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Rethinking theRoleofShanghaiCooperation Keeping FriendsClose,andTheirOilCloser: In partialfulfillmentoftherequirements Organization inChina’sStriveforEnergy Department ofInternationalRe International RelationsandEuropeanStudies Supervisor: ProfessorMatteoFumagalli Security inKazakhstan Central EuropeanUniversity Word Count:17,201 Budapest, Hungary Milos Popovic Submitted to June, 2010 By
lations andEuropeanStudies for thedegreeofMasterArtsin
CEU eTD Collection gains onabilateral level asexpe the SCOapproachenables Chinato assureboth act distribution ofgains.Puttingtoatestdiffering counter-balancing ofChineseactivitiesbyAsta its oildealings, IarguethattheSCOcorrects the p within theorganization.Acting Beijing actsasasecurity-seekertobindbot Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO energy security inKazakhstan. Ag ItisgenerallyacknowledgedthatBeijing’s construction oftheAtyrau-Ala
as aregionalforum throughwhichChinachannelsandreinforces shankou pipelinecomprise theb cted bydefensiveneorealism. ainst thebackdropofawidespr ABSTRACT ) playsnoroleinthisendeav h Kazakhstan andRussiaintoenergycooperation i
hypothesis byrationalistIRtheories,Ifindthat
na and Moscow who are concerned with the na andMoscowwhoareconcernedwiththe itfalls of abilateral approach which elicits the ors aboutitsbenignin bilateral oil dealings pertainingtothe ackbone ofChina’sstrivefor ead scholarlyclaim thatthe or, thisthesis tentions and maximize tentions andmaximize arguesthat CEU eTD Collection
unreserved helpandsupport. channel andexpressmy thoughts. Zumrud, Raul,Blagoy,andZsuzsa. to my dearIlona,because withouthermy though amid hardtimes. supported meduringthecourseofwholeacade
My immense loveandgratitudebelongsto Last butnot least, my supervisor MatteoFumagalli deserves my gratitude for his I am grateful to Robinwhoinvestedconsider I owespecialthanks tomy friends:Mihai, For emotional andmoral supportduringthisin ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii ts wouldnotbeasbright andflourishing.
my parentsandbrotherwhowholeheartedly mic yeargivingme thestrengthtoendure able time andpatienceto teach me howto tellectual journey,Ie Varya,Sanja,Jennie,Mateusz,Diana, xpress deepestthanks CEU eTD Collection BIBLIOGRAPHY CONCLUSION THE UNDERSTANDINGOFCH CHAPTER 4:ALTERNATIVETH ORGANIZATION SHANGHAI COOPERATION ENERGYSE CHAPTER 3:CHINESE OFTH PITFALLS AND THE DEAL OIL CHAPTER 2:CHINESE CHAPTER 1:THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION
3.4 ChineseSCOEnergyAxis:Summary Complementing the Bilateral Approach 3.3 ExpandingChineseOilActiv 3.2 TracingtheShift:The Developmen 3.1 Background 2.4 ChineseBilateralEnergy Approa 2.3 FightingUndertheRag:Sino-Russian Kazakhstan 2.2 “RisingDragon”Engages“SnowLeopard”: 2.1 Background 1.4 Methodology 1.3 TheoreticalFramework: Assessinga 1.2 Operationalizationof Variables 1.1 ConceptualizingEnergySecurityandCooperation ...... 6 ...... ities withintheSCO:BindingMoscowandAstana, Table ofContents ...... 13 E BILATERALAPPROACH ch toKazakhstan: Implications FRAMEWORK ANDMETHODOLOGY t ofBeijing’s SCOEnergyAgenda ...... 49 ...... INESE ENERGYSECURITY Likelihood ofInter-StateCooperation ...... 53 EORETICAL EXPLANATIONS TO EXPLANATIONS EORETICAL Petroleum CompetitioninKazakhstan INGS INKAZAKHSTAN,RUSSIA iii CURITY ANDTHE CURITY
Chinese BilateralEnergyApproachto ...... 10 ...... 42 ...... 40 ROLE OFTHE ...... 22 ...... 44 ...... 55 ...... 14 ...... 36 ...... 25 ...... 42 ...... 22 ..... 19 .... 59 ... 10 ... 1 1
CEU eTD Collection 11(1), pp. 5. pp. 11(1), source:http://www.iea.org/pap China”, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/pdf. decreasing thedependence Cooperation Organization(SCO)inthisendeavor. thesis dealswithChina’sstrive politics, havemade energysecurity coherence, inasmuch Beijing’sgrowinginten as domestic impetus fortheexpandingeconomy awa as 2 1 petroleum supply“through owningboththere (bbl/d) in2006to7.8bbl/d per centofoverallChineseenergyneeds,hasmo on ayearbasis.Accordingtoexpertreports,Chineseoilconsumption, morethan25 comprising than three decades now, soitsthirst foroilhas military power. AsChina’soveralleconomic andmilitary powerhasbeenaccumulating formore resource withthesignificant security andstrate century. Apartfrom boostingtheeconomic andi most challengingissuesinChinese energysecuri
Charles E. Ziegler (2006): “The Energy Factor in China’s Foreign Policy”, Policy”, Foreign China’s in Factor Energy “The (2006): E.Ziegler Charles Energy Information Administration, “Cou The main objectiveofChineseenergy policyrest The insatiableneedforhydrocarbonresources,pa on theMiddleEasternoil, 2008,anditisexpectedto forenergysecurity ers/2007/fs_china.pdf (13/04/2010). (13/04/2010). ers/2007/fs_china.pdf pdf (19/02/2010); International Ener International pdf (19/02/2010); atoppriority inthecountry’s national security policy.This INTRODUCTION 1 scored staggering risewhichirresistibly expands
source inthegroundand,whererelevant, re thandoubledfrom 3.5billionbarrelsperday tion toact asamajor powerininternational gic implications insofa ndustrial growth,petrol ty policy attheoutset of thetwenty-first in Kazakhstanandthe ntry Analysis Brief-China”, source: y topreservepoliticalstabilityandsocial 2 andtheenhancement ofthecountry’s rticularly oil,hasemerged asoneofthe s withthe oilroutes peakat13.1bbl/din2030.
gy Agency, “WEO 2007 Fact Sheet – 2007 Fact Sheet – “WEO Agency, gy Journal of Chinese Political Science Political of Chinese Journal r asitfuelsnation’s role oftheShanghai eum isanessential diversificationby 1 A strong Astrong , CEU eTD Collection International Affairs International Convergent or Divergent Interests?”, meets around8percentofitsoil Kazakhstan from 1997to2009.While itsprofitability billions ofUSdollars,represents Alashankou (Kazakh-Chinese) pipeline, into whichChinesecompanies havehitherto poured pipeline projecttoconnecttheKazakhoilrich of alloilroutes heading from theCaspianto occupying Kazakhstan’s main oilfieldssuchas 5 4 3 a particularemphasis onoil-richKazakhstan. energy policycoursetowardtheso the radical Islamist insurgency andthe USmilitary encroachment ontheregion. represents thekeyvulnerability in China’sener remains China’skeyoilpondaccountingformoreth Latin American, African andCent accelerated followingthemassive conclusionofb transport network”. (13/04/2010). (13/04/2010). y_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2009_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2009.pdf http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp source: 6, pp. 2009”, June Energy of World Review http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/oilreserve source: proven oil reservesamount to approxi
Kazakhstan has the tenth largest proven oil reserves in oil reserves proven largest tenth hasthe Kazakhstan Zhiqun Zhu (2007): “Petroleum andPower: Ch (2000): Vinogradov andSergei Andrews-Speed Philip To reducetransportation risks associated , pp. 29. 29. pp. , 3 Throughoutthemid-1990s andearly- Asian thecoreoilprojectunderpinning mately 30-39.8 billion barrels. See: -called pipelinepoliticsinthe ral Asianoil-rich countries. Survey, 40(2), pp. 390. 390. pp. 40(2), Survey, needs, thestrategicandsecur ina, theand the MiddleEastUnited States”, 5 Europe,Chinahasembarked onamassive oil gy securitywhichappears 2 es withChineseXinjiang.ThegiganticAtyrau- While competing withthewestern companies Tengiz, andwithRussia,controlling 80percent
the world. According to some estimation, the country’s
_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energ ilateral arrangements with s.html (19/02/2010); British Petroleum, “BP Statistical “BPStatistical Petroleum, British s.html (19/02/2010); with theMiddle East,Ch “China’s Involvement in Central Asian Petroleum: Petroleum: Asian Central in Involvement “China’s an 50percentofitsoilimports. Thisfact may becontestedgiventhatthepipeline 2000s China’sglobalquestforoil 4 However,theMiddleEaststill neighboring CentralAsia,with Energy Information Administration, ity importanceoftheproject all Beijing’soildealingswith more highlightedafter theMiddleEastern, ina hasdirectedits Yale Journal of CEU eTD Collection Cooperation Organization. annual summits. Following Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstanand Tajikistan tosolveborder di the in Nineties,” “Xinjiang (2000): (2009): Lanteigne (2006): “CentralAsiaand weaken theexternal support for th bring stabilize Xinjiang. Chinese leadersh cooperatio seesenergy Beijing Likewise, trade-offs, IarguethattheShan some powertoinstitutions soastoincrease multilateral approach.Rather thancomplying with Kazakhstan andRussiaintocooperation through the Caspianispurelyabilateralandoffensive, underpinned withtheoffensiveneorealistlogic term gainswhileconceding temporary losses. Russia. Indoingso,IarguethatBeijingactsas increasing awarenessof boththehostcountr the Kazakh oilsectortopreserve energy s China have during the 2006 and 2009 SCO summits raised a voice for closer energy cooperation. energy closer for a voice raised SCOsummits 2009 and the 2006 during have China extremism. Yet, energy cooperation has become one of the key concerns in the organization’s discourse. Russia and trafficking activities,drugs smuggling prevention, and th Primarily, thefocusof 7 6 Kazakhstan andRussiaaremembers, providesBeiji and stabilizingpolitical underscores Beijing’s interestin decreasingthere non-traditional security issues and as a counterbalance to asacounterbalance securityissuesand non-traditional aims atreducing the dependency onthe Malaccan straitsth group US aircraftcarrierbattle
Theorganization grew out ofthe Shanghai Five, aregional forumestablished in 1996 by China, Russia, Beiji grants location geographical landlocked Kazakhstan’s The wholeprojectissurrounded Chinese Foreign Policy: An An Introduction Policy: Foreign Chinese the SCO isplaced on dealing with thesubstantive
China’s Energy Security”, This regional organization has been primarily seenasregional forum forcooperation in ly volatileXinjiang. the accession of Uzbekistan in2001itbeca s, which can target Chinese oil supply lines from the Middle East. In particular, China from East.In lines Middle the target supply can Chineses, oil which The China Journal China The e Uyghurseparatistmovements among theCentral Asians.See:Xuanli Liao n with Kazakhstan as a shortcut to the stability of Central Asia which may may Central Asiawhich of stability the to asashortcut Kazakhstan n with ip expects energy arrangements connec ghai CooperationOrganization(SCO), with theChinesestruggletokeepexpandinginto 6
, no.44,pp.65-93. The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly gainsthroughlowering y, Kazakhstan,andthe ecurity, whilesimultaneous 3
spute andfacilitategoodneighb arationalactorinterestedinmaximizing long- who claim thatChineseenergystrategytoward
Against thebackdropof I suggestthatBeijing’stacticaims atbinding liance ononshore routes dominated by USfleet the influence of the United Statesin United influence Asia. ofthe Central the ng safe oil transport beyond the striking capabilities of of capabilities striking the beyond safe transport oil ng the neoliberal prediction thatstates may cede e fightagainstterrorism, separatism andreligious rough which most ofthe oil , (London: Routledge), pp. 86; Nicholas Becquelin ng withanusefulmech a skillfulcombination and ofabilateral security issuessuch as me institutionalized ting Xinjiang with Central withCentral Asia to ting Xinjiang cheating probabilityand region’s oilmonopolist, scholarlyarguments orly relationsthroughthe ly dealingwiththe anism toadvance its 7 is annually ofwhichChina, border control, anti- , 4(4), pp. 65; Marc65; , 4(4),pp.
into theShanghai transported.
CEU eTD Collection Ménage à Trois Affairs World of Journal “A Liao (2006): Xuanli Janet pp.7-31; Routledge), Marketos (2009): (2009): Marketos Relations”, Vassal Traditional or New GreatGame Institute), pp. 56-59; Asia-Caucasus Central (Stockholm: Journal of World Affairs World of Journal successful andpreventsth Some authorsclaim thatChinapreferstodeal 10 9 8 sphere ofgeopoliticalinfluence. rapprochement is inextricably linked toChina’s strategy of transforming Central Asiainto its Asia. authors pays attention to increasing role of theSCO inChineseenergy strategy toward Central positive outcome innegotiations increasing Beijing’ bilateral energy talks provide China withgreate scholars tostudyChineseenergystrategytoward Alashankou pipelinewastoagreatextentnego petroleum intheKazakhzone oftheCaspian fields between theKazakhandChinesehigh-rankingo leadership who seem toconsiderBeijing’smounting China’s intentiontoavoidcounter-balancingof interests andcorrect thepitfalls of itsbilateral
Stephen Blank (2005):”The Eurasian Energy Triangle: China, Russia, and the Central Asian States”, “Economic Aspects Peyrouse (2007): Sebastien Peyrouse, Sebastien Peyrouse, forinstance,argues Politically, theSino-Kazakhoildealshavei op. cit. op. ”, The ChinaThe and EurasiaForum Quarterly China’s Energy Geopolitics: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Central Asia Central and Organization Cooperation the Shanghai Geopolitics: Energy China’s , pp. 8. , 12(2), pp. 57. 57. pp. 12(2), , , 12(2), pp. 39-51; St 39-51; , 12(2),pp. e obstructionofRussiato 10 Theunderlying Chinese strate ephen Blank(2005):“China, Kazakh of the Chinese-Central Asia Rapprochement”, AsiaRapprochement”, Chinese-Central of the Silk Road forOil: Sino-K Road Silk Journal of Contemporary China approach. Thelogicofthis 4 itsenergyactivitiesbytheKazakhandRussian
Nicklas Swanstrom (2005): “China and Central Asia: a Asia:a Central and “China (2005): Swanstrom Nicklas
, 3(3), pp. 99-109. tiated onabilateralbasis.Thishasledmany r leverage over Kazakhstan, which leadsto a bilaterally withAstanabecause itismore Kazakhstan interms of or even theinitiative toconstruct theAtyrau- fficials. Theoilagreements, acquisitionof ndeed beenagreedduringbilateralsummits s power relative toAstana. Yet, none of the that thegrowing Sino-Kazakh economic strive for oilthreatening totheir interests. China’s questforenergy. gy towards Kazakhstan,which azakh Energy Diplomacy”, Energy, andRussia: An Unlikely , 14(45), 576-579; Thrassy Thrassy 576-579; , 14(45), behaviordemonstrates a bilateralapproach. 9 Otherspositthat Silk Road Paper , (London: , (London: Brown Brown 8
CEU eTD Collection 13 12 11 unready toengageonamultilateralbasisinener with asoleemphasisonChineseb Kazakhstan andRussiaareposingtoits authors failtoacknowledgethat while adheringtotheexpansivelogicbehindCh member statesaboutBeijing’s allegedlymal in within theSCO supportthisobse energy oranyotherregionalissue.Creationof Kazakhstan andothermembers gladlyusethispl relations” between Beijing Central Asia whichwillultimately diminish Russ the SCOshouldbeseenasamere instrument suggests thattheSCOservesasaddedvaluetoCh hydrocarbon assets. presence inKazakhstanisdriven eastern partsofChina. strategically important Atyrau-A Peyrouse posits tobepredominantly bilateral in itsscope,isdrivenbyaneedtocomplete the
Swanstrom, Ibid Ibid . . However, findingssuggestthattheSCOisnot Other authors yieldcertainsignificance to op. cit., op. pp. 569-584. 569-584. pp. 12 UnlikePeyrouse’s focus onChinese bilateral activities, Swanstrom 11 Swanstrom likewise argues that the rationalebehind China’s growing and theregionatlarge. rvation. Simultaneously, ChinaisusingtheSCOtodissuade lashankou pipelinewhichwillprovide oilto themostremote Beijing isincreasinglyusingth by adesiretodominate theregi ilateralism. Artyom Matusov,for energy activities inthe Caspian. theEnergyClubandotherenergyarrangements tentions throughtheSC 5
gy cooperationasitmakes Beijingvulnerable to
of China’seconomic andpoliticalinroadinto ian influence andsetupabasis for “new vassal inese energyengagement inCentralAsiaboth 13 atform tocheckChinese growinginfluencein inese bilateralengagement. Yetheclaims that theSCO framework, yetstillovershadow it
dominated byBeiji e SCObasistoavoidobstacles on inordertosecurevaluable instance, arguesthatChinais O framework. Therefore, ng giventhatRussia, CEU eTD Collection likely prefertonegotiateandso benefit fromparticipating in multilateral framework ofthe“SCOEnergyCl argues thatwithorwithoutSC 17 16 15 14 goals. Forinstance,Chineseofficialsheldta becomes puzzlingwhyBeijingisusingtheorganizat bilaterally possesses greater bargaining power negotiations andarrangements. both authors paradoxicallyadmit thattheorgani and CentralAsia. provide, aswellChina’sintent rests with the“better negotiating positions and amore efficient format” a bilateral basis can outcomes ofbilateralenergycooperati th Central AsianstatesthroughtheSCOframework China andothermember states.Matusovclaims remainsSCO framework underdevelopedandwedde the congruentinterestsofRussiaandCentralAsiaasoilexportingcountries. Turkmenistan (2010): Taylor Kendall Andrea and Kjaernet Heidi Quarterly
Nargis Kassenova, “The Shanghai Cooperation Energy Club: Purposes andProspects”, in Indra Overland (ed.), SCO: Gathering?”, in the Club or Cooperation “Energy (2007): Artyom Matusov Ibid Ibid. , pp. 169. 169. , pp.
