DOCSLIB.ORG

PSC13 Introduction to Comparative Politics Course Description

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

PSC13 Introduction to Comparative Politics Instructor: Richard S. Conley, PhD Office hours: TBA Email: [email protected] Teaching Assistant: Li Shao Course Description This course introduces students to the discipline of comparative politics, a subfield in political science. Students of comparative politics study politics in countries around the world. Our course will focus on several important themes in the subfield including the science and the art of comparative politics, ideology and culture, political development, democracy and democratization, and the political economy of development. The approach in the class will be global in three senses of the term: 1) it provides broad coverage with select cases in Europe, Asia, North and South America, the Middle East, and Africa, 2) it offers conceptual comprehensiveness, and 3) it promotes critical thinking. Learning Objectives: The general objective of this course is to increase the students knowledge of political realities all aver the world. Students will learn the many ways governments operate and the various ways people behave in political life. By the end of the term students should be able to: accurately describe political life in select countries in all of the world’s geographic regions; show a familiarity with a wide range of substantive issues in comparative politics and be able to discuss them critically; demonstrate mastery of the main theoretical and analytical approaches to the study of comparative politics. Required Text Mark Kesselmen, Joel Krieger, William Joseph (eds.). Introduction to Comparative Politics (6th Edition, 2012). Available as an Electronic Book. ISBN-10: 1111831823; ISBN-13: 978- 1111831820. Other texts will be available as electronic files Course Hours The course has 26 class sessions in total. Each class session is 90 minutes in length. The course meets from Monday to Thursday, and two additional class sessions on the third Friday (July 20) and the sixth Friday (August 10). Grading Policy Course grades are based on a midterm (40%) and a final examination (60%). These exams consist of questions requiring both short answers and longer essays. Attendance is required; participation in class discussion is expected, including leading class discussion on one or more journal articles during the semester. Course Schedules Lectures and assigned readings are both complementary and supplementary; neither is a complete substitute for the other. Pages from the text should be read prior to the lecture for which they are assigned. We move through a lot of material quickly, so keep up. Concepts and Critical Thinking July 2 Introduction and Overview July 3 Comparative Politics: What is it? Why Study it? Kesselmen et al., Chapter 1 (Introducing Comparative Politics) July 4 Critical Thinking about Politics: Analytical Techniques of Political Science Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method.” American Political Science Review 65 (1971): 682-693. Giovanni Sartori, “Comparing and Miscomparing.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 3 (1991): 243-257. Douglas Dion, “Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study.” Comparative Politics 30 (1998): 127-145. Review Symposium: “The Qualitative-Quantitative Disputation: King, Keohane, and Verba,” contributions by Caporaso, Collier, Laitin, Rogowski, Tarrow and rejoinders, American Political Science Review 89:2 (1995): 454-481. July 5 Power Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science Review 56, (1962): 947-952. Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 369-404. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda.” Perspectives on Politics 2 (2004): 725-40. July 5 States and Nations Stephen Krasner, “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics.” Comparative Politics 16 (1984): 223-246. James March and Johan Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life.” American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 734-749. J. P. Nettl, “The State as a Conceptual Variable.” World Politics 20 (1968): 559-592. Paul Cammack, “Bringing the State Back In: A Polemic.” British Journal of Political Science 19 (1989): 261-290. July 9 Democracy: What is it? How does it Work? Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, “Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered.” Annual Review of Political Science 5 (2002): 151-79. Arend Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies.” Journal of Democracy 15 (2004): 96-109. Arend Lijphart, “Democracies: Forms, Performance, and Constitutional Engineering.” European Journal of Political Research 25 (19940: 1-17. July 10 Democracy: What does it Take? Ten Conditions Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53 (1959): 69-105. Zehra F. Arat, “Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory Revisited.” Comparative Politics 21 (1988): 21-36. Robert Putnam, “What Makes Democracy Work?” National Civic Review 82 (1993): 102-107. July 11 People and Politics: Participation in Democracies and Nondemocracies Arend Lijphart, “Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma.” American Political Science Review 91 (1997): 1-14. Anirudh Krishna, “Enhancing Political Participation in Democracies: What is the Role of Social Capital?” Comparative Political Studies 35 (2002): 437-60. Steven Finkel, “Civic Education and the Mobilization of Political Participation in Developing Democracies.” Journal of Politics 64 (2002): 994-1024. July 12 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Kesselmen et al., Chapter 2 (Britain) July 16 France Kesselmen et al., Chapter 3 (France) Ideology and Culture; Interest Groups and Social Mobilization July 17 Niles M. Hansen, “The Protestant Ethic as a General Precondition for Economic Development.” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 29 (1963): 462-474. Marx and Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party.” Francis Fukayama, “The End of History”? National Interest (1989). July 18 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations.” Foreign Affairs 72 (1992): 22-49. Ronald Inglehart and Scott C. Flanagan, “Value Change in Industrial Societies.” American Political Science Review 81 (1987): 1289-1319. Thomas H. Sander and Robert D. Putnam, “Still Bowling Alone? The Post-9/11 Split.” Journal of Democracy 21 (2010): 9-16. July 19 Skocpol, “Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization.” World Politics 40 (1988): 147-68. Ted Gurr, “A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices.” American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 1104-1124. July 20 Midterm exam July 23 Rationality and Decision-Making: The Power of Institutions Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science (1968). Margaret Levi, “A model, a method, and a map: Rational choice in comparative and historical analysis.” In Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure. July 24 Juan Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy 1 (Winter 1990): 51-69. Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy.” World Politics 21 (1969): 207-25. Brian Barry, “The Consociational Model and Its Dangers.” European Journal of Political Research 3 (1975): 393-411. George Tsebelis, “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism.” British Journal of Political Science 25 (1995): 289-325. July 25 Rein Taagepera, “Why Electoral Systems Matter for Democratization.” Democratization 5 (1998): 68-91. William Riker, “The Number of Political Parties: A Reexamination of Duverger's Law.” Comparative Politics 9 (1976): 93-106. Pippa Norris, “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian, and Mixed Systems,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 18 (1997): 297-312. Richard W. Soudriette and Andrew Ellis, “Electoral Systems Today: A Global Snapshot,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2006): 78-88. Benjamin Reilly, “Electoral Systems for Divided Societies,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2002): 156-170. July 26 Modernization Theory, Dependency Theory, The Political Economy of Development Thomas Shannon: World Systems Systems Theory (excerpt). July 30 South Africa and Nigeria Kesselmen et al., Chapter 11 (South Africa) & Chapter 12 (Nigeria). July 31 Brazil and India Kesselmen et al., Chapter 6 (India) & Chapter 9 (Brazil). August 1 The Middle East & China Kesselmen et al., Chapter 13 (Iran) and Chapter 14 (China). August 2 The Middle East Moore and Springborg: The Middle East (excerpt) August 6 Islam and Democracy Asma Afsruddin, “The ‘Islamic State’: Genealogy, Facts, and Myths.” Journal of Church and State 48 (2006): 153-73. Fareed Zakaria, “Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism.” Political Science Quarterly 119 ( 2004): 1-20. August 7 Islam and Democracy Mark Tessler, “Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries.” Comparative Politics 34 (2002): 337-354. Manus Midlarsky, “Democracy and Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict and the Democratic Peace.” International Studies Quarterly 42 (1998): 485-511. August 8 Politics in the United States Kesselmen et al., Chapter 7 (United States). August 9 Politics in the United States Theda Skocpol, “The Tocqueville Problem: Civic Engagement in American
Recommended publications
  • Rights and Votes

