Yearbook of Muslims in Europe

Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Volume 3

Editor-in-Chief Jørgen S. Nielsen

Editors Samim Akgönül Ahmet Alibašić Hugh Goddard Brigitte Maréchal

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2011 Published with the support of

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

ISSN 1877-1432 ISBN 978 90 04 20516 1

Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

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Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. CONTENTS

The Editors ...... xi Editorial Advisers ...... xiii Foreword ...... xv

PART I COUNTRY REPORTS Edited by Jørgen S. Nielsen, Ahmet Alibašić and Brigitte Maréchal

Introduction ...... 3

Country Surveys

Albania ...... 7 Olsi Jazexhi Armenia ...... 21 Sevak Karamyan Austria ...... 31 Thomas Schmidinger Azerbaijan ...... 45 Bayram Balci and Altay Goyushov Belarus ...... 59 Daša Słabčanka Belgium ...... 69 Nadia Fadil Bosnia and Herzegovina ...... 93 Aid Smajić Bulgaria ...... 113 Aziz Nazmi Shakir and Ina Merdjanova Croatia ...... 127 Dino Mujadžević Cyprus ...... 137 Ali Dayıoğlu and Mete Hatay Czech Republic ...... 153 Štěpán Macháček vi contents

Denmark ...... 165 Brian Arly Jacobsen Estonia ...... 181 Egdūnas Račius Finland ...... 187 Tuomas Martikainen France ...... 197 Anne-Laure Zwilling Georgia ...... 219 Satenik Mkrtchyan Germany ...... 233 Mathias Rohe Greece ...... 255 Konstantinos Tsitselikis Hungary ...... 269 Norbert Pap Iceland ...... 277 Göran Larsson Ireland ...... 285 Victoria Montgomery Italy ...... 303 Stella Coglievina Kosovo ...... 321 Besa Ismaili Latvia ...... 335 Egdūnas Račius Liechtenstein ...... 343 Thomas Schmidinger Lithuania ...... 349 Egdūnas Račius Luxembourg ...... 357 Sylvain Besch Macedonia ...... 365 Muharem Jahja Malta ...... 375 Martin R. Zammit Moldova ...... 383 Aurelia Felea Montenegro ...... 395 Sabina Pacariz contents vii

Netherlands ...... 401 Martijn de Koning Norway ...... 419 Christine M. Jacobsen and Oddbjørn Leirvik Poland ...... 433 Agata S. Nalborczyk and Stanisław Grodź Portugal ...... 447 Nina Clara Tiesler Romania ...... 459 Irina Vainovski-Mihai Russia ...... 471 Elmira Akhmetova Serbia ...... 493 Srđan Barišić Slovakia ...... 513 Štěpán Macháček Slovenia ...... 521 Christian Moe Spain ...... 529 Jordi Moreras Sweden ...... 545 Göran Larsson Switzerland ...... 559 Stéphane Lathion Turkey ...... 569 Ahmet Yildiz Ukraine ...... 583 Elmira Muratova United Kingdom ...... 595 Seán McLoughlin

PART II ANALYSIS Edited by Samim Akgönül and Jørgen S. Nielsen

Deconstructing Luther’s Islam: The Turk As Curse or Cure? ... 619 Ian Almond viii contents

Interpreting Islamic Law for European Muslims: The Role and the Work of the European Council for Fatwa and Research .... 655 Karen-Lise Johansen Karman Measuring the Muslim: About Statistical Obsessions, Categorisations and the Quantification of Religion ...... 695 Riem Spielhaus

PART III BOOK REVIEWS Edited by Hugh Goddard and Samim Akgönül

The Last Shall Be the First—Or How the Study of Islam and Muslims in the Nordic Countries Could Be More Developed ... 719 Göran Larsson Two Faiths, One Banner: When Muslims Marched With Christians Across Europe’s Battlegrounds. By Ian Almond. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009 (Dženita Karić) ...... 726 History of Islam in German Thought: From Leibniz to Nietzsche. By Ian Almond. London: Routledge, 2009 (Dženita Karić) ...... 727 Islam in Victorian Britain: The Life and Times of Abdullah Quilliam. By Ron Geaves. Markfield: Kube, 2010 (Hugh Goddard) ...... 729 Muslims in Britain, An Introduction. By Sophie Gilliat-Ray. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; Muslims in Britain: Race, Place and Identities, Ed. Peter Hopkins and Richard Gale. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009 (Philip Lewis) ...... 731 Muslims in Europe: A Report on 11 EU Cities. Open Society Institute. New York, London, Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2010 (Jørgen S. Nielsen) ...... 734 Anti-Muslim Prejudice: Past and Present. Ed. by Maleiha Malik. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010 (Hugh Goddard) ...... 737 Shari‘a as Discourse: Legal Traditions and the Encounter with Europe. Ed. Jørgen S. Nielsen and Lisbet Christoffersen. Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate, 2010 (Göran Larsson) ...... 739 Nach dem Islamismus: Eine Ethnographie der Islamischen Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş. By Werner Schiffauer. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010 (R. Spielhaus) ...... 742 contents ix

The New Orientalists: Postmodern Representations of Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard. By Ian Almond. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007 (Dženita Karić) ...... 745 The New Imagined Community: Global Media and the Construction of National and Muslim Identities of Migrants. By Uriya Shavit. Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2009 (Hugh Goddard) ...... 747 Islam in the Eyes of the West: Images and Realities in an Age of Terror. Ed. Tareq Y. Ismael and Andrew Rippin. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010 (Hugh Goddard) ...... 750

THE EDITORS

Jørgen S. Nielsen is a Danish National Research Foundation Professor of Islamic Studies and Director, Centre for European Islamic Thought, Faculty of Theology, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Previously at the University of Birmingham, he has been researching and writing about Islam in Europe since 1978. He is the author of Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 3rd ed. 2004) and co-editor of Sharia as Discourse: Legal Systems and the Encounter with Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate: 2010).

Samim Akgönül is Associate Professor at Strasbourg University and researcher at the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS). He also teaches Political Science at Syracuse University and International Relations at Galatasaray University. Among his recent publications are Religion de Turquie, religions des Turcs: Nouveaux acteurs dans l’Europe élargie (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006), and, as editor, Laïcité en débat: Principes et représentations du concept de la laïcité en France et en Turquie (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2008).

Ahmet Alibašić holds an MA in Islamic Studies, Political Sciences and Islamic Civilisation from Kuala Lumpur. He is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Sarajevo, and Director of the Cen- tre for Advanced Studies in Sarajevo. He has authored a number of articles on Islam in SE Europe and interreligious relations.

Hugh Goddard is Professor and Director of the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Centre for the Study of Islam in the Contemporary World, Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Edinburgh. His particular research interest is the history of Christian- Muslim relations and he is the author of Muslim Perceptions of Chris- tianity (London: Grey Seal, 1996), and A History of Christian-Muslim Relations (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press and Chicago: New Amsterdam, 2000). xii the editors

Brigitte Maréchal is Professor in the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, and Director, Centre Interdisciplinaire d’Etudes de l’Islam dans le Monde Contemporain (CISMOC), at the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium. She is in charge of the programme ‘Religious Sciences: Islam’. She is editor, with Stefano Allievi, Felice Dassetto and Jørgen Nielsen, of Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Soci- ety (Leiden: Brill, 2003), and author of The Muslim Brothers: Roots and Discourse (Leiden: Brill, 2008). EDITORIAL ADVISERS

Dr. Xavier Bougarel, Etudes Turques et Ottomans, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, France Prof. Felice Dassetto, Centre Interdisciplinaire d’Etudes de l’Islam dans le Monde Contemporain (CISMOC), Université Catholique de Lou- vain, Belgium Prof. Silvio Ferrari, Faculty of Law, Universities of Milan, Italy, and Leuven, Belgium Dr. Franck Frégosi, Maison Inter-universitaire des Sciences de l’Homme, Strasbourg, Alsace, and Institut d’Etudes Politiques d’Aix en Provence, France Prof. Fikret Karčić, Faculty of Law, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina Assoc. Prof. Talip Küçükcan, Adviser to the Council of Higher Educa- tion (YÖK), Ankara, Turkey Dr. Lene Kühle, Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Aarhus, Denmark Dr. Nico Landman, Department for Religious Studies, Utrecht Univer- sity, Netherlands Prof. Dr. Jamal Malik, Chair of Islamic Studies, University of Erfurt, Germany Prof. Tariq Modood, Department of Sociology, University of Bristol, United Kingdom Dr. Ferid Muhic, University of Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje, Mace- donia Dr. Agata S. Nalborczyk, Department for European Islam Studies, Fac- ulty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland Prof. Alexandre Popovic, Directeur de recherche émérite au CNRS, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Socials (EHESS), Paris, France Dr. Nina Clara Tiesler, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Social Sci- ences, University of Lisbon, Portugal Dr. Kari Vogt, Associate Professor, Institute of Cultural Studies and Oriental Languages, University of Oslo, Norway Dr. Antonina Zheliyazkova, Director, International Centre for Minor- ity Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia, Bulgaria

FOREWORD

During the last two decades, questions concerning Muslim communities in Europe have been high on the agendas of both European public opinion and researchers. The ongoing public and political debate has encouraged scholars to conduct thorough research on this question. Thus, since the end of 1980s, Muslims in Europe has become a significant topic in the social and political sciences. The interest in Muslim communities in Western and Eastern Europe has different roots. In Western Europe, Muslims are still seen by public opinion as “migrants”, i.e. foreign citizens. In Eastern Europe, though, they constitute ancient communities. In both parts of Europe, however, the question has recently attracted growing interest, particularly by violent actions linked to Islam. The events of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington DC; a number of similar terrorist attacks such as those in Madrid and London; the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in November 2004; or the cartoons crises in Denmark in September 2005: all this created a heavy climate in which Muslims, in the European view, became synonymous with “danger”. However, the main reason for the need to understand these Muslim communities is NOT terrorist attacks. The end of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century have witnessed the birth of a new generation of European Muslims. These Muslims were born on European soil and have been socialised and educated in the countries of western European. Despite a discourse on communitarianism, these generations are in strong interaction with the majority society and consequently their concerns are “European”. The debates on European Islam show that subjects which pervade European public opinion also belong to the agenda of young Muslim intellectuals who want to create a European identity in conformity with Muslim norms and an Islamic identity in conformity with European values. In these dynamic intellectual, political and social mutations, it has rapidly become clear that data published on Muslims in Europe are quickly out of date. It is also clear that an important amount of data is interpreted without the necessary contextualisation. In particular, too much authority is given to statistics that, by their very nature, are unreliable. Therefore, when Brill publishers approached theeditors of xvi foreword the book series Muslim Minorities, which had started in 2003, suggesting that a Yearbook of Muslims in Europe would be timely, the response was enthusiastic. An editorial team was constituted, bringing together specialists of both Western and Eastern Europe. The preparation of the first two volumes progressed successfully, and we can now present the third volume. To meet the needs of users, this third volume, which covers the year 2010, is divided into three parts. The largest is the country reports which cover 46 countries of Western, Central and Eastern Europe. The second part comprises analytical articles on topics of current interest, while the third part collects reviews of some important books published during the period covered in the volume. Our thanks are due to the many researchers that have contributed to the volume. We are particularly indebted to Emil Saggau, editorial assistant at Copenhagen; Mark Bebawi for often complicated copy-editing; and colleagues at Brill, Nicolette van der Hoek, Ingrid Heijckers and Joed Ehlich for their continuing enthusiastic support and cooperation.

The Editors Copenhagen, Edinburgh, Louvain, Sarajevo, Strasbourg, May 2011 PART I

COUNTRY REPORTS

Edited by Jørgen S. Nielsen, Ahmet Alibašić and Brigitte Maréchal

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this first main part of the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe is to provide essential data about the place of Muslims within each of the countries covered, in principle for the year 2010. In this third volume the structure of this section of country reports remains unchanged. The information is structured in the same way for each country, so that users who wish to make comparisons across countries can quickly find the information they seek within the same numbered section of each country report. Although, of course, much of the material is of a more general nature, special attention is given to developments during the year. The statistics provided in the first section usually state clearly which year they apply to, which is not necessarily 2010, as there are many countries where such statistics are not gathered regularly. Any significant developments that have taken place in a country since the beginning of 2011 have been held over to the next volume. In the process of copy editing, all the web sites cited in source references were tested, and they were functioning at the beginning of April 2011. It is in the nature of such a presentation of data that some of the information acquires a rather more authoritative character than is justified. This is particularly problematic in a volume which seeks to present ‘facts’ about Muslims in Europe. For a start, the mere use of the term ‘Muslim’ begs questions. Both the research tradition and much public debate on the subject tend to start from an assumption that anyone from a Muslim cultural tradition is Muslim—e.g. if their names are Muhammad or Fatima, and they are Turkish of origin, they must be Muslims. As many of the country reports indicate, this is too simplistic: there are ‘Muslims’ who have no practical relationship to Islam, its rites, institutions or organisations. The term ‘cultural Mus- lims’ has come into use to deal with this, while ‘practising Muslims’ is then intended to cover those who engage in some form of Islamic practice. None of these solutions is satisfactory. Nadia Jeldtoft discussed this problem in her article in the first volume (‘On defining Muslims’, pp. 9–14). The problem is reflected in the attempts to ascertain demographic data in section 1 of each of the reports. In some countries, official 4 introduction statistics register religious adherence, usually self-defined, but in many countries researchers have had to use data on nationality and/or ethnicity to deduce some form of reasonably reliable estimate. In a few countries, the law on civil associations requires that a register of members be kept, and this can also be a source of statistics on religious allegiance. Occasionally, Muslim organisations themselves give figures, but their reliability is also often open to question. Each country report sets out the nature of the basis for the demography provided. We have deliberately not tried to provide any summary statistical table, as this is liable to acquire an unjustified authority. So we apologise to those users who thought they might get some quick answers! It goes without saying that the situations in the various countries differ enormously in terms of numbers, complexity and occasionally the peculiarity of one aspect or another, usually to do with legal status. We have therefore not imposed any strict guidelines for the length of individual country entries, except to keep within a guideline maximum—and even that we have had to breach in certain, in our view, justified cases. Sections 1–12 in each country report have a focus that allows for the presentation of factual data, but it is inevitable that, in deciding what information to include and what to exclude, judgments have had to be made. This is the case especially in section 3, where we have had to choose which national Muslim organisations to include. In countries with smaller populations, two organisations may be all that exist in the country, while in other, larger countries some provincial organisations may have national impact. The same goes for Muslim media, covered in section 12. On the other hand, the last three sections, 13–16, are more evaluative in their intent. Given that the situation is so varied among the countries covered, section 13, on family law, can only touch very briefly on those aspects that are particular to the country in question and which especially impact on Muslims and on public awareness. Readers interested in more detail will need to go to the extensive and technical legal literature. To help readers use the country reports, especially if they intend to make thematic comparisons across Europe, a more detailed indication of what each section of the country reports is intended to include may be helpful:

1. Muslim populations: Muslim populations including their history within the country and ethnic composition, including overview statistics covering current numbers and ethnic and geographi- introduction 5

cal distribution. This will include, as appropriate, an indication of the nature of the sources and a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of the statistics. Any statistics here and later, should specify the basis on which they have been worked out, including reference to ranges of uncertainty. 2. Islam and the state: A summary of the general relation between state and religion, including questions of official recognition where relevant, and data on the place of Muslims and Muslim organisations within this structure, their place in the public sphere, and access to public funding. 3. Main Muslim organisations: Identification of the main national and, if relevant, regional or ‘sectarian’ Muslim organisations, including contact details, indication of their relative importance and ethnic, religious (Sunni, Shi’i, Sufi, and other theological trend) and national allegiance. This will include as appropriate charities, cultural organisations, political parties and links with transnational and/or foreign organisations and movements. 4. Mosques and prayer houses: This section will provide an overview of mosques and prayer houses, including identification and locations of the main concentrations and overall numbers analysed according to local practice. Legal issues, especially as regards official planning processes, will be referred to when relevant. 5. Children’s education: The place of Islam and Muslims in the general education system, including the teaching of Islam within the curriculum, any special arrangements for Muslim pupils, and provision for separate (private or public) Muslim-owned or -managed schools. 6. Higher and professional education: The history and place of Islamic studies in further and higher education institutions, including the provision of private or public professional training for imams. 7. Burial and cemeteries: Provision of facilities for Muslim burial both in terms of meeting ritual expectations and provision of space for Muslim cemeteries. 8. ‘Chaplaincy’ in state institutions: Provision of Muslim religious counselling and/or ritual services for Muslims in public institutions such as health services, prisons, and the armed forces. 9. Religious festivals: The status of the main Muslim religious festivals, how they are celebrated, and the extent to which they are publicly recognised, for example, in employment law or school holiday arrangements. 6 introduction

10. Halal food: Access to halal food, whether halal slaughter is permitted, and whether halal food is available in public institutions. 11. Dress codes: How far—and where—Muslim dress, especially for women, hijab (head scarf ) and niqab (face covering), is permitted and practised. 12. Publications and media: A survey of the main Muslim print and electronic media. 13. Family law: The practice of elements Islamic family law, whether formally in the official legal systems or informally within local social environments. 14. Interreligious relations: National interreligious councils and Muslim members, if any; interreligious events with Muslim participation (e.g. public celebrations/programmes, statements). 15. Public opinion and debate: Main features of the public debate about Islam and Muslims, including reference to the results of significant public opinion polls. 16. Major cultural events: Reference to any significant cultural events at which Islam or Muslims as a religious or cultural group have been a focus, whether organised by Muslims or by others.

The editors have entered into extensive correspondence with the country authors to seek clarification and to try to ensure that the information provided is as comparable across countries as possible. The form in which each country report is published is often the result of several exchanges back and forth between the author and the editors. A final comment is necessary regarding the order of the countries. Rather than trying to be legalistic or carefully diplomatic, we use the names of the countries that are in common use in English as the basis for the alphabetical order. ALBANIA

Olsi Jazexhi1

1 Muslim Populations

There are no reliable statistics about religious affiliation in Albania at the present time. During the past decade a number of intellectuals have called for a national survey on the subject, but Albanian governments refused since the registration is rejected by many other interest groups and politicians. The need for religious registration in the country was only officially accepted in January 2010 when the government announced plans to conduct the religious and ethnical registration of the population by 2011.2 As a result, the only official statistics avail able are from 1937, when Muslims were estimated to be 69.3% of the total population and 1945 when they made up 72%.3 After the fall of Com- munism, figures on the percentages of Muslims have been disputed by some Christian organisations, clergy and academics, as well as by Mus- lims.4 As a result of massive conversions of Albanians in Greece and Italy, Christians claim that Muslims no longer constitute the majority

1 Olsi Jazexhi is a PhD researcher on Islam and modern Albanian identity at the European University Institute, in Florence, Italy. He holds degrees in Communication and Islamic Civilisation and has researched Muslims in Albania from the time of the Ottoman Empire. 2 See: Republic of Albania, Council of Ministers: Mblidhet REPOBA: Për herë të parë do të kryhet regjistrimi i popullsisë në bazë etnie (Meeting of REPOBA: For the first time the ethnic registration of the population to be conducted), 14 January 2010, http://www.keshilliministrave.al/index.php?fq=brenda&m=news&lid=12508&gj=gj1, accessed 14 November 2010. 3 Dela Roka, Roberto Moroko, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri 1920–1944 (Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, Nation and Religion in Albania 1920–1944) (Tirana: Eleni Gjika, 1994), p. 19. 4 For the debates over the number of Muslims in Albania see the Press Release of the Muslim Forum of Albania: “MFA denounces the intrigues of evangelist organisations with the religious percentages of Albania”, at http://forumimusliman.org/english/ encyklopedia.html, accessed 7 March 2009; the interview with the Christian Orthodox Archbishop Yanolatos, “Janullatos: Nuk jeni komb tipik musliman”(Yanolatos: We are not a typical Muslim nation), Gazeta Shekulli, 18 May 2007, http://www.shekulli.com .al/news/44/ARTICLE/10080/200705-18.html, accessed 7 March 2009. 8 olsi jazexhi in Albania, but Muslims dispute this.5 The best contemporary source for population distribution by religion in Albania is research conducted by the Institute of Statistics and Institute of Public Health in Tirana in 2008–2009 which found the Muslims to be 78.2% of the population.6 Another source is the US Department of State Committee on Religious Freedoms report (14 September 2007), which estimates that citizens of Muslim background make up the largest traditional religious group in Albania, amounting to 65% to 70% of the population.7 Most of the Muslims are Sunnis and there is a minority of Bektashis. The Muslims of Albania are generally classified as ethnic Albanians. However, after the fall of Communism, many have defined themselves as Bosnians, Gorans, Gollobordas, Turks, Roma and Egyptians. During Ottoman times, Sunni Muslims were usually concentrated in towns, particularly in Gegëria, in the centre and north of the country, while the Bektashis were concentrated mainly in the south,8 but since 1991, many Muslims, following a national trend, have moved towards the capital, Tirana. Islam is believed to have entered the regions that constitute modern- day Albania in the ninth century,9 while the real Islamisation started after the seventeenth century, largely thanks to the privileges and missionary work that the Albanian-speaking populations gained from the

5 In a number of polls in recent years, the people who defined themselves as Muslims made up around 63% of the population, Orthodox Christians 15%, and Catholics 13% (see Hysniu, Jeton, “Përbërja e fetare e Shqipërisë: rezultatet e tre sondazheve” (The religious make-up of Albania: the results of three polls), in Gazeta Start, 26 January 2007). According to a study conducted by the National Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) and Unicef in 2005, Muslims resulted to constitute 80% of the population. See: “Alba- nia’s Population 80% Muslims,” Balkan Insight, 13 October 2009, http://www.balkanin sight.com/en/main/news/22817/, accessed December 10, 2009. 6 Institute of Statistics, Institute of Public Health Tirana, Albania and ICF Macro Calverton, Maryland, USA, Studimi Demografik dhe Shëndetësor në Shqipëri 2008–09 (Demographic and Health Study in Albania 2008–09), March 2010. P. 32, http://pdf .usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADS749.pdf, accessed 14 November 2010. See also: H. Kettani, “World Muslim Population: 1950–2020,” in International Journal of Environmental Science and Development (IJESD), Vol. 1, No. 2, June 2010. 7 Department of State Religious Freedom Report—Albania, 14 September 2007, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90160.htm, accessed 6 April 2011. Subsequent reports no longer provide statistical estimates. 8 Jazexhi, Olsi, “The Bektashi Tarikah of Dervishes”, paper presented at the Col- loque International ‘soufisme-culture-musique’, Centre National de Recherches Préhistoriques, Anthropologiques et Historiques. Algiers, September 2007. 9 Basha, Ali M., Nëpër gjurmët e Islamit (Tirane: no publisher stated, 2005), pp. 48–52. albania 9

Ottomans.10 However, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the numbers and positions of Muslims changed markedly and when Com- munism was established after World War II and Albania was declared an atheist state (from 1967 until 1991), the religious identity of both Muslims and Christians was suppressed. As a result of many decades of rigidly enforced atheism, the majority of the citizens of Albania today are secular in orientation and know little about Islam. No reliable data are available on active participation in formal religious rites, but estimates range from 25% to 40%.11

2 Islam and the State

Albania is a secular parliamentary republic with no official religion, in which the state guarantees freedom of religious belief. The Con- stitution of Albania recognises the equality of all religious communities and the state is neutral in questions of faith.12 However, the Sunni Muslims (known as muslimanët ), Bektashi Muslims (known as bektashijët), Catholic Christians (known as katolikët) and Ortho- dox Christians (known as ortodoksët) are ‘recognised’ as the four traditional religious communities and are often invited to national ceremonies and celebrations. Other faith communities include the Protestants, mostly associated with the Albanian Evangelical Alliance (VUSH), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Bahais, the Holy Waqf of the Holy League,13 and other minor groups. During the past decades both traditional and non-traditional communities did not receive any funding from the state. However this situation changed in 2009 when the government decided to fund those communities who were willing to sign agreements with the Council of Ministers. The change was proposed by the Council of Ministers on 15 April 200914 and approved by

10 Dela Roka, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri, p. 20. 11 Department of State Religious Freedom Report—Albania, 14 September 2006, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90160.htm, accessed 6 April 2011. 12 Constitution of Albania/ Chapter I General Provisions/ Article 10, http://www .parlament.al/dokumenti.asp?id=855, accessed 10 October 2008. 13 The Holy Waqf of the Holy League is an indigenous Albanian sect, headed by Eleonora Bregu, who calls herself the Lady of the Soul. 14 Republic of Albania, Council of Ministers, Këshilli i Ministrave miraton projek- tligjin për financimin nga buxheti i shtetit të bashkësive fetare, që kanë nënshkruar mar- rëveshje me të (The Council of Ministers approves the project for financing from the state budget those religious communities that have signed agreements), 15.04.2010, http:// 10 olsi jazexhi the Albanian Parliament on 15 May 2009.15 The communities were the four traditional ones; the Muslim Community, the Bektashi Kryegjy- shata, the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church.16 In the budget of 2010 the Albanian parliament decided to allocate 122.100 Albanian lekë (around 1,198,580 USD)17 for religious communities.18 After the allocation, the Muslim Community received 28.000.000 lekë (274.860 USD),19 while the Bektashi Kryegjyshata, the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church received 24.000.00 lekë (235.595 USD) each.20

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë (Muslim Community of Albania, MCA, Rruga “Punëtorët e Rilindjes”, nr. 50, Tirana, Albania, tel: +355 42 269123/ 04 22 37 01/23 04 92, http://www.kmsh.al/, email: info@ kmsh.al) is the largest Sunni Muslim organisation in Albania and is recognised by the state as a national organisation of Sunni Islam. It administers most of the mosques and is perceived to be the main representative of Islam in the country. It was originally founded in 1923, when the Sunnis of Albania were officially separated from the

www.keshilliministrave.al/?fq=brenda&m=news&lid=10792, accessed 14 November 2010. 15 Ngjarjet juridike, prill—qershor 2009 (Judicial record April–June 2009), Banka e Shqipërisë, Buletini Ekonomik, vol. 12, nr. 2, June 2009, http://www.bankofalbania.org/ web/pub/8_ngjarjet_juridike_prill_qershor_2009_2797_1.pdf, accessed 14 November 2010. 16 The Muslim Community, the Bektashis and the Orthodox Church signed their agreements with the Council of Ministers on 22 January 2009 with laws 10 056, 10 058 and 10 057. The Catholic Church had signed its agreement on May 23, 2002 with law no. 8902. 17 These exchange rates are from November 2010. 18 LIGJ Nr.10 190, datë 26.11.2009, PËR BUXHETIN E VITIT 2010. Qendra e Pub- likimeve Zyrtare, http://www.qpz.gov.al/doc.jsp?doc=docs/Ligj%20Nr%2010190%20 Dat%C3%AB%2026-11-2009.htm, accessed 14 November 2010. 19 Me vendim te Keshillit te Ministrave Komuniteti Mysliman (KMSH) perfiton shumen 28 milione leke. (By a decision of the Council of Ministers the Muslim Com- munity benefits 28 million leke) Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, http://kmsh.al/ aktualitet/132-me-vendim-te-keshillit-te-ministrave-komuniteti-mysliman-kmsh- perfiton-shumen-28-milione-leke.html, accessed 14 November 2010. 20 Fatjona Mejdini, Komunitetet fetare, qeveria ndan paratë, Myslimanët marrin 27 milionë lekë. Ortodoksët, katolikët dhe bektashinjtë nga 24 milionë, (Religious communities, the government distributes money, the Muslims take 27 million leke, the Orthodox, Catholics and Bektashis get 24 million). Gazeta Shqip. 29 April 2010. albania 11

Caliphate in Istanbul.21 After being abolished during Communist era, the Muslim Community was reorganised in 1991. Kryegjyshata Botërore Bektashiane (World Headquarters of Bektash- ism, Rruga “Dhimiter Kamarda”, Tirana, Albania, tel: +355 4 355 227/ +355 4 355 090, http://www.komunitetibektashi.org/, email: [email protected]) is the largest Sufi tariqa organisation in Albania. Kryegjyshata Bektashiane is recognised by the state as a national organisation and a separate religious community. The Bektas his claim that their headquarters is the World Headquarters of Bektashism, but this is disputed by Bektashis living outside Albania. Kryegjyshata Bektashiane was transferred from Turkey to Albania in 1931, after the prohibition of the order in Turkey in 1925.22 In 1946, the tariqa separated from mainstream Islam and became a separate religious community.23 Apart from the officially recognised organisations, a number of other Muslim bodies are active in the country. We can mention different Sufitariqas such as the Rifa’is, Qadiris, Sa’dis, Khalwatis and Tijanis. Apart from them important Muslim organisations are The Muslim Forum of Albania (Rruga Sami Frashëri, P. 20/3, Ap. 1, 1010, Tirana, Albania, http://www.forumimusliman.org/english/, email: info@ forumimusliman.org) established in 2005 as a lay Muslim organisation with the aim of combating racism, Islamophobia and xenophobia, and the Albanian Institute of Islamic Though and Civilization (P.O. Box: 2905, Tirana, Albania, tel: & fax: +355(4) 2 340 289; 2 382 156, http:// www.aiitc.org, email: [email protected]) an NGO established in 1996 as a research and publishing organisation.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

In 2007, the Muslim Community of Albania reported that some 498 mosques existed in the country. As of 2010, this number has increased to 528.24 For restoring the Ottoman mosques that are presently ruined in the country, on February 16, 2010 the Muslim Community, the

21 Dela Roka, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri, pp. 24–27. 22 Jazexhi, “Bektashi Tarikah”. 23 Kalicani, Baba Selim, Bektashizmi si sekt mistik islam (Bektashism as a mystical sect of Islam) (Tirana: KOHA, 1999), pp. 228–229. 24 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Religions, Ministry of Tourism, Culture, Youths and Sports, 18 November 2010. 12 olsi jazexhi

Institute of Cultural Monuments and the Turkish International Coop- eration and Development Agency (TIKA) signed a protocol of cooperation whereby TIKA will finance the restoration of the historical mosques.25 Apart from the mosques, a small number of prayer houses and masjids (small mosques without minarets), operate throughout the country. The Ahmadiyya community runs one mosque on the outskirts of Tirana and the Rifa’i tariqa runs a masjid.26 The Bektashis have some 137 tekes (Sufi lodges) throughout the county,27 and the Sufi tariqas (Rifa’i, Alevi, Qadiri, Khalwati, Tidjani and others) have altogether an estimated 384 tekes, turbes, maqams and zawias.28

5 Children’s Education

Religious education was prohibited in Albania under Communism, and religion was attacked by the educational system. After the fall of Communism, school textbooks have adopted a more positive stance towards religion, but Islam is not always portrayed in very positive terms.29 Islam and other religions are not taught in Albanian public schools, but the Muslim Community of Albania and some other Albanian and foreign Muslim NGOs run a number of Muslim schools (madrasas). The schools run by the Muslim Community include seven high schools (madrasa), two primary schools and five others teaching facilities.30 The latest madrasa to be constructed is the madrasa

25 Firmoset protokolli per restaurimin e xhamive historike. (A protocol for restoring historical mosques is signed) Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, http://www.kmsh.al/ aktualitet/66-firmoset-protokolli-per-restaurimin-e-xhamive-historike.html, accessed 14 November 2010. 26 The exact number of mosques andmasjid s in Albania is difficult to be established. In an interview on 16 August 2008, the deputy head of the Muslim Commu- nity declared that 568 mosques operate in Albania, but this contradicts data obtained from the State Committee on Religions, which also relies on the Muslim Community of Albania for its information. For more see “Raport ekskluziv / Në Shqipëri ka 638 xhami dhe 1119 kisha”, (Special report: 638 mosques and 1119 churches in Albania) Gazeta Tirana Observer, 16 August 2008. 27 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Religions. 18 Novem- ber 18 2010. 28 Ibid. 29 Olsi Jazexhi, “Depicting the Enemy: the Image of the Turk and the Muslim in Albania’s High School Textbooks”, Islam in South East Asia Forum ISEEF, Paper No. 1, July 2008. 30 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Religions and reported by the Muslim Community of Albania. See also: MEDRESETE DHE KURSET albania 13 of Korça which was licensed on 21 November 2009.31 Mosques and some Muslim NGOs also provide Islamic instruction outside school hours. The Bektashi Community and the Sufi organisations have no registered schools or courses for teaching religion. But the Bektashis are reported to operate strictly religious educational centers for the training of clerics.32

6 Higher and Professional Education

The Islamic institutions of Albania have no institute of higher learning and are dependent on institutions elsewhere in the Muslim world for training their staff. Since the Catholic and Orthodox Churches run their own institutes of higher learning, the question of building an Islamic university has been raised since 2005.33 The Muslim Community has repeatedly asked the state for permission to open an Islamic university and has received positive responses, but no university has yet been established, while the Bektashis have not made any such request. In an extraordinary meeting that the Muslim Community held in September 2010 it approved the opening of a Theological University in Albania. This was justified on the ground that it will be “providing higher education compatible with the culture, tradition and the characteristics of the Albanian society . . . Through its opening, the Albanian youth will no longer need to go to foreign countries for continuing their theological studies.”34 The university, which the chairman of the Muslim Community said was promised to get the approval from the prime

FETARE, (Madrasas and religious classes) Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, http:// www.kmsh.al/medresete.html, accessed 14 November 2010. 31 Keshilli i Ministrave licenson Medresene e re te Korces. (The Council of Ministers licenses the new madrasa of Korça) Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, http://www .kmsh.al/aktualitet/93-keshilli-i-ministrave-licenson-medresene-e-re-te-korces.html, accessed 14 November 2010. 32 Albania, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Reli- gious Freedom Report 2010, November 17, 2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ irf/2010/148905.htm, accessed 19 November 2010. 33 Kulla, Ilir, “Pse-te e universitetit islam!” (The Why’s of the Islamic University), Gazeta Korrieri, 23 January 2005. 34 Kryesia e KMSH-se miraton themelimin e Universitetit Teologjik Islam ne Shqiperi. (The leadership of the MCA approves the establishment of a Theological Islamic Uni- versity in Albania) Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, http://www.kmsh.al/aktualitet/ 249-kryesia-e-kmsh-se-miraton-themelimin-e-universitetit-teologjik-islam-ne- shqiperi.html, accessed 14 November 2010. 14 olsi jazexhi minister,35 is supposed to start with two faculties; Islamic Studies and Social Sciences. However reports in the press suggested that the opening of the Islamic University would not be possible since the building that the Muslim Community was promised would be given by the Ministry of Defence and used as a campus will be demolished by the Ministry of Transport and the Municipality of Tirana to building a road.36

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Due to the Communist legacy, separate Muslim cemeteries are not common in Albania. In graveyards built during the Communist era, such as those in Tirana, Christians and Muslims are buried together. However, a number of cemeteries exist outside Tirana, where Muslims are buried separately from Christians.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

‘Chaplaincy’ is not legally recognised in state institutions, but religious preachers may have access to prisons for teaching religion to inmates. However, religious chaplains are strictly prohibited in public schools.

9 Religious Festivals

The state recognises two Sunni religious festivals as national holidays in Albania. They are Bajrami i Madh (the Great Bayram, ‘Id al-Fitr) celebrated at the end of Ramadan and Kurban Bajrami or Bajrami i Vogël (Qurban Bayram or Little Bayram, ‘Id al-Adha) celebrated on 10 Dhu’l Hijja. Apart from the Bayrams, Sunni Muslims celebrate the month of Ramadan and five special sacred nights. In recent years the Muslim

35 Fatos Mahmutaj, Muça: Krerët e vendit premtuan hapjen e Universitetit Islam, (Muça; country’s leaders promised opening of a Islamic University) Gazeta Panorama, 22 September 2010, http://www.panorama.com.al/panorama/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=988:muca-kreret-e-vendit-premtuan-hapjen-e-universitetit-islam&catid=77:aktualitet&Itemid=414, accessed 14 November 2010. 36 Fatos Mahmutaj, Universiteti Islam, “mashtrohet” KMSH, (The Islamic Univer- sity, MCA is cheated) Gazeta Panorama, 22 September 2010, http://www.panorama. com.al/panorama/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=987:universitet i-islam-qmashtrohetq-kmsh&catid=77:aktualitet&Itemid=414, accessed 14 November 2010. albania 15

Community has celebrated the birthday of Prophet Muhammad in the third week of April by organising a big concert in Tirana. 37 Apart from the Sunni festivals, the Albanian state recognises as a national holiday the ‘Day of Sultan Nawruz’ on 22 March, celebrated by the Bektashis in memory of the birth of Imam Ali. In addition, they celebrate the day of ‘Ashura in memory of the massacre at Karbala, as well as some other local festivals such as their pilgrimages to local saints’ shrines and tombs.

10 Halal Food

Halal food and slaughter are permitted and are gaining popularity among the practising Sunni Muslim population of Albania. Halal food is available in halal shops, pizzerias and restaurants in major cities of the country. However, there is no central institution for halal certification.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules limiting Muslim dress in public places or for pupils in schools. However school principals have the right to set standards for “appropriate clothing,” which at times includes restrictions on public displays of religious symbols. In recent years a number of incidents involving girls wearing hijab being expelled from schools and universities or being required to remove their head scarfs, have occurred. During the reporting period, there were reports that school officials prevented female public high school students wearing Islamic head scarves from attending classes.38 Although the state does not officially prohibit Muslim women from wearing the hijab, in most state and

37 The birthday of Prophet Muhammad is usually celebrated in the third weekend of the month of April. The organisers follow the solar rather than the lunar calendar. The initiators and organisers of this concert are the Nurcu Tariqah, which, since 2005, has developed a strong influence inside the Muslim Community of Albania. The latest concert was organized on April 17, 2010. See:Program madheshtor “Pro- feti Muhamed (a.s.)-Krenaria e Njerezimit dhe Kur’ani Mesazhi Hyjnow,” Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, http://www.kmsh.al/aktivitete/123-program-madheshtor-qprofeti- muhamed-as-krenaria-e-njerezimit-dhe-kurani-mesazhi-hyjnor.html, accessed 14 Novem- ber 2010. 38 Albania, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Reli- gious Freedom Report 2010, November 17, 2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/ 2010/148905.htm, accessed 19 November 2010. 16 olsi jazexhi public institutions this practice is barred under the umbrella of compliance with internal uniforms and regulations, or with the claim that the secularity of the state must be maintained. In December 2010 the Ministry of Education announced a bill which was to be discussed by civil society for adopting a new Law for the Pre-University Education. According to article 36 students are prohibited from displaying any religious symbols in the schools.39

12 Publication and Media

The main Muslim newspapers, magazines and radios in Albania are:

Drita Islame (The Light of Islam), journal of the Muslim Commu- nity of Albania; Udha Islame (The Islamic Path), journal of the Muftini of Shkodra; Drita e Kuranit (The Light of Quran), magazine published by the Quran Foundation; Këshilla (The Advice), magazine published by the Quran Foundation; Drita e Ehlil Bejtit (The Light of Ahl al-Bayt), journal of the Qadiri tariqa; Dashuria për Ehlil Bejtin (The Love for Ahl al-Bayt), journal of the Rifa’i tariqa; Etika (The Ethic), monthly magazine published by the Progresi Foundation; Urtësia (Wisdom), magazine of the Bektashi Community; Familja (The Family), a magazine published by the ‘Women’ association—Shoqata Kulturore “GRUAJA”; Radio Kontakt (Radio Contact), broadcasts religious programs and Quran recitations.

Apart from the above newspapers, there are a number of Muslim publishing houses and organisations, which produce a variety of books, mainly translations from Arabic, Iranian and Turkish. The most prominent are the Albanian Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, “Prizmi” Publishing House, Jehona Association, Tradita Association,

39 PROJEKTLIGJ PËR SISTEMIN ARSIMOR PARAUNIVERSITAR—Dhjetor 2010, Ministria e Arsimit dhe e Shkences, http://www.mash.gov.al:8443/File/PLAPU%20 dhjetor%202010.pdf, accessed 14 November 2010. albania 17

Future’s Youth Organisation, ALSAR association and Ardhmëria association.

13 Family Law

Albanian courts do not recognise any religious law in their juridical practice.40 The Sunni Muslim community recognises the practice of nikah (religious marriage), but this is not often practised and few people marry by having a nikah administered by an imam.

14 Interreligious Relations

Even though communist Albania was one of the most ruthless countries of Eastern Europe on suppression of religious freedoms, the official myth that state politicians have adopted after the fall of communism is that Albania is a country of religious tolerance and harmony.41 In the last few decades a number of projects for fostering interreligious relations have been sponsored by Western agencies such as USAID and “Religions for Peace”. On 22 October 2009, the four heads of the Muslim, Bektashi, Orthodox and Catholic communities established in Tirana the Interreligious Council of Albania whose aim is to foster coexistence in the country. The council was registered in the court of Tirana on 25 October 2009.42 Major interreligious activities for 2010 were organised by the minister of Foreign Affairs,43 as well as by the traditional religious communities which on 3 November 2010

40 Kodi i Familjes i Republikës së Shqipërisë (Family Code of the Republic of Alba- nia), Ribotim i Qendrës së Publikimeve Zyrtare, Tetor 2004. 41 See for example Bamir Topi, “Presidenti Topi përshëndet Konferencën e hapjes së Këshillit Ndërfetar të Shqipërisë” (President Topi congratulates the opening of the Conference of the Inter-religious Council of Albania), 22 October 2009, http://www .president.al/shqip/info.asp?id=5397, accessed 11 December 2009. 42 Gazeta 55, “Këshilli Ndërfetar Shqiptar: Toleranca jonë, shenjë e bashkëjetesës së katër besimeve fetare” (The Albanian Inter-religious Council: Our tolerance is a sign of coexistence of four religious beliefs), 22 October 2009, http://www.gazeta55.net/index. php?artikulli=9081, accessed 11 December 2009. 43 Gazeta Start, Meta mbledh Komitetin e Aleancës së Qytetërimeve (Meta gathers the Committee for the Alliance of Civilizations), 05 March 2010, http://www.gazetastart .com/lajm.php?kategoria=Aktualitet&nr=12159, accessed 14 November 2010. 18 olsi jazexhi organised the symposium “The interreligious harmony in the integration of Albania.”44

15 Public Opinion and Debate

A number of issues pertaining to Muslims and Islam attracted media attention in Albania during 2010. The first major debate happened at the beginning of 2010. The Muslim Forum of Albania and a number of Albanian Muslims living in Albania and in Europe complained to the Conservative Party of the United Kingdom about some anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish declarations that Ms. Mirela Bogdani, who claimed to be a candidate for the party in Wales, made in one TV interview in Tirana.45 Nicholas Bourne, the leader of the Welsh Conservative Party responded to the complains by suspending Bogdani from the list of the candidates of the Conservative Party.46 Her suspension sparked a debate in the Albanian media of whether her suspension and the complains of the Muslim Forum were what the Muslims should do in a democratic society or not. While the example of Bogdani proved successful, Muslims were not so lucky with Kastriot Myftaraj who throughout 2010 has published many defamatory articles in gazeta Sot, where he has called the prophet Muhammad a paedophile, said that there are Muslim terrorists connected to the Jews who conspire against Albania, and has called upon the Albanian authorities to organise a war against the Muslims and remove their citizenship since they threaten the future of the country. The Muslim Forum and the Muslim Community of Albania sued Myftaraj for inciting national, racial and religious hatred in two separate lawsuits.47 However the court of Tirana rejected the charges of the

44 Gazeta Start, Simpozium, “Harmonia Ndërfetare në Integrimin e Shqipërisë” (Sym- posium, “Inter-religious harmony in the integration of Albania”), 3 November 2010, http://www.gazetastart.com/lajme/Aktualitet/26912/, accessed 14 November 2010. 45 “Letter to the Conservative Party of the United Kingdom.” Letter. 18 December 2009, http://forumimusliman.org/english/bogdani.html, accessed 15 November 2010. 46 Letter of Nicholas Bourne to the Muslim Forum of Albania, 28 January 2010, http://forumimusliman.org/english/conservatives.pdf, accessed 15 November 2010. 47 See: KMSH kallezim penal ndaj gazetarit Kastriot Myftaraj (The MCA sues journalist Kastriot Myftaraj), Komuniteti Mysliman i Shqipërisë, http://kmsh.al/ aktualitet/170-komuniteti-mysliman-i-shqiperise-kallezim-penal-ndaj-gazetarit-kastriot-myftaraj.html, accessed 15 November 2010; and KALLËZIM PENAL. Forumi Musliman i Shqipërisë, June 2010, http://forumimusliman.org/english/kacmuftari.pdf, accessed 15 November 2010. albania 19

Muslim Community and Muslim Forum and did not start any court proceeding against Myftaraj, arguing that the author had the right to express his opinions about Islam and Muslims in the media.48 On the other hand the salafi imam, Artan Kristo, who was arrested on 12 October 2009 on charges of inciting terrorist acts, was convicted on 10 December 2010 and sentenced to five years of imprisonment on charges of inciting, propagating and calling for terrorism.49 Apart from external slanders, Muslims witnessed internal rifts within the Muslim Community of Albania which attracted much media attention. On 15 September 2010 the chairman of the Muslim Community, Selim Muça was sacked from his position by his deputy Ilir Vokshi, the general secretary of the MCA Betim Truci and other officials of the MCA. The justification for his removal was that he had abused the statute and manipulated the MCA.50 Muça was accused of supporting suspicious financing coming from Saudi Arabia and siding with the radicals within the MCA.51 Selim Muça and his supporters reacted to the sacking by organising another meeting and ousting the rebels who were accused of being anarchists and extremists who wanted to destroy the institution.52 In the end, the Muça group who had the support of the police and the imams of Tirana triumphed by taking control of the MCA. During these emergency meetings,53 the MCA declared its decision to open an Islamic University in the country.

48 Vendim per mosfillimin e procedimit penal nr. 3863/2010. 28.07.2010, http://www .balkanweb.com/kryesore/1/pezullohet-nga-detyra-kreu-i-komunitetit-mysliman- selim-muca-47337.html, accessed 10 November 2010. 49 Vali Qyfyrçi, Kristo, dënimi i parë për terrorizëm (Kristo, the first indictment for terrorism), Gazeta Shqip, 11/12/2010, http://gazeta-shqip.com/index//e0bf0c0a612c3e- 51f30891810ca2e754.html, accessed 15 January 2010. 50 Pezullohet nga detyra kreu i Komunitetit Mysliman, Selim Muca (The head of the Muslim Community, Selim Muça is sacked from his job), Balkanweb, 15 Septem- ber 2010, http://forumimusliman.org/english/kacmuftari.pdf, accessed 15 November 2010. 51 Vokshi: Selim Muça mbështet financime të dyshimta (Vokshi; Selim Muça supports suspicious finances), Gazeta Shqiptare Online, 19 October 2010, http://www .balkanweb.com/gazetav5/artikull.php?id=87175, accessed 19 November 2010. 52 Press Release of the Muslim Community of Albania, 15 September 2010, http://www .kmsh.al/component/content/article/15-faqja-e-pare/242-deklarate-per-shtyp-nga- kryesia.html, accessed 19 November 2010. 53 Kryesia e KMSH-se miraton themelimin e Universitetit Teologjik Islam ne Shqiperi (The leadership of MCA approves the establishment of the Theological Islamic Univer- sity in Albania), Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë, http://www.kmsh.al/aktualitet/249- kryesia-e-kmsh-se-miraton-themelimin-e-universitetit-teologjik-islam-ne-shqiperi .html, accessed 14 November 2010. http://www.balkanweb.com/kryesore/1/xhamia-e- 20 olsi jazexhi

Another major issue that provoked public debates in Albania was the question of the central mosque of Tirana; which until now Mus- lims have not been allowed to construct. During the celebration of Kurban Bayram, the mayor of Tirana and the head of the Socialist Party of Albania, Edi Rama announced that the Municipality had finally made ready its plans to allow the construction of a new mosque and a museum of interreligious coexistence in the country.54 How- ever the claim of Rama was denied by the Minister of Public Works and Transport, Sokol Olldashi who claimed that Rama was lying to the Muslims for his electoral gain, since in his new plan of Tirana no mosque was foreseen.55 Rama continued with his offer for building a mosque by organising public discussions about his project and offering 2930 m2 of land to Muslims for the mosque.56

16 Major Cultural Events

Major annual cultural organised by Muslims in Albania are:

• the concert for the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad organised on the weekends around 20 April in Tirana by the Muslim Com- munity of Albania; • public celebrations and prayers organised during the Bayrams and Ramadan throughout the country; • the celebrations of Sultan Nawruz on 22 March by the Bektashi Community; • Bektashi pilgrimages in the Tomori Mountain on 20–25 August in memory of the Shi’i saint Abbas Ali.

re-olldashi-rama-genjen-besimtaret-per-qellime-elektorale-51263.html, accessed 19 November 2010. 54 Myslimanët, Rama: Xhamia e re, në qendër të Tiranës (Muslims, Rama: The new mosque in the centre of Tirana), Gazeta Shekulli, 15 November 2010, http://www. shekulli.com.al/2010/11/15/presidenti-topi-uron-fiter-bajramin.html, accessed 15 November 2010. 55 Xhamia e re, Olldashi: Rama gënjen besimtarët për qëllime elektorale (The new mosque, Olldashi: Rama deceives the believers for electoral purposes), http://www .balkanweb.com/shqiperi/2685/xhamia-e-re-olldashi-rama-genjen-besimtaret-per- qellime-elektorale-51262.html. 16 November 2010. 56 Rama kënaq myslimanët: Xhamia, sipërfaqe 3 dynym (Rama makes the Mus- lims happy: the mosque will have 3 dunum of land), Gazeta Shqiptare, 21 December 2010, http://www.balkanweb.com/gazetav5/artikull.php?id=90658, accessed 15 Janu- ary 2010. ARMENIA

Sevak Karamyan1

1 Muslim Populations

The National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia has never conducted a census of religion in Armenia, but the forthcoming 2011 census will include optional questions.2 The 2001 census3 included a question on ethnicity according to which there were small numbers of traditionally Muslim ethnic groups, more specifically, 29 Azerbaijanis,4 123 Tatars, 158 Ingushes, 322 Abazines, 326 Persians (Iranians), and 1519 Kurds. This total of 2477 people5 constituted 0.08% of the population.6 According to various research publications, as well as the information provided by non-governmental organisations, the number of Muslims in Armenia is about 8,000, and 80% of them are resident non-citizens who stay in Armenia for extended periods of time. The majority of Muslims are from Iran, others come from the Middle East and India and most are businessmen, students and diplomats. The ratio of Shi’is to Sunnis is about 3:1. There is some contradictory information concerning Kurds in Armenia. There are more than 60,000 Kurdish-speaking people, but

1 Dr Sevak Karamyan is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Admin- istration, Yerevan State University. 2 http://armstat.am/file/doc/99461113.pdf, accessed 10 November 2010. 3 www.armstat.am/en/?nid=52, accessed 15 October 2009. 4 But according to specialists, the number of Azerbaijanis is probably more, and it is possible that during the census many of them hid their Azerbaijani origin. For example, according to H. Kharatyan, Head of the Chair of Inter-Cultural Commu- nication at Yerevan State Linguistic University after V. Brusov, there are about 120 Azerbaijanis in Armenia. 5 Mkrtumyan, Y., H. Sargsyan and A. Tadevosyan (eds.), Հայաստանի Հանրա- պետության ազգային փոքրամասնությունները քաղաքացիական հասրակաության կայացման արդի պայմաններում (National Minorities of the Republic of Armenia in the Present Conditions of Formation of Civic Society), vol. 2 (Yerevan: National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia, Gitutyun Publishing, 2005), pp. 220–221 (in Armenian). 6 According to the 2001 census, the population of Armenia was 3,210,000. Accord- ing to the Statistical Yearbook of 2009, it has increased to 3,238,000; www.armstat.am/ file/doc/99458058, accessed 15 January 2010. 22 sevak karamyan the majority of this group identify themselves as Yezidis,7 who detach themselves from Islam in terms of religion and from the Kurds in terms of ethnicity.8 Their language is Kurmanji, a Northern Kurdish dialect, although Yezidis call their language Ezdiki in order to under- score their separate identity. It should be mentioned that some Yezidis identify themselves as Kurds or Yezidi-Kurds on the basis of language, traditions and customs.9 According to the Head of the Kurdish National Council of Armenia, K. Hasanov, there are about 300 Kurds in Armenia who do not have a strong religious identity, and who are distinguished from Armenians mainly by the fact that they do not eat pork. Other sources give the number of Muslim Kurds in Armenia as about 1,000.10 Islam reached Armenia shortly after the foundation of the religion. The first Arab invasion of Armenia took place in 640 CE and thereafter Armenia was under Arab rule for more than 200 years. In the second half of the 9th century the Armenians succeeded in overthrowing Arab rule and restoring independence which lasted till the beginning of the 11th century. From the mid 11th century Armenia underwent a number of invasions by the Seljuk Turks who, until the first half of the 12th century, kept Armenia under their control. As a result of Armenian-Georgian military cooperation, most Armenian territories were liberated from the Seljuk Turks. In 1236, the major military incursion of Mongols took place after which Armenia stayed under Mongol rule for approximately almost two centuries. Throughout the fifteenth century Armenia was under the rule of two Turkoman tribes, the Ak Koyunlu or Aq Qoyunlu (the White Sheep) Turcomans, and Kara Koyunlu (Black Sheep) Turcomans. From the sixteenth century, Armenia was divided between two Muslim powers, Ottoman Turkey and Safavid Iran (Persia). The situation changed after the Russian-

7 An ethno-confessional group, whose main identity is religion—Yezidism or Sharfadin. Yezidism is a syncretic doctrine which combines the belief in the One God with the veneration of a Holy Trinity—Malak Tawus (Peacock angel), Shaykh ‘Adi and Sultan Yezid (all being incarnations of God), as well as an extensive popular pan- theon that includes a number of divinities, saints and patron-deities having parallels with both Iranian and Semitic traditions. 8 Asatryan, G. and V. Arakelova, The Ethnic Minorities of Armenia (Yerevan: Cau- casian Centre for Iranian Studies 2004), p. 10. Also available at http://www.hra.am/ file/minorities_en.pdf . 9 Sardar, A., Քրդերը Հայաստանում (Kurds in Armenia) (Yerevan: Hayastan Press 1996), p. 59 (in Armenian). 10 Asatryan and Arakelova, Ethnic Minorities, p. 14. armenia 23

Persian wars of the nineteenth century, when some Armenian territories (including the territory of today’s Republic of Armenia) passed to the Russian Empire. In spite of the long presence of Islamic authority, the Armenians remained strongly attached to their church and did not change their Christian religion, which the Armenian state had first adopted officially in 301 CE. During the period of the First Armenian Republic, from 1918 to 1920, as well as in the following period of the Soviet Republic, the number of Muslims (Muslim Turks later called Azerbaijanis11 and Kurds) was high—about 80,000,12 and according to 1989 statistics, there were 84,860 Azerbaijanis and 4,151 Kurds13 in Armenia. The majority of these Azerbaijanis left the country during the conflict with Azerbaijan that began in 1988. Kurds who used to live in Azerbaijani enclaves in Armenia by virtue of confessional and cultural relatedness (children attending Azerbaijani schools, mixed marriages, etc.) left Armenia along with the Azerbaijanis. Most Azerbaijanis and Kurds went to Russia, Azerbaijan, Central Asia and Turkey, as well as Europe. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, some traditionally Muslim ethnic groups living in the former Soviet Union, such as Abazines and Ingushes, as well as Iranians, have tended to migrate to Armenia. Iranian Muslims in Armenia continue to communicate among themselves in Persian, but switch easily to Armenian with other members of Armenian society. Similarly, ethnic groups from the former Soviet Union use Russian among themselves but Armenian in the wider society. Muslims mainly live in the capital city and major towns.