This isexactlywhatNargisKassenovapoi If Chinaisdisinterested inchannelingits , 5(3), pp. 83-99. 83-99. , pp. 5(3), , (London: Routledge), pp. 162-175. 162-175. pp. Routledge), , (London: 17 While diminishing theroleofSCO a multilateral mechanism forCent O Chinawouldfinditswayto lve issues onabilateral basis”. ion nottoexacerbate already co on andthecooperationwithinSCO. lks overtheextensionofAtyrau-Alashankou vis-à-vis ub”. Kassenovaclaims thatalthoughChinamay 6 Caspian Energy Politics: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kazakhstan Azerbaijan, Politics: Energy Caspian
zation isbeingusedbyBeijingforpetroleum energy strategythroughthe SCObecauseit thatdespiteBeijing’sbargainingwiththe ere isnotmuch intheformat and difference ion asaplatform in nts outwhenanalyzingtheprospectsfor d toseparatelynegotiateddealsbetween itspartners,astheybothclaim, thenit in ChineseoildealingsKazakhstan, invest inKazakhoilassets. 16 ral Asian energy,“itwouldmost Thereasonforthis,sheargues, mpeting interests inKazakhstan The China and Central Asia Central and China The pursuing energyrelated 14 Asacorollary,the 15 In fact, he Infact,he CEU eTD Collection intervening variables are included. Thefirst of ChineseenergystrategytowardKazakhstan. basis. Myultimate aim to explainwhetherther is changes inBeijing’s bilateral approach contribute toincreasing the engagement ontheSCO China’s SCOdealingsasadependentvariable pipeline. simultaneous levelsinacquiringoil useofboth link betweenthetwolevels.Therejection used byBeijingtoempower itsbilateralappr them intoenergycooperation decreasing thechanceof counter-balancing China’s SCOvectorinenergycooperation with the SCO,andwhatisnatureofthisrelationship? within theSCO? Second, isthere a connection be two relatedquestions.First,wh Beijing’s energy strategy toward Central Asia.Thus, thisstudy aims atprovidinganswers tothe energy issues,itquestionstheeasilyrefutedargument thattheorganizationplaysnorolein 2007. While thisthesisac 2006 SCOShanghaisummit,andeventookpartin pipeline withtheKazakh prime minister in2005,
In approachingthetask,Itakebilateralc With anintentionofanswering theseque knowledges immaturity oftheSCO . Mynullhypothesisisthatthe at explainsBeijing’sincreasi by KazakhstanandRussia oach towardKazakhstan 7 of eitherhypothesisis conditioned uponthe
relates tothereluctance of theKazakh state . Indoingso,Iintendtoanalyzewhetherthe e isacausal relationship betweenthe two levels
tween China’s bilateral andthe approach within Kazakhstan reinforces itsbilateral strategy by crafted an oildeal with Uzbekistanduringthe assets withregardtotheAtyrau-Alashankou ooperation asaninde stions, Ipositone theRussian“SCOEnergyClubProject”in This maybeplausibl ng attentiontoenergycooperation SCO framework isoccasionally SCO framework framework in dealing with the framework indealingwiththe overarching hypothesis: through binding bothof and Russiawithoutany pendent variable,and e provided thetwo CEU eTD Collection http://eastime.ru/analitic/1/3/743.html (19/04/2010). (19/04/2010). http://eastime.ru/analitic/1/3/743.html 19 18 Kazakh oilwhichimpacts political relationsbe oil pipelines. companies ontheexploitationoilfieldsand Russian petroleum companiessignedseveral and Kenyiak-Orskpipelines,theCaspianPi bulk ofalloiltransportedviapipelinestoout Caspian energylandscapewouldprovideanincomp Sino-Kazakh energy cooperationwithouttaking variables as Beijingisset toadapt its ener the roaming Chineseoilcompanies. Thisappro underpinned bytheperceptionof country’s mu increasing thestate’sshare inajoint-ventur institutions alike. fear ofKazakhstanbecoming aChineseresource Chinese acquisitions ofoilfieldsand theagreem strengthening nationalcontrolove Kazakhstan’s energypolicycallsforlimiting Ch authorities torelycompletely ononeactorin Partnership”, http://www.cacianalyst.o
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache “Russia, KazakhstanSign $23 bln OilDeal”, Azat Dyushebaev, “Stanet li K The secondinterveningvariableisRussian 19 Moreover,Russiancompanies compete w Eurasia Daily Monitor Daily Eurasia 18 TheMazhilis’(theK rg/?q=node/3215 (21/04/2010); SergeiBlag azakhstan Resursnym Pridatkom KNR?”, r oilassets. Thisapproach wa =1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35549 (21/04/2010). =1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35549 gy strategytotheincrea Central Asia and the Caucasus Analyst azakh parliament) decision side markets, mainly throughtheAtyrau-Samara energy security.The“multi-vector” character of 8 peline Consortium (CPC). , September 28, 2009, source: ach affectsboththeindependentanddependent
increase ofdeliveriesviatheRussian-controlled e with a foreign petroleum corporation was e withaforeignpetroleumcorporationwas
tween thetwocountries ent ontheconstruction of thepipeline, asthe protectorate inflamed thepublic andthestate energyleverageoverKazakhstan.Analyzing agreements withtheKazakhstate-owned into accountMoscow’s influence overthe lti-vector energy policybeing threatened by lete picture. Russian companies control the inese involvement intheCaspianwhilst ith Chinesepetroleum corporations over ov, “Russia and Kazak ov, “Russia Analitika sing Kazakhawareness. s particularlypromptedafter , December 24, 2009, source: source: 2009, 24, , December to introducelegislature . Thestruggleforthe
From 2003topresent , June 7, 2005, source: hstan PursueEnergy CEU eTD Collection theoretical approaches energy strategywhichispresented petroleum. Thisprovidesalinktounderstanding Kazakhstan topinpoint thepitfalls of Beijing’ theoretical framework. Theseco operationalization clarificationof Central Asia;aonethatwoul deals. ThusIshowthatwemight needanew energy securitycanbedistinct the double-trackapproach.Finally, and power-seekersmay concedetem interactions betweenstatesonabilateralandmulti of state’sunilateralsearchforenergytoamoredynamic framework, whichencompasses emerging Firstly,I relianceontheSCOframework. underpinnings onhowtorethinkBeijing’s evolving Kazakhstan. the Russianvectortobeofgreatimportance whenassessingChineseenergyapproachto power soistherelationshipbetweentwocoun control overKazakhhydrocarbonsimplies Caspian riches betweenMoscow
The planof thethesis proceedsasfollows By moving beyondmeresummary, thisthes to Chinesebehavior. d paymoreattentiontotheevolvingroleofSCO. includingalsoregionalforums asastanceforbargainingand variablesareundertakenalong and Beijingisdrivenbytheneed nd chapterdealswiththeChin in thethird chapter. Thefina in policyterms, IshowthatChina’sworldwidestrivefor porary restraintstoachievelong-term gainsandevenuse more thanasupplyline;as pproach tograsp Beijing’s energyinvolvement in 9
s one-sidedapproachtosecuringtheCaspian
tries renderedbythepowerstruggle.Thisleads the emergence oftheSCOvectorinChinese lateral level. Secondly, Ishowthat security- broaden energysecurity from astaticnotion energy securitystrategyinthelightof . Inthefirstchapter, conceptualand is providesconceptualandtheoretical l chapter discusses alternative with theintroductionof forenergysecu ese bilateraldealingsin oil fuelsalllevelsofstate rity, but the CEU eTD Collection
22 21 20 depict theconceptascontingentsolelyupon the diversificationof for nationalsurvival. and diversified inflowofresourcestomeet fund formation, “energysecurity” deals concerned withtheimpactofenvironmental concept bythedistinctobjec security” regardingtheimpact onst ofresources words, “energysecurity”islin whereby the stateis themain referentobjectand former, “energysecurity” isanarrower concept lo similar terms, namely “international security andcooperation.First,theconceptof 1.1 ConceptualizingEnergySecurityandCooperation Institution), pp. 4. pp. Institution), Organisations and Inter-GovernmentalOrganisations oil. security. On thecontrary, myprimary aim hereisto explai mean not th does This diversification. Edward Fried and Philip Trezise(1993): Philip and Fried Edward (2006): (eds.) Kingham Ronald is security” “energy terms scope, In definitional of the CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL F CHAPTER 1:THEORETICAL
On theotherhand,conceptof“environmen In thisthesis twomain conceptswillbe 21 supply asthe concept’s Inparticular,theaforementioned attr An Overview of Strategies and Initiatives of Selected Governments, International International Governments, of Selected Initiatives and An Overviewof Strategies ked tonationalsecurity. t ofinquiry.Whereas“environm at Irejectthesignificanceofother with theprospectsofstate “Oil Security: Retrospect and Pros and Retrospect “OilSecurity: security” and “environmentalsecurity”. RAMEWORK ANDMETHODOLOGY , (Institute for Environmental Security: Hague), pp. pp. 11-17. Security:Hague), forEnvironmental , (Institute the controlof regularsupplybythestate. differentia specifica 10 “energy security” needs to be distinguished from “energy security”needstobedistinguishedfrom
n the regional security implications of Beijing’s strive for implications security theregional n amental needsinthefaceofanassumed threat ate policies,isdistingui changes andaccesstoresources inconflict
cated within thetraditional aspect of security used todealwiththeoutlinedtask:energy herein narrowed to securing stable oil supply and herein and narrowed tosecuring stable oil supply threats arerelatedtost tal security”,although ibute of“energysecurity”basedon strategic resources forChinese energy pect”, (Washington: The Brookings Brookings The (Washington: pect”, to attainstable,uninterrupted isoftencitedbyscholarsto ental security” shed from theproposed ate survival. Inother 20 With regardto the similar to“energy is primarily 22 This
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Whereas “regime” iscontingentupontheexistence They aremore than short-term dealings thatce 25 24 23 states whoagreetodealwith similar butdifferentconcepts,thatis,“regime” in thefaceofmilitary,polit frameworks aimedatachievingdiversified,stable security level. Thus,IpartlydrawonDani definition encompassing interstate cooperation/competition on bilateral aswell onmultilateral and diversifyingroutesregardle the energysecurity conceptfromastaticnotion or hinderstheaccomplishment ofitsenergysecur energy supplies. Rather thestate enters different does notactasa“blackbox”isolatedfrom ot its meaning throughtheinterstatecooperation.Inits activities insecuringappropriate level of perspective, thus,defines“energy Stephen D. Krasner (eds.) (1983): 4-5. pp. London), Press: (Westview Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables”, in Robert Keohane (1989): Daniel Yergin (2006): “E Referring tothesecondconcept,“cooperatio However, apartfrom beingdrivenbythestat
is asystemofstatenational securitypo nsuring Energy Security”, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory Relations in International Essays Power: State and Institutions International ical, economicthreatsposed International Regimes International an issueofmutual importance a ss ofotheractors’interest security” as nationalpolicy i el Yergin’sconceptualproposition. energyforitsdomestic needs. Foreign Affairs Foreign , (New York: Cornell Univer Cornell , (NewYork: 11 and “integration”.“Regime”
her actorscompetingforstableanddiversified arrangements withother actorswhich mitigates ase toexist withthe sh
of nationalpolicyaimed atsecuringresources ity goals.Asacorollary,Iproposetoadvance and constantsupplyofresourcesforthestate of “cooperation”,thereverseisnotcase. licies, bilateralrelations and institutional e unilateral actionenergy security acquires struggleforstrategicresources,thestate n”, itisnecessarytodelineatebetween by stateornon-stateactors , March/April,, pp.”pp. 78-81. nd istheoutcome ofcooperation. s andgoalstoamore dynamic ssue adheringtostate’sunilateral sityPress), pp.2-3. ift instates’ interests. 23 relatestoagroupof Therefore, . energy 25 24 ,
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27 26 of interactions inwhichstateinterests shapethemain processes. multilateralism formeans rather than agoalof under theconstellationsofstatein community ofstates.Inthisstudy, however, Ian institutions, rulesandnorms unde assurances. aegis ofacollectivetreatywhereotherac “multilateral” cooperation betweenthestates is the contacts inwhichthirdparties aredirectly or being carriedoutsolelyonaface- Under “bilateral”cooperationIunderstandrelati at increasing one’s benefits sofaras assume definition insofar asitwillbeused as gains actors expectfrom it.In for explainingthemerging ofdifferententities. “Integration”, however,ismuch broaderanden 569-574. 569-574. Institutionalism”, Institutionalism”, John G. Ruggie (1992): “Multilateralism: An Anatomy of an Institution”, anInstitution”, of Anatomy An “Multilateralism: G.Ruggie (1992): John Joseph Grieco (1988): “Anarchy and the Limits ofcooperation: a Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Finally, Idelineate theconcept of cooperation The conceptofcooperationitselfisneverthe 27 Under“multilateral” cooperation one can likewise subsume theimpact of joint International Organization this study, thedefinition of to-face basis.This implies that terests, thatis,interms of rpinning theactors’participati , 42(3), pp. 485-507. 485-507. pp. , 42(3), an egoist-drivenmutualeffort d gainsofthe othersidedonotexceed it. 12 cooperation, Inarrowmultilateralism toapattern understood totakeplaceinaforum orunderthe
tors aregrantedequalrightsandlong-time compasses asoneoftheaspects “cooperation” alyze theinstrumental
ons betweentwoactorsinwhichcontactsare indirectly includedin thetalks.In contrast, less defineddifferentlydependentonthe into “bilateral” and“multilateral” formats. cooperation cooperation possibilities.Takingthe cooperation theconcepttakes noaccountof International Organization International on inaregime, organizationor of atleasttwostatesaimed aspect ofmultilateralism willfollow arationalist 26
, 46(3), pp. , 46(3), CEU eTD Collection
companies intacklingtheir Chinese rivals. second interveningvariable(Russi about theneedtorestrainChinesecompanies’ increase inawarenessoftheKazakhgovernment Alashankou pipeline.Thefirstin in Kazakhstan,aswellrelationtooi variable) isindicatedwithenc petroleum-related issues.Inaddition,thechange SCO, andatagreements onoilsupplyandth variable) Ilookatthestatements the SCObasistopertainexpl level might assume asortofbila level, respectively. Since itisoften hardtode placed onoutcomes succeedingthe politicaldeali negotiations pertainingtoorduringtheSCOmeeti bilateral summits.Ontheother look atoutcomes ofenergytalk 1.2 OperationalizationofVariables As indicator ofshifttowardgreaterem To measure theindependent variable, thatis ountered obstaclesduringthepurchas s heldbetweentheChineseand hand, thedependentvariableis teral negotiations, thisthesis willconsider all the talks held on byChineseofficialsaboutth anation ofthedependentvariable. tervening variable(Astana’s a asspoiler)isindicativeof l supplybyRussiancompanies totheAtyrau- 13 lineate betweenthetwoapproachesasSCO
participationinenergyprojects.Finally, the phasis on China’s SCO approach (dependent phasis onChina’sSCOapproach ngs betweenthetwosi
e establishment ofcoordinating bodiesfor withinthebilateralapproach(independent ngs. Inrelationtobothvariables,thefocusis coupled with the statements of incumbents coupled withthestatements ofincumbents the Chinesebilateral energy approach,Iwill e energycooperationwithinthe Kazakh seniorofficialsduring to bemeasured bytheenergy the activities of Russian oil theactivitiesofRussianoil obstacles) isinferredbythe e ofoilfieldsandcompanies des takingplace oneach CEU eTD Collection
28 maximize itspowerbecausethestrategicoverstre striving foran“appropriatelevelofpower”. anarchy induces states torestrain from hegemony astheultimate aim of nationalpolicywhile anticipated gainsareex China iseagertorestrainitselffrom amore interests tobethreatenedandfindawaylimit pursued onlyabilateralapproach, becauseboth Beijing’s energy security goals.Thisambivalence, Iargue, wouldnotbepossibleif China and KazakhstanwithregardtoChinese en consultative framework. Actingasaregionalfo confrontation withRussia benign intentions.Asanewcom purpose ofthisrelationshipisdesignedbyBeiji causes inreturnashift thebi security-seeker keenonachievingitsenergy strategy regarding the outcomes. Mybasicassumption isthat Chinaactsasarational actor and cooperation withKazakhstan andwh 1.3 TheoreticalFramework: Assessinga Kenneth N.Waltz(1979): This approach fits to a great extent into the defensive realist argument that structural This thesisbeginswithanempirical puz pected tobehigherthanpotentiallosses. Theory of International Politics Theory of overenergy resources a lateral approachtoward Kazakhsta er to the Kazakhoil market ether thereisarelationship be Likelihood ofInter-StateCooperation 28 assertiveapproachin Defensiverealistssuggest objectivesthroughregi ergy activities withholdingaccomplishment of 14 ng’s aim toassureAstanaandMoscowaboutits
