Introduction

James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge

Democracy is under siege. Approval ratings for democratic institutions in most countries around the world are at near-record lows. The number of rec- ognized democratic countries in the world is no lon- ger expanding after the so-called Third Wave of dem- ocratic transitions.1 Indeed, there is something of a “democratic recession.”2 Further, some apparently democratic countries with competitive elections are undermining elements of liberal democracy: the rights and liberties that ensure freedom of thought and ex- pression, protection of the rule of law, and all the pro- tections for the substructure of civil society that may be as important for making democracy work as the JAMES S. FISHKIN, a Fellow of the electoral process itself.3 The model of party compe- American Academy since 2014, is tition-based democracy–the principal model of de- Director of the Center for Delib- mocracy in the modern era–seems under threat. erative Democracy, the Janet M. That model also has competition. What might be Peck Chair in International Com- munication, Professor of Commu- called “meritocratic authoritarianism,” a model in nication, and Professor of Political which regimes with flawed democratic processes nev- Science (by courtesy) at Stanford ertheless provide good governance, is attracting at- University. tention and some support. Singapore is the only suc- JANE MANSBRIDGE, a Fellow of cessful extant example, although some suggest China the American Academy since 1994, as another nation moving in this direction. Singapore is the Charles F. Adams Professor is not a Western-style party- and competition-based of Political Leadership and Dem- democracy, but it is well-known for its competent civil ocratic Values at the Harvard Ken- servants schooled in making decisions on a cost-ben- nedy School. efit basis to solve public problems, with the goals set (*See endnotes for complete contributor by elite consultation with input from elections rath- biographies.) er than by party competition.

© 2017 by James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge doi:10.1162/DAED_ x_00442

6 Public discontent makes further difficul- Over the last two decades, another ap- James S. ties for the competitive model. Democra- proach to democracy has become increas- Fishkin & Jane cies around the world struggle with the ap- ingly prominent. Based on greater deliber- Mansbridge parent gulf between political elites who are ation among the public and its represen- widely distrusted and mobilized citizens tatives, deliberative democracy has the who fuel populism with the energy of an- potential, at least in theory, to respond gry voices. Disillusioned citizens turning to today’s current challenges. If the many against elites have produced unexpected versions of a more deliberative democracy election results, including the Brexit deci- live up to their aspirations, they could help sion and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. revive democratic legitimacy, provide for The competitive elections and referenda more authentic public will formation, pro- of most current democracies depend on vide a middle ground between widely mis- mobilizing millions of voters within a con- trusted elites and the angry voices of pop- text of advertising, social media, and efforts ulism, and help fulfill some of our common to manipulate as well as inform public opin- normative expectations about democracy. ion. Competing teams want to win and, in Can this potential be realized? In what most cases, are interested in informing vot- ways and to what extent? Deliberative de- ers only when it is to their advantage. The mocracy has created a rich literature in both rationale for competitive democracy, most theory and practice. This issue of Dædalus influentially developed by the late econo- assesses both its prospects and limits. We mist Joseph Schumpeter, held that the same include advocates as well as critics. As de- techniques of advertising used in the com- liberative democrats, our aim is to stimu- mercial sphere to get people to buy prod- late public deliberation about deliberative ucts can be expected in the political sphere. democracy, weighing arguments for and On this view, we should not expect a “gen- against its application in different contexts uine” public will, but rather “a manufac- and for different purposes. tured will” that is just a by-product of po- How can deliberative democracy, if it litical competition.4 were to work as envisaged by its supporters, Yet the ideal of democracy as the rule of respond to the challenges just sketched? “the people” is deeply undermined when First, if the more-deliberative institutions the will of the people is in large part manu- that many advocate can be applied to real factured. The legitimacy of democracy de- decisions in actual ongoing democracies, pends on some real link between the public arguably they could have a positive effect on will and the public policies and office-hold- legitimacy and lead to better governance. ers who are selected. Although some have They could make a better connection be- criticized this “folk theory of democracy” tween the public’s real concerns and how as empirically naive, its very status as a folk they are governed. Second, these institu- theory reflects how widespread this nor- tions could help fill the gap between dis- mative expectation is.5 To the extent that trusted elites and angry populists. Elites leaders manufacture the public will, the are distrusted in part because they seem normative causal arrow goes in the wrong and often are unresponsive to the public’s direction. If current democracies cannot concerns, hopes, and values. Perhaps, the produce meaningful processes of public suspicion arises, the elites are really out will formation, the legitimacy claims of for themselves. On the other hand, pop- meritocratic autocracies or even more ulism stirs up angry, mostly nondelibera- fully autocratic systems become compar- tive voices that can be mobilized in plebes- atively stronger.6 citary campaigns, whether for Brexit or for