    Rights and Votes

    1065.DOC 3/29/2012 5:23:12 PM Daryl J. Levinson Rights and Votes abstractT .T T This Article explores the functional similarities, residual differences, and interrelationships between rights and votes, both conceived as tools for protecting minorities (or other vulnerable groups) from the tyranny of majorities (or other dominant social and political actors). The Article starts from the simple idea that the interests of vulnerable groups in collective decisionmaking processes can be protected either by disallowing certain outcomes that would threaten those interests (using rights) or by enhancing the power of these groups within the decisionmaking process to enable them to protect their own interests (using votes). Recognizing that rights and votes can be functional substitutes for one another in this way, the Article proceeds to ask why, or under what circumstances, political and constitutional actors might prefer one to the other—or some combination of both. While the primary focus is on constitutional law and design, the Article shows that similar choices between rights and votes arise in many different areas of law, politics, and economic organization, including international law and governance, corporations, criminal justice, and labor and employment law. author.T T David Boies Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. Thanks to Gabriella Blum, Ryan Bubb, John Ferejohn, Barry Friedman, Heather Gerken, Ryan Goodman, Bernard Grofman, Don Herzog, Roderick Hills, Daniel Hulsebosch, Michael Klarman, Robert Keohane, Janos Kis, Douglas Laycock, Michael Levine, Dotan Oliar, Benjamin Sachs, Adam Samaha, Peter Schuck, Matthew Stephenson, and Adrian Vermeule, and to participants in workshops at Harvard Law School, New York University School of Law, and University of Virginia School of Law, for useful comments on drafts.
  • The Politics of Group Representation Quotas for Women and Minorities Worldwide Mona Lena Krook and Diana Z

    The Politics of Group Representation Quotas for Women and Minorities Worldwide Mona Lena Krook and Diana Z

    The Politics of Group Representation Quotas for Women and Minorities Worldwide Mona Lena Krook and Diana Z. O’Brien In recent years a growing number of countries have established quotas to increase the representation of women and minorities in electoral politics. Policies for women exist in more than one hundred countries. Individual political parties have adopted many of these provisions, but more than half involve legal or constitutional reforms requiring that all parties select a certain proportion of female candidates.1 Policies for minorities are present in more than thirty countries.2 These measures typically set aside seats that other groups are ineligible to contest. Despite parallels in their forms and goals, empirical studies on quotas for each group have developed largely in iso- lation from one another. The absence of comparative analysis is striking, given that many normative arguments address women and minorities together. Further, scholars often generalize from the experiences of one group to make claims about the other. The intuition behind these analogies is that women and minorities have been similarly excluded based on ascriptive characteristics like sex and ethnicity. Concerned that these dynamics undermine basic democratic values of inclusion, many argue that the participation of these groups should be actively promoted as a means to reverse these historical trends. This article examines these assumptions to explore their leverage in explaining the quota policies implemented in national parliaments around the world. It begins by out- lining three normative arguments to justify such measures, which are transformed into three hypotheses for empirical investigation: (1) both women and minorities will re- ceive representational guarantees, (2) women or minorities will receive guarantees, and (3) women will receive guarantees in some countries, while minorities will receive them in others.
  • Arend Lijphart and the 'New Institutionalism'

    Arend Lijphart and the 'New Institutionalism'

    CSD Center for the Study of Democracy An Organized Research Unit University of California, Irvine www.democ.uci.edu March and Olsen (1984: 734) characterize a new institutionalist approach to politics that "emphasizes relative autonomy of political institutions, possibilities for inefficiency in history, and the importance of symbolic action to an understanding of politics." Among the other points they assert to be characteristic of this "new institutionalism" are the recognition that processes may be as important as outcomes (or even more important), and the recognition that preferences are not fixed and exogenous but may change as a function of political learning in a given institutional and historical context. However, in my view, there are three key problems with the March and Olsen synthesis. First, in looking for a common ground of belief among those who use the label "new institutionalism" for their work, March and Olsen are seeking to impose a unity of perspective on a set of figures who actually have little in common. March and Olsen (1984) lump together apples, oranges, and artichokes: neo-Marxists, symbolic interactionists, and learning theorists, all under their new institutionalist umbrella. They recognize that the ideas they ascribe to the new institutionalists are "not all mutually consistent. Indeed some of them seem mutually inconsistent" (March and Olsen, 1984: 738), but they slough over this paradox for the sake of typological neatness. Second, March and Olsen (1984) completely neglect another set of figures, those
  • Semester at Sea Course Syllabus

