunity to expand its crucial mission and offerings by “providing a training environment with superior information technology suitable for the wars of the present, which deeply depend on information management ceremony: the handover of the Centre’s tion between NATO and Norway, and and information sharing.” new training facility from the Norwegian pointing to the continued relevance of The General noted with apprecia- Government to NATO and unveiling a NATO’s ongoing training efforts, in tion that Ole Lislerud’s piece of art was work of art devoted to peace. which the Joint Warfare Centre is a ma- unique. He said: “I see in this work of jor player. The building, expanding on an art a reference to peace as well as a trib- Looking ahead area of 13,390 square metres with five ute to military thoughts. I invite each of Following the Change of Command storeys, is a NATO-funded infrastruc- you to read the quotations written here, ceremony, Mr Roger Ingebrigtsen, State ture project, approved in 2004. “Need- from Sun Tzu to General McArthur, Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, less to say, perhaps, there is nothing like Caesar, Napoleon Bonaparte, Clause- handed over the new training facility this building in all of Norway,” the State witz and Mao Tse-tung… It reminds us to the Joint Warfare Centre, calling the Secretary noted. After welcoming Major that war is directed by principles rooted handover a crucial step in the coopera- General Jean Fred Berger as new Com- in history, even though the best plan ►►►

10 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 “The number one way to strengthen our cultural and community The guests stop our enemies is to partnerships so that each and every one The impressive assembly of dignitaries of us can help building the international gathered to observe the transfer of au- handle cyber defence and City of Stavanger. You have played a ma- thority from NATO included Lieuten- I am very glad that you jor role in doing just that and I am sure ant General Karlheinz Viereck, HQ are eager to put cyber that, as an Ambassador of Stavanger, you SACT Deputy Chief of Staff Joint will promote Stavanger in the future and Force Training; Lieutenant General defence into practice at help spread the word about this magnifi- Manuel Mestre Barea, Deputy Com- the Joint Warfare Centre.” cent city and its neighbourhoods. Thank mander Joint Command Lisbon; Ma- you,” she said, and presented Lieutenant jor General Pavel Macko, Commander “ General Wolfgang Korte with a special Joint Force Training Centre, Bydgoszcz; never survives the first gunshot. And, gift of Norwegian wooden houses as a Major General Werner Kullack, Deputy this is our mission: to train commanders token of her appreciation. Commander 1 (German/Netherlands) and headquarters, to collect and review lessons learned and, most importantly, not to fight the last battle, but the next one. The graffiti feeling of the piece reminds me of those written down on the trenches by the servicemen of the First World War, who were fighting and too often dying in the midst of mud and blood. We shall never forget that preparing their commanders is serving the soldiers, sailors and airmen. This piece of art conveys what NATO is established for: to prevent wars, or to win them de- cisively, for the purpose of peace. This is NATO’s future and what could sum up the Joint Warfare Centre’s mission better than that.” International Stavanger The Change of Command ceremony was preceded by a reception where Ms Bjørg Tysdal Moe, Deputy Mayor of Stavanger, offered the Mayor’s greetings to the new Commander and warmly thanked Lieutenant General Korte for his friendship and commitment to the community, reminding the audience of the constructive role he played, both in work and in deed. The Deputy Mayor made special mention of the General’s active support when Stavanger was chosen as a Euro- pean Capital of Culture in 2008, hosting the biggest arts and culture event in Norway. She then talked about the vibrant, international identity of the City, home to many international entities, including the Joint Warfare Centre. She said many of those currently living in Stavanger are born outside of Norway Clockwise from top right: Gen Bieniek; Lt Gen Karlheinz Viereck; Maj and that this international community is Gen Kullack with Maj Gen Berger; Rear Admiral Bruun-Hansen greeted mainly made up of international busi- by Brig Gen DePalmer; Mr Hans Vik and Mr Harald Thune; Brig Gen Roy nesses and their employees. “We want to Hunstok and Brig Gen DePalmer. ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 11 Corps, Münster, and Brigadier General Royal Norwegian Navy Band Roy Hunstok, HQ SACT. Representing Norway, the honoured guests included Mr Roger Ingebrigtsen, State Secretary, Ministry of Defence; Mr Harald Thune, Acting County Governor of Rogaland; Mrs Bjørg Tysdal Moe, Deputy Mayor of Stavanger; Mr Hans Vik, Chief of Police of Rogaland; Ms Brigitte Aug- estad, representing the French Honor- ary Consul of Stavanger and Mr Jacky Morelet, representing Lycée Français de Stavanger. Among other honoured guests were Rear Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hansen, Commander Norwe- pability development, in order to maxi- the Office for General Studies, Plans gian National Joint Headquarters; Rear mize transformational efforts to improve and Policies at the Army HQ in Paris, Admiral Bernt Grimstvedt, Chief of NATO’s interopebility, capability and France; Chief Engineer at HQ EURO- the Naval Staff; Lieutenant General operational effectiveness. CORPS, Strasbourg, France; J2/Chief Bertrand Clément-Bollée, the Chief of The Centre provides the best train- Assessment at HQ SFOR, Sarajevo, Staff of the French Army; Major Gen- ing support possible for the collective Bosnia and Herzegovina; Deputy Chief eral Jean-Jacques Bart, representing the training and certification of NATO’s Engineer at HQ KFOR, Pristina, Ko- French Chief of Defence; Navy Cap- joint operational and component level sovo; Commanding Officer of the 17 tain Yves Cuny and Lt Col Rolf Becker, Headquarters. In doing so, the Joint (FRA) Airborne Engineer Regiment; French and German Defence Attachés Warfare Centre’s priority is to support Military Assistant to the Chief of the in Oslo, respectively.  current operations. Army Staff. In an earlier assignment, he was in Saudi Arabia, participating in Joint Warfare Centre Major General Jean Fred Berger’s “Opération Daguet” (1990-1991), also The Joint Warfare Centre, as directed former assignments include Chief CJ5 known as the Gulf War or “Operation by Supreme Allied Commander Trans- at HQ ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan (April Desert Storm”. formation (SACT), and through the di- 2009-February 2010); Deputy Chief of The General’s military awards and rection and guidance of the Joint Force Support at 1 (German/Netherlands) decorations include the title of Officer Trainer ( JFT), plans, conducts and exe- Corps, Münster, Germany; Auditor of the Legion of Honour (1998); Kuwait cutes operational training in accordance at the Centre for Advanced Military Defence Medal (1991); Saudi Defence with SACEUR’s requirements, supports Studies (CHEM) and the Institute Medal (1991); SFOR Medal (1998); doctrine development and coordinates for Advanced Studies in National De- KFOR Medal (2000); National Defence integration of experimentation and ca- fence (IHEDN), Paris, France; Head of Medal (1984); and ISAF medal (2010).

Brigadier Gustavsen presenting a bouquet to Mrs Régina Berger

JWC staff at the reception

12 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Ole Lislerud PAX - Peace and the Art of War

Silkscreen and calligraphy on porcelain slabs, 3.5 x 11 m, site specific art project NATO, Joint Warfare Centre, Stavanger, Norway

The basic concept of the JWC art thor of The Art of War as well as Ma- our effort to replace one with the other.” project was to create a visual in- hatma Gandhi and a number of other My JWC mural Pax – Peace and Art terpretation of the dilemma and influential personalities crusading for of War confronts this fundamental contradiction of war and peace. peace. Sun Tzu claimed that “All warfare question of whether it is necessary to War in one form or the other appeared is based on deception” or, alternatively, wage war in order to create peace. What with the first man, and its morality was “Never will those who wage war tire of is the justification of war? never questioned. It was simply a fact, deception.” The mural is a site-specific piece. It the manner in which civilizations sought A famous citation of Mahatma Gan- relates to NATO staff working in the power and settled their differences. dhi reads: “An eye for an eye only ends up facility and is directly linked to their Peace represents the basic dream of making the whole world blind.” Quotes mission in Afghanistan. The scale of the life where freedom, stability and a home such as “Occasionally principles are more piece places the immediate emphasis on are the cornerstones of existence. Through valuable than people” or “The best form peace, but as one steps closer and details the depiction of the Latin word PAX as of defence is to attack” are from Karl emerge, one discovers the complexity, a mirror image, XAP, the word becomes von Clausewitz. Other people quoted including different layers of perception a metaphor for the contradiction of using on the war/peace dilemma are Otto von and understanding. PAX is painted in a war to achieve peace. In between the three Bismarck, Adolf Hitler, Mao Tse-tung, dark red representing bloodshed and loss large characters, which are 3.5 metres George S. Patton, Napoleon Bonaparte, of life. Simultaneously, however, the red high and 11 metres long, the composition Winston Churchill, Bob Dylan, John characters also denote peace. In some consists of layers of texts and quotes from Lennon and Nelson Mandela. cultures red is a sign of good fortune texts bearing on philosophy, war strategy In his address at the 2009 Nobel and prosperity. Understood from this and peace. The main idea, however, is to Peace Prize Award Ceremony, Presi- perspective, the piece holds a further set emphasize peace, which is the very basis dent Barack Obama made the following of contradictions and double meanings, of man’s moral objectives. statement: “And so I come here with an as life itself. The polarization between those as- acute sense of the cost of armed conflict pects is based mainly on the quotes of filled with difficult questions about the By Professor Ole Lislerud Oslo National Academy of the Arts the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu, au- relationship between war and peace, and

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 13 An Interview With Major General Jean Fred Berger Commander JWC

By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

Sir, first we would like to thank you for area of importance within NATO. The for modern warfare, especially non-tradi- giving us this interview today and the JWC plays a key role in this effort. tional challenges to security. time you spend to answer our questions. Can we start out by having you Which career experiences do you be- What does NATO’s transformation tell us how you felt when you learnt that lieve will be most beneficial to you in mean to you? you were designated as the new Com- your new assignment? I think that NATO’s military transfor- mander of the JWC? What comes to mind is the hardships of mation is always about modernizing I felt blessed, very privileged, and at the war and the sacrifices made in the name NATO’s capabilities. It is about seek- same time quite confident, because I was of peace, freedom and democracy. The ing innovative solutions to existing and familiar with Stavanger and the Joint JWC carries in its name the word ‘war’ emerging challenges and modernizing Warfare Centre. I came to Stavanger for because it is committed to training NA- the forces so that they are more flexible, the first time in 2009 to receive training TO’s operational level headquarters for technologically advanced and networked, prior to my deployment to Afghanistan. the planning and execution of modern more rapidly deployable and sustainable. Over the past three years, I have been in military operations. I believe that we are It is also about the development of trans- Stavanger three times, once as a Senior at the centre of NATO’s transformational formational capabilities and doctrine, Mentor. On each occasion, I was very efforts to become more effective and ef- training and education programmes. impressed by the mission-focused, highly ficient and counter the ever-changing These are all interconnected. The world realistic training environment provided 21st century threats. As we are dealing is changing minute by minute and so is by the JWC and the total professional- with NATO’s current operations, we are NATO. We are now 28 member Nations ism of its staff. However, I never imag- expected to provide ‘training as we fight’, and things are all so very different from ined that I one day would be designated and to do just that, we need to under- when we were 16 Nations some years to become its Commander. Due to the stand what ‘war’ means for our soldiers, ago. We need to be in line with what is French reintegration into NATO’s mili- units and staffs. I have had the chance to going on. Transformation, therefore, is a tary structure in 2009, France has become participate at various levels in a variety of manifestation of NATO’s relevance. The more involved in ‘Flags to Posts’ and, as a peacekeeping/coalition operations in the transatlantic Alliance is a key element result, I received this assignment. It is an Balkans, in the Middle East and in Af- to stability and peace in the world. The honour to command the JWC, and the ghanistan, where I met not only French, Afghan experience has shown us the im- level of trust and responsibility placed in but also foreign contingents. A key ben- portance of an equitable ‘burden sharing’ you is tremendous: NATO counts on you efit of those experiences was the chance mechanism. Right now, we are witnessing to successfully deliver its much required to learn and understand different military the outcomes of the military campaign in operational level training and help in- cultures and the interpersonal skills that Libya, which aims to protect civilians and crease the capability of the war fighter come with them, all of them working to- establish a peaceful transition to democ- to accomplish mission tasks. It is safe to wards the same goal of mission success. racy in Libya. At the November 2010 say that our mission to increase the effec- For me, in particular, the multinational NATO Summit in Lisbon, Allies agreed tiveness of NATO’s operational forces in aspect of the peacekeeping/coalition op- to develop a more streamlined command coalition and joint environments is quite erations has been very important. Since structure, increase cyber security and de- demanding. Training is the most vital then, we have also seen the need to train velop its missile defence cooperation with ►►►

14 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Russia. The acquisition of world operations. My second cyber defence assets is im- priority is the level of ambi- portant in order to defend tion and realism. We have to our populations and sys- help our Training Audiences tems against cyber threats. understand the complexity of This is very new and was the modern operational en- not taken into account a vironment. Our ability to de- few years ago. So, transfor- liver the best training possi- mation is a process, a way ble for our operational forces of striving continuously to is of vital importance because always become more effi- then they will feel confident cient and effective and do- and be successful in their ing our utmost to integrate first mission, winning their all Member and Partner battles. To give you an ex- Nations and help them to ample, NATO is currently bring out their best quali- carrying out Operation ties so that together we can Unified Protector and learn and broaden our focus His Majesty King Harald V implementing all the mili- together. As part of this, in Photo by Solve Sundsbo tary aspects of UN Security our training events, we will Council Resolution 1973 to continue to implement any help establish freedom and lessons learned and challenges identified James Short (OBE), Air Marshal (Ret.) peace in Libya. The Commander of this with regards to the ongoing operations, Peter Walker (CB CBE FRaS) and Lieu- extremely important operation, Canada’s whether in Afghanistan or Libya. tenant General Wolfgang Korte, who all Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard did an enormous job to cement the repu- and his staff came to Stavanger in 2010 to What are your priorities for the coming tation of the JWC within NATO. My first receive JWC training only a few months months? priority will be to ensure the continuity of prior to deployment. The General has My first priority will be continuity. I have actions and provide further advancement commented on how JWC training has the great chance and honour to be the by helping build on the achievements re- helped him through this vital real-world successor of Lieutenant General (Ret.) alized so far in terms of training NATO operation. This shows our relevance and Thorstein Skiaker, Major General (Ret.) HQs and individuals for exercises or real- unparalleled importance when it comes to preparing for current operations. We need to be prepared for the 21st century’s challenges by maximizing our capabilities Below: Identifying possible to face changing conflicts and be more areas for improved coopera- relevant in our handling of emerging tion between the JWC and threats. There is a clear awareness of that the Rogaland Police District fact in NATO. We need to take into ac- was the key topic for discussion during Major General count a number of new unforeseen even- Berger’s first official meeting tualities too, such as cyber security. My with Hans Vik, Rogaland’s third priority is further developing our Chief of Police, on 20 Sep- relationship with Norway. There is a new tember 2011. NATO base concept, which aims to ensure the best possible relations with host nations. Norway is a great nation, a great NATO member. I have just been north to Bodø, where we conducted our Bat- tlefield Study. I want to emphasize that the JWC and Norway have very close ties and that this frank and loyal relationship Above: Major General Berger paid a cour- brings benefits to both. I was received in tesy visit to the former Mayor of Stavanger, audience by His Majesty King Harald V Mr Leif Johan Sevland, on 21 June 2011 where he paid tribute to the importance of on 5 September 2011, and it was a great the distinctive partnership between NATO honour to meet the King. As a NATO and Norway. (Read the full articles on our commander, I have expressed my grati- website at www.jwc.nato.int) tude for the generous support provided ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 15 Staff talks between the JWC and Norwegian National Joint Headquarters to further develop mutual support and awareness of cooperation (from left) Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Petit, Lieutenant Colonel Valerie Bertha, Colonel Timothy Bishop, Colonel Jeffrey Devore, Colonel Trond Hellebust, Brigadier General Steven DePalmer, Major General Morten Haga Lunde, Major General Jean Fred Berger, Major General Rune Jakobsen, Brigadier Gunnar Gustavsen. Photo by Captain Edouard de Catalogne. by Norway to the JWC and also men- levels of the organization to help make and has played a vital and influential tioned how I wanted to intensify rela- soldiers strong and confident, while at role globally. So, since the announce- tions with the City of Stavanger, as well the same time strengthening NATO’s ment that France was to rejoin NATO’s as the Norwegian forces and society. preparedness for future operations. I have integrated military command, French the strong conviction that training pro- Generals have been placed in various Do we have an impact in theatre? vided by the JWC has a major impact in positions in NATO structures. We are Yes, absolutely. The JWC’s Training Au- theatre and ultimately helps to save lives just doing our job as best as we can, diences are NATO’s operational and and costs and also helps forces optimize demonstrating great loyalty to NATO highest tactical level headquarters. It is their efficiency. and the Nations that have been with a fact that failure to provide adequate us, in this Alliance, for more than 60 military training for ongoing operations How did you feel about France’s return years now, to ensure peace and stability as well as the NRF can be costly, and our back to NATO’s integrated military in the world. As a French General, it is soldiers will pay the price when deployed command in 2009? an honour to serve my country within in harm’s way. It is absolutely vital that The French reintegration came as a NATO, and I am also very happy, both the professional and highly realistic train- result of a decision taken by the Prési- as a citizen and officer, to work with ing of NATO’s operational forces during dent de la République, Nicolas Sarkozy. a large number of counterparts of all the NRF exercises and ISAF mission Even though General de Gaulle, back NATO Nations. We develop a wealth rehearsals, with a clear vision of how the in 1966, pulled France out of NATO’s of experience and personal relationships commander intends to accomplish his military structures, France continued and gain a lot of confidence and know- mission, brings confidence, thus paving to participate fully in the Alliance’s po- ledge also on how to do our job today the way for mission success. I think that litical bodies and has worked actively to and tomorrow. no operation can be successful without a transform NATO in the post Cold-War well-trained staff and that is exactly what environment. France is the oldest ally of Do you have people that you look for we aim for here at the JWC: thoroughly the United States and one of NATO’s guidance and inspiration? trained staffs in all aspects of modern op- largest Troop Contributing Nations. I very much admire General Charles erational art and tactics. This team spirit We share common values and views on de Gaulle. I named my son after him. I is vital for the high quality training we most political, economic and security am certainly very inspired by his refusal shall have to deliver in the years to come. issues. France has always been closely to accept defeat during World War II; The teamwork spirit must transcend all integrated into all NATO operations his determination to ensure a signifi- ►►►

16 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 cant French presence at all stages of the Second World War and his vision of a greater role for France in world affairs. He was also a great speaker whose statements were much celebrated. I admire many authors, too, particularly German ones, and I would say that all those en- deavours that finally led to the German unification, as well as what has happened since then, have shown me once again how important it is to be able to understand what is going on in the world, stay informed, and get into the right position to respond and act. And, this is exactly what inspires me: the sense of purpose and effectiveness in resolving the tough- est and most relevant issues facing us right now and in the future. This is piv- otal to our political understanding, and there is a pressing need to develop such Major General Jean Fred Berger qualities in order to make a massive con- French Army tribution to global peace. Commander Joint Warfare Centre What can you tell us about your family? My wife Régina is of Corsican origin. She really likes Norway, especially the ajor General Jean during his deployment to KFOR landscape, but kind of fears dark win- Fred Berger was Novo Selo, Kosovo, in 2002. His ters. My eldest daughter, Mathilde, is born on 25 Decem- next appointment was Military As- 25 and she studies hotel management in ber 1957. His military sistant to the Inspector of the Army London. My son, Charles, is 21, and he careerM started at the Saint Cyr Co- (2002-2004). is studying social and political science in etquidan Military Academy in 1978. Provence. He is particularly interested Auditor at the French Centre for Ad- in Norwegian culture and its Viking Two years later, he was commis- vanced Military Studies (CHEM) heritage, as well as the landscape and sioned into the Engineer Branch and and the Institute for Advanced Stud- modernity of life. My youngest daugh- fulfilled command and staff appoint- ies in National Defence (IHEDN), ter, Floriane, is 18 and she will graduate ments in the Engineer Branch and the Paris, (2004-2005), he subsequently from high school in Paris this year. She Army Staff until 1990. He was sta- became Head of the Office for Gen- will be very happy to visit us regularly. tioned in Saudi Arabia 1990-1991 as eral Studies, Plans and Policies, at part of Operation DAGUET and sub- the Army HQ in Paris (2005-2008). What hobbies do you have? sequently attended the General Staff I enjoy sports such as horse riding, run- Officers Course at the German Com- In August 2008, the General was ning and hiking, but I also appreciate mand and Staff College in Hamburg posted to 1 (German/Netherlands) having the latitude to read broadly in a (1993-1995) and the French War Corps as Deputy Chief of Staff Sup- number of subject areas, history for in- College in Paris (1995-1996). port. In this position, he completed a stance. My favorite period is the 16th cen- tour of duty as Chief CJ5 to HQ ISAF tury France, as well as World Wars I and He was assigned to HQ EURO- (April 2009-February 2010) and was II. I have the intention to write a book CORPS as Chief Engineer (1996- then assigned as General Officer for on history in the future, the reason being 2000), deploying to Bosnia and International Relationships at the that there is some interesting history on Herzegovina as J2/Chief Assessment Army Staff HQ in Paris. He was pro- my family that I would like to shed light at HQ SFOR in Sarajevo (1998) and moted to the rank of Major General on in a book on the French resistance. I to Kosovo as Deputy Chief Engineer on 1 June 2011. am very interested in history, as well as at HQ KFOR in Pristina (2000). social issues, art and theology. Major General Jean Fred Berger be- In 2000, he became Commanding came Commander of the Joint War- Officer of the 17 Airborne Engineer fare Centre on 17 June 2011. He is Regiment; an appointment he held married and has three children.

