Israeli Intellectual and Modern Focus 43

Israeli Intellectual and Modern Focus 43 Chapter 2 Israeli Intellectual and Modern Focus In this chapter it is argued, first, that throughout the years the IDF has suffered from lack of intellectualism, which has sometimes had a detrimental effect on its performance. From the 1990s to 2006 the IDF emulated an RMA-inspired American doctrine, which has come at the expense of its originality and innovation, and Israeli military thinking has been affected by false intellectualism and intellectual pretense. These negative trends, however, have been balanced, at least to some extent, by a number of positive aspects, such as vibrant military thinking during Israel’s formative years; the relative popularity of military history; the existence of great debates on operational and buildup issues; intellectual efforts to understand attrition; and a more critical attitude toward American thought after 2006. Second, it is argued that as far as the modern focus of Israeli military thought is concerned, the IDF has been late to adapt to LIC challenges; it has had a strong tactical orientation, although since the 1980s/early 1990s it has eventu- ally recognized the importance of the operational and the grand-strategic levels; it has developed a cult of technology; its traditional force multipliers have been eroded; and logistics has been ascribed a different logic. Finally, moral and legal considerations have become an integral part of Israeli military thought, something that has been typical of the Western world in general. Intellectual Weakness Symptoms of Poor Intellectualism in the Military After having attributed Israeli commanders’ successes during the War of Independence to their intellectual skills, among other factors,1 Prime Minister and Defense Minister David Ben-Gurion expressed his concern in the 1950s about the lack of “intellectual openness” among IDF commanders.2 And indeed, symptoms of anti-intellectualism in the IDF could be detected throughout the years. Personal testimonies by university professors who taught middle and high rank Israeli commanders, such as Martin Van Creveld from the Hebrew University or Elie Barnavi from Tel Aviv University, found a lack of 1 David Ben-Gurion, Yichud VeYe’ud (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1971) [Hebrew], p. 43. 2 Eliot Cohen, “An Intellectual Challenge,” Haaretz, 20 September 1998. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004306868_003 44 Chapter 2 appreciation among IDF commanders toward the abstract aspects of their profession.3 After having been invited to lecture before the general staff members, Van Creveld was shocked by their lack of knowledge: “I have never met such a bunch of ignorant people in my entire life. In no other state or organization have I seen people who knew so little about their profession and its theory, including the history and doctrine of their own army.”4 Elie Barnavi was sur- prised to discover that “these people have not been reading anything besides a daily newspaper for years.”5 Yaacov Hisdai, a senior researcher for the Agranat Commission of Inquiry that investigated the failings of the 1973 October War, reached the conclusion that IDF commanders lagged in innovation, abstract thinking, and a sense of criticism.6 Uri Milstein, one of the IDF’s staunchest critics, has for many years argued that the IDF is an anti-intellectual estab- lishment. According to Milstein, it is no more than an unprofessional, armed militia that employs sophisticated weapon systems. Former editor of Maa rachot, the IDF’s professional journal, claimed that “the average Israeli officer does not read foreign professional literature. Apparently he thinks he does not need it. Hence he cannot update himself about military thinking in the wider world, which is published in dozens of professional journals in many languages.”7 A study by Eliot Cohen et al. affirmed these diagnoses.8 Only a few years ago, did the Winograd Commission’s final report on the functioning of the IDF during the Second Lebanon War reaffirm the existence of a “bad anti- intellectual tendency” among IDF’s senior commanders.9 Against the backdrop of performance problems during the 1973 October War and the 1982 First Lebanon War, a revolutionary curriculum was launched in 1989 at the Command and Staff College, named Barak (lightning, in Hebrew). According to General (retired) Doron Rubin, head of the IDF’s TOHAD (doctrine and education branch) – the Israeli TRADOC – the Barak program was a 3 Haaretz Weekend Supplement, 12 April 1996; Haaretz Weekend Supplement, 28 March 1997; Giora Eilon, “If We Keep that Way, the State of Israel Might Collapse,” Interview with Martin Van Creveld, Al Hasharon, 8 March 2002. 4 Eilon, “If We Keep that Way, the State of Israel Might Collapse.” 5 Haaretz Weekend Supplement, 28 March 1997. 6 <http://www.toravoda.org.il/14hisdai.html>. 7 Eviatar Ben-Tzedef, “The Israel Defense Forces, 1996,” Outpost (September 1996). Available at <http://www.afsi.org/OUTPOST/96SEP/sep4.htm>. 8 Cohen et al., Knives, Tanks, and Missiles, pp. 74–6. %20לאינטרנט/The Winograd Commission’s final report <http://www.vaadatwino.org.il/pdf 9 .pdf>, pp. 323, 397.מאוחד%20פוסי .

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