2 Islam and the State

According to Article 8.1 of the Constitution of Armenia: The church shall be separate from the state in the Republic of Arme- nia. TheRepublic of Armenia recognizes the exclusive historical mission of the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church as a national church, in the spiritual life, development of the national culture and preservation of the

11 After 1929, this group began to be called Azerbaijanis in official documents (where they were formerly called Turks). See Всесоюзная перепись населения 1926г, (Census of the Population in 1926), Vol. 14 (Moscow: CSU Publishing 1929), pp. 8, 13 (in Russian). 12 Mkrtumyan et al., National Minorities, p. 151. 13 Mkrtumyan et al., National Minorities, pp. 160–161. 24 sevak karamyan

national identity of the people of Armenia. Freedom of activities for all religious organizations in accordance with the law shall be guaranteed in the Republic of Armenia. The relations of the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church shall be regulated by law.14 In 1991, a law was adopted to protect Freedom of Conscience and Regulate Religious Organizations (amendments and additions were made to it in 1997 and 2001). This law guarantees the equality and freedom of religious organisations, and defines the process for their registration.15 Before becoming a member of the Council of Europe in 2001, Armenia had already signed and ratified the Framework Con- vention for the Protection of National Minorities, which guarantees such freedoms. In practice, the Armenian Apostolic Church has some privileges. It has its own television channel, and the History of the Armenian Church is a mandatory subject in Armenian secondary schools. A picture of the Catholicos (Patriarch) of All Armenians is required to be hung in schools, along with other national symbols such as the flag and coat of arms. There is a Council of National Minorities under the President of Armenia, coordinated by one of the advisors to the President. The council is comprised of the representatives of the main minorities and their organisations in Armenia, but does not include any religious organisations. There is a Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs in the Government of Armenia (headed by Vardan Ascatryan, tel: +37410 51 57 40), which deals with issues concerning minorities and religions and provides recommendations and expert evaluations regarding the registration of religious organisations. There is no law, or any other legal framework, that applies specifically to Islam. Muslim monuments are included in the list of sites of historic and architectural value that are protected and maintained by the state.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There are no officially registered Muslim organisations in Armenia, but there are organisations that carry out religious activities. The main organisation in Armenia is the Cultural Centre of the Embassy of the

14 The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, Article 8.1, http://www.president .am/library/constitution/eng/?pn=1, accessed 10 October 2010. 15 www.parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=2041&lang=eng, accessed 10 October 2010. armenia 25

Islamic Republic of Iran (14, Baghramyan 2nd lay, tel: +37410 229053, +37410 229054, fax: +37410 269160, http://yerevan.icro.ir). The Centre is a branch of the Iran-based Islamic Culture and Relations Organisa- tion (www.icro.ir) and was established in 1999. The head of the Centre is Mohammad Shakiba who is also the cultural attaché of the Iranian Embassy in Armenia. The activities of the Centre include free Persian language courses, translation of Persian and Islamic literature into Armenian (in 2006, the Qu’ran was published in Armenian), as well as exhibitions and conferences. There are also a variety of organisations attached to Muslim ethnic groups which do not have any religious activities. They are: The Asso- ciation of Iranian Students (12, Mashtoc Ave., Yerevan, tel: +37410 525730); The National Kurdish Council (Hatis Str., Cinema building, Abovyan, tel: +374222 2 04 56); Kurdistan Committee (62/19, Terian Str., Yerevan, tel: +37410 582 207); The Kurdish Council of Intellectu- als (2, Arshakuniats Ave., 12th floor, Yerevan, tel: +37410 529 612). The activities of these Kurdish organisations mainly focus on the issues of language, culture, and traditions, but not religious affairs. There are no Muslim political parties or political organisations in Armenia.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There is a Shi’a mosque in the centre of Yerevan called the Blue Mosque (founded in 1798). There is no permanent imam and nor are there regular calls to prayer, although an imam comes from Iran and provides services during religious festivals. In the absence of an imam, the most educated individuals in the congregation perform the functions of imam. Apart from this mosque, Muslims use two unofficial places of worship, one of which is located in a room in the dormi- tory of Yerevan State Medical University (10, Davit Anhakht, Yerevan) and the other one is in Nor Nork Student campus (12/6, Moldovakan str., Nor Nork, Yerevan). These locations are more convenient for the mainly Sunni students. The role of the imam there is performed by one of the Muslim students who know the Qur’an well.

5 Children’s Education

The only school that provides optional Islamic education is the Iranian School of the Islamic Republic of Iran Embassy in Yerevan (8, Lvovyan str., tel: +37410 633718). Besides the children of the diplomatic staff, 26 sevak karamyan the school is attended also by the children of Iranian residents. The staff of the school are mainly from Iran and are of both Persian and Armenian origin. The school operates at kindergarten, primary and secondary levels.

6 Higher and Professional Education

More than 30 academic courses on Islam are offered at the Yerevan State University (YSU) within the departments of Arabic, Turkish and Persian Studies (Faculty of Oriental Studies), including BA, MA and PhD programmes. The YSU is developing relations with similar departments at universities in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iran, UAE and other countries. Each year more than 40 students from the YSU spend one year at universities in these countries. The faculty has offered a Masters in Islamic Studies since 2005. There are many Muslim students at Yerevan State Medical Univer- sity from Arab countries, India and Iran. The international University ‘Aria’ in Yerevan is accredited by the Iranian State University Payame Nor (www.pnu.ac.ir) and specialists from Iran teach some courses there. There is no institution for imam training in Armenia.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There are some Azerbaijani and Kurdish cemeteries, particularly in the regions of Masis, Ararat Marz, and in the villages where Azerbai- janis and Kurds used to live in the greatest concentrations. There is a medieval Turkoman mausoleum in the village of Argavand (Armavir Marz) built by Kara Koyunlu Emir Sadayi and dating back to 1413. The majority of Muslims living in Armenia on a non-permanent basis usually send the bodies of deceased relatives to their homelands for burial.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the Armenian armed forces or any other state institutions such as hospitals, schools, prisons, etc. armenia 27

9 Religious Festivals

No Muslim festivals are incorporated into the official calendar of the Republic of Armenia. The Iranian community celebrates Ramadan and the main Shi’i events, such as Muharram. An imam comes from Iran and provides the services for these celebrations. The communities of Muslims from the Middle East and India, mainly consisting of students, organise their celebrations in their dormitories.

10 Halal Food

There are at least two halal butchers in Yerevan. One is located in an agricultural market; the second offers halal meat at the Blue Mosque once a week. Muslim students report that many of them receive food from home. Frozen halal meat and other halal foods are also available in most supermarkets as well as in some smaller shops in Yerevan and other cities. There are also numerous restaurants in Yerevan and in other cities where the cooks come from Iran or Arab countries and offer a wide range of traditional Muslim dishes.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public. In the streets of Yerevan as well as the regions bordering with Iran, the hijab and other Muslim dress elements can be seen very occasionally; they are mainly worn by students, tourists, or employees (and their family members) of diplomatic missions from Muslim countries.

12 Publications and Media

There are at least two magazines,Mihr and Parsian, published by the Iranian Cultural Centre. They are not officially religious, but are rich in Islamic content. The former is published twice a month, the latter once a month and both are published in Persian and Armenian. The Centre also posts its information on its website (http://yerevan.icro.ir). The Centre has published a number of books and brochures with religious content. In 2006 the Qur’an was published in Armenian (Hay- astan Press). There are two Kurdish tabloids,Ria Taza (in Kurdish) 28 sevak karamyan and Zagros (mainly in Armenian with one or two pages in Kurdish), which have no religious content. Apart from the newspapers, there is a 30-minute daily radio programme in Kurdish on public radio, but it too is without any religious content.

13 Family Law

Armenian legislation does not recognise religious marriages, including those contracted at the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church; nor does it recognise religious documents pertaining to such marriages or divorces. Only civil marriages are recognised by the state.

14 Interreligious Relations

There are no interreligious councils in Armenia; nor are there are interreligious events with the participation of representatives of different religions, including Islam. There is a body called Interreli- gious Council of CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) which includes the heads of the main Christian, Muslim, Judaic, and Buddhist denominations in the member states of the CIS (8/29, Michurinskiy Prospekt, Hotel Universitetskaya, Moscow,117192, The Russian Fed- eration, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/54211.html). The Council periodically convenes its meetings with participation of the heads of the aforementioned denominations.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The local media very rarely cover issues concerning Muslims living in Armenia. However, the coverage of the situation in Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as the conflicts in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq, is considerable. From time to time, the media publish speeches made by ambassadors of Muslim countries in Armenia, as well as reports from the Muslim countries with Armenian communities. The media become particularly active at the time of official visits by leaders from Muslim countries. If a leader of a Muslim country does not visit the Armenian Genocide memorial in Yerevan, the media and the public discourse often interpret it as a sign of the solidarity of that particular leader and his country with Turkey. armenia 29

16 Major Cultural Events

The Iranian Cultural Centre occasionally organizes sports events and other social activities such as conferences, exhibitions and debates. An Iranian cultural week was held 1–11 December 2009. It consisted of exhibition of Iranian culture and civilization, a book exhibition, performances of traditional music, theatre productions and film show- ings. There were also some programs for discussion of religious topics and the two countries’ shared moral values.16 The Kurdish community celebratesnawruz on 21 March. Numer- ous performances of music and dance are staged during the celebration and the events are attended by many guests. In 2010 more than 17,000 Iranians17 came to Armenia to celebrate nawruz, a number which has been growing annually.

16 http://en.icro.ir/index.aspx?siteid=257&pageid=11747&newsview=542682, accessed 20 November 2009. 17 http://www.a1plus.am/am/social/2011/03/18/novruz, accessed 28 March 2011.

AUSTRIA

Thomas Schmidinger1

1 Muslim Populations

The history of Muslims living in the later Habsburg territories pre- dates the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into the region. Smail Balić argued that together with the Hungarian establishment in the Pannonian plains in 895, Nomads of Asian origin, who were followers of Islam, entered the region.2 Hungarian documents write about izmaeliták and böszörmények as Muslims in Hungary. It is possible that some of these Muslim groups conserved their religious identity until the Ottoman conquest in the 16th century. However, with the conquest of the region by Austria in the late 17th century almost all Muslims were deported. But with the treaty of Passarowitz (16 August 1718) subjects of the Ottoman Empire were permitted to settle in the Empire, although it was mostly Jews and Armenians who settled in cities like Vienna and Budapest. The largest number of Muslims came under Austrian control after the former Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied by Austrian troops in 1878. Despite the fact that many Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina fled to the Ottoman Empire, the majority stayed within the region and became Austrian subjects after the annexation of the territory in 1908. But after the collapse of the monarchy in the First World War, these territories were lost and only small groups of Muslims stayed within the borders of the new republic of Austria. Only a few private associations like the Orientbund or the Islamischer Kulturbund, led by Umar Rolf von Ehrenfels continued the work of an organised Muslim community. After the Anschluß (the annexation of Austria to Nazi-Germany) Ehrenfels, who was in opposition to the Nazis, had to

1 Thomas Schmidinger is lecturer at the Institute of Political Science at the Univer- sity of Vienna and Research Fellow at the University of Minnesota (US). 2 Balić, S., “Zur Geschichte der Muslime in Österreich I, Lebensräume und Konf- liktfelder”, in S. Heine (ed.), Islam zwischen Selbstbild und Klischee. Eine Religion im österreichischen Schulbuch (Vienna: Böhlau, 1995), pp. 23–35. 32 thomas schmidinger emigrate and his association dissolved.3 But in 1943 another Muslim association was founded under Salih Hadžialić and with the patronage of the regime.4 After World War II some Muslim collaborators of the Nazis, predominately of Bosnian and Soviet origin, were stranded in the Ameri- can zone of occupation in Salzburg. That was one of the reasons why Salzburg became a centre of Muslim activism after 1945. A bigger number of Muslims immigrated from the 1960s on, when agreements for labour immigrants (‘Gastarbeiter’) were signed with Turkey (1964) and Yugoslavia (1966). But Austria also received refugees from Islamic countries like Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and, in the 1990s, from Kosovo and Albania. In addition, Muslim diplomats lived in Vienna, where the UN, OPEC and other international organizations have offices. However the biggest Muslim populations in Austria are of Turkish, Bosnian and Albanian origin. A new assessment based on the census of 2001 suggests that in 2009 there was slightly more than 500,000 Muslims in Austria, making approx. 6% of the total population.5 Due to naturalisation, 49% of the Muslim population were Austrians in 2009; 21% were Turkish nationals; 10% had a passport from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7% were from Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo and 4% from the Russian Federation and 3% from Macedonia.6 Most of the latter were in fact Chechens who are one of the biggest groups of refugees in the last decade. But not all of these 500,000 Muslims are religious and this number contains all Islamic groups, including heterodox groups like the Alevis. The majority of these Muslims live in Vienna and other bigger cities, but also rural regions with a history of labour immigration in Vorarlberg, Lower and Upper Austria.

3 Krammel, G. / Abdelkarim, A., “Die Geschichte des Islam in Österreich”, in Schmidinger, T. / Larise, D. (eds.), Zwischen Gottesstaat und Demokratie, Handbuch des politischen Islam (Vienna: Deuticke, 2008), pp. 47–58. 4 Pritz, O., “Vom Moslemischen Sozialdienst zur islamischen Glaubensgemein- schaft”, (Disseration, Universität Wien, 2006), p. 88. 5 Marik-Lebek, Stephan, ‘Die muslimische Bevölkerung Österreichs: Bestand und Veränderung 2001–2009’ (The Muslim population of Austria: state and changes 2001– 2009), in Jane, Alexander and Mathias Vogl (eds.), Islam in Österreich (Islam in Aus- tria), Vienna: Österreichischer Integrationsfonds, 2010, pp. 5–9 (5). 6 http://www.integrationsfonds.at/wissen/publikationen/islam_in_oesterreich/ #c6384, accessed 31 March 2011. austria 33

2 Islam and the State

The Staatsgrundgesetz (Basic Law of the State) of 1867 (art. 14, 15, 17) for the Austrian half of the Empire (Cisleithania) already guaranteed freedom of religion. The law concerning the recognition of religion of 1874, RGBl Nr 68, also gave non-Christian religions a legal framework to be recognised as Cultusgemeinden (faith communities). The law does not mention Islam or any other specific religion, but it gives the legal ground for the recognition of religions including Islam.7 The Islamgesetz of 1912 then officially recognised adherents of Islam, more precisely of the ‘Hanafite rite’ as a recognised religious community.8 Today Austria is a secular republic, but it still gives officially recognised religious communities certain privileges like the possibility to offer religious education in schools or to collect funds from their members. These privileges in general reproduce the concordat Austria signed with the Vatican in 1933. The rights guaranteed to the Roman-Catholic church by the authoritarian regime of Engelbert Dollfuß are still the model for the rights of other officially recognised religions. Other recognised Christian churches, the ‘Hanafite’ Muslim, the Buddhist and the Jewish communities share the same rights. Besides these officially recognised religious communities ( gesetzlich anerkannte Kirchen und Religionsgesellschaften), smaller groups are also officially recognised as religiöse Bekenntnisgemeinschaften with less privileges then the big Glaubensgemeinschaften. The former status can also be the preliminary stage towards the latter. In 1979 the Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGiÖ, Islamic Religious Community in Austria, www.derislam.at, Bern- hardgasse 5, 1070 Wien) was recognised by the bureau of religions (Kultusamt) of the Austrian Ministry of Culture and education as the official representative of all Muslims in Austria on the base of the law concerning the recognition of religion of 1874 and the Islamgesetz of 1912. Officially they represent all Muslims of Austria, but in reality they have a very limited number of members who are voluntarily paying their membership fees and who are participating in elections. In 2010 the IGGiÖ tried to recruit new members before their new elections. In

7 Gesetz vom 20. Mai 1874, betreffend die gesetzliche Anerkennung von Religion- sgesellschaften. StF: RGBl. Nr. 68/1874. 8 Gesetz, betreffend die Anerkennung der Anhänger des Islams nach hanefitischem Ritus als Religionsgesellschaft. StF: RGBl. Nr. 159/1912. 34 thomas schmidinger

November 2010 IGGiÖ President Schakfeh announced that the IGGiÖ managed to get 45,822 members, but only 15,803 would be entitled to vote.9 The rest are either younger than 14, did not pay the membership fee or had not been living in its territory for at least one year. That means that about 3% of the Austrian Muslims are eligible to vote for the coming elections of the IGGiÖ. Heterodox groups like the Alevis have been trying for years to get recognised as an official religious community. The president of the IGGiÖ has always refused to accept them as Muslims.10 After a long legal dispute, where two different groups of Alevis tried to get the official recognition to establish an independent state-recognised religious community, one of these two groups succeeded in December 2010 and now has the status of Religiöse Bekenntnisgemeinschaft.11 This was made possible by a decision of the Austrian constitutional court that saw the decision of the Kultusamt of the Austrian Ministry of Culture and Education to accept only one Islamic community in Austria (the IGGiÖ) as a violation of religious freedom on 1 December 2010.12 That decision could have a strong impact on the status of the IGGiÖ as well, because the constitutional court regarded the denial of recognition of the Islamisch-alevitische Glaubensgemeinschaft as a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and concluded that Article I and § 1 of the Islamgesetz cannot be interpreted in a way that the Austrian law only accepts one officially recognized Islamic religious community. Time will tell what that means for the claim to sole representation of all Muslims by the IGGiÖ and other Islamic communities who could try to get official recognition. In December 2010 further Islamic groups, including a Shi’ite group requested official recognition. TheKultusamt has to decide on these requests within six months after their application. Many Shi’ites and even large number of non-Arab Sunnis do not feel represented by the IGGiÖ. Many of them are organised in other

9 http://www.wienerzeitung.at/DesktopDefault.aspx?TabID=3941&Alias=WZO&c ob=526141, accessed 9 November 2010. 10 See many statements of IGGiÖ-president Anas Schakfeh to the press or this report about a discussion with him: http://www.dasbiber.at/content/minarett-diskussion %3A-shakfeh-distanziert-sich-erneut-von-aleviten, accessed 20 September 2010. 11 http://www.wienerzeitung.at/default.aspx?TabID=5127&Alias=wzo&cob=532648, accessed 24 December 2010. 12 Entscheidung des Verfassungsgerichtshofs B 1214/09–35 on the 1st of December 2010. austria 35

Muslim organisations and even more of them are not members of any Muslim association. Regardless of discussions about representativeness, the IGGiÖ remains for the time being approved as the single official body that represents all Muslims under Austrian law. Until now the IGGiÖ is solely responsible for Muslim religious education in schools. Alevi associations are appealing to be recognised as independent official religious communities, but these legal procedures have now been underway since 2009. Also the Initiative Liberaler Muslime in Österreich, ILMÖ, a small group of liberal Sunni and Shi’ite Mus- lims have announced that they want to establish a separate officially recognised Muslim community.13

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Alongside with the official IGGiÖ there are large numbers of other Muslim organizations in Austria. Some of them cooperate in different ways with the IGGiÖ, some do not. The IGGiÖ adopted a new constitution in 2010. The long-postponed elections for the Shura Council of the IGGiÖ are now announced for 2010/2011 and should result in a new Shura Council and a new president in summer 2011. The new constitution expands the number of the regional religious communities from four to nine, one for each federal state.14 The IGGiÖ has also a youth organisation, the Musli- mische Jugend Österreichs (MJÖ). Most of the other Muslim organisations are based on the ethnic background of Muslim immigrants. Many also have specific political affiliations. The Austrian Islamic Federation (Österreichische Islamische Föderation, Avusturya Islam Federasyonu, AİF), with its stronghold in Vienna (Rauchfangkehrergasse 36, 1150 Wien, http://www.ifwien .at), is the Austrian section of the Milli Görüş Movement and runs 33 prayer rooms in Vienna, Upper- and Lower Austria, Salzburg, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Styria and Carinthia.15 It cooperates with the IGGiÖ and some of its functionaries also have functions within the IGGiÖ.

13 http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/oesterreich/608350/Liberale-wollen-eigene- Glaubensgemeinschaft, accessed 8 November 2010. 14 http://www.derislam.at/haber.php?sid=169&mode=flat&order=1, accessed 20 Sep- tember 2010. 15 Schmidinger, T. / Larise, D., “Zwischen Gottesstaat und Demokratie. Handbuch des politischen Islam,” Vienna: Deuticke, 2008, p. 157. 36 thomas schmidinger

The AİF is one of the strongest Muslim organisations in Austria and runs Qur’an classes as well as many specialised organisations for students, women, workers or entrepreneurs. Members of the AİF run for local elections in Lower Austria under the name of the Liste für unser Niederösterreich (‘Our Lower Austria List’) and were elected for the labour council under the name Bündnis Mosaik. Another big Muslim organisation that cooperates with the IGGiÖ is the Union islamischer Kulturzentren, Avusturya İslam Kültür Merkezleri Birliği (Pelzgasse 9, 1150 Wien, http://www.uikz.org) affiliated to the Turkish Sufi tariqa of the Suleymancılar. It runs 26 prayer rooms in Vienna, Upper and Lower Austria, Styria and Burgenland.16 In the west of Austria they are active under the name Vereinigung islamischer Kulturzentren im Österreichischen Alpenraum with 19 prayer rooms in Vorarlberg, Tyrol, Salzburg and Carinthia.17 Since 1980 the Turkish Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Diyanet) has been sending imams and religious teachers to Austria.18 It runs a Federation of Turkish Sunni prayer rooms, called Türkisch-Islamische Union für kulturelle und soziale Zusammenarbeit, Avusturya Türk Islam Birligi, ATİB (Sonnleithnergasse 20, 1100 Wien, http://www.atib.at). ATİB is the biggest Muslim organisation with 62 prayer rooms all over Aus- tria.19 ATİB did not cooperate with the IGGiÖ but announced that it will take part in the new elections in 2010/11. The Turkish extreme nationalist political party Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP (Party of the nationalist movement) also has a union of cultural clubs that include prayer rooms. The same is the case for the even more extremist MHP- splinter party Büyük Birlik Partisi, BBP (Great Union Party). The fastest growing groups of Turkish Muslims are the organisations affiliated with Fethullah Gülen and his movement. Many of these organisations are active in education, but they have not yet established an umbrella organisation. There are also some other smaller Turkish Muslim associations of different political, regional or religious affiliation. In Vienna, Graz, Linz and Salzburg there are different Muslim organisations of Arab origin, some of them affiliated with different currents

16 http://www.uikz.org/, accessed 20 September 2010. 17 Schmidinger, T. / Larise, D., “Zwischen Gottesstaat und Demokratie. Handbuch des politischen Islam,” Vienna: Deuticke, 2008, p. 167. 18 Strobl, A., “Der österreichische Islam. Entwicklung, Tendenzen und Möglich- keiten”, SWS-Rundschau Nr. 4/2005: 520–543, p. 530. 19 http://deutsch.atib.at/?q=node/7, accessed 20 September 2010. austria 37 of the Muslim Brotherhood. The biggest of these organisations is the Liga Kultur with five prayer rooms. The Initiative Muslimischer Öster- reicherInnen, IMÖ (http://www.islaminitiative.at) is also dominated by Arab Muslims and their Austrian wives. The IMÖ is very connected to the IGGiÖ. Most functionaries of the IMÖ are also in leading positions of the IGGiÖ. There is also a big Bosnian Muslim Federation, the Islamska Zajednica Bošnjaka u Austriji (http://www.izb-dachverband .com) that is affiliated with the Bosnian Islamic Community. It runs 23 prayer rooms all over Austria. The Union of Albanian Muslims runs 12 prayer rooms. In Vienna, Pakistani, African, Afghan and Chechen Muslim organisations with their own prayer rooms also exist. Recently some small organisations were also founded who openly criticize the IGGiÖ and the conservative Islamic organisations. The Islamisches Informations- und Dokumentationszentrum, IIDZ (http:// www.iidz.at) and the Initiative Liberaler Muslime in Österreich, ILMÖ (http://www.initiativeliberalermuslime.org) predominately attack the leadership of the IGGiÖ for being undemocratic and extremist. The Forum für progressiven Islam (www.fei.or.at) tries to promote progressive thinking in Islam. Most Alevi associations are represented by the Föderation der Alev- iten Gemeinden in Österreich, Avusturya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu, AABF (Schererstraße 14, 1210 Wien, http://www.aleviten.or.at) but there are also rival Alevi organisations of Kurdish origin or with an affiliation to the pro-governmental TurkishCem Vakfı. Most Shi’ite associations are represented by the Islamische Vereinigung Ahl- ul-Bayt Österreich, Verband der schiitischen Vereine. Seven Shi’ite prayer rooms are affiliated with this association that unites pro-Iranian as well as other Shi’ite groups. In Vienna there is also a small community of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat (http://www.ahmadiyya.at).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are five mosques with minarets in Austria (Vienna, 21st district; Telfs and Innsbruck, Tyrol; Saalfelden, Salzburg and Bad Vöslau, NÖ). The approximate number of prayer rooms is 250–260 spread throughout Austria, most of them in private flats often combined with shops or a tea room. The mosque in Vienna, with a 32m high minaret, was opened in 1979 and predominantly financed by the king of Saudi Arabia. Recently the construction of minarets has become a heavily 38 thomas schmidinger disputed topic in Austrian public discourse. In two federal states (Car- inthia and Vorarlberg) the building regulations were changed in a way to make the erection of minarets impossible. Although the building of minarets was not explicitly prohibited, these laws were often described in public discussion as ‘anti-minaret’ laws.

5 Children’s Education

As with other officially recognised religious communities the state funds Islamic religious education in schools. This has been the case since 1982/83. According to the IGGiÖ, there are now 350 teachers teaching about 40,000 children in 2,700 schools.20 Additional to this Islamic religious education in public schools, there are six private Islamic schools in Vienna.21 Teachers have been able to study at the Private Academy for Islamic Education (IRPA, Islamische Religion- spädagogische Akademie), run by the IGGiÖ since 1998, but many also became teachers by passing a written and oral examination under the commission appointed by the Supreme Council of the IGGiÖ without completing a formal education. In January 2009 a study by the Islamic theologian and sociologist Mouhanad Khorchide demonstrated problems with the attitudes of some of the Islamic religion teachers in public schools. For example 21.9% of Khorchide’s sample agreed that they object to democracy because it would be un-Islamic.22 A passage in a school book with an illustration that called for jihad became the subject of public debate. After a controversial debate and public pressure on the IGGiÖ, Anas Schakfeh signed a five-point agreement with the ministry of education to improve religious education in schools. New curricula and new schoolbooks are supposed be developed within a year. In new employment contracts teachers have to sign a commitment to democracy.23 The controversy about religious education run by the IGGiÖ still

20 http://www.derislam.at/islam.php?name=Themen&pa=showpage&pid=154, accessed 20 September 2010. 21 For additional information about Islamic education in Austria see: Aslan, E.: “Isla- mische Erziehung in Europa. Islamic Education in Europe,” Wien: Böhlau, 2009. 22 Khorchide, M., “Der islamische Religionsunterricht zwischen Integration und Parallelgesellschaft. Einstellungen der islamischen ReligionslehrerInnen an öffentli- chen Schulen” (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschafte, 2009), p. 135. 23 http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/religion/449134/index.do, accessed 20 Sep- tember 2010. austria 39

continues, because of the attacks of IGGiÖ officials against Khorchide and the suspension of Aly El Ghoubashy, a religion teacher from Feld- kirch (Vorarlberg) who criticised the leadership of the IGGiÖ for its ‘weak training’ for religion teachers.24 In September 2010 Der Standard reported that most of the projects of the five-point agreement between IGGiÖ and the Ministry of education had not been realised more than one and a half years later.25

6 Higher and Professional Education

Since 2006, the University of Vienna has offered a Masters in Islamic Religious Pedagogy (IRP).26 This degree is the qualification for teaching Islamic religious education in high schools. Since 2010 the Uni- versity of Vienna also offers a two semester course ‘Islam in Europe’ as an advanced training for imams.27

7 Burial and Cemeteries

In the Zentralfriedhof in Vienna there are three sections reserved for Muslims, an old and a new general Muslim section and one for Egyp- tian Muslims. Also in Graz, Linz and some other larger cities there are Muslim sections of public cemeteries. In 2009 a denominational Islamic cemetery of the IGGiÖ in the 23rd district of Vienna was opened. A second Islamic cemetery will be opened in 2011 in the village of Altach for the Muslims in Vorarlberg. This Islamic cemetery is not operated by the IGGiÖ like the one in Vienna, but by the municipalities of Vorarlberg in cooperation with an umbrella organisation of different Muslim organisations, including Alevis, meaning that the cemetery is also for Alevis. A high number of Muslim families still return the bodies of their dead to their former homeland, but the number of burials in Austria is increasing.

24 http://derstandard.at/1234507814198/Islamunterricht-Lernen-fuer-das-Leben- in-der-Isolation, accessed 20 September 2010. 25 http://derstandard.at/1284594477265/Nach-Wirbel-im-Vorjahr-Islamischer- Religionsunterricht-Alles-beim-Alten, accessed 20 September 2010. 26 http://islamische-religionspaedagogik.univie.ac.at/, accessed 20 September 2010. 27 http://mie.univie.ac.at, accessed 20 September 2010. 40 thomas schmidinger

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Islamic chaplaincy service is provided in hospitals, military and prisons. The chaplains are selected by the Supreme Council of the IGGiÖ. There has been a Muslim prayer room in the Maria Theresien barracks in Vienna since 2004.28 Since 2000 the Islamic visit and chaplaincy service (Islamischer Besuchs- und Seelsorgedienst) runs the chaplaincy in hospitals for the IGGiÖ in Vienna. Chaplaincy in prisons was done by different Muslim organisations in different federal states until 2010. In January 2010 the Ministry of Justice signed a contract with the IGGiÖ for future organisation of chaplaincy in prisons that to be run by the IGGiÖ.29

9 Religious Festivals

Religious festivals of Islam have no legal status in Austria, but Muslims have the right to take a day off work for high religious festivals. The same is the case for Muslim school pupils.

10 Halal Food

In the cities there are a lot of Turkish, Kurdish, Arab and Iranian stores and restaurants where halal food is available. Ritual slaughter is legally guaranteed as part of the freedom of religion and thus comes under Article 14 StGG, article 63, paragraph 2 Staatsvertrag of St. Germain and article 9, paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

11 Dress Codes

There are no regulations that prohibit Muslims from wearing the Islamic headscarf in public places (schools, hospitals, etc.) or in

28 http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/351965/index.do?direct=351928 &_vl_backlink=/home/politik/innenpolitik/351928/index.do&selChannel=, accessed 20 September 2010. 29 http://www.derislam.at/haber.php?sid=174&mode=flat&order=1, accessed 20 Sep- bember 2010. austria 41 employment or public services. But there was a court decision that a female defendant in a court case against two Islamic extremists was not allowed to wear the niqab.30 In 2010 the Medical University of Graz banned students from wearing the niqab at exams.31 Other forms of the scarf that show the face are not prohibited. In 2009 and 2010 there were public debates on banning the “burka”—a term often erro- neously used in the media for the hijab or the niqab.

12 Publication and Media

There is currently no Islamic newspaper in German in Austria, but there are several weekly and monthly Turkish newspapers which focus on Turks living in Austria and discuss Austrian affairs as well as global events. Some of these newspapers, like Zaman Avusturya or Pusula are affiliated to Islamic networks close to the Turkish AKP or to Milli Görüş and the Saadet Partisi. Beside Turkish, there are also a few newspapers in some other languages of Muslim immigrants like Bos- niak, Kurdish and Russian. But many of them are completely secular and are not declared Muslim newspapers. Like other official religious communities, Muslims have short TV programmes at the official Austrian TV station ORF. One is called Die Stimme des Islam (The Voice of Islam). During Ramadan or other important religious festivals these programmes explain the religious background of the Muslim religious traditions. Islam also plays some role in other TV programmes about religion and about migration such as Orientierung, Kreuz und Quer, or Heimat, fremde Heimat. In recent years a large number of different Islamic websites appeared in the Internet.

13 Family Law

Family law is not considered to be the responsibility of religious communities, but of the state. Austrian Muslims have to follow the same

30 Penz, E. / Prack, G. / Schmidinger, T. / Wittek, T., “Dies ist kein Gottesstaat. Ter- rorismus und Rechtsstaat am Beispiel des Prozesses gegen Mohamed M. und Mona S.”, Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 2008. 31 http://derstandard.at/1285199558957/Med-Uni-Graz-regelt-Studienbedingungen- fuer-Schleiertraegerinnen, accessed 29 September 2010. 42 thomas schmidinger laws as any other Austrian. Polygamy and forced marriage are illegal and the unilateral repudiation of a woman (talaq) is not recognised. Muslims can conduct marriage ceremonies in prayer rooms or mosques, but this is not considered legally binding.

14 Interreligious Relations

There are various interreligious events at local, regional and national levels. Muslims are invited by churches and NGOs for interreligious discussions. Muslims participate in TV debates and organise public iftars during Ramadan. On the national level, the IGGiÖ also partici- pates in political debates concerning integration, migration and political Islam. Muslim critics of the IGGiÖ also take part in these debates. In 2008 the IGGiÖ participated in the so called Integrationsplattform of the Austrian government. Together with the Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant churches and the Jewish Community it issued a paper of the religious communities concerning integration.32 Interreligious relations between Muslims and Christians are generally relaxed, but there were some conflicts around an anti-Islamic statement of the Bishop of Feldkirch in 2008.33 Although the official representatives of the IGGiÖ and the Jewish Community highlight their good relation, the Middle East conflict sometimes overshadows Muslim-Jewish relations. In June 2010 a fierce argument took place between the president of the IGGiÖ Anas Schakfeh and the president of the Jewish Com- munity (IKG) Ariel Muzicant about the involvement of the IGGiÖ and other Muslim organizations in pro-Hamas demonstrations after the Mavi Marmara incident in the Mediterranean close to Gaza, followed by attacks on religious Jews in Vienna.34 But beyond the official religious communities, there are also attempts to work for a better interreligious understanding of Muslims and Jews. In August 2010 a Muslim-Jewish conference, organized by Jewish and Muslim students took place at the University of Vienna.35

32 http://religion.orf.at/projekt03/news/0805/ne080530_integration_fr.htm, accessed 20 September 2010. 33 http://oesterreich.orf.at/vorarlberg/stories/264428/, accessed 20 September 2010. 34 http://www.wienerzeitung.at/DesktopDefault.aspx?TabID=3941&Alias=wzo&cob= 501441, accessed 20 September 2010. 35 http://www.mjconference.org/, accessed 20 September 2010. austria 43

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Recent election campaigns of the extreme-right-wing Austrian Free- dom Party (FPÖ) have been explicitly directed against Muslims. For the elections of the regional parliament in the federal state of Styria in September 2010, the FPÖ issued a computer game, where muezzins could be shot. The public prosecutor’s office announced that there are investigations taking place against the regional leader of the FPÖ for vilification of religious beliefs Herabwürdigung( religiöser Lehren) according to § 188 StGB and incitement to violence (Verhetzung) according § 283 StGB.36 Plans to expand an existing prayer house in Vienna have been met with aggressive protests by a citizens’ initiative37 that were supported by the FPÖ and other extreme right wing groups. Also, in Linz a right wing citizen’s initiative is fighting plans to build a local mosque. On the other side, leftist and liberal groups support Muslim activists. In April 2011 some citizens’ initiatives against local mosques established a new anti-Islamic political movement called Bewegung Pro Österreich, BPÖ (Movement for Austria). Islam and problems of Muslim immigrants are heavily debated in newspapers and other media. In a disputed opinion survey published in April 2010 54% of Austri- ans saw Islam as threat, while 71% agreed that “Islam is not compatible with western conceptions of democracy, freedom and tolerance”.38

16 Major Cultural Events

There are no specific Austrian Muslim events, but general Muslim festivals are also celebrated. Some of them, like iftar during Ramadan are also sometimes celebrated in public.

36 http://www.oe24.at/oesterreich/politik/Ermittlungen-gegen-FPOe-Kurzmann/ 1699856, accessed 20 September 2010. 37 http://www.moschee-ade.at/, accessed 20 September 2010. 38 “Der Islam in den Augen der Bevölkerung”, IMAS International Report, Nr. 6, www.imas.at, accessed April 2010.

AZERBAIJAN

Bayram Balci 1 and Altay Goyushov 2

1 Muslim Populations

Azerbaijan is a secular country with an overwhelmingly ethnic Mus- lim population. Roughly 96%3 of Azerbaijan’s 9 million4 inhabitants are estimated to have a Muslim background. A large majority is still strongly attached to their Islamic identity and considers it as an inex- tricable part of their self-image. While no accurate data is available on the exact number of men and women who regularly practice religious rites, the practicing segment of the population is much smaller than the number of nominal Muslims. The most recent U.S. Department of State’s annual International Religious Freedom Report says that “Among the Muslim majority, religious observance is relatively low, and Muslim identity tends to be based more on culture and ethnicity than religion; however, there has been a gradual growth in the number of observant Muslims.”5 According to a Gallup poll conducted in 2009, Azerbaijan is one of the least religious countries in the world and only 21% of Azerbaijanis consider religion as an important part of

1 Bayram Balci is Senior Research Assistant in Centre National de la Recher- che Scientifique, Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI: www .ceri-sciences-po.org), he was Director of the Institut Français d’Etudes sur l’Asie Cen- trale, (IFEAC) in Tashkent and Research Assistant in Institut Français d’Etudes Ana- toliennes in Baku between 2003 and 2006. He holds degrees in Political Science and Arab-Islamic Civilization (Sciences Po Grenoble and Aix en Provence) and a PhD in Political Science for a dissertation about Turkish missionaries in Central Asia. 2 Altay Goyushov is a Professor at the Department of Turkic and Caucasus People’s History of Baku State University and currently Visiting Professor at University Cali- fornia, Los Angeles (UCLA). He has a Ph.D. in History of Islam from the Baku State University, Azerbaijan. For the last decade his research interests have been focused mainly on the issues related to National Independence Movements, Political Islam and Islamic Education in the Volga basin, Crimea, Caucasus and Central Asia. 3 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom, US Department of State, Azerbaijan, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148912.htm, accessed 18 November 2010. 4 http://www.news.az/articles/6661, accessed 18 November 2010. 5 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom, US Department of State, Azerbaijan http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148912.htm, accessed 18 November 2010. 46 bayram balci and altay goyushov daily life.6 Some sources say that less than 15% of Muslim Azerbaijanis perform prayers on a daily basis.7 Exceptions are the Ramadan and Muharram months of the Muslim calendar, when the number of active worshippers has been visibly increasing in the years since the country’s independence in 1991, particularly among younger generations. Since the mid-7th century CE the territory of modern Azerbaijan north of Araxes River has been included within the boundaries of the Caliphate. It took almost two hundred years for Islam to finally become the undisputed dominant religion, adopted by the vast majority of the local population along with the ruling elites. In the 11th century CE Azerbaijan fell under the rule of Muslim Seljuk Turks. Migration from Central Asia triggered a major shift in the ethnic composition of the inhabitants populating Azerbaijan by making Turkic-Oghuz tribes its prevailing constituent, although significant populations of ethnic minorities remain. According to the last Census Azerbaijanis of Turkic origin comprise the overwhelming majority of the local population with a nearly 90% share. The other ethnic groups of Muslim background are Sunni Lezgins (2.2%), Avars (0.6%), Tsakhurs (0.1%), and Rutuls (0.1%) who mainly live along the Russian border in the northern Gusar-Xachmaz and Zagatala-Balaken regions of Azerbaijan. Mainly Shi’i Tats (0.1%) are another ethnic minority group who popu- late the northern Baku, Xizi, Devechi, Guba, and Ismayilli regions. Ethnic minorities of Muslim background also include Shi’i Talyshes (1%) who live along the Iranian border in the southern regions of the republic.8 During the reign of the Safavid dynasty (1501–1732) mainstream Shi‘ism (Twelver) gradually became the leading religious branch of Islam in Azerbaijan. Since then Shi’is have been dominant in the regions of Nakhichevan, Qarabakh, Apsheron, Ganja, Mil, Mugan and Lenkoran. While in the regions of Sheki-Zaqatala, Quba-Qusar and Shamakhi-Qabala, Sunnis remained the majority. By the time Azer- baijan was absorbed into the Soviet Union in 1920, Shi’is made up

6 GALLUP WorldView, http://www.gallup.com/poll/114211/Alabamians-Iranians- Common.aspx, accessed 18 November 2010. 7 Social Sciences in the Caucasus, http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2009/02/ gallup-azerbaijan-is-one-of-least.html, accessed 18 November 2010. 8 Official webpage of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, http://www.president .az/browse.php?sec_id=51&lang=en, accessed 18 November 2010. azerbaijan 47 more than 60% of the population of Azerbaijan.9 Azerbaijani Shi’is use the term Ja’fari for self-identification purposes. The majority of Azerbaijani Sunnis belonged to the Hanafi School madhhab( ) which is followed mainly by those with a Turkic ethnic background, while the non-Turkic native Muslim minority embraced the Shafi’i version. Throughout the 19th century the Sufi Naqshbandi movement achieved significant popularity among both Hanafi and Shafi’i Sunnis. After the collapse of the secular Soviet state, a revival of Islam began and stimulated significant changes in the religious life of Azerbaijanis. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these changes was the success of various Sunni branches, like Salafism and the Nurcu movement in attracting many young urban Azerbaijanis, including those of Shi’i origin. Conversions among Azerbaijan’s Sunni minority to Shi’ism however have been negligible so far. In general, Muslims practising today can be identified as members of three main groups (each of which have smaller subdivisions). These are: a) Shi’is who are followers of such religious authorities as the Grand Ayatollahs Khamenei, Sistani and others; b) mainstream Sunnis who are followers of various Turkish Sufi- oriented communities like Nurcu, Naqshbandi, Suleymanci and others; and c) the so-called Salafis/Wahhabis.

2 Islam and State

Article 6 of the Constitution states that Azerbaijan is a secular State. Article 19 affirms the separation of state and religion while Article 37 guarantees freedom of belief and the equality of all religions in the eyes of the law. The law on the freedom of conscience and religious worship which regulates relations between religion and the state was adopted in August 1992. Significant amendments to this law were made in 1996, 1997, 2002 and 2009. After 1996, Muslim religious organizations were no longer allowed to work under the direction of foreign religious organisations. Furthermore, active clerics were denied the right to become elected officials in state institutions. According to the latest amendments to this law made in 2009, mosques can appoint

9 Ali Abasov, “Islam v sovremennom Azerbaidzhane: Obrazy i realii”, in: D.E. Fur- man (ed.), Azerbaidzhan i Rossiia: Obshchestva i gosudarstva (Moscow, 2001), pp. 280–310 (Azerbaijan and Russia: Societies and States), http://www.sakharov-center. ru/publications/azrus/az_009.htm, accessed 18 November 2010. 48 bayram balci and altay goyushov preachers only with the official consent of the executive branch of government. Also, only those Muslim clerics who have obtained their religious education in Azerbaijan are allowed to lead religious ceremonies. Although under the Constitution religion and the state are separate, in 2001 the State Committee of the Azerbaijani Republic for Work with Religious Communities (SCWRC)10 was explicitly created to regulate religious life. According to the latest amendments made in 2009, only those communities officially registered by this Committee are legally allowed to be present on the territory of Azerbaijan.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The latest changes to the law “On the freedom of conscience and religious worship” require the re-registration of religious communities. Before the re-registration 534 communities had received their confirmation certificates. 502 of these communities were Muslim.11 According to state officials approximately 300 communities were functioning without registration.12 As of March 2011, 814 (780 Muslim and 34 Non-Muslim) communities applied for new or renewed registration and 510 religious communities passed official state registration (493 of them are of Muslim orientation). 30 Communities (among them 17 Muslim and 13 non-Muslim) were denied state registration.13 The law requires all Muslim communities to accept the authority of the Caucasus Board of Muslims (CBM)14—a semi-official religious institution established by the Soviet leadership in 1944 as the highest spiritual authority. Described in the law as the Historical Centre of Azerbaijani Muslims, until the early 1990s this institution operated under the name of Spiritual Board of Transcaucasian Muslims. The current head of the Board, the Shi’ite cleric Allahshukur Pashazade,

10 Official Azerbijani Goverment webpages: http://scwra.gov.az, accessed 18 Novem- ber 2010. 11 Azeri-Press News Agency (APA) cited head of the State Committee of the Azerbaijani Republic for Work with Religious Communities, http://az.apa.az/news .php?id=156859, dated 12 June 2009, accessed 18 November 2010. 12 APA http://az.apa.az/news.php?id=153056, dated 29 April 2009, accessed 18 November 2010. 13 Official webpage of the State Committee of the Azerbaijani Republic for Work with Religious Communities, http://scwra.gov.az/view.php?lang=az&menu=211&id=579 and APA News Agency http://az.apa.az/news.php?id=215670, accessed 20 April 2010. 14 http://www.qafqazislam.com, accessed 18 November 2010. azerbaijan 49 became its leader in 1980. His first deputy, with the religious title of Mufti, is responsible for relations with Sunni communities. In order to be registered as a Muslim, community petitioners must address their application to the CBM. After thorough consideration, the CBM has to petition the State Committee for Work with Religious Communi- ties for registration of that particular community. The CBM possesses sole official responsibility for the appointment of clerics to mosques (although it is required to obtain official consent from the executive branch of government) and the organisation of the hajj pilgrimage. Although registered communities are compelled to accept the formal leadership of the CBM, in reality many of them deny its spiritual authority. In addition, some unregistered communities describe the imposition of the CBM’s leadership by the state as the main reason for their unwillingness to apply for official registration. Until recently the Abu-Bakr Mosque located in the Narimanov district of Baku was regarded as an unofficial centre of Salafi-Wahhabi religious life, while the unofficial head of this mosque, Hadji Gamet, was considered to be the leader of the Salafi community. The community’s re-registration is under court consideration. The mosque was closed in August 2008 by state authorities after a terrorist attack which killed two and injured ten, including Hadji Gamet himself. The leader of the former “Juma Mosque”15 community, Iranian educated Hadji Ilgar, is the most profiled Shi’ite preacher in Azerbaijan. This community refused to apply for re-registration in 2001 after the establishment of the State Committee for Work with Religious Com- munities and was expelled from its headquarters in the capital city’s historical centre in 2004.16 Community leader Haji Ilgar spent several months in jail after the disputed 2003 presidential elections. The Mosque of Martyrs in Baku, built in the early 1990s by the state of Turkey, serves as an official residence for the religious attaché of the Turkish Embassy, and until recently was the main place of worship for various religious communities of Turkish orientation. The mosque was closed in April 2009. Renovations were cited as the official reason for this closure.

15 Juma Mosque situated in the historical Old City of the capital. 16 Webpage of former Juma community, http://www.juma-az.org/, accessed 18 November 2010. 50 bayram balci and altay goyushov

The Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, which came into being just after collapse of Soviet Union, was stripped of its official registration in the mid-1990s when party leaders were convicted on espionage charges. Although this party continues to function even without registration, its share in public and political life is minimal. The new head of the Party Movsum Samadov was arrested in January 2011, along with other party officials, on charged related to an alleged coup plot.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

According to state officials, while there are 1802 mosques in Azerbaijan,17 only about 800 of them operate on a daily basis and 150 more serve worshippers seasonally, during Muslim holidays and events.18 The overwhelming majority of existing mosques were constructed before the Soviet period and reopened after the fall of USSR. Since the declaration of independence in 1991, 92 new mosques were built with the financial support of foreign charities, foreign religious organisations and foreign state institutions. Of these, 63 were constructed with the financial support of Kuwaiti sources, 24 were funded through Turkey, three through Saudi Arabia, one through Qatar and one through Iran. The exact number of mosques whose construction was locally funded is unknown.19 According to some officials, since the fall of the Soviet Union the building of more than 100 Muslim prayer houses has been supported by local individuals and communities.20 In July 2010 a Spe- cial Council under the authority of the State Committee for Work with Religious Communities (SCWRC) was established to adminis- ter and supervise issues related to the construction and renovation of mosques. Along with employees of the SCWRC, officials from other state agencies such as State Committee of Land and Cartography, as

17 Azeri-Press Information Agency cited the head of the State Committee of the Azerbaijani Republic for Work with Religious Communities, http://az.apa.az/xeber_ Hidayet_Orucov:_“Bir_qrup__174585.html, accessed 18 November 2010. 18 Azeri-Press Information Agency cited the head of the State Committee of the Azerbaijani Republic for Work with Religious Communities, http://az.apa.az/print .php?id=153745, accessed 18 November 2010. 19 Ibid. 20 Information is provided by Elchin Askerov who is the First Deputy-Chief of the State Committee of the Azerbaijani Republic for Work with Religious Communities, March, 2010. azerbaijan 51 well as representatives of The Caucasus Board of Muslims, joined the newly created body.21 In addition to mosques there are an undefined number of so called hudjras, husayniyyas and dershanes serving small groups of believers which are mainly located in private houses and apartments. There are also more than 500 (50 of them are locally famous) so-called pirs or holy sites and the graves of saints which attract thousands of pilgrims each year.22 The recently renovated Taza-Pir mosque in Baku serves as an official residence for the Caucasus Muslim Board and its head is Sheykhulislam Allahshukur Pashazada.