146 (3) Summer 2017 7 Introduction elected office. In their contributions to this These are some of the challenges facing issue, both Claus Offe and Hélène Lande- those who might try to make deliberative more explore the crisis of legitimacy in democracy practical. representative government, including the The earliest work on deliberative democ- clash between status quo–oriented elites racy began by investigating legislatures.7 In and populism. Deliberative democratic this issue, Cass Sunstein, in contrast, looks methods open up the prospect of prescrip- at deliberation among policy-makers with- tions that are both representative of the in the executive branch. Bernard Manin entire population and based on sober, evi- looks outside government toward debates dence-based analysis of the merits of com- and public forums that can improve the de- peting arguments. Popular deliberative in- liberative quality of campaigns and discus- stitutions are grounded in the public’s val- sions among the public at large. ues and concerns, so the voice they magnify Much of the energy in deliberative de- is not the voice of the elites. But that voice mocracy efforts has focused on statisti- is usually also, after deliberation, more ev- cal microcosms or mini-publics, in which idence-based and reflective of the merits of citizens, usually recruited by random sam- the major policy arguments. Hence these pling, deliberate in organized settings. In institutions fill an important gap. some settings, relatively small groups of fif- How might popular deliberative democ- teen or so deliberate online with an elect- racy, if it were to work as envisaged by its ed representative.8 In other settings, the supporters, fulfill normative expectations groups can be given access to balanced of democracy, thought to be unrealistic information and briefing materials that by critics of the “folk theory”? The issue make the best case for and against various turns on the empirical possibility that the options. They can also be given access to public can actually deliberate. Can the peo- competing experts who answer their ques- ple weigh the trade-offs? Can they assess tions from different points of view. Then, competing arguments? Can they connect at the end of the deliberations in these or- their deliberations with their voting pref- ganized settings, there is some way of har- erences or other expressions of preference vesting their considered judgments. Sever- about what should be done? Is the problem al of the essays discuss Deliberative Polling, that the people are not competent, or that which brings together a random sample of they are not in the right institutional con- citizens for a weekend of deliberation and text to be effectively motivated to partici- gathers data, as in an opinion poll, from pate? These are empirical questions, and the random samples both upon recruit- the controversies about them are part of ment and then again at the end of the de- our dialogue. liberations. The method also permits qual- itative data by recording the discussions, This issue includes varying definitions, both in moderated small groups and in ple- approaches, and contexts. The root notion nary sessions where questions generated in is that deliberation requires “weighing” the small groups are directed at experts rep- competing arguments for policies or candi- resenting different points of view. Other dates in a context of mutually civil and di- mini-publics, such as “citizens’ juries” verse discussion in which people can decide and “consensus conferences,” are usually on the merits of arguments with good in- smaller (a couple of dozen instead of two or formation. Is such a thing possible in an era three hundred people) and arrive at some- of fake news, social media, and public dis- thing like an agreed-upon statement or ver- cussions largely among the like-minded? dict as a recommendation to the public or