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 17 Cyberspace Implications for NATO Operations and the Joint Warfare Centre

By Lt Col H. Todd Waller, US Air Force, Space and Cyber SME Joint Training Division Joint Warfare Centre

“Connectivity – the he Dilemma: Times are changing — and fast. In 1979, I visited the Space and very thing that gives Rocket Center in Huntsville, Alabama the Internet its power and wondered in amazement at a very captivating exhibit. Two futuristic look- to create is also its ing phone booths were located on opposite ends of an exhibit hall. I picked up power to disrupt, the phone and said hello to a person on the other end. What was so remarkable even destroy.” about the conversation that followed ►►► 18 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 T yesterday who lives half way around the into one of those computers can deliver world!” Indeed, the speed of technologi- a program specifically designed to take cal reinvention in our time is less incre- control and give potentially disruptive, mental and more exponential, making even disastrous commands that override leaps over the ancient technology of just a system’s safety limits. 10 years ago. Given the scope of the threat, it’s no One of the most significant ena- surprise leaders all over the world are Cyberspace blers of this technology reinvention is waking up to the reality of modern so- the Internet. Originally crafted to fa- ciety’s dependence and consequent vul- cilitate communication between mili- nerability in cyberspace. In particular, the tary research centres, the Internet was NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh not created with the intent to provide Rasmussen, put NATO on an aggressive global connectivity in military, civil, and path to revise its cyber defence policy private domains.(1) Accordingly, security in June 2011 after identifying cyber as was probably not a primary concern in a key element in NATO’s new Strategic the original internet design because Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit there was no need to police govern- in November 2010. Recognizing cyber ment researchers. Researchers alone, attacks as an emerging threat to national however, did not fully exploit their new and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security creation’s capabilities. That task was best and stability, NATO’s push to prepare performed by competitors operating in for such attacks has energized many a free market. Apple™ is an ideal exam- organizations. In particular, the Joint ple of such competitive excellence and Warfare Centre ( JWC) is leaning for- creativity, regularly realizing its genius ward to meet the challenges created in to create innovative products for which cyberspace. I will discuss these efforts in consumers happily part with their hard- a moment, but first let’s take some time earned means to possess. In this vein, to understand the hype about cyber. the Internet has enabled many laudable successes: creation of a whole new genre of services and products; increased efficiency of information and industrial The perfect weapon processes; and acceleration of world glo- Imagine for a moment what the ideal balization. It also spawned and is con- weapon system might look like. If you’re stantly nurturing to greater maturity a an aviation enthusiast, you might suggest very dangerous vulnerability — connec- a stealthy B-2 bomber with its ability to tivity. That’s right; connectivity. The very invisibly ingress enemy territory and put thing that gives the Internet its power to destructive firepower on a very precise create is also its power to disrupt, even location. If you love the sea, perhaps destroy. an aircraft carrier or a nuclear-armed Interestingly enough, the Internet submarine comes to mind. How about is not the only means of connectivity in a teenage hacker? It’s hard to imagine a the cyber world and while highly wired teenager competing with such advanced, societies have the most obvious vulner- not to mention expensive technology, abilities, they are not the only ones at especially when you think about how risk. Even closed-networks (those not much it costs to hire one to cut the grass. connected to the Internet) can be infil- But not so fast… let’s examine some of is that we could see each other on two trated using social engineering — the the characteristics of the cyber weapon, simple black and white monitors in real art of tricking humans to unknowingly and as we do so, think about what char- time. I was amazed and could not im- compromise their system. For example, acteristics make the perfect weapon. agine something so advanced ever exist- Supervisory Control and Data Acqui- ing outside of a museum. I must admit, sition (SCADA) are simple systems Scalable: On one end of the cyber I feel a bit silly retelling the story. From comprised of computers and controllers weapons scale in terms of purely vis- today’s perspective, it’s so ordinary! So used to run the infrastructure (such as ible effects, you can steal informa- common, in fact, that we have added a water and energy) in both the most and tion and no one will ever know. On verb to our lexicon to express the vir- least developed countries of the world. the other end of the spectrum, you tually free service, “I skyped my friend A USB device (thumb drive) plugged can cause the “most monumental ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 19 scientists at the facility did not ini- tially recognize the problem because Stuxnet caused the system to report that everything was operating normally even though it was not. Stux- net targeted a very specific software control system used in Iran’s nuclear facility and used a number of holes in the Windows™ operating system to gain access. These holes, also known as zero-day exploits, allow someone to break into the “brain” of a computer network and take control.(3) The good news is once the holes are discovered, software patches can be issued to fix them. The bad news, by then the damage may already be done. Although Stuxnet was discovered on many control systems worldwide, it did not activate until it reached its Out of this world: Effective cyber attacks could totally consume and redefine a NATO military intended destination. The very precise operation. Cyber weaponry are scalable, controllable, precise, inexpensive and invisible. It is re- nature of the physical damage caused ported that over a five-year period 72 organizations, including the United Nations, were attacked. by Stuxnet gained worldwide atten- Cyber security today is viewed as a top priority by governments and corporations. tion and raised the profile of cyber attacks to a new level. Its success will undoubtedly inspire similar attacks in non-nuclear explosion and fire vis- grid; a transportation or a banking the future. ible from space.”(2) How you ask? By system; and by doing so create a mul- introducing malware into the control titude of diverse and simultaneous Inexpensive: Modern weapon system for the Trans-Siberian gas effects. For example, terrorists could systems take years of development pipeline. This reportedly occurred in carry out kinetic attacks (perhaps a and immense resources to create, but the 80’s when the former USSR was suicide bombing) then attack com- cyber weapons can be built inexpen- conducting technology espionage munications infrastructure to thwart sively by comparison. For example, against a Canadian company. Aware emergency responders’ ability to re- the zero-day exploits used by Stuxnet of this, Canada and the U.S. conspired act. Similarly, cyber attacks can be might cost as much as $100,000 on to introduce errors in the stolen soft- used as a force multiplier to contrib- the black market; that is nothing com- ware which operated normally at first, ute to mission success. During the pared to the reported $45B pricetag but then dramatically increased pump raid against the Pakistani residence of the B-2 precision strike bomber. speeds to over-pressure the system of Osama bin Laden, local residents (4, 5) While cyber and kinetic weapons and cause an enormous explosion. (2) reported electricity and telecommu- offer considerably different options to nication service outages. The inter- decision makers for achieving politi- Controllable: At the height of the national media speculated that the cal objectives, the advantages of a cy- Cold War, nuclear missiles were a cyber domain may have been used to ber weapon are less political risk and formidable part of nuclear deterrence, disrupt these services in support of less cost. Stuxnet’s precision reduced but once launched they could not be the operation. Just think, if it’s con- collateral damage to a level that even recalled. This undoubtedly weighed nected to a computer or the Internet, the highly sophisticated B-2 bomber heavily on the minds of decision- it’s a potential target. The possibilities would find impossible to match. makers. Unlike nuclear missiles, the are limitless and growing by the day. effects of some cyber weapons, e.g. Inconspicuously Developed: botnets, can be controlled. They can Precise: In 2010, a malware pro- When a state decides to build a new simply be turned on and off at the gram called Stuxnet altered the rotat- military capability requiring signifi- discretion of the cyber operator. ing speeds of centrifuges at Iran’s Na- cant industrial capacity (like an aircraft tanz nuclear enrichment facility. As a carrier) it is impossible to keep secret. Wide Array of Targets: Cyber result, the centrifuges and the nuclear Even commercial satellites can detect warriors can attack military com- material they contained were report- something like that. Cyber weapons, mand and control systems or a power edly destroyed. Amazingly enough, on the other hand, can be developed ►►►

20 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Cyber Security

undetected from anywhere; an Inter- technology and Internet dependent free- inherent in cyberspace can be a player. net café or from a home office. Any- market economies whose critical infra- Individuals can also play in cyber, where you can take a laptop is a place structures are operated commercially. and some may do so unintentionally. from which you can establish your very For example, 85% of America’s critical Empowered by information technology, own cyber weapons production facili- infrastructure (which includes services even single individuals can do signifi- ty. Deploying your weapon is as easy as like power, transportation, banking, and cant damage. Consider the disgruntled connecting to the Internet or prepar- medicine) operates commercially. Australian software programmer, Vitek ing a scheme to get your payload to its Regarding state actors and the emer- Boden, who in 2004 used a cyber attack intended destination, perhaps via USB gence of Stuxnet, many concluded the to cause the release of 264,000 gallons of device and social engineering. United States and Israel were responsi- raw sewage into local waterways because ble for Stuxnet, based on the level of so- he did not get the city government job Freedom of Resources and phistication and the motive for slowing he wanted.(6) It doesn’t take millions of Movement: While the production Iran’s nuclear ambitions(3). But the fact dollars to create a cyber emergency, only of nuclear weapons requires sophisti- remains, there is no conclusive evidence. an inquisitive mind and a computer con- cated technology, rare elements, and Unlike a missile, which comes with a re- nected to the Internet. lots of cash, cyber weapons only return address, you cannot know for sure It is also important to realize that de- quire the intellect and expertise of a from where a cyber attack originates. termining a motive for cyber attack can few hackers; a commodity that is in The 2007 attacks on Estonia were traced be complex, and the most obvious mo- ample supply now and for the foresee- back to 178 countries, and although tive may not always point to the guilty able future. As well, there is no reason Russia was the prime suspect, there was party. National interests, ideology, greed, to risk life and limb on the battlefield insufficient evidence to prove culpability. or prestige can inspire sophisticated and when you can push a button to ex- And even if the attacks could be proven not-so-sophisticated cyber incidents. ecute a cyber attack from anywhere to have originated in Russia, it becomes Deterring so many different actors with there is network connectivity. very difficult to declare the state respon- so many possible motives and so many sible when the state can pass the blame targets available is daunting. Cyber de- Non-Attributable: How much is to its patriotic, but private citizens. This terrence will undoubtedly become one a weapon worth that allows you to be non-attribution environment makes it of the most challenging issues to face invisible? Imagine having the ability to easier for state actors to leverage their future world leaders. Creating an effec- drastically reduce the technical superi- cyber collateral without being caught. tive deterrence strategy will be extremely ority of your opponent on the battle- And since location is irrelevant, states difficult if not impossible. field. Imagine also being able to attack with an interest in a particular conflict your opponent’s banking systems and may use cyber to create a desired out- financial superiority. No need to worry come without being visibly involved. about getting caught. If you’ve been Unlike the Cold War where mutually as- What can cyber do to careful to cover your tracks, it will be sured destruction deterred nuclear pow- me? very difficult to trace the attacks back ers, cyber warfare, which also promises It’s not just computer users. If you use to you. In essence, you are an invisible significant destruction and disruption, electricity, buy groceries, or drive a car operator on a cyber battlefield creating does so without the same powerful de- then you are vulnerable to cyber attack. terrible consequences for your tech- terrent and could be a recipe for rapid In fact, sustained independence from nology-dependent foe. escalation. Less developed countries cyberspace would demand a very primi- might also look to creating their own tive way of life; one without phones, Fa- When you add up all these distinct cyber armies as a way to increase their cebook or modern military operations. characteristics of the cyber weapon, you international prestige without having These vulnerabilities are especially acute get an ideal asymmetric weapon system, to become nuclear states, which is a far for NATO and Member Nations given perfect for opposing a stronger enemy more challenging task. their dependence on information tech- with virtually no risk. How about non-state actors? The nology. The Secretary General, recog- main thing non-state actors gain in the nizing these vulnerabilities, generated a cyber domain is an asymmetrical advan- new emphasis on cyber defence within tage. By using cyber weapons, they can the Alliance. Accordingly, the JWC is Who are the cyber by-pass the economic and military supe- taking steps to ensure the operational players? riority of a developed state. These non- level of command within NATO re- State actors are the most obvious win- state actors might be terrorists, political ceives training aimed at preparing for ners and losers in cyberspace. They have activists, or organized criminals selling cyber attacks. the most resources to contribute to so- their cyber weapons to the highest bid- Since the JWC is chartered to train phisticated cyber operations, but they der. Any organized group with a talent the operational level headquarters for also have the most to lose, especially to exploit the technological weaknesses the planning and execution of military ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 21 operations, it makes sense to begin by Availability: Access to information asking from an operational planner’s systems enables the commander and perspective, “what can a cyber attack do his staff to communicate with higher to me?” Since operational planners in headquarters, receive and prepare in- the HQ spend much of their time using formation relevant to operations, and information technology, the most intui- issue orders to subordinates. Any at- tive answer to this question is to identify tack on NATO’s networks that denies “Extended attacks those attacks that directly affect NATO timely access to information systems military networks. We can analyze how could inhibit the commander from on multiple networks are vulnerable to attack by un- fulfilling these basic duties. derstanding what they are expected to infrastructures provide: confidentiality — data accessi- Integrity: Decision making is only ble by authorized personnel only; avail- as good as the information support- could incite riots ability — data is there when you need it; ing it. Cyber attacks aimed at alter- and possibly and integrity — the data is correct. Let’s ing the data used by the commander examine what a potential attack against to plan and execute operations could precipitate a each of these elements might look like. degrade the decision-making process and negatively impact operational ef- humanitarian Confidentiality: By conducting fectiveness. A clever enemy could al- cyber espionage, an adversary could ter data to precipitate decisions from emergency gain access to a NATO network and NATO leadership consistent with his obtain sensitive information such own objectives. or a complete as operational plans or senior leader collapse of movements. The success of operations While a deliberate attack against NATO will be negatively impacted if the en- military networks can negatively impact governance.” emy knows the Alliance’s next move. military operations, attacks against part- Likewise, senior leaders could be at ner networks can be equally disruptive risk if the enemy knows their detailed to operations. Contemporary military daily schedules. operations are complex in nature involving close civil-military coordination ►►►

22 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Cyber Security Photo © 1000 words

with many non-military elements of na- population. Even strong governments To summarize, the vulnerabilities of tional governments, the United Nations, can appear weak and inept if they can- a NATO military operation in the cyber international and non-governmental or- not deliver basic services. Extended peri- realm are wide and far reaching. While ganizations, and the media. Attacks on ods without power, telephone service or attacks on NATO networks are possible these organization’s networks or inter- the transportation systems necessary to and the type for which military forces ference with NATO’s communication stock grocery stores could lead to mass are most prepared, an attacker may with these organizations can hamper panic. Attacks on natural gas pipelines chose something other than a hardened military operations meant to improve or nuclear power facilities could cause military network. Attacks against less se- regional stability or to support humani- significant civilian casualties, and com- cure civilian networks and infrastructure tarian assistance activities. bined with attacks on medical infra- might be easier and offer more tangible The final and most dramatic types structure could impede efforts to care for results. This presents unique challenges of cyber attack I want to explore are the wounded. The ultimate catalyst for for a traditional defence apparatus de- those carried out against civilian infra- mass hysteria might be an attack on the signed to achieve superiority in physical structure. Some military professionals banking sector that reduces electroni- space, not cyberspace. argue that protecting cyberspace where cally recorded bank accounts to nothing The resources necessary to secure ci- civilian infrastructure operates is a civil but zeros. The real power leveraged by vilian infrastructures are not well known, matter, however, if an attack against cyber attacks on civilian infrastructure much less appropriated. Creating a more infrastructure can affect the military is the ability to simultaneously affect so secure cyber environment is a daunting operation, it has to be regarded in Op- many people; not much different from a task requiring significant investment and erational Planning Process. In order weapon of mass destruction. achievement in technical, legal, and po- to understand how attacks on civilian Given the capacity for mass disrup- litical spheres. The wheels of that proc- infrastructure can impact military option, it is easy to imagine how these at- ess are turning as more world leaders erations, let’s first define civilian infra- tacks could affect a NATO operation to energize government efforts to that end, structure as those assets essential for the improve regional security and stability. but the process will be slow and likely functioning of a society and economy. Extended attacks on multiple infrastruc- involve many bureaucratic hurdles. In It includes the most basic services like tures could incite riots and possibly pre- the meantime, the Joint Warfare Centre electricity, telecommunications, trans- cipitate a humanitarian emergency or a has begun to introduce the cyber threat portation, medical, energy and banking. complete collapse of governance. Effec- into its training regime as a way to better An attack on any one of these sectors tive cyber attacks could totally consume prepare NATO’s military operations for can have significant impacts on a civilian and redefine a NATO military operation. the present danger. ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 23 A blueprint for Joint Warfare Centre support to NATO cyber defence The Joint Warfare Centre vision is to provide the best training support possible for the collective training and certification of NATO’s joint operational and component level Headquarters.(7) Now that cyber defence is becoming a more important aspect of operational readiness, the JWC is beginning to generate training consistent with this emerging requirement. Like any new requirement, especially one as broad and unique as conducting operations in a cyber-contested environment, multiple steps are necessary to achieve a robust capability. The JWC provides an environment suitable for testing NATO’s end-to-end Before I identify those steps, I’d like to cyber defence capability across strategic, operational and tactical lines. sketch out a few details reflecting the JWC’s training boundaries. First of all, it must be understood tion of enemy networks. For now, cyber effectively simulate disruption of the JWC’s Training Audience (TA) is not an arrow in the NATO quiver, NATO networks. Since information- does not currently include the cadre of however, kinetic attacks against known technology dependent decision-mak- NATO’s computer and network special- cyber adversaries are possible. The trick ing under cyber duress is an impor- ists providing communication and in- is knowing them, and that is a task for tant skill we want to develop, we must formation systems for the Alliance. That the NCSA’s computer forensic experts. take another step. cadre is known as the NATO Commu- Now, let’s look at those steps toward cy- nication and Information Systems Ser- ber defence training maturity, taking the Walk: Simulated Attack on Experi- vices Agency (NCSA), an organization crawl, walk, then run approach. mental Network responsible for the care and feeding of An initial step and lower risk ap- NATO’s approximate 70,000 comput- Crawl: Academics and Story Lines proach toward NATO network dis- ers in 58 locations in 30 countries(8). The The most immediate way to get the ruption, contamination or failure is to NCSA supports, but does not “play” in TA to think about the cyber threat is simulate it on a closed network. This JWC exercises. That means the JWC to clarify what the threat looks like could be done by establishing a small does not test NCSA cyber defence ca- and what their role is in respond- network running in parallel with the pabilities, rather the JWC uses NCSA- ing to it. This can be initiated during exercise. This allows maximum con- provided networks to test the com- academics and reinforced using story trol on the simulated network and mander and his staff ’s ability to execute lines during the exercise. Academics completely avoids the risk of bogging operations in a cyber-contested environ- occur before the exercise and serve as down the main network. Simula- ment. Granted, that leaves some holes in preparation for the certification. Dur- tions could be very specific allow- exercise realism that must be addressed ing the exercise, story lines are fed to ing a range of network attacks with by NATO in the future. the TA to provoke a response. For varying effects. The simulation could Another limitation is that the exer- example, an attack on the Air Traf- also serve as a prototype and risk re- cises usually last one to two weeks and fic Control system at a shared airport duction for a more comprehensive include a robust list of training objec- would impact civilian and military air effort involving the larger network. tives (in addition to cyber defence) that operations. Such a story line might One difficulty with this step will be must be met to satisfy the certification prompt the TA to take measures to integrating the activities of those on process. Since the exercise depends on a restore lost operational capacity and the experimental network with the functioning network, cyber incidents at- engage with civilian leadership on air exercise, but even with this challenge, tacking the network risk bogging down traffic limitations. The advantage of this step will enable progress toward the exercise to the detriment of meeting this first step is it doesn’t touch the exercise realism. The key is keeping other objectives. network or put other training ob- focused to ensure the outcome of the Finally, NATO’s current position on jectives at risk. The downside is that experiment supports the JWC’s char- cyber is defensive only. That means no while story lines can simulate a wide ter to improve the operational HQ’s NATO personnel are going to become variety of attacks on outside networks ability to keep the operation going offensive cyber warriors, i.e. conducting (national, NGO and IO networks and to keep making quality decisions computer network attacks or exploita- and civilian infrastructure), they don’t under varying levels of cyber attack. ►►►

24 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Cyber Security

real world on a regular basis. Each bat- the establishment of a NATO Computer tle staff will be challenged to find unique Incident Response Capability (Full Op- “The solutions for each unique attack scenario. erational Capability) by 2012. As another During this process, the Joint Warfare example, the recently updated NATO vulnerabilities of Centre will acquire lessons learned data Cyber Defence Policy calls for shortened that can be analyzed and shared with the acquisition timelines to procure cyber de- a NATO military entire NATO community. fence capabilities and this kind of exercise operation in the could help validate those new capabilities. An agressive model for Also of interest are the Article 5 im- cyber realm are realistic cyber defence plications of cyber attack and how NATO training should respond when a member state is wide and far attacked. Does collective defence apply? I’d like to conclude with an eye toward The JWC’s exercise environment could be reaching.” a very aggressive, if not idealistic, solu- adapted to include strategic players inter- tion for NATO’s cyber defence prepa- ested in exploring that dimension of the ration. In line with the mantra of “train Article 5 process. Ultimately, the JWC as you fight,” the most realistic training provides an environment suitable for test- Run: Simulated Attack on Exercise scenario is one where the entire weapon ing NATO’s end-to-end cyber defence Network system, the user and the network if you capability across strategic, operational The next step in achieving training will, enter the ring and are tested as one. and tactical lines. Regardless of the how maturity is one that involves 100% It may not sound very romantic against robust the exercise approach taken, the participation of the network in the the backdrop of famous military duos: JWC must prepare NATO’s operational exercise. This will require a robust the viking and his battle axe, the cavalry- battlestaff to meet the rising challenges NCSA planning and execution ef- man and his rifle, and yesteryear’s fighter in cyberspace. While network difficulties fort. The NCSA has the experts and pilot and his warbird... but today’s com- during past exercises might have been a knowledge to create realistic cyber at- mander and his battlestaff are enabled cue to suspend exercise play, the future tack effects on the network. And they by the IT network. Testing that network environment cannot be so forgiving. are the most qualified to keep the ef- with its user is the most complete way to NATO’s operational HQ’s must prepare fects of network manipulation under prepare for operations. As the ultimate now to keep operations going no matter control. Control of the network will step in the crawl, walk, and run con- what. The show must go on... lives are be of utmost importance. This control struct, let’s call it a sprint. depending on it.  must be leveraged to balance cyber realism with overall exercise objec- Sprint: Train as You Fight tives. In other words, the “antidotes” A sprint toward exercise realism will Bibliography: for planned cyber attacks on the net- require NCSA “play” as part of the [1] Charles Herzfeld on ARPANet and Com- work need to be readily available to TA, with NCSA exercise control puters, About.com, retrieved Aug 2011, maintain a productive pace for the personnel preparing simulated attacks http://www.inventors.about.com. overall exercise. against the network and NCSA TA [2] War in the Fifth Domain, Murphy, Matt, recovering it. Simulated cyber attacks The Economist Magazine, 1 Jul 2010 [3] Presentation: “The first actually deployed The beauty of using this incremental ap- will require a combined response from cyber weapon in history: Stuxnet’s architec- proach to achieve training maturity is the commander, his staff, and NCSA’s ture and implications,” Langner, Ralph, Inter- that it can be throttled up or down. Each computer and network specialists national Conference on Cyber Conflict, Co- exercise will produce data, and analysis working together during exercise, just operative Cyber Defence CoE, 9 June 2011. of that data will enable decisions about as a real fight will demand responses [4] A Declaration of Cyber-War, Gross, Mi- what to do next. Proceed to the next step, from the entire HQ staff to include chael Joseph, Vanity Fair, Apr 2011 [5] Wikipedia entry for Northrop Grumman grow more capability in the current step, NCSA players. B-2 Spirit, http://en.wikipedia.org. or even leap frog to a more advanced step [6] Malicious Control System Cyber Security At- are all possibilities. Resources will also In addition to certifying the operational tack Case Study—Maroochy Water Services, have to be considered as each step has and component HQs and their support- Australia, Abrams, Marshall and Weiss, Joe, unique requirements. Since there will be ing NCSA counterparts, this kind of MITRE Corp and Applied Control Solutions, considerable learning for every exercise’s exercise environment could prove quite 23 July 2008, http://www.csrc.nist.gov. [7] The Joint Warfare Centre homepage, unique scenario, the crawl phase could useful to the Alliance in demonstrating http://www.jwc.nato.int keep the JWC busy for some time. Re- a full spectrum of NATO cyber defence [8] Presentation: “NATO Cyber Defence member, there is no battlestaff playbook capabilities. For example, it could provide Concept and Information Security,” Anil, Su- for recovering from cyber attack, especial- an opportunity to measure NCSA’s pro- leyman, Cyber Terrorism Conference, CoE ly when new types of attack occur in the gress against NATO milestones such as Defence Against Terrorism, 15 March 2011.