5 Children’s Education

Separate religious classes are not offered in public schools although some basic religious information is provided by the curriculum within the subject called “Life Skills”. Since the early 1990s, dozens of Turkish private schools have opened in Azerbaijan where the basics of Islam are taught as part of the official curriculum (“Culture and Religion” and “Morality” classes). These officially registered and popular private schools are mainly managed by followers of Fethullah Gulen, a prominent Turkish Islamic preacher.23 There is also one Iranian secondary school in Baku which has officially been opened to meet the needs of citizens of that country who are temporarily in Azerbaijan, although local children are also allowed to attend this school. Until recently official mosque education, called Quran courses, existed. Azerbaijani officials have been increasingly concerned over the rapidly growing number of worshippers and their rising involvement in political life during the recent years. This has caused the Azerbai- jani government to impose some strict measures. In 2007 the last 19 Quranic courses were closed by the State Committee for Work with Religious Communities.24 According to Azerbaijani officials, they will be reopened but will only be able to operate under strict state

21 http://ru.trend.az/news/society/1716891.html, accessed 18 November 2010. 22 “Bizim yol” newspaper cited the head of SCWRC, http://www.bizimyol.az/index .php?mod=news&act=view&nid=41438, accessed 18 November 2010. 23 Official webpage of Turkish-Azerbaijani schools, http://www.cagoyretim.com/, accessed 18 November 2010. 24 http://news.qaynar.info/?mod=view&id=7701, accessed 18 November 2010. 52 bayram balci and altay goyushov

regulations.25 Despite government agencies’ tough stance on the issue, unofficial mosque education as well as so-called home education provided by local clerics, was widespread until recently.

6 Higher and Professional Education

The Baku Islamic Madrasa was founded in 1989 by the decision of the Spiritual Board of Transcaucasian Muslims as the first official institution of Islamic education in Azerbaijan. In 1992 it was renamed the Islamic University of Baku (IUB). Only in 2009 did the Ministry of Education officially grant the IUB a license as an Institution of Higher Education. Officially the IUB has four branches in different regions of Azerbaijan and one in the city of Derbent in the Dagestani Autono- mous Republic of the Russian Federation. As of August 2009 the total number of students enrolled in all IUB campuses exceeded one thousand.26 So far the Zagatala campus in the north of Azerbaijan has been both academically and financially the most advanced branch of IUB.27 Since 1992 the Faculty of Theology at Baku State University28 has been providing undergraduate and graduate levels of religious education. There has always been uncertainty regarding the future professional careers of the faculty’s graduates since its foundation in 1992. Initially it was planned that the Faculty would mainly provide public secondary schools with teachers to teach “Basics of Religion” which had been proposed as part of the curriculum. Since this subject has never been officially introduced to public schools’ programme, a core of faculty graduates are working as teachers of Arabic. Some others are pursuing academic careers or working for official state institutions. The faculty was founded on the basis of an agreement between the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Direction of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey (Diyanet).

25 Azeri Service of Radio Free Europe cited official of the State Committee of the Azerbaijani Republic for Work with Religious Communities, http://www.azadliq.org/ content/article/1955460.html, accessed 18 November 2010. 26 Azeri-Press Agency, http://az.apa.az/news.php?id=160838, accessed 18 Novem- ber 2010. 27 Official webpage of Baku Islamic Universities Zagatala campus, http://zaqatalaila hiyyat.edu.az/. 28 Official webpage of Baku State Universities’ Faculty of Theology, http://theology .bsu.edu.az/en. azerbaijan 53

The private Khazar University,29 through its Eastern languages and Religious Studies Department (formerly Department of Oriental and Islamic Studies), also provides courses on various Islamic topics and offers interdisciplinary graduate degrees. Another private university, Caucasus University (unofficially affiliated with the prominent Turk- ish Muslim preacher Fethullah Gülen) was opened in 1993, although the university has not accepted new admissions to its Faculty of Theol- ogy since 2002. Although the university leadership did not provide any official explanation for this move, rumours attribute it to an Azerbaijani Ministry of Education informal decision. We must also mention the presence of dozens if not more of Azerbaijani students abroad, mainly in Iran, Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries like Egypt or Saudi Arabia. It is widely accepted that Azeri institutions, due to a lack of qualified staff, are not able to provide quality religious education. That is one of the main reasons many graduates of Azerbaijani religious education institutions prefer to continue their studies abroad.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Funerals are the most visible sign of Muslim tradition in Azerbai- jan. The Soviet Union’s attempt to get rid of traditional funerals and replace them with so-called “citizen” funerals was a resounding failure. Mass commemorations of the 1st, 3rd, 7th and 40th days after death as well as every Thursday between the burial and the 40th day are common phenomena, including in urban areas. Visits to the deceased person’s grave on these days continue, as do large ceremonial dinners. In addition, the family members of the deceased avoid attending any parties or celebrations, particularly weddings, until the first anniversary of the death. All ceremonies include the obligatory presence of the local mullah, citations from the Qur’an and other Islamic rituals. The attendance of funerals by the friends, neighbours, and relatives of the deceased person’s family is almost a binding duty. Some neighbourhoods are provided with buildings specifically constructed to serve the needs of funeral ceremonies of the community. Despite the fact that this vast funeral ceremony tradition stems from the local population’s Muslim identity, some elements of it according to Islamic

29 Official webpage of Khazar University, http://www.khazar.org/. 54 bayram balci and altay goyushov clerics contradict the basics of Islam. One of them is the depiction of deceased person on the tombstone, which since mid-1960s has become a widespread custom.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

After the declaration of independence and the formation of the armed forces of the newly emerged state, a chaplaincy institution in the military was introduced and existed until the mid-1990s when it was calmly abolished during the modernisation of the military. No official comments were made regarding this matter, although there are claims that measure was taken by Azerbaijani leaders on the advice of Turkey’s military and then secular political leadership. Now there is no longer any kind of chaplaincy in the state institutions of Azerbaijan.

9 Religious Festivals

Both ‘Id al-Adha (Qurban bayrami in the local language) and ‘Id al- Fitr (Orucluq bayrami) are national holidays and include usually 3 to 5 non-working days allocated by the government each year. Animal sacrifices and accompanying ceremonies are an essential part of ‘Id al-Adha. Small charitable donations are considered vital to the commemoration of ‘Id al-Fitr. Tens of thousands attend early morning holiday prayers each year.

10 Halal Food

Currently, food is certified as halal by the Caucasus Board of Mus- lims (CBM). Recently the State Agency on Standardization, Metrology and Patent of Azerbaijan Republic (SASMP)30 challenged the CBM’s right to certify the halal label, insisting that the CBM does not have the necessary equipment to conduct appropriate laboratory work and that the SASMP possesses sole responsibility for any kind of standardization by the laws of the state.31 The issue still remains unresolved

30 http://www.azstand.gov.az/index.php?lang=en, accessed 18 November 2010. 31 «Azadinform» News Agency cited the head of the SASMP, http://www.azadinform .az/index.php?dn=news&to=art&id=1594, accessed 18 November 2010. azerbaijan 55 although criticism of CBM’s allegedly corrupt halal certification practice is growing.

11 Dress Codes

Until recently Muslim dress was not officially limited in public places or within educational institutions, although there have been some attempts to impose restrictions on headscarves and coverings by the administrations of certain schools and universities and an implementation of public school uniforms by the Ministry of Education was expected to challenge the current status quo. In December 2010 Min- ister of Education announced the immediate enactment of a ban on the wearing of head scarfs in public elementary and secondary schools. This caused public outrage among politically active members of the Shi’i community while Sunnis’ reaction was relatively calm. Shi’i believers held mass rally in front of the Ministry of Education and it became the most hotly debated issue during the last Ashura commemorations. Although implementation of this restrictive measure was pre-planned, the timing of its announcement just before the Ashura commemoration surprised many local observers. According to some commentators this sudden announcement was caused by the publication of Wikileaks files which revealed connections between the Azerbaijani Minister of Education Misir Mardanov and an Iranian businessman tied to “Iranian government and Revolutionary Guard organizations and individuals”32 It should also be noted that since mid-1990s some religious groups have been appealing to lift restrictions imposed by government agencies on photographs taken for national passports and identification cards which require the face and head to be uncovered.

12 Publication and Media

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, dozens of print media outlets of Islamic orientation (some of them very popular) have appeared, although none of them proved to be capable of longevity. From 1990

32 http://91.214.23.156/cablegate/wire.php?id=09BAKU175&search=iran http://azeri report.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2502&Itemid=42, accessed April 2011. 56 bayram balci and altay goyushov to 1994, the CBM published the newspaper Islam. Recently it was announced that the CBM is going to resume its publication. In 1993 the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan began to publish its first print media called Islamın sesi (The Voice of Islam). Later it was renamed Islam dünyasi (Islamic world) but shortly thereafter its publication was discontinued. The newspaper Nabz (Pulse) is published under the unofficial supervision of the Islamic Party. From 1999 to 2005 the Centre for Religious Research published its bilingual (Azerbaijani and Russian) quarterly journal Qütb (Pole). In 2009 The State Committee for Work with Religious Associations launched its own newspaper called “Soci- ety and Religion”.33 Several TV channels, including state and public stations, broadcast weekly religious programmes. Internet media and social networking sites are actively used by local religious groups. The following are a few representative web sources:

• http://www.deyerler.org, http://juma-az.org/eng, affiliated with the abovementioned Shi’i preacher Hadji Ilgar, is widely cited by local and international media. • http://www.islam.az is a popular web portal of the Centre for Religious Research. • The views of Azebaijani Salafis are represented on the web by sites like http://www.islamevi.az/, http://www.abubakr-mescidi.com. • The web page http://www.gyf.org.az/ belongs to the Azerbaijani branch of the Turkish Naqshbandi Mahmud Hudai Foundation. • The recently launched http://milleti-ibrahim.com/ is the website of a radical jihadist group connected to Northern Caucasus rebels.

13 Family Law

The CBM requires all local mullahs to performnikah ceremonies only if official proof of a state issued registration of marriage is provided. But some reports suggest that a few mullahs, by breaking this regulation, are paving the way for underage marriages and polygamy, which otherwise are very uncommon to Azerbaijani society overall.

33 http://scwra.gov.az/view.php?lang=az&menu=269, accessed April 2011. azerbaijan 57

14 Interreligious Dialogue

The government has made great efforts to depict Azerbaijan as a non-violent multi-religious country. This effort is underscored by the many government-sponsored conferences, and workshops that have been held since independence in 1992. The most recent one was held in July 2010 entitled “World Summit of Religious Leaders”. Despite continuing conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno- Karabakh, the Catholicos (Patriarch) of all Armenians was among the attendees of this conference.34 Prior to that in November 2009, a conference entitled “Interreligious dialogue from mutual understanding to joint cooperation” was held in Baku which also celebrated the 60th birthday of Sheykhulislam Pashazadeh.35 It is not uncommon to see the Sheykhulislam accompanied by both the Rabbi of the Moun- tain Jewish Community and the head of the local Russian Orthodox Church on state sponsored events and local media. In 2007, the head of the SCWRC initiated the establishment of the interreligious Special Advisory Board under his own chairmanship. Deputy Chief of the CBM and leaders of both Ashkenazi and Moun- tain Jewish communities, as well as the heads of the local catholic and orthodox churches, became its permanent members.36 However, the official discourse makes a distinction between the so- called traditional and non-traditional religions. Most of the protestant churches are labelled non-traditional missionaries. This label has negatively impacted their acceptance by the Azerbaijani public. Since Pope John Paul’s visit to Azerbaijan in 2002, the Catholic Church has enjoyed a privileged status compared to Protestant groups. Occasionally, some of these Protestant Churches have joined forces with the aforementioned defiant Juma Mosque community to protest restrictions imposed by the local government and persecutions of their

34 Official webpage of Caucasus Board of Muslims, http://www.qafqazislam.com/ index.php?action=static_detail&static_id=251, accessed 18 November 2010. 35 Official webpage of Caucasus Board of Muslims, http://www.qafqazislam.com/ index.php?action=static_detail&static_id=158, accessed 18 November 2010. 36 Official webpage of the State Committee for Work with Religious Communities, http://www.scwra.gov.az/view.php?lang=az&menu=206&id=275, accessed 18 Novem- ber 2010. 58 bayram balci and altay goyushov adherents.37 The head of this Muslim community also leads local religious rights advocacy group called DEVAMM.38

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Independent religious organisations are a relatively active part of public life in Azerbaijan. Some independent Islamic community leaders vocally comment on both international and internal political issues and have become very popular public figures. The CBM’s leader also frequently appears in the media with his comments on international and domestic matters and his positions on national presidential elections have been called inappropriate by some local observers. The general population appreciates the Islamic aspect of their identity but at the same time is very cautious in terms of the protection of its secular values and usually is wary of religion’s revival.

16 Major Cultural Events

The yearly celebration of theNawruz holiday on 21 March historically is the biggest event in cultural life of Azerbaijanis. The tradition can be traced to a Zoroastrian belief and commemorates the arrival of a new year, which according to the Zoroastrian legacy comes in spring. Annual mass commemorations of ‘Ashura (the death of Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Husayn) are another very significant event directly related to the Shi’i Muslim identity of the majority of Azerbai- janis. Traditionally the public avoids celebrating weddings during the Islamic month of Muharram, during which ‘Ashura falls and even in the capital city Baku and, as surveys show, the consumption of alcohol drops significantly.

37 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ hrrpt/2009/eur/136020.htm, accessed 18 November 2010. 38 Abbreviation from Azerbaijani, “Dini Etiqad ve Vicdan Azadlığını Müdafia Markazi” (Center for Protection of Freedom of Religious Beliefs and Conscience). BELARUS

Daša Słabčanka1

1 Muslim Populations

Islam came to the territory of modern Belarus in the fourteenth- fifteenth centuries. In 1397 several thousand Tatar families (mostly from the Crimea and the Golden Horde) were invited to serve in the army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania2 and, under the terms of their settlement, they were allowed to build mosques and madrasas. In the middle of the sixteenth century, Muslims were permitted to marry Christians and also received a wide range of privileges and noble titles. By 1591, about 100,000 Tatars3 lived in the territory of the Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth, which included today’s Belarus, and about 400 mosques had been built. Belarus was taken over by Russia in 1795, but already from the early seventeenth century attitudes towards Muslims had changed for the worse and many of them moved to the Crimea and to Ottoman territories. Wars also accounted for a high casualty rate. Within a century, the population had fallen to about 30,000, and by 1914 there were only 14,000 left.4 By 1939, Soviet anti- religious policies led to there being only three mosques left. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1990, a new situation has arisen characterised particularly by Tatar national renaissance, of which one of the main initiators was Dr Ibrahim Kanapatsky (1949– 2005), the author of many articles, publications and books about

1 Daša Słabčanka works with CASE-Belarus, Centre for Social and Economic Research, and Movement for Freedom, human rights and training non-governmental organisations. She graduated from Belarus State Economic University and has a master’s degree in European Studies from University of Graz (Austria). 2 Pashkow, G.P., Вялікае княства Літоўскае Энцыклапедыя (Grand Duchy of Lithuania Encyclopedia), 2 vols (Minsk: BelEn, 2007), vol. 1, p. 688. 3 These Muslims now are often referred to as ‘Lithuanian Tatars’, and include members of the Belarusian, Lithuanian and Polish Tatar Diasporas. 4 http://tatarica.narod.ru/archive/09.2003/07_01.09.03.htm, accessed 3 December 2010. 60 daša słabčanka

Belarusian Tatars. He was also the editor of and contributor to newspapers and magazines about Tatars and Islam.5 Islam in Belarus today, however, is not only represented by Tatars but also by as many as 32 ethnic groups. Besides the 7,316 Tatars,6 the most numerous are immigrant groups of Turks, Azerbaijanis, Tajiks, Kazaks, Uzbeks, Afghans and Iranians. There are no official statistics on the numbers of Muslims as a question on religion was excluded from the official census in the Stalin period, from 1937, so estimates of the Muslim population are made on the basis of data on nationality, which cannot, of course, be reliable, as there are Christians among the Tatars, for example, and Muslims among the Belarusians. Bearing that in mind, estimates based on the most recent census of 20097 suggest there are more than 20,000 Muslims in Belarus. The mass media tend to estimate the number of Muslims at 80,000–100,000 and in Novem- ber 2009 Mufti Shabanovich referred to a figure of 120,000,8 although, according to Deputy Mufti Ali Varanovich, there are about 50,000 Muslims, including about 300 Belarusian converts.9 Most Muslims in Belarus are Sunnis, while the Azerbaijanis and Iranians are Shi’is.10

2 Islam and the State

The state policy towards all religions changed dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Republic of Belarus is now a secular state; there is no state religion, but religious freedom is guaranteed in the Constitution. Relations between state and religion are regulated by the Constitution and relevant international and domestic legislation. The legal basis of state-religion relations is presented in the collection of documents Вопросы совести и религиозных организаций в Республике Беларусь (Questions of Conscience and Religious

5 Magazines: Байрам (Bairam) from 1999 and, in Belarusian, Аль-Ислам (Islam); newspapers: Жизнь (Life) and Жыццё татарскае (Tatar Life). 6 According to the 1999 census there were 10,146 Tatars in Belarus, http://belstat .gov.by/homep/ru/perepic/p5.php, accessed 3 December 2010. 7 Public Census 2009, main results, http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/perepic/2009/ itogi3_new.php, accessed 3 December 2010. 8 У Беларусі жывуць 120 тысяч мусульман (120 thousand Muslims live in Bela- rus), Nasha Niva, http://nn.by/index.php?c=ar&i=31566 , accessed 3 December 2010. 9 Deputy Mufti Ali Varanovich was interviewed 11 November 2009. 10 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.by/ru/republic/ cultrel/, accessed 3 December 2010. belarus 61

Organisations in the Republic of Belarus).11 According to the 1992 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations, all religions are equal before the law. Citizens have the right to freely determine their attitude towards religion, as well as the right to individually or collectively practise any or no religion. Legislation also defines the rights of religious organisations and the procedures for their establishment and management. According to Article 15 of the Constitution (adopted in 1994, amended in 1996), the state is responsible for the preservation and development of the country’s historical, cultural and spiritual heritage. Article 16 stipulates that all religions and confessions are equal before the law and relations between the state and religions are regulated by the law. There are restrictions on the activities of religious organisations (e.g., on activities against the sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus or connected with violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms). Article 31 proclaims individual and collective freedom of conscience. In 2002 the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations was amended. One of the most significant additions is the Preamble, where the role of various religions in Belarusian history, including Islam, is described and emphasised. There is no concept of ‘religious minority’ in the legislation, as all religions are equal. A special separate body called the Office of the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs is in charge of the implementation of the state confessional policy.12

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Shortly before the end of the communist period there was only one Muslim organisation in Belarus. The First Belarusian Congress of Muslims, held in 1994 in Minsk, initiated the creation of Muslim organisations. At that time, Мусульманскае рэлігійнае ўпраўленьне у Рэспубліцы Беларусь (the Muslim Religious Association in the Republic of Belarus) was established, with the Mufti as its head. According to state statistics as of 1 January 2010, of 25 Muslim organisations operating in Belarus, two are in the Brest region, four in

11 Available at http://www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/religion/literat/vopr, accessed 3 December 2010. Also contains the outlook of history and modern status of different confessions. 12 Приветствует Беларусь (Belarus Welcomes), http://www.belarus21.by/en. 62 daša słabčanka the Vitsyebsk region, one in the Homyel region, eight in the Hrodna region, one in the Mahilyow region, six in the Minsk region, and three in the city of Minsk.13 Today, the two major Muslim organisations are: 1) The Muslim Religious Association of the Republic of Belarus14 (email: musul- [email protected], tel: +37517 3285554), whose mufti is Abu-Bekir Shabanovich (tel: +37529 6528217); and 2) The Spiritual Headquar- ters of Muslims in Belarus (email: [email protected], www.islam.by, tel: +37517 3408247, +37529 5561053, fax: +37517 2006615), whose mufti is Varanovich Ismail.15 Both muftis are members of the Interethnic Advisory Board.16 By the end of 2010, nineteen Muslim organisations were included under the umbrella of the first, and four were members of the second. One organisation, in Hrodno, is separate.17 Moreover, one of 25 Muslim organisations is based more on national criteria, uniting Azerbaijanis who are Shi’is. Less formal but with some spiritual influence is the Light of Islam (Святло Ислама), a member of the Spiritual Headquarters of Muslims in Belarus (Zav. Paunochny 17, room 203, Minsk, tel: +37517 2006615, www.islam.by). The head of the community is Varanovich Ismail. The Light of Islam operated from 2001 till 2004 and then restarted in 2008. It provides classes in Qur’an and Arabic language and assistance with funerals, weddings, etc. Among regional Muslim communities, one of the newest, in Homyel, is especially active (Syalanskaya-st 1, room 300, Homyel). Most Muslim organisations have been established by Tatars. The two major ones by this national identity are Zikr ul-Kitab and Chim- sha. Zikr ul-Kitab was created as the Community of Muslim Tatars, with the name Al-Kitab, in 1991 and was at the forefront of a Tatar national renaissance. It changed its name in 2001, when it was granted the status of an organisation of the Republic.18 Chimsha was founded in 1998 by citizens of Bashkir and Tatar heritage. It is mainly a networking organisation; it has close links with many like-minded foreign

13 http://www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/religion/relig_org/new_url_1949557390, accessed 3 December 2010. 14 Мусульманскае рэлігійнае аб’яднаньне ў Рэспубліцы Беларусь. 15 Духоўнае ўпраўленьне мусульман у Беларусі. 16 Міжэтнічная кансультатыўная рада, http://www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/ religion/new_url_145141106, accessed 3 December 2010. 17 http://muslimby.info/?p=682. 18 http://www.t-styl.info/by/19/20/896/?tpid=4, accessed 3 December 2010. belarus 63 organisations and is a member of the World Congress of Tatars.19 It has a principally cultural, educational ethos and anyone who shares its values and ideas can become a member, regardless of religion.20 Tra- ditionally, the leading positions in Muslim organisations were held by Tatars. Exceptions today are the organisation in Vorsha, where the head is an Ingush, and in Homyel, where the leader is a Belarusian.21 A list of organisations associated with the various ethnic minorities can be found at www.ngo.by.22 Updated news about Belarusian Mus- lims may be found at the websites www.islam.by and www.muslimby .info.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Nowadays, there are eight active mosques in Belarus, in Iwye, Klyetsk, Lowchicy, Maladzyechna, Navahrudak, Slonim, Smilavichy, and Vidzy. There are also three prayer houses, in Ashmyany, Hrodna, and Brest.23 Homyel has a temporary mosque. A new mosque in Minsk has been under construction since a building permit was issued in 1998. The first mosque in Minsk was built in 16th century and was from timber. In 1901 it was completed in stone but was demolished in the 1959 by Soviet government. A new mosque, planned to be a replica of that one, is supposed to be built but lack of sufficient financial resources and disagreements between Muslim organisations lead to a slowdown in construction.24 From 2005, under Decree No. 571, religious organisations have been exempt from land and real-estate taxes and, in a 2007 addition to the Decree, religious organisations were also exempted from land tax on land where religious buildings are under construction.25 In a

19 http://tatar-congress.org. 20 http://www.t-styl.info/by/19/20/896/?tpid=4, accessed 3 December 2010. 21 According to Mufti Varanovich, interviewed 11 November 2009. 22 http://www.ngo.by/database/ngo/tag/national-minorities/, accessed 3 December 2010. 23 Мечети Беларуси. Историческая справка (Mosques in Belarus. Historical Ref- erence), http://muslimby.info/?p=549, accessed 3 December 2010. 24 История мечети в г. Минск (History of Minsk Mosque), http://muslimby .info/?p=552#more-552, accessed 3 December 2010. 25 Presidential Decree of the Republic of Belarus No571, About land and real estate taxes exemption for religious organisations, 1 December 2005, http://law.sb.by/329/. 64 daša słabčanka

Presidential Decree on 8 April 2010 Muslim organisations were listed among organisations that pay a reduced rent.26

5 Children’s Education

Schools are separate from the church and pupils receive a secular education. Material about religion is included in courses on ‘world history’ and ‘man, society and state’.27 Legislation provides for religious organisations to set up groups or weekend schools for religious education. Currently there are five Muslim weekend schools, which represents a decline in numbers.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

There are no university courses on Islam or Oriental Studies, and no imam training courses. However, at the Belarusian State University28 students can specialise in the history of the Middle East and North Africa, Arabic, Turkish and Persian languages, literature, mythol- ogy and religion, and the art of the Middle and Far East, as well as ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ (Humanities Faculty, Department of General Sciences).29 There are also Arabic, Persian, Turkish language courses in the Faculty of Translation at the Minsk State Linguistic University.30 Some other universities also provide opportunities to study Arabic. Belarusian Muslims undergo imam training abroad. At the beginning of 2008, two persons were studying in Kazan, Russia, one had completed studies in Jordan, and another in Tripoli Islamic University,

26 Instruction of the President of the Republic of Belarus № 113рп, About setting additional reducing coefficient to base rent rate, 8 April 2010. 27 Kharin Yu, Человек. Общество. Государство: Учеб. пособие для 11-го кл. общеобразоват. учреждений с рус. яз. обучения. В 4 кн. Кн. 4. Человек в мире культуры (Minsk: Narodnaya Asvyeta [Public Education], 2002) (Man. Society. State: Study guide for pupils of 11th grade, in 4 Volumes, Vol. 4 Man in the world of culture), pp. 92–123. 28 http://www.bsu.by/. 29 Department of General Sciences, Humanities Faculty, http://www.bsu.by/ru/main .aspx?guid=6831, accessed 3 December 2010. 30 http://mslu.by/. belarus 65

Libya. One imam of the Hanafi School has been invited from Turkey.31

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The law grants the right for burial to take place in accordance with religion and traditions. Religious organisations can request the establishment of a religious cemetery and plots for religious burial may also be provided in public cemeteries.32 However, there is still no Muslim cemetery in Minsk.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There is no Muslim ‘chaplaincy’ in state institutions, but the Penal Code33 guarantees freedom of conscious for prisoners and their right to practise their religion. A separate space should be provided for religious needs, so long as it does not disturb general order and in some cases, an imam may be invited. However, it is difficult to assess the implementation of such provisions.

9 Religious Festivals

Islamic festivals are not public holidays. However, the law provides that Muslims may ask for one day off work without pay to celebrate each of the two main festivals and Mawlid.34 In 2010 Belarusian Mus- lims celebrated Id al-Fitr together on September 10 in Hrodna, Minsk

31 http://sb.by/print/post/62783/, accessed 3 December 2010. 32 Закон Республики Беларусь от 12 ноября 2001 г. № 55–3 O погребении и похоронном деле (The Law of the Republic of Belarus 12 November 2001 No. 55–3 On Burial and Funeral), Articles 3, 16, 22. 33 Article 12, http://www.levonevski.net/pravo/norm2009/num36/d36268/index.html, accessed 3 December 2010. 34 Постановление Совета Министров РБ от 22 января 1992 г. № 30 О порядке определения нерабочих дней для верующих нехристианских религий в связи с их праздниками (Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 22 January 1992, No 30, On the specifying of holidays for non-Christians based on their festivals). 66 daša słabčanka and Smilavichy. More than 200 people gathered together in Homyel temporary mosque.35

10 Halal Food

Halal food is not widely sold in Belarus, but demand is growing. In 2008 a private company, Sibveran,36 launched a line of halal products. The production process was examined and approved by the Spiritual Headquarter of Muslims in Belarus. From the end 2009 halal food is also produced in Homyel, one of the regional centres of Belarus.37 Halal food is not provided in hospitals, the army or prisons.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules or legislation restricting the wearing of hijab and increasing numbers of women wear head scarves. Attitudes to them at work and in universities are varied, some women, especially converted Belarusians, mention negative reactions in public, but in most cases there are no problems.38 Deputy Mufti Ali Varanovich states that in Minsk there have been cases of women being allowed to wear hijab for passport photographs, although this is forbidden.39 Around 200 women wear hijab in Belarus today.40

12 Publication and Media

The topic of Islam is quite rarely covered in the mass media. Men- tions in the press are mostly related to events in other countries. Mate- rial about Belarusian Muslims mainly stresses interfaith concord and usually has a descriptive character. Some Muslim organisations distribute their own magazines and newspapers.

35 http://islam.by/info/bnews/, accessed 3 December 2010. 36 http://chicken.by/. 37 http://www.islam.by/info/bnews/arhiv2009/, accessed 3 December 2010. 38 See, for example, Быть мусульманкой в Беларуси (To be a Muslim Woman in Belarus), http://islam.by/articles/20100914/, accessed 3 December 2010. 39 Deputy Mufti Ali Varanovich was interviewed 11 November 2009. 40 According to Muslimby.info. belarus 67

13 Family Law

All residents in the territory of the Republic of Belarus are subject to the law of the country and Shari’a norms are not officially recognised. However, Islamic family law norms can be followed unofficially as long as they do not conflict with current legislation. Many Muslims therefore enter into a Muslim marriage contract as well as a civil marriage. Ali Varanovich gives as exceptions the need for permission from the local authorities to hold religious meetings of more than two persons (article 193.1 of Criminal Code provides responsibility for acting on the name of unregistered organisation, and any group of people doing something together may be treated as an unregistered organisation), and the prohibition of polygamy in the Criminal Code.41

14 Interreligious Relations

In 2008, the Interethnic Advisory Board was created under the Com- missioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs.42 The Board consists of representatives of major religious organisations, including Muslim ones. The Board aims to maintain and strengthen interfaith concord, create opportunities to enjoy the right to freedom of conscience guaranteed to every citizen by the Constitution, and facilitate the realisation of socially important initiatives by religious organisations.43 An annual interfaith conference has been held since 2002. Its topic in 2007 was ‘Dialogue between Christianity and Islam under Globalisation’.44 The conference was attended by the president of the Republic of Belarus, who focussed on interfaith concord in the country. On 11 November 2009, Mufti Shabanovich made a speech at a conference on Christian-Jewish dialogue in Minsk, where he stressed interconnections between religions and the need to live

41 Deputy Mufti Ali Varanovich was interviewed 11 November 2009. 42 Консультативный межэтнический совет при Уполномоченном по делам религий и национальностей, http://www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/nationalities/ consultation_centre/new_url_1285022831, accessed 3 December 2010. The contact details for the Office of the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs may be found at http://www.belarus21.by/en/office_comm. 43 http://www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/religion/sotr/new_url_333730627, accessed 3 December 2010. 44 http://www.church.by/resource/Dir0301/Dir0302/Page1726.html, accessed 3 Decem- ber 2010. 68 daša słabčanka together peacefully.45 During the international conference ‘Historical and Cultural Heritage of Tatars-Muslims: Problem of preservation and studying’ that took place on June 26, 2010 a range of questions was discussed: from the history of Tatars in Belarus to issues of interfaith peace and understanding.46

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The Muslim community in Belarus is not big enough to be the subject of broad public debates. Traditional Belarusian Muslims, Tatars, their religion and culture are perceived as part of Belarusian history. Prob- ably the biggest recent public discussion was in 2008, when a deputy editor of the opposition newspaper Zhoda, Aliaksandr Zdvizhkou, was sentenced to three years’ hard labour and the newspaper closed for reprinting the Danish cartoons that were the subject of the 2005 controversy. Later the sentence was reduced to three months. In the subsequent debate at home and abroad the judgment was generally regarded as having been motivated by domestic political factors.47

16 Major Cultural Events

The Muslims of Belarus organise various cultural events throughout the year, among which are Qur’an recitation competitions, literature evenings, music festivals, and presentations of national cultures. There are also a number of more specifically ethnic events, which have no religious dimensions.48

45 http://nn.by/index.php?c=ar&i=31566, accessed 3 December 2010. 46 Международная научно-практическая конференция “Историко-культурное наследие татар-мусульман Беларуси: проблема сохранения и изучения”, http:// www.cscr.ucoz.ru/news/mezhdunarodnaja_nauchno_prakticheskaja_konferencija_ istoriko_kulturnoe_nasledie_tatar_musulman_belarusi_problema_sokhranenija_i_ izuchenija/2010-06-10-10, accessed 3 December 2010. 47 Publications by Human Rights Centre Viasna on the Aliaksandr Zdvizhkou case, http://spring96.org/en/?cx=009573675624945573642%3Amc6jc_30tac&cof=FORID% 3A9&rls=en&hl=en&q=zdvizhkou&sa=Search#926, accessed 3 December 2010. 48 http://www.t-styl.info/by/19/20/896/?tpid=4, accessed 3 December 2010. BELGIUM

Nadia Fadil 1

1 Muslim Populations

While the first reports indicating the presence of Muslims in Belgium date from the 19th century,2 their presence only becomes an issue in the second half of the 20th century.3 Most Muslims in Belgium are primarily descendants of migrant workers who came from the Mediter- ranean basin from the 1960s. In 1970, some 65,000 Muslim immigrant workers and their families lived in Belgium, and by 1985 this number had risen to 200,000. The exact number of people of Muslim culture or Islamic faith living in Belgium today is difficult to determine, as there is no official registration of the population’s ethnic and religious ties.

1 Nadia Fadil is Postdoctoral Fellow of the Fund of Scientific Research (FWO) at the Centre for Sociological Research at the KULeuven. She is grateful to the previous authors of this section, Ural Manço and Meryem Kanmaz, for permission to use some of their material. 2 In 1828, the Turkish Consul of Antwerp Ismaël Hakki Bey Tevfik reports the presence of 5751 Muslims, half of them of Algerian background and the other half of Asian background; see Panafit, Lionel,Quand le droit écrit l’Islam. L’intégration juridique de l’Islam en Belgique (When law writes Islam. The Juridical integration of Islam in Belgium) (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1999), p. 15. 3 Contrary to its neighbouring countries France and the Netherlands, little contact existed between Belgian officials and Muslims during the colonial era as only few Congolese were of Muslim confession. An often forgotten aspect in this Belgian colonial history is, however, that negative representations of the ‘Arab elites’ did exist at the beginning of the 20th century, this as a consequence of their role as slave traders in and presence in valuable mining areas in East Congo. Especially the latter turned into important source of tension with Belgian officials, which resulted in a war at the end of the 19th century preceding the appropriation of the Congo by the Belgian King Leopold II (Congo Free State). The idea that the Belgian colony was installed in order to liberate Congolese from Arab slave traders figured as an important—yet often forgotten—legitimising discourse of the colonial enterprise in monuments and schoolbooks throughout the first half of the 20th century. For an analysis of this discourse in schoolbooks, see De Baets, Antoon, “Gedaantewisseling van een heldendicht: Congo in de Geschiedenisboeken” (Transformations of a hero’s poet: Congo in the History Books) in Jacquemin, J.P. (ed.) Racisme, donker continent: clichés, stereotiepen en fantasiebeelden over zwarten in het Koninkrijk België (Racism, a dark continent: clichés, stereotypes and fantasies about blacks in the Kingdom of Belgium) (Brussels: NCOS, 1991), pp. 45–56. 70 nadia fadil

Until a few years ago, citizenship figures yielded a satisfactory approx- imation, since the overwhelming majority of the country’s Muslims were foreign nationals. Between 1990 and 2002, however, a series of legal reforms liberalised the acquisition of Belgium citizenship. As a result, more than two-thirds of Belgium’s Muslim population now have Belgian citizenship. The latest generally accepted estimates put the Muslim population at between 410,000 and 450,000, which amounts to at least 4% of the country’s population.4 Today, Moroccan and Turkish ethnic groups account for 80% of the country’s Muslim population. The remaining 20% are other immigrants (and their descendants) from Algeria and Tunisia and more recent arrivals, such as refugees and immigrants from the Balkans (Kosovo and Albania), South Asia (Pakistanis, Indians, Afghans, and Iranians), and Sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. Senegal and Mali). The overwhelming majority of these Muslims are Sunnis. The Shi’is are very much in the minority, but there are indications that some Moroccan Sunnis have been converting to Shi’ism since the beginning of the 1980’s.5 With regard to the Sunnis, those from Morocco belong to the Maliki rite, whereas the Turkish Muslims are Hanafis (although some Kurds follow the Shafi’i school). There are also some Alevi Turks and Kurds. The geographic distribution of the country’s Muslim population is very uneven. More than 40% of Belgium’s Muslims live in the

4 These are the generally accepted estimates used by the Executive of Muslims in Belgium and various scholars on the basis of data from the National Institute of Sta- tistics (foreign population from countries with a Muslim majority) and the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Against Racism (official data of naturalisations by country of origin). In November 2010, the Francophone Daily Le Soir reported that Sociologist Jan Hertogen estimated the number of Muslims in Belgium at 623.000 on the basis of a demographic survey and German estimates on the number of practising Muslims. The latter method has however been subjected to critique, and is reason for some scholars to dismiss Hertogen’s estimates, see Le Soir, 14 November 2010. 5 There exist no exact figures but only estimates which vary from a minimum of one thousand (estimates of the Belgian security services in 2001) to a maximum of eight to ten thousand (estimates by the imam of the main Shi’i mosque of Brussels). I am grateful to Imane Lechkar (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven) for these figures. For a further anthropological account on the reality of Moroccan Sunni converts to Shi’ism see Lechkar, Imane, “Quelles sont les modalities d’authentification parmi les chiites belgo-marocains?” (How to understand Sunni Moroccan Belgians becoming Shi’i) in Maréchal, B. & El Asri, F. (eds.), Islam Belge (Presses Universitaires de Lou- vain, forthcoming). belgium 71

Brussels-Capital Region, where they are concentrated in six central boroughs (City of Brussels, Schaerbeek/Schaarbeek, Molenbeek, Ander- lecht, Saint-Josse/Sint Jos, and Saint-Gilles/Sint Gillis). It should be noted that Muslim residents account for 17% of the Brussels Region’s population.6 This makes Brussels one of the cities in the Western world with the largest Muslim population. The Muslim presence in the rest of the country is more modest. Only 3% of the population in Flan- ders are Muslims. This northern, Dutch-speaking half of the country contains some 39% of the country’s Muslims, who are mainly distributed between the region’s two major towns (Antwerp and Ghent) and the former mining province of Limburg. Similarly, in Wallonia, the southern, French-speaking region of the country, Muslims also make up about 3% of the population, living mainly in the industrial areas of Charleroi, Liège, and Mons. They number around 94,000 (or about 21% of the kingdom’s Muslim population). The average age of Belgium’s Muslim population is lower than the national average and it is generally estimated that a third are under the age of 18. Despite a noticeable improvement in the socio-economic situation of some of members of the Muslim community since the turn of the century, when it comes to higher education, home ownership and self-employment, a large proportion of Muslims continues to grapple with social problems such as failing at school and unemployment. The level of poverty is estimated at 55.56% for the Moroc- cans and 58.94% for the Turks, and unemployment balances around 38%.7 Both communities also belong to the lowest educated segment of the Belgian society, with 63.1% of Turks and Moroccans having no high school degree, and only 6.1% of Turks and Moroccans in higher education.8 Their precarious socio-economic position is also exacer- bated by active and passive forms of discrimination in various social

6 Although the recent estimates by Jan Hertogen assess it at 21%, see www.npdata.be. 7 Van Robaeys, B.; Vranken, J.; Perrin, N.; Martiniello, M. De Kleur van armoede. Armoede bij personen van buitenlandse herkomst (The colour of poverty. Poverty among people of foreign origin) (Leuven: Acco, 2007), pp. 26, 31. This is the first comprehensive study on the poverty level of minorities from Turkish, Moroccan and Italian backgrounds. Data have been drawn from the national household survey which allows for a specific measurement on the basis of ethnic background instead of nationality. These estimates of poverty have been measured on the basis of income, taking the EU poverty line (60% of the median income) as threshold: i.e. 777€/month per household for Belgium. 8 Ibid., pp. 31–32. For a comprehensive study on the unequal school performances between minority and majority in Flanders and Francophone Belgium, see also Jacobs 72 nadia fadil domains like housing, education and the job market. Albert Martens et al. recently observed that within a sample of 321 job applicants (European and non-European) followed for a period of three months in the region of Brussels, 27% of the non-European respondents had been confronted with various forms of discrimination during job application processes.9 Those immigrants of Muslim heritage and their descendants who have acquired Belgian nationality make up part of today’s electorate. Their participation can be important in the municipalities that have a strong population of immigrant origin, noticeably in Brussels.10 As a result, candidates and elected officials of Muslim culture may be found in all the political parties and in all the elected assemblies. Since the end of the 1990s, some ministerial positions in regional governments and several local councillors of Muslim origin have been active in political life.11 None of these politicians favour their religious identity over their ethno-national identification (Turkish or Moroccan). Indeed, it seems that a significant number of the Muslim electorate tends to vote for candidates according to their national origin. There have been several attempts to create an explicitly Islamic party during the last decade, yet none succeeded so far in gaining a seat at a communal, regional or federal level.12

et al. De Sociale lift blijft steken/L’Ascenseur Sociale reste en panne (The social elevator remains broken)(Brussels: Koning Boudewijn Stichting, 2009). 9 Martens, A., Ouali, N., Van De Maele, M., Vertommen, S., Dryon, Ph., & Ver- hoeven, H., Etnische discriminatie op de arbeidsmarkt in het Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest: onderzoek in het kader van het Sociaal Pact voor de Werkgelegenheid van de Brusselaars (Ethnic discrimination at the job market in the Brussels Regional Capital: a survey in the context of the Social Pact of Employment for the residents of Brussels) (Brussels: Brusselse Gewestelijke Dienst voor Arbeidsbemiddeling, 2005), p. 34. 10 Pierre-Yves Lambert notes that since the last 2006 municipal elections, there are 147 municipal representatives (unequally spread over the 19 Brussels communes) from a minority community, of which 94 Moroccans, 22 Turks, 2 Algerians and 1 Tunisian, http://suffrage-universel.blogspot.com/2006/11/combien-dlus-allochtones- dans-les.html, accessed 05 January 2010. 11 Fadila Laanan, the current minister of Culture in the Government of the Fran- cophone Community, is the only sitting minister of Muslim background in any of the Belgian regions. 12 On the French speaking side, the best known attempt to create an Islamic political party has been the Brussels based Parti des Jeunes Musulmans led by the convert Jean-François Abdullah Bastin: http://www.mvjm.be/. It ran in the elections in 2004 gaining 0.93% at the regional elections in Brussels and 3.38% at the local elections in the Brussels commune of Molenbeek St. Jean. In Flanders, the political movement Arab European League launched the Islamic party Moslim Democratische Partij belgium 73

2 Islam and the State

Relations between the state and religions in Belgium are based on constitutional provisions adopted in 1831. Article 19 of the Constitu- tion establishes the principle of freedom of religion and Article 21 the separation of church and state, which is considered to be a relationship of reciprocal non-interference. These provisions actually reflect the Belgian state’s spirit of neutrality towards religious affairs, which differs from the concept oflaïcité or secularism that assumes a strict separation between the State and religion(s). Belgian law allows the public authorities to recognise and finance various religions. Since the state reform of 2001, the latter has partly turned into a regional competence. Whereas the federal government maintain the responsibility over the salaries of the recognised faiths’ ministers, including those of its chaplains in the prisons and the army; the upkeep of religious buildings has become a regional competence in 2001 and is thus borne by the regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital). The recognised religions are also given time slots in state broadcasting networks for religious broadcasts which are organised on a regional level, while public schools must provide religious education of the recognised religions if asked by a number of parents. The teachers and inspectors of these classes are on the payrolls of the Flemish Region (which has been merged with the Flemish Community) and the French-speaking Community, whose powers include education and cultural affairs. At a local level, municipalities also play an important role in dealing with certain matters concerning the organisation of Islamic religious practices. Issues such as mosque settlement, Islamic parcels in cemeteries, the infrastructural organisation of ‘Id al-Adha for the sacrifice of sheep or the provision of halal food in public schools are dependent on local regulations and may thus strongly differ across several localities.13

(MDP) at the regional elections of 2004, gaining 0.42% at the Flemish level (the party only run in the Flemish provinces Antwerp and Oost-Vlaanderen). 13 Corinne Torrekens offers in her PhD study a detailed account of the relationship between local officials and representatives of mosques and Muslim organisations in the public management of mosques (and the instalment of minarets), the organisation of Eid al Adha and halal food at schools. See Torrekens, C., La visibilité de l’islam au sein de l’espace public bruxellois: transaction, reconnaissance et identité (The visibility of Islam in the Public Sphere of Brussels: transaction, recognition and identity). Thèse de doctorat. Bruxelles, Université Libre de Bruxelles/Université Catholique de Louvain, 2008. For more information on the local management of the Muslim presence in the Brussels borough of Schaerbeek see Manço, U. and M. Kanmaz, “From conflict to 74 nadia fadil

Six denominations (in addition to the non-denominational Ethic Movement) are recognised today. They are the Anglican, Roman Cath- olic, Greek Orthodox, and Protestant churches, Islam, and Judaism. Belgium is the first European country to have granted Islam official recognition through a law passed on 19 July 1974. In order for a religion to be officially recognised, the Belgian state requires that a head of the faith be designated, who will become its spokesman with regard to the religion’s secular administration and the representative of its followers.14 Yet this question of representativeness remains a thorny issue in the case of the Islam. The establishment of a representative body that would meet Belgium’s constitutional requirements has been a constant source of tension, both in relations between the state and the Muslim communities, as well as within the Muslim communities. The question of a Belgian representative body for Muslims only turned into an important political matter in the second half of the 1980s. Until then, the Moroccan and Turkish embassies and the Saudi-funded Islamic Cultural Centre figured as main interlocutors to the Belgian government. Mosques and imams were largely financed by the countries of origin, donations from Saudi Arabia or by the local Muslim communities themselves. The eighties however signalled a shift in perspective among the Belgian authorities: Islam was no longer con- ceived through a ‘foreign’ lens, but became increasingly linked with domestic concerns about the integration of Muslims. The need for an institutional body which would not only act as a representative of the Belgian Muslims, but also act as direct interlocutor with the Belgian government on issues of integration became an important domestic preoccupation from the 1990s. The establishment of what would come to be known as the Executive of Muslims in Belgium did thus not only emerge from an administrative need for an institutional body

co-operation between Muslims and local authorities in a Brussels borough: Schaer- beek”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1105–1123, and for the case of Ghent see Kanmaz, M., Moslims in Gent: De ontwikkeling van gebedsruimtes, moskeeën en islamitische centra (Muslims in Ghent: the Development of worship Places, Mosques and Islamic Centres) (Ghent: Academia Press, 2009). 14 The conditions for recognising a religion are: (1) having a large considerable following (tens of thousands), (2) being organised in such a way that a representative organ maintains contacts with the civil authorities, (3) being present in the country for a number of decades, (4) fulfilling a social function. See http://www.just.fgov.be/ nl_htm/informatie/htm_justitie_atotz/erediensten.html. belgium 75 that would regulate the operation of the Islamic faith, but also from the quest by the Belgian authorities for an official spokesperson of the Muslim community.15 This convergence of different agendas turned the establishment of this administrative body into a highly delicate enterprise. Whereas the various ethno-cultural composites of the Mus- lim communities longed for a balanced representation of their (often conflicting) needs, Belgian officials longed for representatives able to transcend these different agendas and uninvolved in ‘radical’ networks which they tried to control through security monitoring. Because of the absence of a proper ‘representative’ head, Muslim communities could not access state financing other than for schooling until 1996, when provisional representatives were appointed to prepare for general elections in order to nominate a new representative body.16 In 1998, elections were held which resulted in an executive body for the Islamic faith, called the Executive of the Muslims of Belgium or EMB (Executif des Musulmans de Belgique/Executief van de Moslims van België). The creation of this body did not settle the matter. Vari- ous internal crises afflicted the body, the causes of which are linked with the heterogeneous composition of the body (both in ethnic and ideological terms), an internal competition between the different ethnic groups and attempts by the Belgian government and Turkish and Moroccan diplomatic authorities to meddle in its affairs. The second election organised by the Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs in March 2005 to elect a new EMB was largely boycotted by the Moroc- can community (especially in Brussels),17 and its political and legal aftermath led to a situation where internal conflicts and allegations of corruption thrown at some board members regularly paralyse the

15 This is the line of argumentation developed by Lionel Panafit following his thorough historical account and analysis of the institutional recognition of the Islamic cult. See Panafit, Lionel,Quand le droit écrit l’Islam. L’Intégration juridique de l’islam en Belgique (Louvain-La-Neuve: Bruylant Academia, 1999). 16 The Royal Decree of 3 July 1996 provided for a modest subsidy for the material organisation of the Islamic cult which was 74.500€ in 1996, 495.000€ in 2000, 1.180.000€ in 2005 and 996.000€ in 2007. Figures from Husson, Jean-François, “Le financement du culte islamique en Belgique”, http://www.cil.be/files/PC7%20Le%20 financement%20du%20culte%20islamique%20en%20Belgique%20JF%20Husson.pdf, accessed 6 January 2010. 17 Due to a boycott by a large segment of the Moroccan civil society in Brussels of the 2005 elections, the General Assembly ended up being composed of a large proportion of Turks. See Crivellaro, Rachel “les Turcs raflent la majorité des sièges” (Turks obtain the majority of seats) in La Libre Belgique, 24 March 2005. 76 nadia fadil operation of Executive. The institutional organ continues to fulfil its administrative functions and to accompany the mosques and imams in their recognition processes despite the current uncertainty that exists about the modalities for a renewed composition of the board and general assemble of the EMB.18

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Aside from the official body for the Islamic faith, the EMB, ethnic socio-cultural associations and federations of all sizes make up a very dynamic Muslim civil society.19 These associations are organised mainly along ethnic lines. Among the Turks there are a number of federations (which sometimes encompass a large number of local mosques) expressing competing ideological and religious tendencies from Turkey. Moroccan civil society is, on turn, composed by a number of federations, and a myriad of associations, including many run by independent mosques and denominational associations that cater, for example, for young people or Islamic teachers of religion. The best organised and consequently most influential Turkish Islamic movement is the Belgian branch of the Presidency of Reli- gious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey Belçika( Türk Islam Diyanet Vakfi), known as Diyanet (Chaussée d’Haecht 67, 1210 Brussels, Bel- gium, tel: +32 2 218 57 55, fax: +32 2 223 01 52, http://www.belcikadi yanet.be). Today, Diyanet unites close to two-thirds of the Turkish mosques in Belgium and receives imams and Islamic teachers trained

18 The official mandate of the actual Executive only lasted until the end of 2009. The actual board has however received an extension until the end of the year 2010 to come up with a consensus on a procedure for the designation of new board members. At the time of our writing there wasn’t yet a consensus about the procedure to adopt, although the last information seems to indicate that the option of delegate members from existing mosques would have the upper hand (Le Soir, 20 May 2010). This option has, however, been contested by some EMB members who have organised themselves as the Democratic Alternative of Muslims in Belgium, calling for a general and democratic election and denouncing the increasing role given to the Moroccan and Turkish authorities through this. See alternativemusulmane.blogspot.com, accessed November 2010. 19 For an overview of the different (Islamist) networks, movements and organizations within the Muslim community of Belgium, see Maréchal, B., “Courants fonda- mentalistes en Belgique” (Fundamentalist tendencies in Belgium), Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 3, no. 1 (2008), available at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal_fr/ 2008/issue1/jv3no1a5.html, accessed 16 May 2009. belgium 77 in Turkey and financed by the Turkish government. The second Turk- ish Islamic group is the religious political movement Millî Görüs (lit. ‘national vision’) represented by the Islamic Federation of Belgium (Belçika İslam Federasyonu) (Chaussée de Haecht, 125, 1030 Brussels, Belgium, tel: +32 2 219 80 79, fax: +32 2 218 20 49, http://www.fibif .be), the parent chapter of which was founded in Germany in 1973. Millî Görüs maintains ties with non-Turkish Islamic groups and various European public authorities and close to a third of the Turkish mosques in Belgium belong to this group. There are some other Turk- ish Islamic communities, but they are markedly smaller. The Islamic reform movement known as the Gülen movement (Boulevard Auguste Reyers 207–209/3, 1030 Brussels, tel: +32 2 736 90 11, fax: +32 2 742 30 11, http://www.idp-pdi.be) is the third group. It runs six primary or secondary schools (the Dutch-language Lucerna Colleges and French- language Ecoles des Étoiles), boarding schools, and religious training centres. Its vision centres on the creation of an economic and intellectual elite of believers, although its officers refuse to call its establishments ‘Islamic’. The Belgian Federation of Alevi Associations Belçika( Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu) forms the heterodox Shi’i variant of Turk- ish Islam in Belgium and presents a humanist culture. Moroccan religious associations and mosques in Belgium are not organised along such clear ideological lines. Groupings do exist, but it is more a matter of individual practising Muslims who identify with a certain religious and ideological orientations rather than clear-cut lines adopted by the mosques. It is thus difficult to offer an accurate picture or clear estimates of the spread of different ideological tendencies within the Maghrebi community. A large part of Belgium’s Moroccan migrants adheres to a traditional Maliki rite, which is also close to the Moroccan monarchy and is followed by most traditional mosque leaders. Religious-political groupings, like the Moroccan Al Adl wal Ihsane or Reformist tendencies of the Muslim Brotherhood, are also represented among mostly higher educated segments of the community.20 The same also applies for spiritual Sufi traditions such as the Moroccan tariqa Boutchichiyya. Pietistic movements like the Tabligh are mostly represented among the lower educated segments

