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The Prospects & Limits of Deliberative Democracy

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on the horizon: Dædalus Civil Wars & Global Disorder: Threats & Opportunities edited by Karl Eikenberry & Stephen Krasner with James D. Fearon, Bruce Jones & Stephen John Stedman, Stewart Patrick, Martha Crenshaw, Paul H. Wise & Michele Barry, Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Hendrik Spruyt, Stephen Biddle, Will Reno, Aila M. Matanock & Miguel García-Sánchez, and Barry Posen Ending Civil Wars: Constraints & Possibilities Democracy Summer 2017 The Prospects & Limits of Deliberative Dædalus edited by Karl Eikenberry & Stephen Krasner Francis Fukuyama, Tanisha M. Fazal, Stathis N. Kalyvas, Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Steven Heydemann, Chuck Call & Susanna Campbell, Sumit Ganguly, Clare Lockhart, Thomas Risse & Summer 2017 Eric Stollenwerk, Tanja A. Börzel & Sonja Grimm, Seyoum Mesfi n & Abdeta Beyene, Nancy Lindborg & Joseph Hewitt, Richard Gowan & Stephen John Stedman, The Prospects & Limits of Lyse Doucet, and Jean-Marie Guéhenno Deliberative Democracy Native Americans & Academia edited by Ned Blackhawk, K. Tsianina Lomawaima, James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge, guest editors Bryan McKinley Jones Brayboy, Philip J. Deloria, Loren Ghiglione, Douglas Medin, and Mark Trahant with Claus Offe · Nicole Curato John S. Dryzek · Selen A. Ercan Carolyn M. Hendriks · Simon Niemeyer Bernard Manin · Hélène Landemore Representing the intellectual community in its breadth Arthur Lupia · Anne Norton · Ian Shapiro and diversity, Dædalus explores the frontiers of Cristina Lafont · André Bächtiger · Simon Beste knowledge and issues of public importance. Alice Siu · Cass R. Sunstein · Roy William Mayega Lynn Atuyambe · Nathan Tumuhamye Julius Ssentongo · William Bazeyo Baogang He · Mark E. Warren U.S. $15; www.amacad.org; @americanacad Dædalus Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences “The Prospects & Limits of Deliberative Democracy” Volume 146, Number 3; Summer 2017 James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge, Guest Editors Phyllis S. Bendell, Managing Editor and Director of Publications Peter Walton, Assistant Editor Heather Mawhiney, Senior Editorial Assistant Committee on Studies and Publications John Mark Hansen and Jerrold Meinwald, Cochairs; Bonnie Bassler, Rosina Bierbaum, Marshall Carter, Gerald Early, Carol Gluck, Linda Greenhouse, John Hildebrand, Jerome Kagan, Philip Khoury, Arthur Kleinman, Sara Lawrence-Lightfoot, Rose McDermott, Jonathan F. Fanton (ex of½cio), Don M. Randel (ex of½cio), Diane P. Wood (ex of½cio) Inside front cover: Pieter van der Borcht’s The Difficulty of Ruling over a Diverse Nation (1578), adapted to appear as The Difficulty of Deliberating in a Diverse Nation–Difficult, But Today Not Impossible. Contents 6 Introduction James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge Engaging the Issue 14 Referendum vs. Institutionalized Deliberation: What Democratic Theorists Can Learn from the 2016 Brexit Decision Claus Offe 28 Twelve Key Findings in Deliberative Democracy Research Nicole Curato, John S. Dryzek, Selen A. Ercan, Carolyn M. Hendriks & Simon Niemeyer New Thinking 39 Political Deliberation & the Adversarial Principle Bernard Manin 51 Deliberative Democracy as Open, Not (Just) Representative Democracy Hélène Landemore Critics 64 Inequality is Always in the Room: Language & Power in Deliberative Democracy Arthur Lupia & Anne Norton 77 Collusion in Restraint of Democracy: Against Political Deliberation Ian Shapiro 85 Can Democracy be Deliberative & Participatory? The Democratic Case for Political Uses of Mini-Publics Cristina Lafont Responses 106 Deliberative Citizens, (Non)Deliberative Politicians: A Rejoinder André Bächtiger & Simon Beste 119 Deliberation & the Challenge of Inequality Alice Siu Applications 129 Deliberative Democracy in the Trenches Cass R. Sunstein 140 Applying Deliberative Democracy in Africa: Uganda’s First Deliberative Polls James S. Fishkin, Roy William Mayega, Lynn Atuyambe, Nathan Tumuhamye, Julius Ssentongo, Alice Siu & William Bazeyo 155 Authoritarian Deliberation in China Baogang He & Mark E. Warren Dædalus Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Nineteenth-century depiction of a Roman mosaic labyrinth, now lost, found in Villa di Diomede, Pompeii Dædalus was founded in 1955 and established as a quarterly in 1958. The journal’s namesake was renowned in ancient Greece as an inventor, scientist, and unriddler of riddles. Its emblem, a maze seen from above, symbolizes the aspiration of its founders to “lift each of us above his cell in the labyrinth of learning in order that he may see the entire structure as if from above, where each separate part loses its comfortable separateness.” The American Academy of Arts & Sciences, like its journal, brings together distinguished