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 25 HYBRID THREAT

By Adrian Williamson Operational Analyst, Joint Capability Integration Division Joint Warfare Centre Introduction Hybrid threat has the potential to con- across this spectrum is a potentially hos- ventional and non-conventional means tribute to instability beyond NATO’s tile or belligerent intent either against adaptively in pursuit of their objectives.” borders, magnifying tensions and escalat- the Alliance or a third party whom the This description captures some im- ing crises, which can then threaten Alli- Alliance may wish to support. However, portant ideas. Adaptively captures the ance security. While this alone would be the problem of definition is even more above-mentioned “ability to flex”; con- sufficient to generate concern within the complex as there may be “threat” posed ventional and non-conventional addresses Alliance, hybrid threat can also directly to the Alliance “collaterally” through the “spectrum of belligerent capability”; target NATO and the NATO Nations, non-belligerent intent and actions. and the phrasing with the ability to si- possessing the ability to generate strate- Consider a nation or region outside the multaneously employ does not require the gic effect at NATO and Allied Centres Alliance, but of concern to it; suffering threat to simultaneously employ mul- of Gravity, often for little cost and with ethnic, territorial, social and/or other tiple capabilities but merely to possess little risk, perhaps, even with anonymity. destabilising tensions. Such an environ- the ability so to do. This is an important The understanding that such a threat ment may be attractive to Organised idea, as NATO needs to be able to plan exists, comprising manifold modes of ac- Crime, which is apt to seep into the so- against the threat’s capability to act, tion and with the potential ability to flex cietal fissures that open up as a result of whether or not it actually chooses to act. to threaten the Alliance at its weak points other pressures. Organised Crime may The phrase in pursuit of their objectives is and “seams” has made hybrid threat a not be actively belligerent, rather being also important for what it does not say: topic of high priority for the Alliance. In financially motivated, but, as it fills these that is, it does not limit adversaries to July 2009, NATO’s International Mili- fissures and grows, its activities may ex- military or political objectives; it does tary Staff (IMS) responded by directing pand the cracks, further destabilising not preclude financial motivation. development of an overarching concept the nation or region, and thus, indirectly One other connation of the descrip- for the NATO Military Contribution to threatening the Alliance. tion is that single adversaries possess Countering Hybrid Threats (CHT). multiple modes of action. This is an The inherent diversity of hybrid interesting topic with subtle inferences threat presents a significant problem of Understanding and is discussed below (See “Opportu- definition. Firstly, a spectrum of belliger- the threat: NATO’s nity for Collaboration”). ent capabilities could be considered rang- Capstone CHT Concept Reference 1 recognised that many ing from classical conventional military The Bi-Strategic Command Response(1) aspects of hybrid threat have existed for forces, through irregulars, “kinetic” ter- to the IMS tasking offered a fairly broad many years — in some cases millennia rorists to cyber warriors. Each of these, description of hybrid threat, which is — with responses incorporated into depending on their commanding intent, now agreed by NATO: “Hybrid threats modern military doctrine and practice. may, singly or in combination, present are those posed by adversaries, with the It was clear, however, that the phenom- a destabilising threat. A commonality ability to simultaneously employ con- enon represented a new set of challenges ►►►

26 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Asymmetric THREATS

to the Alliance, permitting adversaries to illogical. However, record those attacks, Opportunity for Collaboration. achieve “a favourable outcome against a broadcast them on social media, present The opportunities that the Internet, so- force that is superior both technologi- its own interpretation and commentary cial media and advances in telephony cally and militarily” (Reference 1). It was and the Taliban has a powerful means present to hybrid actors in terms of ef- thus necessary to break out those aspects of simultaneously targeting Alliance fecting C2 or in communicating their of the current threat environment that will and bolstering that of its followers. messages to friends and foes alike have together posed the problems that war- It may not be going too far to suggest already been discussed. However, there ranted the description “hybrid threat”. that the attack itself is not the aim; but is another characteristic of this global The four aspects identified as characteris an act required to support the media interconnectedness that needs to be con- ising hybrid threat were: the Use of Mis- campaign. Carr quotes U.S. General Da- sidered: the increased opportunity for information in the Media for Strategic Ef- vid Petraeus, former Commander ISAF: disparate actors to collaborate and work fects; the Use of Diverse Means and Ways; “(...) this is a war of perceptions. This is together. Such actors may have little in the Increased Opportunity for Collabora- not a physical war in terms of how many common; perhaps only some shreds of tion and the Ability to Exploit NATO and people you kill or how much ground you a common philosophy; perhaps nothing Nations’ Rules and Laws. Also, the po- capture, how many bridges you blow up. more than a shared animus to a third tential interconnectedness of individuals This is all in the minds of the partici- party. The closer the ideological linkage, and groups exploiting these characteris- pants.” The Use of the Media for Stra- the easier it may be to act in concert, but tics was further stressed. tegic Effect is an aspect of the current essentially all that may be necessary for To understand hybrid threat, and its threat environment that rebalances the collaboration is the assessment by each implication for NATO, it is useful to scales in favour of hybrid actors. party that their cause is advanced by explore what these characteristics may such collaboration. mean in practice; essentially to make Use of Diverse Means and Ways. One topic discussed during the them more tangible. The diversity of threat components that Countering Hybrid Threat Experiment may be deployed against the Alliance, is the degree to which threats could co- (2) Use of Misinformation in the simultaneously or otherwise, is a key ordinate and what this meant for those Media for Strategic Effect. If a characteristic of the current environ- threatened by them (see Inset II, Pages conflict will only end when the ability or ment. The threat environment includes 30, 31). For illustrative purposes, con- will of one (or both) combatants to con- conventional weaponry, chemical, bio- sider an operational theatre containing tinue the conflict is sufficiently depleted, logical, radiological and nuclear materi- a number of different threats to the Al- then each adversary must, of course, als; conventionally used or by irregulars liance. A collaboration spectrum can be consider how to erode the other’s ability or terrorists. It includes cyber attack and envisaged ranging from threats being and/or will, whilst protecting its own. In cyber support operations and a diversity almost entirely “stand-alone” and unco- asymmetric conflicts, it is likely impos- of criminal activity. It also may entail a ordinated to those threats being unified sible for the less militarily capable adver- fusion of aspects of these differing means, under the Command and Control of a sary to sufficiently denude the ability of perhaps enabled and multiplied by the single entity, and thus potentially highly its opponent. The consequence of this is hybrid actors’ grasp of new technologies coordinated. Table I (Page 29) illustrates that will rather than ability becomes the and their ability to innovatively use them. this theoretical spectrum. focus of the militarily weaker adversary’s This is a characteristic exemplified by the strategy. Whilst that “will” is ultimately November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks The likelihood is that future the will of the political decision-makers, particularly with regard to the terrorists’ operational theatres will include a mix particularly in democracies, their “will” use of technology to enable Command of these, with some actors able to employ must, to a significant extent, reflect the and Control (C2) (See Inset I, Page 28). different threat modes — that is, threats will of their populations, and it is this that are themselves “hybrid” — whilst that is increasingly seen as the stronger others may possess single modes, which adversary’s Centre of Gravity. The con- they may use alone, opportunistically or sequence of this is seen, for example, in collaboratively. It is an interesting infer- Afghanistan, with the Taliban adopt- ence from this that even uncoordinated ing — and becoming ever more adept in threats with single modes of action can the use of — modern media tools. (See be viewed as “hybrid” from their target’s “Neo Taliban’s Information Envi- standpoint. Moreover, if attacks occur ronment” by Hope Carr, at Page 58 of simultaneously or synergistically, it may this issue). It is essentially impossible for not matter whether that simultaneity or the Taliban to inflict substantial military synergism is a result of design, oppor- damage to the Alliance military machine tunism or happenstance. The target, per- and if depleting NATO’s ability was the haps, the Alliance, still needs to be able aim, attacks on NATO forces would be to respond to all credible attack options. ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 27 Inset I Mumbai Attack

The horrific terrorist attack on multiple loca- fidence that, despite the massive attention Strategic Aim: The strategic aims of tions in India’s business capital, Mumbai, in that the attacks would of course generate, Laskar-e-Taiba in undertaking the Mumbai November 2008 exhibits many of the char- the operation could extend for a significant attack have been much discussed. One well- acteristics of a sophisticated military opera- period. Indeed, blood tests on the attackers argued, though unproven(1), assessment is tion. Some of these had been seen before in confirmed traces of cocaine and LSD and that the primary strategic aim was to provoke terrorist attacks, but others represent a step also indicated the possible use of steroids. the Indian Government to deploy significant- change in modus operandi. ly more troops to its border with Pakistan, Execution: Another feature of the plan was as it did in 2002 in Operation Parakram, its Planning: Perhaps the most striking aspect that, while sophisticated in design, it was not response to the December 2001 terrorist at- of the attack is the sophistication of the oper- complex to execute. The terrorists arrived by tack on the Indian Parliament. Such troop ational plan itself. The terrorist organisation, sea, inserting them directly into the target deployments are usually matched by the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s, plan included attacks on area. Distraction was achieved through plant- other nation and it would be reasonable to multiple targets combined with diversionary ing bombs in taxis to detonate at a later time, expect Pakistan to also move troops to its incidents, with a clear intent of getting within wherever subsequent passengers happened side of the border. To do this, Pakistan would the Indian authorities’ OODA loop by satu- to travel: planting these was one of the first have to pull troops away from its tribal areas rating their C2, whilst maintaining unprec- actions of the terrorists after landing. The plan where they had been engaged in fighting the edented C2 for the terrorists themselves. on reaching the targets, essentially to murder Pakistani Taliban since 2004. That is, the stra- Their Preparation of the Operational Envi- indiscriminately in each location and to take tegic aim was to weaken the Pakistani military ronment involved the extended intelligence hostages in the hotels, was straight-forward to campaign against the Pakistani Taliban. gathering necessary to support such a plan execute. A novel feature of execution, though, and the primary targets themselves, a promi- was the real-time C2 exercised by the terror- A Hybrid Act: The 2008 Mumbai attack, nent bar, two landmark hotels, a major train ist controllers in Pakistan. The terrorists were therefore, was a terrorist attack, but one station and a Jewish Centre were selected equipped with phones and Blackberrys and which included elements more usually as- both for the maximum media impact and for were in frequent communication with their sociated with a conventional military. It was resonance with their constituency. controllers. Amongst other benefits, this pro- also one whose exploitation of technology vided them with much enhanced Situational and understanding of various media ele- Indeed, during plan execution the terrorist Awareness, as the terrorist controllers were ments typifies hybrid threat. Moreover, if the controllers repeatedly emphasised the need monitoring international media and were able assessment of Lashkar-e-Taiba’s strategic to set fire to the top floor of the Taj Mahal to provide information to the terrorists about aim is correct, then the events of November Palace and Tower Hotel, clearly with a sense activity near them, together with some as- 2008 can be seen almost as the embodi- of the consequent iconic television image. sessment of the Situational Understanding ment of hybridity: a terrorist act designed Again the “messaging”, though crude, pri- of the Indian Security Forces. Indirectly, they to affect conventional forces in their opera- marily to generate fear in the minds of the also benefitted from the use of other social tions against irregulars in a location over a population of what they considered an en- media including Twitter and Flickr, together thousand kilometres away. emy state, was clear. The plan recognised with the activities of numerous bloggers, as that it would not be possible to provide sus- these were cited by various media channels, (1) Evidence includes reference to this in an intercepted tainment to the terrorists during the attack thus providing relatively accurate information call to the Control Room in Pakistan. and so they had to be self-sufficient, but their to the terrorists in near real-time. sustainment packages had to be balanced with their need for both mobility and to not arouse suspicion. In addition to firearms, ammunition and grenades, they included high-energy foodstuffs and supplies of cocaine and LSD, with syringes. These were included both to sustain energy levels and to enable the terrorists to remain awake and functional for an extended period (50 hours in some cases). This also indicates that the planners’ assessment had given them con-

Photo source: Rex Features www.computerweekly.com Asymmetric THREATS

Descriptor Meaning Implication must occur within differing constraints, Uncoordinated There are a number of The Alliance needs to be able again potentially exposing seams within threats to the Alliance but to respond to any threat. It the Alliance. they do not work cohesively. may need to counter more They may, by chance, act than one at a time. The above discussion highlights the simultaneously, but again, issues for the Alliance as a whole. Whilst they may not. the diversity of an Alliance acts to mul- Uncoordinated but There are a number of The Alliance needs to be able tiply the seams, it would be wrong to opportunistic threats to the Alliance but to respond to any threat. think that such seams are only a func- they do not work cohesively. It should expect to have to However, some of all monitor counter more than one at a tion of being an Alliance: that they do the environment and may time. not exist within an individual nation. seek to act when the Alliance It is likely that the novel problems pre- is most stretched dealing sented by hybrid threats — with cyber with other actors. There is an increased risk of the most obvious exemplar — will find near-simultaneous attack. weaknesses and ambiguities within national systems and jurisprudences. Legal Collaborative There are a number of The Alliance should expect to threats to the Alliance that have to deal with coordinat- systems, developed over centuries to deal seek to work cohesively. ed action against it. Those with the problems of those times, are apt actions may also be synergis- to become stressed under the challenge tic. There may be dividends to be yielded by attacking of new crimes and new technologies un- the threat network. til judgements satisfactorily extend the legal base or legislatures intervene to re- Unified The threats are essentially The Alliance should expect to weapons in the armoury of have to deal with coordi- define aspects of law. a single actor. That actor nated and cohesive action. will deploy them to best Overall, threat C2 may be a advantage. fruitful target. A response framework for NATO Table 1: Collaboration, Coordination and Cohesion Models Having characterised hybrid threat, the concept articulated the areas that the Al- Ability to exploit NATO and Na- cyber attack may be location-independ- liance needs to address if it is to provide tions’ Rules and Laws. It is a truism ent and may allow hybrid threats to op- an effective military response. The Key that there is often benefit to be gained erate invisibly. NATO may know that Challenge Areas were identified as En- from attacking an enemy at its weak an attack has taken place, but in practice vironmental Understanding, Communica- points. In conventional warfare, “seams” may know little more then that. Moreo- tion of Action, Increasing Access to High-end may exist at Division or Corps bounda- ver, even if the location of the attacker can Technology and CBRN Material for Non- ries; for a hybrid adversary targeting the be determined and even if an attack can state Actors and Adaptability and Agility Alliance, they may be associated with be seen to correlate with the general aims of Actors. A theme common to all these different nations’ interpretations of what and posture of the state from which the challenge areas is that a military contri- the actions of hybrid threat actor actu- attack was launched, that may not be suf- bution is likely necessary but insufficient. ally constitute and/or what responses are ficient to tie the state to the deed with the For example, with respect to Adaptabil- possible, legally supported and appropri- certainty needed to ensure cohesive legal ity and Agility of Actors, as a threat flexes ate. It may be that hybrid actors can “pick and political opinion across the Alliance. between a terrorist mode and criminal at the seams” within the Alliance across Similar problems are likely to exist activity (perhaps for finance motives or many of their possible modes of opera- with respect to Organised Crime. His- as another means of destabilising a gov- tion, but it is in the new threat areas that torically not a focus of Alliance concern, ernment it opposes), a policing contribu- this may present the greatest problem. it is a potential source of instability, as tion may be required or the knowledge of Cyber is one such area. The Alliance recent operations have shown. Op- economic or political experts may need to may be confronted with having to judge erations may require action to counter be harnessed to analyse impacts. As new what constitutes a cyber attack; what Organised Crime, and, while the main technologies become available, specialist constitutes a cyber attack that requires a effort would be expected to come from technical expertise may be needed to pre- response (perhaps cyber, perhaps diplo- other Instruments of Power (typically dict their use in the hands of threat ac- matic); what would constitute an Article policing within the “Civil” Instrument), tors and, perhaps, to organise a response. 5 attack and what would the response op- there may be a desire to employ the Mil- The assessment of these Key Challenge tions then be. Also, as Lt Col Todd Waller itary Instrument in a supporting role. It Areas, therefore, screams for the Alliance lays out in Cyberspace: Implications is likely that different nations, with their to engage with other actors in adopting for NATO Operations and the Joint different histories, cultures and legal a Comprehensive Approach to tackling Warfare Centre (Page 18, this issue), a systems may assess that military actions hybrid threat. Building on this, four ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 29 Inset II Countering Hybrid Threat Experiment – May 2011

Background: To consolidate, refine and experiment was divided into sessions that tirely. Instead two other mechanisms were improve the Concept, the developers rec- stepped through aspects of hybrid threat, adopted. Firstly panel facilitators and other ognised a need to test aspects of it, and to and of the concept, where the input of the control staff could interject to seek clarity focus upon it the scrutiny of those, across all participants was required; with each aspect and to investigate implications of actions pro- Instruments of Power, whose organisations debated and discussed in the panels, before posed by panel members. Secondly, within might anticipate operating in hybrid threat being presented back in plenary and further each panel, a participant (carefully selected environments and who might provide ele- discussed under the stewardship of a highly based on their background) was given the ments of the solution to stability and other experienced Plenary Facilitator and with the Devil’s Advocate role — essentially licence problems. An experiment was therefore de- guidance and insight provided by a panel of to probe for weaknesses that a hybrid threat signed to “investigate the utility and feasibil- Senior Advisers. actor might identify and exploit. The Devil’s ity of the Military Contribution to the Counter- Advocate was in all other respects a normal ing Hybrid Threat (CHT) Concept”. The CHT Senior Advisers Panel: Senior Advisers panel member and could switch freely be- Concept had highlighted Key Challenge Ar- had two main roles: to provide their analy- tween these modes. The Devil’s Advocate eas of Environmental Understanding, Com- sis and guidance during the plenaries and construct worked well, though, as it turned munication of Action, Increasing Access to to shape and guide the panel sessions, as out, the calibre of the panel participants High-End Technology and CBRN Material they judged necessary. An extremely strong was such that they proved more than adept for Non-State Actors and Adaptability and team of four advisers was assembled for the at scrutinising and challenging the ideas Agility of Actors and had identified potential Experiment: The Honorable Ms Mary-Beth emerging from within their own panels. approaches to deal with them. The experi- Long, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of ment thus also set out to “develop with both Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. The panels and the panellists: The experi- military and civilian actors an understanding Gen. (retired) Yves de Kermabon, currently ment design called for three panels: Cyber, of potential NATO approaches in addressing EU representative responsible for the rule of Technology and Economic Threats; Stabi- the identified Key Challenge Areas”. law in Kosovo; Gen. (retired) Sverre Diesen, lisation, Conflict Prevention and Partner- former CHOD NOR; and Sir Michael Aar- ship and Global Commons and Resource Experiment Design: It was recognised that, onson, former Director General of Save the Security. Each of these required panellists if the insights required were to be provided, Children. All four Senior Advisers were able with a diversity of skill sets, usually with the scope and construct of the experiment to deploy their knowledge, experience and deep technical knowledge.(1) Moreover, ap- would be very demanding, requiring a team understanding built on their roles as senior proximately two thirds of the 75 participants with the breadth of knowledge and size nec- decision-makers. Additionally, Sir Michael were required from the civil sector: IOs, essary to undertake this significant planning Aaronson provided civil sector balance to NGOs, police, private industry and aca- effort. The experiment was designed by HQ an otherwise defence-centred team. Each demia. NATO can find it challenging enough SACT and ACO with substantial input from of the three Senior Advisers with a defence even to identify people suited to such roles the NATO International Staff and Interna- background was allocated to guide a particu- let alone persuade them to attend a NATO tional Military Staff, U.S. JFCOM and U.S. lar panel, whilst Sir Aaronson was in a “free event. However, the experiment execution National Defense University. As develop- floating” role, to ensure that his unique per- subsequently demonstrated the outstanding ment progressed, Subject Matter Expertise spectives were available to all. quality and diversity of the panellists brought was pulled in from National Representatives, together for the event. Centres of Excellences and Joint Warfare Devil’s Advocates: Though the normal Centre, as required. “blue move - red move - blue move” mecha- The Scenario: After considering the possi- nism needed to be sacrificed to enable es- ble modification of existing NATO scenarios, To meet the complex requirements of the ex- sential information to be generated, the de- it was determined to develop a new scenar- periment, a unique design was developed. signers recognised that there is considerable io. The resultant Silver and Ivory Seas Sce- While in some ways similar to a seminar war- benefit in understanding possible adversary nario was a non-crisis scenario set in 2016 game, it did not utilise the usual “blue move responses as these can probe at any weak- in a fictional region bordering NATO. The - red move - blue move format”. Instead of nesses in the thinking of the panels, and so scenario was extremely rich with tensions this, more classical “temporal evolution”, the were reluctant to surrender this option en- and problems, including ethnic tensions Asymmetric THREATS

Silver and Ivory Seas Scenario: a non-crisis scenario set in 2016 in a fictional region bordering NATO.

and unresolved border disputes, democratic deficits, Organised Crime, piracy, unsecured CBRN material, cyber criminality, external influences and resource imbalances.