rum, theSCOprovidestransparency toRussia
, (New York: McGr , (NewYork: tch may causeotheractorstobalanceagainst AstanaandMoscow would conceive their Beijing’s activities.Ther nd thusiswillingto zle abouttheformat ofChineseenergy n andRussia. Icontend thatthe , Beijingseekstoavoidany aw Hill) pp.40. energy cooperation, for the energy cooperation,forthe tween thetwolevelsofits onal cooperationwhich the stateiseagernotto take partintheSCO efore, Isuggestthat CEU eTD Collection
30 29 cooperation. Althoughlacking multilateral approach,developed deal withthetwoactorssepara approach. In fact,thescope ofa “multi-vector” energy policy. leadership may expectto efforts. Atthesame time, byintroducing calculation thatinvoking Russia’sopposition orhos common long-term interestswith Kazakhstan a into mutual cooperation. ThisisnotduetoBeijing’s faithinthe possibilityoffindingthe Moscow’s back, Beijing islikelytopur needs tobeadopted.Insteadofpushingsolely companies intotheKazakh energysector,aspeci power. with otherpowersthroughregimes andinstitutions increase inrelativepowerth survival. As survival is thecore goal ofever it. Relations Theories: Disciplines and Diversities Disciplines and Theories: Relations Kenneth N.Waltz(2000): “Structu (2007): Smith Steve and Milja Kurki Tim(ed.), Realism”, in “Structural Dunne Mearsheimer, John 29 Thebalancingcoalitionmay leavetheaspiri To accomplish the twointerlinked goals, Ch In particular,ifBeijingwantstoavoidcl induce rough self-restrainedbehavior. ral Realism Cold afterthe War”, strong institutionsthatcouldsh tely whichdecreasestheoverall bilateral approachmay beinadequa Kazakhstantocooperatewithout through theSCOappearsto facilitatethe conditions for , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 75-78. Press), University Cambridge , (Cambridge: sue amore balancedapproachaimed at Russia intotheenergycooperationChinese y nation,defensiverealis 15
ng hegemon lesssecureorevenendangerits for bilateralagreements nd Russia, butrathercomes arational nd Russia, as ashes withRussiaovertheexpansionofits wherethestateaims atincreasingitsrelative fic strategy of mitigating Russia’s concerns tility might bringhighcoststoBeijing’s ina reliesnot entirely onits bilateral International Security International 30 Thismay alsoincludecooperation ape stateinterestsandpreferences effectofabindingstrategy.A te given thatBeijingneedsto a fearforthefutureofits ts argueforincremental withAstanabehind , 25(1), pp. 5-41. 5-41. pp. 25(1), , binding International International Russia Russia CEU eTD Collection
others. most statesarekeenon riskingwartoexpandorpursuestrategies that areincompatible with given thatweaker actorsareuneagertoconfront reasoning is thatthemore powerstateacquires, power byexpandingintoKazakhstanw 34 33 32 31 pursuing aregionalhegemony commits statestosurvive.Chinabehavesasareluctantpowerunwillingandincapableof Russia bypursuinghegemony. all,energysecur After seeking behavior,IneverthelessarguethatChinas their rivals either tobesecured orto achieve coalition. Theyclaim thatstat by defensive neorealism, becausemoststateste reject thestate’sreluctanceto cooperation becausethecostsofsecurity compe As SethG.Jonesargues“thefearof future to decreasetheprospectsofa regarding theenergysecurity,asneoliberalswoul 34. Robert Jervis (1999): “Realism, JohnMearsheimer (2001): G.Jones (2007): Seth Ibid . 34 On the other hand, offensive realismwouldargue On theotherhand,offensive While my argument supportstheoffensive
The Rise of European Security Cooperation The Tragedy of Great Power Politics Power of Great The Tragedy Neoliberalism andCooperation”, future confrontationwithRussi maximize powerinfearofbalanc striving insteadtosecuresuffici es areconstantlylookingforsp ith hegemony astheultimate goal. conflict may createastrongimpetus formultilateral othervaluesthatpowerisbelievedtobring. 16 tition canbecome exorbitantlyhigh forstates”.
the lessis probability . Forthisreason,thecooperationisunlikelyas
d expect,the SCOservesasaforumforChina nd to buck-passrather than join abalancing eems reluctant toexacerbate the tensions with neorealist claim aboutthestates’power- ity isinterlinkedwith , (New, York: W. W.Norton),pp.46. International Security , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. University Cambridge , (Cambridge: thatBeijing’saim tomaximize its is a overKazakhstan’senergyassets. ent energyforit ace toexpandat ing byotheractorsassuggested tobebulliedbyothers , 24(1), pp. 48-49. 48-49. pp. 24(1), , nationalsecurityand 32 Offensive realists s needs.TheSCO the expenseof 33 The 31
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treatment to allparties, diminish chea This ismade possiblethrough theestablishment 37 36 35 making thecooperationpossible. utilize institutionsfor their e expectations oflimiting theimpacts ofan on constellations of interests whic stability. Namely, interstatere paradigm drawsonaslightlydifferentconclusi system stimulates countriestoactin accordancew understood throughthelogicofneol leverage. Kazakh leadership may preferdea preserving theinfluencewhile sector. Ontheotherhand,Russiamay perceive costs theintensecompetition may bringto Beijing as a relative latecomer to the Kazakh energy eager tocooperate despiteconstrainingeffects avoiding the balancing andconflict withRussia andKazakhstan alike. Chineseleadership is framework standsfortheinstitutionthroughwhic Cambridge University Press), pp. Press),pp. 26. University Cambridge Keohane, Andreas Hasenclever, PeterMa Ibid , pp. 26-27. 26-27. , pp. Beijing’s eagerness to use the SCOintackling the energy issues can be toacertain extent op. cit. op.
nds, butfurtherinstitutionsshape yer and Michael Zürn (2000): lations areunderstoodthroughinte hoping to restrain theChines 37 ling withBeijingonabasisopento h areirreducibletoconfigurati Consequently,theprospects of iberalism. Whileadmitting that the anarchic featureofthe ting probability and lower thetrade-offs. archy throughconfidence-building and assurance. upon itsbehaviorbecause oftheexceedinglyhigh 17
on regardingtheprospectsforcooperationand of institutions whicharethoughtto grantequal
ith thestruggle-for-power logic,the neoliberal h Chinarestrainsitsenergy-drivenpowerby cooperationasmost welcome interms of Theories of International Regimes of International Theories actors’ interests and preferences e growingpower,whereasthe ons ofpower,andfosteredby rest-driven cooperationbased future conflicts aremitigated otherstatestogaincertain 36 Notonlystates (Cambridge: 35
CEU eTD Collection 38(1), pp. 57. 57. pp. 38(1),
38 while providing Beijingwiththeway tos the inputofSCOrestrainingBeijing’sstrate relative totheinvolvedactors.ThusIhereinsugg other participantsofbenigninte ends. cooperation Chinaaims atenta profitable partnership inwhichautonomous institu want them tohavebindingeffects”. serve asaplatform toincreasegainsfrom the particularly ifBeijing’sleverageoverAstana with theextentofChina’ssharein theKazakh maximizing theirgains butalso inhowtheasse reasons. First,acting asegoistactorsofener Chinese interests andpreferences. for themoment theSCOinstitutions aresettoa the absolutegainsrestrainingit induces them tocooperate.In doing so,China Allthree sideshaveidentified common inte cooperation. through cooperation,becauseeveryactor Robert Jervis (1985): “From Balance to Concer to Balance “From (1985): Jervis Robert In conclusion,Iarguethatthe self forthesakeofcooperation. ngling bothKazakhstanandRussia ntions soastoa This viewis,however,hardlyap 38 Inotherwords,ratherthan purpose ofbindingstatesinto istoacertainextentsatisf ecure a stableandrelatively invulnerab t: A Study of International Security Cooperation”, Cooperation”, Security t: AStudy International of is increasing. Second,theSCOinstitutionsmay not mutual cooperation,but“because national leaders 18 may amultilateral optfor approach tomaximize gy aims atassuringbothKazakhstanandRussia,
void counter-balancing,wh gy securitystatesarenotonlyinterestedin ts are divided. Russiawillbemore concerned est thattheChinesestra
energy market thanwiththepossible benefits ffect its members leadingtothe reshaping of tions are intentionally created tofacilitate rests regardingoilas Consequently, althoughfledgling settinggroundsforamutually ied withthespoilsofmutual into cooperationforitsown plicable tothis case for two an organizationistoassure tegy isofadualnature: the keyasset which ile increasingpower le accesstooil. World Politics World , CEU eTD Collection
announcements andstatisticaldata aretaken into government documents includingpolicyreco answers usingtherationalistepistemology. international system, bydealingwi Although ideationalfactorsplayac rational unitaryactorwithexoge bilateral oildealings. axis inChina’s strive for energy security in Ka attention tocooperationwithin approach spurs energy competition withRussia, relations regarding the competition overKazakh oil. acquisitions callingfortheSCOvector.These indicates that Kazakhstan andRussia arebeco study focusesonSino-Kazakhenergy dealsonoilfi surrounding themajor Sino-Kazakh oilproject, th will be achieved through thethree causalexplan approach towards energy cooperation withKaza pursuit ofenergysecurity throughtheSCOa 1.4 Methodology In terms ofdata,both primary andseconda This singleunitdiachronically The thesisadoptstheinductive the SCO. Thethirdcasestudytr nous preferencesandidentity,fo th material assetssuchasen onsiderable roleinexplaining basedcasestudytakesChina,hereinunderstoodasa logic ofinquirytoexplain nd therelationship betw 19 cond casestudy focusesonSino-Russian energy khstan andRussiaitsbilateralstrategy.This zakhstan asaconsequence which China tries to avoid bydedicating more
account. In addition, the Charter of the SCO, account.Inaddition,theCharterofSCO, atory case studies based onChinese activities mmendations, strategies,publicspeeches, e Atyrau-Alashankou pipeline.The firstcase ming more reluctant toChinese bilateral elds and theAtyrau-Alashankoupipeline.It IwillshowthatBeijing’sbilateral energy ry sourcesareuse ergy, thisstudymay givebetter aces theemergence oftheSCO the reasonsbehindBeijing’s the behaviorofstatesin r themain unitofanalysis. een Chinesemultilateral d. OfficialChinese of the pitfalls in the CEU eTD Collection
in examining interactions,yetitistime-cons between theindependentanddependentvariables. the interveningvariablesonth existing theoreticalexpectations extent to whichtheChinese interactions between thetwoChineseapproaches.Indoings pertaining tothedependentvariab the Chinese bilateral and theSCO-drivenenergy Using themacro-level of analysis(state asunita 41 40 39 addition, processtracingmakes intermediate infe intervening variablesuponthe theoretical problem. the outcome ofthedependentvariabletolimit the tracing provides thecausal chai news availableonline. findings fromacademic articlesand conference conventions, andjointdeclarations willbeasse International Relations: A Pluralist Guide APluralist Relations: International (Cambridge MA: Belfer Center for Scien Jeffrey Checkel, “Process Tracing”, in in Au Tracing”, “Process Checkel, Jeffrey Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005): Ibid . As Checkelpointsout,process The datawillbeanalyzedusingthepro 39 Inparticular,processtracingisadvantageousinintroducingtheimpact of e processbymaking causalinfere n and causalmechanism betweentheindependent variable and observed processwhichnarrowsthelistofpotentialcauses. about interstatecooperation.Fina le (outcome) inordertomake inferences abouttherelationship ce and International Affairs), pp. 206-207. 206-207. pp. Affairs), International ce and , (New York: Palgrave McMillan), pp. 114-127. McMillan), pp. 114-127. Palgrave , (NewYork: dies Klotz (ed.) and Deepa Prakash (2008): (2008): Prakash Deepa and (ed.) Klotz dies tracing hasitsgoodandbadsi with bothKazakhstan a uming andrequiresasignificant amount ofdata. Case Study and Theory Development in the Social Sciences the Social in Development Theory and Case Study ssed. Asforsecondarysources, thestudywilluse 20
cess tracingmethod. Met ry actors) Iintendtoestablish thelinkbetween rences betweentheinde
papers, fieldreports,think-thank analysisand o, Imap theempirical processtoanalyzethe approach. With processtracing Itraceevents number ofpotentialcaus lly, Iexamine theinfluenceof nces abouttherelationship nd Russiacorrespond with des. Themethod isfruitful pendent anddependent hodologically, process es inanempiricalor Qualitative Methods in in Methods Qualitative 41 In 40 ,
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43 42 simultaneously interacting. outcomes areseldom markedwithcontingency, different causal links thatintermediate betw which theprocessoccurs.Finally,whilemet explanation. variables basedonalternativear
Ibid Ibid . . 42 However,theprimary focusoninteractions 43
guments rather thanonthemost favored theoretically derived 21 een theindependentanddependentvariables,
andmay pointtovariouscausalmechanisms
hod isusefulforaresearchertocontemplate tendstoblurthegeneralcontextin CEU eTD Collection
may jeopardizetheirmonopolyoverKazakhoil.TheChinesepurchase ofKazakhoilfields, Russian companies suchasLukoilbecame increasingly awarethatChineseenergy expansion transfer certainshares inajo and elites,startedreconsidering both Kazakhstan andRussia. came acrosssignificantobstaclesto despite arelativelysuc energy cooperation withinthe SCOframework (dep from Astanaand the Kremlin, whichhelpsme thentotrace Chineseincreasing involvement in why Beijing’s bilateral strategy ofsecuring Ka the KazakhawarenessandRussianleverage(inter present howchangesintheChinese bilateral appr exploitation ofoilfieldsandth Kazakhstan from 2006byconsideringevents 1997to 2.1 Background To fight and conquer inall ourbattles isnotsuprem CHAPTER 2: CHINESE OIL DEAL OIL CHAPTER 2:CHINESE In particular, theKazakh authorities,fu In thefollowing chapterIdiscuss thebac AND THE PITFALLS OFTH PITFALLS AND THE cessful bilateralapproachtoener int-venture toaKazakh state-owne e constructionoftheAtyrau-Alash enemy’s resistance without fighting. resistance enemy’s existing oilarrangements andevenforcedChinesecompaniesto itsfurther energyexpansion inthe Caspianwithregard to 22 e excellence; supremeexcelle e excellence; eled byincreasingsinophobiaamongthepublic
zakh oilalone became vulnerable topressures E BILATERALAPPROACH INGS INKAZAKHSTAN,RUSSIA
kground ofChineseenergyengagement with oach (independentvariab vening variables).Indoingso,Ihereinshow endent variable). It surroundingthebilateralagreements on gy cooperationwith d petroleum firm. Inaddition, ankou pipeline.Myaim isto Sun Tzu,“The ArtofWar” nce consists in breaking nce consists will beshownthat, le) wereaffected by Astana,Beijing CEU eTD Collection
likely that theChinese bilateral oil dealingswill defensive neorealism positthat,duetothe relative security inKazakhstan isdiffe states cooperateorco competition between different corporatist intere frequently filledwithstate bureaucrats. Therefore, not amere instrument in thegovernment’s hands, acquisitions intheKazakh oilmarket. AlthoughRu integral actors of widernational security po two actorswerenotinterlinkedw Petroleum Corporation(CNPC) andLukoil. of thePetroKazakhstanpurchase backed bytheKremlin enteredacompetition withtheir Chinesecounterparts,which inthecase while decreasingMoscow’sleverageoverK route tothe East.Instrategic terms, this Moscow’s dominant controlover state-backed oilcompanies. Theconstructionof underpinning allChineseinvestments intheKa oil pipeline running from KazakhstantoChin which considerablycontributedtotheconstruc Whether cooperation or competition willprevail inChina’s bilateral strive for energy This wouldposenonoveltyinthecompeting mpete witheachother. rently contemplated bythe IRtheories.Bothoffensive and Kazakhpetroleum throughtheesta developed intoalegaldisput ith theirrespectivegovernments. would enhanceAstana’s multi-vector energy policy licies whichrely onnati 23 azakhstan. Consequently,petroleum companies tion oftheAtyaru-Alash zakh oilsector,raisedaconcernamong Russian
a circumventing Russiaand themajor project sts, but likewise involves amacro-level where theKazakh-Chineseoilpipelinemight negate
encounter difficulties inestablishing fruitful the top placesintheco gains logicunderpinningst thesearchforenergysecurityisnotonlyby ssian andChinesepetroleum corporationsare arena overhydrocarbonresourcesifthese e betweentheChineseNational In particular,bothfirms are blishment ofanalternative onal champions inmaking ankou pipeline,thefirst mpanies’ hierarchy are ate’s behavior,itis CEU eTD Collection