    Semester at Sea Course Syllabus

    Democratization and Modernization: Concepts, Issues, and Approaches SEMESTER AT SEA COURSE SYLLABUS Voyage: Spring 2013 Discipline: Political Science PLCP 3500: Democratization and Modernization: Concepts, Issues, and Approaches Division: Upper division Faculty Name: Tao XIE Pre-requisites: This course has no pre-requisites. However, intellectual curiosity in and prior exposure (academic or otherwise) to politics and history of non-U.S. countries, as well as knowledge about U.S. foreign policy, would be quite useful. COURSE DESCRIPTION This is an upper-level political science course that examines the major concepts, issues, and approaches in scholarly research on democratization and modernization. Given the nature of the Semester at Sea program, this course pay special attention to processes of democratization and modernization in countries located along the route, as well as topics that are highly relevant for these countries. As the ship departs the U.S., the oldest democracy in the world, the course starts with discussions about democracy, including how to conceptualize democracy, the relationship between economic development and democracy, and the pros and cons of different forms of democratic governance. When the ship approaches Japan, we will shift attention to Japanese politics and U.S.-Japan relations. We will take a brief look at the cultural underpinnings of the Japanese democracy, as well as the major issues in U.S.-Japan relations. As the ship departs Kobe, we will spend three classes on China, the largest (in terms of population, territory, and economy) country on the route. We first address the rise of China, particularly its implications for regional and international security.
  • POL 224Y1: Canada in Comparative Perspective Course Outline Fall 2015 & Winter 2016 (Section L5101)

    POL 224Y1: Canada in Comparative Perspective Course Outline Fall 2015 & Winter 2016 (Section L5101)

    Department of Political Science University of Toronto POL 224Y1: Canada in Comparative Perspective Course Outline Fall 2015 & Winter 2016 (Section L5101) Class Time: Tuesdays, 6{8 PM Class Location: MS 3153 (Medical Sciences Building 3153) Instructor: Prof. Ludovic Rheault Email: [email protected] Office Hours: Wednesdays, 3{5 PM Office Location: Sidney Smith 3005 Course Description This course introduces students to Canadian politics using a comparative approach. It pro- vides essential knowledge about the variety of political regimes around the world, with con- crete examples emphasizing the comparison of Canada with other countries. Topics covered include the evolution of democracies, political institutions, electoral systems, voting, ideology, the role of the state in the economy, as well as contemporary issues such as social policies, representation and inequalities. The objective of the course is twofold. First, the aim is for students to acquire practi- cal knowledge about the functioning of democracies and their implications for society, the Canadian society in particular. Second, the goal is to get acquainted with the core theories of political science. By extension, this implies becoming familiar with the scientific method, from the conception of theoretical arguments to data analysis and empirical testing. By the end of this course, students should have gained considerable expertise about politics and be more confident about their scientific skills. Course Format The course comprises lectures given in class on Tuesdays, combined with tutorials chaired by teaching assistants (TAs) roughly every two weeks. The precise schedule for tutorials will be determined at the beginning of the course. Tutorials provide students with opportunities to participate actively in the discussions undertaken during the lectures, and to prepare for evaluations.
  • PS 103 Intro to Comparative Politics

    PS 103 Intro to Comparative Politics

    Principles of Comparative Politics Political Science 250 Instructor: Wade Jacoby Office: 742 SWKT Office Phone: 801-422-1711 E-mail address: [email protected] Office hours: Mondays 3:30-5pm in 742 SWKT TA: Adam Stevenson, office hours, Wednesdays, 9-10 am and by appointment in 109 HRCB Introduction: This course shows you how and why to compare political systems to one another. By ‘political,’ I mean pretty obvious things like electoral rules, legislatures, and courts, but I also mean things like economics and non-government organizations and civil wars. During the course, we will discuss: What is comparative politics? What makes for good comparisons? What are the characteristics of a state? How have states emerged across human history, ancient and modern? How do class, ideology, and nationalism influence politics? What do the variety of political institutions and regimes look like? What is the role of economics in the populist backlash? Why do some regimes transition to democracy? Why are some countries rich and others poor? How do political institutions shape patterns of economic development? What are the varieties of ways people participate in politics? How do social movements and civil society affect politics? Why does politics sometimes become violent? How does identity shape political participation? How does globalization affect the state? We will address these questions by looking both at theoretical approaches and by studying larger trends and actual cases in a variety of countries around the globe. Right away, you will notice that our readings provide different—and often conflicting— answers to the big questions above. We won’t always have time to resolve the debates— and many of them have not been resolved by scholars either.
  • Nationwide Threshold of Representation Rein Taagepera *

