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Issues, Trends and Challenges in an Emerging Global Power Structure

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Issues, Trends and Challenges in an Emerging Global Power Structure ISSN 1712-8056[Print] Canadian Social Science ISSN 1923-6697[Online] Vol. 14, No. 2, 2018, pp. 5-15 www.cscanada.net DOI:10.3968/10182 www.cscanada.org Issues, Trends and Challenges in an Emerging Global Power Structure Aituaje Irene Pogoson [a]Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. *Corresponding author. INTRODUCTION Two phenomenal events, more than any other, shaped our Received 24 November 2017; accepted 27 January 2018 world in the last century. The first is the denotation of Published online 26 February 2018 the first two weapons of mass destruction on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, both in Japan in 1945. The second was the Abstract pulling down of the Berlin wall in 1989. The reality of the early 21st century is that the world is The use of the atomic bomb in the theatre of war, in the grip of the transformation of the power structure. after several years of secret research and development, China has risen into global reckoning; Russia began to announced the arrival of the United States of America as rise from its inertia; North Korea has evolved to a global the most powerful nation in the world, Before then, the threat. All have begun to lay claims to a greater role in United States was just one of the major powers, although the international political system. The unipolarism of the one whose entry and contributions to the second world post-Soviet era seems to be dissolving before our eyes. war, helped to save the world from Hitler’s philosophy of These emerging trends raise questions as to; what sort superiority of the Aryan Race and his dream of imposing of multipolarism are we talking about? How will the a 1000-year Reich on the world, as well as from Japan’s coming multipolar order operate? Will great power be aggressive imperial adventure in South-East Asia. able to work together to uphold order? Will they descend The atomic bomb also ensured that the Soviet into self centred and destabilizing military and economic Union did not convert its massive military advantage competitions? Can the world support multiple world characterized by a huge military manpower and the largest orders, co-existent yet separate? There are no iron-clad assembly of tanks in any post war era. The Soviet Union answers to these questions. However, current geopolitics had Western Europe by the jugular and was within its does, perhaps, allow for a glimpse into the future. operational capability to occupy the rest of Europe but This article aims to contribute to that discourse by the reality of atomic bombs in the arsenal of the United making three claims. First, there is a dramatic increase in S was always a sobering strategic reality. The communist the number of global actors. Second, the diversity among romance of turning the world into one giant proletariat actors has created opportunities for the emergence of universe was moderated by the harsh prospects of nuclear new systems and new partnerships and for old ones to be annihilation. strengthened and transformed. Lastly, the future multi- For the first four years of the post second world war polar world will be potentially more unstable than all the era, the world was in turmoil arising from the tensions other multi-polar periods history has experienced: for the over the management of the spoil of the war-Germany. first time in history, the world could become both multi- Several times during that period, the prospects of war polar and nuclear. between the erstwhile allies against Germany loomed Key words: Polarity; Multipolarity; Power-shifts large, the most obvious being the Berlin blockade of 1949 which was broken by heroic air drops of foods and drugs Pogoson, A. I. (2018). Issues, Trends and Challenges in an Emerging by the Wester powers. Fortunately, there was no war, Global Power Structure. Canadian Social Science, 14(2), 5-15. Available instead, the Soviet Union developed its own atomic bomb from: http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/css/article/view/10182 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/10182 in 1949 and by so doing, ended the monopoly which the United States had enjoyed for four years. 5 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture Issues, Trends and Challenges in an Emerging Global Power Structure The Soviet atomic bomb ushered in the era of the Cold The presence and availability of nuclear weapons will War, characterized by a vicious nuclear arms race, fierce indeed allow even middle and small powers and non-state ideological confrontation, proxy wars and sponsorship actors to seriously threaten and undermine global security of instability and regime change around the world. and peace. The Cold War lasted till the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, a momentous event which saw the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the restructuring of the world 1. UNDERSTANDING POLARITY from bipolarism to unipolarism. Francis Fukuyama In international relations, polarity is important in the optimistically described it as the “End of History”, that is understanding of global governance and in dealing with the end of the war inducing dialectics of power. What we global issues in the current globalised world. Polarity are witnessing he wrote at the time, describes the degree to which the global system revolves is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular around one or more powerful states or “poles”—the period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that distribution of power in the global system- the number of is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the independent power centers, or poles, in the world (Kaarbo universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form & James, 2011; Hughes, 2000). Polarity first distinguishes of human government. (Fukuyama, 1989, p.2) between great powers and lesser powers. Great powers The Cold War came to an end in 1991 and the United have system wide interests and sufficient powers to purse States emerged as the only super power while western them (Craig & George, 1983). Second, polarity identifies liberal democracy was on the march. That had however the number and relative size of great powers. Historically, begun to change. China rose like a phoenix into global great powers have constituted a limited subset of total reckoning; Russia began to rise from its slumber; North states, seldom more than five or six (Sytoll, 1989). Third, Korea has evolved to a global threat. All have begun to polarity sometimes specifies relationships between great lay claims to a greater role in the international political and lesser powers. Polarity defines the character of the system. The unipolarism of the post-Soviet era seems to international system at a particular period of time. The be dissolving before our eyes. distribution of power capabilities in the international The reality in this early 21st century is that the world system determines the number of the great powers and, once again is in the grip of the transformation of the consequently, the polarity of the international system. power structure. But this does not tell the full story. What If the great powers are more than two, the system will sort of multipolarism are we talking about? How will the be multi-polar; if they are two, it will be bipolar, while coming multipolar order operate? Will great powers be systems with only one great power are considered able to work together to uphold order? Will they descend unipolar, or hegemonic (Mearsheimer, 2001). Basically, into self centred and destabilizing military and economic polarities offer a powerful way of grasping the structure competitions? Can the world support multiple world of power in historic and contemporary systems. orders, co-existent yet separate? There are no iron-clad Unipolarity: When a single entity dominates the answers to these questions. However, current geopolitics system, it is unipolar. The unipolar system contains does, perhaps, allow for a glimpse into the future. a single great power, meaning that only one state has This article aims to contribute to that discourse by most of the economic, military and cultural influence. making three claims. First, there is a dramatic increase in Jervis (2009) argues that there are three main features of the number of global actors. Second, the diversity among unipolar system: unipolarity being an interstate system actors has created opportunities for the emergence of rather than an empire. “Unipolarity implies the existence new systems and new partnerships and for old ones to be of many juridically equal non-states, something that an strengthened and transformed. Lastly, the future multi- empire denies. In empires, inter-societal divide-and-rule polar world will be potentially more unstable than all the practices replace interstate balance-of-power dynamic” other multi-polar periods history has experienced: for the (Jervis, 2009, p.190); unipolarity is anarchical. Waltz first time in history, the world could become both multi- (1964) argues that “a great power cannot exert a positive polar and nuclear. control everywhere in the world” (Waltz, 1964, p.887). The article will be presented in four sections. In the This kind of system has been characterized by the lack first, we establish an understanding of multipolarism of competition among great powers and thus absence of within the larger conceptualization of polarity and war. According to Samuel Huntington, a unipolar system polarization. The second section will provide a historical would have one superpower, no significant major powers, overview of multipolarity. The third will focus on today’s and many minor powers (Huntington, 1999). An example world, arguing that a decline of United State’s unipolarity of a unipolar system according to Monteiro (2011), is the and the rise of other powers are creating the conditions post-Cold War international system when the defence for a multi-polar world.
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