individuals from every ½eld of human endeavor. It was char- tered in 1780 as a forum “to cultivate every art and science which may tend to advance the interest, honour, dignity, and happiness of a free, independent, and virtuous people.” Now in its third century, the Academy, with its more than ½ve thousand members, continues to provide intellectual leadership to meet the critical challenges facing our world. Dædalus Summer 2017 Subscription rates: Electronic only for non- Issued as Volume 146, Number 3 member individuals–$50; institutions–$137. Canadians add 5% gst. Print and electronic © 2017 by the American Academy for nonmember individuals–$55; institutions– of Arts & Sciences $153. Canadians add 5% gst. Outside the United Introduction States and Canada add $24 for postage and han- © 2017 by James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge dling. Prices subject to change without notice. Referendum vs. Institutionalized Deliberation: Institutional subscriptions are on a volume-year What Democratic Theorists Can Learn from the basis. All other subscriptions begin with the 2016 Brexit Decision next available issue. © 2017 by Claus Offe Political Deliberation & the Adversarial Principle Single issues: $15 for individuals; $38 for insti- © 2017 by Bernard Manin tutions. Outside the United States and Canada, Collusion in Restraint of Democracy: add $6 per issue for postage and handling. Prices Against Political Deliberation subject to change without notice. © 2017 by Ian Shapiro Claims for missing issues will be honored free Can Democracy Be Deliberative & Participatory? of charge if made within three months of the The Democratic Case for Political Uses of Mini-Publics publication date of the issue. Claims may be © 2017 by Cristina Lafont submitted to [email protected]. Members of Deliberation & the Challenge of Inequality the American Academy please direct all ques- © 2017 by Alice Siu tions and claims to [email protected]. Applying Deliberative Democracy in Africa: Uganda’s First Deliberative Polls Advertising and mailing-list inquiries may be © 2017 by James S. Fishkin, Roy William addressed to Marketing Department, mit Press Mayega, Lynn Atuyambe, Nathan Tumuhamye, Journals, One Rogers Street, Cambridge ma Julius Ssentongo, Alice Siu & William Bazeyo 02142-1209. Phone: 617 253 2866. Fax: 617 253 1709. Email: [email protected]. Editorial of½ces: Dædalus, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge ma To request permission to photocopy or repro- 02138. Phone: 617 576 5085. Fax: 617 576 5088. duce content from Dædalus, please complete the Email: [email protected]. online request form at http://www.mitpress journals.org/page/permissionsForm.jsp, or con- Library of Congress Catalog No. 12-30299. tact the Permissions Manager at mit Press Jour- Dædalus publishes by invitation only and assumes nals, One Rogers Street, Cambridge ma 02142- no responsibility for unsolicited manuscripts. 1209. Fax: 617 253 1709. Email: journals-rights@ The views expressed are those of the author(s) of mit.edu. each article, and not necessarily of the American Corporations and academic institutions with Academy of Arts & Sciences. valid photocopying and/or digital licenses with Dædalus (issn 0011-5266; e-issn 1548-6192) is the Copyright Clearance Center (ccc) may re- published quarterly (winter, spring, summer, fall) produce content from Dædalus under the terms of by The mit Press, One Rogers Street, Cambridge their license. Please go to www.copyright.com; ma 02142-1209, for the American Academy of ccc, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers ma 01923. Arts & Sciences. An electronic full-text version Printed in the United States by The Sheridan of Dædalus is available from The mit Press. Press, 450 Fame Avenue, Hanover, 17331. Sub scription and address changes should be ad - pa dressed to mit Press Journals Customer Service, Newsstand distribution by Ingram Periodicals One Rogers Street, Cambridge ma 02142-1209. Inc., 18 Ingram Blvd., La Vergne tn 37086. Phone: 617 253 2889; U.S./Canada 800 207 8354. Fax: 617 577 1545. Email: [email protected]. Postmaster: Send address changes to Dædalus, One Rogers Street, Cambridge ma 02142-1209. The typeface is Cycles, designed by Sumner Periodicals postage paid at Boston ma and at Stone at the Stone Type Foundry of Guinda ca. additional mailing of½ces. Each size of Cycles has been sep arately designed in the tradition of metal types. Introduction James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge Democracy is under siege. Approval ratings for democratic institutions in most countries around the world are at near-record lows. The number of rec- ognized democratic countries in the world is no lon- ger expanding after the so-called Third Wave of dem- ocratic transitions.1 Indeed, there is something of a “democratic recession.”2 Further, some apparently democratic countries with competitive
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