20 For a recent analysis of the Muslim brotherhood movement in Belgium and in Europe, see Maréchal, B., The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse(Lei- den: Brill, 2008). 78 nadia fadil of the Moroccans. Salafi tendencies, mostly from Saudi Arabia, can in turn be found among some youth and converts. The Moroccan religious associations and mosques are organised in provincial federations. The Antwerp union,Unie van de Mos- keeën en Islamitische Verenigingen van Antwerpen (UMIVA) (Plantin Moretuslei 202, 2018 Antwerp, Belgium, tel: +32 3 235 48 33, umiva [email protected]) for the Dutch-speaking part and the Brussels- Brabant union, Union des Mosquées de Bruxelles-Brabant Wallon (UMBB) (rue François-Joseph Navez, 60–64, 1000 Brussels, Belgium, [email protected]) for the French-speaking part of the country, are the oldest.21 In 2002, the provincial unions came together to form the Federation of Mosque Unions (FUM). These federations figure as main representatives of locally based mosques, act as interlocutors with local authorities. In the Flemish part of the country, the Moroccan community is also organised in Federations such as the Federatie voor Marokkaanse Verenigingen22 (FMV) which has its main activities in Antwerp, or the Federatie voor Marokkaanse Democratische organisaties23 (FMDO), with its main activities in Brussels and the province of Limburg. The associationVereniging voor Ontwikkeling en Emancipatie van Moslims24 (VOEM) adopts a mid-way position, profiling itself both as Islamic and socio-cultural organization. These ethno-cultural federations fulfil similar functions to the Islamic federations, yet with a focus on organizations organized on an ethno-cultural basis rather than a religious basis. The Islamic and Cultural Centre of Belgium (Centre Culturel et Islamique de Belgique (ICC)) (Parc du Cinquantenaire, 14, 1040 Brus- sels, Belgium, tel: +32 2 735 21 73, http://www.centreislamique.be), known as La grande mosquée, housed in the grand mosque of Brus- sels since 1969, is a historical player on Brussels’s Arab Islamic stage. It is a creation of the World Muslim League, controlled by Saudi Arabia, and played a decisive role in Belgium’s official recognition of the Islamic faith up until 1996. The ICC continues to have religious authority within certain parts of the North African population, and

21 For an account of the socio-cultural activities of the youth group of the UMIVA see Fadil, N. “We have to be walking Qur’ans’. The making of an Islamic political subject” in Amiraux, V. & Jonker, G. (eds.) The Politics of Visibility. Young Muslims in European Public Spaces (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2006), pp. 53–78. 22 Federation of Moroccan Organizations. 23 Federation of Moroccan Democratic Organizations. 24 Association for the development and emancipation of Muslims. belgium 79 also for the majority of converts. The Centre provides statements of religious advice ( fatwa), grants conversion certificates and organises Arabic language classes and courses in Islamic theology. Besides mosque-based organisations, there are also a number of Islamic socio-cultural organisations which are not necessarily linked to mosques but provide for cultural initiatives from an Islamic perspective and organise conferences on questions of Muslim identity and citizenship on a more local basis, such as the Présence Musulmane network in Brussels and the francophone part of Belgium.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

According to recent estimates there are 333 mosques and prayer houses in Belgium, all self-financed and with the formal legal status of non-profit associations.25 Flanders accounts for half of the houses of worship, with 167 mosques or prayer houses. There are 89 in Wal- lonia and 77 in the Brussels Region. Close to half of the mosques are attended and managed by Moroccans. The Turkish mosques account for 42% of the total. The remaining 10% belong to Albanian, Bosnian, Pakistani and other Muslim groups. Mosques are generally prayer houses converted from schools, shops or industrial premises. Only four Islamic places of worship in Belgium are purpose built according to the classical architecture of a mosque, with one or two minarets and a dome. Twelve others mosques have added a minaret to their renovated buildings. This possibility depends on building regulations and the political will of the local authorities.26 The amplified broadcasting of calls to prayers is generally prohibited in most municipalities, yet some exceptions exist.27 The official recognition and financial support of mosques turned into a regional competence in 2001. Stipulations on conditions to be recognised and financed are fixed by the regional authorities and

25 “Report on Mosques, Imams and Islam Teachers in Belgium” in http://www.kbs- frb.be/publication.aspx?id=178192&LangType=1033, accessed 16 May 2009. 26 For some example of local tensions around mosques, see Allievi, S., Conflicts over mosques in Europe—Policy issues and trends, NEF, 2009 (available to download at www.nefic.org). 27 In the small francophone town of Visé, the Turkish mosque Mimar Sinan at Cheratte-Bas has been calling to prayers three times a day since its establishment in 1981. See Dorzée, Hughes, “Le Chant du muezzin au pied des terrils” (The song of Muezzin at the region of Terrils), Le Soir, 19 December 2009, p. 19. 80 nadia fadil mostly apply to the size of the building, number of members and the administrative structure. Candidate mosques must furthermore declare that they will observe the Belgian constitution and human rights, and a positive report by the Belgian security services of the activities of the house of worship is a condition for their recognition. The Flemish recognition criteria are stricter than those applied in the rest of the country: the imams who draw salaries in recognised mosques in Flan- ders must take courses in ‘citizen-building’ (inburgering) organised by the regional authorities, and Dutch must be the official language of the mosque’s administration. Recognition by the regions entails the regional authorities’ commitment to maintain the buildings, and the federal government, for its part, is responsible for paying the salaries of the imams who officiate regularly in those mosques (some mosques enjoy the services of more than one imam). There are currently 43 mosques recognised by the Walloon regional government, 17 by the Flemish government and 8 by the Brussels Regional government.28 Nineteen imams are recognised by the federal authorities.29

5 Children’s Education

The country’s public primary and secondary schools offer the possibility of taking two hours a week of religion classes for the recognised religions, or non-denominational ethics classes. Under this general framework, classes in the Islamic religion have been organised in both Dutch- and French-speaking public education since 1975. The teachers of these classes are paid by the public authorities of the relevant language systems. For a considerable period, these teachers came from the immigrants’ home countries and often had insufficient teacher training (they did not have the requisite training) and/or Dutch or French language skills. Specific teams of inspectors (three Dutch-speaking and three French-speaking inspectors) were appointed in 2003 yet close to 700 Islamic religion teachers do not have a clear occupational status. One can thus assume that no standard curriculum exists and that there are inequalities when it comes to payment, seniority, appointments

28 Data from the Executive of Muslims in Belgium and the Regional Authorities, December 2010. 29 16 from Wallonia, two from Flanders and one from Brussels Capital Region. Data from Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique, December 2009. belgium 81 and pensions compared with other teachers within the educational system. Islamic religion classes are given in some 800–900 public primary and secondary schools. These courses are taken by an estimated 30,000 pupils (the general consensus is that this accounts for half of the potential Muslim student body). Belgian legislation allows the creation of private denominational schools that are eligible for public financing provided that they meet certain legal conditions. The first such denominational Muslim school was the Al-Ghazali School run by the Cultural and Islamic Centre of Brussels, founded in 1989. At the time, its creation triggered major political and media reactions. A second initiative was taken in Septem- ber 2007 with the opening of the Avicenna Islamic Secondary School for only a score or so of pupils in a borough of Brussels (Molenbeek) with a large Muslim population. Also noteworthy, although they refuse the label ‘Muslim school’, are the six Lucerne Schools (run by the Gülen movement) established across the country and which are quite successful. Besides the Islam classes given in public schools, some Flemish Cath- olic schools and the few Islamic schools in Brussels, Belgian mosques generally provide Quranic study classes in Arabic, Turkish, French, and Dutch, mostly on Wednesday afternoons and in the weekends.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Almost all imams who officiate in the Turkish mosques have been trained in theological schools in Turkey. Whilst their level of religious training is satisfactory, their French or Dutch language skills are often very poor and, most importantly, they are not familiar with the socio-cultural context of Belgian society or the economic, social, and cultural conditions in which the Muslim populations of immigrant descent live. The situation of the imams in the Moroccan mosques is more complex. In the first years of the immigration, Imams would be designated by the members of the community on the basis of their knowledge of the Qur’an and Islamic tradition. These would often also consist of men from the same regions in Morocco, who often enjoyed a minimal training in religious institutions (al ma’ahid al-diniyya) or local mosques in the home country.30 The function of these first

30 Kanmaz & Battiui, Moskeeën, Imams en Islamleerkrachten in België (Mosques, Imams and Islam Teachers in Belgium) (Brussel: King Baudouin Fondation, 2004), p. 26. 82 nadia fadil imams was mostly to head the prayer and act as administrator for the mosque. Moroccan authorities also provided for imams, either on an occasional (especially during Eid festivities) or permanent basis. Over time, however, the Moroccan Muslim community—especially the second generation—became more demanding towards their imam. Their knowledge of the Islamic tradition and capacity to engage with the daily needs of the community became an important factor of authority and credibility. This also explains the higher authority granted to Imams trained in Egypt or Saudi-Arabia, who are considered to have benefited from the best training possible. The capacity to engage with the problems emerging from the reality of Muslims as a minority in a non-Muslim context also became an important criterion of evaluation. Yet not only Muslims but also non-Muslims had an increasing interest in the functioning and training of the imam, especially after 9/11. Non-Muslim officials and social actors viewed imams as central and influential figures, whose conduct and speeches impact upon the integration of the Muslim community. Whether this perspective holds true is a matter of debate.31 Both the Muslim community’s need for locally trained imams as well as the fear of ‘radical imams’ by Belgian officials thus stand at the basis of a number of pilot projects to train Islamic religious personnel. In the French-speaking part of the country, the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) has been offering courses in Islamic Studies based in the social sciences since 2007 open to all—Muslim and non-Muslim.32 The ‘Observatory of the Relations between Religion, organised Secu- larity and the State’33 organised training for ministers of religion of foreign origin in Charleroi in 2007 with the assistance of federal public funds and the support of the government of the Walloon region.34 In Flanders, the University of Antwerp has started a programme for Islam

31 Several scholars have indeed argued that the social role of the Imam is often overestimated by the local authorities, which results from a projection of the moral role played by the priests upon the figure of the Imam. See Kanmaz & Battiui, ibid. and Welmoet Boender, Imam in Nederland. Opvattingen over zijn religieuze rol in de samenleving (Imam in the Netherlands. Viewpoints on his religious role in society) (Amsterdam: Bert De Bakker, 2007). 32 http://www.uclouvain.be/38784.html. 33 http://oracle.cifop.be/. 34 http://oracle.cifop.be/#form, accessed 16 May 2009. belgium 83 teachers in collaboration with the EMB,35 and is studying the possibility of creating a new programme to train Muslim executives in the broadest sense (imams and other representatives).36 The Cultural and Islamic Centre of Brussels (Centre Culturel et Islamique de Bruxelles) has long offered theology courses in Arabic in order to train Islamic personnel. A number of Islamic theological institutions have also been created in both Arabic and Turkish-speaking circles, yet none of these initiatives has received so far an official recognition.37

7 Burial and Cemetries

The bodies of most Muslims who die in Belgium, even those who have acquired Belgian citizenship, are mostly sent back to their homelands for burial.38 In order to pay for this, most Muslim families contribute to either commercial or association funds. There are no Islamic cemeteries per se in Belgium. Cemeteries are managed by the municipalities and some of those that have large Muslim populations have set aside specific areas for Islamic burials. There are nine of such Islamic parcels in Flanders,39 three in Wallonia, and two in the Brussels Region.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Islamic counsellors have been able to visit patients in hospitals and inmates in prisons (a third of inmates in Belgium are of the Muslim faith) for years. The prison chaplains have enjoyed recognised legal

35 “Universiteit Antwerpen Leidt Islamleerkrachten op”, De Standaard, 8 October 2009. 36 A study is being conducted by Jonathan Debeer, University of Antwerp, on the feasibility of such a programme which consists of a survey and qualitative interviews among Imams in Flanders. 37 For example: Islamitische Universiteit van Europa-Afdeling Gent (European Islamic University, Section of Ghent), http://www.ifeg.be/ifeg/x; Faculté des Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles: http://www.faculte-islamique.be/; Académie Européenne de Culture et de Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles: http://www.alkhayria.com/index.htm. 38 There exist no exact data on this question, yet it is fair to say that the largest majority of the bodies of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims of the first generation are transferred to the country of origin. The picture is however less clear regarding the younger generations considering their young age, and it remains an open question to which extent the forthcoming generations will be buried in Belgium rather than in the country of their parents (or grandparents). 39 http://www.flwi.ugent.be/cie/archief/docu3.htm. 84 nadia fadil status since 2005 and eighteen of them draw salaries for this work. There are currently 22 chaplains who are recognised and financed by the Belgian authorities: 9 Dutch-speaking and 13 French-speaking.40 The hospital counsellors are not paid by the state.

9 Religious Festivals

Muslim religious holidays are not granted any official status by the Belgian authorities but are individually observed by Muslims. While most of these holidays generally pass unnoticed, some do become visible and require a minimum of support by the local authorities. This is especially the case for the sacrifice or Id‘ al-Adha. Slaughtering animals at home is illegal in Belgium and the majority of the country’s Mus- lims obey this law. Municipalities with large Muslim populations have been trying to organise the ritual sacrifice of Id‘ al-Adha since the late 1990s. They set up temporary slaughterhouses (where EMB-approved halal butchers officiate) and arrange for the sacrificed animals’ car- casses to be collected, but organisational set-backs emerge in certain municipalities each year. Butchers and breeders are also allowed to make their services available to Muslims at such times. The Executive of Muslims in Belgium provides for slaughtering certificates during ‘Id al-Adha, provided that certain conditions are met. ‘Id Al-Adha has traditionally also every year been a source of protest by the animal rights movement and the far right The Antwerp alderman of diversity and social affairs Monika De Coninck caused a turmoil during the ‘Id al-Adha of November 2010 after announcing her plans to open a spot where sheep would be rendered unconscious before being slaughtered, which would also be 10 euro cheaper than the regular 25 euros. Both the Executive for Muslims in Belgium and other Muslim actors reacted sharply against this proposal, viewing it as an illegitimate intrusion of the local government in Muslim affairs. While plans did not take effect due to an administrative error, De Coninck declared to continue her plans during next year’s Id festivities.41

40 Data: Executive of Muslims in Belgium. 41 Sascha Van Wiele, “Wie schaap voor slachting offerfeest verdooft krijgt 10€ kort- ing” (Where sheep stunned before festival slaughter get 10€ off ), Gazet Van Antwer- pen, 16 September 2010, and Christine De Herdt, “Discussie slachtingen overschaduwt Offerfeest” (Discussion of slaughter overshadows festival),De Standaard, 17 Novem- ber 2010. belgium 85

A large absence of Muslims from school or work is also generally felt during the two main holidays of ‘Id Al-Adha and ‘Id Al-Fitr (the celebration of the end of the Ramadan). This has led some to advocate the recognition of those religious festivities as national holidays. Yet this idea has not seriously been considered and is met with resistance. There exist therefore no official or uniform regulations on these issues. Muslim pupils and students stay at home, either without permission or on presentation of a sick note, and which is authorised by the authorities.42 Workers and employees use a day’s leave to participate in each of these two main Islamic holidays. The recent report for intercultural dialogues (cf. infra), proposed to reform the current calendar by replacing three fixed national Christian holidays (Easter, Ascension and All Saints) by three, flexible, holidays which could be used by the citizens at the moment of their choice.43

10 Halal Food

Halal butcheries and halal products are widely available in the main Belgian towns where most Muslims live. Yet these halal labels for food only partially reflect the reality. While the EMB has the capacity to grant a certificate to Muslim butchers who request it, it has neither the resources nor the authority to issue a halal label for food products (meat and others), or to control the supply chains or the production processes. This issue is currently being examined by a working group set up by the EMB.44

11 Dress Codes

The issue of wearing head scarves in schools has been on the Belgian agenda since 1989 and discussions continue to be passionate. Until 2009, the wearing of a head scarf or hijab at schools was not regulated, and the education authorities left school principals free to decide upon

42 The Flemish government explicitly grants the rights to religious minorities of recognised cults to remain absent on specific holidays, for Muslims being the Id Al Fitr and the Id Al Adha. 43 Martine Vandemeulenbroucke “Les Assises de l‘Interculutralité pour un calen- drier de congés moins chrétien”, Le Soir, 9 November 2010. 44 Data: Executive of Muslims in Belgium. 86 nadia fadil this matter. Yet in September 2009, the Flemish communal schools adopted a general and controversial regulation for all its schools (25% of the Flemish schools) which prohibits the wearing of visible religious signs with effect from September 2010. This measure was a consequence of an escalation of student’s protest to the head scarf ban imposed by the last remaining public schools of Antwerp allowing the hijab in September 2009. The measure was, however, suspended in April 2010 due to a successful legal charge against it at the Bel- gian State Council (Conseil d’Etat/Raad van State) which questioned its constitutional grounds. At the time of writing, the constitutional legitimacy of this measure was still being deliberated at the level of the Constitutional Court. In the French-speaking part of the country, 90% of public secondary schools prohibit hats, hijab and ‘obvious’ signs of religious affiliation on school premises. At the level of the job market, there are no regulations concerning the hijab, and employers are free to decide, both in the public and the private sector, upon this matter. Women in white-collar positions are often prohibited from wearing head scarves in their job in the private and public sectors, the few exceptions notwithstanding. One can furthermore find female factory workers and cleaners wearing head scarves.45 In the public sector, the picture is similar. Four major towns in Flanders (Antwerp, Ghent, Ninove and Lier) explicitly banned the wearing of the head scarf in 2007 and 2008 by female civil servants working in contact with the public. Wearing hijab for photographs for identity documents is allowed by the Belgian authorities if the face is visible between the forehead and the chin.

12 Publications and Media

There are several Islamic publishing houses and book stores in Bel- gium which sell mostly traditionalist or Salafi publications. They include Al-Imen (Brussels), Editions al-Hadith, Iqra, etc. In addition, some French publishers also distribute publications such as Editions le

45 Most famous example is that of Naima Amzil who could work in a food company with her head scarf on since it was compatible with the hygienic rules imposed on all workers who had to cover their hair. Between November 2004 and March 2005, Amzil’s employer, Rik Van Nieuwenhuyse received 7 letters wherein the author threatened to kill Van Nieuwenhuyse if he didn’t fire Amzil. A massive solidarity movement emerged and petitions were set up as a way of solidarity with the threatened employer. The letters ceased after a while and author of the letters was never found. belgium 87

Savoir, Editions Tawhid or Maison d’Ennour, in French-speaking areas or the Dutch edition house Al Bulaaq. A quota of time for broadcasting in the public media is granted to all recognised faiths. Islam is, however, the only religion that does not fully benefit from this right. The Brussels Radio Midi 1 has started allocating two hours on a weekly basis to the EMB. In December 2010, the Flemish Government approved the allocation of a time slot for Muslims at the Flemish Radio and TV channel (VRT), which will be organised as the MTRO (Moslim Televisie- en Radio Omroep). The first programmes are not expected to air before 2011.46 The national broadcasting services, both the French-speaking and Flemish ones, have still to grant the Muslim religious broadcasting time. The latter is partly due to the recent and difficult start of the Executive for Muslims in Belgium, which hasn’t been able to fully take up this agenda, local regulations concerning the allocation of broadcasting time as well as the reluctance of the national broadcasting services to do so.47

13 Family Law

There is no system of local arbitration by Muslim law courts which has an effect on the national law in Belgium. Muslim legal systems do, however, regularly intersect with Belgian national regulations, mostly because of the foreign or dual nationality of most Muslim citizens (cf. Moroccan or Turkish). In the case of the Moroccan community, the regulations of the Mudawwana (Moroccan personal and family law) have an effect upon the Moroccan-Belgian community, since a large part of Muslims of Moroccan origin, also from the second or third generations, contract their marriages in Morocco or at the Moroccan consulate as well as in Belgium. While this dual legal binding does not necessarily pose problems, there are some cases which are not recognised by the Belgian law system. This is especially so for matters like repudiation or polygamy, or matters of inheritance or guardianship in cases of divorce, where important differences exist between the Moroccan and Belgian legal systems. While Belgian and Moroccan

46 “Moslimomroep krijgt zendtijd” in De Standaard, 17 December 2010. 47 See “Moslims vragen zendtijd bij de VRT” (Muslims ask broadcasting time at the VRT), De Standaard, 24 November 2006 and “Zendtijd voor Moslims ten vroegste in 2010” (Broadcasting time for Muslims at the earliest in 2010), Het Nieuwsblad, 24 November 2006. 88 nadia fadil authorities have been working on bilateral agreements to settle these conflict points,48 the absence of concrete guidelines and regulations on these issues have resulted in a situation where there is no consistency in the way these different legal systems are administered by the judges. The latter is mostly left to the individual judges’ appraisal and their knowledge of the International Private Law regulations. Some studies show that most judges limit themselves to the Belgian law. Those few who engage with the Moroccan law refrain from doing so in cases which are seen to conflict with the Belgian order (especially equality between men and women which is seen to conflict with practices such as polygamy or repudiation).49 There are some cases, however, where judges simply follow the foreign regulations, even when conflicts arise with Belgian principles.50 Besides the institutionally recognised and visible intersections, Islamic normative principles also impact on more invisible or informal ways upon Muslims’ daily lives. Pious Muslims often seek fatwas or religious advice by highly respected religious scholars or imams before contracting a house mortgage, and there are some cases where civil arrangements are even left aside, such as for instance in the case of Islamic marriages (djawaz ‘urfi or shari’i).

14 Interreligious Relations

There exist a countless number of interreligious initiatives which aim at fostering the ties between Muslims and Christians and strive towards a

48 For an elaborate account of this problematic issue see the work of the Belgian legal scholar Marie-Claire Foblets. 49 See Verhellen, Jinske, “Entretiens avec des Juristes Practiciens et Travailleurs Sociaux” in Foblets, M.C. (ed.) Femmes marocaines et conflits familiaux en immigration: quelles solutions juridiques appropriées (Moroccan women and migration or domestic conflicts : which proper juridical solutions?)(Antwerpen-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 1998), pp. 149–211. 50 A concrete case can be found in a decision by the legal court of Brussels in 1986 where a woman of Moroccan nationality sued her ex-husband for moral harm caused by the fact that he repudiated her and remarried under the Moroccan law. The judge decided against the female plaintiff, arguing that her ex-husband’s actions ware in concordance with the Morocco law and didn’t have any injurious objective. Marie- Claire Foblets has questioned this decision, arguing that by simply recognizing the effects of the repudiation the judge fails to question the unequal status between men and women undergirding this decision see Foblets, Marie-Claire, Familles—Islam— Europe. Le droit confronté au changement (Family, Islam, Europe. Law confronted with change) (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996), pp. 141–142. belgium 89 better mutual understanding. Some examples are the working group ‘Relatieopbouw Christenen en Moslims’ (construction of mutual relationship Christian and Muslims) of the Flemish organisation Kerkwerk Multicultureel. At the Francophone side, the organisation El Kalima (www.elkalima.be) organises on a regular basis conferences and seminars to foster Christian-Muslim ties. In November 2010, the Federal Report of intercultural dialogue was presented. This report is the fruit of one year of intensive work by various commissions composed of grassroots organisations of the different confessional groups, and experts from the academic scene and the civil society.51

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Since the end of the 1990s, and especially after 2000, a new turn has been adopted in the multicultural debate, particularly in Flanders, which is largely centred on the presence and integration of Muslim minorities. The electoral successes of the right wing as well as the explosion of the debate in Holland,52 has largely influenced the Flemish public debate. Several journalists and commentators, as well as politicians, called for an acknowledgment of the problematic facets of the multicultural society and to call the problems by their names. These discussions are also fed by the growing visibility of Muslims in the public sphere, and their increasing claims; such as the right to wear hijab or niqab; or the increasing assertiveness of a number of minority organisations, as illustrated through the emergence of and controversy around Islamic political organizations such as the Mouvement des Jeunes Musulmans (MJM), or the Arab European League in 2003 and 2004. International events like the attacks on the World Trade Centre, the London or Madrid attacks, the Danish cartoon crisis in 2005, the French head scarf affair or the Swiss vote against minarets, also impacted upon the

51 See http://www.interculturalite.be/Rapport-2010?lang=fr, accessed 15 December 2010. 52 The end of the nineties signals the emergence of Pim Fortuyn, a charismatic politician who denounced the non-integration of Muslims and linked it with the back- wardness of Islam. In that same period, left intellectuals like Paul Scheffer denounced what they considered as a ‘multicultural drama’, which was attributed to unwillingness to confront the socio-economic deprivation as well as the cultural particularity of Muslims. 90 nadia fadil tone of the debate, which is often passionate and polarised with little room for nuance. More locally, the involvement of some Belgian Mus- lims (such as Abdessatar Dahmane or Muriel Degauque) in suicide operations in Iraq or Afghanistan, has also fed fears and suspicions on existing terrorist networks within the capital. Such polarised discourses, which have the ‘integration’ of Muslims as main target, also have an effect upon the ways non-Muslims view their fellow Muslim citizens. According to a survey carried out by the Institute for Social and Political Research (ISPO) of the Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) and published in January 2008, 48% of the Flemish population believes that the values of Islam constitute a threat to Europe, and 37% believes that the majority of Muslims do not respect the European culture and lifestyle.

16 Major Cultural Events

Over the past few years, a number of large scale cultural activities have also been organised by Islamic organisations. A consortium of European Muslim organisations called the European Association of Art and Culture has been organising since 2006 a number of cultural festivals in Brussels conference centre the Heysel gathering hundreds or even thousands of Muslims.53 In May 2007, a cultural festival which lasted for two days gathered over 5000 participants. The cultural event included conferences on the presence of Muslims in Europe given by Muslim and non-Muslim scholars as well as a concert of the well- known Muslim artist Sami Yusuf. In February 2006 and May 2008 the European festival of Anasheed and Spiritual Songs was also organised by the same consortium in the same place in Brussels. Such performances are structured according to specific Islamic ethical rationales both in their message as well as in their format (such as the restriction on percussion). Farid El Asri notes that the cultural and aesthetic expressions like those of Sami Yusuf should be read at the intersection of the Islamic tradition and cultural modernity: while these Muslim artists compose music which largely fits in the scripts and codes of contemporary popular music (e.g. video clips, the production process and style), these artistic performances equally inscribe themselves within

53 The Consortium is an ensemble of Muslim organisations from various European countries which are linked to the Moroccan Al Adl Wal Ihsane movement. belgium 91 the Muslim tradition.54 In recent years, not only Muslim organisations but also private Muslim entrepreneurs have been organising similar cultural festivals. An example is the annual Cultural and Islamic meeting (Rencontre Culturelle et Islamique) organised since 2007 by the Brussels collective ‘Les disciples du style’ and which mostly gathers young Muslim women.55 Another important cultural expression to be noted within this category is the emergence of a Muslim hip-hop and R&B scene which has turned into a highly popular musical genre among Muslim youngsters, mostly in urban areas through local artists like Manza or Rival in Brussels or French artists like Kery James, Médine or Abd Al Malik. According to El Asri, this Muslim hip-hop distinguishes itself from other forms of hip-hop through the inclusion of Islamic ethics and aesthetics in its form and content.56 This translates mostly in the choice of themes (often a socially engaged hip-hop which affirms one’s Muslim identity and explicitly distances itself from gangsta’ rap), but also the activities and conduct of the artist.57

54 El Asri, Farid, “Au croisement des mondialisations. Le cas de Sami Yusuf ” (At the crossroad of globalization. The case of Sami Yusuf ) inRecherches Sociologiques et Anthropologiques, (Louvain-La-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain, 2006/2), pp. 79–91. 55 I am grateful to Farid El Asri, member of the CISMOC at the UCL, for this information. 56 El Asri, Farid, “L’Expression musicale de musulmans européens: Créations de sonorités à l’épreuve de la normativité religieuse” (The Musical expression of Euro- pean Muslims. Creating sound challenged by the religious norm) in Revue européenne des migrations internationales, vol. 25 (2009), no. 2, pp. 35–50. 57 The Brussels collective Rival organizes since two years a yearly benefit called ‘hip-hop(e)’ each December in Brussels which consists of a hip-hop festival gathering a large part of the Belgian hip-hop scene. All profit goes to specific causes.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Aid Smajić 1

1 Muslim Populations

According to the last official census in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BH or Bosnia), conducted in 1991, 1,902,956 (or 43.5%) of the 4,377,033 inhabitants of the country declared themselves as ‘Muslims’ by nationality.2 Since ethnic and religious identities overlap to a large extent in the case of all three constituent ethnic communities in Bosnia, this figure is usually taken as indicative of the number of adherents of Islam, just as most Croats are usually considered Roman Catholic and most Serbs are considered Orthodox Christians. ‘Muslims’ were recognised as one of the Yugoslav nationalities in the late 1960s. In 1993, the term ‘Muslims’ was replaced by ‘Bosniaks’ as the national name for Bosnian Muslims. Before the 1992–95 war, a significant number of Muslims declared themselves to be ‘Yugoslavs’.3 Due to war-related death, expulsion and internal and external migration, the numbers and demographic distribution of ethnic groups within BH have significantly changed. A new census proposed for 2011, which may include questions on ethnicity, religion or language, is a sensitive political issue opposed by some Bosniak and Croat politicians because of the fear of implicitly ‘legitimising’ the new ethnic map created by genocide and ethnic cleansing during the 1992–95 war and post-war obstruction of

1 Dr. Aid Smajić is a senior assistant lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo. He holds BA degrees in Islamic Studies and Psychology, an MA in Islamic Civilization, and a PhD in Social Psychology of Religion. He has published several articles on interreligious relations and tolerance. 2 See details at http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/NacStanB.htm, accessed 30 Novem- ber 2010. 3 For more about the history behind and debates surrounding the question of national identity of Bosniaks see Kamberović, Husnija (Ed.), Rasprave o nacionalnom identitetu Bošnjaka: Zbornik radova (Debates about National Identity of Bosniaks: Collection of Papers), (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju u Sarajevu, 2009). 94 aid smajić refugee return, especially in the Republika Srpska, where many areas were completely cleansed of non-Serbs.4 According to estimates by the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the population of the country is 3,843,126,5 while the CIA World Factbook estimates the total number of Bosnian citizens in 2010 at 4,621,598, of whom 48% are said to be Bosniaks, 37.1% Serbs, 14.3% Croats and 0.6% others,6 including more than 1.3 million living abroad.7 It is generally accepted that Islam arrived in Bosnia with the Ottoman armies in fifteenth century. Bosnian Muslims are mainly descended from Christians (Catholics, Orthodox, or adherents of the extinct Medieval Bosnian Church) who converted to Islam during the four centuries of Ottoman rule from the middle of the fifteenth century until 1878, when Bosnia became part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and remained so until 1918. From 1918 to 1992, the territory that makes up today’s Bosnian state was successively part of three countries, including the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–41), the Independent State of Croatia (1941–45), and Communist Yugoslavia (1945–92).8 A referendum on independence from Yugoslavia was held in Bosnia in February 1992 and was boycotted by most Bosnian Serbs, whose forces, assisted by Belgrade, initiated a bloody war in 1992–95. After the war atrocities culminated in the Srebrenica massacre9 in July 1995,

4 More detailed analysis of atrocities and genocide committed against Bosniaks during the 1992–95 war could be found in Cigar, Norman, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing, (Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1995). 5 Estimated data as of 30 June 2010. For details see http://www.bhas.ba/new/, accessed 30 November 2010. 6 Estimated data as of July 2010. For details, see https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html, accessed 30 November 2010. 7 See Svjetski Savez dijaspore Bosne i Hercegovine (World Association of the Diaspora of Bosnia and Herzegovina), http://www.bihdijaspora.com/prva.htm, accessed 30 November 2010. 8 See Marko Attila Hoare, The History of Bosnia: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day (London: Saqi, 2007); Karčić, Fikret, The Bosniaks and the Challenges of Modernity (Sarajevo: El Kalem, 1999) and Malcolm, Noel, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1996). More detailed accounts of the history of the Bosniaks and the spread of Islam could be found in Imamović, Mustafa, Istorija Bošnjaka (History of the Bosniaks) (Sarajevo: Preporod, 1998) and Filipović, Nedim, Islamizacija u Bosni i Hercegovini (Islamisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Tešanj: Centar za kulturu i obrazovanje, 2005). 9 In 2007, the International Court of Justice explicitly labeled the crime committed in Srebrenica in July 1995 as an act of genocide. See: ICJ, Press Release 2007/8, bosnia and herzegovina 95 in November of the same year a peace agreement was made in Dayton (USA) and was officially signed in Paris (France) on December 15, 1995, thus ending over three years of bloodshed and dividing BH into the Federation of BH and Republika Srpska, with the strategic town Brčko in the north as a separate district.10 Estimates of the death toll of the war have ranged from 25,000 to 300,000, with about 200,000 being the accepted figure until 2007, when a three-year investigation of the Research and Documentation Centre put the total number of direct victims at 97,207, of whom 64,036 were Bosniaks or Bosnian Muslims. The study also revealed that more than 83% of civilian deaths were Bosniaks, rising to nearly 95% in Eastern Bosnia, and that more than two million people fled their homes during the war, including over one million to neighbouring states and the West.11 According to the latest estimates by the UNHCR, around 200,000 Bosnians still have the status of refugees and internally dis- placed persons, who face many obstacles when returning to their pre- war homes.12 Bosnian Muslims are overwhelmingly Sunnis who follow the Hanafi school of Islamic law and Maturidi School of Islamic doctrine. During and after the 1992–95 Bosnian war, the first Salafis, locally known as ‘Wahhabis’, emerged. Their exact number is not known and, contrary to general belief, they control no mosques and their initial public presence has been steadily weakening. There are very few Shi’i Muslims and

27 February 2008, ‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish- ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)’, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=1897&pt=1&p1=6&p2=1, accessed 30 November 2010. Two other international courts have determined that genocide took place in BH 1992–95. See Marko Attila Hoare, “Bosnia-Hercegovina and International Justice: Past Failures and Future Solutions”, in East European Poli- tics and Societies, vol. 24 No. 2 (May 2010), 191–205. 10 For the history and socio-political forces behind the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, see Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Bal- kans (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996). 11 See Rezultati istraživanja ‘Ljudski gubici 91–95’ (Results of the Research on Human Losses in 91–95) (Sarajevo: Research and Documentation Center, 2007) at http:// www.idc.org.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&id=35&Itemid= 126&lang=bs, accessed 30 November 2010. For an excellent analysis of these figures see: Marko atilla Hoare, “What do the figures for the Bosnian war-dead tell us?” available at http://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com/2008/01/04/what-do-the-figures-for-the- bosnian-war-dead-tell-us/. 12 See http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d766, accessed 30 November 2010. 96 aid smajić no Shi’i mosques, although there are several pro-Shi’i associations. 13 For many Bosniaks, however, their Muslim identity very often has much more to do with cultural roots than with religious beliefs. Reliable data on the extent of active religious practice of Muslims are scarce and mostly could be found in post-war empirical studies of religiosity of different Bosnian peoples, including Bosniaks.14

2 Islam and the State

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a secular state with no state religion. The state defined its relations with churches and religious organisations in the Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Organisations in BH passed in 2004.15 The law provides for freedom of religion and religious non-discrimination, the legal status of churches and religious communities, and the establishment of relations between the state and religious communities. In 2006 the Catholic Church, and in 2008 the Serbian Orthodox Church, signed basic agreements with the state, while the Islamic Community in BH (hereafter ICBH) in January 2010 submitted its proposal of the agreement and is waiting for its ratification. Individual religious communities, including the ICBH, receive ad hoc funding for their projects, especially for the (re)construction of religious sites. Most of about a dozen religious schools, including Islamic ones, are also regularly supported by public funds. However, the Law on Religious Freedom envisages the possibility of public funding

13 For some modern changes in the landscape of Islamic religiosity in BH, see Alibašić, Ahmet, “Globalisation and its impact on Bosnian Muslims practices”, available at http://www.bosanskialim.com/, accessed 30 November 2010, and Islamska tradicija Bošnjaka (Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks) (Sarajevo: Rijaset Islamske zajednice u BiH, 2008). 14 See for example Smajić, Aid, Psihosocijalni aspekti religioznosti kao determinante međunacionalne tolerancije (Psychosocial aspects of religiosity as a determinant of ethnic tolerance), unpublished PhD dissertation (Sarajevo: University of Sarajevo, 2010); and Abazović, Dino, Bosanskohercegovački muslimani između sekularizacije i desekularizacije (Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina between secularisation and de-secularisation), unpublished PhD dissertation (Sarajevo: University of Sarajevo, 2009). 15 For the complete text of the law, see http://www.mpr.gov.ba/userfiles/file/ Biblioteka/zakoni/bh/ZAKON%20O%20SLOBODI%20VJERE/ZAKON%20o%20 slobodi%20vjere.pdf, accessed 30 November 2010. bosnia and herzegovina 97 for other expenses too. Apart from concerted efforts by all religious communities to solve the issue of their property that was nationalised under Communist rule, the ICBH together with Catholic and Ortho- dox Church is currently appealing to respective state ministries to take over paying for pension and health care insurance for their imams, priests and pastors.16 In post-war Bosnia, the increased presence of religion in the public arena is evident. Some welcome the religious revival as a healthy assertion of identity after the decades long de-Islamisation process during the Communist period, while others see it as a rising threat to the secular and politically fragile state. A survey conducted in 2006 and 2007 of attitudes of parents and students in Bosnia towards the content of education curricula, including religious education, showed that more than 90% were of the opinion that religious education in some form should be taught in public schools.17 Increased public visibility has also exposed religious communities to new challenges arising from publicity and public critique. In the post-war period, the ICBH has been strongly and regularly criticised by the media, often in a manner it finds unacceptable (see section 15 below). Together with other religious leaders, the representatives of the ICBH are regularly invited to attend official ceremonies and celebrations at all levels.18 However, unlike Orthodox priests in Republika

16 See “Report on the Status of the Right to Freedom of Religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1.1.–31.12. 2008)” published in 2009 by the Interreligious Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at http://mrv.ba/images/stories/documents/ Izvjestaj_stanje_prava.pdf, accessed 30 November 2010. 17 Trbić, Dženana and Snježana Kojić Hasanagić, Obrazovanje u Bosni i Herce- govini: Čemu učimo djecu? Istraživanje stavova roditelja i učenika o vrijednostima u nastavnim planovima i programima i udžbenicima (Education in Bosnia and Herze- govina: What Do We Teach Children About? Survey on Attitudes of Parents and Stu- dents towards Values in Education Curricula, Programmes and Textbooks) (Sarajevo: Open Society Fund BH, 2007). 18 For more on the status of Islam in BH as a secular state, see article by Dr Fikret Karčić, one of the leading Muslims thinkers in the country, “Secular State and Religion(s): Remarks on the Bosnian Experience in Regulating Religion and State Relations” in Religion and Secular State: Role and Meaning of Religion in a Secular Society from Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Perspectives (Zurich & Sarajevo, European Abrahamic Forum, 2008), pp. 15–25. Also see Kovačević, Emir, “The legal position of churches and religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Silvo Devetak et al. (eds.), Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in South-Eastern Europe (Ljubljana: IDSE, 2004), pp. 63–68. 98 aid smajić

Srpska Muslim clergy never consecrate new public buildings and no Islamic symbols are present in public premises.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The main Muslim organisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBH—Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini, Zelenih beretki 17, Sarajevo, 71000, tel: +387 33 533 000, fax: +387 33 441 800, ww.rijaset.ba). The ICBH is, according to its Constitution, “the sole and united community of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Bosniaks outside their homeland, and of other Muslims who accept it as their own. The autonomy of ICBH is based on the religious and legal institutions of Bosnian Muslims from the time of Ottoman administration in Bosnia.”19 The ICBH is recognised by the state as the institution that has traditionally represented Islam in BH. It is independent in regulating its activities (rituals, Islamic education, management of Islamic endowments, publishing, charity, etc.) and the management of its property, and is financed mainly throughwaqf s, membership fees, zakat (alms giving), sadaqat al-fitr (charitable amount given to the poor at the end of Ramadan), the revenue of its profit-generating agencies, donations and legacies. The organisational structure of the ICBH consists ofjama’a s (community of at least 100 households), majlisas (usually a group of not less than seven jama’as in one municipality or city), 9 muftiates (mufti offices, covering the area of a canton) in Bosnia, including a military one without territorial definition, and 5meshihat s (organisation units gathering Bosnian Muslims living in a country abroad), including meshihats in Slovenia, Croatia, Sandžak in Serbia (Sanjak), Germany and Australia, as well as many other umbrella organisations gathering Bosnian Muslims on the basis of their ethno-religious identity in the USA, Austria and other European countries. TheRiyasat , as the highest religious and administrative organ, is the main executive body of the ICBH and is headed by Rais al-ulama (the President of the Riyasat

19 The Constitution Rijaset“ Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini ” (Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Hercegovina) (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1997), Articles 1–4, is available at http://www.rijaset.ba/en/images/stories/Constitution.pdf, accessed 30 November 2010. bosnia and herzegovina 99 and the Grand Mufti or supreme authority in the ICBH), a position held by Dr Mustafa Cerić since 1993. The Council of the ICBH Sabor( or the ICBH’s assembly) is the highest representative and legislative body of the ICBH.20 Apart from the Office for the Bosniak Diaspora, Office for Hajj and Office for Relations with Islamic World as departments of theRiyasat , the main institutions of the ICBH include the Waqf or Endowments Directorate (Vakufska direkcija), El-Kalem publishing centre, the Cen- tre for Islamic Architecture, the Muslim News Agency (MINA), the Agency for Halal Quality Certification, the Gazi Husrev Bey Library, the Association of Islamic Scholars (Ilmija), the Tariqa Centre and the recently established BIR Radio Station. Educational institutions managed by the ICBH include six Islamic high schools or madrasas, a secular high school (Bošnjačka Gimnazija—Bosniak Gymnasium) and three faculties (see below). Except for the Gymnasium, all contact details can be found on the ICBH website, www.rijaset.ba. Several Sufi orders, mainly Qadiris and Naqshibandis, are active in the country, while Tarikatski centar (the Tariqa Centre) in Sarajevo, as an institution of the ICBH and is responsible for coordinating Sufi orders as part of the ICBH. In addition to the ICBH, there are other relatively small faith- based Muslim and Islamic associations with a variety of aims and orientations. Some are missionary, others cultural, scientific, charitable, student or exclusively female. The most significant Islamic charity is the Muslim Charitable Society ‘Merhamet’ (Muslimansko dobrot- vorno društvo ‘Merhamet’, Azize Šaćirbegović 112, 71000 Sarajevo, tel: +387 33 526 101, fax: +387 33 526 101), founded in 1913, banned 1946 and re-established 1990, which has been very active in collecting humanitarian aid, especially during the Bosnian war. Two of the main NGOs for Muslim women are the Women’s Education Centre ‘Nahla’ (Ženski edukacioni centar ‘Nahla’, www.nahla.ba), founded in 2000 in Sarajevo, and the Women’s Education Organisation ‘Kewser’ (Ženska edukaciona organizacija ‘Kewser’, www.kewser-zehra.com.ba), founded in 1994 in Zenica. The latter publishes a bi-monthly family magazine, Zehra.

20 For more about the organisation of the ICBH, see Karčić, Fikret, “Administration of Islamic affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” inIslamic Studies, vol. 38, no. 4 (1999), pp. 535–561, and official webpage of the ICBH available at http://rijaset.ba/. 100 aid smajić

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are approximately 1,700 mosques andmasjid s21 in BH, all run by the ICBH. Most Muslim villages and towns with significant Muslims communities have a mosque or masjid, either dating from Ottoman times or constructed by the local residents. In larger towns, such as Sarajevo, Zenica and Bugojno, a number of mosques were built after the war as a gift from friendly countries such as Saudi Ara- bia, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Jordan, and Kuwait. Many mosques are still under reconstruction after being destroyed or damaged during the war, while others are new builds. The ICBH reports that 613 mosques, 218 masjids, 69 maktabs (offices), zawia4 s (religious schools), 37 turbes (mausoleums) and 405 various other waqf properties were completely destroyed in the war of 1992–95.22 Occasionally attempts to rebuild a mosque has been halted or delayed by protests or attacks. In at least one case (Divič), an Orthodox church was constructed on the site of a destroyed mosque. After years of negotiation, in 2008 the ICBH and Serbian Orthodox Church reached an agreement that the former would cover the cost of the ‘displacement’ of the church, which eventually took place in March 2009. The formal opening of a newly built mosque is expected in near future.

5 Children’s Education

Although the status of confessional religious education (CRE) in Bos- nian public schools, including Islamic religious education, has varied over time, from canton to canton and entity to entity, today generally it is an elective course taught one hour a week in the first two grades of secondary school and one or two hours a week in all grades of primary school. Islamic teachers are trained and approved by the ICBH but employed and paid by public schools. While the status of CRE in Bosnian public schools is no longer questioned, the issue remains of how and in what form to introduce

21 In the Bosnian context, a mosque (džamija) is usually expected to have a minaret and a full-time imam. A masjid (mesdžid) is a smaller place for prayer, usually with part-time service and in most cases without a minaret. 22 For more details see Omerdić, Muharem, Prilozi izučavanju genocida nad Bošnjacima (Addendum to Study of the Bosniak Genocide) (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1999), pp. 15–25, 461–463, 473, 476. bosnia and herzegovina 101 non-denominational religious studies, locally known as Culture of Religions, or History of Religions, in schools. For years, local and international organisations led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have been trying to introduce such a one-year mandatory course, but with limited success. Progress is being made but the course is still at an experimental stage.23 In 2008, religious education was also introduced as an optional course in public pre-school kindergartens in Sarajevo. The ICBH runs six Islamic high schools or madrasas: Gazi Hus- rev Bey Madrasa (the oldest, founded in 1537) in Sarajevo, Behram- bey Madrasa (founded in 1626, re-established in 1993) in Tuzla, Elči Ibrahim Pasha Madrasa (founded in 1706, re-established in 1993) in Travnik, Madrasa Osman-ef. Redžović (founded in 1992) in Visoko, Džemaludin-ef. Čaušević Madrasa (founded in 1993) in Cazin, and Karađoz-Bey Madrasa (founded in 1557, re-established in 1995) in Mostar. The madrasa programme has changed significantly over the past ten years, transforming them from institutions for training imams and teachers of Islamic religious education into regular high schools with an additional religious curriculum. Around 400 students (roughly equal numbers of boys and girls in recent years) graduate every year from these six schools and most of them go on to study at public universities. Only 10%–15% opt for Islamic studies in BH and abroad, usually in order to work as imams in jama’as and teachers of Islamic religious education in public schools, or possibly to go into other jobs at the ICBH and its institutions.24 Unlike in madrasas, the curricula of the Bosniak Gymnasium from its first days have focused exclusively on secular education, while implicitly nourishing traditional values of Bosnian Muslims. There are no separate courses or specific emphasis on religious education, beyond the Islamic religious education that is also taught in other public schools. Given the latest reform of curricula in BH madrasas that reduced the percentage of religious courses to

23 For more on the status and challenges of religious education in Bosnian public schools, see Open Society Fund BH, Religija i školovanje u otvorenom društvu: Preispi- tivanje modela religijskog obrazovanja u Bosni i Hecegovini (Religion and Education in Open Society: Assessing Religious Education Model in BH) (Sarajevo, 2009), available at http://www.soros.org.ba/docs_obrazovanje/2009/religija_i_skolovanje_preispi- tivanje_bh_modela.pdf, accessed 30 November 2010. 24 For more about the current educational profile of BHmadrasas one should look at Machaček, Štepan, “European Islam and Islamic education in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” in Südost Europa: Herausgegebe von Südost-Institut, 55, 4 (2007), pp. 395–428. 102 aid smajić about 30%, the substantial difference between the two schools, however, has been blurred.25

6 Higher and Professional Education

The Islamic Community has three major institutions of higher learning. The Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo (Ćemerlina 54, 71000 Sara- jevo, tel: +387 33 251 011, fax: +387 33 251 044, www.fin.ba), founded in 1977, today offers three different study programmes, including Islamic theology, religious education, and imam training. Some 300 full-time students and a similar number of part-time students are enrolled at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, with Bosnian being the language of instruction. So far, some 654 male and female students have graduated from the faculty in addition to 32 Masters and 17 PhDs. The Faculty also offers a Diploma in Islamic Studies, a three-month non- degree programme in Bosnian and English for laymen and women. The Islamic Education Faculties in Zenica and Bihać were established in 1993 and 1996 respectively as Islamic education academies with two-year programmes to train teachers for Islamic education in public schools. Both acquired the status of university faculties in 2006. The Faculty in Zenica (Juraja N’idharta 15, 72000 Zenica, tel: +387 32 402 919, fax: +387 32 402 919, www.ipf.unze.ba) now offers three-year undergraduate and two-year postgraduate programmes in three different departments, leading to BAs and MAs in Islamic education, social education and pre-school education. The Faculty in Bihać (Žegarska aleja, 77000 Bihać, tel: +387 37 220 162, fax: +387 37 228 160, www.ipf. unbi.ba) is the smallest of the three and currently offers only a BA and MA in Islamic education. So far, about 700 students have graduated from the Faculty in Zenica, while the Faculty in Bihać has produced around 330 graduates. The faculties in Sarajevo, Zenica and Bihać have recently become associate institutions of the universities of Sarajevo, Zenica and Bihać respectively.26

25 According to the school’s administration, the school web-page should be back online in near future and more information about the school should be available at http://bosnjackagim.edu.ba, which at the time of writing the report was not accessible. 26 For more on current Islamic education in Bosnia, see Alibašić, Ahmet and Asim Zubčević, “Islamic education in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Isla- mische Erziehung in Europa (Islamic Education in Europe) (Vienna: Bhlau, 2009). For a history of Islamic education, see Kasumović, Ismet, Školstvo i obrazovanje u bosnia and herzegovina 103

7 Burial and Cemeteries

It has been traditional practice to have separate cemeteries for the different religious communities. In villages, burial practices have continued to observe the traditional separation, with many cemeteries located near the village mosque. In larger cities, there are mixed cemeteries with separate sections for adherents of different communities. Atheists and non-religious people are mostly buried in mixed public cemeteries. As a consequence of the war, many new shahid (martyr) graveyards have been designated for the burial of both civilian and military Muslim dead. The Potočari Memorial Complex in Srebrenica is the biggest of all.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

‘Chaplaincy’ in the armed forces is organised at all levels of military service for all the main religious communities. The Islamic service for the military is managed by the Military Muftiate (established in 1999), headed by the military mufti, who is nominated by the Rais al-ulama. The military mufti appoints the military imams and chief imams, subject to the approval of the Rais al-ulama. While there is still no official chaplaincy in prison facilities, weekly visits and Friday prayers are organised in some detention centres, mainly by the local branches of the ICBH. Chaplaincy in health institutions does not exist, but in some larger hospitals prayer rooms are available.