8 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences to authorized policy-makers. Some ran- necting the people to policy-making. Nicole James S. domly selected mini-publics even make Curato, John Dryzek, Selen Ercan, Carolyn Fishkin 9 & Jane binding decisions. Hendriks, and Simon Niemeyer offer a sys- Mansbridge The basic rationale for the mini-public tematic overview of what they regard as the approach is that if the random sample that key findings of the deliberative democra- is gathered to deliberate is representative cy research around the globe. Their find- of the population, and if it deliberates un- ings are optimistic and differ from some of der good conditions, then its considered the critical perspectives presented later in judgments after deliberation should rep- the issue. resent what the larger population would The second group of essays might be la- think if somehow those citizens could en- beled “new thinking.” Bernard Manin pro- gage in similarly good conditions for con- poses that the core of deliberation is cap- sidering the issue. A great deal depends on tured by what he calls the “adversarial the mini-public actually being representa- principle,” according to which public dis- tive and on the account of good conditions cussions should be organized to allow a to which it is exposed. “confrontation of opposing positions.” Im- Whenever an application of delibera- plementing this idea is more complex than tive democracy depends on a randomly se- first appears and has a history going back to lected mini-public, that application raises Ancient Athenian institutions. Manin of- the issue of degree of empowerment. Can fers various suggestions, including some for or should such mini-publics supplant de- modern televised debates. Hélène Lande- mocracy by competitive elections? No con- more asks whether deliberative democracy tributor to this issue makes that argument. can be saved from the current crisis of rep- But in several cases, duly appointed admin- resentative democracy around the world. istrators have committed in advance to im- Her positive answer depends on an ambi- plementing the recommendations of such a tious sketch of an “open democracy,” in mini-public and, in some cases, those rec- which institutions would be inclusive and ommendations are binding. How much can power accessible to ordinary citizens, in- randomly selected groups be relied upon for cluding through representation in delibera- authoritative public decisions and in what tive bodies of randomly chosen citizens, cit- ways? Cristina Lafont argues against re- izens’ initiatives, and crowd-sourced law- lying solely on such groups for decisions, making and policy processes. but opens the door to discussions of a pos- The next two groups of essays alternate- sible albeit limited role for them. She use- ly present and respond to some of the main fully poses the problem from the perspec- criticisms of deliberative democracy. Ar- tive of the vast majority of citizens who will thur Lupia and Anne Norton argue in their not be in a mini-public: how do the deliber- elegant phrasing that “inequality is always ations connect with them if they have not in the room.” If the outcome of delibera- deliberated? tion is inevitably distorted by the more ad- vantaged participants dominating the dis- The essays are organized roughly in five cussions, the results are not likely to repre- groups. To introduce the topic of deliber- sent the true views of the rest of the group. ative democracy, Claus Offe sketches the Rather, any such results would reproduce conflict between distrusted elites and the the inequalities and power relations among populism of Brexit and other plebiscitary the participants. Inequality among partic- processes, arguing that deliberation via ran- ipants is one of the major challenges to the dom sampling could help fill the void, con- larger idea of implementing deliberative