This “steady-state” non-crisis scenario enabled the participants to study and assess a region with complex tensions and instabili- ties, where hybrid threat actions had the ability to increase the fissures within the region with potential direct or indirect effect on the Alliance. This included the risk of disrup- tions to trade, increased criminality such as drug-related and/or cyber (including trans- border), displaced citizens, and the many implications that flow from the existence of an “economic gradient” between neighbour- ing regions. Moreover, the scenario, whilst providing data, including economic and social data commensurate with the level of analysis that could be managed in a short post-exercise processing requirement re- should extend to training together. The abil- event, was not overly prescriptive, provid- mained. The First Impressions Experiment ity to work well in the same environment re- ing the participants with enough “meat” to Report (Reference 2) covered a diversity of quires that all parties understand each other, explore the issues surrounding hybrid threat, topics, stretching from the need to develop their needs, intents and modi operandi. It is without imposing an “exam solution”. an approach to collecting and sharing early far better to establish such relationships be- warning indicators between non-military and fore crises erupt than to seek to form them in Execution and Results: The experiment military organisations to “encouraging stake- the heat of an evolving crisis. was executed from 9 to 13 May 2011 in holder effort to create policy and legal struc- Tallinn, Estonia. The format worked ex- tures for currently unregulated spaces where tremely well, stimulating exactly the calibre non-conventional threats thrive”, to NATO (1) “Technical” in the sense intended here includes, for of discussion intended. A number of senior assessing where its principle vulnerabilities example, understanding of NGO strategic planning or decision makers attended the experiment, to hybrid threat lie in order to identify how to of the functioning of the World Bank, as well as more including Supreme Allied Commander improve to address the key challenges iden- connotatively “technical” such as Cyber Defence. Transformation, General Stéphane Abrial tified. It also assessed that the concept had and Deputy Assistant Secretary General of proven to be a very useful intellectual model, NATO HQ’s Emerging Security Challenges though requiring refinement. Division, Dr Jamie Shea, who spoke to plenary about the security challenges posed There was much commonality across the by hybrid threat. General Abrial, having as- panels, but panels also identified issues spe- sessed the progress made during the experi- cific to their own interests. For example, the ment, directed further effort to develop solu- Stabilisation, Conflict Prevention and Part- tions for the Alliance. nership Panel identified the importance of developing relationships between NATO and A very large amount of data was gath- the various IOs and NGOs who are likely to ered and, although an initial synthesis was operate in the same environment when a cri- achieved during the event, a substantial sis erupts, and that the relationship-building Framework Elements of a NATO re- and other non-NATO civilian actors.” clarity is expected to develop within the sponse were identified. The first of these (Reference I) next year. Much focus remains at the is Building Partnership and Knowledge. grand strategic and strategic levels and Recognising that both conflict preven- engagement with IOs and NGOs will tion and stabilisation require multipar- Validating the Concept likely focus at these levels this year, be- tite “comprehensive” engagement, this The Bi-SC input to the Capstone Con- fore expanding to the operational level. framework element seeks to work with cept can be seen to have developed a This said, though, the hybrid threat in- those other, non-military actors to de- reasoned basis for thinking about hy- formation base continues to expand velop a shared understanding of crises brid threat, imposing a logical structure with, for example, the Silver and Ivory and to establish working relationships, on a problem that may seem somewhat Seas Scenario available for study, along which can then be expanded and rein- amorphous and difficult to bound. The with reports and data from the Tallinn forced as required to best meet the chal- next logical step was to test this to de- experiment that will assist the JWC to lenges that emerge as a crisis evolves. It termine both whether it was correct and prepare to meet the challenges SACEUR recognises the value of NATO’s Knowl- whether it was useful. In May 2011, an laid out in his Annual Guidance. edge Development process in forming Experiment was executed in Tallinn, In addition to the intended experi- an appropriate System of Systems Anal- Estonia, to provide information to help mentation results from Talinn, that event ysis of the crises environment. assess this and to help refine the concept has also succeeded in opening commu- The second Framework Element if so required (Inset 2, pages 30-31). The nication channels with non-NATO ac- identified is Deterrence. Whilst this is experiment indeed confirmed the utility tors. As the work develops and the op- a more traditionally “military” element, of the concept and supported its basic erational level starts to gain more focus, the Concept also highlights the impor- premises, whilst indicating areas where the enthusiasm of many IOs and NGOs tance of comprehensiveness in this case, further work is required. to work with NATO to counter hybrid so that an appropriately balanced set of threat engenders the attractive possibil- deterrence messages are transmitted. ity for JWC of collaboration with these Based on the comprehensive under- Next steps for NATO IOs and NGOs in exercise design, plan- standing discussed above, there is a need The concept is not yet mature and fur- ning and execution. Discussions at Ta- to understand the various messages that ther work has been initiated to put into linn indicate that there is even a strong need to be communicated to the differ- place the findings from the Tallinn ex- possibility that they might wish to be in- ing target audiences and to identify the periment. The immediate focus is to corporated into the Training Audiences means of doing so. Deterrent approaches consolidate the results, analysis and con- for STEADFAST Phase 2s and Phase may be quite wide ranging, including, clusions from Talinn. The sheer amount 3s, with considerable consequent benefit for example, disruption to hybrid threat of data collected, the breadth and diver- to those exercises.  financing and defence of information sity of material covered, the newness of networks alongside the more familiar the NATO – non-NATO relationships deterrent activities such as economic formed for the experiment and the nov- blockade and shows of force designed to elty of much of the subject matter to- coerce the threat. gether means that there is a requirement The third framework element is to to reconstitute an albeit reduced forum Engage the Threat, where NATO seeks of those from Talinn, to collectively in- militarily to force a solution. This would vestigate the outputs from the experi- still be undertaken in tandem with dip- ment. A short workshop is planned to lomatic, political and other actions and accomplish this, with the specific aims must be harmonised with them. This of studying what the non-military References: (1) framework element allows for a wide stakeholder community can specifically Bi-SC Input to a new NATO Capstone Con- spectrum of NATO options up to and undertake to address hybrid threat, what cept for the Military Contribution to Counter- including employment of full combat NATO needs to do and how the two ing Hybrid Threat, July 2010. Reference 1: capable forces, depending of the particu- groups should partner. This reference, whilst technically only the “Bi- larities of the problem to be addressed. SC” input to the Concept, is the most complete Stabilisation is the fourth Frame- embodiment of the concept and, until such work Element. This includes, inter alia, Implications for JWC time as it is superseded, can reasonably be reconstruction and stability operations, SACEUR’s Annual Guidance to JWC viewed as being the Concept. It is referred to partnering and increased co-operation has mandated that “hybrid threat” be as such throughout this article. (2) with regional authorities, agencies and incorporated into JWC exercises. At Assessing Emerging Security Challenges in IOs. It emphasises a comprehensive present however, the concept is not ma- the Globalised Environment: The Countering military and political approach based on ture enough to provide clarity to JWC Hybrid Threat (CHT) Experiment First Impres- “continuous cooperation with the UN on specific actions to take, though that sion Experiment Report, 20 June 2011.

32 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Countering Hybrid Threat (CHT) Experiment Photos by Estonian Ministry of Defence

(Clockwise) Leendert Nijssen of ACT in animated discussion. Gen Stéphane Abrial (middle), Dr Mart Laar, Estonian Minister of Defence and Lt Gen Ants Laanfots, Estonian Chief of Defence are updated on the progress of the experiment in the presence of national observers. Maj Gen David A Morris, Director of USJFCOM’s Joint Irregular Warfare Centre, in discussion with Col Richard Lakin (FRA A) of the IMS (P&P Branch): the JIWC provided vital support to the experiment. Mr Sugio Takahashi, the Japanese National Ministry of Defence Representative and SME on Civil Protection. The author (fourth from left) analyses the debate in the Stabilisation, Conflict Prevention and Partnership Panel against the formal Research Questions. Stabilisation, Conflict Prevention and Partnership Subject Matter Experts listen as the debate unfolds. OPERATIONAL REALITY Observations from  Operation Unified Protector

By Maj Martijn van der Meijs, NLD A SME Information Operations/STRATCOM Joint Training Division, Joint Warfare Centre

he Joint Warfare tion Unified Protector (OUP); the observations from the small JWC Centre ( JWC) is a the NATO operation over and around team that travelled to Naples in June NATO training facility Libya. Since JFCNP had just partici- 2011 to determine ways to improve the that provides operational pated in Steadfast Juno 2010 and NRF exercises. level collective training (the planning phase of ) Steadfast for NATO headquarters before they Joist 2011, this offered a unique oppor- JWC definitely made assume responsibility as a NATO Re- tunity to make a comparison between an impression sponseT Force (NRF) headquarters, or their training and their operational ex- One of the first things the JWC team before deploying on an ISAF mission. perience. In fact, Commander JFCNP noticed was that Steadfast exercises To that purpose, the JWC conducts two Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, III specifi- make an impression. In the first Com- major Steadfast Series exercises and cally invited the JWC to send a team to mander’s Update Brief, also attended by two to four ISAF-related exercises a do that. Although his invitation letter the JWC team, the POLAD briefed on year, in addition to some smaller exer- clearly stated the current training pro- an agreement to send 4,000 Ethiopian cises. For ISAF-exercises, JWC largely gram prepared JFCNP well for the chal- Peacekeepers to Sudan, “to – for those depends on Subject Matter Experts lenges they met in OUP, there would who are familiar with the Cerasia Sce- (SMEs) from theatre to provide relevant most certainly be some areas where the nario – the area known as the Tori Pock- and current expertise when training a JWC could further improve exercises for et.” This was an almost exact copy of the new headquarters. For NRF exercises, future NRF headquarters. Cerasian Union Security Force (CUS- JWC depends on in-house expertise. There have been several other NATO FOR) in the fictitious Cerasia Scenario, Unfortunately, the JWC often does not organizations that have identified les- and it was quite interesting to see how have the luxury to relate that to real life sons from the planning and execution of reality followed scenario scripting. At operations since there are NRF-standby OUP. A SHAPE Strategic Assessment the time of the visit, there was even a headquarters on a continuous and rota- Team and a team from the Joint Analysis standing joke in the OUP HQ that the tional basis, but they are not deployed and Lessons Learned Centre ( JALLC) JWC should stop coaching Gaddafi, regularly. In March 2011, however, have done the same, and JFCNP has which is exactly what we would be do- NATO called upon Joint Force Com- also accomplished an internal collection ing with our Role Players in the Grey mand Naples ( JFCNP) to lead Opera- of observations. This article only covers Cell during an exercise. ►►►

34 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Observations from Operation Unified Protector

The structure of the OUP Headquar- maintaining a long term or operational Response Operation based on a given ters is significantly different from how focus, which is always an area of particu- scenario setting, in conjunction with a JFCNP trained in previous Steadfast lar attention during an exercise. Second- Strategic Operations Planning Group exercises. Previously, JFCNP followed ly, OUP HQ drew personnel from the (SOPG) from SHAPE and the subordi- the DJSE concept and trained with JFC so it became fairly large. Combin- nate Component Commands’ participa- their standing Peace Establishment, ing this with running an operation 24/7 tion. During this phase, Crisis Response together with their assigned Forward in due course resulted in a struggle for Planning is exercised using the Com- Element (DJSE from Force Command manpower for which there is no stand- prehensive Operations Planning Direc- Madrid), Component Commands and ard NATO-solution other than ad hoc tive (COPD). In an exercise setting, this Joint Logistics Support Group ( JLSG). Force Generation. phase takes roughly six weeks or so, from For Unified Protector, there was An additional lesson that was identi- the issuance of a North-Atlantic Coun- no Land Component Command in- fied at a later stage was that JWC NRF cil Initiating Directive (NAC ID) to the volved and no theatre for deployment of exercises generally train with standing time the JFC sends its Operational Plan a Forward Element. There was also no PEs. Our exercises do not offer oppor- (OPLAN) to SHAPE for approval. JLSG to support logistic operations, but tunities to train Command and Control When planning for Operation Uni- only a Maritime Component Command (C2) planners to design and employ fied Protector in March 2011, this and an Air Component Command. The headquarters based on different mis- phase was significantly shorter. JFCNP OUP HQ was collocated with JFCNP, sions and C2 requirements; something (with SHAPE’s SOPG) had to simulta- and largely manned by it. Two obser- JFCNP certainly would have benefited neously plan an Arms Embargo Opera- vations regarding this set-up: first, col- from when they set up a mission-tai- tion and a No-Fly-Zone operation. The locating the HQ with the operational lored headquarters on very short notice. No-Fly-Zone planning was made more level JFC caused some difficulties in “The speed of planning complicated by the fact that half-way was frightening...” through the process the NAC issued a Above, from left: Dutch Detachment, pho- new NAC ID focusing more on protect- tos by Dutch Armed Forces; Canadian forces Phase II of a Steadfast exercise fo- ing the civilian population in Libya. In participating the operation. Photo by Cana- cuses on Operational Planning. In this fact, there was even a concurrent third dian forces combat camera. phase, a JFC practices planning a Crisis planning process concerning Humani- ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 35 Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR overview given at a press conference held by Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard, Commander UNIFIED PROTEC- TOR, Naples May 27, 2011. Photo by JFC Naples PAO. tarian Assistance Support, although that tional reality” would be useful to in- considerably, and it provided them with plan has until now not taken effect. Thus, troduce in JWC exercises as well. This a higher level of experience and com- two plans became four, and execution of has been considered, but it is probably fort leading into Steadfast Joist 11 the mission was jumpstarted by taking unwise to do so. The graph below por- (SFJT11). During SFJT11, the level was over Operation Odyssey Dawn, a trays the planning level of performance raised again, giving JFCNP a good start- coalition mission in place over Libya up of JFCNP during the past two Stead- ing position for OUP. until then. All of this coordination took fast exercises and OUP. It is not based The point here is that if the JWC were place in a time frame of about two to on objective measurements, but merely a to introduce OUP’s level of complexity three weeks, which caused the lead plan- visualisation of different observations. It and time constraints at the beginning of ner in Naples to state that “the speed of shows how JFCNP started Steadfast a Steadfast exercise, it would likely planning was frightening.” Juno 10 (SFJO10) at a good, but rela- overwhelm a JFC and seriously affect The next question that comes to tively low level of performance. SFJO10 their self-confidence. The JWC should mind is whether this level of “opera- raised JFCNP’s level of performance stick to teaching the basics and exercising the foundations of operational planning, thus giving a JFC the necessary Performance level of JFC Naples experience and expertise to build upon when called to plan a mission. One of the planners in JFCNP stated that, when it came to planning for OUP, “the first thing we did was to throw the COPD out the window.” It would have been a major concern if the COPD, when used for the first time in a real operation, had been discarded like that. For- tunately, when the JWC team examined

Performance Performance this a little further, it actually turned out not to be a true statement. True, the time Time constraints of the planning did not allow JFCNP to follow the process to the ►►►

36 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 letter, but it was their intimate knowl- Another observation from one of cedures, Steadfast exercises play an edge of the COPD and their familiar- the staff officers was that “information important role in building the team, and ity with the process gained in previous from nations can be very unreliable.” To we tend to forget that. This team building Steadfast exercises that allowed them anyone that has been in a real operation aspect turned out to be crucial during the to focus their time and effort on crucial before, this probably seems like an open rapid preparation and planning for OUP, aspects, such as developing and defining door. Exercise reality sometimes proves as well as the execution of the mission. Decisive Conditions and Effects. Plan- to be different, though. Very often, in Because, as one general officer put it, “at ning with the same Joint Operations our scenarios, the intelligence that is the end of the day, it is PEOPLE that Planning Group ( JOPG) at JFCNP and provided is true and actionable, other- make it work.” SOPG at SHAPE as during a previous wise it would not have been scripted that exercise also was critical, as the groups way. It serves a purpose, but it is not as So what? knew each other well and knew what to realistic as possible. To improve this, the There have been quite a few interest- expect from each other in the planning JWC could introduce more intelligence ing observations made when comparing process. If SHAPE were to designate that is unreliable, or unconfirmed, or just Operation Unified Protector with an SOPG for each NRF rotation and background noise allowing a Training the training provided for NRF head- train with the subsequent JFC during Audience to understand this reality. We quarters. Some of those observations the preparation for that tasking, both incorporated this to a larger extent for described above highlighted deficiencies headquarters would benefit significantly Steadfast Juncture 11, which will in structures and policies; some will have from their common experience. take place in November 2011. direct implications on how the JWC conducts its exercises. There should al- Knowledge “At the end of the day, ways be a drive to improve our exercises Development and it is PEOPLE that make as best as possible, based on experiences Targeting it work...” from previous exercises and real world In an operation like Unified Pro- Although there is certainly room for im- operations. At the same time though, tector, Knowledge Development and provement in some areas, there seems we must realize that every mission is Targeting are crucial aspects in planning to be a general consensus that Stead- unique, and it is an illusion to think that and execution of the mission. This is also fast Juno 10 and Steadfast Joist one exercise will prepare a headquarters where the most interesting observations 11 prepared JFC Naples well for lead- perfectly for every conceivable mission. have been made, not in the least being Operation Unified Protector. An Article 5 Collective Self-Defense cause of the major differences in these Several staff officers involved in plan- operation, an out-of-area Crisis Re- areas when comparing OUP with the ning for OUP stated that just having sponse Operation, an anti-piracy mis- non-kinetic nature of the Cerasia Sce- gone through the process twice helped sion, a police training mission, or Natu- nario employed for the past few years in immensely, especially given the time ral Disaster Relief: they all have unique Steadfast exercises. One of the most restraints they faced. Even Lieutenant aspects. The JWC should continue to try fundamental observations is that, while General Charles Bouchard, Commander to incorporate all these different aspects the targeting process is practiced and OUP, lauded on several occasions the in its exercises, but for any headquarters understood during exercises, no NATO- experience gained through his direct it is better to be prepared “well enough” specific entity exists to physically de- participation in Steadfast Juno 10. in many aspects than “perfectly” in only velop approved targets (i.e. coordinate But apart from training structures, staff one or two. The ultimate value is in mensuration, target folder generation, processes, and Standing Operating Pro- maintaining the right balance.  etc). Instead, NATO depends heavily on national contributions for Knowl- Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard (right) during JWC-run edge Development and intelligence sup- Exercise Steadfast Juno 10 in Stavanger. port. Steadfast exercises take place in an unclassified environment to enhance involvement of civilian expertise and role players, and only with NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure. Therefore, these are aspects that a Training Audience does not get exposed to during an exercise, but it is an area the JWC must carefully consider in an Article 5 scenario. Involving national contributions, or replicating them during an exercise, would certainly improve the level of reality.

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 37 Individual Augmentee just returned from theatre within the two months prior to IAPDT. They were able to impart the most recent knowledge and experience from positions very Pre-Deployment similar to what the trainees would soon be filling. These SMEs facilitated the vast majority of the training, ranging By Robert Scheider from broad topic briefings to the entire Analyst, Joint Training Division audience to small group or one-on-one Training Joint Warfare Centre

IAPDT “left seat/right seat” training related to specific functions. Many of these SMEs were also “dual-hatted” to develop con- uring the March iteration In the first training to ad- tent for the 27 June to 8 July 2011 ISAF of the ISAF Individual dress the needs of those who could not MRT 11/01 and for JWC’s participation Augmentee Pre-Deploy- attend an MRT, Joint Warfare Centre in Exercise Unified Endeavor 11/03 ment Training (IAPDT), conducted a special training event de- (5 to 20 June 2011). Their dedication an officer provided a “back brief ” on his signed solely for Individual Augmen- and willingness to share their experience syndicate’s excellent efforts to understand tees in February 2007 and the NATO and knowledge with the next group of theD insurgency in Afghanistan from the School Oberammergau continued this personnel deploying to staff positions in peoples’ perspectives. He was followed by training as the Individual Augmentee ISAF was invaluable. syndicates who explored the insurgents’ Pre-Deployment Course from 2007 to The content was built around one and counterinsurgents’ perspectives re- 2010. In order to synchronize this train- prerequisite – Joint Advanced Distance spectively. They had just completed the ing with JWC’s MRTs and to provide Learning – and four main blocks (Mis- first of three blocks of Cross-Functional a realistic operational environment (in- sion Specific Training, Electronic Work- Training, which were built upon princi- cluding hands-on work using replicated ing Practices, ISAF Working Practices, ples of counterinsurgency (COIN). computer systems and recent data from and Cross-Functional Training). Prior to theatre), NATO moved the training arriving at IAPDT, all participants were The IAPDT is more than a course, as back to the JWC. The Centre was able required to complete Joint Advanced it involves hands-on reinforcement of to use the same data and much of the Distance Learning. This consists of on- concepts in a realistic operational envi- same content on the MRT and IAPDT. line modules to enable participants to ronment. While the Joint Warfare Cen- Another advantage to hosting the learn about a variety of topics ranging tre’s ( JWC) primary training event for training at the JWC was the opportuni- from the ISAF Mission to Afghan Cul- personnel deploying to HQ ISAF and ty to use many of the same Subject Mat- ture to Counter-Improvised Explosive ISAF Joint Command (HQ IJC) is our ter Experts (SMEs) for IAPDT and the Devices. Anyone preparing for deploy- twice-annual Mission Rehearsal Train- Training Development Conference for ment to ISAF can enroll in and access ing (MRT), not everyone deploying to the upcoming MRT. We conducted a these modules at jadl.act.nato.int. these headquarters is able to make the pilot IAPDT from 8 to 13 September Mission Specific Training (MST) training. For a variety of reasons, in- 2010. The pilot IAPDT had 36 partici- was the first block actually conducted cluding late notification of deployment pants who were deploying to HQ ISAF, as part of IAPDT and consisted of 21 or conflicting national training require- IJC, NATO Training Mission–Afghan- briefings developed around the follow- ments, many Individual Augmentees are istan, and other commands. ing themes: The Mission and Campaign, unable to attend any NATO-sponsored Although the number of participants Current Issues, Working with Afghan pre-deployment training. was not large, the pilot programme of- Partners, and Force Multipliers. These In a report entitled “ISAF Pre-De- fered an excellent venue to test and vali- briefings provided updated (and usually ployment Training (PDT) in the New date the content and methods for IAP- classified) information to build upon the ISAF Command and Control Structure” DT. JWC, JFC Brunssum, and JALLC unclassified distance learning modules. (31 August 2010), the Joint Analysis and analysts observed the training and col- They also provided foundational knowl- Lessons Learned Centre ( JALLC) stat- lected feedback from trainees and fa- edge, which would be further developed ed “Both HQ ISAF and IJC staff who cilitators. Based upon this feedback, the in subsequent blocks. had attended NATO PDT felt ready to JWC revised the programme for IAPDT Electronic Working Practices (EWP) start in their job within a few days. In 11/01, which was conducted from 24 to enabled the trainees to learn about and contrast, personnel who had not com- 29 March 2011 for a Training Audience use HQ ISAF and IJC information man- pleted NATO PDT reported that they of 110, representing 16 Nations. agement policies and common electronic took several weeks to months before By far the most important aspect of systems, including the Document Han- they were able to execute their duties IAPDT is the interaction between train- dling System, SharePoint, JOCWatch fully after arrival in theatre.” ees and SMEs. Most of the SMEs had (used to log events at Joint Operations

►►► 38 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Prior to arriving at IAPDT, all participants are required to complete Joint Advanced Distance Learning jadl.act.nato.int

Centres in ISAF), JChat (a joint opera- Besides applying the concepts learned in ing IWP, the participants applied specif- tional chat tool), iGeoSIT (a mapping MST, EWP, and IWP, Cross-Functional ic concepts to operations in the district. and geographical data tool), and Adobe Training was also designed to reinforce They dealt with topics such as Civilian Connect (used for online meetings). Af- COIN training at the operational level. Casualty Allegations, Incident Assess- ter learning about each system, students Cross-Functional Training consisted ment Teams, the District Delivery Pro- completed practical applications using of three parts and included brief lectures, gram, Reintegration and Reconciliation recent data from theatre. They also drew access to SMEs and civilian experts, and of former Taliban fighters, Logistics upon this knowledge during hands-on vignettes. We conducted the first two Support and COIN contracting issues. sessions in the ISAF Working Practices parts, “Understanding the Insurgency” After each period of syndicate work, and Cross-Functional Training blocks. and “Shape, Clear, Hold, Build” immedi- they gathered in plenary sessions to ISAF Working Practices (IWP) is ately after MST to allow the participants teach the other groups about their spe- related to, but different from, the Func- to apply the topics to a COIN scenario. cific topics and solutions. tional Area Training in JWC’s MRTs. They analyzed the district of Maiwand As with the pilot program, the Joint In the MRT, we are normally able to from the perspectives of the popula- Warfare Centre learned a great deal provide an SME for each functional area tion, the insurgents, and the counterin- from the Training Audience and SMEs present in the Training Audience. How- surgents to understand the root causes and will incorporate these lessons into ever, due to the uncertainty of positions, of the insurgency, specific grievances of the next IAPDT, scheduled for 22 to 28 which will be filled by participants and the population, and potential actions to September 2011. Anyone who will be the relatively small size of the IAPDT mitigate the grievances and root causes. deploying to HQ ISAF or IJC who will Training Audience, the IWP training is They then looked at specific actions that not be able to attend one of the MRTs aimed at more broad-level knowledge. could be applied in the Shape, Clear, should plan on attending.  It consists of a mix of Directorate and Hold, and Build stages of operations in Cross Functional Team-Level Training the district. In each case, they focused “IAPDT is more than a and more individualized left seat/right on what actions and support were need- ‘course’ as it involves seat or small group training. ed from IJC and HQ ISAF, as well as Finally, the Cross-Functional Train- other actors, such as international and hands-on reinforcement ing allowed the participants to apply non-governmental organizations. In the of concepts in a their knowledge from each of the other final part of Cross-Functional Training, realistic operational blocks to specific tasks similar to those which was conducted after they learned they are likely to encounter in theatre. about their broad functional areas dur- environment.”