PetroKazakhstan in2005. Chinese pipelinefrom 2006;second,theSino-Russian competition 1997to over Kazakh oilmarket alongwithb Kazakhstan andRussia. Herein,Ipresent twocase the politicalconsequences forthemacro-level unwilling tocommit itself tobindingrulesthat costs ofcooperationwhileincreasing trustamong RussiaandKazakhstan.Yet,Beijingseems Neoliberalism wouldevensuggest might serveasabindingstrategy of exceedingly highergainsinthefuture.Al as asecurity-seeker, might accept temporaryrestra as defensiverealism suggests.Consequently,de provoke counter-balancingbyRussiaandKazakhstan goal, offensiverealism wouldclaim, eventhoughthismight beahazardousattemptasitmay maintain theexpansionintoKazakhoilsector the gainsBeijing acquiresfrom thearrangement. Themedicine for Beijing’s positionisto bilateral basis ishardly achievable given that bot energy cooperationwithbothKazakhstanandRu In sum, in this chapterIpresentChinesei In sum, inthis
thatwoulddisabletheprosp ilateral dealspertainingto Beijingwillturntoregimes a would permanently restrainitsbehavior. 24 oose arrangement interms ofa common forum fensive realismwouldar
h MoscowandAstanawillbemore attentive to withapreponderanceorhegemony asthefinal
nvolvement intheKazakhoilmarket todepict of energy interactions betweenChina,and ints toits energyexpansion withaprojection ssia. Thus, stable en studies: first, Chinese penetrationintothe and thwartChineseeffo the constructionofKazakh- ects forcounter-balancing China. nd institutions todecreasethe gue thatBeijing,acting ergy cooperationona rt toobtainpower CEU eTD Collection
44 Kazakhstan, withapredominant Muslim po incentives induce states toactassecurity-seekers. Russia fordecades. This appears tobackthedefe would loseauniquechance to gain accesstothe balance against Chinesepowertogetherwiththe it wouldhavegivenRussia a goo China hadpursuedamore assertivepolicytowa represents thecoreofChinesepost-1989fore friendly environment tocontinueeconomic grow with the Kremlin wereimperative for Beijingafte Kazakhstan couldnotbetackledwithaggressive Asia. Ontheonehand,Chineseofficials were strategy may becaused by Chineseperceptions of reluctance topromptly expanditspolitical influence into Kazakhstan. Beijing’s “wait-and-see” regional powervacuum immediat the offensive neorealist expectations thatBe in January1992,theformation ofpolitical Kazakhstan 2.2 “RisingDragon”Engages“SnowLeopard”:Ch http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-05 “Brief Introduction to Relations between China and Kazakhstan”, Other authors,similarly, point Although Chinawasamongthefirstcountries ely afterthe collapseofth /21/content_879991.htm (24/04/2010). (24/04/2010). /21/content_879991.htm d reason to worryabout Beij outthatBeijingwas uncerta relations hadtowaitforalmosttwoyears. ijing wouldmaximize itsgainsbyfilling inthe 25 pulation, wouldsupporttheUyghurseparatist awarethatstronglinka
rd Kazakhstanimmediately afterindependence, foreign policy;ontheother,improved relations
r decadesofhostility.Inbothcases,securinga Caspian basin whichhadbeen safeguarded by Russia asthemost influential powerinCentral ign policytowardRussia Central Asianstates.In thisscenario, Beijing nsive neorealist hypothesis thatthe structural th andachieveinternal inese BilateralEnergyApproachto to recognizeKazakhstan’sindependence e USSR,Chinademonstrated in whethernewlyindependent Xinhua ing’s intentionsandperhaps ges betweenRussiaand , May21, 2005, source: and Central Asia.If politicalstability 44 Against CEU eTD Collection Asia-Caucasus Institute), pp. 91. 91. pp. Institute), Asia-Caucasus
47 46 45 Nazarbayev stressed, “onlyalarge quantityof Astana amorenuancedapproachtowardbothofitspowerfulneighbors.As President leverage. Usingtheabundantoilresourcesto closely bindKazakhstan’seconomy toRussiamaki acting asanindependentregionalactor. would boostAstana’smulti-vectorpolicyofs return, normalization and gradualdevelopment of economic andpolitical relationswithBeijing economy providing agenuineopportunityfore that therising Chineseeconomy becomplimentary may toKazakhstan’s rawmaterials exporting intentions, Kazakhstan’s President, Nursultan leading torenewedtensionswithChina.De Kazakhstan’s nation-buildingmight triggernati Asia. frontier was highlymilitarized with noeconomic, propaganda attacksagainstthe a saferesortforUyghursepara activities intheChineseprovinceof Xinjiang. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/f Economic and Security Review Commission, August 4, 2006, source: Martha Brill Olcott, “Is China A Reliable Stakeholder in Central Asia?”, Testimony before the U.S.-China U.S.-China the Testimony before Asia?”, Central in Stakeholder AReliable “IsChina Olcott, Brill Martha Ariel Cohen (2008): “Kazakhstan: Liao, Xuanli Notwithstanding theindependence of theCentralAsiancountries, Beijingworriedthat op. cit., op. pp. 40-41. 40-41. pp. iles/MBO0806.pdf (25/04/2010). (25/04/2010). iles/MBO0806.pdf theRoadtoIndependence”, tist groupsandorganizations,a Chinese authorityinXinjiang.Duetothis,China’s eastern 47 ApassiveforeignpolicytowardChinawould more 45 attract thegrowing Chineseeconomy would grant Nazarbayev, andhiscloseassociatesunderstood 26 DuringtheSoviettimes
eeking equidistance withmajor powerswhilst spite thepopularanimositytoward Chinese xpanding tradeandinterstatecooperation.
onalist sentiments towardtheUyghurissue sovereign exportroutescan preventour ng it more vulnerabletoMoscow’sng itmore political cultural andpoliticalrelationswithCentral Silk Road Studies Paper nd alaunchingpadforSoviet , Kazakhstanrepresented , (Stockholm: Central Central , (Stockholm: 46 In CEU eTD Collection
50 49 48 more thanUS$4billion,returncompany’s debts, Chinese bilateralenergy approachtowardKaza obliged topayahighpricewinAstana’sfavor Texaco) and theRussian Yuzhnimost. company inKazakhstanwhileoutbiddingthewe investment intheKazakhoilindustrygrantedCh second largestpetroleum siteinKazakhstan. gained aspecialrighttoexplo field andthe Zhanazholgas field located inth Aktyubemunaigaz. Inaddition,Beijingacquired a 1997 whentheCNPCbought60.3percent ofthe shar oil diplomacy, Beijingsubstant establishment ofclosepolitical became dependentonoilimports, thestruggletomaintain aneconomicimpetus prioritized force behindtheChineserisingenergyengageme consumer.” dependence onasingleneighboraswell Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus Asiaand Central in Conflict Kazakhs the EricaStrecker Dru C. Gladney, “China’s Interests in Central Asia”, in Robert Ebel (eds.) and Rajan Menor (2000): Nursultan Nazarbayev (1997): Beijing’s inroad intothe Caspianwas unexpected Despite initial reluctance, Beijing’s mounting “thirst forenergy”became thedriving , source: , source: http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa 48
Downs (2000): (2000): Downs China's Quest for Energy Security Energy for Quest China's Strategy ‘Kazakhstan-2030’: Prosperity, Se it theAktyubinskdrillingsite,a links withoil-richcountries. iated itsfirstacquisitionin , (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers), pp. 215. Publishers), Littlefield and , (Lanham: Rowman 50 Yet,inorder toenter the 27 e same region.Finally,
khstan. Inparticular,Beijingpledgedtoinvest monopoly pricingdependenceonasingle
twenty-year licenseto exploittheKenkyak oil nt withKazakhstan.As financiallytake careof5,000workers,and , ascenario that willrepeatedly burdenthe ina controloverthethenfourthlargestoil stern petroleum corporations(Amoco and /en/content/reference/strategy2030 (25/04/2010). /en/content/reference/strategy2030 es in the Kazakhstate-ownedoil company , (Santa Monica: RAND), pp. 15-16. 15-16. pp. RAND), , (Santa Monica: aswelltriumphant: the CNPC’sfirst 49 the Kazakhhydrocarbonsectorin Embarking onextensivebilateral curity andever Growing Welfare ofAll nd theUzenoilfield,then Kazakh oilsector,Beijingwas the Chinesecorporation of1993whenChina Energy and and Energy
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of Aktyubemunaigaz. President Nazarbayev andChinesePrime Minister 52 51 production levelinUzenfieldowne annually whencompleted in2005. Atyrau throughtheentire investment inKazakhstan’shydr anticipated Kazakh-Chineseoi particular logicofseizingoilfieldsandK no choicebut toinvest insmaller petroleum sites. Russian companies whoalreadyheldagrip on th China’s late-comer positionin theKazakhoil s Furthermore, the restraint ona demands gainsthroughcarefu whilstmaximizing energy sector. IfBeijing wantedtoavoidbeing balancedagainst, ithad toaccept Astana’s policy marked withreluctance toward thegrowin suggest that Beijinghadfrom theverybeginningto company. above alltransferacertainamount ofsh 35(1), pp. 146-152. 146-152. pp. 35(1), The interstate agreement was signed in Beijing, September Beijing, in interstate agreement24, wassigned The 1997. K.Esimova (2005):“Kazakhstan-Chinese The 3,088kilometers longAtyrau-Alashankou 51 Even though the CNPC took overtheenti EventhoughtheCNPCtook 52 Thepipelinestretchingfrom theCaspia country toXinjiangwasexpected l pipelinewouldpass. pursuing assertive bilateral ener ocarbon sector,wasbrokeredth d bytheCNPCalonecameouttobe Theprojectstalle Cooperation in the Energy Sphere,” Sphere,” Energy inthe Cooperation azakh oilfirmslocatedin theregion wherethe ares toKazMunaiGaz,the Kazakh-stateowned 28
g influenceofanymajor powerinKazakhstan’s
e largest oilfields,such asTengiz, Chinahad LiPeng, whoagreed onthe CNPCtakeover ector. Unlikethewestern oilconsortia and payattentiontoAstana’s multi-vector energy Infact,Chinahadto lly choosingwhichoilassetstoacquire. re companyin2003,thesearrangements d, however,in1 land-based oilpipelin transport10-20bi n shoresneartheKazakhtownof gy approach wasexacerbatedby e same yearbyKazakhstan’s Central Asia and the Caucasus insufficienttofillinthe 999-2000 whentheoil play inaccordwitha e, amajor Chinese llion tonsofoil , CEU eTD Collection
56 55 54 53 established, connecting twoexisting sections of through theexistingtwosectionsofpipeline on July11,2009. the twosections into afully-fledged pipeline finished bytheendof2005andbecame operative in May2006. pipeline, running988km from Atas 448 km from AtyrautoKenkiyak inKazakhstan. KazMunaiGaz, jointlyconstructedthefirst,wester traveled toChinaattendtheSCO2002summit. Formally, talks regarding the project were revi Atyrau-Alashankou pipelinebackonthenegotia largest oilfieldsince1968inth excessively dependentonChinaforoilexports Daqing pipeline. Theagreement wasnotimplem on theconstructionofapipeline unprofitable, andBeijing postponedthe pipeline. Likewise,thethenlowpetroleum worl http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/press/newsrel http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006- http://www.china.org.cn/ source: 2004, March 3, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central ecomes_operational.htm (26/04/2010). “KazakhstanOilPipedintoChina”, “Sino-Kazakhstan Oil Pipeline Construction to toChina”, Looks “Oil-rich US AllyKazakhstan “Kenkiyak-Kumkol Section of Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline Becomes Operational”, source: Meanwhile, BeijingunsuccessfullywooedMosc 56 Forthetime being,around200,000bbl/dof _Asia/FB27Ag01.html (26/04/2010). (26/04/2010). _Asia/FB27Ag01.html from Russia’sSouthernSibe e KazakhzoneoftheCaspian,Kashaganoilsite,put 05/25/content_4597314.htm (26/04/2010). (26/04/2010). 05/25/content_4597314.htm eases/Kenkiyak_Kumkol_s u inKazakhstantoAlashankou realization oftheagreement. english/international/89110.htm (26/04/2010). (26/04/2010). english/international/89110.htm Start Second Stage This Year: Kazak PM”, running from CaspiantoChina,wascompleted the Xinhua News Agency 29 . OncethelinkbetweenKenkiyakandKumkol is ved aftertheKazakhforeignminister Tokayev
. Simultaneously, thediscoveryofworld’s
d pricemade theconstructionofpipeline ting tableamid Chinesesouringoildemand. the pipeline,oilout nmost sectionoftheoilpipeline,stretching 54 ented duetoRussianfearsofbecoming 53 Thesecond,easternmost sectionofthe Asia Times By the spring of2003,theCNPCand Bythe ow intoenergycooperationbyagreeing ection_of_Kazakhstan ria toDaqing,knownasAngarsk- 55 Thethirdpart,whichconnects crudeoilisbeingtransported , February 27, 2004, source: source: 2004, 27, , February , May 25, 2006, source: 2006, , May25, at theChineseborder,was － flow isexpectedto China_Oil_Pipeline_b Xinhua News Agency Xinhua , CEU eTD Collection
estimated between 35and 65million tons. petroleum company, andinOctoberbecame thesole repurchased 35percentofsharesintheNorthBuzachifieldMangistau regionfrom aSaudi reinforce oilnecessaryforf Kazakhstan, Chineseoilcorporatio 60 59 58 57 greatest prize. and Sazankurak oilsiteproducing morethan Kazakhstan among whichtheAdaisite,withes took overtheassetsofan 2002, despitebackingfrom Astana. Beijing failedtotakepartintheexploitationof bilateral approachandincreasedcompetitionwith PetroKazakhstan, andobtaintheoilfrom Russian connecting them tothepipeline,take source. represents asinglemajor projectintheregion double. asia/Kazakhstan/ (04/05/2010). consortium in charge of exploration and exploitation of the field, was vetoed by other members. to buy sh as and offer Sinopec the CNPC an by Kashagan, http://www.wtexecutive.com/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms MariaYakovleva, “China “CNPCin Kazakhstan”, attempt at inan China wasleftempty-handed In2003, h source: Administration, Information USEnergy 57 To make thepipelinefully operative, however,Beijinghadtoacquire additional oilfields Thiswouldaccountforapproximately 8percentofChina’scurrentoilneeds.Thusit 60 Togetherwiththemajor Kazakhstate- Official website of CNPC of the website Official Thirsts forKazakhOil”, American petroleum corporationto illing intheSino-K ns decidedtoinvestinonshore 58 Beingunabletoclaim access ttp://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/Oil.html (26/04/2010). (26/04/2010). ttp://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/Oil.html 59 Inthesame year,Chines over amajor company owningthesefields, , source: http://www.cnpc.com.cn/eng/cnpcworldwide/euro- 30 Kashagan,agiantKazakh oilfielddiscovered in granting Beijingrelativelystableandreliableoil 200,000 tons ofoilannually accounted forthe gaining a foothold in Kazakhstan’s major onshore oil site, site, oil major onshore inKazakhstan’s a foothold gaining .cms.article.Article_rpi_article_1 (02/05/2010). (02/05/2010). .cms.article.Article_rpi_article_1
timated 100million tons ofcrudeoilreserves,
Russian Petroleum Investor azakh pipeline.InA otherforeignactorsinKazakhstan.In2003, ares of the British Gas, participating in the western the in the participating ares Gas, of British refineries. This requireda more assertive ownerofthesitewithcrudeoilreserves owned firm, KazMunaiGaz,aChineseoil acquire severaloilfieldsinwest and offshorefieldsinorderto to the greatestoil wellin e stateenterpriseSinopec ugust 2003,theCNPC , June 27, 2005, source: source: 2005, 27, June , CEU eTD Collection
modern andbiggestofKazakhstan’ production with10respectiveoil second largestoilcompany opera outbid anIndianoilcompany tobecome the to beasteppingstoneforfutureChinesee the aegisofBeijing’ worldwidepursuit forsecuri 64 63 61 oil requiredforthepipeline. the Atyrau-Alashankoupipelineand most remote partsofthe Sino-Kazakh pipeline. half-ownership, whicharelocate is engagedintwomajor oilfields, Kumkol So would increasetheoverallproductionlevel. shares toKazMunaiGaz, andmade acommitment to the KazakhstateovermountingChineseenergyexpa right over the Karazhanbas fieldendowed with December 2006theChinaInternationalTrusta corporation enteredin2005theexploitatio http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Chi http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/com http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/compan 62 “China’s KazakhPrize: “KazMunaiGaz andCNPC to jointly develop Darkhan field”, Ibid
“KazMunaiGaz to shell out out half shell to “KazMunaiGaz . The most valuablepetroleum acquisitionaChinese company haseverundertaken under 64 theExpert Opinion”, na/GH25Ad01.html (02/05/2010). (02/05/2010). na/GH25Ad01.html of Citic Group’s assets”, ofCiticGroup’s AsMarkMcCafferty,aCentral pany/cnc74393.htm (02/05/2010). (02/05/2010). pany/cnc74393.htm d inthecoreofKumkol-K y/cnc54300.htm (02/05/2010). (02/05/2010). y/cnc54300.htm ting inKazakhstanholding10percentofthecountry’soil s threeoil-processing facilities. sites initspropertyandthe facilitate itsconstructiongran xpansion intheCaspian.InAugust2005,CNPC 62 n agreement intheDarkhanoilsite.