9 Religious Festivals

Irrespective of the fact that BH does not yet have a law pertaining to public holidays, two ‘id or bayram festivals, as well as two (Catho- lic and Orthodox) Christmases and Easters, are celebrated as public holidays in BH. Both the religious and the secular media cover the celebrations of bayram, with state television broadcasting live from

Bosanskom ejaletu za vrijeme osmanske uprave (Schools and Education in Bosnian Eyalet during the Ottoman Administration) (Mostar: Islamski kulturni centar, 1999); Hasanović, Bilal, Islamske obrazovne ustanove u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1850. do 1941. godine (Islamic Education Institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1850 until 1941) (Zenica: Islamski pedagoški fakultet u Zenici, 2008). 104 aid smajić the Gazi Husrevbegova mosque in Sarajevo, where ‘id prayer is led and the khutba (sermon) is delivered by the Rais al-ulama or his deputy. Local television stations also often broadcast all-day programmes devoted to bayrams and other traditional festivals. Muslim religious authorities arrange bayram receptions for public and diplomatic dig- nitaries. The second day of Ramadan bayram is designated as the Day of Martyrs (shuhada’ ) in remembrance of those killed in the Bosnian war of 1992–95. On this occasion, martyrs’ cemeteries are visited and commemorative programmes are organised by the local authorities and the Islamic Community. The ‘id celebrations are famous for their bayram meals (Turkish: Bayram sofra).

10 Halal Food

Halal slaughter is permitted and many Muslims slaughter animals privately following halal practice. There are also a number of halal abattoirs throughout BH. In February 2006, the ICBH established the Agency for Halal Quality Certification (Turalibegova 39, 75000 Tuzla, tel: +387 33 258 427, fax: +387 35 258 427, www.halal.ba/site/), which certifies the compliance of food products with Islamic rules and the Halal Standards Rulebook. In 2009, the agency was successful in establishing its representative branches in other Balkan countries, while the state institutions in Bosnia agreed to partly subsidise the costs of issuing halal certification for local companies. In 2010 it issued the second version of the Rulebook (BAS 1049–2010) which was revised to be more in harmony with the standards of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and broadened its activities to include the certification of catering services too.

11 Dress Codes

There are no special rules on dress code in any institution of learning or public offices that would affect the wearing of hijab, although there is evidence of discrimination against hijab-wearing women, especially in some areas of employment.27 In July 2010 representatives of the

27 For more on the issue as well as the current practice and perception of hijab in Bosnia, see Šeta, Đermana, Zašto marama? Bosanskohercegovačke muslimanke o životu i radu pod maramom (Why Hijab? BH Muslim Women about Life and Work under Hijab) (Sarajevo: Centar za napredne studije, 2011). bosnia and herzegovina 105

Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, currently the strongest Serb nationalist political party in BH, unsuccessfully proposed a bill at the state parliament for outlawing niqab. After the 1992–95 war, it has become more common for Muslim women to wear hijab in public, and some women, mostly those who follow the Salafi interpretation of Islam, wear niqab, although this has not traditionally been very common in Bosnian Muslim tradition since it was banned by the Com- munists in 1949.

12 Publication and Media

El-Kalem (the Pen, www.kalem.ba, web-page currently under construction) is the publishing house of the ICBH established in 1973, soon after the ruling communist regime eased its restrictions on the activities of religious communities. The oldest printed periodical isGlasnik (the Herald), a bi-monthly official journal of the ICBH (founded in 1933, circulation 2,200). The largest and most influential newspaper is the ICBH biweekly Preporod (the Revival, founded in 1970, circulation around 25,000, www.preporod.com), which mostly covers current events within the ICBH, as well as more daily news concerning Islam and Muslims in BH and abroad. The ICBH publishes the annual Tak- vim, a hijri calendar with accompanying intellectual articles on current issues in religion, culture and society (circulation 50,000). The Association of Ulama publishes a quarterly education magazine Novi Muallim (New Muallim, circulation 2,000). The Faculty of Islamic Studies publishesZbornik FIN-a, an annual collection of scholarly papers mainly written by its staff (first published in 1989, circulation 300). The Islamic faculties and madrasas also have their own student magazines, the oldest being Zemzem, the student magazine of Gazi Husrev Bey Madrasa (first published in 1968, circulation around 1,000). The Gazi Husrev Bey Library (founded in 1537, with a collection of over 10,000 oriental manuscripts) publishes annals (Anali, first published in 1972, circulation around 500), which include studies and texts in the fields of Islamic studies, history and bibliography. Two independent Islamic magazines are published in Zenica: Novi Horizonti (New Horizons, founded in 1997, circulation around 3,000, www.novihorizonti.ba) and the pro-SalafiSaff (the Line, founded in 1998, circulation around 5,000, www.saff.ba). There are also a few Sufi publications: the quarterly magazine Kelamu-l-šifa (Healthy Speech, 106 aid smajić first published in 2004, with a variable circulation) and the older periodical, Šebi arus (Wedding Night, first published in 1982). In November 2006 the ICBH established a radio and television station BIR, which has been broadcasting 24 hours a day since March 2009. So far the station has produced radio programmes and a website (www.bir.ba), offering content and information about religious, educational, sporting and political issues. According to its administration, the radio station is one of the seven most listened to stations in BH, with their regional frequencies covering an area inhabited by 1.4 million people.

13 Family Law

Since the abolition of the Shari’a courts in 1946, only civil marriages are legally valid. However, it is very common to perform a so-called ‘Shari’a wedding’ after the civil ceremony and in the presence of local imam. This procedure is recommended by the ICBH authorities at all levels. With regard to inheritance, only civil courts have jurisdiction over the distribution of the property, debts and obligations upon an individual’s death.28

14 Interreligious Relations

The Bosnian war was first and foremost an act of aggression from outside but it also had elements of a civil war fought along the lines of ethno-religious identities and interests. Interreligious relations in the country suffered as a result. Consequently, BH has become a focus point for various interreligious activities and projects, generally initiated jointly by various local and international actors.

28 Hasani, Mustafa, Tumačenje i primjena normi šerijatskog prava o mješovitim bra- kovima u BiH u periodu 1930–1940 (Interpretation and application of norms of Shari’a law concerning mixed marriages in BH during 1930–1940 period) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo) offers a more detailed account and reference sources on the issue of applying Islamic law in family matters. For history of Islamic family law in Bosnia and Herzegovina see Džananović, Ibrahim, Primjena šerijatskog porodičnog prava kroz praksu Vrhovnog šerijatskog suda 1914–1946 (Appli- cation of Shari’a Family Law through the Practice of Supreme Shari’a Court from 1914 until 1946) (Sarajevo: Fakultet islamskih nauka u Sarajevu, 2004). bosnia and herzegovina 107

The ICBH is a co-founder and member of the Interreligious Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the IRC, Ferhadija 16/1, 71000 Sarajevo, tel: +387 33 666 217, fax: +387 33 550 060, www.mrv.ba). It was established in 1997 with the joint participation of the representatives of the four traditional religious communities in BH, namely the Catholics, Orthodox, Jews and Muslims, with the aim of promoting interreligious dialogue and reconciliation as well as to represent the common interests and activities of religious communities in Bosnia to the state. The current representative of the ICBH in the assembly of the IRC is Sarajevo mufti Husein Smajić. According to the Protocol of Coopera- tion signed between the IRC and the Council of Ministers of BH in 2008, the government committed to provide regular annual financial support for the activities of IRC.29 Representatives and members of the ICBH are also active at the Interreligious Institute in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ferhadija 16/1, 71000 Sarajevo, tel/fax: +387 33 666 776, www.mri.ba), established in 2007 with the main aim of facilitating communication and cooperation between religious communities in the country and the wider society. The International Forum Bosna (Sime Milutinovića 10, 71000 Sarajevo, tel: +387 33 217 665, fax: +387 33 206 484, www.ifbosna.org .ba) and other similar NGOs are organisations within which Muslims are active in rebuilding interreligious trust and relations. Apart from being active in various trans-national Muslim bodies,30 the contribution of Dr Mustafa Cerić, the current Rais al-ulama, to interreligious dialogue and understanding has been especially recognised. The awards he has received for his efforts in that regard include the UNESCO Felix Houphouet Boigny Award in 2003, the Sir Stern- berg Award by the Interreligious Council of Christians and Jews (UK) in 2004, the Theodor-Heuss-Award in 2007 and the Eugen-Biser- Award in 2008. In addition, he was one of the 38 co-signatories of the

29 The Protocol is available at http://mrv.ba/images/stories/documents/Protokol. pdf, accessed 30 November 2010. 30 Dr. Mustafa Cerić, for example, for years has been one of 34 members of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, a specialised institution of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe. It was established in 1997 in London to gather Muslim scholars of various ethnic backgrounds in an effort to provide an authentic understanding of the practising of Islamic legal norms pertaining to daily life of Muslims in distinctive European environment. For more see Arabic version of the Council web-page availabe at http://www.e-cfr.org/ar/index.php, accessed 5 May 2011. 108 aid smajić

“Open letter to His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI”, in response to the Pope’s Regensburg speech (13 Oct 2006), and co-signatory of “A common word between us and you”—an appeal addressed by 138 Muslim individuals and organisations on 13 October 2007 to the Christian churches, for dialogue on the basis of love of God and love of neighbour.31 Dr Cerić also led an international Muslim delegation at the Catholic-Muslim forum in November 2008 in the Vatican. At the more grass-roots level of daily life, the quality of Muslim relations with the other two constituent peoples, namely the Croats and the Serbs, generally depends on the locale. The parts of Republika Srpska and the Federation where ethnic cleansing and mass crimes against Muslims took place are generally more tense. The relations of Muslim returnees with Bosnian Serbs and Croats are also influenced by the fact that they often face obstacles to returning to their pre-war homes and reclaiming their private property. For example, Fata Orlović from Konjević Polje in Republika Srpska has been unsuccessfully appealing to various courts for about ten years for the removal of an Orthodox church built illegally in her courtyard after the war in 1997.32 On the other hand, in 2008 the Party of Democratic Action, which is the biggest Bosniak political party, nominated a Catholic priest and professor at the Faculty of Catholic Theology, Franjo Topić, to be mayor of Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, which is predominantly inhabited by Muslims.33 According to one survey, over 90% of Bosniak citizens of Sarajevo approved this nomination, although Dr Topić eventually declined the offer, citing Church rules.34 In order to contribute to protection of religious freedoms, the Interreligious Council in BH started the project “Monitoring of attacks on religious sites and other places

31 http://www.acommonword.com/, accessed 30 November 2010. 32 For more on the obstacles often faced by Muslim returnees, see the previously mentioned “Report on the Status of the Right to Freedom of Religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1.1.–31.12. 2008)”. 33 See http://www.ezadar.hr/clanak/hrvatski-svecenik-novi-gradonacelnik-sarajeva, accessed 30 November 2010. 34 http://www.ktabkbih.net/info.asp?id=18241, accessed 30 November 2010. How- ever, for more about challenges and prospects of interreligious dialogue in BH, see Zovkić, Mato, Međureligijski dijalog iz katoličke perspective u Bosni i Hercegovini (Interreligious Dialogue from Catholic Perspective in Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Sara- jevo: Vrhbosanska katolička teologija, 1998). bosnia and herzegovina 109 significant for religious communities and churches in BH—protection of sacred sites” in November 2010.35

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Public debates about Islam and the ICBH, often initiated through the publications and media of the ICBH or the secular mass media, are noticeably present in Bosnian society. They are usually dominated by the following topics: the presence of Islam and the ICBH in the public sphere and politics; discrimination against certain Islamic practices (such as wearing hijab), and Muslims generally; new emerging orientations in the understanding and practice of Islamic teaching; the positions and attitude of the ICBH, the state and BH society in this regard. For example, even though the law provides for religious education in kindergartens, its introduction in Sarajevo in 2008 sparked a heated debate in the secular media, with sporadic discussion of the topic that lasted all the way until 2010. Similar debates about the role and nature of religious education in public schools are still present. Although the issue of Salafism and Wahhabism has recently subsided, it re-emerged with the killing of a Salafi-oriented Muslim on his way to a mosque in Mostar on 15 July 2009 and a major police raid on a socially self-secluded community of so-called Wahhabis and their families in Gornja Maoča near Brčko in Febraury 2010. The issue gained urgency after an attack on a police station in town Bugojno on 27 June 2010, allegedly masterminded by militant Islamists. Soon after the incident, local police arrested suspects and in December 2010 a BH Court indicted six persons for planning and assisting in the attack.36 The presence of the ICBH in politics and state affairs seems to be a constant matter for debate, within which the Rais al-ulama is especially exposed to fierce and very often libellous attacks by some of the

35 For details and full text of initiative see http://mrv.ba/en/archive/11-monitoring- napada-na-vjerske-objekte-i-druga-mjesta-od-znaaja-za-vjerske-zajednice-i-crkve- u-bih-zatita-svetih-mjesta, accessed 5 December 2010. 36 For an authoritative comment on Bugojno event and its broader implications see Alibašić, Ahmet, Militantni ekstremisti: haridžije našeg doba (Militant extremists: Kharijis of our time) (Sarajevo: Preporod, 14/928, 15 July 2010), pp. 12–14, also available at http://www.cns.ba/docs/militantni_ekstremisti_haridzije_naseg_doba_ahmet_ alibasic.pdf, accessed 5 December 2010. 110 aid smajić secular media.37 As a result, Islamophobia in the Bosnian media has been an issue throughout the past two years, partly because the Riyasat in October 2009 decided to adopt a media relations protocol, defining relations of the ICBH with media as well as explaining the means of its communication with them and specifying the organs, institutions and religious authorities of the ICBH whose views represent its official standpoint.38 In August 2010 during Ramadan the municipal authorities of Livno, a town in western BH dominated by ethnic Croats, ordered a partially constructed mosque in the village of Sturbe to be demolished under the pretext that necessary legal approvals for its construction had not been granted, which caused an outcry of local Muslims and strong reaction by the ICBH. The end of 2010 however will probably be remembered by all citizens of BH, especially Muslims, for the visit of Mekki Turabi, self- proclaimed spiritual healer from Morocco, and his healing sessions conducted in Zetra Olympics Centre in Sarajevo. The sessions attracted tens of thousands of ordinary people from different religious traditions but also the contempt of the ICBH.39

16 Major Cultural Events

Religious festivals held annually at places called dovišta, ‘supplication sites’ or places for prayer, linked in local legends to miraculous events, attract thousands of men and women from around Bosnia and neighbouring countries. The most important of them is the centuries-old annual gathering of Muslims at the Ajvatovica plateau near the towns of Donji Vakuf and Bugojno in the last week of June, with a two-week

37 For some reactions of the Public relations service of the Rijasat during 2010 see Tucaković, Ekrem, Reagiranje na različite oblike organiziranih medijskih kampanja i hajki (Reaction against different forms of organized media campaigns and chase) (Sarajevo: Preporod, 7/921, 1 April 2010), p. 14. 38 Text of the Protocol is available at http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=7885, accessed 5 December 2010. 39 For some reactions of the ICBH officials see webpage of theRiyasat at http://www .rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9678:ne-odlazite- na-sumnjive-iscjeliteljske-seanse&catid=253:aktuelnosti-kat&Itemid=184# comment-731. Also see Halilović, Safvet, Nebuloze i prijetnje marokanskog iscjeljitelja (Nonsense and threats of Moroccan healer) (Sarajevo: Preporod, 23/937, 1 December 2010), pp. 46–47. bosnia and herzegovina 111 cultural, religious and tourist programme. Other prayer sites include: Djevojačka pećina (Maiden’s Cave) near Kladanj where, according to the legend, a young girl let out her soul trying to get water from a scary place and thus proved her courage to local youngsters; Lastavica near Zenica in remembrance of Bogumils who used to praise God for rich harvests and eventually accepted Islam; and the Musalla plateu near Sanski Most where the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II el-Fatih led the jum’a prayer after he conquered the area, thus announcing the arrival of Islam to the region. Concerts and festivals of spiritual music and nasheeds are organised throughout the country by the ICBH and other Muslim civic associations on the occasions of religious holidays or Ramadan. An event called Mošus Pejgamberov is organised annually by the women’s association, Kewser, in memory of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, who is revered by pious Bosnian Muslim women. Early in May of each year the Sufi orders have their own central gathering in the form of a great mawlid in Blagaj at the spring of the Buna River.40 Since the genocide in Srebrenica, 11 July is commemorated as Srebrenica day. During the ceremony, the collective funeral prayer ( janaza) attended by tens of thousands is performed at the Memorial Centre in Potočari, and newly identified victims of the genocide are buried.41

40 For more on the cultural particularities of Islamic life in Bosnian rural areas, see Bringa, Tone, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 41 As a sign of recognition of the Srebrenica massacre as an act of genocide, on 7 January 2009 the European Parliament passed a resolution proclaiming 11 July the European Commemorative Day for the victims of the Srebrenica genocide on 11 July 1995. The text of the resolution is available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B6–2009–0027&language=EN, accessed 30 November 2010. The same resolution (M-416) was passed by the Canadian Par- liament with unanimous consent on 19 October 2010. For details see http://www .instituteforgenocide.ca/canadian-parliament-unanimously-adopts-the-srebrenica- genocide-resolution/, accessed 5 December 2010. US House of Representatives passed similar resolution (H. Res. 199) already in 2005 and its text is available at http:// www.srebrenica95.com/images/stories/Srebrenica%20Genocide%20Resolution%20 199%20in%20the%20United%20States%20House%20of%20Representatives.pdf, accessed 5 December 2010.

BULGARIA

Aziz Nazmi Shakir1 and Ina Merdjanova2

1 Muslim Populations

At the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans conquered the disintegrating medieval Bulgarian Kingdom. Subsequently, Islam spread through the mass resettlement of Anatolian Turks, on the one hand, and through the conversion of the local Christian population, on the other. According to some researchers, the Islamisation process was helped by the fact that prior to the Ottoman conquest certain regions like the Rhodopes and Dobrudja were already populated by a considerable number of Turkic colonisers,3 who became natural mediators between the conquerors and the conquered. Another factor that possibly reduced the potential religious tensions between the two sides and accelerated the number of conversions was the fact that some of the so-called Christian population belonged to Gnostic sects like Bogomilism,4 which denied the religious authority of the official church. A great many of their followers adopted Islam, for its doctrine seemed much closer to their “protestant” beliefs. Ottoman rule lasted until 1878, when Bulgaria gained territorial autonomy.5 A mass exodus of Muslims followed. In 1881, an

1 Dr Aziz Nazmi Shakir is currently working as an Arabic language instructor at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences and School of Languages at Sabanci University- Istanbul and as a visiting professor in Islamic Art at Higher Islamic Institute-Sofia. 2 Dr Ina Merdjanova is Director of the Centre for Interreligious Dialogue and Con- flict Prevention at the Scientific Research Department, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”. 3 Memişoğlu, Hüseyin, Bulgaristan’da Türk Kültürü (Turkish Culture in Bulgaria) (Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, Anakara 1995), pp. 9–24. 4 A dualist religious sect that flourished in the Balkans between the 10th and 15th centuries; for more about Bogomolism see: D. Obolensky, The Bogomils: A Study in Balkan Neo-Manichaeism (Cambridge, 1948), reprint New York, 1978. 5 For the history of Islam in Bulgaria in general, see: Zhelyazkova, Antonina, Bozhi- dar Alexiev and Zhorzheta Nazarska (eds.), Myusulmanskite obshtnosti na Balkanite i v Bulgaria (Muslim Communities in the Balkans and in Bulgaria) (Sofia: International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations [Sofia: IMIR, 1997]); Gradeva, Rossitsa (ed.). Istoriya na myusyulmanskata kultura po balgarskite zemi (History of Muslim Culture in Bulgarian Lands) (Sofia: IMIR, 2007). 114 aziz nazmi shakir and ina merdjanova estimated 578,000 Muslims still lived in Bulgaria, comprising 28.8 % of the total population.6 In 1900, the number of Muslims was 643,300, or 17.18 % of the population, while in 1946 the number of Muslims had risen to 938,418, although in terms of percentage of the population, they were only 13.3%.7 According to the 2001 census, there are 966,978 Muslims in Bul- garia, comprising 12.2% of the population.8 The majority of Muslims are Sunnis of the Hanafi School. An earlier census (1992), which also included data on the population by ethnic and sectarian affiliation, indicated that 7.7% of Muslims were Alevis (also called Aliani or Kizilbash).9 As far as ethnic groups are concerned, the ethnic Turks10 are concentrated in the south-east and north-east of Bulgaria and account for 75.3% of all Muslims in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, also known as Bulgarian Muhammadans or Pomaks,11 are concentrated in the central and western Rhodope Mountains in southern Bulgaria and make up 13.5%; the Roma (dispersed throughout

6 Eminov, Ali, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria (London: Hurst, 1997), p. 71. 7 http://www.nsi.bg/Census/StrReligion.htm, accessed 17 May 2009. 8 http://www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Census_e.htm, accessed 17 May 2009. For studies on Muslim minorities in Bulgaria, see: Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities; Neuburger, Mary, The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Ghodsee, Kristin, Muslim Lives in Eastern Europe: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Transformation of Islam in Postsocialist Bulgaria (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). 9 On the Aliani/Kizilbashi, see De Jong, Frederick, “Problems concerning the origins of the Qizilbas in Bulgaria: remnants of the Safaviyya?” in Accademia Nationale dei Lincei, vol. 25 (1993), pp. 203–15. 10 On Turks in Bulgaria, see Popovic, Alexandre, “The Turks of Bulgaria (1878– 1985)”. In: Central Asia Survey, vol. 5, no. 2, (1986), pp. 1–32; Höpken, Wolfgang, “From religious identity to ethnic mobilisation: The Turks of Bulgaria before, under and since communism”, in Poulton, Hugh and Suha Taji-Faruki (eds.), Muslim Iden- tity and the Balkan State (London: Hurst, 1997), pp. 54–82; Yalamov, Ibrahim, Istoriya na turskata obshtnost v Bulgaria (History of the Turkish Community in Bulgaria) (Sofia: IMIR, 2002). 11 On Pomaks, see: Todorova, Maria, “Identity (trans)formation among the Pomaks in Bulgaria”. In: Kürt, Lásló and Juliet Langman (eds.), Beyond Borders: Remaking Cultural Identities in the New East and Central Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 63–82; Memişoğlu, Hüseyin, Balkanlar’da Pomak Türkleri (Pomak- Turks in the Balkans) (Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, İstanbul 1999); Çavuşoğlu, Halim, Balkanlar’da Pomak Türkleri-Tarih ve Sosyo-Kültürel Yapı (Pomak-Turks in the Balkans-History and Socio-cultural Structure) (Ankara: Köksav Yayınları, 1993); Georgieva, Tsvetana, “Pomaks: Muslim Bulgarians”. In: Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 12, no. 3 (2001), pp. 303–16. bulgaria 115 the whole country), some 40% of whom are Muslims, amount to 10.5%. The tiny Tatar community has some 4,500 members living in north-eastern Bulgaria. Around 5,000 Arabs living mainly in the capital Sofia form the most recent local Muslim community. Since Arabs (most of whom came to the country in the 70s and 80s of the 20th century) are excluded from the list of ethnic groups found in the Bul- garian census forms, their exact number remains unofficial. Accord- ing to the National Statistical Institute the numbers of foreign Arab citizens permanently residing in Bulgaria as of 31 December 2009 are as follows: Syrians: 1987, Lebanese: 953, Iraqis: 443, Egyptians: 106, Algerians: 91, Moroccans: 57, Tunisians: 47, Libyans: 38.12 Here we do not find any figures concerning one of the biggest local Arab communities, Palestinians. A recent private count held by the Palestin- ian embassy in Sofia indicates that Bulgarian Palestinians (including children from mixed marriages) number 2000. Few of the local Arabs are non-Muslims, others consider themselves atheists, but the major part belongs to one of the four Sunni schools: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i and Hanbali. The 2001 census indicated that Muslims are the majority population in the Kurdzhali district in south-east Bulgaria (69.9%) and in Razgrad district in north-eastern Bulgaria (53.7%). Most Muslims live in rural areas, and have been seriously affected by the economic crisis following the collapse of communism. The results of the two censuses showed that between 1992 and 2001 the number of Muslims decreased by 143,317. This has been explained by the emigration of Muslims to more prosperous countries (Turkey and various West- ern countries are preferred destinations rather than the Arab world) and, to a much lesser degree, by the conversion of some Pomaks to Orthodox Christianity and to various Protestant denominations.13 In September 2010 during the preparations for a new census in Septem- ber 2011 foreseeing an online questionnaire form including “Bulgar- ian Mohammedans” as a separate ethnic group, the nationalistic party “VMRO” (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Bul- garian National Movement) initiated a massive political attack aimed at the National Statistical Institute. As a result high ranking experts involved in the preparation of the form were forced to resign and its

12 See: http://www.nsi.bg/otrasal.php?otr=19&a1=367&a2=375#cont. 13 Eminov, Ali, “Social construction of identities: Pomaks in Bulgaria” (2007), available at http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/download/2–2007-Eminov.pdf, accessed 17 March 2009, p. 6. 116 aziz nazmi shakir and ina merdjanova contents underwent changes reflecting the nationalistic views claiming that “Pomaks” are Bulgarians and therefore should be excluded from the target list of the census.14 As a result in the census form only three ethnic groups and mother tongues were left: Bulgarian, Turkish and Roma. The list of confessions included: Christians: Orthodox, Catho- lic, Protestant; and Muslims: Sunni and Shi’i.15 Those Pomaks, who considered themselves members of a separate ethnic group, did not welcome the changes, but their opinions went unheard because the Bulgarian media virtually ignored their views.

2 Islam and the State

Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic with no state religion; although the Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the ‘traditional’ religion (82.64% of the population belong to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, although the number of regular church-goers is extremely low). Each year, the Religious Confessions Directorate at of the Council of Ministers allocates financial support from the state budget to several denominations with a longer historic presence, mainly for the renovation of their religious sites and to cover some of their running expenses. According to official information in 2009, the Islamic community received 250,000 BGN (around €130,000).16 However the Chief Muftiate insists that it obtained only 170,000 (around €87,000). For the year 2010 due to an uncertainty concerning the official status of the Muftiate (see sect. 15) it did not receive any funds.17 For comparison, Bulgarian Orthodox Church was granted a sum exceeding 500,000 BGN. The sums granted to the official representatives of the different religious communities are calculated in accordance with the number of their followers. Current legislation allows a Muslim denomination to register and then re-register as a trading company which provides opportunities

14 For details see: Ivanov, Mihail, “Prebroyavaneto stana zalozhnik na VMRO i star- ite im kavgi” (The census became a hostage of VMRO and its old quarrels) In: http:// www.bghelsinki.org/index.php?module=pages&lg=bg&page=obektiv17927. 15 http://www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Karta_Census2010.pdf. 16 Information obtained from Georgi Krastev, chief expert at the Religious Confes- sions Directorate, Oct. 8th 2009. 17 Information obtained from Hayri Emin, Public Relations manager of the Chief Muftiate, Nov. 9th 2010. bulgaria 117 way for abuses of a juridical nature. This leads to splits in the Muslim community; registrations of several administrations of Muslims and the unsatisfactory functioning of the Head Office Mufti as an administrative spiritual-religious body.18 For example, in 2008 the court registered at the address of the Muftiate an illegitimate administrative organisation headed by Nedim Gendjev, a former secret service officer and former chief mufti appointed in the end of the Communist era. Taking advantage of the situation he allegedly succeeded in unauthorised withdrawals from the bank accounts of the Muftiate in the amount of 850,000 BGN (€435,000).19 Muslims are represented in the public arena, both religiously, through the Muftiate, and politically, through the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi). This party was established in 1990 and has been represented in every post-communist parliament since. It has drawn support primarily from the Turkish minority and the Muslim community as a whole, although its political leaders have been very careful to preclude any identification with Islamist or pan-Turkist ideas, which would be illegal according to legislation governing political parties.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Bulgarian Muslim community, called officially the Muslim Denomination (Myusyulmansko izpovedanie), has well developed structures. It is administered by the Supreme Muslim Council (Vissh Duhoven Savet), with its core institution, the Chief Muftiate Glavno( Myuftiystvo, Bratia Miladinovi Str. N. 27, Sofia 1301, tel: +359 2 981 60 01, http://www.genmuftibg.net; e-mail:[email protected]). The Chief Muftiate presides over all Muslims in the country, irrespective of their ethnic or intra-Islamic divisions. Fourteen regional muftis are responsible for the administration of the community at the provincial level (in Aytos, Dobrich, Krumovgrad, Shumen, Haskovo, Pleven, Smolian,

18 This problem is expressed in a letter of the Muftiate sent to the attn. of Mr Serhiy Holovaty, Chairman of the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). 19 Hadji, Mustafa, “Glavno myuftiystvo sled demokratichnite promeni” (The Head Mufti’s Offica after the Democratic Changes), in Godishnik na visshiya islyamski institut (Annual of the Higher Islamic Institute), No. 2, Sofia 2010, p. 18. 118 aziz nazmi shakir and ina merdjanova

Silistra, Gotse Delchev, Plovdiv, Kurdzhali, Pazardjik, Russe and Tur- govishte). The current Chief Mufti is Mustafa Alish Hadji.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are approximately 1,250 mosques, where Friday prayers are conducted, as well as 240 masjids, and some 50 tekkes and turbes, most of which date back to Ottoman times. Around 400 of the mosques have been constructed since the fall of communism.

5 Children’s Education

Optional classes in Islam were introduced in public schools in 2000. Students use textbooks proposed by the Muftiate and approved by the Ministry of Education. The classes are conducted in Bulgarian once a week and are financially supported by the Muftiate. The teachers are mainly graduates of the Higher Islamic Institute and occasionally from universities abroad (mainly Turkish and Jordanian). There are three private Islamic secondary schools recognised by the Ministry of Education, in Shumen, Russe and Momchilgrad. These follow the general curriculum for state secondary schools, with extra classes in Islam. The graduates from these schools can serve as imams or continue their education in any discipline they choose. There is a growing tendency for imams to pursue higher education in the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia (kv. Vrazhdebna, St. “57”, No. 6, tel: +359/2/9456298, fax: +359/2/8406366; e-mail: [email protected], web: www.islamicinstitute-bg.org). In recent years the Higher Islamic Institute and the three religious secondary schools have depended fully on the financial aid provided by the Turkish Religious Foundation (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı). Apart from these three state accredited schools, the Muftiate organises Qur’an courses for children every summer. In 2010, over 500 such courses were held throughout the country. In Sofia there are two private Arab schools (an elementary Lebanese school “Gibran Kahlil Gibran” founded in 1999 and a high Palestinian school “Avicenna” open in 2006)20 in which most of the students are

20 For details visit: www.avicenabg.com, http://arabwives.wordpress.com and www .goldenpages.bg/bg/b/740E23FF-B203-DC11-B6C5–00145E9525E4. bulgaria 119 children from Muslim or mixed (Muslim-Christian) families. There was also an Iraqi high school, but at the beginning of the academic year 2010/2011 it was closed.

6 Higher and Professional Education

About 1,000 imams serve the religious needs of the Muslim population. Most of the imams are elderly and privately educated, as no religious training was available under communism. The younger imams were educated in the three secondary schools mentioned above, and a few of them were trained in summer Qur’an courses mentioned above. Some of the imams have diplomas from the Higher Islamic Institute or from various Islamic schools in Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt. According to the Muftiate, around 100 students it has sent have graduated from various Islamic universities abroad. The number of students who have pursued studies abroad through private channels outside the Muftiate is impossible to verify, although it does not seem to be very high. The Islamic Institute was founded in 1991 as a semi-higher institution, and in 1998 with a decision of the Council of Ministers became a higher institute.21 Its 3000 hours curriculum includes the following compulsory subjects: Qur’an 240 h, Tafsir (commentaries of the Qur’an) 225 h, Hadith (narrations concerning the words and deeds of the prophet Muhammad) 225 h, Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) 210 h, Kalam (theology) 120 h, Islamic History 150 h, Islamic Ethics 60 h, Islamic Culture and Art 60 h, Islamic Philosophy 60 h, History of the Islamic Schools 45 h, Rhetoric 60 h, Fatwa (opinion concerning Islamic law issued by an Islamic scholar) 45 h, Sufism 45 h, History of Reli- gions 60 h and Arabic language 360 h. The graduates acquire the qualification “Islamic theologian” and they can work as clerics, i.e. imams, muftis and vaizes (preachers). They also get a teaching certificate and the right to become religion teachers in elementary schools as well as instructors of Qur’an courses. The Institute offers free education, board and lodging to its students, whose average number is around 100, and is currently working towards state accreditation. Its main

21 For the history of the Higher Islamic Institute see: Cambazov, İsmail, Sofya İslam Enstitüsü: Anılar-Belgeler (Sofia Islamic Institute: Memories and Documents) (Davudoğlu Yayınları, Sofia 2005). 120 aziz nazmi shakir and ina merdjanova sponsor is the Turkish Religious Foundation (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı), and usually two or three of the faculty members are visiting professors from Turkey. However, alongside their teaching activities covering the core courses of the theological curriculum, they sometimes face a distrustful approach from the Religious Confessions Directorate and often experience serious problems with their residence permits. Academic courses on the history and culture of Islam and the Mid- dle East are offered on a regular basis by the Department of Arabic and Semitic Studies at Sofia University “St Kliment Ohridski”.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims are free to perform traditional funeral rites, and separate cemeteries or separate burial plots for Muslims are available. Recently the Municipality in Kurdzhali developed a unique project aimed at providing mobile pre-burial services to Muslims living in isolated villages, or urban places without local imams, experiencing difficulty organising ceremonies for their dead. A specially equipped truck, with an imam on board, goes to the address of the deceased and the imam performs the washing and shrouding of the corpse inside the truck.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Imams have access to prisoners and may also visit patients in hospitals, although no special regulations exist. Imams are not allowed in the armed forces, as military law bans any religious activities on military premises as well as ministry to the armed forces. This provokes the Muftiate’s objections regarding the fact that priests representing the Orthodox Church regularly inaugurate flags of the Bulgarian Army and perform religious rites at official ceremonies such as opening of schools and other institutions.

9 Religious Festivals

Muslims regularly celebrate their religious festivals. The chief mufti announces the beginning and the end of the month of Ramadan on national television and greets the believers at Ramazan Bayram (‘Id al-Fitr). Greetings are also offered on television on the occasion of bulgaria 121

Qurban Bayram (‘Id al-Adha). Muslims are officially entitled to a day’s holiday for each of these festivals.

10 Halal Food

During the socialist period (1944–1989), most Muslims (and especially those living in the cities) did not have the chance to obtain halal food. Nowadays the halal food notion is only slowly re-appearing and only few Muslims (mainly Arabs) strictly adhere to halal food regulations. Actually, Muslims have a very limited access to halal food through few local shops, which are supplied by a couple of local firms that perform the ritual slaughter. In supermarkets there are no special signs indicating whether a certain meat product is halal; Muslims must conduct their own search to find. Nevertheless, private slaughter is not forbidden. Perhaps as a consequence of the lack of demand, halal food is not available in public institutions.

11 Dress Codes

There are no formal regulations prohibiting the wearing of Muslim dress, including hijab, in public places. There have been occasional bans on the hijab in state schools that require school uniform.

12 Publication and Media

The Muftiate publishes a monthly bilingual journal Müslümanlar/ Myusyulmani (Muslims) with children’s enclosure Hilal (Crescent) in Turkish and Bulgarian.22 Since 1992 the Fethullah-Gülen related Zaman Foundation publishes the newspaper Zaman-Bulgaria (Time- Bulgaria) (also in Bulgarian and Turkish) and the monthly bilingual magazine dedicated to the Muslim family called Ümit/Nadezhda.23 In the post-communist period (1990–2010) the Muftiate and Zaman Foundation published a considerable number of translations from Arabic and Turkish languages of books on Islamic issues, the most

22 See: http://www.genmuftibg.net/bg/library/downloads/category/1-magazine.html. 23 http://www.zaman.bg; http://www.umitdergisi.com. 122 aziz nazmi shakir and ina merdjanova fundamental being an academic translation of the Qur’an from 199724 that was approved as “official” and the hadith collection “Gardens of the Righteous” by An-Nawawi.25 In 2009 the Higher Islamic Institute published an Annual: the only Muslim scientific magazine launched in the post-socialist era. Its second and third volumes are under print and will be issued at the end of 2010. There are no separate Muslim television or radio channels. Since the introduction of daily Turkish language programs on national television and radio in 2000, national radio broadcasts a three-hour program on Islam every Friday. Religious programs are also available on some commercial television channels.

13 Family Law

Under communism, Muslims could only hold religious weddings privately, usually without a certificate being issued. Islamic marriage is practised mainly in the villages, after the couples have been married according to the civil law. At the present time, imams can issue certificates to those who conclude an Islamic marriage, but the state recognises only marriages contracted in a civil registry office. The Islamic regulations on marriage, divorce and inheritance are only occasionally followed unofficially, and the function of the spiritual court at the Muf- tiate is limited to hearing cases of clerics’ misdemeanours.

14 Interreligious Relations26

Since 1989, Bulgaria has made significant progress in the (closely related) areas of interethnic and interreligious relations. It has reversed

24 Teofanov, Tzvetan, Prevod na Sveshteniya Qoran (Translation of the Holy Qur’an) (Sofia: Glavno myuftiystvo na myusyulmanite v R. Bulgaria, 1997). A second edition was launched in 2006. 25 Imam an-Nawawi, Gradinite na pravednitsite (Рияду-с-Салихин) (Gardens of the Righteous). vol. 1 Translation from the Arabic: Teofanov, Tzvetan. First Ed. (Sofia: Glavno myuftiystvo na myusyulmanite v R. Bulgaria, 2008). 26 For a general overview, see Zhelyazkova, Antonina, Nielsen, Jorgen and Kepel, Gilles (eds.), Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria: A Collection of Articles (in English and in Bulgarian) (Sofia: IMIR, 1995). bulgaria 123 communist assimilation campaigns and introduced mother-tongue education for minority children and religious education. Moreover, it has adopted a number of important legislative documents, such as the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Convention for the Protec- tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom (both ratified in 1999) and the Law on Protection against Discrimination (in 2004). However, changes in policy and legislation have not always been followed through and put into practice. Generally, religious communities remain relatively closed and focused on their internal problems, preserving the boundaries between them and interacting mostly along the lines of what can be described as ‘negative tolerance’.27 In 2008, a new association, the National Council of the Religious Communities in Bulgaria, was established on the initiative of the Reli- gious Confessions Directorate of the Council of Ministers. The Council includes the leaders of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Islamic community, the Central Israeli (Jew- ish) Spiritual Council, the Catholic Church and the United Evangeli- cal churches. The Council pledges to represent the Bulgarian model of religious tolerance to Europe and to the Balkans, and to develop interreligious dialogue as a means of improving understanding, preserving religious harmony and the preventing intolerance.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In May 2010 a Sofia City Court (taking into consideration a decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation from January 2008) passed a decision upholding an earlier decision of the Sofia Court of Appeal (and overriding its former decision from March 2009) according to which the national Muslim conferences held in 1997, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2009 and consequently all their decisions (including the election of the current chief mufti Mustafa Alish Hadji) were annulled and the plaintiff Nedim Gendjev recognized as Chairman of the Supreme Muslim Council: the position he occupied in 1997.28 However the

27 See Merdjanova, Ina, “Uneasy tolerance: Interreligious relations in Bulgaria after the fall of Communism”, in Religion, State and Society, vol. 35, no. 2 (2007), pp. 95–103. 28 Decision of Sofia Court of Appeal No. 1154 from13 August 2009. 124 aziz nazmi shakir and ina merdjanova mentioned position was obtained after a disputable court registration from 1996 and was contested by the administration elected by the Muslim community in 1994. The case was referred to the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg and its decision was against the registration of Nedim Gendjev’s administration, but this was not implemented by the official authorities. After the announcement of the Sofia City Court decision in May 2010 most of the Muslim trusteeships started a countrywide protest including a massive demonstration in front of the Parliament. In its turn the Muftiate administration headed by Mustafa Alish Hadji sent a considerable number of declarations, reports and protest letters to the President of the European Parliament Prof. Jerzy Buzek, President of the Islamic Development Bank Dr. Ahmad Mohamed Ali, the Chair- man of the Monitoring Committee of PACE Mr Serhiy Holovaty, the ambassadors of the member states of the EU and the ambassadors of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to the R. Bulgaria, to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Chairman of the Bulgar- ian Helsinki Committee Mr Krasimir Kanev etc. The protests were motivated by Gendjev’s notorious reputation among Bulgarian Muslims who remember him as the last appointed Chief Mufti of the communist regime. During his time in office (1988– 1992), and in in total disregard of his duties, he turned a blind eye to the assimilation process (involving a forcible name changing campaign) imposed against the Muslim minority in the second half of the 1980s. Gendjev’s name was also associated with numerous financial affairs the most striking being the selling ofwaqf properties for personal benefit. Gendjev struck back at the beginning of September 2010, by hiring a private security company that imposed a blockade around the premises of the Office of the Chief Muftiate. The blockade failed, but Gendjev achieved a major “success” in Plovdiv: Bulgaria’s second biggest city. Hashim Hasan, “appointed” by Gendjev as the head of the Muslim Board of Trustees in Plovdiv, along with a few henchmen, used physical force against Kemal Rashid, imam of the Muradiye Mosque, to extort the keys of the Mosque as well as offices of the Regional Mufti and the local Muslim Board located in the annex of the Muradiye Mosque and broke in. The conflict between the two sides continues in the courts as well as through daily physical clashes and will possibly escalate in 2011. No doubt, the main loser is the Muslim bulgaria 125 community, which has to deal with of never-ending court decisions and conflict. In April 2010, as a result of a fire that occurred in unclear circumstances, Yali Mosque in Karlovo was burned and since it was the only one open for prayers in the city, the local Muslim community consisting of 3000 believers demanded the re-opening of the historical Kurshunlu (Mehmed Bey) Mosque built in 1485 and closed for religious ceremonies after being made into a museum in 1962. In a letter addressed to the Minister of Culture the community backs its demand with the argument that article 79 of the Cultural Heritage Law ratified by the Parliament in April 2009 according to which after certain procedures cultural monuments can be used for worship. For the time being the problem remains unsolved.

16 Major Cultural Events

The week of the Prophet’s birthday is celebrated annually with religious sermons, various musical performances, plays and conferences. There is an annual Islamic Education Week in the last week of Ram- adan. Both events are organised nation-wide by the Chief Muftiate and the Higher Islamic Institute and are very well attended.

CROATIA

Dino Mujadžević 1

1 Muslim Populations

The last national census from 2001 for the Republic of Croatia provides very reliable data on the number and dispersion of the Muslim population and other religions, as well as ethnic groups, in this country. There are 56,777 persons in Croatia, who identified themselves as Muslims, which is 1.28% of the total population of 4,437,460. This is a small increase from the 54,814 persons counted in the 1991 census. The largest part of the Muslim population resides in City of Zagreb (16,215; 2,08%) with the remainder residing in the following counties (županije):2 Primorsko-goranska (Rijeka; 9,029; 2.96%), Istarska (Pula; 8,623; 4.18%), Sisačko-moslavačka (Sisak; 3,887; 2.10%), Dubrovačko- neretvanska (Dubrovnik, 2,986, 2.43%), Vukovarsko-srijemska (Vuko- var; 2,843; 1.39%), Karlovačka (Karlovac; 1,984; 1.40%).3 Muslims are largely concentrated in urban areas, most notably in the capital and the largest industrial centre of Zagreb and other major towns and industrial centres in mainland Croatia: Sisak (2,537; 4.86%), Slavonski Brod (1,131; 1.75%) and Karlovac (653; 1.10%). Muslims are significantly present in ports, industrial and tourist centres of Northern Adriatic: Rijeka (5,497; 3.82%), Pula (3,020; 5.15%), Labin (1,114; 8.97%), Vod- njan (655; 11.59%), Poreč (652, 3.73%), Umag (597; 4.63%), Raša (555; 15.70%), and Rovinj (459, 3.22%). The historical city of Dubrovnik in the Southern Adriatic also has relatively large Muslim population (2,310; 5.28%).4 Smaller concentrations of Muslims live in rural

1 Dino Mujadžević, PhD, works as research fellow at the Croatian Institute for His- tory in Slavonski Brod and is a lecturer on Islamic Civilisation at the Philosophy Faculty in Zagreb. 2 Županija (pl. županije) is a Croatian term for administrative region, sometimes translated as district or county. 3 http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_04/H01_02_04.html. Census data are given according to official web site of State Statistical institute, www .dzs.hr, accessed 15 October 2010. 4 http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_04/H01_02_04_ zup08.html;http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_04/ 128 dino mujadžević

communities situated next to state border of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gunja (1,488; 29.56%) and Drenovci (522; 7.03%) in Vukovarsko- srijemska, and Vojnić (650; 11.83%) and Cetingrad (421; 15.33%) in Karlovačka županija.5 The largest Muslim ethnic group in Croatia is Bosniaks (20,755; 0.47% of the total Croatian population). This traditionally exclusively Muslim group is composed of immigrants from Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, who came largely in second half of the 20th century, and their descendants. In addition, according to the 2001 census 19,677 persons identified themselves ethnically as “Muslims” in Croatia. This term was used until 1993 as the official term for Bosniaks in Bosnia and elsewhere and, sometimes, for other Slavic Muslims in Macedo- nia and Kosovo. The 1991 census lists 43 thousands “Muslims” in Croatia. It is fair to assume that the almost all of “Muslims” of the 2001 census are of Bosniak origin, but due to different factors—such as ignorance about the changed terminology or desire to assimilate in Croatian society by accepting more neutral ethnic identification—they did not identify themselves as Bosniaks.6 A large number of Muslims in Croatia are to be found among Albanians (15,082; 0.34% of the total population), a community mainly consisting of immigrants from Kosovo and Macedonia, who settled in Croatian in the second half of the 20th century, and their descendants. Albanians in Croatia are also largely Christian Catholics, but there are no reliable data to establish the exact number of adherents of both religions in this group. A significant part of the Roma population in Croatia (9,463; 0.21%) has Muslim roots, but the exact number of those among them who identified themselves as Muslims is unknown. The Muslim part of the Roma population in Croatia are immigrants from Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia, who came in the second half of the 20th century, and their descendants. According to census data there are also 300 ethnic Turks,

H01_02_04_zup18.html;http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/ H01_02_04/H01_02_04_zup19.html, accessed 15 October 2010. 5 http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_04/H01_02_04_zup16 .html; http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_04/H01_02_04_zup04 .html, accessed 1 October 2009. 6 ŠemsoTanković, Bošnjaci u Republici Hrvatskoj (Bosniaks in Republic of Croatia) (Sarajevo: Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca, 1997); http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/ censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_02/H01_02_02.html; http://www.index.hr/vijesti/ clanak/bosnjacka-nacionalna-zajednica-hrvatske-poslala-zahtjev-drzavnom-vrhu- da-se-muslimani-prevedu-u-bosnjake/201295.aspx, accessed 15 October 2010. croatia 129 immigrants from Kosovo and Macedonia, and their descendants. It is fair to speculate that certain smaller numbers of Muslims, who have ethnic origins in all above mentioned ethnic groups, are ethnically assimilated declaring themselves as belonging to Croat ethnic majority.7 Muslims in Croatia are almost exclusively Sunni and belong to the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence, with very small numbers of adherents to the Naqshabandi, Qadiri and Bektashi Sufi orders. The history of Muslims and Islam in Croatia is very old, but without continuity. The settlement ofIsmaeliti— a Muslim population of unknown origin (and not to be confused with Isma’ilis as we know them today)—is documented in 1196 in Osijek. This population, as well as Ismaeliti and similar groups of Muslim origin in neighbouring Hungary, was religiously and ethnically assimilated under pressure from the Catholic Church in the 13th and 14th centuries.8 During the 16th century Ottomans established their rule in eastern parts of the country (Slavonia, Banija, Kordun, Lika, inner Dalmatia), over roughly half of territory of contemporary Croatia. According to reliable estimates, during the 16th century around one fourth of the population in Slavonia, the largest and most populous province under Ottoman rule, were Muslims, living mostly in towns. Among them, the cities of Osijek (1500, mostly Muslim, households in the late 17th century) and Požega (1150 Muslim and 200 Christian households in the late 17th century) were the largest Muslim settlements. The Muslim population in Slavonia mainly originated from other parts of the Otto- man realm, chiefly Bosnia, and the number of indigenous converts to Islam was relatively small. There are no reliable estimates about the Muslim population for other parts of Croatia. Islamic religious infrastructure, such as mosques, tekkes and waqfs, was fairly developed in towns and some villages, especially in Slavonia and inner Dalmatia during the 16th and 17th centuries. For example in Požega alone there were 14 mosques.9 Ottoman rule in Croatia ended after the Habsburg and Venetian conquest at the end of the 17th and the beginning of the

7 http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_02/H01_02_02.html, accessed 1 October 2009. 8 Ive Mažuran, Srednjovjekovni i turski Osijek (Mediaeval and Turkish Osijek) (Osi- jek: Zavod za znanstveni rad u Osijeku HAZU, 1994) p. 50. 9 Nenad Moačanin, Slavonija i Srijem u razdoblju osmanske vladavine (Slavonija and Srijem in the Age of Ottoman Rule) (Slavonski Brod: Hrvatski institut za povijest 2005), p. 43; Nenad Moačanin, Turska Hrvatska (Turkish Croatia) (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska 1999), pp. 146–147, 178–179. 130 dino mujadžević

18th century. All Muslim populations left these areas or were expelled, killed or enslaved. Certain smaller numbers of Muslims in Lika converted to Catholicism under these circumstances. All Islamic religious infrastructures, including graveyards, were destroyed or used for other purposes.10 Muslims started to return to Croatia only two centuries later, from 1878, when the Austro-Hungarian monarchy occupied present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this new modern environment Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosniaks, were able to travel, study and settle in other parts of the monarchy. According to the 1910 census, only 204 Muslims lived in Zagreb and other Croatian towns. The Austrian part of the monarchy recognised Islam as an official religion in 1912 while the Hungarian and Croatian parliaments did the same in 1916. In addition to this, it is important to stress that the Croatian political elite and, especially, nationalist opposition, in the first half of the 20th century considered Bosniaks as part of Croat nation and accepted Islam as part of the national heritage. This enabled the Muslim community in Zagreb to work in a relatively friendly environment and to establish themselves socially. After the establishment of the South Slavic state (later Yugoslavia) in 1918, Muslims of different professions and social strata, mostly Bosniaks, began to settle permanently in larger numbers in Zagreb. According to the census of 1931 there were 4,750 Muslims in Croatia, around 3,000 of them in Zagreb. In 1919, a Muslim religious community (džemat) headed by an imam was officially founded in Zagreb; in 1922 the imam of Zagreb was given the title of Mufti. Previously independent, this community officially became part of Yugoslav Islamic Religious Community (Islamska vjer- ska zajednica) in 1930. A Shari’a Court was established in Zagreb in 1935 adjudicating legal issues relating to Muslim marriage, family law and inheritance. An initiative to build a mosque in Zagreb was announced in 1938, but realised only in 1944 under the pro-Nazi Croatian Ustaša regime, which used it for propaganda purposes. The Ustaša regime was given

10 For the contemporary plight of Muslim populations in lands re-conquered by Habsburgs, including Croatia, see autobiographical accounts of Ottoman prisoners in Habsburg captivity, Osman-aga of Temisoara: Der Gefangene der Giauren. Die aben- teuerlichen Schicksale des Dolmetschers Osman Ağa aus Temeschwar, von ihm selbst erzählt (The Captive of the Infidels. The Adventurous Fate of the Translator Osman Ağa of Temişoara) (Graz, Wien, Köln: Verlag Styria, 1962). croatia 131 control of Croatia and Bosnia by the Axis powers, and in order to assimilate Bosniaks into the greater Croatian nation, the Ustašas sought to attract Muslim leaders in Croatia and Bosnia. Some imams in Croatia collaborated with the regime and in 1945, when the com- munists came to power, were severely punished by execution or imprisonment. Most prominently, the Mufti of Zagreb Ismet Muftić was arrested and executed. After legal reform in Yugoslavia in 1946 the Shari’a court in Zagreb ceased operating. In order to erase what they saw as Ustaša legacy, Zagreb City authorities closed the mosque that was built in 1944 in 1948, destroyed the minarets and demolished the interior. Under the socialist regime (1945–1990) Muslims in Croatia headed by the Mufti of Zagreb continued to operate in a revived Yugoslav Islamic Religious Community, and several Muslim communities in other Croatian towns were founded. After Croatia achieved independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, the Yugoslav Islamic religious community was dismantled and the Islamic Religious Com- munity in Croatia, later Islamic Community in Croatia (ICC, Islamska zajednica u Hrvatskoj), started to operate independently.11

2 Islam and the State

Croatia is a parliamentary democracy. According to the Constitution all religious communities are equal before the law and are separate from the state (Article 41).12 The legal status of religious communities is regulated by a law promulgated by parliament in 2002.13 According to this law the government defines its relations with religious groups through special agreements. The agreement with the ICC—which is currently the only existing Islamic community in Croatia—was signed

11 For the history of the modern Muslim community see: Omerbašić, Šefko, Islam i muslimani u Hrvatskoj (Islam and Muslims in Croatia) (Zagreb: Mešihat Islamske zajednice u Hrvatskoj), 1999; 2010 (second edition); Hasanbegović, Zlatko, Muslimani u Zagrebu, 1878–1945. Doba utemeljenja (Muslims in Zagreb, 1878–1945. The Foun- dation Age) (Zagreb: Medžlis Islamske zajednice u Zagrebu i Institut društvenih zna- nosti Ivo Pilar, 2007), p. 31; Ankica Marinović Bobinac—Dinka Marinović Jerolimov, Vjerske zajednice u Hrvatskoj (Religious communities in Croatia) (Zagreb: Prometej, 2008), pp. 285–286. 12 The latest version of the Constitution of Republic of Croatia is available at the website of the Croatian parliament, http://www.sabor.hr, accessed 15 October 2010. 13 Text of this law is published online: http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/ 309118.html, accessed 15 October 2010. 132 dino mujadžević in 2002. It stipulates the rights of the ICC in terms of mosque construction, freedom of speech and publishing, religious education in public schools, financing, chaplaincy in prisons, armed forces, police, etc. It also gives the ICC the right to register marriages. Imams’ salaries, healthcare and pension charges are fully paid by the government. The government also supports ethnic minorities through projects such as seminars, publications and other activities.