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 39 ISAF TE 11/01 Mission Rehearsal Training

“The focus was training HQ ISAF, as HQ IJC was being trained as part of the Unified Endeavor 11/3 in the U.S.”

Headquarters International Security The training aimed to prepare per- how the campaign is managed on behalf Assistance Force (HQ ISAF) Mission sonnel for the cross-functional nature of of the Commander of ISAF and Coali- Rehearsal Training Event (ISAF TE the ISAF HQ in advance of their July/ tion troops in Afghanistan. 11/01) took place at the Joint Warfare August deployment to Afghanistan. Key topics briefed and discussed Centre’s Ulsnes Training Facility, Sta- Designed as a command post exercise, in detail included Afghan Culture and vanger, Norway, from 26 June to 07 July ISAF TE 11/01 was based on most cur- Traditions, Stability Operations, Stra- 2011. Together with the total Exercise rent data and real world challenges from tegic Partnering, Force Reintegration Control (EXCON) organization, the theatre. The Mission Rehearsal Train- training involved 412 service members ing included Mission Specific Training Above: Major General Jean Fred Berger and and civilians from ISAF HQ, NATO’s (MST), Functional Systems Training Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer at the Allied Force Command Heidelberg, the (FST), Electronic Working Practices After Action Review, 7 July 2011. Next page: (from left) Col Nasir Roghbat, ANA; Joint Warfare Centre, NATO Commu- (EWP), Functional Area Training (FAT) Col Ghulam Ranjbar, MoI; Brigadier General nication and Information Systems Ser- and Battle Staff Interaction Training Ghulam Sakih Asifi, ANA; Lt Johan Flad, USA A; vices Agency (NCSA) and other agen- (BSI). Having only ISAF HQ as the Col Habiburahman Afzal, ANA; Capt Obadullah cies, as well as the national Individual Training Audience, the exercise focused Kheradmand, ANP; Col Andy Stewart, USA A; Augmentees. on the battle rhythm of HQ ISAF and Mr Abdullah Nezami; Mr Abdullah Rohullah. ►►►

40 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 ISAF TE 11/01 TRAINING Mission Rehearsal Training

Capability, Strategic Communications curriculum to ensure that the Training and the process of final transition to and Public Affairs, Governance, and Audience receives the most updated Afghan security control in 2014, a new “Shafafiyat” (which means transparency sense of what is priority in Afghanistan,” Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Gen- in Dari and Pashtu) to enable person- said U.S. Army Colonel Tom Quintero, eral John R. Allen, was set to take over nel to contribute fully to the mission ISAF Joint Command (HQ IJC) Sub- command of the Afghanistan mission in from the first day of their deployment. ject Matter Expert. He said that it was July. The General said: “That’s why this Overall, the training curriculum was vital that trained personnel add value training is very important. The Training “Afghan-Centric” based on current from the day they arrive in theatre. Audience here will invest in team build- theatre necessities, including the devel- ISAF TE 11/01 Senior Mentor, ing, acquire a sound knowledge of ISAF opment and reconstruction mission. It French Army Brigadier General Olivier HQ procedures and battle rhythm as also showcased the spirit of transition- Rittimann, HQ ISAF Chief CJ3, un- well as functional area and cross-func- ing from a NATO/Coalition lead to an derlined the changing environment that tional area competency. The Joint War- Afghan lead. the Training Audience would face when fare Centre is the best environment for “We took the most current focus ar- they arrive in Kabul. During an inter- providing all these components to the eas at ISAF Joint Command and ISAF view on June 29, he said that in addi- Training Audience.” HQ and we applied it to the training tion to an impending troop withdrawal Text, Interviews Inci Kucukaksoy. ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 41 Interviews

to actually complete a day’s work, that’s We only trained HQ ISAF this time. successful training. At HQ IJC, we see the What difference does that bring? ISAF staff as an enabling headquarters, You lose the demand and stress HQ IJC working to conduct those engagements would bring to the TA. Here too, with eve- with the Afghan Government that assists ry major HQ and subordinate HQ working us with the operational fight. We look to relationships are impacted by personali- ISAF to filter those requests for informa- ties. Each personality is unique and your tion from other commands, military and ability to work with that person is critical non-military organizations outside ISAF, to success of the overall mission in any and protect us from unnecessary staff facet. Without the HQ IJC audience here, actions that add to our already compli- you lose some of that friction. Colonel Tom Quintero cated day. I attempt to qualify timelines and deliverables; to showcase how deci- Which area, in your view, requires (USA A) sions made at this level affect HQ IJC and further attention? ISAF TE 11/01 SME try to highlight the importance of the 1/3 They are all important. I think more – 2/3 timing rule to give HQ IJC as much engagement and understanding as to Can you describe your daily job? time as possible to produce quality staff how the embassies, UNAMA, USAID and I am Lieutenant General David Rodri- products and deliverables. others engage with ISAF and IJC staffs guez’s Liaison Officer to General David should be given more attention. I sat Petraeus(1). However, I cross all direc- What are the main focus areas for through some of the briefings but they torates and functional areas when and the exercise? do not capture the unique working re- where I must. Day to day, I cover all the At ISAF I cover the Command Group, but lationships and expectations we have of standard mandatory meetings and I also I hang my hat in Operations. That said, I each other with respect to Security, Gov- shadow General Petraeus in most events also cover down on Stability Operations, ernance and Development. It is far more and meetings unless they are restricted. Strategic Partnering, Force Reintegra- complicated than briefed; here again, What I try to do is pull operational in- tion Capability, Shafafiyat, etc., when relationships being key to success. formation and possible deliverables from and where needed. Within this exercise I the strategic discussions and turn them am trying to replicate an IJC presence in How do you assess the personnel is in an Executive Summary (EXSUM) to all the Directorates, staff functions and ready for deployment? General Rodriguez and the IJC staff; so associated battle rhythms’ in place for I think it is about how they engage with they are informed. the Training Audience (TA). I attempt to questions and how they smile. They are apply realism on how they would work looking to the SMEs and the instructors What’s your role in this training? with IJC and how the Directorates inter- to gain a better understanding of how I am the HQ IJC Subject Matter Expert act from ISAF staff to IJC staff. We take things work within both headquarters. I (SME) augmentee. I am not earmarked the most current focus areas at IJC and think all the egos have been left outside to any specific functional training; I just ISAF and we apply it to the training cur- and there is humility with every ques- provide insights on how IJC would re- riculum to ensure that Training Audience tion. They want to do well and be value spond to ISAF staff operations/require- receives the most updated sense of what added; to me that’s the important thing. ments. Here, I move from directorate is priority in Afghanistan. You can get all the training needed, but to directorate and try to cover all battle if you bring an agenda with you, you are rhythm training events that are going What are your expectations from not going to be value added. Every per- on. I make myself available for any and the Training Audience? son I have come in contact so far seems all questions or for clarity about ISAF op- That they get a sense of the operation to be a player. erations and functions as they apply to tempo that HQ IJC has and how the HQ IJC. decisions they make affect us. One of What is your message? the things I mentioned my second day If you are worth your salt, stay engaged What’s your definition of a success- here was within your functional lanes and work and coordinate to try to get ful pre-deployment training? you have a counterpart at HQ IJC. You things done now — don’t wait until to- For ISAF and the ISAF staff augmentees should make contact with that counter- morrow. Work smart, keep others in who are here currently, as long as they part as soon as possible. I stress making the loop and be humble. If you have get an understanding of what we are do- a phone call rather than just sending an not been in theater the last six to nine ing right now and why, feel some of the e-mail. An e-mail may not get the vis- months, don’t talk about your last time operational tempo and how much it takes ibility you need if the individual is not at so much. Relevance is presence. You be- his desk, where a phone call will usually ing there now will be your credentials, (1) At the time of this interview, General be answered by someone. The more you not what you did the last time. Here are Petraeus was Commander ISAF. communicate the better it is going to be. some points:

►►►

42 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 1) Do not duplicate work; you do not least an hour a day. Do not over indulge, start. Ask around, everyone will have have the staff hours. Take time to ask this is not a vacation. their favorites. Some include: Afghani- around and make some calls before go- 7) Try to be courteous to your mates stan: A Cultural and Political History, ing down a road that may have already within your building. Fixing Failed States, Descent into Chaos been travelled. 8) Skype when your roommate is awake, and Taliban. 2) Make yourself available to as many not asleep. Keep a clean room and a 10) Stay connected with your signifi- people as possible. Support your boss clean person. cant others. No matter how bad your and his deliverables and do quality work, 9) Do some professional reading while day gets, don’t take it out on your fam- but realize perfect is the enemy of “good you are there. Any book that talks about ily. Remember, you are not going to get enough”. Afghanistan and its history, the insurgen- everything done. Be as good as you can 3) Be professional. If you are assigned cy, the Taliban and Al-Qaida are a good be for the time you are there. a specific function, know as much as possible about that area of responsibility. Do your data-mining early and often. Look at historical documents and become familiar with the rationale for the current thinking/way ahead. Somebody will always ask the “why” question, so be ready. 4) Know the ISAF mission and the lines of effort. Leave what you heard from your last job, organization or command at home; this is here and now. 5) Try to be as transparent as possible and make sure that your counterparts in HQ IJC have the same understanding as you do. You do not have to be in complete agreement. You can agree to disa- gree so long as you are informed and stay professional. Flag Officers will work out the finer points. 6) Get a good personal battle rhythm. JWC Exercise Planners with Col Jeffrey Devore (first row, left), Chief Joint It is important that you stay healthy and Exercise Division, and Lt Col Randulff, (first row, right) Exercise OPR. fit, both mentally and physically. Try to have a good work-out plan and get at Lt Col Thor Randulff (NOR A) ISAF TE 11/01 OPR, JWC

“I am the Officer of Primary Responsi- with the Exercise Planning Team nomi- bility (OPR) for this ISAF Training Event nated for the event, dealing with any- (ISAF TE). Even though the Training thing from Real Life Support, finances, Audience is rather small compared to security, CIS, floor-plans, manning, pro- that of a ‘standard ISAF Training Event’, grammes, exercise content, visits, infor- there are scores of details to be taken mation management, etc. Without the care of. The JWC and NCSA are fortunate professionalism and pro-activeness of all enough to have a very competent crew the officers, NCOs and civilians involved, to handle them, making my job as OPR the OPR job would have been almost a an easy one during event execution. As ‘mission impossible task’. OPR, I am also the Chief of the Situation Centre, from where we keep track of the “In the final planning stage leading up to overall execution of the exercise. the execution of ISAF TE 11/01, the JWC also supported the U.S. exercise Unified “There are several highlights throughout Endeavour 11/3 (UE 11/3) in the U.S. Brigadier General Olivier the preparation phase of a training op- Most of the UE 11/3 planning and coor- Rittimann, HQ ISAF Chief CJ3 eration like the ISAF TE. For me what dination meetings took place there, and has been the most valuable is working there were quite a few of them. Some

►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 43 key members of the ISAF TE 11/01 planning team were also involved in supporting UE 11/3 planning activities, thus making the final planning of ISAF TE 11/01 one notch more challenging.

“One of the recurring challenges for the JWC while planning any ISAF TE, is that neither the size nor the composition of the Training Audience are known until very close to the actual execution dates. Invitation letters to Contributing Nations, also known as ‘quarterly letters’, are sent by Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCBS) to the National Military Repre- sentatives (NMRs). However, what hap- JWC Exercise Planners pens to those letters once they reach the NMRs is beyond the control of the JWC (and, for that matter, the JFCBS). And with close to 50 Contributing Nations in not experience this networking opportu- to have all Contributing Nations nomi- ISAF, each of them nominating personnel nity, as IJC did not attend the event. nate larger numbers of Individual Aug- to serve in HQ ISAF or ISAF Joint Com- mentees for training at the JWC, which mand (IJC) in their own specific manner, “The Joint Warfare Centre retains a would, without doubt, make life easier there are challenges in identifying the strong reputation in NATO for delivering for those deploying. characteristics of the Training Audience. pre-deployment training to individuals As to ISAF TE 11/01, the focus was train- and Standing Headquarters deploying to “It has been a pleasure to take on the ing HQ ISAF, as IJC was being trained HQ ISAF or IJC in Afghanistan. Over the role of OPR for ISAF TE 11/01 and work as part of the UE 11/3 in the U.S. De- last years, we have continuously sought with a very competent team from both veloping the content of our exercise was to improve the way we deliver training, the Joint Warfare Centre and external a huge challenge to my Chief MEL/MIL, taking into consideration all the changes sources. It would have been impossible, or Chief Content if you like. Lieutenant that are occuring in theatre. All feedback entirely and completely, to deliver such Colonel Rob van Putten and his team did from personnel trained by us prior to de- a high quality pre-deployment training a great job developing the exercise con- ployment has, without exception, been at the Joint Warfare Centre without the tent, which was specifically tailored to positive. Once in Kabul, they need far extensive support of ISAF HQ and IJC, match the requirements of HQ ISAF. For less time to get up to speed than per- as well as recently redeployed person- future training events, exercising both sonnel without a similar training. The nel and experts provided by Nations and HQ ISAF and IJC, the lessons identified challenge for NATO’s training entity is NATO HQs.” from TE 11/01 will add value and hope- fully contribute to even further improvement in the training value delivered to HQ ISAF Training Audiences.

“In all ISAF training events we conduct Mission Specific Training, Electronic Working Practices and Functional Area Training. When it comes to ‘content’ for this specific exercise, ‘transition’ was very much at the forefront of the discussions. In December 2011, the JWC will again host a two-tier exercise to train a combined HQ ISAF and IJC Training Au- dience. One of the benefits of training both HQs together is that the Training Audience gets a chance to meet and discuss with opposite numbers of the other HQ. The TE 11/01 Training Audience did JWC Real Life Support team

44 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Colonel Andy Stewart (USA A) Senior Escort Officer ISAF TE 11/01

“I look at the Coalition Training Objec- tives and I constantly try to push or incorporate Afghans in every facet of the training here. One of the things I noticed in my year in Afghanistan is that while we all understand the COIN doctrine, the way that we apply it is very different from the Afghan way. We in the coalition are very information centric. The Afghans are just the opposite. They just want to have a meeting with you. They are about people; we are about data. I want the Training Audience here to be able to ask questions to the Afghans and be able to get the face-to-face interaction, which I think is very important to help the overall Afghan-centric, ‘Afghan-First’ transition plan. It adds to the realism of the exercise because, as I said, Afghans do not process the data like us.

“During the exercise, we had lunch with Major General Jean Fred Berger, Com- mander JWC; Lieutenant General John W. Morgan III, Commander JFC Hei- delberg; Lieutenant General Olivier de Bavinchove, the incoming ISAF Chief of Staff. Afghan Brigadier General Assafi thanked the assembled group for their hospitality and allowing them to be a part of it. He is highly complementary of General Berger and the JWC staff, and made it very clear that he valued tions for Training Audiences are that they from wherever you came from. Afghani- the programme and it is very important ask a lot of questions. The more ques- stan is a very difficult place; very few for the JWC to continue inviting repre- tions they ask, the more demands they people have succeeded there. There is sentatives from the Afghan Government. put on the Afghans, and the better they a reason for that. Afghanistan is very dif- Transition, intelligence, police, and more will be prepared for their tour in Afghani- ferent from all its neighbours. It has been importantly cultural awareness are key stan. I also expect them to be open- able to protect its identity and preserve its elements here. We spend a lot of effort minded. Right now the mission is chang- cultural integrity by being impervious to trying to culturally sensitize people de- ing towards more capacity building and foreign information. Coming to a training ploying to Afghanistan but what you re- transition, and it is very important, as centre like this and getting quality brief- ally need to do is to make them culturally General Berger and the assembled Gen- ings from the Afghans better allows you effective. Learn the Afghan culture, learn erals at the lunch earlier said, that there to transition your mind and tailor whatev- the Afghan ways, but be empowered, do will be an Afghan-centric approach. er it is you are doing to an Afghan-centric not be submissive. We have great cultur- ‘Afghan-First’ solution.” al advisors here, and it is really great to “You cannot afford not to train. The have all the Afghans in one place shar- training here is very good because it ex- Above: Afghan officers proudly displaying ing some nuances that will be helpful to poses you to internal HQ battle rhythm their certificates; Brigadier General DePalmer and Brigadier General Assafi (photo by Ludo Coalition transition planning in the spirit and staff processes, and it allows you Semper); Lt Gen Bavinchove at media training of building Afghan capacity. My expecta- to have a chance to re-orient your mind and JWC After Action Review.

