Innovation, Element of Power Laurent Murawiec published by Geopol, C.A.S.E. translation: Elizabeth Heeter This is a translation of Laurent Murawiec’s report, L’Innovation, Facteur de Puissance, as published by Geopol, C.A.S.E. The findings and analysis presented here are solely the responsibility of the author. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning and investment strategies for the 21st century. CSBA research makes clear the inextricable link between defense strategies and budgets in fostering a more effective and efficient defense, and the need to transform the U.S. military in light of the emerging military revolution. The center is directed by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich. For more information on CSBA, see our web site at http:// www. csbahome.com 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W. Suite 912 Washington, DC 200036 (202) 331-7990 Introduction According to historian and military analyst Martin van Creveld, military technology and infrastructure, logistics and communications “dictate for the most part the major characteristics of organization, training, strategy, even the concept itself of battle. Without it, one couldn’t conduct an armed conflict, and even the existence of conflict would be inconceivable.”1 The vast amount of land held in the rear of the battle sets narrow limits on what could take place along the front: battles, campaigns, and even war. The modern era, since the beginning of the industrial revolution has seen the front line expand to the detriment of the rear flanks. The path dependency described by van Creveld has grown: one fights wars based on and limited by technology. The acceleration of technological innovation over the 20th century is such that we could describe this era as an age of innovation. Moreover, the speed of this acceleration is rapidly increasing. The striking progress in electronics, information and telecommunication in the last two decades have contributed to the creation of unprecedented economic upheavals: innovative waves have a multiplier effect. All innovation necessarily disrupts the status quo ante. This axiom holds as true for military affairs as for economic ones. For example, the introduction of the steam engine and electricity transformed not only industry but also the realm of military affairs. These new technologies did not impact all nations in the same fashion or way. The resulting imbalance soon benefits one [nation] at the expense of another: those gaining from the breakthrough will be able to dominate those who do not. Innovation is an element of power. First this paper will analyze the innovative nature of the United States as a society before studying the significant waves of economic, technological and social innovations as experienced by this country. In the second part, the paper looks at the institutional fluidity valued by Americans and how this has played a role in fostering innovation. In this section, the study will also look at U.S. geopolitics. Thirdly, the study will then observe the connections between civilian and military evolution and how each has influenced the other, particularly in regards to the fragmentation of economic activity and organizational changes. The paper will question what is meant by the concept, the “revolution in military affairs,” looking closely at promulgators of the concept and at resistance to its acceptance in the fourth section. The fifth section will sound out the RMA’s impact on doctrines, industry and research and development. The sixth and final part will attempt to put forth some of these notions as they apply to France and Europe. A bibliography of documents relevant to the current U.S. debate is provided in the Appendix. 1 Martin van Creveld, Technology and War, From 2000 BC to the Present, The Free Press, Macmillan, New York (1991), pp. 311-2. 1: The United States: Innovative Society An observer of the United States today would have two principal impressions: its renewed sense of power and its bubbling innovation. These are not discrete, but rather are associated phenomena. The facts seem to clearly show that the United States is better at innovation than other countries. First, this report will attempt to grab hold of the rebound effects of this superior innovation, without forgetting the recent decline that affected power and innovation, the nadir of which is symbolized by Carter’s presidency. First this report discusses the sociology of innovation—which is based on U.S. history and its constitutional nature—and then examines the economic character of the American marketplace, and moves to the idea that there is a socio-cultural fluidity within American society. Second, the study will look at economic innovations, particularly those caused by a wave of technological innovation, the “drought” between the end of the Vietnam War and the end of Jimmy Carter’s term of office, and then the benefits from a new type of economy, based on decentralization and the unfolding economic revolution. In the course of human history, the first experiment demonstrating thermodynamic efficiency was conducted by Benjamin Franklin in 1744. This is one of the first contributions of the American colonies to innovation. Just as Franklin encompassed the scientist, the businessman and the politician, the causes and effects of innovation studied in this paper are parts of a whole. 1.1 Sociology of Innovation 1.1.1 The "Tocqueville" Base As many historians and analysts have noted, the United States, in contrast to the old nations of Europe and, it could be said today, of Asia, possesses neither a territorial nor an ethnic identity. Rather, the United States has become a new ethno-territorial entity, having been created on the basis of a social contract freely entered into by its citizens. This is what American social scientists call the “American Experiment,” in the sense that the nation [United States] is an experiment rather than a country rooted since time immemorial in, according to the ideology of some Europeans, “blood and earth.” Thus, the United States is first defined by being established on a contractual, not natural basis, and is itself the very representation of that contract. The contract is—following the epistomological issues raised by the Declaration of Independence—the Constitution of 1787, itself arising from a long, deliberative process involving not just the Founding Fathers but many other thinkers, intellectuals and political scientists. Completed by the Bill of Rights in 1791, this contract enhances and makes universal the fundamental concept that power originates from the people and so constitutes the state; the state is the representative of the people and the territorial organizations it creates: the federal government and its administration are not fundamental, but secondary; they do not establish, but are established.2 Clearly, unlike the European tradition preceding this era, the populace is not beholden to the state, nor are people subjects of the crown, but rather they are subject to a law in which the governing concept is natural law, not divine right. The abolition of an ideology based on roots and ethnicity corresponds to the abandonment of these as criteria for belonging: no longer is sanguinity or caste membership the basis for social hierarchies, but an individual’s worth: the American social contract is based on the individual. 2 Cf: 10th amendment, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.” 2 This notion of a meritocracy, and the absence of identification with a particular region or territory, makes social fluidity normal, not exceptional; the social rigidity that serfdom, guilds, and [medieval] corporations hold as coterminous with the divine order of things, disappears; change becomes the norm. It was not surprising that emigrants settling down in new territory, became inspired by the pioneering spirit, itself arising out of such notions. American history as such fosters the notion of change and pioneering. The apparently endless extension westward, the frontier unfolding before the conquest, the ceaseless contribution of immigration were consolidating unconsciously what was desired by the collective conscience. Despite the melting pot’s recurring crises, the pattern continues. The United States did not escape the desire to consolidate acquired positions and transform them into social monopolies: the blue bloods of Boston and New England wanted to erect an English-style aristocracy. Robber barons believed they could also create another European aristocracy, but all these attempts have remained ephemeral and have been swept aside by the flux of change. The United States remains a nation of pioneers and immigrants who are conscious of these realities. The closing of the frontier, once the Pacific was reached, and the refusal to pursue colonial policies have not tamed the vision, but have redirected it from geography to other spheres such as the New Frontier announced by President Kennedy in 1961. This said, the American social contract is not that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The secret meritocracy of elites. The circulation among elites allows for renewal, but it still assumes a society directed by elites. In the American version, there are functional elites, not feudal or post-feudal ones. Nor are the elites tied as such to the state: they do not derive their force or power from their association with the government, but on the contrary, once established as elites, they then bring their status under the guise of providing the service an elite owes the state. These elites are local, primarily wealth-based, whether it was earned in agriculture, business, industry or banking. The power comes from below. This power itself is not the monolith of European absolutism. The separation of powers theorized by Montesquieu, John Locke and David Hume has been realized.