    Nationwide Threshold of Representation Rein Taagepera *

    Electoral Studies 21 (2002) 383–401 www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud Nationwide threshold of representation Rein Taagepera * School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697, USA Abstract How large must parties be to achieve minimal representation in a national assembly? The degree of institutional constraints is reflected indirectly by the number of seat-winning parties (n) and more directly by the threshold of representation (T), defined as the vote level at which parties have a 50–50 chance to win their first seat. The existing theoretical threshold formulas use district-level reasoning and therefore overestimate the nationwide threshold. This study extends the theory to the nationwide level. In addition to district magnitude (M), the number of electoral districts and hence assembly size (S) emerge as important variables. When all seats are allocated in M-seat districts, T=75%/[(M+1)(S/M)0.5] and n=(MS)0.25. T and n are connected by T=75%/[n2+(S/n2)]. These theoretical expectation values are tested with 46 dur- able electoral systems. 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Effective thresholds; Number of parties; District and national levels; Small party representation 1. The problem As shown by Duverger (1954), electoral systems affect party systems. In Sartori’s (1976) terminology, electoral systems can be “feeble” or “strong”, meaning that they can be permissive or inhospitable to small parties. How large should parties be, to be entitled to representation in a national assembly? Should 1% of the nationwide votes suffice, or 3 or 5%? And if a certain cutoff level is felt desirable, then how can it be approached through institutional design? One obvious means is to stipulate a nationwide legal threshold, but this has been used relatively rarely.
  • Patterns of Democracy This Page Intentionally Left Blank PATTERNS of DEMOCRACY

    Patterns of Democracy This Page Intentionally Left Blank PATTERNS of DEMOCRACY

    Patterns of Democracy This page intentionally left blank PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries SECOND EDITION AREND LIJPHART First edition 1999. Second edition 2012. Copyright © 1999, 2012 by Arend Lijphart. All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the US Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers. Yale University Press books may be purchased in quantity for educational, business, or promotional use. For information, please e-mail [email protected] (US offi ce) or [email protected] (UK offi ce). Set in Melior type by Integrated Publishing Solutions, Grand Rapids, Michigan. Printed in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of democracy : government forms and performance in thirty-six countries / Arend Lijphart. — 2nd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-300-17202-7 (paperbound : alk. paper) 1. Democracy. 2. Comparative government. I. Title. JC421.L542 2012 320.3—dc23 2012000704 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48–1992 (Permanence of Paper). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 for Gisela and for our grandchildren, Connor, Aidan, Arel, Caio, Senta, and Dorian, in the hope that the twenty-fi rst century—their century—will yet become more
  • The Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science

    The Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science

    International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention ISSN (Online): 2319 – 7722, ISSN (Print): 2319 – 7714 www.ijhssi.org ||Volume 4 Issue 9 || September. 2015 || PP.30-32 The Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science Nils-Axel Mörner Patron of the Skytte Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden Abstract:Johan Skytte was a true scholar of the 17th century in Sweden. In 1622 he instituted a new professorship in Eloquence and Politics financed by a separate patronage donation. It has survived all through the years and will soon celebrate its 400 years’ anniversary. In 1994, the foundation running the practical/economical parts of the donation founded an international prize: The Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science. This year, the 21st prize goes to Francis Fukuyama. Keywords:Political Science, Johan Skytte, the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science, Skytte Foundation, Uppsala University. I. JOHAN SKYTTE AND HIS DONATION IN 1622 Johan Skytte (Figure 1) was born in 1577, son of a merchant. Duke Karl, later to become King Karl IX, understood that the young boy was unusually gifted and intelligent, and he paid for his education abroad[1].He staid abroad for 9 years, visiting different universities in Germany, and travelling to France, England and Scotland. In 1598 he took his thesis in Marburg. He was deeply taken by ramism, the philosophy by Petrus Ramus [1, 2]. According to Ramus all sciences were based on the depth and sharpness in intellectual thinking as expressed by eloquence. Eloquence was the base for everything. It could turn and twist the human heart in whatever direction wanted.
  • Constitution-Making Gone Wrong