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 45 COMMUNITY SUPPORT

2011 JWC Information Day and Welcome BBQ By Gordon Ramsay, JWC Chief Community Support From Steadfast JOIST JWC’s annual Information Day and Welcome BBQ were held at Jåttå on Saturday, August 13, 2011. The aim of the day was to allow members of the JWC community to meet newcomers to JWC and to “catch up” with each other after the summer leave period. The special day also aimed to give the chance to see some activities and services available in the local area. This year 59 different companies, organizations, groups and associations from the Rogaland area came to the JWC to display what they had to offer and inform how members of JWC could take advantage of the great opportunities that abound in the region. The information given was extremely useful and helpful to, both, the approximately 60 new families who have arrived at JWC this past year as well as to those who have been here longer. With over to Steadfast Change 700 burgers and 300 hotdogs served to the families and our invited exhibitors, over 500 people participated during the day, getting to know each other a bit better and being exposed to the welcoming and fantastic region in which the JWC members live. From Steadfast JOIST to SteadfastJWC fully lives Change up to Transformation in action

By Lt Col Heiko Hermanns, DEU AF, OPR SFJT 11, Exercise Planning Team A Joint Warfare Centre T was supposed to be the most complex STEADFAST series proximately 1,350 people participated in was used to simulate Unakos and allow I exercise ever conducted, execut- the exercise, including a Training Audi- the OLRT to feed the Training Audi- ing a transfer of command from an ence of 872. In a compressed time scale ence, which was developing its plans Initial Entry Force to a follow on of six days, the audience had to address a based on information directly from force within a smaller joint operation total of 1,025 injects grouped into three theatre. As the task required all entities beyond SACEUR’s regular area of events, each dealing with a specific topic: involved in the exercise to work together responsibility. Instead, by the time threats, logistics or political/humanitar- closely and have a deep understanding most of the preliminary phases were ian affairs. As a result, there were hardly of the subject, it was decided to set up completed, real life events intervened any days with less than 100 injects being one single Joint Operational Planning and, with only a couple of weeks left fired into the various cells and elements Group per level or Component dur- to go before the start of Phase 3B, of the Joint Headquarters and its subor- ing the Operational Planning Process. a new exercise had to be designed. dinate Component Commands. The Operational Plans were developed The JWC’s capabilities to deliver The planning process for the event based on NATO’s new Comprehensive “Transformation in Action” were began in April 2010, the idea then be- Operation Planning Directive of De- once more in the spotlight. ing to run SFJT 11 as the first exercise cember 2010. of the Steadfast series to see a When NATO took control of the Exercise Steadfast Joist 2011 transfer of command between two Joint Operation Unified Protector at the (SFJT 11) was run by Joint Force Com- Force Commands and two major Com- end of March, JFC Naples was tasked mand Lisbon ( JFC Lisbon) from 23 ponent Commands (Air and Maritime) to take the lead on the operational lev- May to 2 June at the JWC Ulsnes Train- conducted “for real” during exercise ex- el. Given this task, JFC Naples asked ing Facility, Norway, as well as at the lo- ecution. Hence, an exercise design with a SACEUR to be released from participa- cations of the subordinate Component twelve day execution phase was chosen. tion in SFJT 11. The request was granted Commands. The other locations were The decision to include a transfer early April, and JFC Lisbon took over Istanbul, Turkey for the Turkish NATO of command impacted hugely on the the very challenging task of conducting Rapid Reaction Deployable Corps Joint and Component levels, let alone SFJT 11 with no fully capable DJSE to (NRDC TUR) as Land Component how to develop Operational Plans. Dur- support them. By doing so, they not only Command and the Czech Chemical Bi- ing the Operational Planning Phase in enabled NATO to finalize the certifica- ological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) February 2011, a combined Operation tion of the three Component Com- Battalion; Lyon, France for the French Liaison Recce Team (OLRT), manned mands – NRDC TUR, FRA JFACC Joint Forces Air Component Command by personnel from Allied Force Com- and SP MARFOR for their NRF 17 (FRA JFACC) and offshore on board mand Madrid as Deployable Joint Staff rotation, but also seized the opportunity the MS Castillia, a command and con- Element (DJSE) and the Component to become a certified Joint Headquarters trol ship of the Spanish Maritime Force Commands, was dispatched into Una- themselves for NRF 17. (SPMARFOR), which was plying the kos, the capital of Tytan, in the fictitious At the same time, this gave them waters of the Mediterranean from Rota, exercise crisis region of Cerasia. Once the opportunity to conduct an ad-hoc Spain to Lisbon, Portugal. Overall, ap- more, the JWC Ulsnes Training Facility trial of a possible future command and ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 47 “The successful NRF 17 certification of JFC Lisbon, NRDC TUR, FRA JFACC, and SP MARFOR made all the hard work and worry over the last minute adjustments become worthwhile.” control structure for deployed NATO Joint Command Headquarters. Since the Force Commands, currently responsible for providing Deployable Staffs for the Joint Force Commands, will no longer be available in the new NATO Command Structure, this will be one of the major issues that NATO will have to address in a near future. As Exercise Director the then Com- mander JWC Lieutenant General Wolf- gang Korte (DEU A) challenged the JWC Exercise Planning Team led by OPR Lieutenant Colonel Heiko Her- manns (DEU AF), in particular Chief MEL/MIL, Wg Cdr Mark Attrill (GBR AF) and Chief Scenario Lieutenant Colonel Alfio Guercio (ITA A), to adjust the exercise to fit with the circum- stances at hand, whilst still allowing for NRF certification of JFC Lisbon and the remaining Component Commands. At the same time, the entire SFJT team made sure that all the necessary details and limitations were immediately communicated to the commanding levels of the participating headquarters so as to facilitate rapid and effective decisions on the way ahead. Ultimately, the successful NRF 17 certification of JFC Lis- bon, NRDC TUR, FRA JFACC and SP MARFOR made all the hard work and worry over the last minute adjustments become worthwhile. By the end of Phase 3B, a number of valuable lessons had been identified to underpin the emerging NATO concept of operating in a Deployed Operational Joint Head- quarters. Once again, even under such tough conditions as described above, the JWC successfully supported the training and exercise efforts of the Operational Headquarters, thus proving that it fully lives up to its motto of “Transformation in Action” . 

48 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Photos by CPO Valerie Guyoton, FRA N, JFC Lisbon PAO

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 49 Gender DIMENSION

By Lone Kjelgaard Deputy Chief LEGAD Joint Warfare Centre

 In the 1950s, French writer and philosopher Simone de Beauvoir challenged traditional ideas about gender roles with her epoch- making “The Second Sex”, which was to form the basis for current understandings of the social construction of gender and widely influence scholars of literature, philosophy, history, sociology, and gender studies.  Sixty years later, her analysis of women’s cultural status still largely seems to hold. In modern warfare, gender dimensions are an important component of a Comprehensive Approach.

“All oppression creates a state of war” - Simone de Beauvoir, 1908-1986

On 27 January 2010, NATO Secretary security challenges of the 21st century.” education and operations to fulfil our ob- General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen stat- In gender studies the term gender is ligations both to the United Nations Se- ed: “We need to not only integrate gender used to refer to proposed social and cul- curity Council and to the North Atlantic issues into our planning and our operations, tural constructions of masculinities and Council or are we already incorporating but we must work proactively to develop femininities, and taken in this context, gender into our way of thinking? our capabilities in this field. (…) Greater gender excludes reference to biological From dictionaries, two definitions empowerment and more effective protec- differences to focus on cultural differenc- stand out to help us answer the questions of women against the specific dangers es. So what is gender and how does it in- tions above: gender and sex. Sex is bio- they face in armed conflict is of benefit not fluence military operations at the various only to women, but to all of us. It is a crucial levels, if at all? Do we have to dramati- Above: Simone de Beauvoir in Paris, 1955. Hulton Archive/Getty Images component of a comprehensive approach to cally change the way we conduct training, ►►►

50 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 logical differences associated with being way from the political level through the operation, we need to mitigate for the male or female, whereas gender refers to strategic assessment to the daily CIMIC potential abuse of power at all levels of social differences taken to exist between brief at the sub-tactical level: government and administration in host males and females. What is the differ- nations to the best of our ability. When ence between gender and sex? Using the — Which men and which women we choose our partners on the ground, definitions above, the difference is quite hold the power in this community? attention must be given to potential ad- clear. Gender is learned, changeable and — Who owns and controls the verse effects on the local power balance. varied; the sex of a person is not. Gender resources? Gender-based violence is common dur- is based on socially constructed differ- — Who makes the decisions? ing armed conflicts, and is sometimes ences that are learned. These differences — Who sets the agenda? employed as a means of warfare. This, in are deeply rooted in every culture. As — Who gains and who loses from itself, raises a multitude of issues for the the culture they are rooted in, they too processes of development? later development in the area. change over time. Because the differenc- A prior analysis of this area will help es are culture-bound, they have so very By answering those questions we will measure both effectiveness and perform- many variations within and between be able to identify the vulnerable groups ance in development: Is our presence or cultures. and identify the factors that make them projects influencing social structures the It is gender along with other aspects vulnerable, and understand how they are way we want? Is the level of gender ine- of social identity that determines the affected. Through that, we have already quality diminishing, and how is the level roles, power, and access to resources for begun to assess their needs and capabili- of interaction between various groups people in any culture. Gender roles and ties, shaping our own force generation improving? The analysis will have to fo- gendered power relations directly influ- to facilitate and enhance the empower- cus on people, and their constraints and ence who has access to, and control over, ment of these groups. It will also ensure opportunities, because then it will not which resources and opportunities, and, that our local projects on the ground, differentiate between women and men. who makes decisions at the end of the our region-specific programmes and Such an analysis can be extended to day. In many countries of today’s world, our political and diplomatic interactions cover aspects of sustainable livelihoods, the distribution and control of resources are targeted in a way so as to prevent vulnerabilities, human capital, institu- and opportunities is not equally shared or mitigate potential adverse impact on tion building, just to mention a few, for between men and women. As a result of those vulnerable groups. In other words, a true Comprehensive Approach. This this, men and women do not enjoy equal it enables the military to adapt a Com- is Knowledge Development, establish- rights, opportunities, access to resources, prehensive Approach. For example, in ing existing networks, relationships and and rewards. Women typically hold less Afghanistan it is of interest to identify influences together with basic infra- power and fewer resources. This unequal if poverty affects women and men dif- structure and producers of goods and gender structure is often embedded not ferently, so that our projects target their related natural resources. This allows us only in the household but throughout respective needs and priorities. to address the root causes of the issues the community and the State. Some Other gender-related factors influ- in our operations area and develop lines typical examples are that often women encing NATO and UN operations are of operation to reduce the pressure on have little control over their most private women’s status in the local culture and vulnerable groups and thereby gain their matters such as marital choices or fertil- their ability to exercise leadership and trust. This in turn leads to achieving the ity and even less over their mobility and power in public life. Successful local en- military end-state of creating key condi- potential public participation. gagement often depends on our ability tions for sustainable development. However, gender is not just about to understand and interpret the differ- In other words the military has a women. Men also have gender-specific ent skills, capacities and aspirations of most important role to play in gender- vulnerabilities. It is important to pay women and men in the society. mainstreaming, which is a process of en- equal attention to these, even though Unfortunately, gender-based violence suring that all of our work, and the way men are rarely faced with gender-based often is a reality in a conflict or post- we do it, contribute to gender equality discrimination. This places a responsibil- conflict area. Gender-based violence is by appropriately influencing the balance ity on everyone to ensure that all men defined asphysical, mental, psychological, of power between women and men. In and women equally enjoy rights, op- or social abuse, committed on the basis of practice that means ensuring that the portunities and life chances. But, it does the victim’s gender and against their will. different concerns and priorities of both not mean that women and men are the Although the majority of gender-based women and men are addressed in, and same. violence is aimed at women and girls, it shape, our engagement projects — from What it does place upon the mili- does include violence aimed at men and diplomatic talks and initiatives to daily tary and our political leaders is the ob- boys. It is important to be aware of this contact by engagement teams. ligation to conduct a gender analysis of in an operations area, where our presence It is important to remember that gen- a potential mission area. The following might enforce gender inequality despite der mainstreaming starts at government questions should be addressed all the our best efforts. In planning a military level. Institutional frameworks, policies ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 51 VIEWPOINT

and legislation, at all levels, need to up- the importance of women’s equal and need to be considered. Experience has hold women’s rights and contribute to full participation as active members in shown that it is important to ensure at- gender equality. This is not only true of a the process of establishing peace and se- tention to gender perspectives form the potential host nation, but indeed also for curity. UNSCR 1325 is binding on all very outset of peacebuilding and peace- the sending states. Even though gender UN Member States. The adoption of the keeping missions, including thorough mainstreaming aims to support women’s Resolution marked an important inter- incorporation in the initial mandates. ability to exercise their human rights, it national political recognition that gen- All reports of the individual mission is also about the concerns of men and, in der is relevant to international peace and to the Security Council should include particular, about the root causes of imbal- stability. The key provisions of UNSCR explicit routine reporting on progress in ance of power. Where possible, it needs 1325 demands that the Member States: integrating gender perspectives as well to be ensured that women and men from as information on the number and level marginalized groups are represented and - Increase the participation and of women involved in all aspects of the participate actively in planning. Military representation of women at all levels mission.” (Extract from the Secretary- projects need to address this by working of decision-making; General’s report on resource require- with the men who typically hold a high- - Pay special attention to specify ments for the implementation of the er degree of power, to get their support protection needs of women and girls report of the Panel on United Nations for the specific project and to facilitate in conflict areas; Peace Operations, 27 October, 2000, women’s participation in, and influence - Include gender perspectives in A/55/507/Add.1) on, a given project. It is at the same time post-conflict processes; paramount to identify partner organiza- - Include gender perspectives tions whose core business is, or who has in UN programming, reporting NATO’s perspective great experience in gender mainstream- and Security Council sanctioned ing and cooperate with them. missions; NATO thrives to implement UNSCR Having an in-depth understand- - Include gender perspectives and 1325 to the full extent, which is done ing of the different needs, priorities and gender awareness training in UN through Bi-SC Directive 40-1. All potentials of women and men in a par- Peace Support Operations. NATO Member States are members ticular country should ultimately lead of the UN, so they have an obligation to better-informed decisions and more This means that “attention needs to within their national systems. Bi-SC 40- effective implantation of the mission be given to gender perspectives in all 1 extends this to the whole of NATO’s mandate. In practical terms, that means phases of the Peace Support Opera- structures. The Directive is applicable that the commander on the ground tions, beginning with needs assessment to all International Military Headquar- must identify gender vulnerabilities and in mission through post-conflict peace- ters, or any other organisations operat- categorise them into physical/material, building. Gender perspectives should be ing within the ACO or ACT Chain of social/organisation and attitudinal/mo- considered in analysis, policy and strat- Command. The Directive consists of tivational. Furthermore, he needs to egy development and planning of Peace guidance on the implementation of UN- identify vulnerabilities related to fear Support Operations, as well as training SCR 1325, as well as NATO’s Standards of or experience of gender-based vio- programmes and instruments developed of Behaviour for operations and missions lence. For the complete picture, he then to support effective implementation and a list of measures for the protection needs to identify gender capabilities in of those operations, such as guidelines, of women and girls in armed conflict. the same categories. After that, he can handbooks and codes of conduct. All Realizing that gender dimensions are ask the “so what” and make the neces- aspects and all levels of Peace Support an important component of a Compre- sary adjustment to his plan or project. Operations require attention to gender hensive Approach, the Directive seeks to This ensures the mission does not make perspectives, including political analy- mainstream gender issues in all phases matters worse for the local population or sis, military operations, civilian police of NATO’s military activities, ensuring reinforces past discrimination. activities, electoral assistance, human gender awareness throughout the chain rights support, humanitarian assistance, of command, integrating gender dimen- including for refugees and displaced sions in an operational context will be United Nations Security persons, development and reconstruc- seen as a force multiplier. Council Resolution 1325 tion activities and public information. To facilitate this, the Directive ad- Training of troops and civilian police dresses the measures NATO forces will On 31 October 2000, when the United on gender issues is critical. In the con- undertake in the planning and conduct Nations Security Council unanimously text of complex missions where interim of NATO-led operations to protect adopted Resolution 1325, it was the governments will be established, gender women and girls. One thing to note is very first time the UNSC addressed the balance in interim bodies and develop- that the Allied Command Operations disproportionate and unique impact of ment of capacity within those important Comprehensive Operations Planning armed conflict on women, and stressed bodies to work with gender perspectives Directive (ACO COPD) currently does ►►►

52 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 KABUL, Afghanistan -- Women from the first graduating class of the Afghan National Army Female Officer Candidate School stand for the playing of the National Anthem during their graduation ceremony, 23 September 2010. Twenty-nine Afghan women completed 20 weeks of training, which included eight weeks of basic training and 12 weeks of advanced training in logistics and finance. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Laura R. McFarlane.) not reflect this guidance. These measures eas of operations, missions and exercises. advice to the relevant national authori- are applicable during and after conflicts The responsibilities of the Gender Advi- ties during an investigation. It can be as part of NATO’s wider policy objec- sor will be to directly support the Com- argued that the NATO Standards of tives of enhancing security and stability. mander in planning, conducting and Behaviour are self-explanatory but still The Key Concepts list a number evaluating operations from a gender per- they provide the Commander with the of actions to be taken; e.g. increasing spective. This includes providing advice means to consistently enforce good order female representation throughout the on information and guidelines related to and discipline, and are therefore closely NCS and Crisis Establishments and UNSCR 1325. The Gender Advisor will linked to command responsibility. providing training supplementary to na- work closely not only with manpower Finally, the Directive offers a number tional gender awareness training as well to maintain an overview of the number of measures for the protection of women as NATO’s Standards of Behaviour. The of women employed and deployed, but and girls in armed conflict, and lists a Directive emphasises that pre-deploy- also with other staff elements such as number of responsibilities that opera- ment training is a national responsibility, Intelligence and Knowledge Develop- tors and planners must focus on during yet at the same time it accentuates the ment, Civilian Military Cooperation all stages of NATO operations from the requirement for integrating UNSCR in and Operations Directorate for support strategic planning to the re-deployment all of NATO training events, both so- to operational planning to include logis- of forces. One example is the Rules of called garrison training, exercises and tical aspects, and will of course provide Engagement (ROE) development. The pre-deployment training. The selection guidance on gender awareness scenarios ROE need to provide the troops with the and utilisation of Gender Advisors are for exercises. ability to not only use force for mission also highlighted as a most important Particularly in cases of breach of accomplishment, but also to use force to part of the implementation. It is foreseen NATO Standards of Behaviour, the shield civilians, in particular women and that a dual-hatted Gender Advisor will Gender Advisor will work closely with girls, from violence, rape and other seri- be designated to all static Headquarters, the Legal Office and the Commander’s ous crimes. and those HQs involved in NATO ar- Office. The Gender Advisor may offer The reports and returns describing ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 53 VIEWPOINT

the mission progress now must contain This includes a revision of Bi-SC Dir Gender perspectives are already a part of statements on the level of integration of 40-1 and an update of the COPD. our MEL/MIL, where various incidents gender perspectives. The NATO Com- The ACO Gender Action Plan also re- have a clear bearing on gender and cul- mittee on Gender Perspectives in 2009 quires a higher degree of involvement ture awareness. We can, however, expect introduced the idea of gender aware- of the nations, especially when it comes greater focus on this in the future.  ness training to the Military Committee to improving the gender balance in op- (MC). The MC endorsed the proposal erations to include deploying Gender “One is not born a woman, as it agrees that gender mainstream- Advisors. Special tasks are given to the one becomes one” ing is an indispensable part of opera- deployed commanders, particularly in - Simone de Beauvoir tions and daily work. Following that, ISAF and KFOR, where numbers pre- a gender training template was devel- scribing the desired number of female oped, which now provides the common personnel in the security forces provides principles as a basis for gender training an ambitious challenge. both within the nations and in NATO All these initiatives will in turn be- training. The training template consists come a mandatory part of the JWC’s of a number of Topics to Learn, Learn- training mission. Already periodic mis- ing Objectives and Targeted Public. On sion reviews are required to describe 18 July 2011, ACO released its Gender the progress on implementing UNSCR Action Plan, which is a consolidated 1325. This requires the JFCs to develop plan with JFCs’ input to facilitate the measures of effectiveness in this regard, implementation of UNSCR 1325. The and have gender perspectives as an in- implementation will take place through tegral part of the on-going assessment. Anyone wishing further guidance on gender a number of tasks to be achieved pre- Therefore, the JWC needs to continue to is invited to contact the author by email on: dominantly before the end of 2011. develop our own knowledge in this area. [email protected]

GENDER DEFINITIONS IN NATO References: • United Nations Security Council Resolution Gender: The term “gender” refers to the in all areas and at all levels. It is a 1325 http://www.un.org.events.res_1325e. strategy for making the concerns and • NATO Di-SC Directive 40-1 on Integrat- social differences and social relations ing UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspectives between women and men. It therefore experiences of women and men an in the NATO Command Structure includ- refers not to women or men, but to the integral dimension of design, imple- ing Measures for Protection During Armed relationship between them, and the way mentation, monitoring and evaluation of Conflict this is socially constructed. A person’s policies and programmes in all political, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/ gender is learned through socialization economic and societal spheres to that pdf_2009_09/20090924_Bi-SC_DIREC- women and men benefit equally and TIVE_40-1.pdf and is heavily influenced by the culture • Gender Equality Handbook–Practical of the society concerned. inequality is not perpetuated. advice for International Assistance http://www2.msb.se/shopping/srv_ Gender equality: This means equal Gender analysis: Gender analysis Showltem.aspx?id=27813 rights, responsibilities and opportunities means looking at the different roles and • CWINF Guidance for NATO Gender activities that women, men, girls and Mainstreaming http://www.nato.int/issues/ for women and men and girls and boys. women_nato/cwinf_guidance.pdf boys have in a particular society and Equality does not mean that women and • Recommendations on Implementation of men will become the same; it means that the social relationship between them. UNSCR: Gender Training and Education women’s and men’s rights, responsibili- It asks “Who does what?” “Who makes (CWINF) http://www.nato.issues.women_ ties and opportunities will not depend on the decisions?” “Who derives the ben- nato/pdf/2010/BrochureGender.pdf whether they are born male or female. efits?” “Who uses resources such as • Allied Command Operations Comprehen- land or credit?” “Who controls these sive Operations Planning Directive Allied Command Operations Gender Action Plan Gender mainstreaming: Gender resources?” and “What other factors in- (dated 18 July 2011) mainstreaming refers to the process of fluence relationships.” Examining these • www.oxfm.org.uk/resources/issues/gen- assessing the implications for women aspects of a society reveals the differ- der/introductino.html and men of any planned action, includ- ences in experiences of women, men , • www.un.org/womanwatch/osagi/gender- ing legislation, policies or programmes girls and boys. mainstreaming.htm • www.undp.org/women/mainstreaming • www.unifem-eseasia.org • www.unwomen.org

54 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 If you really want your audience to remember your message, then you have to make them want it.