31 340 million bbl.Tomitigate growingconcernsof uth, assoleowner,a
nd Investment Company (CITIC)acquiredthe This takeover willbolsterChina’scontrol over ng stableand diversified oilroutes,wasthought owner ofCanada-basedPetroKazakhstan,the
AFX NewsLimited buildanewrefinery neartheoilsitewhich nsion, thecompany tran Asia Times Interfax Information Services enkyak branchconnectingthetwo ian analystplainlypointedout , October 3,2007,source: , August 25, 2005, source: Shymkent refinery,themost ting Beijing nearlyhalfofthe 63 Inparticular,thecompany nd Kumkol Norththrough sferred halfofthe 61 Finally,in
, source: CEU eTD Collection
66 65 and perceivedPetroKazakhstantobethepeak energy securitypolicy,the activities. Driven by aneed toprotect whatwas believed to represent Kazakhstan’s multi-vector Ironically, oneofthelargestinvestmentsin PetroKazakhstan puttoa test the previous to Astana’s supportfortheemerging Chinesevectorinitsenergypolicy,thecaseof distribution ofpowertomainta Central Asiadiminishing USpowerwhilebalancingMoscow. would inevitablyincrease Beijing’s political in petroelum toXinjiang,andsetupabasisforfutu Most importantly, owningPetroK purchase PetroKazakhstanshares,Astanadecided to Astana promptlyreactedtoc the influenceaswesterncorporationsor independence asaninternati Analyst http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/busine Hooman Peimani, “China’s Acquisition of PetroKazakhstan: aBlessing or aCurse?”, “Kazakhstan/China:OilD , September 7, 2005, source: production through this acquis pipeline.They’vefill CNPC’s nowsecured going tocomefrom to the oilwas Kazakhstan toChinajustnow,andprevious because they’re inthe process ofbuildin because they’re And important inKazakhstan,andspecificallycentralKazakhstan. that’s reserves acquisition, giventhembecause it’s quiteasizeableamount of productionand important avery theCNPC,it’s side,andspecifically fromtheChinese Certainly However, the main dilemma of thisacquisition washowAstanawillreact toshifting eal Marks Beijing’s1stForeign Energy Takeover”, country’s leadershipf onal actor.AlthoughPetroKazakhsta http://www.cacianalyst.org/ ounter-balance Chineseinfluence. in a balanced energy policytowardRussia and China. Despite azakhstan willguaranteeBeijing ition of PetroKazakhstan.ition of ss/articles/pp082305.shtml (02/05/2010). (02/05/2010). ss/articles/pp082305.shtml as RussiaholdintheKazakhhydrocarbonsector, 32 Kazakh oilindustryhadAstanarestrainChinese ly there ly were bigconcernsaboutwhere
fluence andexpanditssecurityengagement in g apipelineinthe easternpartof
eared Beijing’sincreasi lerance toward Beijing’s energy expansion. ofalingeringChinese re takeoversinKazakhstan.Politically,this compel ittocooperatewiththestate. ?q=node/3367 (0 ?q=node/3367 65
66
BeforetheCNPCmoved to n didnotendowBeijingwith 2/05/2010). a secureandst ngly assertivebehavior Central Asia-Caucasus Asia-Caucasus Central threat toAstana’s EurasiaNet able supplyof , source: CEU eTD Collection
develop resources...andtoestabl “not toadmit athreat totheinterests of national proposed abillto theMazhilis,whichPresiden dependence onChinawouldcauseadeclinein afford tohaveitsmulti-vector energypolicycloselyboundtoanymajorpower,as With theambitionofpreservinganindependent 70 69 68 67 PetroKazakhstan whilelimiting theChines against theCNPCacquisition with monopolistic positionof theChinesecompany, a oil. control oftheShymkent refinery,whichispr The Minister’swordsechoedtheKazakh’slead mineral resource minister Vladimir Shkolnikafte http://www.ups http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005- (02/05/2010). source: http://cacianalyst.org/?q “Astana ‘Poised to Block Oil Sales’”, of‘Collisio “Kazakhstan Warns CNPC, the http://www.cnpc. source: of Official Website “Kazakhs SeekControl’ ‘Strategic Over PetroKaz”, 68 Granting theCNPC issue; we’retalkinghereaboutastrate serious Thisisavery within thecountry. willstay case,strategiccontrol In any The coreof thismove wasaddressedinanannouncement bytheKazakhenergyand for thataslongIcan. taken withregardtotheseoilfields,and important strategically projectandhave apartof influenceall any thedecisions region ofour country isdependent.Ibe treamonline.com/live/article =node/3474 (0 la carteblanche 67
n’ Over PetroKaz Sale”, ish thestate’spre-emption right”. the intention of obtaining control part for theKazakh state in 99591.ece (02/05/2010). 2/05/2010). 10/13/content_484643.htm (02/05/2010). (02/05/2010). 10/13/content_484643.htm e grip overthecompany’s assets. gic enterprise, upon whicha gic enterprise, hugesouthern lieve that in any caseKazakhstanshould any lieve thatin inPetroKazakhstan’s acquisition would imply a also to Shymkent refinery. I’ll strugglealso toShymkent refinery. ocessing more than40percentofKazakhstan’s Central Asia and the Caucasus Analyst 33 t Nazarbayev immediately turned into lawaimed Kazakh power.Forthisreason,thegovernment
r theCNPCplacedbidforcompany: nd wouldendangercountry’senergysecurity. security duringsalesortr
Upstream News actor status,theKazakhleadershipcouldnot com.cn/en/aboutcnpc/ourbusin ership enduringconcernsovertheChinese China Daily China , October 5, 2005, source: 70 , October 13, 2005, source: source: 2005, , October 13, Thismove directed was ansfers oftheright to esses/refiningchemicals/ , October 4, 2005, 2005, 4, , October 69
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dispute betweentheCNPCandRussiancompany. that Astanatacitlybacked RussianLukoilincl 73 72 71 logic IuseforexplainingChin expectations basedonrelativega despite temporarylossesBeijingacceptedallAstana pipeline, Beijing waseven willing tocedepart of itsgrowing powertoAstana. Asshown, Kazakh oilsectorandacquiringpe that Beijingwasdrivenbyener Kazakh-Chinese pipeline.Theambivalence ofthe cooperation withKazakhstanasitwaseagerto deposit (SouthBuzachi). Lukoil’s favor against PetroKazakhstan inadi through TurgaiPetroleum, a subsidiarycompany ofPetroKazakhstan. under which Beijing acquiesced totransfer33per Chinese company. refinery, whichrepresentedthedrivingforcebe enacted, theKazakhstate wasgranted equalrights (27/04/2010). http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/17/business/worldbusiness/17kazakh.html http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/depeches_det http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Bus “ChinaPaysDearlyforKazakhstan Oil”, “CNPCtoSell33%ofPetroKaz Kazak “CNPC Finalizes PetroKazakhstan Acquisition”, Finally, Chinahadtopaydearlyforacqui The caseofPetroKazakhstan clearly sugge 71 Moreover,theCNPCandKazMunaiGazofficially signedanagreement gy securityratherth ins logic.Eventhoughthisexam ese behavior,thestrategyne troleum assets tosupportthevi iness/GJ28Cb02.html (27/04/2010). (27/04/2010). iness/GJ28Cb02.html ail_imprim.php?idp= 34
aiming theotherhalfofTurgaiPetroleum ina spute overhow tosharetheoilinacommon
hind Astana’sdecisiontoputpressureonthe cent ofthecompany’s sharestoKazMunaiGaz New York Times New York pursuit forpowerandrestraintseemtosuggest establish amissing linka forthejointmanagement oftheShymkent an hegemony. For the sake of entering the an hegemony.Forthesakeofentering ’s demandsintheircooperationcontraryto ring PetroKazakhstan. After the law was hs-PR firm”, October 19,2005, source: 73 Asia Times sts thatBeijing wasasinterested in Thiswasimpeded byacourtdecisionin 307 (27/04/2010). , vertheless pinpointsBeijing’s
ple may contradicttherational ability oftheKazakh-Chinese , March 17, 2006, source: 2006, 17, March , October 28, 2005, source: source: 28, 2005, October 72 Itwaslikewise believed
ge inthestrategic
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the pipelinetobeprofitable.However,Russiaha oil from refineriesasKumkol andUzen Russian shows this.Finally,toensureth jointly balancing Chinese companies whenever risk Astanabecoming moresuspic dependence onmutual cooperation.Inaddition, Be increase thelimits posed onBeijingtosque actor pursuingenergypolicyof may become exceedingly continues w highifChina can utilize thebilateral oilagreements. external powers.Partnershipwith Kazakh oilthroughthestablefunctioning ofthe apt toconcedetheburdenofcoop long asthis arrangement preventsbalancing coal cooperation withaconsiderably Astana’s pressure.RatherIarguethatthestate gains forfuturebenefits.Beijingwasuneagerto logic proposedbyneoliberalinstitutionalism which its long-term energysecuritygoals rationally in this case to theextent itanticipa intention to maximize itsfuture gainsdespiteth The main problem ofChinesebilateralapproach e Atyrau-Alashankoupipe KazakhstanassuredthatMoscowwaskeptawaywhileBeijing weaker actorwhich constrainsitspowerandlowersgainsas . Havingsaidthis,Idonotinte equidistance tomajor powers, ious ofitsintentionsandcau eration withAstanaaslong ted thepotentialsofacqui 35 acting assecurity-seeker maytakepartinenergy eze as many gains aspossiblefrom China’s oil fieldsalonestand forinsufficient sourcesfor possible. The caseofPe Kazakh-Chinese pipeline wasnotin perilfrom itions from occurring.Inparticular, Chinawas s hitherto attempted tobalance Chinese energy
sacrifice its gains, butitwascompelled dueto e presentlosses.Inotherwords,Chinaacted ith anassertivebilateralpolicy.As arational argues thatstatesarekeentogiveupcertain ijing’s aggressive bilateralapproachwould , however,rests withthe future coststhat line isentirelyoperative,Beijing needs se closertieswithMoscowby nd tofollowtheabsolutegains Astana may beexpectedto itsfuturegoalofsecuring ring PetroKazakhstanfor troKazakhstan clearly CEU eTD Collection
Nazarbayev is,therefore,awareofhiscountry gas shut-offtoUkraineandthewarinGeorgi projecting itseconomic andmilitary powertoprot based inneighboringKyrgyzstan andnearbyTa cent) isexportedviapipelinesrunningthrough Economic Community(EurAsEC).Thirdly,the Independent States(CIS),CollectiveSecuri economic organizationssponsoredandled franca countries make Russiathefarmost important population iscomprised ofethni world’s longestborderwithitssouthernneighbor Moscow hasbeendecisivelyshapingKazakhstan’s Understanding obstaclestoChineseenergy incomplete ifoneexcludesRussia’sinfluenc 2.3 FightingUndertheRag:Sino-Russian depicts thesecondrestraintuponCh The long-term energybattlebetweenChinesepetr Thus, theKremlin usesRussianenergy companies Chinese encroachment withKazakhstan oilriches activities related tothe Kazakhenergysector. in Kazakhstan.Secondly,Kazakhsta c Russians;tighteconomicandtradelinksbetweenthetwo inese bilateralenergystrategy. n isdeeplyanchor PetroleumCompetition in Kazakhstan economic partnerofAstana;Russianisthe e overtheregion.Formore ty TreatyOrganization(CSTO)andEurasian 36 by Moscow such as theCommonwealthof by Moscowsuchas
Russianterritory.Finally,troopsare ’s heavydependenceonRussiaasasecurity (7,000km); nearly30percentof Kazakhstan’s
a supportthisclaim. Kazakhstan’s President willdecrease itsenergyleverage overAstana. lion’s shareofKazakhhydrocarbons (80per oleum corporationsandLukoilinKazakhstan Apparently Moscowisawarethatgrowing ect imperiled national in jikistan. Ifnecessary, Russiaiscapableof security landscape. Firstly, Russia sharesthe to constrain theChinese bilateral approach. encroachment withKazakhstanremains ed inregionalpol thantwo centuries, terests. Thecasesof itical-security and lingua CEU eTD Collection 21st Century. between Russia and Kazakhstan wereinked in a1998 Declaration of Eternal Friendship and Cooperation for the
terminated Yukoscompany in2003whovigorously particular, theRussiangovernment blocked pipeline projects,butbalancedagainstBeij and its petroleum companiesdisplayed notonly reluctance tocooperate withChina inoil cooperation betweenthetwocountrieswillincr in Moscow’sforeignpolicyarsenal.LikewiseRu undermine themonopoly ofRussianfirms andconse Consequently,neitherMoscownorRussian resources withChinesecorporations.Shar control overstrategicre military presence. In theenergyrealm,however, regional China andRussiaarecloselycooperatingonkeypo 75 74 military power, Beijing isbindingMoscowto relationship betweenMoscowand Kazakhstan requirescooperationwithRussia.Ra cooperation” and“integration”withRussi provider. Due tothis,theKazakhleadernever security, economic and energy sphere. relations and “integration” with Russia The SCO stands for an obvious example of growing growing example of obvious for an SCOstands The State-of-the-Nation to In 1997 his address N Mazhilis, China, ontheotherhand,isawarethatacco status quo bysupportingCentral Asianpoliticalre sources topreserve energy securityand increasenational power. which was reiterated wasreiterated which Astana, ataskforwhichChinanoticeablylackseconomic and a istopmost priorityforAstana. ing hydrocarbonassetsw a purchaseofSlavneftbytheCNPCin2002, azarbayev underscored the importance of close and friendly friendly and ofclose importance the underscored azarbayev 37 ing anditscompanies whenever possible.In securitycooperation inCentralAsia. ease Moscow’s dependence onBeijing. Moscow
China andRussiaarecompetitors struggling for interconnectedness between the two states in political- statesin two the between interconnectedness
misses anopportunitytostressthat“friendly afterwards inasimilar fashion. The “special relations” ssian officialsfearthatany closerenergy ther thanattempting tobreachtheclose quently diminish thero mplishment ofenergyrelatedobjectivesin companies are willingto sharestrategic supportedtheRusso-Chineseoilpipeline, litical issuesinCentral Asia:keepingthe gimes andbalancingagainsttheUS ith theChinesemay 74 le of“energyfactor”
75 Indeed, CEU eTD Collection November 7,2005,source:http://www.jamestown. source: http://www.gasandoil.com/GOC/c source: (02/05/2010).