3 Main Muslim Organizations

The Islamic Community in Croatia—ICC Islamska( zajednica u Hrvatskoj) is the only existing and officially registered Islamic religious community in the country. The ICC has established cooperation with government, city and municipal authorities and relations with other religious communities. It consists of an Assembly (Sabor), an executive body called Mešihat, the Mufti of Zagreb and his office, local Muslim communities in various towns (medžlisi) and the Zagreb Islamic high school (Islamska gimnazija). The current mufti of Zagreb and president of the Mešihat is Ševko Omerbašić (Islamic Community in Croatia, Gavellina street bb, 10000 Zagreb. http://www.islamska-zajednica.hr). The ICC is in practice an independent religious institution despite its symbolic connections with the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina whereby the ICC recognises its leader (Reisu-l-ulema) in Sarajevo as the supreme religious leader while the Reisu-l-ulema confirms the mufti as the head of the ICC.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are two purpose-built mosques in Croatia, one in Zagreb and another one in the village of Gunja. The Muslims of Zagreb made a decision in 1961 to build a new mosque and but began construction twenty years later. The mosque was officially opened in September 1987 and since then has been the centre of Islamic life in Croatia. It is part of an Islamic Centre which comprises prayer facilities, a library, offices, apartments for Imams, classrooms, a restaurant, a youth club, a theatre, Islamic high school premises, etc. There are prayer facilities (masjids) in fifteen other cities. Construction of a new mosque and Islamic Centre in the city of Rijeka started in September of 2009. The croatia 133 first collective prayer in this mosque was performed on 16th Novem- ber 2010, the first day of ‘id al-Adha Kurban( bajram), but the building still remains unfinished.

5 Children’s Education

Muslims have the right to organise confessional religious education in all public schools where there are seven or more pupils in a class. The Islamic community in Zagreb has been running an Islamic religious school (madrasa) called “Dr Ahmed Smajlović” since 1992. In 2006, due to low enrolment of new pupils, it was converted to a general Islamic high school. The school’s programme is organised with that of the state high schools. While it includes Islamic subjects, a graduate does not receive the title of imam.14 In 2008 the ICC, in cooperation with the authorities of the City of Zagreb, opened a kindergarten called “Jasmin”. This is the first Islamic kindergarten in Croatia and has been operating ever since in the Islamic Centre in Zagreb.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Universities do not offer Islamic studies. Plans for an Islamic Studies Faculty as part of the Islamic Centre in Zagreb have been initiated, but little progress has been made. Imams are sent abroad for training, often to Bosnia, but also to Turkey and Arab countries. The influence of conservative Islamic trends from these countries is very limited among these cadres.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims have the right to be buried according to Islamic rites. In Zagreb, Muslims have a separate section at the Mirogoj cemetery. In other cities burial places are usually mixed with those of non-Muslims.

14 See also: Marinović Jerolimov, Dinka and Marinović Bobinac, Ankica, “Islam- ische Ausbildung in Europa—kroatisches Modell”, in: Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamische Erziehung in Europa (Islamic Education in Europe) (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 239–258, and http://www.zg-medresa.hr, accessed 15 October 2010. 134 dino mujadžević

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Imams have the right to visit and ask for a separate room for prayers in all public institutions including the police, armed forces, prisons and hospitals (article 17 of the Agreement). Muslims serving in the armed forces have the right to ask for pork-free food, and to be taken to the nearest mosque on Fridays to perform prayers.

9 Religious Festivals

Muslims have the right to a holiday on both major festivals. In practice, private companies are less likely to grant this right. Both ’id prayers are broadcast live on the national TV and radio stations. On ’id day a prominent politician (such as the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister or the Mayor of Zagreb) will usually visit the Zagreb mosque to greet Muslims and their leaders.

10 Halal Food

The Halal Quality Agency of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina was until recently certifying as halal the products of Cro- atian companies (the full list can be obtained at the webpage of the Halal Quality Agency: http://www.halal.ba). Since 2010, the Centre for Halal Quality Certification of the ICC has been operating in Zagreb. However, not all companies have all their products Halal certified, and certified products still do not have a Halal logo on them, which makes them difficult to identify. Certified companies were obliged to label their Halal certified products with the logo by 1 July 2009. Dining and fast food restaurants are not Halal certified. Recently the ICC opened a butcher’s store on the mosque premises, but due to low revenues it had to be closed, as most Muslims live far away from the mosque, which made it difficult for them to always purchase there. Unlicensed slaughter is strictly prohibited, while qurban slaughter is organised by the Islamic Community together with a local meat company. croatia 135

11 Dress Codes

Civil law does not prohibit women from wearing hijab, though few Muslim women wear it. Wearing hijab is allowed in photographs used for identification documents.

12 Publication and Media

The ICC is involved in publishing Islamic books and books related to Muslim heritage in Croatia, but also publish its almanac (Takvim) and bulletin (Bilten) occasionally. News about the ICC is published on its website (http://www.islamska-zajednica.hr). Muslims usually read religious newspapers imported from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Imams give sermons regularly on national TV and radio stations.

13 Family Law

All family legal issues except the registration of marriages are referred to the civil courts. According to the 2002 agreement between government and the ICC, sharia marriages administered by ICC are recognized by the state and have the same legal status as civil marriages.

14 Interreligious Relations

The Mufti and other leaders of the ICC participate regularly in interreligious conferences of high representatives of religious communities in Croatia. Representatives of the ICC also participate regularly in Inter- religious Prayer Meetings organised in Croatia. The ICC has very good on-going cooperation with Council for Ecumenism and Dialogue of the Croatian Bishops’ Conference.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Due to the cultural similarity of Croatian Muslims and the Christian majority there are no social tensions and Muslims are integrated into Croatian society. Nevertheless, negative prejudices towards Muslims, increased by ethnic warfare between Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia in 1993–1994, still influence parts of public opinion. This was visible 136 dino mujadžević in the resistance by part of the local population to the building of the Islamic Centre in Rijeka. On the other hand, major political actors and influential media tend to be supportive and open to the ICC and to Croatian Muslims.

16 Major Cultural Events

The ICC organises an annual European Qur’an recitation competition held in conjunction with the celebration of the anniversary of the opening of the Zagreb mosque in September of each year. It also organises occasional scholarly conferences on topics concerning Islam and Muslims in Croatia. CYPRUS

Ali Dayıoğlu and Mete Hatay1

1 Muslim Populations

The Muslim presence in Cyprus dates from the seventh century, but Islam took root, grew, and was institutionalised in the island during the period of Ottoman rule (1571–1878). Cyprus was a British colony from 1878 until 1960, when the island gained its independence and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was formed. The RoC was based on a consociational system of power-sharing between the Turks and Greeks of the island, each community dealing with its own religious affairs. However, this power-sharing arrangement broke down in 1963, leading to a period of intermittent inter-communal violence over the next decade. During this period, the RoC came under the sole control of Greek Cypriots, while Turkish Cypriots established their own administration in armed enclaves. A Greek-sponsored coup and subsequent Turkish military intervention in 1974 ultimately led to the island’s present division. Greek Cypriots residing in the north fled to the south of the island and Turkish Cypriots in the south to the north. By 1979, there were only around 1,000 Greek Cypriots remaining in the north (out of an original 142,000) and only 150 Turkish Cypriots remaining in the south (out of an original 55,000).2 After the division of the island, the RoC, under Greek-Cypriot control, in the south, became the only internationally recognised government of the island. Turkish Cypriots in 1983 proclaimed a state in the north, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which remains to this day unrecognised by any country other than Turkey.

1 Ali Dayıoğlu is an assistant professor in the Department of International Rela- tions, Near East University, Northern Cyprus. He researches the Turkish-Muslim minority in Bulgaria and Greece and the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. Mete Hatay is Project Leader at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Cyprus Centre, Nicosia. 2 Gürel, Ayla and Kudret Özersay, The Politics of Property in Cyprus: Conflicting Appeals to ‘Bizonality’ and ‘Human Rights’ by the Two Cypriot Communities, PRIO Report 3/2006 (Nicosia/Oslo: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2006), pp. 3–4. 138 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay

Although the RoC is constitutionally a bi-communal state, in 2004 it became a member of the European Union without its Turkish Cypriot partners. Turkish Cypriots may carry European passports via the RoC, but the northern part of the island was excluded from the EU’s acquis communautaire. According to the 2006 Demographic Report of the RoC’s Statistical Service department, the current population in the south, under the RoC-controlled area, is 778,700. Of these, 118,100 are foreign residents who do not have Cypriot citizenship. Some reports also claim that there are 20,000–30,000 illegal or unrecorded foreigners living in the south.3 Of these, an estimated 15,000–20,000 are Muslims of various nationalities. During the civil war in Lebanon, many Lebanese fled and settled in Cyprus, and Cyprus is today an important receiving country for economic migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers from nearby Muslim countries, South East Asia and Africa. According to UNHCR, 900 refugees and more than 10,000 asylum seekers are currently living in Cyprus, the majority of whom are Muslims. Cyprus is also home to a number of private universities and colleges which attract international students, many from Bangladesh and Pakistan.4 Apart from this immigrant and student population, a substantial number of Turk- ish Cypriots, mostly of Roma origin, moved from the island’s north to the south after the 2003 opening of the ceasefire line that divides the island, especially since Cyprus’s 2004 European Union accession. However, according to a recent study, the Muslim population of Turk- ish Cypriot extraction living in the south still does not exceed 1%.5 In the north, the total population, according to the 2006 census, is 256,644, although this census does not include the rotating population of Turkish military, which is estimated at 30,000–35,000 at any one time. Of the total recorded population, 178,031 are citizens of the TRNC, although 27,333 of these gave their birthplace as Turkey. Although religion was not listed on the census, and even though the majority of the population is fundamentally secular, Turkish Cypriots are officially

3 Trimikliniotis, Nicos and Demetriou, Corina, Active Civic Participation of Immi- grants in Cyprus, Cyprus Country Report prepared for the European research project POLITIS, (Oldenburg: University of Oldenburg, 2005), p. 8 (www.uni-oldenburg.de/ politis-europe). 4 Statistical Service of Republic of Cyprus, Statistics of Education 2005/2006, Nico- sia 2007, available at www.mof.gov.cy. 5 Directorate General Internal Politics of the Union, “Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future?”, IP/B/CULT/IC/2006_061. cyprus 139 considered to be Muslims. There are also 70,525 immigrants who are nationals of the Republic of Turkey who are recorded in the census, almost all of whom are Muslim. The majority of this group are either studying in the universities of north Cyprus or working in the island’s growing construction, tourism and manufacturing sectors. Amongst the latter group there are many Kurdish and Arabic speakers. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims following the Hanafi or Shafi’i schools. In addition, there is a large Alevi immigrant population, approximately half of them Kurdish and half Turkish. The president of the largest Alevi association has claimed that they number around 4,000–5,000. The majority of Arabic-speaking Turkish nationals are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school, but there is also a small population of Alawites or Nusayris (different from Alevis), most of whom are from the Hatay area of southern Turkey. The remaining 8,088 foreign residents are listed in the census as being of other nationalities, including the UK, Pakistan, Bulgaria, and African countries. Of these, approximately half are Muslim.6 In the years since the census was taken, there has also been an influx of migrants from Central Asian countries, especially Turkmenistan, the majority of whom are women coming to the island to work as domestic labourers. According to the U.S. State Depart- ment Report on Religious Freedom (2010), approximately 8% of the population in the island’s north attend weekly religious services, and 1.3% attend more than once a week.7

2 Islam and the State

Article 18 of the 1960 Constitution of the RoC guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion for everyone. It also provides in principle that the administration of the RoC, in the application of the law, will not discriminate against any religion or religious institution. Because of the bi-communal nature of the RoC, provisions are made in the Constitution for the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the institution of waqf and the Laws and Principles of awqaf (Ahkamül Evkaf ). These religious foundations are among the principle institutions

6 Hatay, Mete, Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking? An Overview of the Ethno-Demography of Cyprus in the light of the Preliminary Results of the 2006 Turkish- Cypriot Census, PRIO Report 2/2007 (Nicosia/Oslo: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2007). 7 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148926.htm, accessed 3 March 2011. 140 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay of the Turkish Cypriot community, and historically the Evkaf was one of the largest landholders in the island. In the past, funds generated from these properties supported schools and other public works and religious institutions. Article 110 of the RoC Constitution confirms that the control of these properties and their funds belongs solely to the Evkaf, and any laws and regulations shall be enacted by the Turkish Communal Chamber, which during its years of operation (1960–1963) was comprised of elected Turkish Cypriot deputies. Article 23 of the Constitution secures properties belonging to mosques and other Muslim religious institutions. According to this article, no confiscation, restriction or limitation of ownership rights may take place with regard to such movable or immovable properties without the approval of the Turkish Communal Chamber and subject to the Laws and Principles of Evkaf and for the purposes of town and country planning. Muslim institutions are exempt from taxes and are eligible for government subsidies. However, after 1974, the Evkaf lost control over all its properties in the south and operates only in the north. As with all other Turkish Cypriot property in the south, Evkaf property has been placed under the Turkish Cypriot Proper- ties Management Service, an institution established after the departure of Turkish Cypriots from the south. Despite the provisions in the Constitution, many complaints have been lodged pertaining to violations in the form of acquisitions made by the RoC in respect of waqf properties. After the proclamation of their own state in 1983, Turkish Cypri- ots approved a constitution by referendum. Article 1 of the TRNC Constitution stresses the secular character of the state, while Article 23 guarantees freedom of faith and conscience. Provisions have been made regarding acquisitions, requisitions, restrictions and limitations relating to waqf properties in Article 42. According to this article, matters relating to acquisitions and requisitions of waqf properties are to be regulated by law enacted in accordance with the Laws and Prin- ciples of Evkaf. According to Article 131 of the Constitution, all matters relating to or in any way affecting the institution or foundation of waqf or any Muslim religious institutions shall exclusively be subject to the Laws and Principles of Evkaf and the legislation in force and the laws to be enacted by the Parliament. The same article further provides that properties belonging to the waqf institution shall be exempted from any form of taxation. cyprus 141

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Historically, the two primary Muslim organisations in Cyprus are the Evkaf (Vakıflar İdaresi, Nicosia, PO Box 118, via Mersin 10, Turkey), which manages the affairs of land and business holdings that have been donated for religious purposes, and the Müftü (or Mufti) (KKTC Din İşleri Başkanlığı, Müftü Raci sokak No. 24, Nicosia via Mersin 10, Turkey, http://www.kktcdinisleri.com/baskanligimiz.html), who is the official spiritual head of the community. As explained above, as representative of Muslims in Cyprus, the Evkaf Administration, currently called Vakıflar ve Din İşleri Dairesi (Evkaf and Religious Affairs Office), owns all the island’s mosques, cemeteries, tekes and turbes (shrines). As explained above, following the 1974 division of the island, the Evkaf lost control of all holdings in the south, both religious and commercial, and operates solely in the north. Similarly, although the Mufti is the official spiritual head of the Muslim community in Cyprus, after 1974 his office moved to the north, and he is effectively without power in the south. Because Muslim organisations controlled by Turkish Cypriots moved to the north after 1974, no such Muslim-controlled organisations remained in the south to provide religious personnel and ensure the maintenance and upkeep of mosques. The need to provide such services, especially for immigrant Muslims, is currently being met by the World Islamic Call Society, an organisation based in Libya. As explained above, the Evkaf was the most important institution responsible for religious affairs in Cyprus. The Mufti, once the spiritual leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, lost his influence during the twentieth century, as the Turkish Cypriot community was increasingly secularised. While once influential in legal and educational matters and in areas such as marriage and divorce, the Mufti lost his historical title and privileges in the 1980s and became the Director of Religious Affairs (DRA) under the control of the Evkaf Administration, which is run by a board appointed by the Prime Minister. In addition, the DRA has authority only in the north. Because of the isolation and non- recognition of the north, these institutions receive significant financial contributions, personnel, and guidance from Turkey. In addition to these official institutions, two associations, the Evrensel Sevgi ve Kardeşlik Derneği (Association of Universal Love and Broth- erhood) and the Kıbrıs Türk İslam Cemiyeti (Cyprus Turkish Islam 142 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay

Association) sponsor various activities and programmes, mainly for students from Turkey studying in the island. The former was founded by the former Mufti, who was educated in Saudi Arabia and espoused a particular interpretation of Islam that emphasised universal peace. The latter was influenced by the Turkish-Islam Synthesis, popular in Turkey in the 1980s, which attempted to combine nationalism and Islam. Certain tariqas also operate in north Cyprus, the most important being the Naqshbendi tariqa, whose leader, Turkish Cypriot Sheikh Nazım Kıbrısi (Nazim al-Qubrusi), has many followers from Europe and the Americas. His main centre (dergah) is based in the small town of Lefke, where he regularly receives disciples visiting from abroad. Along with the Sunni Muslim institutions, there are two Alevi associations, whose members are immigrants from Turkey. The larger of the two, the Society for Research and Promotion of the Culture of Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli (Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Kültürünü Araştırma ve Tanıtma Derneği) has recently acquired land from the government to build a cemevi, or Alevi place of worship. Currently, they use the association’s building for their rituals and gatherings. The other significant Alevi organization is the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Society (Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Prior to the departure of Turkish Cypriots from their villages, either during the period of conflict in the 1960s or after 1974, there were 102 mosques in the south as well as four tekes and 148 cemeteries. Since the island’s division, these properties have been under the control of the Turkish Cypriot Properties Management, an institution established by the Greek Cypriot-controlled RoC after 1974. Although there has been interest in the restoration and upkeep of mosques in the past several years, until 2003 few repairs had been carried out. During the RoC’s EU accession process between 2000 and 2003, RoC spent approximately €100,000 per year. The amount then increased significantly in 2004, following the opening of Cyprus’ checkpoints, the subsequent return of many Turkish Cypriots to visit their villages, and the May 2004 accession of the RoC to the EU. From 2004 to 2006, the RoC spent approximately €500,000 each year for the upkeep of Muslim religious properties. In 2008, one UNDP-funded project to list and evaluate religious sites found that 60 mosques in the south were cyprus 143 in good condition after repairs.8 The 2010 Ministry of Interior budget for restoration activities was € 983,470. Today, only five of the above mentioned mosques in the south are in use, and these are in towns with immigrant Muslim populations. The mosques in Nicosia, Larnaca and Limassol are maintained and run by the Islamic Call Society of Libya. Another small mosque in Limas- sol has been recently renovated at the request of the growing Turkish Cypriot Muslim community there (mainly Roma). A Turkish Cypriot imam travels from the north to this mosque every week for the Friday prayers, and also on religious festivals. In Larnaca, the Hala Sultan Tekke and Mosque is under the dual management of the Department of Antiquities and the Custodian of Turkish Cypriot Properties. Dur- ing 2009, the Nakshabendi tarika, based in the town of Lefke in north Cyprus, received permission to conduct services in the Hala Sultan Mosque on Fridays and during religious holidays. Receiving encouragement from this success, the tarika proceeded to establish an association in the island’s south with the intent of pressuring the RoC to give control of the mosque to this order. Their application was rejected by the Ministry of the Interior on the grounds that the mosque is now a cultural heritage site and used as a museum.9 It should be noted that the largest Muslim immigrant community lives in Nicosia, where there is only one functioning mosque. Although two other mosques have been renovated and could be used, they have not been opened for use. Only the Bayraktar Mosque is now open on Thursday evenings for the Nakshabendi order to performzikr , despite the fact that the mosque is not open for regular prayers. In addition, the authors observed that the one operational mosque is not sufficient to meet the increasing demand of practising Muslims, especially during Friday prayers. In the north, according to data provided by the former head of the DRA, Yusuf Suiçmez, in 2009 there were 182 functioning mosques. Of these, 84 existed before the island’s division, while 48 were churches that had been converted to mosques after 1974. In addition, four buildings previously used as cinemas or schools had been converted into mosques. Suiçmez also stated that between 1974 and 2009, 39 new mosques have been built, and of these 31 were financed by the

8 See http://www.cyprustemples.com. 9 Kıbrıs, 6 January 2011. 144 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay

Religious Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy. He further stated that the building of 9 mosques continued in 2009 and that the building of another 7 mosques was in the process of planning.10 In recent years, in view of Greek Cypriot and international reactions against the conversion of churches into mosques, more weight has been given to building new places of worship. Mosques in Northern Cyprus belong in law to the Evkaf Administra- tion. Although the Evkaf collects considerable revenue from its various properties, only 10% of the cost of mosque upkeep and clerical salaries is provided by this Administration. The remaining 90% comes from the Ministry of Finance, which in turn requests this amount from Tur- key, so the cost of mosque maintenance and staffing, like much of the infrastructure in the north, is provided by Turkey. However, members of the Alevi sect complained that because they are recognized only as an association and not as a religious group, they were given no funds to help build a cemevi, or Alevi house of worship. While the state granted land for such a building, funds for construction were raised privately.

5 Children’s Education

There are no state-supported Islamic schools in either of the two parts of Cyprus. In the south, instruction in the Greek Orthodox religion is compulsory in primary and secondary schools. However, parents of different faiths may submit a written request for their children to be exempted from this subject. Turkish Cypriot pupils who attend schools in the south, if there are reasonable numbers of them, may receive religious instruction in their own language. Currently, a Turk- ish Cypriot teacher gives religious lessons in Turkish in Limassol, where most Turkish Cypriots in the areas controlled by the RoC live. It must, however, be noted that despite the provisions of the Constitu- tion of the RoC and repeated assurances by the RoC administration to the United Nations Secretary General, to date no Turkish primary school has been opened in the south of the island.11

10 Ergül Ernur, “16 Yeni Cami için 13 Trilyon (13 Trillion for New Mosques)”, Kıbrıs, 7 May 2009. 11 On this subject, see Dayıoğlu, Ali, “Kıbrıs’ta Okullar Sorunu II: Limasol Türk İlkokulu (The School Problem in Cyprus II: The Limassol Turkish Primary School)”, Kıbrıs Yazıları, No. 2, (Bahar 2006), pp. 56–69. cyprus 145

According to the TRNC Constitution, “Religious education and instruction shall be under the supervision and control of the state.” Since 2005, after an enactment of a regulation, school management committees have been deciding on the provision of religious instruction at the secondary level of primary education. As a result, many schools have chosen not to include religion lessons in their curricula. However, in 2010 compulsory instruction in “religious culture and morality” was put into effect one hour per week, but so far the lack of teachers has hampered its implementation in many schools. Traditionally, families who wish their children to receive religious instruction have sent them to summer courses in local mosques. In recent years, however, these summer courses have been a source of controversy, twice prevented by laws forbidding the teaching of religion outside school. In other words, imams in mosques are allowed to preach but not to teach.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There are no institutions of higher education that offer training for imams and other religious professionals in the south. The clergy operating and performing their duties in north Cyprus are attached to two authorities, the DRA, (under the control of Evkaf ), which is an institution of the TRNC, and the Religious Affairs Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia. There are no faculties of theology orimam-hatip lycées. Only one university, the Anadolu University, a Turkish university, which also has a campus in north Cyprus, has an Open Faculty, where there is a theology department at the undergraduate level. Most of the imams and muezzins attached to the DRA have received their education in private or official Qur’an courses run by the DRA. The education level of the 270 mosque employees under the DRA is therefore quite low, and only 10% of them are full-time employees, with the rest working on a temporary or part-time basis. However, since 2007, 64 imams from Turkey have been employed in north Cyprus mosques on four-year contracts, through auspices of the Religious Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy. They are at leastimam-hatip lycée graduates, and quite a number are graduates of theology faculties.12

12 Ibid., p. 162. 146 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay

7 Burial and Cemeteries

As noted above, only three of the 148 Muslim cemeteries in the south are in good condition. In the north, there are over 150 Muslim cemeteries. The land is owned by the Evkaf Administration, which also provides for services conducted in these cemeteries. Maintenance is provided by municipalities.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no rules governing religious assistance in health facilities, prisons or the armed forces in either part of the island. Religious support is usually provided on an ad hoc basis according to need. In 2010, the U.S. State Department Religious Freedom Report noted that the Ombudsman’s Office in the RoC had investigated a Muslim prisoner’s complaints regarding the lack of prayer facilities in the prison. While the Central Prison has both a mosque and an Orthodox church, the Ombudsman’s Office found that these were not open regularly but only weekly and on religious holidays. In addition, in response to the complaint of a prisoner in the state’s “open prison,” the same office found that the opportunity for religious practice in these facilities was limited but that the state had promised to correct the problem by the end of 2011.13 Moreover, Muslims are not allowed to join the military in the south. The armed forces in the north have their own places of worship and provide their own religious personnel. Clergy visit Nicosia Central Prison, the only prison in north Cyprus, for special activities, especially during the month of Ramadan.

9 Religious Festivals

While no Islamic festivals are recognised in the south, all Islamic festivals are recognised in the north. Because Turkish Cypriot society is for the most part secular, most Turkish Cypriots take part in religious activities primarily during religious festivals, especially the major festivals of Ramadan and ‘Id al-Adha (Kurban Bayramı). Although there

13 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148926.htm, accessed 3 March 2011. cyprus 147 have been no surveys on the extent to which fasting is practised during Ramadan, it is the authors’ observation that most of those who fast are elderly Turkish Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey. Most people, however, actively participate in traditional ways in festivities associated with the bayrams. Beginning approximately ten years ago, Turkish Cypriots began to celebrate the Mevlid Kandili, or the anniversary of the Prophet’s birth, as Kutlu Doğum Haftası, or the Week of the Holy Birth. Mevlid-i Nebi, the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, is fixed as the twelfth day of the third month (Rebi‘ ul-Evvel/Rabi‘ al-Awwal) of the Hijri calendar. It was usually celebrated with mosque illuminations and preparation of special sweets. Although Mevlid Kandili was celebrated before, under the influence of trends coming from Turkey, this one-day event became a week-long festival, with religious educational activities, including conferences and seminars. In addition, clergy employed by the DRA are requested to visit the homes of people within their communities and to offer them a rose and a book about the Prophet Muhammad. Several minor Muslim festivals are also celebrated in north Cyprus, including Regaip Kandili, celebrating the night of Muhammad’s conception, Miraç Kandili, celebrating the Prophet Muhammad’s ascent into heaven; and Berat Kandili, the Day of Forgiveness. On these days main mosques in the cities are illuminated and the clergy offer special prayers in the mosques. Alevis also freely celebrate their festivals such as Ashura and qurban. During the celebrations many dedes and traditional ashik, or minstrels, are brought from Turkey. In this context, in October 2010, the Society for Research and Recognition of Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Culture organised a traditional Lokma Day. Also, the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Society celebrated in December 2010 the Ashura and the “2nd Alevi Symposium”.

10 Halal Food

Halal food is available in the south because of the immigrant Muslim population. One halal meat provider in Nicosia told the authors that he had reached an agreement with the government slaughterhouse to allow him to slaughter his own meat at this government-monitored area. He estimates that he slaughters approximately 25–30 large animals each week. 148 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay

All meat slaughtered in north Cyprus under the control of municipal slaughterhouses is halal.

11 Dress Codes

There are no laws or regulations concerning dress codes and hence no prohibitions on the hijab in workplaces in the south, though there have been some discussions about head scarves in private schools. However, in May 2010 the Minister of Education and the teachers union confirmed the government’s policy that all students have the equal right to use religious symbols, including wearing a head scarf, at school. In north Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots generally do not wear head scarves, and there are no laws regulating dress. However, in Turkey the head scarf has long been forbidden in universities and other public institutions, and implementation of the prohibition intensified from 1997. As a result, many young women from Turkey who wish to wear the head scarf come to north Cyprus to study.

12 Publication and Media

The media operate freely in the south, though the local media sources do not publish or air informative content about Islam. Muslim immigrants in the south tend to read newspapers imported from abroad, listen to radio stations from neighbouring Arab countries, and watch Arab and Turkish television via satellite. In north Cyprus, there are no visual or printed media that consistently address religious issues, though some newspapers provide space on Fridays for articles on religion. Also, during the main religious festivals, local television and radio stations air religious programmes. On the other hand, all religious publications including newspapers and periodicals that are published in Turkey are available on sale in the north and it is possible to view television channels with religious content via satellite. In 2010, through a joint venture of the Rumi Institute of the Near East University (NEU) in the north and the Rumi Working Group of the University of Exeter in England, publication of the journal Maw- lana Rumî Review began in 2010. cyprus 149

13 Family Law

Until 2004, it was prohibited in the south for Christians to marry Mus- lims. With the RoC’s accession to the European Union, however, this law has been changed, and inter-faith marriage is technically allowed. Both civil and church marriages are recognised by the state, though marriages performed by Muslim clergy are not recognised. In north Cyprus, only civil marriages are recognised by the state. Some Mus- lims in the north do choose to perform religious ceremonies, but these must be accompanied by a civil marriage in order to be officially recognised. Only people who have been married in a civil ceremony recognised by the state may inherit from each other. Although other forms of conjugal relationship are not recognised as grounds for inheritance between the couple, children of unmarried couples may inherit from both parents.

14 Interreligious Relations

A missed opportunity for interreligious relations occurred during the year with the visit of Pope Benedict to the island. Although the Pope met briefly with Sheikh Nazım Kıbrısi, leader of the Nakshabandi Sufi order in Cyprus, he was unable to meet with official religious leaders, such as the Director of Religious Affairs. One positive development in 2010 were the activities of the bi-communal Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage, which cleaned a mosque in the island’s south and two churches in the north in April of that year. This action followed similar efforts in October 2009, when one mosque in the south and one church in the north were cleaned under supervision of the same committee.14

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In 2010 compulsory instruction in “religious culture and morality” was put into effect one hour per week, but so far the lack of teachers has hampered its implementation in many schools. In one school where this course was implemented, parents complained in January 2010

14 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148926.htm, accessed 3 March 2011. 150 ali dayıoğlu and mete hatay that the teacher had used several students to demonstrate how to perform namaz during a lesson on the topic. The school principal reported that explanation of namaz is part of the approved curriculum, and the teacher had used volunteers in the demonstration.15 The government’s programme also proposed summer religious courses, which included Qur’an lessons. This new proposal also produced vehement reactions amongst some fundamentally secularist Cypriots.16 However, the Head of DRA Suiçmez stated that over 2,000 applications were received for the courses, most coming from Turkish immigrants living in Cyprus.17 However, continuing opposition to the courses on the part of teachers’ unions and other associations, primarily Alawite, prevented the courses from being held. As a result, families that wished to give their children religious and Qur’an education continued to apply to the DRA for summer courses, in this case asking that their children be sent to Turkey. According to the DRA, the number of applications for summer religious courses rose from 200 in 2008 to 300 in 200918 and to 600 in 2010.19 On 20 July 2010, the Prime Minister of TRNC, State Minister and Assistant to the Prime Minister of Turkey, Head of the Religious Affairs of Turkey and Mayor of the Nicosia Turkish Municipality signed a protocol for a Külliye (complex of buildings around a mosque) to be built in the centre of Nicosia. The State Minister and Assistant to the Prime Minister of Turkey, Cemil Çiçek, explained that while Turkey would continue to contribute materially to north Cyprus through aid and investment, additional investment aimed at spiritual enrichment was also needed.20 Many political factions and civil society groups reacted against the announcement that the Külliye would be built at the Nicosia Bus Ter- minal. Led by leftist parties, many associations and unions opposed the protocol. They pointed out that at a time of financial crisis, when

15 Günay Toygar, “Okulda Namaz Tartışması (Ritual Worship Argument at School)”, Havadis, 9 January 2010. 16 Sami Özuslu, “Kuran Kursu Değil, Hafız Kursu! (2) (It is not Qur’an Courses, It is Hafiz Courses (2))”,Yenidüzen , 23 September 2009. 17 Aral Moral, “Kur’an Kursu için Kuyruk (Queue for Qur’an Courses)”, Havadis, 17 June 2009. 18 Yenidüzen, 31 May 2009; see also Çağıl Günalp, “Türkiye’de Kur’an Kursu (Qur’an Courses in Turkey)”, Yenidüzen, 13 August 2009. 19 Yenidüzen, 10 July 2010. 20 Havadis, 21 July 2010. cyprus 151 the government was cutting public spending and remunerations, spending millions of dollars to build a Külliye complex when there are already two mosques in the vicinity was inconceivable. In addition, they argued, building of the Külliye at the bus terminal was contrary to the Nicosia Master Building Plan. They formed an ‘Action Committee’ to fight against the building of theKülliye .21 Further tensions were caused by the DRA’s announcement that the former Haydarpaşa Mosque, used for years as an art gallery, would be opened for prayers. Artists protested, alleging that Turkey was attempting to assimilate secular Turkish Cypriots through religion. By the end of 2010, no further development had taken place regarding this issue.22

16 Major Cultural Events

The usual religious holidays were celebrated in both sides of the island. Mawlana Jalal al-Din Rumi was commemorated in various activities in 2010. Within the context of the ‘Mawlana Week’, Head of the DRA organised in December a conference on ‘Mawlana and Tolerance Cul- ture’ for the religion officers. The Rumi Institute of the NEU held a series of activities headed by the ‘Walk of Love’.

21 Yenidüzen, 5 September 2010. 22 Çağıl Günalp, “Sanat Galerisinde İbadet Tartışması (Debate on Worship in Art Gallery)”, Yenidüzen, 17 March 2010.

CZECH REPUBLIC

Štěpán Macháček1

1 Muslim Populations

In the last Czech census in 2001 about 3,700 people indicated Islam as their religious affiliation.2 However the actual number of Muslims is higher since many of them feel uncomfortable with identifying with the Islamic faith in official documents. The estimated number of Muslims in the Czech Republic is around 10,000.3 No newer official figures on believers of different faiths are available until the next census in 2011. The territory of today’s Czech Republic has never been under direct Islamic influence or rule so there is no indigenous Czech Muslim community. Three categories of Muslims can be defined: ethnic Czech converts, Czech citizens of foreign origin, and foreigners who live in the Czech Republic on the basis of permanent or temporary residency permits. There are only about 400 Czech converts, who are nevertheless very active in Muslim organisations.4 The second group consists

1 Štěpán Macháček is a research fellow at the Oriental Institute of the Czech Acad- emy of Sciences, now temporarily teaching Czech language at the University of Ain Shams in Cairo, Egypt. He is a graduate in Arabic and the history and culture of the Islamic world. He has researched on contemporary Islam in the Balkans and published several articles on the subject. 2 A figure given by the Czech Department for Statistics Český( statistický úřad ) and available at http://www.czso.cz/csu/2003edicniplan.nsf/o/4110–03--obyvatelstvo_ hlasici_se_k_jednotlivym_cirkvim_a_nabozenskym_spolecnostem, accessed 4 January 2011. 3 An estimate widely accepted by both the Czech authorities (see Rýdl, Karel and Marika Uiberlayová, “Education and Muslim minorities in the Czech Republic”, in Holger Daun and Geoffrey Walford (eds.),Educational Strategies among Muslims in the Context of Globalization (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 247–261 (253)), and the Czech Muslim community (see Mendel, Miloš, Bronislav Ostřanský and Tomáš Rataj, Islám v srdci Evropy (Islam in the Heart of Europe) (Prague: Academia, 2007), p. 408). 4 This figure is also an estimate, presented by Mohamed Alí Šilhavý, the late head of Czech Muslim community, in late 1990s. Since then, this number has often been assumed to be the most accurate estimate. However, Vladimír Sáňka, a representative of UMO, claimed in a personal interview on 3 January 2011, that there are tens of Czechs converting to Islam annually. Thus the number of Czech converts is supposed to be increasing. 154 štěpán macháček of former students who came from then socialist oriented developing countries to study in the former Czechoslovakia. Some stayed after their graduation, married and obtained citizenship. Most of them came from Arab countries with Syria, Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Sudan being at the forefront. Muslims from the third category came mostly after 1989 as students or entrepreneurs. Arab countries (especially Egypt, Syria and Iraq) and the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo or Macedo- nia) are typically their regions of origin, followed by other countries (Chechnya, Turkey, Afghanistan etc.). Muslims are also represented among asylum seekers. According to Ministry of Interior figures, out of 3,016 applicants in 2006, several hundred came from Muslim countries. The most numerous were Egyptians (422 persons) but there were asylum seekers from Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Kyrgyzstan, Iraq, Turkey, Algeria, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Somalia, Bangladesh, Syria and Sudan. Muslims were, in comparison with non-Muslim asylum seekers, successful in being granted asylum. The highest numbers were Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians and Kazakhs.5

2 Islam and the State

Until 1918, the territory of today’s Czech Republic was subject to the laws of the Habsburg Empire (see Austria). Today the Czech Repub- lic has no state religion and the constitution provides for freedom of religion. In comparison with other European countries, a high proportion of Czechs, 59% according to the 2001 census, do not profess any religion.6 Since religious affiliation was an optional entry in the 2001 census forms, all figures are only approximations. Most Czech Muslim organisations are registered with the Minis- try of Culture as cultural or social organisations. As such, they are not granted any public funding. In 2004, the umbrella organisation Ústředí muslimských náboženských obcí (Headquarters of the Muslim Religious Communities, UMO) succeeded in registration as a religious community. For the first time since the end of World War I, Czech Muslims were officially recognised by the state. For more privileges,

5 Mendel et al., Islám v srdci Evropy, pp. 408–410. 6 http://www.czso.cz/csu/2003edicniplan.nsf/t/7A002F081C/$File/41100308.pdf, accessed 5 January 2011. czech republic 155 such as the right to public funding or running religious schools, there are requirements that the UMO is unlikely to be able to fulfil in the foreseeable future (for instance, established believers must form at least 0.1% of the total population, i.e. 10,000 for the Czech Republic). The UMO has asked the authorities for an exception from that rule since 2002, but the request has been refused so far.7 UMO and other Muslim activities are funded by local and foreign believers’ contributions and donations.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Ústředí muslimských náboženských obcí (Headquarters of the Muslim Religious Communities, UMO) was formed as a Muslim umbrella organisation. The UMO chairman was, until his death in March 2008, Mohamed Alí Šilhavý (born in 1917), a legendary Czech convert and symbol of Czech Muslims. Since March 2009, the organisation has been led by Muneeb Hassan Al Rawi (of Iraqi origin), while another important person in the organisation is a Czech convert Vladimír Sáňka (for many years a very active and influential person in the Czech Muslim community). The core of the UMO is an executive council in which every Czech Muslim organisation is meant to have a representative. Geographically, the UMO consists today of four communities: Prague, Brno, Teplice, and Hradec Králové. The UMO resides now in the mosque of Prague (Blatská 1491, 198 00 Praha 9—Kyje, islamcz@ islamcz.cz), having moved there from the town of Třebíč. Before the UMO was registered with the Ministry of Culture in 2004, several Muslim groups registered as “cultural” or “social” organisations formed a platform for Muslim activities. Some of them have continued functioning until today and have become UMO members.

7 According to Vladimír Sáňka, a representative of the UMO, published on the internet news site Novinky.cz on 23 February 2009, http://www.novinky.cz/domaci/ 162064-muslimove-a-krisnovci-se-zlobi-nedosahnou-na-miliony-od-statu.html, accessed 5 January 2011. From 2002 to 2007, there was an option for religious communities to request an exception called Special Rights (zvláštní práva) intended for “historically established world religions” (as opposed to large number of modern sects) with insufficient number of believers in the Czech Republic. In the case of Muslim community, Czech authorities gave a negative response in 2006. 156 štěpán macháček

The Islamic Foundation in Prague Islámská( nadace v Praze) was started in 1989 with the aim of establishing a mosque in Prague and was registered in 2001. After having managed a small prayer room from 1992 to 1999, it succeeded in opening the first mosque ever built in Prague in 1999 (www.praha.muslim.cz). Since 2003, the Islamic Foundation has run an information centre in the centre of Prague (Politických vězňů 14, 110 00 Praha 1) and since 2004 has managed an Islamic centre, with a prayer room, in the spa city of Teplice in northern Bohemia. Since 1993, the chairman has been Lazhar Maamri, of Algerian origin. The previously mentioned Vladimír Sáňka also plays an important role in the organisation. The Islamic Foundation in Brno (Islámská nadace v Brně) was registered in 1994 as a charitable society with the aim of establishing a mosque in Brno, the second largest city in the Czech Republic. An Islamic centre, with a mosque, was opened in 1998 and this was the first mosque to be built in the country. The Islamic Foundation is based at the mosque (Vídeňská 38a, 693 00 Brno, www.mesita.cz). The Union of Muslim Students in the Czech Republic (Svaz mus- limských studentů v ČR, www.svazmuslim.cz) was founded by foreign students studying in the Czech Republic, the most visible being a Sudanese student, Muhammad Abbas al-Muʾtasim. It manages prayer rooms in student dormitories and used to publish the web magazine Muslimské listy (Muslim News; www.muslimskelisty.cz) but this has not been updated for several years. Another Muslim organisation, The Muslim Union (Muslimská unie), was no longer active in 2010. Its informative website www .muslim-inform.cz disappeared in late 2009. Its address was Chmelová 2893/4, 106 00 Praha 10. In 2007, an association Libertas Independent Agency (www.libertas news.cz) was established in Brno. It brings together mostly Czech Muslim converts as well as some non-Muslims and among its main goals is to fight Islamophobia and to present Islam to the Czech public. One of the founders, a Czech convert Lukáš Lhot’an, is well known for his repeated criticisms of the representatives of the Czech Mus- lim community. The main targets of his critical statements are alleged connections of the leadership of the Czech Muslim Community to international Islamist organizations and the moral support given to movements such as Hamas or The Muslim Brotherhood. Lukáš Lhot’an also criticised the alleged support given by Muneeb Hassan czech republic 157

Al Rawi, the UMO chairman, to the “Freedom Flotilla” organised to help Palestinians in Gaza in May 2010.8 Generally speaking, these organisations do not have a specific ethnic, national or religious character. Their members include both Czech converts and Muslims of foreign origin, apart from the Union of Mus- lim Students, whose members are foreign students, or former foreign students, from various Muslim countries. In 2009, however, it was reported that Muslims in Brno who were disappointed with Muneeb Hassan Al Rawi’s appointment to the UMO chairmanship had formed Alfirdaus Language School. There are indications that this group is mostly Shi’i Muslims, whereas most of those connected with the Brno mosque and Al Rawi are Sunni.9 This claim could not be verified from other sources.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Since 1989, Czech Muslims have come up with several mosque- building projects, but most have been rejected by the local authorities who ‘responded to the will’ of local inhabitants. This was most often expressed through protest petitions against a mosque in a particular neighbourhood or city. These petitions were in some cases supported by local church representatives. Such was the fate of two projects for mosques or Islamic centres in the spa city of Teplice in 1995 and 2004. Both were to be financed by donors from the United Arab Emirates—there are always tens or even hundreds of patients from Arab countries staying in Teplice for treatment at the spa. Another mosque project was proposed in another spa town, Orlová in northern Moravia, although members of Czech Muslim community themselves regarded it as unlikely to be approved. It was rejected by local authorities in 2004. Czech Muslims, however, finally succeeded in establishing mosques in the two largest cities, Prague and Brno. In Brno, after a struggle

8 See the article published in the web magazine iBrno, on 19 April 2011, http:// www.ibrno.cz/zajimavosti/34375-vedeni-ceskych-muslimskych-obci-spolupracuje-s- teroristy-obvinil-kolegy-byvaly-clen-vedeni.html, accessed 5 May 2011. 9 A report on this split was published in the local daily Brněnský deník on 18 April 2009, http://brnensky.denik.cz/zpravy_region/sef-muslimu-novodoby-diktator-z-brna 20090418.html, accessed 5 January 2011. 158 štěpán macháček with the local authorities, local Muslims were allowed in 1996 to build the first mosque in the Czech Republic and it was inaugurated in 1998. One year later, a mosque was inaugurated on the outskirts of the capital and this is the only Czech mosque with a professional imam. From 2002 to 2006, the imam was Karam al-Badawi, an Egyptian graduate of al-Azhar University and the Islamic University in Medina. Since 2006 the imams have been a Bosnian, Emir Omić (a graduate of the Islamic faculty in Amman), and Sheikh Ahmad Al Khadhmi (a graduate of the Islamic faculty in San‘a). In addition to these two mosques there are nine prayer houses, mostly associated with student accommodation. There are no special regulations in Czech law concerning the construction of places of worship. Like any other construction project, a mosque must be approved by the local council’s planning department. A project may be rejected on the basis of technical defects but opposition by local people is also considered. Approval of a project by local authorities may be conditional on certain modifications, for ‘aesthetic reasons’ for example. The approval of the Brno mosque project, for instance, depended on the exclusion of characteristic features “alien to surrounding architecture”, i.e. a minaret.

5 Children’s Education

There are no Muslim or Islamic schools in the Czech Republic. Accord- ing to the 2002 Law on Churches and Religious Communities (Zákon o církvích a náboženských společnostech), on the basis of which the UMO was finally registered in 2004, religious communities have the right to establish their own, state-recognised schools ten years after their registration, but only if they can prove they have at least 10,000 believers in the Czech Republic. The UMO does not meet these requirements. For the same reason, Muslim children do not have a right to religious education in primary and secondary schools. In one public primary school in Prague, there are Arabic language lessons available, attended mostly by the pupils from families of foreign origin (základní škola Písnice, L. Coňka 40, 140 00 Praha 4; www.zspisnice.info). Courses in Arabic and some basic Islam are organised by the Islamic Foundation in Prague in the Prague mosque and by the language school Alfirdaus Jazyková( škola Alfirdaus, Masarykova 30, 602 00 Brno; www.alfirdaus.cz). Courses in Islam are attended by several czech republic 159 dozen children on weekends (about 30 children attend in Prague on Saturdays). Arabic courses are open to the non-Muslim public.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There is no higher Islamic education or imam training institution in the Czech Republic. Imams serving in Czech mosques obtain their qualifications abroad. Arabic and Islamic studies programmes are offered at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague, where Islam is studied from the religious, sociological and historical points of view. Arabic, Turkish, and Persian language courses are also available there. There are Ara- bic and Islamic Studies at the Faculty of Arts at Western Bohemian University (Západočeská univerzita) in Plzeň and there are also classes in Islam in the religious studies programmes at several other Czech universities.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There are two Muslim cemeteries in the Czech Republic. The older one, with about 50 burial places, was established in 1994 in the town of Třebíč, where the UMO formerly had its headquarters. Ten years later, another Muslim cemetery with a capacity of around 100 burial places was established in Prague in a section of the large cemetery in the suburb Olšany. The ritual washing of the deceased is organised by the Islamic Foundations in Brno or Prague in hospitals or cemeteries at the request of the relatives and prayers for the deceased person are performed. No other special burial facilities or services are available. According to Czech civil law, Muslims, like everyone else, must be buried in a coffin.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the Czech army, prisons or hospitals, although Catholic religious services are provided in these institutions and for that purpose most of them have a separate non-denominationally decorated space allocated for prayer and contemplation. The Islamic Foundation in Prague has succeeded in opening a small Islamic prayer 160 štěpán macháček room in the Ruzyně prison in Prague, where the Foundation arranges the provision of a Friday sermon. In the spa towns of Dubí and Darkov, there are prayer rooms designated mostly for the Arab Muslim clien- tele of the spas.

9 Religious Festivals

Islamic religious festivals are generally not much publicised, and their celebrations are limited to private homes, embassies, and mosques in Prague and Brno. Since 2008, the Islamic Foundation in Prague has been hiring a sports hall for the celebration of ’Id al-Adha, because the mosque was not big enough for the 1,000 Muslims who attended. Representatives of Christian churches frequently come to celebrations to greet Muslims. On average, every year 30 to 50 Muslims from the Czech Republic carry out the pilgrimage to Mecca. Some pilgrims travel at their own expense and use specialised travel agencies in neighbouring Germany or Austria. Since 2008, a few Czech Muslims have enjoyed the offer of the Saudi king to travel to the pilgrimage at Saudi expense. In 2010, about 25 Muslims took advantage of this offer.

10 Halal food

There are not many opportunities for Czech Muslims to obtain strictly halal food. However, the number of halal grocery shops and butcheries is increasing, especially in Prague and Brno. There is a list of Czech halal shops available on www.al-islam.cz website. Since its registration in 2004, the UMO has been exempt from veterinary regulations and has been allowed to appoint a Muslim butcher to slaughter animals in a slaughterhouse. This exemption is extensively exercised during ‘Id al-Adha.

11 Dress Codes

No rules limit Muslim dress in public or in schools. Dress code incidents because of wearing the hijab are still rare but they do occur. There have been two anecdotal cases of Muslim women (both of them Czech converts) being fired from their jobs in 2007 and 2008 because czech republic 161 they wore hijab. Both of them worked in government hospitals and one of them took her case to the courts. She won the right to return to work and continue wearing hijab. These cases were not publicised. On the other hand, primary school and university faculty teachers have been observed wearing hijab freely and conversations with two of them did not indicate they were under any pressure to not wear hijab. Muslim women wearing niqab have yet to be observed.

12 Publication and Media

The only periodical published by Czech Muslims is the magazine of the UMO Hlas (The Voice) in the Czech language. Three to four issues are published per year. Hlas was renewed in 1991 after being published initially between 1937 and 1945. The editorial office is in the Prague mosque and members of the editorial board are Vladimír Sáňka, Muneeb Hassan Al Rawi, Jalal Atassi and Lazhar Maamri. The magazine is available on-line at www.al-islam.cz. There are several Czech Islamic websites. The UMO has its informative site www.islamweb.cz with practical information for believers. Other Czech Islamic websites include www.al-islam.cz and www.info muslim.euweb.cz, both gathering useful information and world news seen from the Islamic standpoint and both run by individual believers. Another interesting on-line source of information is the electronic magazine Libertas News (www.libertasnews.cz) published by the above mentioned Libertas Independent Agency. Czech Muslims also translate and publish books and booklets aimed to bring more information on the faith to Czech Muslims. There are three translations of the Qur’an to Czech. Translations of works by Bosnian Muslim intellectual Ali Izetbegović, as well as a few booklets promoting Islam in Czech have also been published by Czech Muslims in recent years.

13 Family Law

Islamic religious marriages are not recognised by the state. Muslims must have a civil marriage in order for it to be legally registered. They can arrange an Islamic marriage in the mosque in addition to this, but it has no legal standing. The Islamic Foundation in Prague arranges 162 štěpán macháček and registers about fifteen Islamic marriages annually and keeps copies of all Shari’a marriage contracts in its archive.