Making your idea stick Part Being heard in a world of Three information overload

By Paul Sewell Lessons Learned Analyst, JCID, Joint Warfare Centre

This is the third article on the use Information overload cally focuses on how we can present and (and abuse) of PowerPoint. The first arti- deliver our knowledge with real impact, cle explored how to remedy some of the It is no secret that we are constantly regardless of the situation. However, we common mistakes we make with Power- bombarded with information both in need to first tackle the biggest obstacle: Point and the second offered some use- our personal and professional lives. This the “curse of knowledge”. ful and user-friendly design principles overabundance of choice is harmful to to make our slides more interesting and both the sender and the receiver. The re- Curse of knowledge effective for our audiences. This final ar- ceiver is overwhelmed, trying earnestly ticle will focus on the most important to make sense of the flood of informa- The most common barrier to commu- element of any presentation: the content. tion, while the sender also suffers as nicating clearly, and with impact, is the You will be introduced to ways to give their message is drowned out by count- “curse of knowledge”. It’s something we your content relevance and real impact, less other voices. We constantly switch all suffer from, but are mostly unaware regardless of whether your audience are between these two roles in our profes- of. Take the following example. We all your work colleagues, a room full of gen- sional lives, so for the benefit of both we know of the person who is very intel- erals, or the football team you coach on need to ensure that what we’re talking ligent but can’t get his/her point across. the weekend. about is understood. This article specifi- They speak in jargon, and use acronyms, ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 55 concepts and processes only known to their research they uncovered six prin- your topic that may surprise them? others from that specific area of exper- ciples, which are presented below. They What preconceived ideas does your au- tise. Wait, does this sound familiar? YES! found that by using one or more of these dience have that are wrong? Secondly, This occurs all over NATO! Every day, principles, any idea could become more you can then hold their attention with in every HQ! People are constantly giv- interesting, memorable, and ultimately suspense. Crime fiction is excellent at ing presentations to people who have no more impacting on your audience; who- this. The reader is constantly kept guess- idea about the topic and yet little is done ever they may be. ing. This can be achieved by asking ques- to transform the content into terms that tions, which highlights gaps in their the audience can understand. knowledge, such as, “Can anyone guess Simply put, once we know some- The six principles the most important skill to have in an thing, it’s hard to put ourselves back in operational headquarters?” or “Where do the mindset of not knowing it, which is Simple you think most of our intelligence comes often the knowledge level of our audi- Unexpected from in theatre?” If you really want your ence. We are “cursed” by our knowledge, Concrete audience to remember your message so to speak, and cannot help but use Credible then you have to make them want it. specific terminology. Once you become Emotion These two elements of the unexpected aware of it, you will find it everywhere. Story principle pull people in and keep them No headquarters in NATO is immune! captivated. Unfortunately, being able to adapt In line with NATO culture, they can be our communication so our audience un- summarized in an easy to remember (but derstands, is taken for granted but seldom inaccurately spelled) acronym: Succes! Concrete done: we all have thoughts, we can all You probably already recognize some One of the biggest stumbling blocks to talk, so what’s the problem? The problem of them and have used them. However presenting is that the topic is too ab- is clear: miscommunication has negative, the Succes acronym serves as a simple stract. NATO, with its transformational and sometimes grave, consequences. reminder for these six important prin- focus, has many examples: CA, EBAO, For example, your audience resents ciples for you to use in future. There is DJSE, Future Capabilities, and so on. you because they fail to see the relevance enough explanation in this article for They have all suffered from the label of your presentation; a leader’s uninspir- you to start, but those wishing to learn of being “out there” and too abstract. ing direction and guidance are incorrect- more are invited to read the book. Short To change this you need to give your ly interpreted; you receive no support for examples will also be given to help dem- audience common points of reference your project because no one believes or onstrate the principle. so they can find meaning. You can use understands it; staff ignore important physical descriptions: describing a hole safety and security issues simply because that is big enough to fit an SUV gives the information is not engaging. SIMPLE your audience a better idea of its size, This need not be the case and our This seems so obvious, but think how rather than just saying, “It’s a big hole”. personal histories tell us so. Think for truly uncommon it is in NATO. The Al- You can use a metaphor: CIS infrastruc- a moment of an inspiring speech you liance is so large and diverse that it is no ture is like plumbing, putting in “pipes” once heard, a memorable scene from a wonder we come into contact with top- to optimize the flow of information and film, or a story you read when you were ics we have little knowledge about, many remove blockages. You could also use a young that has remained with you ever of which are overly technical, theoretical, real world example rather than relying since. These moments stick so clearly in or abstract. The first step is to determine on theory. our minds even years after the event, but your core message. If there was only one have you ever wondered why? What is thing your audience would remember the secret that makes one speech worthy what would it be? One core message is Credible of a standing ovation and another jus- much easier to remember than ten core An idea with credibility can be taken a tification for capital punishment? How messages. Can you simplify your topic lot further. Advertisers have been using does one story stick in our minds amidst with an analogy? this since the very beginning and more countless others? importantly, strong leaders exude this Thankfully, the “curse of knowledge” principle. However, credibility can come has an antidote and can be found in the Unexpected in many forms, and it pays to think about book, Made To Stick by Chip and Dan There are two main ways to get people’s where you can pull credibility from to Heath. This immensely readable book is attention. The first is to capture it with bolster your message. Do you have cred- a result of their research into all of these surprise. This is also why jokes are so ibility in your area of expertise? If not, things which “stick” in our minds, in- popular at the beginning of presenta- who does and can you use them? cluding stories, urban myths, speeches, tions because they contain the element advertising campaigns and so on. From of surprise. Is there something about ►►►

56 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Engaging your audience WITH six PRINCIPLES

Emotion to distribute knowledge. They are easy these tools to strengthen your message. Slides full of graphs do little to inspire. to visualize and thus remember and in- For an excellent example of these prin- Without doubt, audiences are more in- finitely more engaging than any SOP or ciples in use, check out a speech by the terested in people than numbers. Con- directive. What stories can you tell about famous educator, Sir Ken Robinson(1). He sider where you can bring the people your topic? Can you tell them the origin is proof that you can captivate an audi- factor into your data or area of knowl- of the concept, the people who invented ence without a single PowerPoint slide. edge. Engaging your audience means it, what challenges they faced? Like the These skills can be used in any arena of invoking some kind of emotion in them. other principles, using story pulls people life; not just work presentations. For your content to be relevant, you have into your topic and gets them engaged. In actual fact, you can use these six to answer the question they are all ask- principles in any situation where you ing, “What’s in it for me?” What does need to communicate with others and the data mean for them? Speak to their Using the principles want to make an impact. This can be in identity and their values, how they can any role: as a parent, a leader, colleague, contribute to your common goals. Like the advice given in the two previ- friend, and so on. ous articles, to get the best effect from As a final note, what got NATO these principles, start small. It’s certainly where it is today will not get it to where Story not important that all six are used all the we need to be tomorrow. Therefore in Our whole lives are made up of stories. It time, in fact many of the “stickiest” ideas this age of information overload we each is no surprise that fables, biblical stories we have in our history have used one or need two vital skills: to be able to com- and urban myths have always had such two at the most. Begin with one or two municate clearly and with impact, oth- a strong pull on us as humans. Stories and expand as your confidence grows in erwise your message will be ignored or are such a rich and compressed format the material. The main point is to use misunderstood at your peril. 

STORY (BEFORE): “I will now continue with Chapter 9, on Key Stakeholders in Comprehensive Approach.” EMOTION (AFTER): “When we started to SIMPLE look into working with IO/ (BEFORE): “Welcome to the annual PAO (BEFORE): “New network- NGOs, we found that they each Conference, which aims to contribute to enabled infrastructure providing had completely different aims. NATO ‘s transformational aims.” seamless connectivity amongst We learned this the hard way. (AFTER): “Right now, there is a military end users.” There once was a...” driver waiting to drive from ISAF HQ to (AFTER): “The New CIS Kabul International Airport. Every day he structure makes it easier for deals with the fact that his vehicle could NATO staff to work together.” be bombed and that he could be his last day on earth. Ladies and gentlemen, during this week’s conference at this luxurious hotel, we must do our utmost to make sure the output of this week supports our troops on the ground.”

UNEXPECTED (BEFORE): “The following CREDIBLE presentation will be on the security procedures in the HQ.” (BEFORE): “Lessons Learned (AFTER): “Did you know that is important because it helps I could extract all of your headquarters improve.” CONCRETE personal details on your phone (AFTER): “There is no reason to (BEFORE): “The budget for the next with a device that costs no more send troops into the fight and get exercise has been reduced by 15%.” than $5?” [surprise] or “The them killed when a lesson learned (AFTER): “The budget cuts will mean that last attack on the HQ occurred the month before could have been we are unable to hire more contractors earlier this year; can you guess used for training,” General James for the new exercise meaning that we will how it happened?” [suspense] Mattis, former SACT. have no scenario support.”

(1) http://www.ted.com/talks/ken_robinson_says_schools_kill_creativity

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 57 Neo-Taliban’s Information Environment

By Hope Carr Media Subject Matter Expert Consultant ar is a compilation of it must first gain a better appreciation moments in time that of the ways in which the movement is are thread together successfully fuelling itself by harnessing under the umbrella new technologies.” of strategic objectives, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt “Through the operational planning and tactical gains. (2001) introduced the term “netwar” a Modern technological and industrial decade ago to describe a newly develop- extensive use of advancementsW have not only changed ing form of conflict that is played out social media tools the experience of war but the skills rein the information society. The term quired by those who fight them. The “netwar” is defined as: (...) an emerging the neo-Taliban has conflict in Afghanistan and the neo- mode of conflict (and crime) at societal shifted the centre Taliban have been instrumental in re- levels, short of traditional military war- focusing global attention on transition- fare, in which the protagonists use net- of gravity of conflict ing modern warfare, the evolution of our work forms of organisation and related from the kinetic enemies and the impact of technology doctrines, strategies and technologies on the changing modern battlespace. As attuned to the information age. This ear- battlefield to Jarrett Brachman, a recognized terrorist ly and accurate assessment has evolved the information expert, states in his article High-Tech during a decade of battle in Afghani- Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Use of New stan and is now widely referred to as the battlespace.” Technology: “For the United States “information battlespace”. As Jonathan to defeat the broader jihadi movement, Marcus, a BBC news diplomatic corre- ►►►

58 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Information Battlespace

spondent effectively described in 2010: from non-native Muslims. While the has proved to be a successful risk for the “It is called shaping the battlespace. It is new Taliban force is about a quarter neo-Taliban. “Once notorious for their not the traditional air onslaught or artil- the size of the original Taliban, the re- ultra-orthodox interpretation of Islam, lery barrage designed to weaken the insurgent organization has the ability to which prescribed a complete aversion to tended enemy (...) it is now about shap- replenish its ranks even after numerous all manifestations of modernity, the Tal- ing the information battlespace, because confrontations with NATO and Afghan iban now appear to have mastered inno- in Afghanistan – and in modern warfare government forces. As Dr. Seth Jones, a vations in technology and put them to in general – information has become the senior political scientist with the RAND optimal use in their insurgency against new front line.” Corporation argues, the idea of the neo- Hamid Karzai’s government and ISAF The neo-Taliban’s strength in this Taliban has grudgingly evolved from a troops” (Brahimi, 2010). transition has been their ability to ef- derisive label to a concession that the Both the paleo and neo-Taliban fectively embrace an approach of under- enemy is actually more organized and originally focused internal information standing the effect of media operations strategic than the U.S. or other NATO campaigns through Shabnamah or night on both local and international popula- forces first assumed (2007). letters, a traditional means of commu- tions. At the heart of this transition is the nication in Afghanistan that deliver neo-Taliban’s evolution and adaption of threats or direction to individuals, villag- their media environment to include the Neo-Taliban’s informa- es or even whole provinces. This system use of social media as both an internal tion environment of communication expanded in 2003 to and global force multiplier. As a result, Following the U.S.-led Operation En- include neo-Taliban publications in the the adoption of social media by the neo- during Freedom, the Taliban began to form of pamphlets and magazines that Taliban has redefined the impact of the regroup. By 2003, rearmed groups of neo- supported Taliban ideas and activities. information environment allowing them Taliban, from in and outside of Afghani- DVDs followed, which provided sav- to engage in a global war of words. stan, re-emerged as a strong resistance age images of beheadings and attacks to to U.S. forces. Initial successes led to the punctuate the literature and night letters insurgents’ evolutionary step of initiating that the Taliban had relied on in the past. Who is Neo-Taliban? media and information campaigns in the The use of DVDs also transcended high The neo-Taliban, a term first introduced hopes of reasserting the message of Tali- illiteracy rates in Afghanistan by relying by the Economist magazine in 2003, ban strength (Maloney, 2008). on imagery to spread the message of the refers to militants in Afghanistan who The Taliban’s approach to the media neo-Taliban. fought against coalition and govern- was built on more than a decade of evo- The real transition in modern neo- ment forces and aid workers after the lution in contemporary insurgent media. Taliban media began in 2005 when the Taliban government was overthrown by As Dr. Adam Exum, a former U.S. Army neo-Taliban began their Internet pres- the U.S. backed Northern Alliance in officer and a Fellow of the Center for a ence. Building on the success of Iraqi 2001. The distinction between the neo- New American Security (CNAS), out- insurgent media’s use of the Internet, Taliban (2003-present) and the paleo- lines in 2008, the neo-Taliban followed the Taliban perfected Hizbullah’s model Taliban (1994-2001) is defined by their in the successes of Hizbullah and Iraq of attack, tape and disseminate in an at- resurgence following the fall of the Tali- and immersed themselves in media in tempt to reach an international audience. ban government and their inclusion of an attempt to win local support, main- While originally fairly basic, the site has “tribal malcontents, drug traffickers, and tain power through fear and elicit anger, evolved since 2005. As outlined in the other ‘ill-educated chancers’”. frustration, and backlash in the interna- article Taliban uses social media to The label has come to include top tional community. usher in a new era of Jihad (2011): leaders who were never captured, in- This transition was challenging for “More than just an amateur-made Tali- cluding Mullah Mohammed Omar, who the neo-Taliban in consideration of their ban home page, the ‘Voice of Jihad’ is a founded the movement. Also included previous stance on the perils of western full-service, well-managed, multi-media are Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his technology. But, like other insurgencies tool that is seemingly well-funded and Hizb-e-Islami party, the main recipients before them, they balanced the need poised for growth, which includes the of U.S. funded weapons that Pakistan to defeat their enemies with modified use of an official spokesperson whose funneled to the mujahidin groups that considerations of the impact on their role is to promulgate these stories to fought the 1979-89 Soviet occupation, ideologies. As James Forest illustrates, other Internet mediums and sources.” Pakistani Islamic extremists, foreign effective armed groups adapt to “attract The site is now updated up to 50 times jihadists and Al-Qaeda fighters from new recruits and to avoid stagnation daily and most battlefield accounts are Chechnya, Uzbekistan, and Arab coun- and complacency of the group’s mem- presented in ticker tape format making tries, Afghan drug merchants, lumber bers. They also recognize the need to them easy to transition to modern me- and gem smugglers, and criminal gangs learn and adapt in order to be success- dia mediums. This transition has allowed who cover their activities by portraying ful against their more powerful govern- the neo-Taliban’s media environment to themselves as defending Afghanistan ment adversaries.” (2008) This adaption effectively challenge both the U.S. and ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 59 ity, such as the online deluge of attack Taliban’s change of attitude since they videos, and not enough on its more were toppled for sheltering Al-Qaeda mundane aspects, such as jihadi web fo- after the 9/11 attacks. rums.” The neo-Taliban’s use of Twitter The most obvious social media tool and other high profile social media tools that the neo-Taliban has used is Twit- has severely challenged the perception ter. But, another example is their use of within the international community that Google’s Orkut, a popular, worldwide the neo-Taliban’s grasp of modern media Internet service, which provides a use- The impact of the neo- has reached its limit and is challenging ful tool for accessible communication Taliban’s continued international forces to once again rise with others who have a similar affinity advancement of their to the evolving information challenge for jihad. This online community has media environment driven by the neo-Taliban. helped rally support for the movement The neo-Taliban’s inclusion of so- and facilitated the sharing of jihadi vid- and their immersion cial and interactive media may best be eos as well as communication among into social and explained by their desire to remove the non-Arab jihad sympathizers. These two interactive media middle man to allow them to commu- social media tools do not even begin to tools has resulted in a nicate directly with their communities, address the inclusion of Facebook groups streamlined, modern networks and global audiences. The ex- and discussion groups/interactive com- pansion of their media environment to ponents on their “Voice of Jihad” website and prolific mediaand include social and interactive media tools that serve audiences in five languages. public relations cells. has not only had an external but also an The impact of the neo-Taliban’s internal impact on the insurgency. Ac- continued advancement of their media cording to Brachman, they have “used environment and their immersion into the Internet to replace their dismantled social and interactive media tools has NATO in their own traditional media training camps, reconnect their weak- resulted in a streamlined, modern and outlets at home and internationally, and ened organization, and reconstitute their prolific media and public relations cells. to effectively redefine insurgent online leadership.” And while he does not argue Further, the transition from a singular media as mainstream news. In a 2009 that the use of the Internet renders the to a comprehensive insurgent media interview in Foreign Policy, Michael physical training classrooms obsolete, environment has happened at lightning Doran, the former American Deputy Brachman does think that “information speed. The result has been an unprepared Secretary of Defense, said: “The Taliban technologies do change the nature of military and public consumer. As out- have great skill in directing their media education, indoctrination, and participa- lined in the article Taliban uses social activities and are very quick to publish tion,” (2006). media to usher in a new era of Jihad news. If any attack is conducted against Key to this transition has been the the neo-Taliban’s exploitation of social our forces, news is being published 26 ability of the neo-Taliban to understand media is moving at an unprecedented minutes later on the global satellite net- the power that social media has in pro- pace allowing them to disseminate or- works, taking its place in the breaking viding a voice and a presence to an organ- ders, post information on attacks and link news tickers for most of the global satel- ization that would otherwise be invisible with international media at a break-neck lite networks like Al-Jazeera, BBC and to the global audience. pace through various social media tools. CNN.” “The Islamic Emirate of Afghani- “A new war has been building; a cyber stan joined Twitter months ago,” Taliban war of words, challenging the West to spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid told AFP, be better and faster at viral messaging — Social media and the using the group’s name from its time in emailing, texting, Twittering, YouTub- neo-Taliban power. “We did it because we know Twit- ing, blogging, and Facebooking. It’s per- The announcements of the neo-Tali- ter is a popular social network in the West, vasive, sweeping across terrorist breeding ban’s appearance on Twitter merely and we want to make our voice heard. grounds in the Middle East and taking highlighted the fact that the neo-Tali- They used to hear only one-sided news root right here among us. Seemingly ban had already included social and in- about us from the invaders, but now they overnight, the rules of war have gotten teractive media tools into almost every can know the reality.” Mujahid said that less literal and more virtual.” component of their media campaign. an official Taliban page on Facebook had As Jarrett Brachman accurately points been shut down by the company earlier out: “widespread misconceptions about this year, but supporters still host personal The new information the movement’s use of technology have pages passing on news and information. battlespace served to focus too much public (and “We regard modern technology in- As an insurgency, this expansion has thus policy) attention on the more sen- cluding the Internet as a blessing of enabled the neo-Taliban to expand be- sational features of jihadi Internet activ- God,” he said, declining to explain the yond their territorial boundaries and ►►►

60 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Information Battlespace

engage in a global conversation, recruit- environment capabilities. The article Physical Battlespace ing a fear campaign that all serve an end says: “Like an army of ants that surround Information Battlespace goal of ridding Afghanistan of western their host and then simultaneously attack vs forces. As Angela Crack has described, as one synchronized unit, the Taliban is engaging in the public sphere allows for now able to instantly disseminate orders expansions previously limited by territo- across cyberspace to targeted audiences rial space. “New Information and Com- using every available technology.” munication Technologies have increased dialogic opportunities between geo- graphically disparate actors, thus open- Conclusion ing up the prospect of extending public For centuries the word “war” has been spheres beyond the state.” (2007) synonymous with physical battle. The While the neo-Taliban may never war in Afghanistan and the neo-Taliban have considered their transition in terms insurgency have changed the way that of entering the public sphere, they always modern militaries fight wars. Through understood the necessity of combining the extensive use of social media tools the military and information battlespace the neo-Taliban has shifted the centre of if they were to succeed in Afghanistan. gravity of conflict from the kinetic bat- We see this in al-Zawahiri’s quotation tlefield to the information battlespace. when he said, “We must get our message With the advancements of digital tech- across to the masses of the nation and nology the neo-Taliban have effectively break the media siege imposed on the transitioned the battlespace and evened jihad movement. This is an independent the playing field by creating a war where battle that we must launch side by side they do not have to meet the enemy sol- with the military battle” (2001). As a re- dier for soldier; allowing them to not sult of this aggressive insurgent media only survive but also expand and evolve. campaign, international forces have had As highlighted by the Crisis Group to acknowledge and engage in a new in- in Asia: “At the heart of this develop- formation battlespace. NATO’s former ment and transition is the neo-Taliban’s top commander in Afghanistan, Gener- adaption of and evolution to social media al David Petraeus, best summarized the mediums for the purpose of depicting conflict in Afghanistan when he stated themselves as unflagging and their ulti- in an interview with the BBC in 2010 mate victory as inevitable in order to se- that “this is all a war of perceptions. cure a strategic advantage. The neo-Tali- This is not a physical war in terms of ban as an assertive insurgency is seeking how many people you kill or how much to project its power to both domestic and ground you capture, how many bridges international audiences”. you blow up. This is all in the minds of As Stephanie Maier contends, “the the participants.” pervasiveness of the Taliban’s use of so- This statement by ISAF’s highest cial media and technology is a sure sign ranking soldier highlights the realities that there is more to come,” (2011). To of the changing modern battlespace and sum up, this is a battlespace that is still the fact that it is now a reality, rather growing and is challenging modern mil-  than an annoyance, of war. The concept itaries to catch up. of the information battlespace is now also taking hold in driving our approach to war and is at the heart of achieving successful outcome in Afghanistan by winning the battle of perceptions. As accurately described in the article Tali- References for this article are listed on ban uses social media to usher in a page 66. new era of Jihad (2011) the driver behind that new information battlespace is Right: Information battlespace is constantly the neo-Taliban who has survived more growing and challenging modern physical than a decade of international military battlespace. Above: ISAF photo by Royal presence while advancing their media Army Sergeant Andy Cole.