The courtdismissed thisrequest over thefinancialcompensation ofoilsalesfr North Kumkoloilfield. Atthattime,thetwo CNPC’s takeover,LukoilandPetroKazakhstanheld Kazakhstan soaredwhentheCNPC Amajor purchased energybattlebetween Chinese hardly acceptable totheRussian geopolitical roletoasupplierof Moscow was,inall,afraid that yielding 78 77 76 transfer claiming aright the CNPCannouncedtakeover,L the reactionofLukoil,whichow purchase ofPetroKazakhstan which spoiledLukoil’s petroleum monopolytotheRussiancompany. Th PetroKazakhstan’s valuable assets(particularly theShymkent refinery) whichwouldgranta dominant position in theCaspian. Backedby theKremlin, Lukoilwastrying toobtain buy itspartner,mostly duetoa lackofsupport few monthsbeforetheCNPCtookoverPetroK and abandonedtheAngarsk-Daqing times.asial .com/sg/sub/news/story/0.4574, 173474.00.html (03/05/2010). “CNPC’s Takeover of Petrokaz in Court Limbo”, “PetroKazakhstan andLUKo StephenBlank, “PetroKaz: China’s Diff of pre-emption basedonits50 perc il in Crude Oil Quarrel”, Crude il in rawmaterials totheChinesegr elite claiming greatpowerstatus ned theaforementioned subsidiary ompany/cnc50476.htm (30/04/2010). (30/04/2010). ompany/cnc50476.htm , butLukoilappealedbefore pipelineinfavorofariva ukoil appearedbeforeanAlbert icult Search for Central Asian Energy”, Energy”, Search for Central Asian icult to Chinese energy demands may limit theRussian Business-Times Asia om thejointlyoperatingNorthKumkolsite. 38 companies wereentangledinalingeringdispute Alexander’sConnections Gasand Oil
from Astanadismissive ofRussiaextendingits azakhstan, Lukoilunsuccessfullyattempted to
PetroKazakhstaninAugust2003.Priorto en, in August 2005, came CNPC’s triumphant en, inAugust2005,came CNPC’s org/single/?no_cache=1&t plans. The transaction immediately elicitedplans. Thetransactionimmediately and Russianpetroleumcorporationsin a joint-venture, TurgaiPetroleum, inthe ent ownershipofTurgaiPetroleum. , October 24, 2005, source: http://busines5- source: 2005, 24, , October owing regionalpower–ascenario l projectsubsidizedbyJapan. intheinternationalarena. withPetroKazakhstan. Since the CourtofArbitrationin a courtwillingtoblockthis x_ttnews[tt_news]=31073 Eurasia Daily Monitor Daily Eurasia , January 27, 2005, 27, , January 77 A 78 76 ,
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79 Russian refineries in the northinorder tooperate power. Atpresent,theKazakh-Chinesepipeline would heightenChinesedependenceonRussian running, and ownsthemostmodern oilrefinery As mentioned earlier,PetroKazakhstan dominance butitwouldallow for controloverthe Moscow, obtainingPetroKazakhstanwouldimply petroleum amid astrongRussianopposition to itscontrol oftheCaspianpetroleum assets.For PetroKazakhstan isembeddedin thecontextof functioning oftheAtyrau-Alash Thisexample ofSino-Russian only asegment ofamorecomple hydrocarbons. PetroKazakhstan shows Russia’s strongopposition to Chinesecontrol oftheCaspian section oftheKazakh-Chinesepipeline, is concentrated. near Aktobe,theregionwherebulkofCh Resources for US2$billionsecuring thecontrol overseveral fields, some of whicharelocated jointly operating withtheCNPCinCaspian. half oftheBuzachifield, Petroleum.Th half ofTurgai Stockholm, which confirmed in2006thattheRussi http://www.lukoil.com/press.asp?div_id?= Official Website ofLukoil Oil Company, September 30, 2005, source:
which Lukoil acquiredthroughthe e CNPCcounter-attackedbyclaimi ankou pipeline.TheCNPC-Lukoil 1&id=2411&year=2005 (03/05/2010). (03/05/2010). 1&id=2411&year=2005 x picturepertaining strategiccompetition over controls oilfieldswherethece 39
in Kazakhstan.Holdingagripoverthese assets inese oilactivities,includingthewesternmost withfull capacities. Russia waswillingtotake
theChinese ambitious pursuit of additional
oil necessaryfortheKazakh-Chinesepipeline. requires acertainamount At theendof2005,LukoilacquiredNelson companies andincreaseMoscow’s relative an company hadarightofpre-emptionover not onlyanextension to Chineseinterests to secure normal 79
The CNPC-Lukoilstruggleover purchase ofNelsonResources, ng itspre-emption rightover Kazakhstan’s oilrepresents struggle forthecontrolof ntral partofthepipelineis ofpetroleum from of energysecurity CEU eTD Collection
80 suggest thatassertivebilateraldealings allowed petroleum. Trackingthe Chineseemergence asanimportant playerin theKazakhoilsector, I Using theKazakhawarenessandRussianlevera the problems facingthe Chinesebilateralenergy 2.4 ChineseBilateralEnergyApproac which wasfarmore expensiveandtime-consuming. was compelled totransport theadditional petroleu 2006, claiming thatitsownpipeline supplying theKazakh-Chinesepipeline, delayed de refineries intheSouthSiberia. necessary tofillinagapthesupplyroute derivate inordernot tofreeze.In addition,for seven months ayear.Duringwint Beijing’s relianceonmutual cooperation. Instead, Russian leadership restrainsChinese companies areunwilling toprovide natural reso for thefuture of itsinfluence in Central Asia completed. Yet,Chinese mounting encroachment part inthisendeavorprovidi http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Centr “ChinaPipelineistan”, Plays The Kazakh-Chineseoilpipeline,forinstan ng theoilfrom themoment theAtasu-Alashankousectionwas al_Asia/KL24Ag07.html (02/05/2010). al_Asia/KL24Ag07.html
However, theRussiancompany Transneft,whichisinchargeof er thecrudeoilmust bemixe was alreadyoperatingatminimum.
h toKazakhstan:Implications Asia Times at large. Asindicatedabove, theKremlin andits 40 activities in Kazakhstan’ Beijing tocapturevaluable
urces that would fuel Chinese economic power.
to China.Thisoilis providedfromRussian with Kazakhstan exacer the pipeline tobeprofitable Russianoilis approach tosecuring access totheCaspian m byrailfrom anotherpartofKazakhstan, livery oftheseadditives inthewinterof ce, operateswithoutdifficultiesonlyfor , December 24,2009,source: ge asinterveningvariables,Iexplained
d withlessviscous petroleum 80 Asacorollary,CNPC s energysectorusing bates Moscow’s fears petroleum fieldsand
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Kazakhstan andRussiaalike. the SCOemergence asachain-link inBeijing’s increased separateorjointbala cooperation. Pursuingb Tomitigate theirconcerns, Iargue thatBeiji SCO framework pertainingtoen both concerned thatthegrowingChinesepow of PetroKazakhstanAstanaandMoscowjoinedhands Moscow promptedLukoiltoblockCNPC’s purch and enacted alawgivingthestaterightofprevention againstforeigncompanies, while Kazakhstan pressedChinesecompanies to re-sell half Russia growntoturnintooppositionBeijing’ the Caspian, acquiescing more Kazakhstan. Alashankou pipelinerepresenti companies. China’smain energy security goal However, asChinagraduallytransformed from ilateral energyapproachmade the ncing byKazakhstanandRussia.In and moreoilsources,sohasth ng thedriving-forcebehindal ergy relatedissuessoasto er willdecrease theirrespective gains. 41
was theconstruction and filling of theAtyrau-
ase ofPetroKazakhstan.Worse yet,inthe case s furtheruncheckedexpansion.Inresponse, ng consequentlyincreased itsactivities inthe energy securityrelatedtocooperation with inbalancingChineseactivities. Theywere of theirshares inoilcompanies andsites, a late-comer intoaninfluential actor in e pressurefrom Kazakhstanand Chinese strategyvulnerableto bindAstanaandMoscowto thefollowing chapter, Itrace l Chinese acquisitions in l Chineseacquisitionsin CEU eTD Collection
82 81 pursuing thelong-term maximization ofgains. follow defensiverealist behavioraccepting the restraints ofmultilateral frameworks, while balancing measuretomajor powers(theUS,Japan,IndiaandRussia). way ofdiscouragingotheractorsfrom aligningagai of nationalsurvival. norms andremains weddedtorelativepowercons suggest, however, thatBeijing’s diplomatic turnove essential change ofstrategicculture, thatis, eagerness todiscussinternational andregional issueson themultilateral levelreflects an the coldwar,seems tobegenerallyacknowle within multilateral frameworks such asASEANa 3.1 Background China and Asia’s New Dynamics Power Survey Socialization”, Limitsof The Policy: Foreign Chinese in “Multilateralism (2000): Wang Hongying 835-864; CHAPTER 3: CHINESE ENERGYSE CHAPTER 3:CHINESE Bates Gill, “China’s Evolving Regional Security Regional Evolving BatesGill,“China’s Avery Goldstein (2001):“The Diplomat The Chinesecharmyouwhentheywanttoyou, , (London: Routledge), pp. 1-33, 115-143. 115-143. 1-33, pp. Routledge), (London: , , 40(3), pp. 475-491; Marc Lanteigne (2005): A more substantiveChineseemphasis onpo SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION SHANGHAI COOPERATION 81 Inthissense, themultilateral dipl , (Los Angeles: University of California Press), pp. 252-255. 252-255. pp. Press), California of University Angeles: , (Los and they doit quitesystematically. ic Face of China’sFace of GrandStrategy”,ic
China and International Institutions: Alternate Paths to Global to Global Paths Alternate Institutions: International and China Strategy”, in David Shambaugh (eds.) (eds.) (2005): Shambaugh inDavid Strategy”, norms andvaluesofthe dged. Constructivism would 42
CURITY ANDTHE CURITY iderations andconditio nd theSCO,particularlyfollowingendof and squeeze youwhentheyand squeeze you, wanttosqueeze nst the“Chinesethreat”, r fallsshort ofsocializ litical-security and omacy servesBeijing asaconvenient The China Quarterly 82 community. Theevidence Thus,Beijingappearsto ned onthepreservation A SingaporeanDiplomat economic cooperation ation into institutional ROLE OFTHE aswellacounter- claim thatBeijing’s , Nr. 168, pp. pp. 168, , Nr. Power Shift: Shift: Power Asian CEU eTD Collection
firm holdingthecoreoilsiteslocatedinth the Russianbackedcompany,Lukoil,undermined balancing onthepartofKazakhstanandRussia. with onlyabilateralapproach,as the main projectunderpinning Beijing’s energy issueswastoassurethenormal functi purchase. Finally,Iarguethat Kazakhstan andretaineffectiveness, aswillbe states into a commonframework allowsBeijing to establishment oftheSCOEnergyClubsuggestsacrux activities theSCOen actions. In theChineseview,aslong assuch cons “dragon” canbecontrolledthroughjointconsulta SCO appearstoprovide anassurance totheRuss Chinese hydrocarbonambitionsintheCaspian. D BeijingChina’s moves, tocurtail SCOallows purely bilateralenergyapproach, neorealism, thanfrom awilltoimpose hegem framework stems fromtheopportunitytoavoidbei pursued withinSCO.Chinesewillingnesstoc I arguethattheprecise logiccanbeidenti Assuring thenormal operationoftheAtyrau ergy cooperationwillprob the main goalof Chineseenga showninthepreviouschapter, which istroubledwiththepo petroleum acquisitions inKazakhstan. e regionwheretheKazakh-Chinese pipeline runs. oning oftheAtyrau-Alash 43 Moscow’s andAstana’s mounting concernsover ooperate withMoscowandAstanaintheSCO ony asoffensiveneorealism claims. Unlikethe
showninthecaseof ably serveitspurpose.