    Constitution-Making Gone Wrong

    1 LANDAU 923-980 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/2/2013 5:08 PM CONSTITUTION-MAKING GONE WRONG David Landau* ABSTRACT With the recent wave of regime change in the Middle East, the process of constitution-making must again become a central concern for those interested in comparative law and politics. The conception of constitutional politics associated with Jon Elster and Bruce Ackerman views constitution- making as a potentially higher form of lawmaking with different dynamics than ordinary politics and states that, ideally, constitution-making should be designed so as to be a relatively deliberative process where the role of group and institutional interests is deemphasized. I argue that a focus on achieving deliberation and transformation through constitution-making is unrealistic in certain situations and that theorists should instead often focus on avoiding worst-case scenarios of authoritarian regimes or breakdowns of order. Constitution-making moments must not be idealized; they are often traumatic events. In these situations, the central challenge of constitution-making is not to achieve a higher form of lawmaking but rather to constrain unilateral exercises of power. I use two recent Latin American examples where the constitution-making process was problematic to illustrate the difficulty. If political forces in assemblies are left unconstrained or poorly constrained, they can reshape politics to create a quasi-authoritarian regime (as occurred in Venezuela), or their attempt to impose a constitution on a reticent minority may create a constitutional breakdown (as nearly occurred in Bolivia). Some of the normative recommendations of followers of the dominant model—for example, that constitution-making should be highly participatory and should be undertaken in a specialized constituent assembly—emerge as problematic under this reconceptualization because they may increase the likelihood of a worst-case outcome.
  • Computational International Relations

    Computational International Relations

    Computational International Relations What Can Programming, Coding and Internet Research Do for the Discipline? Author: H. Akin Unver, assistant professor of international relations, Kadir Has University, and a dual non-resident research fellow at the Center for Technology and Global Affairs, Oxford University and the Alan Turing Institute in London. [email protected] Abstract: Computational Social Science emerged as a highly technical and popular discipline in the last few years, owing to the substantial advances in communication technology and daily production of vast quantities of personal data. As per capita data production significantly increased in the last decade, both in terms of its size (bytes) as well as its detail (heartrate monitors, internet-connected appliances, smartphones), social scientists’ ability to extract meaningful social, political and demographic information from digital data also increased. A vast methodological gap exists in ‘computational international relations’, which refers to the use of one or a combination of tools such as data mining, natural language processing, automated text analysis, web scraping, geospatial analysis and machine learning to provide larger and better organized data to test more advanced theories of IR. After providing an overview of the potentials of computational IR and how an IR scholar can establish technical proficiency in computer science (such as starting with Python, R, QGis, ArcGis or Github), this paper will focus on some of the author’s works in providing an idea for IR students on how to think about computational IR. The paper argues that computational methods transcend the methodological schism between qualitative and quantitative approaches and form a solid foundation in building truly multi-method research design.
  • Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

    Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

    EUI WORKING PAPERS RSCAS No. 2005/05 Conceptual Definitions and Measurement Indicators of the Quality of Democracy: An Overview Svetlozar A. Andreev EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 2005_05 Andreev Cover.indd 1 24/02/2005 12:56:25 EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES Conceptual Definitions and Measurement Indicators of the Quality of Democracy: An Overview SVETLOZAR A. ANDREEV EUI Working Paper RSCAS No. 2005/05 BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO DI FIESOLE (FI) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed or utilised in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise, without the prior permission in writing from the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Download and print of the electronic edition for teaching or research non commercial use is permitted on fair use grounds—one readable copy per machine and one printed copy per page. Each copy should include the notice of copyright. Permission for quotation should be addressed directly to the author(s). See contact details at end of text. Source should be acknowledged. ISSN 1028-3625 © 2005 Svetlozar A. Andreev Printed in Italy in February 2005 European University Institute Badia Fiesolana I – 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Publications/ Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies carries out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of European integration and public policy in Europe. It hosts the annual European Forum. Details of this and the other research of the centre can be found on: http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/ Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and books.