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 61 JWC Media Staff Prepares to Debut New Multimedia Capabilities

By Pete DuBois and Laura Lof lin DuBois World News Today (WNT) Producers, Joint Exercise Division Joint Warfare Centre

The mission Since its inception in 2005, the Joint of six and the cameras, lights and other timillion Euro capability reflects how Exercise Division ( JED) Media Section equipment that go with the mission. important the media environment is to has been operating from studio and of- Five years and many exercises later, the Alliance training and mission rehears- fice space at the Ulsnes Training Facil- JED media team is on the cusp of begin- als. Media training has evolved from a ity. The location was not chosen for its ning a new chapter in media simulation nice-to-have offering into an essential prime fishing spot or waterfront view and training with their state-of-the-art training objective and the JWC has been but rather out of necessity. The original studio in the new JWC headquarters at the forefront of this movement, pro- Joint Warfare Centre ( JWC) facilities building in Jåttå. The staff began formal viding practical training to NATO’s key at Jåttå, including the former tempo- training on the equipment early this year leaders and their staffs. rary buildings, did not provide adequate and current plans call for the studio and space for the media operation, and with related distribution system to be fully JWC exercises held at Ulsnes, it made operational in 2012. The studio sense for the exercise media team to base The mission of the JED Media Sec- The studio was integrated into the de- its operations there. tion is unique within NATO as it is sign of the new headquarters building In 2006, the media staff quickly the only full-time media training and and the equipment was carefully se- converted the Ulsnes Boathouse into a simulation entity in the 28 country Alli- lected in order to meet the mission of space that would accommodate the staff ance. NATO’s investment into this mul- providing timely, realistic and effective ►►►

62 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Media Simulation

media products to JWC Training Audi- The process World News Today is known for be- ences. At the heart of these capabilities The new studio and master control coming realistic, dynamic and effective when lies the studio and master control room ponents will certainly provide new ca- it comes to creating television news on the 2nd level. This will be the home of pabilities to the mission; however, that during exercises. To unsuspecting view- future World News Today (WNT) pro- does not mean the media equipment at ers WNT newscasts are often mistaken ductions – the flagship product of the Ulsnes will be mothballed, sold or given for real-world news programs seen on JED media simulation mission. As its away at the next JWC yard sale. Many CNN or BBC. The WNT staff looks to name implies, the master control room is of the components currently in use at take that realism even further with a few the nerve center for live and taped pro- Ulsnes will be integrated into the pro- more capabilities in the new facility. The ductions. All of the elements going into duction process at Jåttå. This is necessary two most exciting features are the ability a newscast converge here and are either in order to meet the complex demands to produce a live newscast and the media remotely or manually inserted into the of the JWC’s exercises and mission re- distribution system. final product. A variety of components hearsals. The media simulation team will Currently, a WNT newscast takes allow for complete control of audio, vid- still be fully kitted out and prepared to most of the day to produce in order to be eo, graphics and even lighting. deploy to Training Audiences outside of ready for an 18:00 viewing by the Train- The studio is simple yet impressive. Norway. Many of the elements used in ing Audience. The product might look Gone are the days when a TV news set WNT newscasts and other productions “live” however it actually takes hours to required props, windows, plants, monitors are created by the media staff at their produce. Scripts and interviews are con- or even camera operators. The new stu- workstations using a variety of multi- ducted by mid-day and the afternoon is dio uses a virtual set comprised of a blue media software. These pieces are then spent shooting, editing and creating the background, lights, two cameras and news inserted into the show being produced many other elements needed. The lead- desk. Virtual sets allow the crew to digit- in the studio. Graphics, animations, time of this process forces the team to ally create a variety of looks depending on standalone reports and audio clips are cutoff the news information flow in the the scenario. The studio cameras provide created and/or manipulated on separate early afternoon. Any major events hap- different perspectives of the subjects and computers and then transferred to mas- pening in the exercise after that time are totally operated via remote control. ter control. cannot be included in that evening’s

SPOTLIGHT WNT multimedia artists’ perspectives:

Yrjan Johansen Chris Hill Brandon Chhoeun Tudor Jelescu “I’ve worked at other “Perhaps the biggest “A commander’s “Staff going through TV studios before and improvement that channel, news about our media training ses- what we have now at customers can expect events in the Joint sions will now experi- Jåttå is definitely the is the immediacy that Warfare Centre, and ence a full-blown TV best and most modern the new facility pro- even Community Sup- studio and feel the I’ve worked with. The vides. Newscasts no port news bulletins pressure of the cam- thing that stands out longer need to be lim- are just some ideas eras and lights exactly the most is how auto- ited to a 6 pm viewing that can also be pos- as if they were inter- mated a lot of things time. I really think we sible with the new viewed on the BBC are in the studio.” have only just begun studio.“ or CNN. These new to scratch the surface capabilities will help of what’s possible.” increase the perception about the JWC as being the premiere training facility for NATO.”

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 63 newscast. This will all change in the new an added media training opportunity. Distributing the WNT programs training facility. WNT will be able to conduct “live” in- and other media products will follow a terviews during an exercise with selected two-pronged approach. In addition to staff from the Training Audience. Live loading the products onto WISE, they The way ahead interviews are a fact of life in today’s will also be pushed out through the With the stand-up of the new studio media environment and NATO military JWC’s internal distribution system. The and control room, live newscasts to the personnel have increasingly taken part in widescreen monitors mounted through- Training Audience in Jåttå will now be these interviews from Afghanistan and out the headquarters can now be used possible. It’s a capability offered nowhere other locations. to broadcast news products in real time. else in the military exercise community Currently, WNT interviews are con- The staff has the capability to determine and will provide the Training Audience ducted early in the day in order to be what programming goes to what moni- a media environment that will mirror the ready for the post-production process. tors. This will be a breakthrough that reality of the modern 24/7 news cycle. Sometimes interviews are simulated gives Exercise Control the ability to con- Future WNT newscasts will not only “live” but in reality they are usually a trol when certain information is pushed be able to report on a larger number of few hours old by the time the program to the Training Audience and it provides events but be flexible enough to react to is produced and aired. Now, the Training a more realistic avenue to deliver media late breaking changes in the scenario, Audience will have the opportunity to products. which can often happen. For example, take part in true, live interviews and be there might be a mass casualty event able to respond to whatever the situation scheduled for the afternoon. Previously, might be. The only simulated elements The evolution of media WNT would have had to pre-produce in the live interviews are the locations simulation the report in order to have it ready for of the participants. For example, the Ultimately, the mission of the JWC broadcast. If there were last minute interviewer can be “in London” in the media simulation team will not change. changes to the story then the report WNT studio on the 2nd level, while the The team will still provide media simu- would have to be cut or delayed. interviewee can be “in-theatre” on the 1st lation and training to NATO’s com- With the new capability, WNT will level. Video monitors throughout Exer- manders and their staffs. The new studio be able to report the mass casualty event cise Control and the Training Audience and equipment will simply allow them soon after it happens, in real-time and will be able to show the interview as it is to take their training to another level, with the latest, relevant information happening. It is an excellent chance for providing a more realistic media envi- from Exercise Control. The “live” ele- senior leaders to hone their messaging ronment, reflective of what commanders  ment of the new facility also introduces skills in a live setting. will actually face on the front lines.

WNT Producers Laura and Pete DuBois,

64 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 A PRESS DESK WITHIN THE JOINT OPERATIONS CENTRE

By Public Affairs Office HQ Rapid Reaction Corps — France

aking advantage of its Command (LCC) to provide quicker Issuing press releases: first to recent operational theatre confirmation of facts at hand. Therefore, tell the story experience in ISAF Joint it is very important once reporters have Press releases must be issued fast in or- Command, Rapid Reac- queries related to their stories, that an der to inform the public and counteract T tion Corps — France Public extensive effort is undertaken to pro- the enemy’s media misinformation spree, Affairs Office (RRC-FR PAO) experi- vide adequate answers. Reporters will regardless of the subject. In this way, the mented with the implementation of a normally send their queries to the PA military can be the first with the infor- new Public Affairs structure in the Joint Office. Determining the relevant facts mation to the public, so that the enemy’s Operations Centre ( JOC) at Exercise and executing the subsequent chain of unrealistic or exaggerated message can Common Tenacity 2011, held in approval process may slow down infor- be balanced with the military’s story. The Camp Wildflecken, Germany. mation delivery time and even informa- longer the delay in publishing truthful Like in most NATO JOC layouts tion accuracy. Even though everyone information, the more credibility for the for high readiness forces, a PA officer works fast, answers cannot be given on enemy’s story! Since all LCC branches is part of the JOC team and serves as a the spot. A time delay is imposed and have specialists acting as LNOs in the Liaison Officer (LNO) to PAO, keeping reporters may fear they will not be first JOC, it becomes easier for a JOC Press it updated on the latest events, incidents with the information, especially if they Desk representative to get information and facts of a nature to trigger a PA re- have it first-hand. So, they may decide to fast, craft a press release and issue it di- sponse. However, due to the latest de- publish an unverified story. This is one of rectly from the JOC. This could be seen velopments on the battlefield, combined the reasons why referring media queries as a major shift in PA procedures as with a spectacular evolution in use of directly to the JOC could significantly Chief Press Desk needs to hold release new media in conflict areas, PA assets on help to speed up the military’s response authority for each specific release. If the the ground are required to provide thor- time. All branches have representatives regular chain of approval is followed, ough responses to ensure new challenges in the JOC, which allows the JOC Press however, the “time window” for provid- are properly addressed. To be able to do Desk team to cut down on information ing correct information first may be lost, so, HQ RRC-FR put to test, for the first verification time and present verbal con- and additional (in most cases useless) ef- time, a “quick reaction” tool called “Press firmation to reporters within minutes. fort is expended to rectify a story already Desk” as it is currently employed by the reported in the news. ISAF Joint Command Current Opera- tions Cross Functional Team. Creating media updates: raised awareness across staff Answering media queries effi- Since most of the operational effort is ciently: a permanent challenge concentrated around the JOC and JOC Events on the battlefield, such as own members, together with LCC leader- troop or civilian casualties, plane crash- ship, media awareness briefings should es, or, in a different register, successful be given at least twice a day. Major development projects, greatly influence events may trigger more in-depth me- people’s perception of the conflict, be it dia analyses, which can be run by the PA internationally or locally. Raw, first-hand Office, but firsthand media awareness, accounts of events become available very together with relevant news verifica- fast through use of modern communications (also done in the JOC), should be tion technology. Reporters worldwide, available in the JOC. Given the mounds including local media, adjust accord- H Q Rapid Reaction Corps France of information on the table (latest news, ingly and expect the Land Component their confirmation, and other details),

►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 65 needs in conflict zones, however, cannot be met by the Press Desk alone since the desk normally has a narrower area List of References of responsibilities, mainly dealing with for Neo-Taliban’s Informa- short-term issues. Therefore, in terms of tion Environment (Page 58): events that could impact heavily on the • al-Zawahiri, A. (2001). Knights Under LCC, a sustained coordinated effort led the Banner of the Prophet. Al-Sharq al- by Chief PAO will be required, as will a Awsat. set of predefined criterion for triggering • Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D. (eds.) required actions. In respect to manning, (2001), Networks and Netwars: The Fu- ture of Terror, Crime and Militancy, Santa given the new tasks and responsibilities Monica, CA: RAND. of the JOC Press Desk, a minimum of • Brachman, J. (2006). High-Tech Terror: three PA officers are required to man a Al-Qaeda’s Use of New Technology. robust cell, subject to variations in media • Brahimi, A. (2010). The Taliban’s Evolv- pressure. ing Ideology. • Crack, A. (2007). Transcending Bor- Conclusion ders? Reassessing Public Spheres in a creating media updates at the JOC Press Networked World. Globalizations, 4(3), Desk can bring great advantage. The experimental use of a JOC Press 341–354. Desk in the RRC-FR exercise delivered • Crisis Group Asia Report. (2008). Tali- JOC Press Desk: part of the superior results in terms of gaining media ban Propaganda: Winning the War of staff momentum, as well as boosting news de- Words. • Exum, A. (2008). The Spectacle of War: All LCC members play a role in the livery and saving information verification Insurgent Video Propaganda and Western proper functioning of a JOC Press Desk, time, thus reflecting the HQ’s constant Response, 1990 – present. Arab Media & the key here being the release authority efforts to improve its operational proce- Society, 1-13. given to Press Desk members with re- dures. The JOC Press Desk is a quicker • Forest, J. (2008). Knowledge Trans- gard to press releases, media queries and alternative to the traditional media rela- fer and Shared Learning Among Armed statements, as well as any other actions tions process as conducted in an opera- Groups. • Guitozzi, A. (2008). Koran, Kalashnikov, to be taken by the desk. Release authori- tional environment. The Rapid Reaction and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in ty is required in order for the Press Desk Corps – France will continue to refine Afghanistan. Columbia University Press. to be first with the information, seize all aspects of this structure, as well as its • Haddick, R. (2009). Losing the Media and keep the initiative and gain the me- procedures so as to more closely identify War to the Taliban. dia momentum. Crisis communication benefits and potential improvements.  • Harpvikin, K. (1999). The Taliban Threat. Third World Quarterly. 20(4), 861-870. • Keeton & McCaan (2005). InfoOps, STRATCOM, and Public Affairs. Military Review, November–December. • Jones, S.(2008). The Rise of Afghani- stan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad. Internal Security 32(4), 7-40. • Maier, S. (2011). Taliban Uses Social Media to Usher in a New Era of Jihad. • Maloney, S. M. (2008). A Violent Im- pediment: the Evolution of Insurgent Op- erations in Kandahar Province 2003-07. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 19(2) 201. • Marcus, J. (2001). Afghanistan Conflict an “Information War”. • Ressler, S. (2006). Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Ter- rorism: Past, Present, and Future Research. Homeland Security Affairs. 2(2), 1-10. • Sharifi, U. (2011). Taliban on Twitter for Afghan Internet age. • Tan, Z.C.W. (1988). Media Publicity and Insurgent Terrorism: A twenty-year balance sheet. The International Journal for Mass Communication Studies, 42(1), 3-32. • The Economist Online. (2003). • USFOR-A. (2009). Initial United States Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Assess- U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 1st Class Stephen Hickok. ment Annex D: Strategic Communication.

66 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 Adventurous BeyondBeyond thetheTraining callcall ofof dutyduty By Wg Cdr Mark Watson, Royal Air Force Joint Warfare Centre

The United Kingdom’s Joint Service (10 meters) yachts. These yachts are re- standard. The JWC crew were vastly Adventurous Training (AT) scheme is placed every three years, the boats be- more experienced but, never expecting designed to test and develop the quali- ing delivered by sea from Ellos, Sweden the journey from Sweden to Germany ties of fitness, self-reliance, physical and (north of Gothenburg) to Kiel. to be easy, was surprised by the harsh- moral courage, powers of endurance and Exercise Diamond Viking was or- ness of the passage: brand new boats and interdependence. A secondary aim of the ganised by the Kiel Training Centre their attendant teething problems, foul training is to provide a nucleus of in- and served a dual purpose: to deliver 10 weather and fog, storm force winds and structors whose task it will be to lead yachts and conduct AT during the deliv- sea sickness all contributed their part. expeditions and pass on their learning. ery passage. UK service personnel from Taking over brand new boats, checking AT is conducted through the medium the JWC formed one of the crews. Colo- inventories and ensuring everybody had of sporting activity, including parachut- nel Colin Nobbs, Lieutenant Colonel a firm grasp of safety procedures, from ing, sub-aqua diving (and caving), moun- Ian Stanton, Wing Commander Mark working on the foredeck to man over- taineering and offshore sailing. Regard- Watson and WO2 (FofS) Bob James board drills, was a time consuming pro- less of rank, age or experience all UK have all gained much from the scheme. cess. This process is nevertheless essen- servicemen are encouraged to particpate, This was an opportunity for them to tial before undertaking the lengthy and with many younger servicemen sent on profit from the scheme and reinvest arduous passages expected, and helps AT as part of their early training. It is rec- time and effort for the benefit of future mitigate the risks of offshore sailing. The ognized that the emotions experienced servicemen; they did so during the 2011 two days spent alongside in Ellos was on AT are akin to those experienced on delivery, which took place over the pre- vital for what was to come. operations, and it thus plays a vital role equinox period 4-17 March. Although further south than Sta- in preparing individuals for deployment. A mixed bag of experience marked vanger, the weather was far more severe The Kiel Training Centre is located the crews and skippers: from nil to and the boatyard team had to break up in northern Germany. The Centre pro- Ocean Yachtmaster. Some skippers had the 10-15 cm of ice that threatened vides AT through offshore sailing and brought complete novices, with the the fleet’s departure. Once clear of the sub-aqua diving courses; the offshore intent of bringing them to the Royal harbour, the forecast southerly wind sailing element comprises ten 34 foot Yachting Association’s Competent Crew soon freshened and was gusting to 30 ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 67 The fleet had endured gale force 10 winds and 11 to 12 foot seas, sea sickness, freezing temperatures and tough living conditions.

knots. Sail size was reduced but it was and it was after this leg, two members in less than 50m visibility; with only a quickly apparent that to make progress of another crew were hospitalised, suf- rudimentary radar reflector (and no ra- we would need to proceed under engine. fering head and back injuries. As one of dar of our own) and the necessity to cross The rough seas and strong winds persist- our crew was to experience, after a par- the Flensborg–Kiel shipping channel ed for the next 30 hours — and the sleet ticularly gruelling stint on the helm, it the decision was made to turn back for and snow during the midnight hours was easier to stay on the floor and sleep the visiting yacht marina. This sounds “only made the sea sickness feel worse, a than try to get into a berth. grand, and in the summer months it is, condition much of the fleet was to suffer. After 25 hours on passage we found when these harbours are thronging with After some 34 hours since departing El- our mooring in Fredericia, Denmark — other yachts and the facilities available; los, skirting around the ice-bound har- and tucked into the curry we had scraped we, however, were the only yachts on the bour on Anholm, and a passage of 150 up from behind the galley stove where it water and these havens offered nothing nm; we arrived in Grenaa, Denmark. had been deposited after one particularly more than somewhere to moor up. Wa- While most had found some form violent wave. During the next three sail- ter and electricity had to be husbanded of “sea legs” during the earlier passage, ing days, both Ian and Bob planned and and the careful victualing conducted be- the next passage was to experience more executed complex passages culminating fore we left Kiel now paid dividends. severe weather, with winds peaking at 57 in night entrances into unfamiliar har- The final day’s passage to Kiel was knots, and steeper seas. Changing sails bours. Our passage to Sonderborg, Den- again marked by strong gusts but the in such conditions at night is a major mark was marked by light winds, forcing wind, no longer on the nose, meant we challenge and tests the crew to the max- the use again of the engine. Picking up were able to sail rather than having to imum; leaving the cockpit tests commu- the navigation lights at night against the rely on engine power. After 345 nautical nication, needs teamwork and no small backdrop of a major town was problem- miles, over some 84 hours of sailing (one measure of courage. Going below to atical and saw the speed kept to a mini- third, which was at night) and at an aver- navigate becomes a physical challenge mum. Nonetheless, we were alongside age speed of four knots, we tied up along- as crew are thrown around the cabin the town quay by 22:00, albeit on the side at Kiel. The fleet had endured gale while trying to chart position, correct wrong side of the swing bridge for any force 10 winds and 11 to 12 foot seas, the course and call out waypoints to the of the amenities, and ready for hot food. sea sickness, freezing temperatures and helmsman. We were forced again to re- We now discovered a loose hose had al- tough living conditions. Did we achieve sort to the engine to battle the mounting lowed all our cooking gas to vent over- the aims of the exercise? Categorically, seas and head winds, cooking was nigh board; fortunately, we were able to bor- yes. We delivered 10 yachts (now in less on impossible and we survived, those row a bottle from another of the fleet. than showroom condition) and fulfilled that could face food, on biscuits and Our departure the next day from every aspect of Adventurous Training. water. Our crew all suffered multiple Sonderborg in 400m visibility was Beyond the call of duty? No... Duty bruises as we were flung across the cabin, aborted when the next buoy was spotted Carried Out.

68 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 JWC Battlefield Studies

Photos Lt Col Markus Beck, DEU A PAO, Joint Warfare Centre

OTX HIGH NORTH will be featured on the upcoming December issue of The Three Swords

The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 69 ACTIVITIES EVENTS

NASA astronauts visited JWC Two astronauts with NASA’s STS 129 Mission, U.S. Navy Cap- tain Barry Wilmore (pilot) and Mike Foreman (mission specialist), visited the Joint Warfare Centre on 21 September 2011, to give a presentation about the STS 129 Mission aboard space shuttle Atlantis in November 2009. The presentation at Jåttå consisted of a demonstration of pictures that the STS 129 crew took from outer space as well as a spectacular movie, showing Atlantis’ launch at 700 frames per second, films taken inside the International Space Sta- tion at zero gravity and ultimately Atlantis’ successful landing after the completion of its 11-day mission. (Read the full article on JWC website at www.jwc.nato.int)

JWC TENNIS TOURNAMENT

The JWC Tennis Club held its first international tournament in May and June, just between the French Open and the Wimbledon championships. A total of 16 players competed and played 15 matches. On 6 July 2011, with the participation of Col Nobbs, the winners, Lt Col Siegfried Eisenre- ich (men’s singles), Mr Simon Dewing (doubles); and Ms Anne Gaelle Fer- randi (ladies’ singles), were rewarded and warmly congratulated. (From left: Lt Col Bottee de Toulmon, Col Nobbs, Lt Col Aguera, Mr Dewing, Mr Franc- esco, Lt Col Hammerer, Col Eisen- reich, Ms Ferrandi, PO Ferrandi, Ms Drezigue, MSgt Dieguez, Lt Drezigue, Lt Col Ozcelik.)

70 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011 In Memoriam The solemn Remembrance Ceremony in Jåttå marks the 10th Anniversary of September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks On Friday, 9 September 2011, U.S. Air Force Major Peter F. Olsen, Commander 426th Air Base Squadron, Stavanger, Norway, held a Commemoration and Re- membrance Ceremony at the Squadron’s Community Activity Centre, to mark the 10th Anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks on America as well as to honour and celebrate the resilience of individuals, families, and communities across the world. French Army Major General Jean Fred Berger, Commander of the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC); U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer, JWC Chief Brig. Gen. Steven J. DePalmer, U.S. Air Force, JWC Chief of Staff of Staff; Norwegian Army Brigadier Gun- nar E. Gustavsen, Adviser to Commander JWC, as well as many other staff attend- Most recently, on 22 July 2011, our Host ed the solemn ceremony in Jåttå. The Nation of Norway was attacked by an sequence of events started with a short extremist. The ceremony underlined that prayer, which was then followed by re- as we confront such senseless and hor- marks from Major Olsen. rific attacks, our commitment to promote “The 10th Anniversary of September and defend the shared values of toler- 11 is a milestone for the United States; ance, understanding and mutual respect a moment to reflect on the events that quickly emerge as a common sentiment. took place ten years ago,” Major Olsen Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer said in his opening speech. also provided remarks during the cer- “Having spent five of the last ten emony where he expressed his compas- years living in Europe, I know that Sep- sion and solidarity for the victims of the tember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks not terrorist acts. He also paid tribute to the only affected my Nation, but changed soldiers in harm’s way dealing with ac- the world and our relationships in it. tive conflicts, adding that we must also Citizens of 90 countries were among the remember and honour those who died 2,993 souls lost that day. The attacks in the fighting that has followed. Briga- united us with our fellow democratic na- dier General DePalmer also challenged tions against an ideology of radical ex- the audience to think ahead another 10 tremism. As we reflect on the horrific day years and decide what they can do to that marked the beginning of our strug- help prevent similar attacks. gle to better secure the world from these threats, we honour those that died in the Recollections of the 9/11 attacks attack, the heroic efforts of emergency At the end of the ceremony there was response personnel, and the resilience of a special presentation about the big- the survivors.” gest attacks on American soil a decade The ceremony highlighted that Sep- ago, which demonstrated extraordinary tember 11 terrorist attacks in the United images as well as the unique memories States were not a uniquely American of some of the Jåttå community mem- event; as in their aftermath the world bers on that day. Each slide highlighted has witnessed at least a dozen large how September 11 marked our collec- scale and brutally efficient attacks by tive memory and changed the world; extremists throughout Europe and Asia. reminding us, as vivid as yesterday, our profound state of horror and disbelief, Left: (Above) Light beams are lit at the while uniting us all in remembrance and site in memory of World Trade Center reflection once again. destroyed on September 11. Photo by Songquan Deng. Below: Maj Olsen. Text The Three Inci SwordsKucukaksoy, Magazine JWC PAO20/2011 71 K O O L

R I F

Article Page 62.  New Multimedia Capabilities Multimedia New JWC Media Staff Prepares to Debut

72 The Three Swords Magazine 20/2011