146 (3) Summer 2017 9 Introduction democracy–a challenge that must be pur- some parliamentary contexts, particularly sued with great seriousness. those characterized by “coalition settings, Responding to critics of deliberation, second chambers, secrecy, low party disci- Alice Siu reflects on the role of inequality pline, low issue polarization, and the strong using data from Deliberative Polls, both presence of moderate parties.” Their insti- online and face-to-face, finding far less dis- tutional prescription for parliament con- tortion than critics expect. She also offers trasts sharply with Shapiro’s. Regarding surprising findings on who takes the most public deliberation, they draw on Europolis, talking time, who has the greatest influence a European-wide Deliberative Poll with a on the outcomes, and who offers more “jus- sample of ordinary citizens, and provide ev- tified” arguments, supplying reasons for idence that the citizens were able to reason their positions. But this is an ongoing em- in ways comparable to those of the parlia- pirical question. No one has yet systematic- mentarians. ally studied the role of inequality under dif- In her essay, Cristina Lafont makes a ferent deliberative designs. More research case against giving any decisional status with controlled experiments could clarify to mini-publics. Although she grants that this issue further. deliberating mini-publics may make rea- Ian Shapiro robustly defends the model sonable decisions when the participants of competitive democracy as the alterna- have considered the options in good con- tive to deliberative democracy. He believes ditions, to grant them power over decisions that through party competition we can fos- on this basis would be to give “blind defer- ter an “argumentative ideal” that has ele- ence” to a “special version of elite concep- ments of deliberation, but does not suffer tions of democracy.” On the representative- from either the lack of realism of the delib- ness argument for granting them power, the erative model or the potential veto power public might think that the participants in of intense minorities that emerges when a mini-public “share our interests, val- consensus is the decision rule or goal. He ues, and policy objectives,” so their views champions an argumentative version of the will “coincide with what we would have Westminster two-party competition mod- thought if we had participated.” Yet most el in which each side must make its case. He larger mini-publics (including those that also criticizes the room for deliberation of- collect post-deliberative opinions in con- fered in multiparty proportional represen- fidential questionnaires) are not designed tation systems, in an argument that con- to produce consensus. In this respect, they trasts with the position offered by André differ from the model of deliberation most Bächtiger and Simon Beste in their contri- criticized by Shapiro. Hence there is almost bution to this issue. always, at least in the larger mini-publics, a Bächtiger and Beste contest the “standard majority view and a minority view revealed argument that politicians do not want to de- in the final confidential questionnaires or liberate and citizens are not able to.” They vote. Lafont argues that an individual voter draw on extensive empirical work with the who has not participated cannot be sure “Discourse Quality Index,” which exam- whether she would have been in the ma- ines the reasoning offered by deliberators jority or in the minority after deliberation. in legislatures, especially on the question of Why should she be bound by the majority whether they offer justifications for their as- view post-deliberation if she might have sertions. They find that, despite the current come out with the minority view? cynicism about representative democracy, No essay in this issue stands as an explic- room for genuine deliberation appears in it response to Lafont, as we fortuitously

10 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences had for the first two critics. So we will try high-quality deliberation. In this case, how- James S. to respond here by asking: if the citizens in ever, high-level policy-makers, rather than Fishkin & Jane the broader public believe in democracy, the people themselves or their elected rep- Mansbridge then why might they not take as serious- resentatives, are doing the deliberating. ly the recommendations of deliberating James Fishkin, Roy William Mayega, Lyn majorities as they do the decisions of non- Atuyambe, Nathan Tumuhamye, Julius deliberating majorities? In a deliberating Ssentongo, Alice Siu, and William Bazeyo mini-public, the final reported views are examine the first Deliberative Polls in Af- what the people in microcosm concluded rica. Those skeptical of the capacity of ran- on the basis of in-depth deliberation. If a domly selected bodies to make intelligent decision is taken on the basis of the major- decisions have assumed that if such proce- ity after deliberation, there will certainly dures are viable at all, they must apply only be dissenters, as with any majority decision. or primarily in developed countries with Much depends on what we mean by the highly educated populations. Can these public taking the results seriously. Lafont methods be applied to populations with argues forcefully against any trust-based low literacy and very low educational lev- argument that might suggest “blind def- els? Can the people in such communities erence” to the majority in a randomly se- reason usefully about the trade-offs of ma- lected mini-public. Perhaps, however, duly jor policy choices affecting their commu- elected officials might delegate some re- nities? Can they do so in ways useful for sponsibility to such a group. How much policy? The difficult issues of disaster re- decisional status should the recommenda- lief and population pressure in rural Ugan- tions of a mini-public have? Should these da pose a test case for the question: who mini-publics be an official part of a decision can deliberate? In these first African De- process or only part of the dialogue in the liberative Polls, random sampling and de- public sphere? Are there contexts in which liberation allowed the people who must live they could bear the full weight of an institu- with development policies to be consulted, tional decision? The question of role poses with reasonable results, even in such diffi- a central challenge for deliberations based cult conditions. on mini-publics. In the final essay of the issue, Baogang He The final section focuses on applications. and Mark Warren look outside the purview The essays shed light on the questions: who of competitive democratic systems to ask deliberates, and in what context? As Cass whether the practice of deliberative democ- Sunstein notes, the term deliberative democ- racy may be feasible within authoritarian racy was coined in a study of how delibera- regimes, such as China. They ask: why have tion took place in the Senate, in ways that, some Chinese authorities embraced and to some degree, matched how the Consti- supported the form of a randomly selected tution’s framers thought the Senate ought mini-public for “grass roots experimen- to act.10 Deliberation is a crucial part of tation” for local government decisions? government in the executive and judicial Can deliberating mini-publics be properly branches. Sunstein distills his experience conducted for budget and other local deci- in government to offer a compelling picture sions in a society that lacks the civil liber- of deliberation taking place within the pol- ties and individual rights familiar in com- icy teams grappling with interagency issues petitive democracies? What are the effects and the production of good policy in the ex- and prospects of what they call “delibera- ecutive branch of the U.S. government. His tive authoritarianism?” Will such experi- account seems to satisfy all the criteria for mentation lead to further institutional de-