CNPC’sattempt atbuyingPetroKazakhstan,a ultations do notimpose acontrol or limit toits ian andKazakh leadership that the riseof the In particular,bothth tions, andaddmore transparency toChinese ng balancedagainstaspredictedbydefensive ealing withChinaundertheauspices ofthe -Alashankou pipelinewashardlyachievable “soften” itsassertive bilateral advancein fied inBeijing’s energy securitystrategy ofthisview.Inaddition, binding the two giventhatitprovokedcounter- gement withinSCO regarding ssibility ofcounter-balancing theMangistaumunaigaz e Kazakhleadershipand ankou pipeline,hitherto Chinese supportforthe CEU eTD Collection
threat. Thebulkofoilroutes ar friendly environment andstablebordersfor thebenef 3.2 TracingtheShift:The Development complementary forcebehindChin ability tobilaterally copewithAstana’san members. RatherIsuggest thattheSCOaxisst by themultilateral. The SCOenergyinstitutions arefragile andreflect theinterests of its not accountforaseparatelevelof implies itsdeparturefromthebilateralenergyapproach.Formost part,theSCO settingdoes approach. However, Idonotclaim thatBe Chinese SCOinvolvement,Iarguethatthisshift events posing obstaclestoBeijing’s bilateral ener greater engagement withKazakhstanandRussi Russia. energy axisreacheditspeakunleashing theChin bilateral activities.Thisispa minimized thechanceofcounter-balancinga fluctuations inenergyarrangements. Most stable energyrelationswithbothKazakhsta With theSCOaxisaddedtoitsenergy strategy, In general,theimportance of In sum, inthischapterItrace theprocessof Chineseenergy strategy shifting toward rticularly indicativeasof2009 e to pass through theentire Kazakhs interactioninwhichthebilatera ese bilateralenergystrategy. the SCOfor China’s pursuit of Beijing’sSCOEnergyAgenda importantly,Beijing’snewapproachnotonly ijing’s greateremphasi 44 d Moscow’sinterests,andthusservesasa
lignments formation, butempowered Chinese Beijing gained amaneuvering spacetomaintain ands foratacticalgroundreinforcingBeijing’s n andRussia,decreasingthefrequencyof a undertheaegisofSCO.Bylinking
was causedbythepitfalls gy activities inKazakhst ese “loan-for-oil”dealswithKazakhstanand it of interstate trade routesamid theterrorist whenChinesefocusontheSCO l courseischangedorreplaced tan, endinginthepolitically s on the SCO framework s ontheSCOframework for oilrestsonsecuring an withthe emerging of abilateralenergy CEU eTD Collection http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central
85 84 83 organization’s threeenergy-producing states (Ru Tashkent Beijingenteredan acquisitions, BeijingintensifiedSCOenergycoop activities inKazakhstan, marked bythebeginning Chinahasbeenpushingforyetanother dir arrangements inenergyrelatedissues.Si China represents anoteworthy part in Beijing’s SCO energyagenda. in theregionthroughwhichpetroleum istobe aimed atprotectingbordersand fight against terrorist threats, andconducte up aRegionalAntiterrorist Structure(RATS)in protect itselfagainstapotentialdisruptionofoilroutes. members thatBeijing’swantsto security objectives.AtoneSCO have frequentlyreferredtorein arrangement suchastheSCO.Inthissense, assurances fortheAtyrau-Alashankoupipelinewh regimes, Chinesesupplyrouteswilleasilybeimperiled. unstable Xinjiangregion.IfCentralAsiaisfra 23(4), pp. 455. 455. pp. 23(4), MarcLanteigne, “Oil-rich US Ally Kazakhstan Looks to China”, for Oil: TheRu Hunger “China’s (2007): Mommen Andre China and International Institutions: Alternate Paths to Alternate Paths Power Global Institutions: China and International
action planthatcreatedaba forcing energycooperationasaco _Asia/FB27Ag01.html (09/05/2010). _Asia/FB27Ag01.html securing strategic facilities. closelycooperatewithRussia meeting, Chinesehigh-rankoffi nce 2004andtheChinese d joint military exercisesin 2003,2005 and2007 particularly sinceOct 45 ught withmilitantgroup
transportedviaAtyrau-Alashankoupipelineto ssia, Kazakhstan andUzbekistan) thethree
ection withinthe SCO–aplatform forcommon 2004 which coordinates state activities in the 2004 whichcoordinates stateactivitiesinthe eration. First,duringthe 2004SCOsummit in ich canbeattainedthro of thepipeline construc ssian Connection”, Journal of Developing Societies Societies ofDeveloping Journal Connection”, ssian 83 Asia Times 84 Forthisreason,Chinaneedsprotection Consequently, the SCO members set Consequently,theSCOmembers 85 Thus,securingstableenvironment
sis forcooperationbetweenthe and CentralAsiancountriesto re tacticforpromoting SCO’s , February 27, 2004, source: source: 2004, 27, , February cial ZengPeiyantoldother ober 2002,Chineseofficials revival ofhydrocarbon s andunstablepolitical ugh aregionalsecurity , pp. , pp. 120-124. tion andtheoilfields
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Sino-Kazakh oilagreement came upinJuly, existing sectionsofthepipelinewithChin The dealwassupposedtoacquire provinces was agreedbetweentheChineseand First, theextensionofAt 88 87 http://www.eur source: 2008, April24, 86 Indoingso,ChinaisusingtheSCO platfo and institutional deals with Kazakhstan, aswe possible foritskeyenergy securitygoal in through arrangements onamultilateral basis so suggest thattheChineseSCOapproachseeks Kazakhstan andeventuallymake possibleaconnec activities allowingBeijingtotakepartintheimp ventures”. energy bureaucraciestoconsiderregionalgasa member statesshouldfoundanenergycoordina indicative ofthislogic,isBeijing’sproposi allowed Beijingtopavetheroadtowardmo significance ofKazakhstanandRussiaasChinese consumer countries(China, with Uzbekistan, and negotiated investments in the hydroelectric sector with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. (09/05/2010). http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc60627.htm Apart from petroleum deals, China at the margins of the 2006 SCO meeting brokered an oil and gas arrangement “CentralAsia Plans “Energy Cooperation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Much Ado about Nothing?”, 87 Inparticular,thegroupwasdesignated Energy Cooperation”, Tajikistan andKyrgyzstan). yrau-Alashankou pipelinefrom Xi asianet.org/departments/insight/artic Astana’s supportfor Alexander’s OilandGas Connections Kazakhstan, the Atyrau-Alashankou pipeline. tion laidoutatthe2004 ese industrialcentersintheeast.Noticeably, the 46 re coordinativeenergyin re to bindKazakhstanand Kazakh leadersatthe2005AstanaSCOsummit. ll aswithothermembers ofthe organization.
nd oilpipelines,hydropow
just onemonth beforethe PetroKazakhstan ting groupfor“experts thatBeijing cansqueeze asmanygains lementation ofMoscow’s sources for petroleum, butatthe same time it tion withRussianoilsources.Bothexamples rm tonegotiateandconcludeenergysupply additional oilsources to coordinatemember states’energy 86 Thisarrangement confirmed the les/eav042508b.shtml (09/05/2010). (09/05/2010). les/eav042508b.shtml njiang tothe , February 9, 2006, source: source: 2006, 9, , February SCOmeeting thatthe Russia intocooperation teraction. Second,and from states’ member er projectsandother pipelineprojectsin to linkthetwothen Chinese eastern EurasiaNet 88 ,
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http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insigh 91 90 89 meeting, Moscow’sproposalofse avoid clashessuchasthatsu Chinese activities through joint consultations in and importer countriesintoajointframework transparent overview of itspartners’ activities. wordy facade wasto setupan energycoordinati our nationalenergyconcepts,and Shanghai, thethenRussianPresidentVladimir coordinate energymoves betweentheSCOmemb PetroKazakhstan, Moscowstepped upwithapr institutions tobemanaged bythe members of with aloose multilateralbasissoasto a dominantly unilateral andbilateral approachto related issues throughthe SCO.ThePetroKazak the Kazakh leadership andLukoil, Beijing sought PetroKazakhstan purchase inOctober 2005and con Chinese oildiplomacy inKazakhstan. Second,after theproblems heatedoverthe purchase took place,whichsuggeststhegradualemer http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070319/62246008.html (12/05/2010). (12/05/2010). http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070319/62246008.html (12/05/2010). http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20060621/49855458.html “Russia Urges Formation ofCentral Asian Energy Club”, “Energy Club is not an OPEC Clone”, Club”, SCOEnergy Initiates “Russia The apparentwayforBeijingtoachieveth rrounding thePetroKazakhstanpurchase. tting upa“unifiedenergymarket the creationofanenergy club”. avoidthejointcounter-balancing. t/articles/eav110707a.shtml (12/05/2010). (12/05/2010). t/articles/eav110707a.shtml the organization.Amid thedisputeunravelingover 47 90 the implementation ofener Putin urgedfor“energydialogue,integrationof energycooperation withKazakhstanandRussia
hstan casesuggestedChinashouldcomplement Morespecifically,byconnectingtheproducer on mechanism withwhichRussiacouldgaina
the proposalimplicitly oposal tocreateajointbodywhichwould RIA Novosti ers. AttheJune2006SCOsummit heldin tinued up to2006causingfriction withboth toincreaseitsengagement intheenergy is residedwithsuppor RIA Novosti gence of the SCO as animportantgence oftheSCOas vector in EurasiaNet , June 21, 2006, source: source: 21, 2006, , June , March 19, 2007, source: source: 2007, 19, March , ” foroilandgasexploration, 89 , November 6, 2007, source: source: 6,2007, , November The rationale gy projectsin aimed atmonitoring 91 ting thecreationof DuringtheSCO behindthis orderto CEU eTD Collection
the roleofEnergyClubinto Russian politicalleveragewith keen nottoconcedeadominant energyroleto Beijing’s ability toact independently insecuring stable relationshipwith China’s eagernesstojoinMoscow Kazakhstan intoaloosearrangement whilepreser 93 http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insi 92 coordinating member states’nationalenergypolici cooperation whileadvancingits Kazakh oilChinawasatthesame time eager keeping theenergystrategy awayfrom anycontrol Asia, gas andoilcartelwhichwouldcementMoscow Moscow. the representativesofmemb Tashkent summit later thatyear theRussianproj the member statesandparticularlydive production andshipment throughtheestablishment ofaSCOEnergyClubgainedthesupport http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1 SergeiBlagov,“RussiaSees SCO as “CentralAsia:SCOLeadersFocus 93 Beijing waswilling totakepart inthis pr However, theEnergyClubfell Despite someexpertconcerns thatthe Russi
the twoactors.Althoughsuchaproject in theSCO.Beijingwasbeyonda SCO approachtoempower oil Potential EnergyCartel”,Eurasia Daily On Energy, Security, Cooperation”, er states,andtheEnergyCl a full-fledgedinstitutionwould ’s projectseems tobedriven ght/articles/pp081607.shtml (12/05/2010). (12/05/2010). ght/articles/pp081607.shtml short ofgrowingintoafull &tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32294 (20/05/2010). (20/05/2010). &tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32294 rsification-oriented President Nazarbayev 48 Moscow, asthiswouldlikewiseleadtoextended
’s energymonopolyinKa access topetroleum, theChineseleadership was ect was endorsed inajoint statement issued by
oject asfaritpermitted binding Russiaand to engageKazakhstanandRussiainmutual ving afreehandinbilateralenergydealings. es. AsBolatNurgaliev, SecretaryGeneralof an proposalsignified theambition toform a by third parties. Yetaware ofthe needfor dealings withbothpartners. ub wasformed inJuly,2007 by aneedtosecureoilthrough EurasiaNet might haveposedarestraintto Monitor, December 5, 2006, source: ny doubtawarethatextending -fledged institutioncapableof cause problems toitsplanof , August 15, 2007, source: source: 15, 2007, , August zakhstan andCentral . 92
At theSCO CEU eTD Collection
reinforcing thebilateral approachwiththeSC Mangistaumunaigaz, thefourth meetings toacquireRussianoilforthefilling Following increasingenergycoop negotiated andconcludedtwove Atyrau-Alashankou pipeline. Underthe banner simultaneously provideloanstobothRussiaand Complementing theBilateral Approach 3.3 ExpandingChineseOilActiv advance itsSCOapproachasacomplementar and theinabilityofth Club. Theevidentabsenceoftrilateralconsultati engagement withKazakhstanwhichinvolvesRu instance, thefillingof Atyrau-Alashankoupipe major energyissuesbetweenChina,RussiaandK existence, theSCOEnergyClub 94 cooperate with eachotherwithintheSCOframework”. the SCOpointedout,member stateshavea (14/05/2010). (14/05/2010). and Analysis Mr. Bolat Nurgaliev, Secretary General of Mr.Bolat Nurgaliev, Amid theglobaleconomic andfinancial crisis Beijing isusingthe SCO mechanism to , Round Table, February 27, 2009, source: source: 2009, Table,February 27, , Round e Clubtomove beyondemptyrhetoric largestKazakhstate-owned ities withintheSCO:Bi did notprovideacommonlegalgroundbasedonwhichthe eration withintheorganizat ry important oilarrangements the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Organization, Cooperation Shanghai the y forcebehindthebila O-based activityBeijinghasinbothcasesachieved of theAtyrau-Alashankou pipeline,and tookover 49
ons onthisissue
Kazakhstan tofurtherse azakhstan couldbediscussedandresolved.For oftheSCO platform,Beijing successfully “difference ofopinionon line asamajor issueunderpinning theChinese ssia aswell, wasnottackledbytheEnergy http://www.idsa.in/event/RTBolat%20Nurgaliev http://www.idsa.in/event/RTBolat%20Nurgaliev nding MoscowandAstana, 94 Notwithstandingtwoyearsofits have openedaspaceforChinato ion, Chinaemployed theSCO oil company.Noticeably,by between theresp withMoscowandAstana. teral oildealings. Institute for Strategic Studies Studies for Strategic Institute cure petroleum forthe the issue of howto ective parties, CEU eTD Collection
96 were dedicatedtooilandgasprojects. summit, RussiaandChinasigned32major intersta intolerable bilateral dealings. become increasingly favorabletoenergycooper worry aboutwhogetswhichoilfieldorcomp aimed atand succeeded inassuringMoscowthatit the “rulesofgame”. With theSCOapproach Chinese struggle forKazakhoilbycreatinganim organization. TheSCOplatform usefulto was meetings inorder topresentitselfasprone China. Beijingwasalso eagertosign contra keep theexpansionofitspetroleum companie unravel causingadeclineinoil bilateral dealings withtheSCObasis.Atthat time, provide oilfortheAtyrau-Alashankoupipelinedur 2006 and2009SCOsummits.Aftertheunsuccessful the Atyrau-Alashankoupipelineprofitable. two goalsitfailedtodob June 20, 2006, source: source: 2006, 20, June SergeiBlagov,“Russia andChinaEyeBoom Two SCOsummitsofferacoreofBeijing’ The firstSCObasedapproachwhichaimed oilfrom atsecuring Russiatookplaceatthe ilaterally only acoupleofyearsago: 95
production andconsumption, promp 96 ing Bilateral Trade and Investment Ties”, As oneofthetopRussiano As
to mutualenergycoopera cts andlendmoneytoMoscowusingtheSCO 50 discharge Moscow’ssuspicionoverthegrowing s. Theobviouschoicewasplacedoncash-rich any inKazakhstan.Consequently,Moscowhas
as partofitsenergysecurityapproachBeijing ing winter,Chinawaseagertosupplement the te dealsworthUS$2.48billionmost ofwhich ation withChina,complying withformerly age ofBeijingaspartner whokeenlyaccepts theglobal financial crisis had just started to ismore important to enter cooperation than wooing ofRussianoilcompany Rosneftto s approach.First, duringthe2006SCO it gained thenecessary oiltomake ting Moscowtoseekloans fficials said“thecontracts tion withinthecommon Eurasia Daily Monitor Daily Eurasia , CEU eTD Collection http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/18/ch http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-06
100 99 98 97 http://www.jamestown.o abovementioned loan dedicatedtotheSCOmemb with thebilateralaxis, Chinahas particularly Beijing’s bilateral energy engagement withRussia andKazakhstan. economic crisis. joint loantotheSCOmember states tobolste pipeline. Furthermore, attheSC dealings, partiallywithanin Transneft withUS$10billion, Kazakhstan. energy security strategy: US$25billionwas two so-called “loan-for-oil” deals withthetwo the preparationforYekaterinburgmeeting of forward initsstrategyofbi of, andduringthe2009SCOmeeting inYekateri which waspreviouslyabandonedinfavorofa oil andgaspipelinestoChina”. include anagreement toproducepipe-laying equi 1 (15/05/2010). (15/05/2010). 1 “China-Russia Oil Deal: Take It with a Grain of Salt”, aGrainof It with OilDeal:Take “China-Russia “Sino-Russian Baby Comes of Age”, Ibid “China to Provide 10-Billion-Dollar Loan to SCO to Members”, Loan 10-Billion-Dollar to Provide “China . The secondChinesegoalwasachieved with 98 Thearrangement made withRussia 100 Consequently,bothagreements pert rg/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news nding MoscowandKazakhstaninto terest inboostingthei 97 ina-russia-oil-markets-equity- _Asia/KF13Ag01.html (15/05/2010). (15/05/2010). _Asia/KF13Ag01.html O meetingChinesePresidentHu
99 ThisdealassuresMoscow’ss the twocrucial oilcompanies incharge of Moscow’soil /16/content_11552439.htm (15/05/2010). (15/05/2010). /16/content_11552439.htm 51 Japanese competingproj
scoredin theKazakh oilsector.Usingthe r theireconomies inthestruggle against the
pment inRussiaforsubsequentconstructionof of themost important ers, BeijingtookoverMangistaumunaigaz,the the SCOheadofstatesinJune,Chinasigned nburg, Russia, Beijingma granted toRussia,andUS$15billion Asia Times targeted Rosneftwi regard toKazakhstan.CombiningtheSCO r participationintheAtyrau-Alashankou aining totheSCOsummit haveboosted 0218_energy_04.html (15/05/2010). (15/05/2010). 0218_energy_04.html ]=31794&tx_ttnews[ba Xinhua NewsAgency Xinhua Forbes upport fortheoilroutetoChina,
, June 13, 2009, source: source: 2009, 13, , June energy-related arrangements. In Jintao pledgedaUS$10billion , February 27, 2009, source: source: 27, 2009, , February ect. Second, on the eve ect. Second,ontheeve SCO chain-linksofits th US$15billion , June 16, 2006, source: source: 2006, , June 16, ckPid]=177&no_cache= de thegreatestleap
and
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helped Beijingnotonlytopreven to Kazakhstan’smulti-vector energy policy.The combination of theSCOandbilateral approach Kazakh oilassets, Beijing pursuedpurely abilatera PetroKazakhstan. Inthis casewhen Astanakeenlybalanced against theChinese tappingof moRussia, andwhyBeijing’sapproachwasfar Mangistaumunaigaz. Chinese SCOloantoKazakhstanenticed Astana toaccept Beijing’s offer regarding thesaleof shares. giant Gazprom courtedAsta hadunsuccessfully Interestingly, beforeBeijingboughtMangistaum up halfoftheShymkent refineryand33percent the Kazakhgovernment, likeinthecaseofPetroK the SCO-drivencourseallowedBeijingtoavoi the Caspian,iftherewasnoparticularimpact of This example wouldhardlyrepresentanynovelty 103 102 101 placed bythe Russiancompany wasseemingly nodifferent. million barrelsandareportedoutput of113,000 fourth largestKazakhstate-ownedoilandgas Strategic Culture Foundation Culture Strategic http://www.thestreet.com/sto Ajdar Kurtov, “SCOSummitinYe “Kazakhs,China inTalks over Stakein Oil Producer”, Ibid. Ibid. 102 The question iswhatmade adifferenceinthe
The Kazakhleadershipprovedmore favora ry/10485092/2/kazakhs-china-i , June 18, 2009, source: http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2238 (16/05/2010). (16/05/2010). http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2238 source: 2009, 18, June , t being balancedagainst, but furthermore tosoften itsapproach katerinburg And China’s Energy Offe 52 company, owning asmany as36oilfields,500 d previouslyencountered theSCOapproachon outcome. Inthiscase,
of thecompany’s sharesinKazakhstan’sfavor.