14 Interreligious Relations

Relations between Czech churches and Czech Islamic organisations, as well as between believers of other faiths, are generally very good. The UMO and the Islamic Foundations in Prague and Brno organise ‘dialogue meetings’ with representatives of churches and Czech Christians, where it is usual for there to be an atmosphere of mutual recognition and understanding.10 Czech Islamic organisations and the Czech Muslim community as a whole try to maintain amicable relations with Czech churches and the Christian community. The Islamic Foundation in Brno, for example, sent a gift to Pope Benedict XVI on the occasion of his visit to the Czech Republic in September 2009.11 The approach of Christian churches towards Czech Muslims is usually polite, with some local exceptions when there are plans to build a mosque. On the occasion of his retirement, the former highest Czech Catholic authority, Cardinal Miloslav Vlk, said that Europe was open to Islamisation because Christians were weak in their faith. His words were largely understood as a critique of European (and particularly Czech) Christianity and a compliment to the state of Muslim religious life.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In 2010, no specific topic or event attracted the attention of media to the Muslim community. However, some articles on Czech Mus- lims were published in Czech periodicals. One of the most influential weekly magazines, Reflex, published an article on an unhappy marriage of one Czech woman who converted to Islam after her marriage to a

10 For example, Czech Muslim community representatives took part in the Euro- pean Christian Youth Meeting in Jičín on 16 August 2009. For details, see http:// www.mesita.cz/node/48, accessed 5 January 2011. Another discussion meeting took place on 17 October 2009, in Nosislav. See http://www.mesita.cz/node/68, accessed 5 January 2011. 11 See http://www.mesita.cz/node/63, accessed 5 January 2011. czech republic 163

Muslim foreigner.12 Muslims and many other readers found this article deliberately showing Islam as a culprit of bad relations between men and women. Such generalisation and pointing at Islam as a source of social evils is rather typical for the Czech media. In September, some media covered the angry reaction of some Muslims to the words of the president Václav Klaus who said that he does not support the possible construction of more mosques in the Czech Republic.13 Some Czech Muslims accused the president of spreading and supporting Islamophobia in the country. There are also several rather anti-Islamic web sites, the most prominent of them being www.eurabia.cz, that presents Islam as a danger to Europe.

16 Major Cultural Events

No data.

12 Reflex weekly 35/2010:Žena je totéž co pes (A Woman Has the Same Rights as a Dog). 13 See for example http://www.euportal.cz/Articles/6581-cesti-muslimove-zautocili-na- vaclava-klause.aspx, accessed on 5 January 2011.

DENMARK

Brian Arly Jacobsen1

1 Muslim Populations

The earliest information we have on Muslims in Denmark is from the census in 1880, when eight ‘Mohammedans’ were counted.2 Subse- quent censuses (the last was in 1970) have not referred to Muslims, either because there were none or because they were part of the category ‘other faiths’. Data summaries extracted from the central person data registry (Folkeregisteret) and published since 1970 only give figures for members of the official Lutheran church. As a result of active mission in Denmark in the 1950s, Ahmadis from a Pakistani background succeeded in establishing an Ahmadi- yya community, which in 1966–67 constructed the first purpose-built mosque in Denmark, the Nusrat Djahan Mosque in Hvidovre (Copen- hagen). The first full translation of the Qur’an was published in the same year by a prominent Danish convert to Ahmadiyya; Abdus Salam Madsen (1928–2007). From the late 1960s, the numbers of Muslims in Denmark became more significant, primarily as a result of immigration. From the mid-1960s to the early 1970s people came to Den- mark as migrant workers from the former Yugoslavia, North Africa, Pakistan and Turkey, and then, from the mid-1970s till today, immigrants have been mainly refugees and the families of migrant workers already in the country. The waves of refugees have had various causes:

1 Brian Arly Jacobsen has a PhD in Sociology of Religion and is a post-doctoral researcher in the Department of Cross Cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His research is mainly in the area of religion and politics and religious minority groups in Denmark. His publications include Tørre tal om troen: Religionsdemografi i det 21. århundrede(Dry numbers on faith: demography of religion in the 21st century), co-edited with Margit Warburg (Højbjerg: Univers, 2007) and “Muslims on the political agenda”, Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, vol. 22, no. 1 (2009), pp. 15–35. 2 Statistiske bureau, Det (1883), Folkemængden i kongeriget Danmark, den 1ste feb- ruar 1880 (The statistical Bureau (1883) The Population in the Kingdom of Denmark, 1st of February 1880) (Statistisk Tabelværk IVR Serie A3 (Statistical Table Work IV R, Serie 3)). 166 brian arly jacobsen the civil war in Lebanon (1975–90), the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88), the wars in the former Yugoslavia (1991–1999), the war in Afghanistan (2001–present) and the Iraq wars (1991 and 2003–present).3 The number of Muslims has increased significantly since 1980— from 29,300 (0.6% of the population) in 1980, to an estimated 231,600 (4.2%) in January 2011.4 The Danish authorities do not register individuals’ religious beliefs, so it is generally difficult to gather reliable information on individual religious affiliation. An estimate of the number of Muslims in Denmark must therefore be based on a number of assumptions about correlations between nationality, ethnicity and religion. Research conducted regularly since 1999, for example, has suggested that only 92% of Turkish immigrants and their descendants regard themselves as Muslims.5 The largest ethnic group is Turks (23.8% of all Muslims), followed by Iraqis (11.5%), Lebanese (10.3%), Pakistanis (8.1%), Somalis (7.2%) and fastest growing ethnic group in the last decade; the Afghanis (5.7%). The calculation also includes an estimate of converts and third generation Muslim immigrants. Estimates of the number of Danish converts to Islam range between 2,000 and 5,000, and can be reasonably put at 2,500–3,000.6 This estimate does not take account of internal religious differences within Islam and includes groups such as Alevis, Shi’is and Sunnis. A survey from 2007 distributes eight different ethnic groups from predominantly Muslim countries as follows: 49% Sunnis, 13% Shi’is, and 19% ‘Islam, other’, which may include Ahmadis, Alevis and heterodox Sufis (most Sufis consider themselves to be Sunnis).7 The remaining percentage is accounted for by people who said they belonged to other religions or no religion. It is estimated that 20%–25%

3 Colemann, David and Eskil Wadensjö, Indvandringen til Danmark (Immigration to Denmark) (Viborg: Spektrum, 1999). 4 1980 is the first year in which Statistics Denmark has information on both immigrants and their descendants (Statistics Denmark 2010, www.dst.dk). 5 For background data, see Mikkelsen, Flemming, Integrations Status 1. halvår 2004 (The status of integration 1st Half-year 2004) (Copenhagen: Catinét Research, 2004), and Jacobsen, Brian, “Muslimer i Danmark: en kritisk vurdering af antalsopgørelser (Muslims in Denmark: A critical assessment of estimations)”, in Warburg, M. and B. Jacobsen (eds.), Tørre tal om troen: Religionsdemografi i det 21. århundrede (Højb- jerg: Univers, 2007), pp. 143–165. 6 Jensen, Tina and Kate Østergaard, Nye muslimer i Danmark: møder og omven- delser (New Muslims in Denmark: Meetings and conversions) (Højbjerg: Univers, 2007), pp. 30f. 7 Mikkelsen, Flemming, Integrations Status 1999–2007 (The status on integration 1999–2007) (Copenhagen: Catinét Research, 2008), p. 12. denmark 167 of Muslims in Denmark (roughly 46,300–57,900 people) are associated with a mosque association,8 although formal membership numbers are much lower. The present Ahmadiyya community in Denmark consists mainly of Pakistani immigrants and their descendants and numbers around 600 according to their own estimates.9

2 Islam and the State

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and other laws and policies contribute to the generally free practice of religion, although the Evangelical Lutheran Church, as the national church, enjoys some privileges not available to other religious groups. The national church is the only religious organisation that receives state subsidies or funds directly through the tax system, but the government does grant official status to other religious groups. Prior to 1970, a total of 11 religious communities were ‘recognised’ by royal decree. Since then, the state has ‘acknowledged’ more than 100 additional religious communities under the Marriage Act, by which the Minister of Justice can authorise clergy within non-recognised religious communities to conduct marriages. In January 2011, 23 Muslim communities were ‘acknowledged religious communities’.10 In April 2007, the Liberal-Conservative government passed legislation that required all foreign religious workers (missionaries, imams, etc.) to pass a Danish language test within six months of entering the country. The intention of the law is said to be to restrict further the entry of Muslim clerics, whose number had already been restricted under a 2004 ‘Imam Law’ that requires the number of religious residence visas to be reasonably proportionate to the size of the religious community in question.11

8 Kühle, Lene, Moskeer i Danmark: Islam og muslimske bedesteder (Mosques in Denmark: Islam and Muslim places of prayer) (Højbjerg: Univers, 2006), pp. 39, 47. 9 Cf. www.islam-ahmadiyya.dk. 10 Alevis are not included in this category. The six current Alevi associations are categorised as ‘other congregations’, see http://www.familiestyrelsen.dk/samliv/ trossamfund/anerkendteoggodkendtetrossamfundogmenigheder/oevrigetrossamfun- dogmenigheder/, accessed 26 January 2011. Dansk Tyrkisk Islamisk Stiftelse (Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation (Diyanet in Denmark)) is acknowledged as one religious community with 28 congregations. 11 See “Integration: Omstridt danskprøve til præster og imamer skaber splid i Ven- stre (Disputed Danish test of imams and priests create conflicts in Venstre)”,Politiken , 8 January 2007. 168 brian arly jacobsen

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There are many different kinds of Muslim organisations in Denmark. The ethnic-religious associations dominate in terms of members and number. They were the first to be established in Denmark and are often related to a mosque. There are also a number of religious organisations, such as Sufi orders, that transcend ethnicity, and finally there is a growing number of politically oriented associations. In the last decade, some Muslim organisations have started to organise themselves in Muslim umbrella organisations so that they can speak with one voice on issues affecting Muslims in general, such as the establishment of burial grounds. Ethnic religious associations include the following. The Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation Dansk( Tyrkisk Islamisk Stiftelse, H.C. Ørsteds Vej 29, 1879 Frederiksberg C, tel: +45 33238127) is part of Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam Birligi (www.diyanet vakfi.dk). It is indisputably the largest Muslim organisation in Den- mark and around half of all Danes of Turkish descent are members of the Diyanet funeral foundation (which has around 31,000 members). It was established in Denmark in 1985 and the Foundation’s local mosque associations were recognised as religious communities in 2006. In 1986, various local Turkish mosque associations formed the Union of Muslim Immigrant Associations (Danimarka Müslü- man Göçmenler Teşkilatı, DMGT, www.dmgt.dk). The DMGT runs six Turkish mosques in Denmark and between 500 and 750 Muslims in total attend Friday prayers in these mosques. The DMGT website says that 42 different associations are members of the union. The movement is regarded by some observers as being linked to the Turk- ish Milli Görüs movement.12 Idara Minhaj-ul-Qur’an International Denmark (Bispevej 25, 2200 København NV, tel: +45 36464898, www.minhaj.dk) was founded in 1987 as a Sunni educational and cultural centre in Copenhagen. It has around 1,200 members, including children. In June 2010 Minhaj Denmark inaugurated a new centre for their religious, educational and recreational activities in Copenhagen. The spokesperson in Denmark is Qaisar Najeeb. Minhaj Denmark and all its units operate according to the Minhaj-ul-Qur’an movement’s constitution in Pakistan. Several of their mosques are recognised as religious communities.

12 Cf. Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, pp. 90–91. denmark 169

Non-ethnic religious associations include the following: The Alevi association in Denmark (www.alevi.dk) was founded in 1994 in Aarhus. Its current Chairman is Başkan Feramuz Acar and there are today seven local associations and a national youth association. The Alevi associations in Denmark have approximately 1,000 members but some estimates put the number of Alevis in Denmark at about 6,500.13 Six local Alevi associations were approved as religious communities by the state in 2007.14 Besides the six approved associations there exist two other local Alevi associations and one youth organisation for the entire country.15 Many Sufi movements are currently experiencing growth, especially among Pakistanis and Turks. They largely keep to themselves. Exam- ples are Tariqa Burhaniyya (Damhus Boulevard 65, 2610 Rødovre), Al-Murabitun and Sufi-oriented Turkish groups such asNurcu groups and Dialog Forum (www.dialogin.dk), established in 2002, which is related to the Fethullah Gülen movement. The Islamic Religious Com- munity in Denmark (Det Islamiske Trossamfund i Danmark) or Wakf (Dortheavej 45–47, 2400 Copenhagen NV, tel: +45 38112225, fax +45 38112226, www.wakf.com) was founded in 1996, when Palestin- ians in Copenhagen, headed by the charismatic imam Ahmed Abu Laban, who died in 2007, collected money to build their own mosque in Copenhagen. Its current chairman is Mohamed Ziad Nehme and the association is primarily made up of Sunni immigrant groups from various countries. According to its own figures, it has approximately 800 paying members and around 1,000 people attend the khutba every Friday. Wakf is rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood and has strong ties to Egypt. Its perception of Islam is closely identified with Arab culture. A Muslim youth movement, Young Muslims in Denmark (Muslim- ske Unge i Danmark, MUNIDA, www.munida.dk), related to Wakf, was established in 1995. This is a trans-ethnic movement that aims to provide information on Islam and social activities for its members. Its current chairman is Kamran Shah.

13 Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 138. The Alevi’s own estimation is around 10.000 Alevis in Denmark, cf. http://www.alevi.dk/. 14 See also Jørgensen, Martin Bak, National and Transnational Identities: Turkish Organising Processes and Identity Construction in Denmark, Sweden and Germany, PhD dissertation, Aalborg University, 2006, pp. 195–218. 15 Cf. http://www.alevi.dk. 170 brian arly jacobsen

The first Shi’is in Denmark were Twelvers and Isma’ilis of Paki- stani descent. The Isma’ilis established an association in 1969 (and a mosque in 1970 in Copenhagen) and in 1981 the Islamic Centre Jaf- fariya (Rådmandsgade 56, Copenhagen N.) became the first mosque of the Twelver branch. The massive migration of refugees with Shi’i backgrounds fleeing from civil war in Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war led to new organisations and mosques being established from the mid- 1980s onwards. There are around ten Twelver mosques in Denmark, with related associations. There are also a number of Shi’i oriented organisations. Salam (www.salam.nu) is an association established in 2005, headed by young women of various ethnicities and educational backgrounds with the aim of promoting Islam. The number of its members is not known. Politically oriented associations include the following: Hizb ut- Tahrir in Denmark (www.hizb-ut-tahrir.dk) is part of the international ‘caliphate’ movement. It gets a lot of media coverage but is difficult for outsiders to contact. Its spokesperson in Scandinavia is Chadi Freigeh. Its members are estimated to number somewhere between 50 and 500.16 Some of their public meetings in Copenhagen have attracted crowds of about 1,000. In November 2009 the first Muslim party in Denmark, Muslims of Denmark (Danmarks Muslimer), was founded by the Danish convert Ras Anbessa (see ‘Danmarks Muslimer’ on www.facebook.com). Their political agenda is to fight for socially marginalised people. They have been registered at the Ministry of the Interior as a political party but besides that, their activities were not visible to the public in 2010. There is also a number of Muslim networking organisations. The United Council of Muslims (Muslimernes Fællesråd, www.mfr.nu) was formed in 2006, born of a desire for a shared representation of Muslim organisations in Denmark. Its chairman is Asmat Mojaddedi and its spokesperson is Zubair Butt Hussain. It currently acts as an umbrella organisation for thirteen assorted Muslim associations, with a combined membership of up to 35,000. The Danish Muslim Union Dansk( Muslimsk Union, Valdemarsgade 17, 1, 1665 Copenhagen V—tel: +45 50565908; www.dmu.nu) is also an umbrella body, consisting of nine

16 Estimated by the researcher Kirstine Sinclair in the newspaper Information, 4 March 2003 and Grøndahl, Malene, Torben Rugberg Rasmussen and Kirstine Sin- clair, Hizb ut-Tahrir i Danmark: Farlig fundamentalisme eller uskyldigt ungdomsoprør? (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2003) pp. 16, 29, 31. denmark 171 national Muslim organisations and 31 local Muslim organisations. It was formed in March 2008 and the Union’s ambition is to create unity among Muslims across ethnic, cultural, political and religious divides. Its spokesperson is Osman Öztoprak. Muslims in Dialogue (Muslimer i Dialog, Nørrebrogade 32, 1, 2200 Copenhagen N, www .m-i-d.dk) was formed by a Minhaj ul-Qur’an breakaway group in 2003 and organises dialogue activities between Muslims and non- Muslims. Its chairman is Fatih Alev and its spokesperson is Zubair Butt Hussain. It is a Sunni association with 440 members, according to its own figures. The Danish Islamic Council (Det Danske Islamiske Råd, Hermodsgade 28, 1, 2200 Copenhagen N, www.disr.dk) is an independent charitable institution, which is co-founder of the Fed- eration of Islamic Organizations in Europe. Its purpose is to bring together Muslim associations to jointly lobby on Islamic issues. Its initiator was the politician Hamid El-Mousti and the first meeting, in 2000, was attended by approximately 30 Muslim associations. Its chairman is Abdelhamid Hamdi. In 2001, a practising Muslim woman and a male non-Muslim social researcher took the initiative in forming the association Forum for Critical Muslims (Forum for kritiske Muslimer, www.kritiskemuslimer.dk). Its website describes its purpose as to ‘work for a democratic and pluralistic approach to Islam, with particular focus on the visibility of women as agents and public figures in Islam’ and, according to its spokesperson, Sherin Khankan, it currently has around 130 members. A survey in 2006 showed the following support for various major Muslim associations among Muslims in general: Islamisk Trossam- fund: 5.4%; Demokratiske muslimer: 8.9%; Diyanet: 9.1%; Muslimer i Dialog: 6.0%, Hizb-ut-Tahrir: 0.7%, Milli Görüs: 2.9% and Forum for kritiske muslimer: 0.9%.17 Some of these figures are no longer reliable.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

According to a study in 2006, there are about 115 mosques in Den- mark, eleven of them being Shi’i.18 The Shi’i Isma’ilis claim to have acquired rooms for prayer in 1969/70, and the first Sunni mosques

17 Mikkelsen, Flemming, Integrations Status 1. halvår 2006 (The status on integration 1: Half-year 2006) (Copenhagen: Catinét Research, 2006), p. 39. 18 Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 65. 172 brian arly jacobsen were established at the beginning of the 1970s, the first being the Islamic Cultural Centre (Islamisk Kulturcenter) in Brønshøj (Copen- hagen) in 1972.19 Today, there are mosques all over Denmark, but they are most numerous in the major cities of Aarhus, Copenhagen and Odense. Most mosques are located in former office and factory buildings and are often not big enough to accommodate all the people who want to participate in Friday prayers or other religious activities at the mosque. Three mosques are purpose-built, namely the mosque built by the Ahmadis in 1967 and two Turkish mosques on Funen, one built in Odense in 1991 and the other in Svendborg in 2000.20 Several more local groups are planning to build mosques. One of the most controversial plans for a mosque is that of a grand mosque in central Copenhagen. In 1981, the state leased a building lot to the Honour- able Islamic Committee (Ærværdige islamiske komité). It was a 50-year lease with an annual rent set at 1,000 Danish kroner (roughly €134)—a minute amount for a lot with a central location in the municipality of Copenhagen. The Danish state has a long tradition, going back to the period of absolute monarchy, of handing over building lots to religious communities unconnected to the national church, but politicians from various parties and public bodies have regularly and increasingly forcefully attacked the state’s agreement with the Committee for the Islamic Cultural Centre in Copenhagen, so the lot remains undeveloped.21 In June 2009, the Municipality of Copenhagen accepted the United Council of Muslims as the organisation in charge of the finances and operation of a grand mosque in Copenhagen. In August 2009, the Shi’i association Ahl ul-Bait in Denmark was also granted permission by the Municipality of Copenhagen to build a mosque in the existing premises of the Imam Ali Islamic Centre on Vibevej in Copenhagen’s Nordvest district.22 In October 2009, the Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation presented plans for a new purpose-built mosque in Aarhus and most of the parties in the municipality of Aarhus have until now backed the plan.23 All three projects are still in the planning phase but, according

19 Ibid. 20 Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 63. 21 Jacobsen, Brian A., “Muslims on the political agenda”, Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, vol. 22, no. 1 (2009), pp. 15–35. 22 Cf. http://islamdk.dk/indlaeg/imam-ali-moske/. 23 “Bred støtte til moské-planer i Århus (Broad support for the mosque plans in Aarhus)”, Jyllands-Posten, 5 November 2009. denmark 173 to a spokesperson from the Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation, they are already funded.24 Finally, the United Council of Muslims is now planning a Muslim nursing home. Danish institutions don’t always meet the needs of different religious groups according to the Council spokesperson. The nursing home will serve food prepared according to Muslim practices and holidays will be celebrated. The organisation hopes the first home will open its doors in Copenhagen in two to four years followed by others in major towns across Denmark. Both Social Democrats and the Danish Peoples Party were against the plans for Muslim nursing homes.25

5 Children’s Education

Religious education in primary and secondary schools in Denmark is called ‘Christian studies’, and the subject has traditionally been taught on an Evangelical Lutheran basis, with the addition of elements about other religions, including Islam. Parents have the right to withdraw their children from Christian studies on religious grounds, and some Muslim parents do so. Since the mid-nineteenth century, it has been possible for a group of parents to establish ‘independent schools’, which are entitled to state support to cover most of their budget. The first Muslim independent school was established in 1978 and since then over 30 such schools have opened.26 Many of them offer Arabic and Islamic studies. In the school year 2006–07, there were 22 independent Muslim primary schools with a total of approximately 3,600 pupils, all with Muslim backgrounds.27 This means that the majority of

24 Cf. “Folk bag Århus-moské har pengene klar (People behind the Aarhus mosque have the money ready)”, Denmarks Radio, 10 September 2010. 25 Cf. “Muslimske plejehjem på vej” (Muslim nursing homes are being planned), Jyllands-Posten, 7 July 2010. 26 Shakoor, Tallat, “Formål for muslimske friskoler i Danmark: udviklinger i formålserklæringer og vedtægter i danske friskoler for muslimske børn (Purpose for Islamic free schools in Denmark: Developments of purpose statements and regulations in Danish free schools for Muslim children)”, Tidsskrift for Islamforskning, no. 3 (2008), pp. 29–43. Some of these schools have since closed again. 27 Ihle, Annette H., Magt, Medborgerskab og Muslimske Friskoler i Danmark: Tra- ditioner, idealer og politikker (Power, citizenship and Muslim free schools in Den- mark: Traditions, ideals and policies) (Copenhagen: Research priority area Religion in the 21st Century, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen, 2007), p. 7. In a feature in Jyllands-Posten (5 August 2009) the Minister 174 brian arly jacobsen

Muslim pupils go to public school. The Ministry of Education carried out a study in 2006, which showed that 41% of the pupils in Muslim independent schools progressed into upper secondary school, whereas the national average was only 26%.28 Immigrants with Turkish backgrounds are planning to open the first private Turkish-Danish high school in 2011.29 Most mosques and Muslim associations provide some form of Islamic instruction outside school hours. In the survey on ethnic group’s values in Denmark from 2006, 82% of the Muslim parents thought that religion was an important or very important issue in the upbringing of children. By comparison, 67% of all parents in the survey answered the same.30

6 Higher and Professional Education

Islamic studies are offered as part of Arabic and Middle Eastern studies programmes and at the departments of religious studies at the universities of Aarhus, Copenhagen and Southern Denmark (Odense). Discussions about possible imam training have surfaced on a couple of occasions in recent years, but have not led to any formal proposals.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Sections within fifteen existing municipal cemeteries (all Christian consecrated) have been reserved for Muslim use since 1975. Danish rules on funerals are based on a law of 1975, according to which the authorities can assign burial places for other religious groups. Reli- gious groups also have the right to acquire land for burials. In 1996, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs gave cemetery boards permission for an exemption for the specific funeral rituals of faiths other than the national church. In 2006, a separate Muslim cemetery owned by the Danish Islamic Burial Fund was established outside Copenhagen after of Educational Affairs, Bertel Haarder, stated that the number of Muslim free schools now was 20. 28 “Muslimske friskoler sender flest i gymnasiet (Muslim independent schools send most of the pupils to upper secondary school)”, Jyllands-Posten, 16 August 2007. 29 Cf. “Første tyrkisk-danske gymnasium på vej” (First Turkish-Danish high school is being planned), Denmarks Radio, 30 June 2010. 30 Cf. Etniske gruppers værdier (Ethnic Groups Values), 2006. denmark 175 some years of lobbying. Today the Muslim cemetery in Brøndby— a suburb of Copenhagen—has 400 graves and 6,000 members of the burial support association.31 According to a committee member, about 200 Muslims die each year in Denmark, and the bodies of about half of them are flown back to their country of origin to be buried.32 In April 2008, the municipality of Herning agreed to sell a plot of land for the establishment of a Muslim cemetery in the town, but this project has now been put on the back burner. In October 2008 the municipality of Roskilde also agreed to the establishment of a Muslim cemetery near the city. The planning group is still in the fund raising phase of the project.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

During the 1990s, there were some short-term projects to establish some form of religious counselling for Muslims in hospitals and prisons, but only in recent years has this been more firmly formalised. There are no imams in the armed forces. According to Danish and European law, prison inmates have the right to participate in worship with a priest or the equivalent of their own faith. The first proper ‘prison imam’ financed by the Danish state was appointed on 1 May 2002.33 In 2008, the state budget allocated an amount of 1.5 million kroner (ca. 300,000 Euros) per year for 2008 and 2009 and 2 million kroner per year thereafter for special approval procedures for imams and closer supervision of religious activities in prisons, with the hiring of up to 20 ‘prison imams’.34 In 2005, the first Muslim prayer room was appointed at Rigshos- pitalet (Copenhagen University Hospital) and the first imam began to provide pastoral care for patients. Today, there are several imams affiliated to hospitals in major cities in Denmark.

31 Cf. “Muslimsk gravplads lever sit eget stille liv” (Muslim cemetery lives its own quiet life), Folkebladet Glostrup-Brøndby-Vallensbæk, 2 February 2011. 32 “Gravplads: Religionsfrihed i praksis” (Cemetery: Religious freedom in practice), Jyllands-Posten, 22 September 2006. 33 “Imam Hansen fra Hatting (Imam Hansen from Hatting)”, Nyt fra Kriminalfor- sorgen (News from Danish Prison and Probation Service), no. 3 (2002). 34 See “Flerårsaftale for Kriminalforsorgen 2008–2011 (Multi-year agreement for The Prison and Probation Service for 2008–2011)” on the Prison and Probation Serv- ice homepage: http://www.kriminalforsorgen.dk. 176 brian arly jacobsen

9 Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are celebrated in mosques and sports centres all over the country. Several schools and kindergartens in the major cities that have a large number of pupils from ethnic minorities either plan holidays during Ramadan or else take it into account in their activities. In recent years, Shi’is have organised parades through the streets of Copenhagen in connection with ‘Ashura, with 500 to 1,000 people taking part. These have avoided political statements and mostly call for action against disease and war. Finally, The Danish Muslim Union and Minhaj-ul-Qur’an and other Muslim organisations organise an annual Peace March in celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday in Copenhagen.

10 Halal Food

Halal slaughter is permitted and halal food is widely available. Den- mark is a major exporter of halal meat to the Arab world.35 There have been political attempts from right- and left-wing parties to prohibit ritual slaughter since the mid-1990s.36

11 Dress Codes

Hijab and the like are permitted in public schools and services. The Supreme Court, in a verdict in January 2005, upheld the right of retail- ers and others to insist on uniform codes without the female head scarf for employees dealing with the public. The Danish People’s Party tried to ban the wearing of the head scarf in Parliament in the spring of 2007, but failed. In the spring of 2008, there was a major political debate about whether female Muslim judges and other public authority

35 Cf. Jønsson, Signe, “Mod på eksport til Mellemøsten” (Minding export to Middle East) i: Eksport Fokus, no. 1, 14 May 2007, Udenrigsministeriet Danmark (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark). 36 Jacobsen, Brian A., Religion som fremmedhed i dansk politik. En sammenligning af italesættelser af jøder i Rigsdagstidende 1903–45 og muslimer i Folketingstidende 1967–2005 (The construction of otherness in the Danish Parliament: A comparison of the discussions about Jews and Muslims in the Parliamentary records from 1903–45 and from 1967–2005 respectively), PhD dissertation, Faculty of Humanities, Univer- sity of Copenhagen, 2008, pp. 202–206. denmark 177 figures should be allowed to wear the head scarf with judicial attire. In December 2008, the government proposed legislation that would ban judges from wearing religious or political symbols in court. The law has come to be called the ‘head scarf act’, because its real purpose is to ban Muslim women from wearing head scarves when acting as judges or jurors. The government and Danish People’s Party passed the act in May 2009, although the proposal has been met with strong opposition from judges’ and lawyers’ associations. In August 2009 The Conservative People’s Party called for a ban on the burqa. Venstre (the Liberal Party)—their partners in government—rejected a ban, but pressure on the government from both the Social Democrats and the Danish Peoples Party made the government set up a committee with the purpose of looking at ways to restrict the wearing of the burqa and other similar garments in Danish society. The Conservatives have since revoked their own call for a ban on the burqa. The committee report was published in early 2010 (See sect. 15 for details).

12 Publications and Media

There are no Muslim newspapers in Danish, but there are a number of Internet sites where Muslims (and non-Muslims) exchange information of various kinds. The largest Internet forum is Denmark’s United Cyber Muslims (Danmarks Forenede Cybermuslimer, http://uk.dir. groups.yahoo.com/group/dfc/), formed in 1998, which currently (Jan- uary 2011) has 510 members. This forum is related to one of the oldest websites established to inform Muslims and non-Muslims about Islam in Denmark (www.islam.dk). In 2004, a web-based Muslim newspaper, Sahafa, was launched, but it did not last. There are also Muslim publishing firms, the oldest of which,Alif Bogforlag, which began to publish books of specific Muslim interest in 1983.

13 Family Law

Danish courts can only refer indirectly to Islamic family law through the rules of International Private Law. There is only limited scope for the courts to take variations in cultural customs into account in individual cases. According to observers, Shari’a is practised in some Muslim communities in Denmark, for example in matters of family law, divorce and child custody. There are no official Shari’a courts in 178 brian arly jacobsen

Denmark.37 The Danish government has planned to analyse the spread of parallel court systems in Denmark—especially among immigrants— in 2011.

14 Interreligious Relations

In 1996 Islamic-Christian Study Centre was established by a group of Christians and Muslims.38 It has an equal number of Christian and Muslim board members and is currently supported by a number of Christian and Muslim organisations and societies. Its current chairman is Revd Lissi Rasmussen. The purpose of Islamic-Christian Study Centre is to build, through cooperation, positive relations between citizens with Christian and Muslim backgrounds and to work for equal citizenship. The organisation’s members cooperate on various projects such as courses on counselling for clergymen and imams, conferences, lectures, study groups, excursions and publications. The centre works together with a number of research and educational institutions, Christian and Muslim organisations and other NGOs on activities in Denmark and internationally. In 1998 the bishops of the Evangelical Lutheran Church appointed a committee whose task was to write a report on the relationship between the church and Islam. The report,Conversation Promotes Understand- ing, was submitted in 2000 and there was particular emphasis on the need for the state church to increase dialogue with Islam on all levels, and that this would require more resources, including diocese priests to strengthen dialogue. The then Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs Margrethe Vestager (the Danish Social-Liberal Party) supported the report and the demand for more resources. One of the lasting results of the committee’s work is the Evangelical Lutheran Church’s sub- organisation Church and Religious Encounter which promotes interreligious dialogue between Lutherans and other religions especially Muslims.39 Some of the main activities are annual meetings between

37 Cf. “The executioners of Sharia” (editorial),Jyllands-Posten , 31 October 2008, and “Religion and law: The legal system must move with the community”, interview with Jørgen S. Nielsen, Information, 9 September 2008. 38 Cf. Islamisk-Kristent Studiecenter (IKS) (Islamic-Christian Study Centre), www .ikstudiecenter.dk/. 39 Cf. Folkekirke og religionsmøde (Church and Religious Meeting), www.folkekirken .dk/folkekirkens-arbejde/folkekirke-og-religionsmoede/. denmark 179 church leaders, including bishops from the state church, and imams from Muslim communities in Denmark in the Christian Muslim Con- versation Forum; and friendship dinners at Ramadan and Christmas that Christians and Muslims in Denmark invite each other to. In December 2009 Muslims and Jews in Denmark founded The Jewish Muslim Cooperation Platform in Denmark (http://sites.google. com/site/jmnetvaerk/). Among the initiators were the former Rabbi in Denmark Bent Melchior and the Imam Naveed Baig.40 Its chairman is Nadia Stonall. It is part of The European Platform for Jewish Muslim Co-operation. The organisation facilitates co-operation, dialogue and partnership between the Jewish and Muslim communities.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Questions about the Muslim presence in Denmark are frequently and hotly debated in the Danish media. A series of studies show a Danish population that is very sceptical about the prospects for peaceful coexistence with Muslims. Some opinion polls from 2008 showed that only 38% of Danes would have a positive attitude towards their children marrying Muslims, while 48% of Muslim parents would welcome their children marrying Danes. A report published in January 2008 by the World Economic Forum (WEF) showed that 79% of Danes see greater interaction with the Muslim world as a threat. The Danes are the most sceptical of the nations surveyed. The Conservative Party proposed a burqa ban last year, but the justice ministry ruled it unconstitutional. Officials and scholars were asked to draft a report on the burqa and niqab issue in Denmark which was completed in late 2009, but the government first published the report in January 2010 after a version was leaked to the press. Scholars at University of Copenhagen wrote the report and their conclusion on the number of women wearing niqab or burqa in Denmark was 100– 200 (60 of them were converts) and 0–3 respectively.41 The publication of the report lead to a major debate in Denmark on Islam in Denmark,

40 Naveed Baig is project manager for Ethnic Resource Team at Rigshospitalet— Copenhagen University Hospital—and Herlev Hospital. He is affiliated with both institutions as an Imam. 41 Cf. Warburg, Margit et al., Rapport om brugen af niqab og burka (Report on the use of niqab and burqa), 2009. 180 brian arly jacobsen

Muslim veiling and research in Islam. Following the publication of the report, Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen (Denmarks Liberal Party) said that the full Islamic dress and niqab is not appropriate in Danish schools. The outcome of the report—besides another round of debating Islam and veiling—was a government plan on banning burqa for witnesses in courtrooms. In a survey commissioned for Denmarks Radio on Danes’ view on burqa and niqab, 53% answered yes to a ban while 38% thought niqab and burqa should be allowed in public places.42 Another major public debate in 2010 was the defamation of Mus- lims under the anti-racism section of the penal code. Member of Par- liament Jesper Langballe, church spokesperson for the Danish People’s Party, was convicted in December 2010 of making defamatory statements about Muslims. In January 2010, Langballe wrote a letter to the newspaper Berlingske Tidende in which he commented on claims made the previous year by the chairman of the Free Press Society, Lars Hedegaard, that Muslim fathers rape their daughters.43 In his letter, Langballe supported Hedegaard’s views, saying that Hedegaard should not have written that “Muslim fathers rape their daughters, when the truth seems to be that they only kill them (the so-called honour killings)—and turn a blind eye when uncles rape them.”44 Langballe was fined 5,000 kroner.

16 Major Cultural Events

The celebration of ‘Id al-Fitr has become a major event for thousands of Muslims in Denmark. It is celebrated in mosques, sports centres and the like and has grown in size throughout the last couple of decades. Many public schools with Muslim pupils also celebrate ‘Id al-Fitr.

42 Cf. “Over halvdelen af danskerne vil have forbud mod burka” (More than half of Danes want a ban on burqas), Denmarks Radio 13 July 2010. 43 Cf. “Langballe dømt for racisme” (Langballe convicted of racism), Berlingske 3 December 2010. 44 Cf. “Islams formørkede kvindesyn” (Islam’s darkened view on women), Berling- ske 22 January 2010. ESTONIA

Egdūnas Račius1

1 Muslim Populations

The last official census in 2000 counted 1,387 Estonian residents as Muslims, of whom 754 identified themselves as Tatars (the total number of Tatars in Estonia according to the 2000 census was 2,582 of whom only 760 were Estonian citizens while 681 were Russian citizens), 83 as Estonians and 79 as Russians, while 455 Muslims came under the category ‘other ethnic nationalities’. The number of those who identified themselves as Azeri (Azerbaijani) was 880 (of whom only 162 were Estonian citizens), but there are no figures for Azeris who identified themselves as Muslims. Azeris are the second largest community (after the Tatars) who come from a Muslim background. Up to 500 people (132 Uzbeks, 127 Kazakhs, 48 Chechens, 24 Turks, 19 Arabs, 15 Kurds and others) identified themselves as being of ethnic groups traditionally associated with a Muslim background. Though in the official census only 30% of the Tatars and none of the Azeris, traditionally Shi’is, indicated that they were Muslims, many if not most of them potentially could be considered at least nominally so. By 2010, the number of Muslims in Estonia should have somewhat increased due to the immigration of several hundred people of Muslim background and to conversions. The total number of nominal Mus- lims in Estonia in 2010 could be as high as 4,500, but regularly practising Muslims would hardly exceed several hundred. The overwhelming majority of Estonia’s Muslims are said to be located in and around the capital city Tallinn.2 Several public sources provide ungrounded

1 Egdūnas Račius is an Associate Professor at the Institute of International Rela- tions and Political Science of Vilnius University, Lithuania, where he chairs the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies section. His research interests encompass Muslim revivalism throughout the world and specifically developments in the Muslim communities of the Baltic States. 2 Information supplied by the Estonian Institute, February 1997. 182 egdūnas račius estimates of 10,0003 or even 20,0004 Muslims in Estonia, but these are evident exaggerations. A more likely figure of 4,000 is indicated in Islam in Estonia published with the active participation of Estonia’s Muslims in 2008.5 The majority of Estonia’s Muslims are settlers and descendants of settlers from the Soviet period, when scores of people from the then Soviet Central Asian republics moved to the Baltics. There was also a nascent Muslim community around 170 strong, according to a 1934 census, in the pre-Soviet independent Estonia. This was composed mainly of Tatar immigrants from Russia.

2 Islam and the State

Estonia is a secular republic with no state religion and or dominant faith. Traditionally, Estonians were Lutherans, but today only a small percentage of the Estonian population identify with the Lutheran faith. Relations between the state and religious organisations are regulated in accordance with the Churches and Congregations Act (passed in 1993, new version adopted in 2002), which confirms the constitutional right of freedom of belief and religious practice. All faiths are deemed equal (there is no formal distinction between ‘traditional’ and ‘non- traditional’ faiths) in the eyes of the state. Religious communities are required to register formally with the state through local courts (until 2002 through the Department of Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Interior). Unregistered religious communities are free to practise their religion as long as it does not violate public morals and/or disturb public order, but have neither the status nor the rights of a legally registered religion. Registered religious organisations acquire tax exempt status, the right to conduct marriages with civil validity and the right to establish private schools. Muslims (like all other faith communities) have no public representation in state institutions and there is no public funding for their activities (the state may only fund cultural activities of ethnic minority groups, such as Tatars and Azeris.)

3 Huang, Mel, “A mosque with a view”, Central Europe Review, 2001, http://www .ce-review.org/01/3/amber3.html, accessed 12 November 2009. 4 Muslims in Estonia, Muslim American Society, 2003, http://www.masnet.org/ news.asp?id=687, accessed 12 November 2009. 5 Abiline, Toomas (comp.), Islam Eestis. Islam in Estonia. Ислам в Эстонии (Tal- linn: Huma 2008). estonia 183

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The first Muslim congregation officially registered in 1928 in Narva but, along with its sister organisation (registered in 1940) in Tallinn, it was dissolved in 1940 by the Soviets. The Estonian Islamic Congregation (Eesti islami kogudus), then comprised mainly of Tatar, Azeri, Kazakh and Uzbek elements, re-established itself in 1989 and was officially registered in 1994. In spring 2009, it moved to its permanent headquarters to Tallinn (9 Keevise Street, Ülemiste, Tallinn) where a 1,000m2 former office building purchased with a Saudi sponsor’s (reputedly al- Waqf al-Islami) money houses the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath”. This has rooms for lectures, a tiny library and a reading room, the office of the imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation, and prayer hall that is open daily. The Centre is headed by the imam Ildar Muh- hamedshin (tel: +370–559–47689, www.islam.pri.ee). In 1995, a small splinter organisation, Estonian Muslim Sunni Congregation (Eesti Muhameedlaste Sunniitide Kogudus) was formed. There also is a Tatar dominated congregation in Maardu town not far from Tallinn.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Between the World Wars, a house-turned-mosque in Narva served the needs of the Muslim congregation in that town, while in Tallinn the congregation rented an apartment to use for prayers. Since summer 2009, the Muslims of Tallinn have had a prayer hall on the premises of the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath”, which serves as the main Tallinn mosque. Communal Friday prayers are also held in makeshift mosques in the Kopli suburb of Tallinn and the nearby town of Maardu. It was announced in 2008 that the Emirate of Sharjah had communicated its intention to finance the building of an Islamic religious and cultural centre (housing a mosque) in Tallinn, but with the movement of the Estonian Islamic Congregation to its current headquarters the need for such a space appears to have been at least temporarily alleviated.

5 Children’s Education

Religious education in public schools is optional and non-denominational: pupils are introduced to various faith traditions, though the general spirit is Christian. Some history of Islam and the Middle East 184 egdūnas račius is taught within the history curriculum. Confessional religious education conducted by a clergyman of the denomination can be requested if there are at least 15 pupils in a class who wish it, but so far no class with this number of Muslim pupils exists. As there are no private primary or secondary schools run by Muslims, the teaching of Islam is entirely extra-curricular and offered by Muslim communities in improvised weekend ‘schools’ (in Tallinn and Maardu). At the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath”, a dozen or so children attend Arabic language and Islam classes on Saturdays.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are continuously offered at the University of Tartu (Arabic language, Introduction to Islamic studies, both in the Department of Theology). Recently Tallinn University has started offering some instruction in Arabic and Turkish languages as well as an introduction to Turkish culture. Elsewhere (Tartu Theological Seminary) teaching about Islam tends to be on an ad hoc basis. There is no institution for imam training in Estonia. Two of the four active imams received their higher religious education abroad (in Russia and Saudi Arabia) and the remaining two are self-taught. It is unlikely that a need for local imam training will arise in the foreseeable future.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

During the Tsarist period, Estonian Muslims (Tatar settlers from inner Russia) maintained their separate cemeteries in Narva, Rakvere and Tallinn. In the first years of the Soviet occupation in 1940 they were closed and later destroyed. Since then, Estonian Muslims have been using general cemeteries for burial, where they have a separate section. No need for a separate Muslim cemetery has yet arisen.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation officially serves as an imam in the Estonian armed forces and is occasionally invited to prisons and hospitals to perform rites. estonia 185

9 Religious Festivals

There are annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations in Tallinn, Maardu and Narva, which are open to the public. The ‘Id al-Fitr communal prayer is said to be attended by several hundred Muslims and ‘Id al-Adha is attended by up to 500 persons.

10 Halal Food

No halal butchers have yet opened in Estonia. Some individual Mus- lims (among them the imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation) perform ritual slaughter privately after purchasing livestock from local farmers, and afterwards sell it to others. This practice is not prohibited by law. Some imported halal food (frozen meat and meat products, along with canned vegetables and sweets from Middle Eastern producers, imported from Finland) is available at Friday prayers in the Islamic Cultural Centre “Turath”.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. However, only a handful of Muslim women wear hijab, mainly on Fridays while attending communal prayer. No niqab- wearing Muslim women have yet been observed. Since 2002, women have been allowed by law to submit personal photos with the head scarf for official documents.

12 Publications and Media

There is no Muslim printed media in Estonia and only one website (http://www.islam.pri.ee/ in Estonian and Russian languages) which is run by Estonian Muslims. In August 2009, it started posting a monthly on-line Islamic magazine, Iqra, in Estonian (though prospective authors are also encouraged to submit texts in Russian) and by November 2010 had produced 16 issues, the last of which was 100 pages. A multilingual website run by the Azerbaijan Cultural Centre of Estonia (Eesti Aserbaidžaani kultuurikeskus) (http://azeri.ee) is only indirectly related to Islamic issues (mainly through the history of the Muslim presence in Estonia). 186 egdūnas račius

13 Family Law

Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriages in mosques, and the marriage is then registered with a municipal civil registry office. An imam wishing to serve as a state registrar has to obtain official certification after attending special training. No Estonian imam is yet certified to serve as a state registrar. Annually up to five marriage contracts (nikah) are signed under the supervision of an imam. Inheri- tance can be apportioned according to Islamic regulations provided it is accepted by all parties involved. Otherwise, the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and the religious affiliation of the parties is irrelevant in litigation.

14 Interreligious Relations

In an overwhelmingly secular society, it is extremely rare for Estonian imams to be invited to multi-religious events and they themselves are not eager to organise such functions. There seems to be virtually no interreligious dialogue in Estonia.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

There is very little coverage of the situation of Muslims in Estonia in the local media. Occasionally, local Muslim leaders are approached by the media to comment on events and processes involving Mus- lims abroad or Estonia itself. In 2010, like in previous years, several local newspapers ran small articles on the presumed concern of the Estonian security services about a possible rise of Islamic radicalism among Estonian Muslims. Tablighi Jamaat was identified as the organisation whose activities in Estonia are under the close scrutiny of security services.

16 Major Cultural Events

Sabantuj is an annual gathering of Tatars and Bashkirs. It takes place over several days with various festivities (songs, dances, games and sports). It is not a religious occasion, though religious attendees may hold communal prayers and some lectures on religious issues may be offered. FINLAND

Tuomas Martikainen1

1 Muslim Populations

The annexation of Finland from Sweden by imperial Russia in 1808 gradually led to the permanent settlement of Muslims. From at least the 1830s there were Muslim soldiers, including Kazakhs and Tatars, among the Russian military in several garrisons. They practised their religion and were served by an imam. Since the 1870s, Tatar Muslims from the Nizhni Novgorod region started to arrive, and they eventually became the first permanently settled Nordic Muslim community. After Finnish independence (1917), Muslims were granted citizenship (1920 onwards) and they were able to organise officially as a religious community when the Freedom of Religion Act came into force in January 1923. By the mid-1920s, the main wave of migration ended following the closure of the Soviet borders.2 Muslim migration remained low, but the population grew gradually due to marriage, work, study and international tourism in the post-World War II period. The Muslim population started to grow rapidly at the turn of the 1990s as the number of UNHCR quota refugees and asylum seekers from Muslim countries grew, alongside other forms of migration. Currently, the largest groups are Somalis, Arabs (mainly from Iraq), Kurds, Kosovo Albanians, Bosnians and Turks. The majority of Muslims in Finland are Sunni and about a tenth Shi’i.3 By 2009, an estimated 50,000–60,000 Muslims were living in Finland, that is, 1% of the total population of 5.4 million.4 The Muslim average age is

1 Tuomas Martikainen is a university researcher in the Department of World Cul- tures, University of Helsinki. He has researched and published widely on contemporary religious and ethnic diversity in Finland and is the author of Immigrant Religions in Local Society: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives in the City of Turku (Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2004). The author would like to thank Isra Lehtinen for commenting on this article. 2 Leitzinger, Antero, Suomen tataarit: Vuosina 1868–1944 muodostuneen muslimi- yhteisön menestystarina (Finland’s Tatars: The Success Story of the Muslim Commu- nity Formed during 1868–1944) (Helsinki: East-West Books Helsinki, 2006). 3 Martikainen, Tuomas, “Finland”, in Göran Larsson (ed.), Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 76–89. 4 In Finland, people are registered according to their official membership of 188 tuomas martikainen very young and about half are under the age of twenty. This estimate of the total number of Muslims in Finland is conservative, and higher figures can be suggested. The Muslim population broadly consists of four parts. (1) The majority (about 40,000) of Finnish Muslims are first generation migrants.5 (2) The second generation and children of mixed marriages are increasing in number and currently number at least 10,000. This figure is based on parents’ country of birth data with either a fifth (migrant-migrant parents) or half (migrant-native parents) deducted from the number (data from Statistics Finland).6 (3) Isra Lehtinen, a long-standing Finnish Muslim activist, estimates the number of converts to be 1,000–1,500.7 (4) The two Tatar congregations have 649 members, according to official membership statistics provided by the Population Register Centre. There are no representative surveys regarding identification as a Muslim, nor are the majority of Muslims registered in official Muslim communities. Little is known about the religious activity and participation levels of Finnish Mus- lims, but it has been estimated that around one third are in contact with the mosque communities. The majority of Finnish Muslims live in the capital region and other large cities, most notably in Turku and Tampere. The geographical distribution between different ethnic groups is, however, very different.

2 Islam and the State

Freedom of religion was added to the Finnish Constitution in 1919 (revised 1999). The Freedom of Religion Act (1922, revised 2003) state-recognised religious organisations (rekisteröity uskonnollinen yhdyskunta). Such Muslim organisations had 8,230 registered members in 2009. These figures significantly under-report religious affiliation among all migrant groups, including Mus- lims, and there is no survey or census data (the last census was conducted in 1985) that provides accurate information on the religious affiliation, adherence or identity of immigrants. As a result, numbers of Muslims need to be estimated by using less reliable and direct means. As the majority of Muslims in Finland are first generation migrants, country of birth statistics are the best available starting point. Comprehen- sive statistical data on the second generation are still missing. See Martikainen, Tuo- mas, “Maahanmuuttajien uskonnollisen taustan tilastollinen arvioiminen Suomessa” (The Making of Statistical Estimates of Immigrants’ Religious Background in Finland), Teologinen Aikakauskirja, vol. 116, no. 3 (2011), pp. 40–54. 5 The calculation of the estimate is presented in detail in Martikainen, “Maahan- muuttajien uskonnollisen taustan tilastollinen arvioiminen Suomessa”, pp. 40–54. 6 These reductions are somewhat arbitrary (see, n. 7) but nevertheless provide a clear standard that can be corrected when more reliable data becomes available. 7 Isra Lehtinen, personal communication, 16 November 2010. finland 189 provides more detailed regulations on the matter. The Evangelical Lutheran and Finnish Orthodox Churches enjoy a special status as religious organisations with their own legislation. All other religious organisations are dealt with under the Freedom of Religion Act as recognised religious bodies or under the Association Act as voluntary associations.8 Muslims are organised in both ways, and there also are informally organised groups. In January 2010, there were 29 Muslim communities registered as religious organisations, but not all of them were active.9 Altogether, there are about 40 mosque associations and 20–30 other Muslim associations focused on specific issues, including women, youth and charity. Local organisations have to a varying degree been able to receive public funding, and the Ministry of Education and Culture10 started to fund minority religions that met certain criteria from 2008 onwards. The Muslim Umbrella OrganizationSuomen Islamilainen Neuvosto (Islamic Council of Finland, SINE, www.sine.fi, [email protected]) receives its funding from the Finnish state and member organisations. Muslim organisations have little national public visibility, although they are often consulted by public authorities in many issues.11

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Until recently, the focus of Muslim activity in Finland was mainly local or, in some cases, directed at the countries of origin. SINE was established in November 2006 and functions as an umbrella organisation for the representation of Muslims in Finland. In November 2010, SINE had twenty-two member organisations and it is currently funded by the Finnish state with 60,000 euros annually to cover its basic running costs. The activities of SINE are still developing, but the society is

8 Muslim groups organised under the Freedom of Religious Act gain recognition as a ‘religion’, and may apply for certain rights, including the right to provide legally approved marriage. Muslim groups organised under the Association Act are considered as any other voluntary association, and cannot gain religion-specific rights. Heik- kilä, Markku, Jyrki Knuutila and Scheinin, Martin, “State and Church in Finland”, in Robbers, Gerhard (ed.), State and Church in the European Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), pp. 519–536. 9 National Board of Patents and Registration of Finland. 10 The Ministry of Education was renamed the Ministry of Education and Culture in 2010. 11 Martikainen, Tuomas, “The Governance of Islam in Finland”,Temenos , vol. 43, no. 2 (2007), pp. 243–265. 190 tuomas martikainen working, among other things, on issues related to burial and cemeteries, aspects of Shari’a, media, religious education and youth. The council represents the main mosques (with the exception of the two Tatar communities) and the majority of registered Muslims in Finland. The main division of mosques in Finland is between Sunni and Shi’i, and the Sunnis are further divided between Tatars and newer arrivals. Little information is available about the religious orientations of new mosque communities, but most of them follow a traditionalist understanding of Islam. Tablighi Jamaat is prominent in some mosques.12 In 2007, Suomen Islamilainen Puolue (Finnish Islamic Party, www .suomenislamilainenpuolue.fi) was founded, but by the end of 2010, it had failed to collect enough support to be formally registered as a political party. The party represents mainly Salafist Muslims.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are around 40 mosques in Finland, of which two are purpose- built and owned by the Tatar community. A wooden mosque was built in Järvenpää in 1942 and a house with one floor set aside as a mosque in downtown Helsinki in 1960. The Tatars have five mosques (Helsinki, Järvenpää, Kotka, Tampere, Turku). The Islamic Society of Finland was registered in 1987, and it was the first non-Tatar Islamic organisation in the country. Since the early 1990s, several new prayer-rooms have been established. New Sunni mosques exist in Espoo, Helsinki, Joensuu, Jyväskylä, Järvenpää, Kajaani, Kotka, Kuopio, Lappeenranta, Lahti, Lohja, Oulu, Pori, Tampere, Turku, Vaasa and Vantaa. New Shi’i mosques are to be found in Helsinki, Lempäälä, Tampere and Turku. Some of the mosques have had problems with neighbours, including complaints of noise and increased traffic, and have moved to new locations. Generally, mosque communities have positive relations with municipal authorities. There have been plans to establish new purpose-built mosques in several locations, but so far these have failed because of the lack of funding. In December 2009, the Islamic Society of Turku announced plans to build an Islamic cultural centre with funding from Kuwait in the City of Turku, located in South- western Finland. The plan has not proceeded during 2010.