146 (3) Summer 2017 11 Introduction velopment in line with democratic values reform mass politics and public debate to or will it simply serve to legitimate current avoid not only fake news, but also the in- power relations and institutions, preclud- creasing pressures of narrow-casting in the ing long-term reform? commercial media, self-sorting into infor- mation bubbles on social media, and geo- This issue examines a wide range of de- graphic sorting by ideology as people move liberative democratic practices and appli- to more politically homogeneous commu- cations. It includes competitive democra- nities. It should leave the reader asking: cies, authoritarian regimes, and developed What challenges and critiques are most and developing countries. It opens up de- telling for deliberative democracy? How bates on how to improve deliberation in serious are the ways in which deliberation legislatures and other governmental bod- can go awry? Whatever conclusions our ies, and on what institutional roles and de- readers reach on these questions, this is- cision power randomly selected citizens sue depicts a vibrant area of democratic ex- might have after they have been able to dis- perimentation at a time when many have cuss issues in some depth under good con- lost confidence in the processes of electoral ditions. It asks how we might effectively representative democracy.

endnotes * Contributor Biographies: JAMES S. FISHKIN, a Fellow of the American Academy since 2014, is Director of the Center for Deliberative Democracy, the Janet M. Peck Chair in International Com- munication, Professor of Communication, and Professor of Political Science (by courtesy) at Stan- ford University. He is the author of When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consulta- tion (2009), Deliberation Day (with Bruce Ackerman, 2004), and The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (1995). JANE MANSBRIDGE, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1994, is the Charles F. Adams Professor of Political Leadership and Democratic Values at the Harvard Kennedy School. She is the author of Why We Lost the ERA (1986) and Beyond Adversary Democracy (1983), and coeditor of Political Negotiation (with Cathie Jo Martin, 2015) and Deliberative Systems (with John Parkin- son, 2012). 1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 2 Larry Diamond, “Facing Up to Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy 26 (1) (January 2015): 141–155. 3 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 4 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1942), 263. 5 Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2015). 6 For the legitimacy of the distortions from economic inequality, see Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014). 7 The work began with Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), followed by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

12 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Press, 1996); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton, James S. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); Jürg Steiner, André Bächtiger, Markus Spörndli, and Fishkin Marco R. Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action: Analyzing Parliamentary Discourse (Cambridge: & Jane Cambridge University Press, 2004); and further work inspired by this Swiss team and others. Mansbridge 8 See, for example, Michael A. Neblo, Kevin M. Esterling, Ryan P. Kennedy, David M. J. Lazer, and Anand E. Sokhey, “Who Wants to Deliberate–And Why?” American Political Science Review 104 (3) (August 2010): 1–18. 9 On citizens’ juries, see the work of Ned Crosby and Peter Dienel. On binding decisions and other features of a variety of randomly selected mini-publics, see Yves Sintomer, Petite histoire de l’expérimentation démocratique: Tirage au sort et politique d’Athènes à nos jours (Paris: La Découverte, 2011). 10 Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason.

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