n-talks-over-stake-in-oil- na toacquire49percentofthecompany’s unaigaz itwasreportedthattheRussiangas in theChinesebilatera barrels perday,andthePavlodarrefinery. azakhstan whentheCNPCwasforcedto give l approach whichwasconceived of asathreat re effectivenowthaninthecontextof ble totheChineseofferalthoughbid The Associated Press Chinese approach incontrast tothatof 103 Itisreasonable toargue that nsive Towards the CaspianSea”, producer.html (16/05/2010). l energyacquisitionsin obstructionsposedby , April 13, 2009, source: source: 2009, 13, , April
the 101
CEU eTD Collection kumkol+section+of+kazakhstan-china+oil+pipeline+be Official Website Official
security environment for thesakeof itsoil for more thanaframework throughwhichBeijing bilateral dealings toward agreat 3.4 ChineseSCOEnergyAxis:Summary represents averysi not yethavecome toanend,butBeijing’sposi The conclusion ofthelong sagasurroundingthe 104 energy inthelong-term providingmorethan million tons thusmaking theKazakh-Chinese pipeline finallyprofitable andareliable source of finalization ofthefinalsection aftermath ofthetwooilagreements conclu oil necessary forthenormal functioningofth leverage. more assuring thanthe solebilateral which members oftheorganization.Simply put,theK offered apossibilityforAstanatobetreatedac Kazakhstan waseagertoturnablindeye with agroup approachwhileretaining effectiven
“CNPC Announces Kenkiyak-Kumkol Section of Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline Becomes Operational”, In this chapter Itraced theshift of the As aresultofBeijing’sincreas , July 15, 2009, source: http://www.youro source: 15, 2009, , July gnificant move inthecountry’s er engagement within theSCOba thepipelineinJuly2009,oil ed activitiesthroughtheSCO routes headingfrom Kazakhstan.TheSCOlikewise Beijing’s acquisition because the SCO framework Beijing’s acquisitionbecausetheSCOframework comes+operational_35798 e Atyrau-Alashankoupipelin 7 percentofChina’soverallpetroleum needs. 53 ded with Astana andMoscow. Followingthe ded withAstana tioning towardtheoildiplomacy withintheSCO left AstanafacingBei azakh leadershipfoundBeijing’sSCOapproach cording tothesame loanconditionsasallother
filling oftheAtyrau-Alashankoupipeline might
ess. Apartfrom theapparentneedformoney, Chinese energysecuritystrategyfrom solely searchforpetroleum. secures thefriendlyand ilandgasnews.com/cnpc+announces+kenkiyak- sis. Asshown,theSCOstands inflow raisedtoatargeted10 .html (20/05/2010). and bilateraldealings,the jing’s ascendingenergy e wassecuredinthe stable CentralAsian CNPC CNPC 104
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while retainingtheeffectiveness approach combinedwiththebilateraldealings stand beforeBeijinginanarrangement roofed assurances thatChinese activitie eager toenter previously unacceptabledeals Mangistaumunaigaz. Apart from adesperaten companies forthefillingofAtyrau-Alashankoupipeline and successfullyacquired arrangement within thecommonframework, Beijing managed to getsupportfrom Russian which ChinapledgedtoKazakhstanandRussia Beijing’s power prerogatives that wouldrestrain theChinese energy cooperation.The aim behindthisstra evoked bytheglobaleconomic andfinancialcrisis for theAtyrau-Alashankoupipeline,major goa Astana andMoscowovertheKazakh oilassets, a direction. The main aimbehindthisChinesesh andthesupportforSCOEnergyCl SCO summit negotiations withKazakhstan ove basis forenergycooperationbetweentheSCO arrangements inenergyrelatedissues.China’sen shores upBeijing’senergystrategytowardMosc To achievethisendeavor, Beij vis-à-vis bothpartners.Thiswas obviousin s canbecontrolled.Moreimportan of Chineseenergystrategy. r theextension oftheKazakh- ing exploitedthestru 54 within theSCO margins. InbothcasestheSCO eed formoney, bothAstana andMoscowwere aided Beijinginavoiding
tegy wasnottoempower theSCO withthe ability to actindependently, butto enhance because the SCO framework offered certain because theSCOframeworkoffered
nd more importantly securingthestablesupply ow andAstana,beingaplatform forcommon trance intothe2004actionplanthatcreateda l of Chinese oildealings withKazakhstan. ift appearstobeavoidingclasheswithboth ontheSCObasis. petroleum producingandconsuming states, tobindRussiaandKazakhstanintomutual ub, aresome ofexamples pointinginthis ctural shiftindistributionofpower the caseof“loans-for-oil”deals China pipelineduring the2005 tly, both actors were eager to Binding them bothinto thecounter-balancing CEU eTD Collection
offensive neorealism may evenarguefortheSCO emphasis onsecuringoilthanexacerbating tensi ultimate optiongiventhat Beijing’s behavior demonstr Central Asia.While findingsconfirm Chines behavior by squeezingtheCaspian oilriches Beijing’s power-seeking behavior. Thisviewpoint However,otherrationalisttheoriesprovide incentives. One major argument, mentioned earlie incremental riseinthestate’srelative Hence, my explanationreststo limit itspursuit for oil,butrepresents awayto reveals Beijingdoesnotintendtodevelopperman based level alike,tobind thetwoactors into In doing so,Chinais argued toembrace atwo- energy cooperationwithAstana neorealism. Pursuingits energysecuritygoals,Be Inthisthesis IexplainChinesestrive for by securityconcernsthan CHAPTER 4:ALTERNATIVETH THE UNDERSTANDINGOFCH by power-preponderanceandhegemony asemphasized byoffensive and Moscowwhileaiming toal a greatextentonthedefensive powerthroughaself-restrainedbehavior. 55 andcompeting withRussiaoverhegemony in track policy,comprised of energy arrangements. Thecoreofthisapproach EORETICAL EXPLANATIONS TO EXPLANATIONS EORETICAL e struggleforpower,hegemony notas seems
oil inKazakhstanasarationalbehaviordriven
prevent counter-balancing coalitions tooccur. r, stems fromoffensiveneorealism arguingfor as Beijing’smere instrument, findingsdismiss INESE ENERGYSECURITY ijing seems toaccepttemporary restraints in ons withthetwoactors.Infact,although alternative explanations based onstructural ent institutionswithin theSCOthatwould claims thatChina exertsthe expansionist ates agreat levelof restraint withagreater ong-term maximization ofgains. realist assertionswhichsuggest abilateral andaSCO-
CEU eTD Collection 79. pp. 271.
beliefs, institutionsandpractices. Constructivism arguesthatagentsdonotexist 106 105 their ownidentities,understa lenses wheresecuritycooperati market andAstana’sbehaviorthanwithth Thus, Beijingismore concerned withhowto multilateral levelcombining itwith substantial influenceonBeijing’sbehavior.Chin addressing broadsecurityissuesincludingener security according tocommon rules.While th establishment of institutions capable of shifti prospects tofacilitate on constellationsof interests. Neoliberalism expresses “optimism” withregard toChina’s Anotherrationalistargument, basedonneolib relations withbothMoscowandAstanaarechan Energy Clubindicates. energy security interests byclos this explanation.BothMoscowandAstanaapp Alexander Wendt (1999): (2007): A. Kolodziej Edward Apart from therationalisttheories,issu energy cooperationwithboth Social Theory of International Politics International of Theory Social Security and International Relations International and Security nd each other and form interestsbasedontheiridentities. nd eachotherandform on isunderstoodinterms ofth ely monitoring Chineseenergy activitiesasthecaseofSCO 106 bilateral oildealings than to Intheinterplay between the socialenvironment and e possiblebenefitsfrom 56 ng Chineseinterests and preferences inenergy ab initio e SCOhascertainly evol manage Russia’sshare inthe Kazakhenergy
neled throughinterest-d ear tousetheSCOplatform their toadvance
gy, this does not imply that SCO emanates gy, thisdoesnotimplythatSCOemanates a iskeentochannelitsinfluencethrough e canbeanalyzedth actorsandsuggeststhat eral expectations,isthatChineseenergy , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. apart from sociallyconstructednorms, , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), strengthen commoninstitutions. e wayactorssociallyconstruct mutual cooperation. rough theconstructivist riven cooperationbased ved intoorganization thismay leadtothe 105
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107 with otheractors.Otherargument, derivedfrom approach doesnotaccountforChina’sunchanged inferences aboutthenormative underpinnings ofBeijing’s greateremphasisonthe SCO,this leadership anddecision-makers areembedded. culture ofcontemporary Chinathatiscommun constructivism, arguesthattound how leadersanddomestic groupsinfluencethe taking accountofothers’inten within the SCO.Chinarather power considerations.Within theSCOBeijings cooperation fallsshortofsocializationintoins framework. Asshownintheprevious chapter,Beijing’s greater emphasis onmultilateral alter its core valuesaiming attighterrelatio Russia shifteditsidentitytoward to promote energycooperationwithintheSC mutually interchangeableidentitiesbeing interests and preferences.Inst the rationalistassumption ofcausallyestablis agents/actors’ knowledgeandexperiencearebe See:Alistair Johns Ian Finally, some arguments regardthedomestic le This may contributetounderstanding thereasons underpinning theChinese willingness on (1995): “Thinking About Strategic Culture”, Culture”, Strategic About “Thinking on (1995): tions toavoidcounter-balancing. ead, securitycooperation ispl acts according totherational lo greaterintegration.However, erstand Beijing’sbehaviorone shaped throughdifferentsocialimages. nship withKazakhstanandRussiaintheenergy 57 titutional norms and remains weddedtorelative titutional norms andremains O asenergycooperationwithKazakhstanand decision-making process.Oneversion,basedon
hed relationsandtheexogenouscharacterof ity’s commonnorms andvaluesinwhichthe ing shaped.Thisway,constructivismneglects
107 eems reluctant tosocialize with otheractors neoclassicalrealism, indicatesthefocus of nature of rationalist calculations in dealing Although usefulformaking additional vel ofexplanationasavariabletoanalyze International Security International aced intoadynamic landscapeof gic ofpreserving power,while I contendthatBeijingdidnot needs toexplorethe strategic , 19(4), pp. 32-64. pp.32-64. , 19(4), CEU eTD Collection
108 the stateininternat aim istoconcentrateonoutcomes ofChinesebeha strive forenergysecurity,particularlyincreasi domestic stakeholders. way Chineseleadership translatesthemintodecisions amidtheinteractions withdifferent inquiry should beplaced ontheinterplaybetween Policy Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds.) (2009), See:Jeffrey W. Taliaferro , (Cambridge:, Cambridge University Press) pp. 23-28. ional system. 108 AlthoughIemphasize theimpact ofdomestic constraintsonChinese et al , “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy”, in Steven inSteven Policy”, Stateand Foreign the Realism, Neoclassical , “Introduction: ng socialpressuresonthegovernment, my primary 58
the incentives from thest vior tomakeinferencesaboutthebehaviorof Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign ructural levelandthe CEU eTD Collection
milieu. Beijingremained uneagerto assumption aboutmutual interests,orwithth expansion. However,theunderlyingaim wasnot Consequently,Chinashiftedits appro framework. Offensive realism fails toexplainthis shift given thatitstresses constant unilateral Beijing’s movesweretaughttobeunchecked and non-transparent. behavior reflectedconcernsabouttheirinterest the extent ofKazakhstan’sand Russia’s eagerne counter-balancing ofitsactivitie bilateral strategy.AsshowninChapter2,Chin Thefindingsfrom thethreecasestudies interconnected, whereintheSCOapproachemerged cooperation. counter-balancing byKazakhstan intoenergy andRussiathroughbinding bothofthem argue thatChina’sSCOenergyvectorreinforces level indealingwiththeaforementioned actors. explain apossiblecausallinkbetweentheChines in theCaspianreflectingonconstructionof InthisthesisIinquired in energy security withregard to Kazakhstan and Russia.Exploring Beijing’s striving for petroleum s byAstanaandMoscow.Thecas to theunderpinningsofCh cede itsoilpolicytoany actor, CONCLUSION 59 e constructivistproposalofchangingnormative s inthelightofChinesemounting presence,as the Atyrau-Alashankou pipeline,my aim wasto
ach toward agreateremphasis ontheSCO Contemplating itsbehaviorassecurity-driven,I its bilateral strategy by
a’s bilateralrushfor e simultaneous useofa suggest thatbothChin ss torestrain Beijing’s acquisitions. This as aconsequence ofthepitfallsinBeijing’s either inaccordance e ofPetroKazakhstanrevealed inese ambivalent approachto not eventothe SCO.Rather decreasing thechanceof Kazakh oilendedwith bilateral and theSCO with theneoliberal ese approachesare CEU eTD Collection
indicated inthecase ofloan-for-oil d Beijing’s sole instrument, butrather asuseful monitor Beijing’s moves inKazakhstan. Thisclearlyshows thattheSCOdoesnotserve as importing members, orsupporttheRussian-led agreements suchasthe2004actionplanon pipeline. AspresentedinChapter3,Chinesele framework wasexpectedtoeasytheirreluctan grounds: bindingAstanaandMoscowinto Beijing employedtheregionalforum tonegotia eals. cooperation betweentheSCOoilproducingand 60
project, TheSCOEnergyClub,whichaimed to cooperation underthebannerofacommon ce andsecuretheoilforoperationof
adership was willingto takepartincommon theater toreinforce its te andconcludearrangements ontactical bilateral dealings as CEU eTD Collection
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