12 For this movement see Muhammad Khalid Masud (ed.), Travellers in Faith, Leiden: Brill, 2000. finland 191

5 Children’s Education

Most education in Finland is provided by the state and there are very few private schools, although the Tatars had their own primary school from 1948 to 1969. In general, Tatars have participated in regular school education. In religious education (RE) in Finnish schools instruction is given in the religion of the pupils in a non-confessional manner. This means that RE is focused on providing information about religion. Religious practice in schools is not permitted. Due to the rise in the number of Muslim pupils in the 1990s, several Finnish cities established Islamic RE in local schools. The Religious Freedom Act of 2003 made it obligatory to organise RE in Islamic and all other minority faiths if at least three pupils asked for it within a municipality. In practice, the situation varies greatly between municipalities, but Islamic RE is already well established in all the larger cities. The Islamic Society of Finland had a private religious school in Hel- sinki from 2001 to 2005, but the school did not gain official status and was not financially viable. There are, however, some private Muslim kindergartens. Issues related to the ritual practices of Islam have been dealt with on an ad hoc basis and this is only gradually becoming more systematic, but diverse local guidelines have been created. The City of Helsinki guidelines are the most comprehensive, and provide detailed recommendations on how to deal with many issues.13

6 Higher and Professional Education

Islamic theology and law cannot be formally studied in Finland. Arabic and Islamic studies are offered at the University of Helsinki. In addition, courses on Islam can be found in several disciplines in Finnish universities, most notably in comparative religion at the Universities of Helsinki and Turku and in Åbo Akademi University. No official discussions about imam training in higher education have taken place, but training of minority faith RE teachers at the Department of Comparative Religion, University of Helsinki, has been on-going

13 Lehtinen, Isra, “Miten viranomaiset huomioivat muslimit” (How the Authori- ties take into Account the Needs of Muslims), in Uskonnontutkija 1/2007, available at www.uskonnontutkija.fi/arkisto/2007_1/lehtinen.pdf, accessed 27 November 2009. The website is currently down (28 April 2011), but is expected to be re-launched. 192 tuomas martikainen since 2007. This consists of both pedagogical and Islamic studies and leads to formal qualification as an RE teacher in Finland. In autumn 2008, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) launched a project entitled “Integration: A Multifaith Approach”, which aimed to improve the integration of foreign-born religious leaders and their communities. Several Muslims participated in the course.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The Evangelical Lutheran Church takes care of most cemeteries in Fin- land. The Tatar Muslims have two cemeteries in the cities of Helsinki and Turku which are not open for use by other Muslims because the Tatars have reserved them for their own members. Discussion of the need for more Muslim burial sites has been taking place since the early 1990s, but no long-term solution has been found. Practices have varied between municipalities and a process involving the Ministry of Educa- tion and Culture and SINE is taking place. There are plans to establish a burial foundation, and the Ministry of Education and Culture has reserved funds for 2011 to hire a consultant to map suitable burial grounds for an Islamic grave yard.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Chaplaincy in state institutions has traditionally been organised by the Evangelical Lutheran Church, which also has, among others, full-time hospital, military and prison chaplains. In addition, the Finnish Ortho- dox Church and other minority Christian religions have been active. Islam is increasingly recognised as a religion to be noted in chaplaincy, although Muslim organisations have not provided chaplaincy systematically in these institutions. Several state institutions, including the police, the armed forces and health care providers, often together with publicly funded immigrant projects, have produced guidelines and information booklets on Islam, but it is currently unclear to what extent these are followed and the quality of these guidelines is very variable.

9 Religious Festivals

Religious festivals are customarily organised by cultural and mosque organisations in places with larger Muslim populations. Apart from finland 193

Muslim organisations, various ministries arranged invitation-only iftar dinners during Ramadan for some years after 2001. All these events have been open either to Muslims only or, by personal invitation, to non-Muslim friends, researchers and others. Time off to celebrate the main festivals is not a legal entitlement.

10 Halal Food

In earlier times, Finnish Muslims used the services of a Jewish shop in Helsinki, and later halal food was imported into Finland and sold at outlets in mosques and ethnic stores. Today, fresh halal meat is available in Helsinki, where some halal shops currently sell meat slaughtered in Finland. Halal slaughter has occasionally been discussed in the Finnish media and in 1996, the Animal Protection Act provided guidelines for approved halal slaughter in Finland, which require the animal to be stunned simultaneously with the slaughter.

11 Dress Codes

So-called Muslim clothing, including head scarves, has not been a major topic of public discussion in Finland. For example, girls have the right to wear a scarf at school, even though modifications may be required for sport and other activities for safety or hygiene reasons. Employers increasingly have to deal with the issue and some have provided guidelines regarding acceptable clothing at work, for instance in public health care.

12 Publication and Media

The media image of Islam is conflict-oriented and gives a violent and aggressive impression of Islam, as has been noted in many studies over the years. This applies particularly to foreign news reporting, while Finnish Muslims are more often represented in a multicultural framework. Popular literature on Islam was scarce until the 2000s, but more has been published since then. The professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Helsinki, Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, has been especially active and has produced more than a dozen popular books on various topics relating to Islam. Few books written by Muslims are published. The Qur’an has been translated into Finnish three times 194 tuomas martikainen

(1942, 1957 and 1995). Mosque communities and other Islamic associations increasingly distribute Finnish-language literature and leaflets, which are often translated from other languages. There are three Finnish-language Muslim periodicals. A Sunni journal, An-Nur, has been published by the Islamic Society of Fin- land since 1994 and a Shi’i journal, Salam, by Resalat Islamilainen Yhdyskunta (the Resalat Islamic Community) since 2007. The periodicals contain theological articles and discuss current affairs. A new journal for young Muslims, Umma, was launched in 2010 by SINE. Tatars have published a newspaper called Mähallä Habärläre (News from the Community) in the Tatar language since 2004. In addition, several ethnic communities produce journals including religious material, although this is not their primary focus. Beyond print media, the Internet provides several information and discussion forums for Muslims and on Islam, including Sunnapolku (The Path of Sunna, www.sunnapolku.com), a Finnish-language information and discussion forum on Islam, and Islam Suomessa (Islam in Finland, www.tulevaisuus.org), a Finnish language information portal on Islam. In addition, a global, high-volume and non-religious English-language site for Muslims, Muxlim—Enhancing the Muslim Lifestyle (www.muxlim.com), has been run in Finland since 2007 by Mohamed El-Fatatry who moved from the United Arab Emirates to Finland to study computing in 2004.

13 Family Law

The relationship between family law and Islamic laws and traditions is still taking shape in Finland. The legal committee of SINE, mosques and imams provide consultation and settlements in family matters, but there is no overview of how this takes place. There have been reports of clashes between civil divorce processes and informal Islamic practice. In 2007, the Finnish League for Human Rights published a survey of the relationship between Finnish and Islamic laws,14 according to which the majority of Finnish Muslims view Shari’a as a general

14 Kouros, Kristiina, Suomessa asuvien muslimien suhtautumisesta perhearvoihin ja perhelainsäädäntöön (The Relationship of Muslims Living in Finland to Family Values and Family Law) (Helsinki: Ihmisoikeusliitto, 2007). finland 195 moral guideline but follow national legislation in practice. Only a small minority view Shari’a as the primary normative code. Male circumcision has been a topic of heated public discussions, and some Finnish NGOs as well as the majority of Finnish medical doctors oppose the practice when carried out solely for religious or cultural reasons. Despite the recommendations of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2003), the position of male circumcision in public health care remains ambivalent and this has led to circumcisions being carried out in private homes, with consequent medical complications.15 In October 2010, the Minister of Health and Social Services announced that a long planned law on male circumcision will not be brought to the parliament. Hence, the ambivalence of the situation continues.

14 Interreligious Relations

Muslim-Christian dialogue has been taking place since the 1990s. Spo- radic one-off events are gradually being replaced by more organised forums. The longest standing activity has been the biannual dialogue between the Church and Islam Committee of the Evangelical Lutheran Church and several Muslims organisations that was established in 1997. The events focus on religious questions and have gathered 20–50 participants on a regular basis. Another forum to note is the activities of United Religions Initiative in Helsinki. The Islamic Council of Finland is represented in the Cooperation Forum of Religions in Finland, which is an evolving high-level interfaith network. Also, Muslim organisations are and have been represented on Etnisten suhteiden neuvottelukunta (Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations, ETNO), whose aim is to incorporate minority voices into state administration. Interreligious relations have been moving in a more proactive direction in recent years. Since 2001, the President of Finland has initiated meetings between leaders of the Christian, Muslim and Jewish communities on a regular basis.

15 Sakaranaho, Tuula, Alitolppa-Niitamo, Anne, Martikainen, Tuomas and Tiilikainen, Marja, “Religion in Migration: Studies on Muslims in Finland”, in Vesa Puuronen, Antti Häkkinen, Anu Pylkkänen, Sandlund Tom, and Toivanen, Reetta (eds.), New Challenges for the Welfare Society (Joensuu: University of Joensuu, Kar- elian Institute, 2004), pp. 124–139. 196 tuomas martikainen

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Finnish public opinion regarding Islam and Muslims is generally cautious and negative and similar to attitudes towards Jehovah’s Wit- nesses, Mormons and Scientology. About half the population express a negative stance, and this view seems to have stabilised over the years. The latest opinion poll was conducted in 2008 and found that 52% of Finns view Islam negatively and 6% positively.16 Islam in Finland continues to be an on-going part of public debate, but there were no major public controversies related to Muslims in 2010. From previous year, the Helsinki Court of Appeal confirmed in October 2010 the previous court order against Dr. Jussi Halla-aho, a city councillor and Internet blogger from Helsinki, for violation of the sanctity of religion. He had published a blog in June 2008, where he had written provocatively about the Prophet Muhammad. Halla-aho was sentenced to fines.17

16 Major Cultural Events

Local cultural centres and cultural and religious organisations have run several, small-scale events on Islamic culture since the 1990s. The first major national cultural event on Islam, theMinareetin kutsu (Call of the Minaret), was organised with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004–2005. It was part of a campaign calledTuhat ja yksi askelta (A Thousand and One Steps) that aimed to inform Finns about Islam around the world. The first major event organised solely by Finnish Muslims took place in November 2008, when the Islamic Council of Finland in Helsinki put on a two-day “Islam-Expo”. This included panel presentations, exhibitions about Muslim communities and displays of Islamic products. The Expo attracted around 200 visitors. No major public, cultural events took place during 2010. The second Islam-Expo has been arranged for March 2011.

16 Ketola, Kimmo, “Uskontotilanteen muutos ja suomalaisten suhtautuminen eri uskontoihin” (Changes in the Religious Situation and Finns’ Views of Different Reli- gions), in Martikainen, Tuomas and Jalovaara, Ville (eds.), Uskonnon ylösnousemus: Kirkon, uskonnon and kulttuurin murros (The Resurrection of Religion: Changes in Church, Religion and Culture) (Helsinki: Magma, 2010), pp. 40–51. 17 Mika Illman, personal communication, 9 November 2010. FRANCE

Anne-Laure Zwilling1

1 Muslim Population

Figures concerning the numbers of Muslims in France are very difficult to provide. Since 1872, it has been forbidden for a census to identify people according to religious affiliation. Article 8 of the revised law of 6 January 1978 forbids the collection of any data providing personal information on racial or ethnic origin, or philosophical, religious or political belief or affiliation.2 The French National Institute of Statisti- cal Information (INED) therefore provides no such information and it can only be obtained from surveys carried out for newspapers, magazines, political groups, or religious institutions by companies such as BVA (www.bva.fr), IFOP (www.ifop.com/europe), CSA (www.csa-fr .com), IPSOS (www.ipsos.fr) and TNS-Sofres (www.tns-sofres.com), or from European surveys that include sections on France.3 Since the methods and techniques used in these surveys are diverse, results can sometimes vary significantly, and are always difficult to compare. Besides, the issue of religious belonging to Islam is also a sensitive one; therefore, people can sometimes have political, religious or personal motives for exaggerating or downplaying figures about Muslims. Finally, it may also be difficult to know precisely what people actually understand by “Muslim”: a person claiming to be a Muslim, a person

1 Anne-Laure Zwilling is research fellow at the research centre PRISME—Société, Droit et Religions en Europe (Society, Law and Religions in Europe), Centre National de Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Strasbourg. She holds MA degrees in philosophy and religious studies and a PhD in religious sciences. She works in the field of religious minorities in Europe. 2 “Il est interdit de collecter des données à caractère personnel qui font apparaître, directement ou indirectement, les origines raciales ou ethniques, les opinions politiques, philosophiques ou religieuses ou l’appartenance syndicale des personnes, ou qui sont relatives à la santé ou à la vie sexuelle de celles-ci.” 3 European Social Survey, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/, European Values Studies, http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/, Eurobaromètre, http://cdsp.sciences- po.fr/enquetes.php?idTheme=2&idRubrique=enquetesINT&lang=ANG, or Religions Monitor, http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-0A000F14-340C6D4F/ bst/hs.xsl/85217_85220.htm?suchrubrik, for instance, accessed 12 December 2010. 198 anne-laure zwilling with a high degree of religious practice, or a person from a Muslim family background. For all these reasons, only a general picture of the Muslim presence in France can be given. In 2000, the High Council for Integration estimated the number of Muslims in France to be 4 million.4 Other estimates followed, the figures steadily increasing, up to 6 or 7 million. In 2003, however, the demographer Michèle Tribalat criticised the lack of serious work in this field, and provided her own result, based on a demographic analysis taking into account the ethnic origins of the population: 3.7 million (or 4.1 million if one includes the Harkis— Muslim Algerians who sided with the France during the Algerian war of independence). She does underline, though, that, like all the other statistics about Muslims in France, this can only suggest the number of ‘possible Muslims’, not of ‘actual Muslims’. In 2007, the National Institute of Statistics reaffirmed that Muslims are 7.1% of a total population of 63,392 Million.5 A survey led by IFOP in 2009 gives 5.8% of the population claiming to be Muslims,6 and IFOP estimates in 2010, as a result of several different surveys, the number of Muslims to be 5.3 Million,7 The difference between all these results illustrates the difficulty of having a definite idea of the number of Muslims,8 but the generally accepted number is now around 6% of the population. France remains nevertheless a very Catholic country: according to a 2010 IFOP survey,9 Catholics are 64% (Protestants 3%, people belonging to other religions including Muslims 5%, with no religion 28%).

4 L’islam dans la République (Islam in the French Republic), November 2000, available at http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/014000017/0000.pdf, accessed 12 December 2010. 5 French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE), 2007, available at http://www .insee.fr/fr/bases-de-donnees/default.asp?page=recensements.htm, accessed 12 Decem- ber 2010. 6 Enquête sur l’implantation et l’évolution de l’Islam de France, IFOP survey, 2009, http://www.ifop.fr/media/pressdocument/48-1-document_file.pdf, accessed 12 December 2010. 7 http://ifop.fr/media/pressdocument/154-1-document_file.pdf, accessed 13 Decem- ber 2010. 8 There is now a strong demand for a change in the law, and the possibility to obtain such statistical information. See Heran, François, Pour un usage critique et responsable de l’outil statistique, rapport du Comité pour la mesure de la diversité et l’évaluation des discriminations (COMEDD) (Report on the use of statistics concerning minorities), http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/104000077/0000 .pdf, accessed 13 December 2010. 9 http://www.ifop.fr/media/pressdocument/238-1-document_file.pdf, accessed 13 December 2010. france 199

The Muslim presence in mainland France is primarily the result of immigration.10 The starting point for the noticeable presence of Mus- lims in France is the end of World War I. Men from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia served in the French army and this led to the arrival in France of immigrants from these countries. These immigrants were estimated to number 120,000 in 1920, of which 100,000 were from Algeria, which was then a French colony, Tunisia and Morocco being French protectorates. From then on, with a marked increase after World War II,11 Muslim immigrants were mostly men, responding to a French demand for cheap labour. During the Algerian war of independence, up to 160,000 Algerians were soldiers in the French army. When the war ended in 1962, there were widespread reprisals against those who remained in Algeria, and many tried to find refuge in France. It is usually estimated that the number of these ex-soldiers, called Harkis, and their families who arrived in France between 1962 and 1968 amounted to 91,000. But not much effort was made to welcome them: they were lodged either in settlements near existing urban centres, in isolated purpose-built hamlets in the rural south, or in so- called temporary camps, some of which had formerly housed refugees and political prisoners. After France and Turkey signed a labour agreement in 1964, a large number of Turks began to migrate to France—18,000 in 1970, 200,000 in the early 1990s and 450,000 by 2005. Finally, a number of immigrants came from former French colonies and other countries with a Muslim population, such as Senegal and India. After the 1970s, the immigration from Morocco and Turkey began slowly to increase and in 1974 the government passed a law allowing the families of immigrants to join them, so many children and wives moved to France. As a result of all these factors, the Muslim population in France is currently made up predominantly of people from North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), Turkey, Sub-Saharan Africa and their children born in France. There are also South Asians (Tamils, Gujarati for

10 Godard, Bernard and Taussig, Sylvie, Les musulmans en France—courants, institutions, communautés: un état des lieux (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2007), p. 454. 11 Blanchard, Pascal, Deroo, Éric, El Yazami, Driss, Fournié, Pierre and Manceron, Gilles, “L’immigration: l’installation en métropole des populations du Maghreb”, in Blanchard, Pascal and Lemaire, Sandrine, Culture impériale 1931–1961 (Paris: Édi- tions Autrement, 2004). 200 anne-laure zwilling example)12 and people from the Middle East and, since the Yugoslav wars (1991–2001), Bosnians and Albanians. The concentration of the Muslim population is high in socially deprived areas, major urban centres and suburbs. Many are in the region around Paris (Muslims are more than 10% of the population in the departments of Val d’Oise, Seine-Saint-Denis and Val de Marne);13 they are also found in the region of Lyon and Bouches-du-Rhône and in the eastern part of France. Because many immigrants came to France for work, the number of Muslims is high in former industrial and mining areas such as Haut-Rhin, as well as along the Mediterra- nean coast, geographically close to North Africa. Turkish people living in France are mostly concentrated in Paris, Alsace and Lorraine14 and the region of Nord-Pas de Calais, where they live mainly in the cities of Calais, Lille and Roubaix.15 Very few Muslims live in rural areas.16 The first generation of Muslim immigrants, now retired from the workforce, often applied for French nationality before retiring in France.17 Many live alone in housing estates, and have lost their ties with their countries of origin. The second generation and now a third generation of Muslims find integration difficult, though this may be highly dependent on their family origin.18 The second generation, being born in France, is composed of French citizens, but a reform of the nationality law in 1992 delayed the granting of French nationality until it was applied for in adulthood (where previously it was automatically granted).

12 Moliner, Christine, “L’immigration sud-asiatique en France: discrète et exem- plaire?”, Infos migrations 12, November 2009, http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/IMG/ pdf/IM_12.pdf, accessed 12 December 2010. 13 Settling and evolution of French Islam, IFOP 2009, http://www.ifop.com/media/ pressdocument/48-1-document_file.pdf, accessed 13 December 2010. 14 Akgönül, Samim, Maffessoli, Murielle, Koç, Muharrem, De Tapia, Stéphane, 40 ans de présence turque en Alsace: constats et évolutions (Strasbourg: Neotheque, 2009), p. 273. 15 IFOP survey on the geographical repartition of religions in France, 2009, http:// www.ifop.fr/media/pressdocument/48-1-document_file.pdf, accessed 12 December 2010. 16 Cartographie des musulmans et des sans religions en France, http://www.lem onde.fr/societe/infographie/2007/03/02/l-islam-affiche-une-presence-moyenne-de-3- dans-de-nombreux-departements_878171_3224.html, accessed 12 December 2010. 17 Keiser, France, Geisser, Vincent, Nous sommes Français et musulmans (Paris: éditions Autrement, 2010). 18 Alba, Richard and Silberman, Roxane, “Decolonization immigrations and the social origins of the second generation: the case of North Africans in France”, in Inter- national Migration Review, vol. 36, no. 4 (2002), pp. 1169–1193. france 201

The Muslim population is younger than the average (35% are 15–24 years old—that number is 16% for the population of France).19 This study also gives 29.5% of non-workers (including students), against 15.5% for the total population. According to the 2005 data from the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies,20 unemployment among people of French origin was then 9.2%, while for those of foreign backgrounds the rate was 14% (statistics adjusted to take account of educational qualifications). Furthermore, there was a 5% overall unemployment rate for graduates of French origin, but 26.5% of university graduates of Northern African origin were unemployed. All this has led to growing dissatisfaction among second and third generation Muslims.21 Muslims account for an estimated 50% of the population of detainees in France (some jails in the region of Paris and Marseille reach up to 80 percent).22 Social and educational inequalities remain for young people originated from Northern or Sub-Saharan Africa, and their level of unemployment is high23—even higher for immigrants who do not acquire French nationality.24 According to an IFOP survey in 2009,25 79% of people claiming to be Muslims fast during Ramadan (70% during the entire Ramadan); 61% pray five times a day; 77% go to the mosque at least once a week.26

19 TNS-Sofres survey, “Les enjeux du quotidien”, 2007, available with free login at http://www.tns-sofres.com/points-de-vue/opinion-style-de-vie/religion/, accessed 12 December 2010. 20 http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/docs_ffc/IP1042.pdf, access 12 December 2010. 21 Lopez, Alberto, and Thomas, Gwénaëlle, “L’insertion des jeunes sur le marché du travail: le poids des origines socioculturelles”, in Données sociales—la société française (Paris: INSEE, 2006), pp. 293–305. 22 Beckford, James A., Joly, Danièle, Khorsokhavar, Farhad, Muslims in Prison, Challenge and Change in Britain and France (Louvain-la-Neuve: Presses universitaires de Louvain, 2007), pp. 276–279. 23 Dupray Arnaud, Moullet Stéphanie, L’insertion des jeunes d’origine maghrébine en France. Des différences plus marquées dans l’accès à l’emploi qu’en matière salari- ale (Marseille: Céreq, 2004), available at http://www.cereq.fr/cereq/Net-Doc-6.pdf, accessed 6 January 2010. 24 See the report of the Ministry of labour, Le vécu des attitudes intolérantes ou discriminatoires par les personnes immigrées et issues de l’immigration, September 2005, http://www.travail-solidarite.gouv.fr/etudes-recherche-statistiques-drees/publi cations/etudes-resultats/no-424-vecu-attitudes-intolerantes-ou-discriminatoires-par- personnes-immigrees-issues-immigration.html, accessed 10 January 2010. Also http:// www.immigration.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/IM_7_ENL2.pdf. 25 Settling and evolution of French Islam, IFOP 2009, http://www.ifop.com/media/ pressdocument/48-1-document_file.pdf, accessed 13 December 2010. 26 “Portrait des musulmans (Portrait of Muslims)”, available at http://www.csa-fr .com/dataset/data2006/opi20060823b.htm, accessed 12 December 2010. 202 anne-laure zwilling

Religious practice seems to be on the increase: 23% of Muslims claimed to attend the mosque regularly in 2007, compared with 16% in 1989; 70% said they observed fast during Ramadan, compared with 60% in 1989; and 6% had performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, compared with 4% in 1989.27 Religious practice, however, remains more a concern for the older generation: 28% of young people (18–24 years old) claim to pray once a day, 35% of the 40–50 years old, and 64% of over 55 years old. Also, when 41% of men over 55 years old attend the mosque on Fridays, they are only 23% of 18–25 years old.28 According to a survey of the Interior Ministry, more than a thousand men are currently working as imams in France.29 Only 9% of them are French. 40% are Moroccans, 24% Algerians, 13% Turks, 5% are Tunisians and the rest come from various other countries (mostly in Africa and the Middle-East).30

2 Islam and the State

The main framework governing religion in France is the separation between religion and the state. It is defined by the law of 9 December 1905,31 which stipulates that the French Republic “guarantees freedom of conscience” and “the free exercise of religion”. Nevertheless, the State “does not recognise, pay a wage to or subsidise any religious denomination”. This law did not establish any kind of religious status or regime, but it does provide for support mechanisms such as the possibility of creating religious associations, tax exemptions, chaplaincies in the army, financial support for the maintenance of places of worship.32 These were to be granted to churches and religions that

27 Settling and evolution of French Islam, IFOP 2009, http://www.ifop.com/media/ pressdocument/48-1-document_file.pdf, accessed 13 December 2010. 28 Settling and evolution of French Islam, IFOP 2009, http://www.ifop.com/media/ pressdocument/48-1-document_file.pdf, accessed 13 December 2010. 29 HAUT CONSEIL À L’INTÉGRATION, L’islam dans la République, 2000, http:// www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/014000017/index.shtml, accessed 12 December 2010. 30 See Mondot, Jean-François, Imams de France, (Paris: Stock, 2009). 31 Text available at: http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT00 0006070169&dateTexte=20090401, accessed 12 December 2010. 32 Frégosi, Franck, Penser l’islam dans la laïcité (Paris: Editions Fayard, 2008), 504 pages. france 203 requested them. Because of their previous legal status as “recognised religions”, Catholic dioceses and, to a lesser extent, Protestants and Jews, automatically enjoyed the advantages provided for in this law. This does not apply in the Rhine-and-Moselle departments (Alsace and Moselle), which were part of Germany in 1905, and in which recognised denominations are organised within the framework of public law and financed by the state and the towns. Religious groups organise within the framework of private law. Local law also applies to the organisation of religion in the four territories and one department overseas.33 In March 2005, the Fondation pour les Œuvres de l’Islam de France (Foundation for the Works of Islam in France) was established to be responsible for collecting all donations and distributing funds for the construction and renovation of places of worship and to support the training of imams, as well as for financing the CFCM (sect. 3 below). Official reports provide information on the legal situation of Islam in France. Among the more recent is a full report issued in 2006 by the Ministry of Interior, providing up to date information on the relation between religious groups and the authorities in France.34 Since then, three reports, two in 2009 and one in 2010, dealt with the question of the niqab (see sect. 11 below). Islamic finance is nowadays attracting attention in France, and an official report was issued in 2008 on this question by the Commission of Finances.35 An Institut français de finance islamique (French Insti- tute for Islamic Finance) was created in December 2009, in partnership with the Islamic Development Bank. However, Islamic financial products are still not allowed in France, and the Conseil Constitutionnel has banned a law designed to authorise sukuks (Islamic bonds) in France (14 October 2009),36 several deputies believing that such a law is not compatible with the principles of laïcité. In response to the

33 Curtit, Françoise, Messner, Francis, Droit des religions en France et en Europe: Recueil de textes (Brussels: Bruylant, 2008). 34 Machelon, Jean-Pierre, Les relations des cultes avec les pouvoirs publics: rapport au ministre de l’Intérieur et de l’Aménagement du territoire, 2006, http://lesrapports .ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/064000727/0000.pdf, accessed 12 December 2010. 35 Arthuis, Jean, La finance islamique en France: quelles perspectives ? Rapport d’information, fait au nom de la commission des finances du Sénat, n° 329 (2007–2008), 14 May 2008, http://www.senat.fr/noticerap/2007/r07–329–notice.html, accessed 13 December 2010. 36 Decision n° 2009—589 DC of the Conseil Constitutionnel. 204 anne-laure zwilling growing interest in Islamic finance, two university degrees Diplôme( d’université) are now available in France, one in the School of Manage- ment of Strasbourg, the other one in the University of Paris Dauphine. An Institut des cultures d’islam is to open in Paris in 2012.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Muslim groups and associations are organised according to the law of associations (1901) and a large number of Muslim associations are registered. The majority of them are small and only of local interest, but a few associations are of national importance. Muslims in France are predominantly Sunnis. TheUnion des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF, www.uoif-online.com), often said to have links with the Muslim Brotherhood, aims at bringing together all French Mus- lims, but many of the main Muslim organisations in France reflect countries of origin: Algerian Islam is represented by the Grande Mosquée de Paris (GMP, www.mosquee-de-paris.org), and the Fédé- ration Nationale des Musulmans de France (FNMF) is the organisation of Moroccan Muslims. After an internal dispute, the FNMF split in 2007 and a second organisation of Moroccan Muslims, the Rassem- blement des Musulmans de France (RMF), was then created. Turks are grouped in the Comité de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France (CCFTF); Millî Görüs is also an important structure grouping almost 30% of French-Turkish mosques.37 Other Turkish brotherhoods have networks in France, as Süleymanci or Fethullahçi. The Fédération française des associations islamiques d’Afrique, des Como- res et des Antilles (FFAIACA), created in 1989, brings together Mus- lims of Africa and Antilles. The group “Foi et pratique”, created in 1972, (Faith and practice, http://www.foietpratique.org/) is the French Jama’a at-tabligh. There are also substantial numbers of Sufi orders in France, including groups such as the Murid tariqas38 or the Tijaniyyah

37 CIMG FRANCE—Communauté Islamique du Milli Gorus de France, www .cimgfrance.com. See Akgönül, Samim, « Millî Görüs: Institution religieuse minoritaire et mouvement politique transnational » in Samir Amghar (dir.) Recompositions con- temporaines de l’islamisme en situation de diaspora (Paris: Lignes de Repères, 2006), pp. 63–86. 38 http://touba-aix-marseille.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id =57&Itemid=41, accessed 12 December 2010. france 205 from Senegal and Mali, the Naqshbandis (www.naqshbandi.fr, mostly Turkish) and the ‘Alawiyya tariqa. One can also find several youth associations, the main one being Jeunes Musulmans de France (Young Muslims of France, www.jmf .asso.fr), founded in July 1993 with the support of the UOIF. L’Union des jeunes musulmans (the Union of Young Muslims, http://www.ujm .fr/ujm.php) is a growing group. The French Muslim Scouts group (Scouts musulmans de France, http://scoutsmusulmans.fr/), created in 1991, was integrated in the official association Scoutisme français in 1994. The Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (French Council of the Muslim Religion, CFCM, http://www.lecfcm.fr/) was founded in 2002 at the request of the French authorities as a body whose aim is to represent Muslims to the government and communicate the views of the state to Muslims. It has concerns regarding issues such as the construction of mosques, sections for Muslim burial in cemeteries, halal slaughter, nomination of chaplains and the training of imams, but it has neither real prerogatives nor any executive power. It was set up to represents Islam on a national level and is recognised by the French government,39 but its real capacity to represent French Muslims has often been questioned by Muslims themselves. A contesting group is even using the same acronym, CFCM, for Citoyens Français de Culte Musulman (www.cfcm.tv). The main problem is that seats on the Council are granted according to the ground area of each mosque, which benefits affluent groups and is therefore not viewed as very democratic. The last elections took place in 2008, when 43 delegates elected Mohammed Moussaoui, vice- president of the Rassemblement des Musulmans de France, as president of the CFCM. He decided to re-organise the CFCM in order to provide a better representation of all the different groups. Out of 17 members, 3 are RMF, 2 CCMTF, 2 UOIF, 2 GMP (Fédération de la Grande Mosquée de Paris), 1 FFAIACA (Fédération des associations islamiques d’Afrique, des Comores et des Antilles), 1 Foi et Pratique group, 1 FNMF (Fédération nationale des musulmans de France) and 5 represent the important mosques. The FNMF, however, refused the offered places.

39 See the report of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Muslim faith in France, September 2007, available at http://www.ambafrance-pk.org/france_pakistan/ IMG/pdf/muslim_faith.pdf, accessed 13 December 2010. 206 anne-laure zwilling

Some tensions exist between different trends: there were media reports in May 2009 of a conflict between the vice-president of the CFCM and the general secretary of the FFAIACA.40 Salafism exists in France,41 and seems to be spreading (reports from the police information agency, Renseignements généraux, say that Salafi adepts have multiplied by ten between 1995 and 2005).42 According to Mohamed Sifaoui, some 50 mosques in France belong to the Salafi trend; it remains however a minority (less than 10% of Muslims).43

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There were around 2,150 places of Muslim worship in France in 2006, about twenty of which can accommodate more than 1,000 people.44 There are also some twenty mosques with minarets, the eldest being the Grande Mosquée de Paris. Some 120 buildings are dedicated solely to Muslim practice and activities, but most are not, being either private houses or sometimes former factories and the like, often a simple garage, that are used for worship.45 The number of building projects is on the increase and important mosques are being built in Marseille, Strasbourg, Nantes, Paris, Tours, Villeneuve d’Ascq and St Louis, among others. The mosque in Créteil, which can accommodate 2,000 people, was inaugurated in December 2008. The mosque in Gennevilliers opened its doors for Ramadan in August 2009. It can host 2,500 people and is now the biggest mosque in the Paris region.

40 See “Le CFCM excuse Hortefeux et se déchire en coulisse”, Claire Chartier, l’Express, 15 September 2009, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/religion/ le-cfcm-excuse-hortefeux-et-se-dechire-en-coulisse_786846.html, accessed 12 Decem- ber 2010. 41 Amghar, Samir, “Le salafisme en Europe: la mouvance polymorphe d’une radicalisation”, Politique étrangère 1, 2006, pp. 67–78, http://www.ifri.org/files/PE_1_2006_ amghar.pdf, accessed 11 April 2011. 42 http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/religion/la-strategie-des-salafistes_ 489383.html, accessed 11 April 2011. 43 http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2009/11/07/01016-20091107ART FIG00153—le-salafisme-en-10–questions-.php, accessed 11 April 2011. 44 See Frégosi, Franck (dir.), Les conditions d’exercice du culte musulman en France, Contrat FASILD, 2003. 45 http://www.la-croix.com/illustrations/Multimedia/Actu/2006/10/25/carte1.jpg, accessed 12 December 2010. france 207

The mosque of Argenteuil was officially opened by the Prime Minister François Fillon in June 2010. Cultural centres, which can host meetings and worship, are also to be built. It is impossible for the state, due to the law of laïcité, to fund the construction. These projects depend mainly on the involvement of the members of the community. Help can sometimes be obtained through generous donors from other countries. However, some financial mechanisms do exist allowing the local authorities to do things like charging very low rental fees or reducing taxes. Religious groups sometimes manage to benefit from these structures.

5 Children’s Education

State education, which in France means all public schools, does not include the teaching of Islam. This is because the French school system, with the principle of separation of the state and religious groups, does not allow any religious instruction in state schools. Generally speaking, there are three kinds of school in France:46 private schools without contract with the state (écoles privées hors contrat), private schools with a contract with the state (écoles privées sous contrat d’association avec l’Etat), and public schools (écoles publiques). Private schools without contract receive no financial assistance from the state and they are free to organise as they wish (law Debré of 31 December 1959; code of education L 442).47 When private schools do have a contract with the state, they can receive public funding to cover up to a tenth of their costs, and possible official recognition of their curriculum and diplomas. They then have to comply with the Code of Education, Article L141-3 and Article R442-36, which states that religious education can be given either outside normal hours of schooling, or else as the first or last hour(s) of teaching of the day. Religious education must remain optional, and the school cannot discriminate about which students it accepts. Nearly all these private

46 For more detail, see Peiser, Gustave, “Ecole publique, Ecole privée et Laïcité en France”, Cemoti, no. 19—Laïcité(s) en France et en Turquie, available at http://cemoti .revues.org/document1699.html, accessed 12 December 2010. 47 See Massignon, Bérengère, “Laïcité et gestion de la diversité religieuse à l’école publique en France”, in Social Compass 47, 2000, pp. 353–366. 208 anne-laure zwilling schools (90%) are Catholic schools. The same rules apply to primary and secondary education. Chaplaincies can be created at secondary level (collèges and lycées), but not in primary schools. In Alsace and Moselle, where the legal status of religions is different, state primary schools and secondary and technical education establishments are secular, but all must include religious instruction in their curriculum. Students’ parents can have their children exempted from these classes upon request and in primary schools such pupils must attend classes in ethics. The content of religious instruction is left to the discretion of the relevant religious authorities. In reality, however, Christianity and Judaism are almost always the only possibilities, although the Archbishop of Strasbourg stressed in an interview with the Christian journal La Croix (12 December 2003), the necessity of allowing Islam to be taught in public schools along with the two other major religions. Three private Muslim secondary schools (receiving no public funding) have opened in France in the recent years: in Aubervilliers (called La Réussite (Success), it is nowadays encountering financial difficulties), in Lille (2003) and in Lyon (2008). A private Muslim school with a contract with the state has existed since 1990 in La Réunion (French overseas department). On 10 March 2008, the Muslim private school Éducation et Savoir opened its doors in Vitry-sur-Seine (Val- de-Marne, Paris suburban region), the private lycée Averroes opened in Lille in 2006, the Al Kindi lycée opened near Lyon in 2007. Muslim children often attend Christian private schools to receive religious instruction, and some of these schools allow Muslim teachers for their Muslim pupils. In 2006, 317,000 Muslim pupils attended private schools for kindergarten, 565,000 at primary level, 655,000 in the first years of secondary school (collège) and 410,000 in the second part of secondary school (lycée).48 Outside school, Muslim religious education in France is delivered in mosque associations and is therefore very much connected to the country of origin.

48 See the budget of the Ministry of National Education, available at http://www .performance-publique.gouv.fr/farandole/2007/pap/html/DBGPGMPRESPGMAC TPGM139.htm, accessed 12 December 2010. france 209

6 Higher and Professional Education

Muslim higher education and imam training is currently organised in France only by private institutions: l’Institut Français des Etudes et Sciences Islamiques (Ile de France, www.ifesi.fr); l’Institut Avicenne des Sciences Humaines (Lille, www.avicenne.eu); and l’Institut Européen des Sciences Humaines (close to Nevers, www.iesh.fr). One needs also to mention the French branch of the International Institute of the Isla- mic Thought (IIIT) which offers a broad programme in Islamic studies (fiqh, theology, ulum ad dîn), including sociology of religions.49 This institute opened in 2000 and works as an open university (lectures are given in the afternoon or during the week end). It organises different workshops and Islamic meetings every year. The institute is also a publishing house which publishes books on Islamic theology and jurisprudence, including translations from English to French. A specific programme for imams opened in September 2008 in the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at the Institut Catholique de Paris, a private Catholic faculty. It is a Diplôme Universitaire course, meaning a two-year study programme at higher education level, with the course title: Interculturalité, Laïcité et Religions (Interculturalism, Secularism and Religions). Although the Grande Mosquée de Paris is sending its imams there for further training, not all Muslim institutions find this situation acceptable. Finally, a Masters in Law and Religious Studies with a specialisation in Islamic studies has started at the Faculty of Law of the University of Strasbourg, in September 2009.50 This is the first degree programme in Islamic studies to be offered in a state university in France. Another master’s degree in Islamic studies was started in September 2010, with a more cultural approach: “Islamic and Semitic Worlds” in Aix en Provence.51

49 www.iiitfrance.net, accessed 12 December 2010. 50 “Sciences et droit des religions”, spécialité “islamologie: religion, droit et société”, Faculté de droits, sciences économiques et gestion de l’Université de Strasbourg, http:// islamologie-strasbourg.fr/, accessed 12 December 2010. 51 http://www.iremam.univ-provence.fr/spip.php?article92, accessed 12 December 2010. 210 anne-laure zwilling

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Cemeteries in France (apart from the exception of Alsace-Moselle) are neutral spaces: the Law of November 14, 1881 forbids the mayors to create in a cemetery separate spaces limited by a wall or a hedge, in order to group tombs according to religious belonging. Circulars issued by the Ministry of the Interior (25 November 1975; 14 Feb- ruary 1991; and 19 February 2008), recommended, nevertheless, that prefects and mayors should reserve specific areas for Muslims in cemeteries, while avoiding any physical separation of the allocated space. However, it is not up to the mayor to establish the religion of the deceased; only the will of the deceased or his family can be taken into account. Therefore, a mayor could not oppose a Christian asking to be buried in a Muslim section of the cemetery, for instance. This is a problem for the Muslim community in France, though it suits families of mixed religious belongings. Three Muslim cemeteries exist in France (the oldest is in Bobigny, close to Paris; its construction was allowed because it has initially been built for the French Muslim hospital of Bobigny. It has become a public cemetery only in 1996). Around 70 Muslim sections in cemeteries have, nevertheless, been opened in major cities such as Montpellier and Marseille. 25 of them are located around Paris. An agreement was signed in October 2009 for the building of a publicly run Muslim cemetery in Strasbourg, by the Mayor of Strasbourg (Roland Ries), the president of the CFCM (Mohammed Moussaoui), and the president of the Conseil régional du culte musulman d’Alsace (Driss Ayachour). The cemetery has been open since 2010.52 One can only be buried in a Muslim space if one has lived or died in the municipality where it is located. Therefore, for 85% of Muslims who die in France, the deceased is sent back to the country of origin for burial. This practice is often encouraged by Arab countries, such as Tunisia, which financially takes in charge of the repatriation of its citizens. The European Council for Fatwa and Research, supported by the UOIF, has declared in favour of burial in the homeland; Muslim undertakers in France expect a change in the years to come, in favour of burial in France.53

52 http://www.nationspresse.info/?p=103689, accessed 13 December 2010. 53 “Mourir loin du bled”, Le Monde, 8 September 2006. france 211

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The French law codes of education and health and the penal code permit the provision of chaplains. These people mostly work on a voluntary basis and have no real legal status. The CFCM has nominated head chaplains for hospitals, schools and prisons, but this remains an internal recognition. Chaplaincy has a legal status only in the army. Since March 2005, a Muslim head chaplain has been appointed by the Minister of Defence, along with the three existing head chaplains (Catholic, Protestant and Jewish). The head chaplains nominate and manage the military chaplains of their own religious groups.

9 Religious Festivals

France, claiming to be a secular republic, never has state-organised religious festivals or feasts. Muslim religious holidays are not recognised by the state. Public holidays, given the historical importance of Catholicism in France, follow the Christian calendar (Easter, Christ- mas, etc.). Official departments and agencies, state schools and employers nevertheless grant leave of absence to Muslims who wish to attend religious ceremonies on occasions such as ‘Id al-Adha, ‘Id al-Fitr and Mawlid, and the Discipline générale militaire (internal regulations of the army) now accepts to grant leave of absence for such religious feasts.54

10 Halal Food

Eating halal in France is becoming increasingly common. Halal food is nowadays commonly found in supermarkets, and some have even launched their own halal trade mark (Carrefour Halal or Wassila for the Casino group). Specialised shops also exist and halal business seems to work well (the market represents perhaps over 3 billion Euros). The Direction générale de l’alimentation believes that 12% of cattle and 49% of the sheep are slaughtered according to religious prescriptions, even

54 http://www.formation.terre.defense.gouv.fr/PJ/Documents/VotreEspace/ Savoirvivre/references/decret_discipline_generale_militaire.pdf, accessed 13 Decem- ber 2010. 212 anne-laure zwilling though Muslim and Jewish believers are at most 7% of French population. The fast food chain Quick has started to offer halal burgers, drawing some reaction. As in most European countries, exceptions for ritual slaughter have been made to the Rural Law Code55 and to the European code,56 and the state has given official consent for this to the Paris Mosque (1994) and Lyon and Evry mosques (1995). The debate on exemption from stunning an animal does not raise much interest outside animal welfare circles. Thus, even though the main Islamic organisations (leaders of the Mosques of Paris and of Lyon, or of the Union of Islamic Organisations of France) accept stunning in principle, exemption for ritual slaughter has not been challenged.57 The local authorities usually try to facilitate the organisation of halal slaughter. In 2007 the UOIF set a service of control and certification of halal food, “Halal Services”. Private associations such as A Votre Ser- vice (AVS, www.halal-avs.com) are intended to make sure that halal processes are properly monitored and provide information concerning halal food. Muslim associations, however, often point out that, because there is no legal definition of halal, fraud is quite common. Some claim, for instance, that over 90% of the meat sold under the halal label is not the result of ritual slaughter. The situation reached a its climax with the airing of a television documentary in October 2010 (http:// www.cfcm.tv/2010/10/15/halal-de-france-reportage/). An association of information and defence of the Muslim consumers (Asidcom) was founded in 2006; it led in 2009 a survey on certification agencies available on its website.58 A survey issued by IFOP in December 200959 shows that some 59% of Muslims buy halal meat (the number reaches 71% for migrants of the first generation, while younger people are only 47%). 49% of

55 Rural Law Code, article R 214-73 to 75, derogation 1980–1981, decrees 80–791 et 81–606. 56 Rule # 1099/2009 of the EEC on protection of slaughtered animals, to be applied in 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/welfare/slaughter/regulation_1099_2009_ fr.pdf, accessed 13 December 2010. 57 Bergeaud-Blackler, Florence, “New Challenges for Islamic Ritual Slaughter: A European Perspective”, in Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33, no. 6, August 2007, pp. 965–980. 58 http://www.asidcom.org/IMG/pdf/Halal_certification_agencies-ASIDCOM_ survey.pdf, accessed 13 December 2010. 59 http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/1045-1-study_file.pdf, accessed 13 December 2010. france 213 consumers claim to “buy more halal food than a few years ago”. 91% of people attending the mosque on Fridays eat halal food, but 44% of non-goers also eat halal.60 The practice seems more related to cultural habits and upbringing, or to the conviction that halal food will be better quality, than to religious concerns.

11 Dress Codes

The head scarf issue suddenly emerged in the public arena during the 1980s with the increased use—or at least increased visibility—of different types of head coverings worn by young Muslim girls in public places. Because of some local difficulties, the French President set up an investigative committee known as the Commission Stasi in July 2003. This Commission released a report on 11 December 2003, stating that wearing conspicuous religious symbols violated the secular principle of the French school system. On this basis, the law on secularism and religious symbols in state schools was passed in February 2004. Article 1 of the law states: “The wearing of symbols and apparel by which a student conspicuously expresses religious affiliation in public schools is prohibited. The rules of procedure provide for conciliatory dialogue before disciplinary action is taken against an offending student.” This decision was followed by extensive debate as to its interpretation and application, but passions have nowadays settled. Another report was issued in 2004, on the manifestations of religious affiliation in schools.61 New regulations concerning photos used for passports and national identity cards required that the head must appear without any kind of cover, decoration or scarf; there are no exceptions. There were some protests, arguing that a woman wearing a hijab should not appear without it, even on a photo, but this did not really lead to an intense public debate. In 2008 and 2009, after the head scarf, the burqa or niqab became the object of public debate. An investigative committee on the wearing

60 http://www.ifop.fr/media/pressdocument/154-1-document_file.pdf, accessed 13 December 2010. 61 Obin, Jean-Pierre, “Les signes et manifestations d’appartenance religieuse dans les établissements scolaires”, in Rapport au ministre de l’éducation nationale, juin 2004 (2004–115), available at ftp://trf.education.gouv.fr/pub/edutel/syst/igen/rapports/ rapport_obin.pdf, accessed 12 November 2009. 214 anne-laure zwilling of the burqa in France was set up in June 2008.62 The French Senate issued in September 2009 a report on “le port de la burqa dans les lieux publics”.63 The Ministry of Interior tried to estimate the number of women wearing a burqa; two information notes give the numbers 367 (Direction centrale du renseignement intérieur) and 2000 (Sous-direction de l’information générale). The frenzy reached a peak in 2010, with three reports issued: on wearing the full face cover (niqab),64 on banning the niqab,65 and on religious expression in public spaces.66 Finally, a law banning face-coverings in public places was enacted in October 2010 to come into force in March 2011.67 Public opinion was apparently in favour of such a ban: 57% of people agreeing on the ban according to a survey for Le Point in January 2010,68 64% according to one done for the Europe 1 radio in April 2010.69

12 Publication and Media

The broadcasting of religious programmes on public television stations is covered by the law on the freedom of communication No. 86-1067 of 30 September 1986, article 56: “France 2 schedules religious programmes devoted to the main religions practised in France on Sunday mornings. Said programmes shall be produced under the responsibility of the representatives of said religions and be presented in the form of the live transmission of cultural ceremonies or religious

62 Mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire national, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/dossiers/voile_integral.asp, accessed 12 November 2009. 63 See “Wearing the burka in public spaces”, available at http://www.senat.fr/lc/ lc201/lc201.pdf, accessed 12 November 2009. 64 Raoult, Eric, Rapport de la mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire national, available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/ rap-info/i2262.asp, accessed 13 December 2010. 65 Conseil d’Etat, Étude relative aux possibilités juridiques d’interdiction du port du voile intégral, available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/cde/node.php?articleid=2000, accessed 13 December 2010. 66 Haut conseil à l’intégration, Recommandations au Premier ministre relatives à l’expression religieuse dans les espaces publics de la République, http://eurel.info/ telechargement/FR_rapportHCI2010.pdf, accessed 13 December 2010. 67 Law No. 2010–1192 of 11 October 2010, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affich Texte.do;jsessionid=06BC8927D9E58A1400D7DC9EE35D298B.tpdjo13v_2?cidTexte =JORFTEXT000022911670&dateTexte=, accessed 13 December 2010. 68 IPSOS, http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/articles/2969.asp, accessed 13 December 2010. 69 TNS Sofres, http://www.tns-sofres.com/_assets/files/2010.04.24-burqua.pdf, accessed 13 December 2010. france 215

comments. The company shall bear the costs of production within the limit of a maximum amount set in the annual provisions of the terms of reference.”70 The amended decree No. 92-280 of 27 March 1992 lays down the rules regarding the broadcasting of advertisements during religious programmes. A 30-minute programme on Islam, Connaître l’islam (Knowing Islam) (France 2, 7 Esplanade Henri de France, 75907 Paris cedex 15), is broadcast every Sunday. A very large number of Muslim television channels are accessible by satellite. A number of printed publications concerning Islam have existed in France for some time: La Médina, Hawwa-Magazine, Réflexions- Reflets de l’Islam en France, Colombus, Actualis (UOIF), Sézame, Islam de France. They all closed down for financial reasons. One could have thought the future was in electronic publications, but a blog such as Hanut-ul-muslim closed after less than a year of existence. We have also to point out the increasing importance and number of Muslim websites, such as oumma.com, one of the most famous, saphir news (www.saphirnews.com) or salam news (www.salamnews.fr/), or Islam en France (http://lislamdefrance.fr/).

13 Family Law

The French legal system is an entirely secular one and religious affiliation is not relevant in legal matters. However, jurisprudence does sometimes take into account questions of religious affiliation and practice (in matters such as holidays for religious festivals, for example). In 2005, the French government raised the legal age of marriage for girls to 18 (it had been 15 for nearly 200 years). This was to counter the practice of arranged marriage. Chantal Brunel, a right-wing deputy (UMP—Union pour un Mouvement Populaire), proposed a law against polygamy in June 2004,71 and the issue regularly arises in public debate. This question will certainly have to be dealt with when Mayotte, which recognises polygamy since Muslim family law applies there, eventually will become a French department (this is scheduled for 2011).

70 http://misha1.u-strasbg.fr/doris/doc/ILEGI/860930.pdf, accessed 13 December 2010. 71 http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/propositions/pion1645.asp, accessed 12 November 2009. 216 anne-laure zwilling

14 Interreligious Relations

Many initiatives of religious dialogue exist, of national or local interest. There are far too many to provide a list here. On the national level, one can for instance name the Islamo-Christian research group (http://www.gric.asso.fr), or the journal Chemins de dialogue (paths of dialogue).72 Marseille-espérance (Marseille-Hope)73 is an interesting local initiative. All the leaders of the different religious groups of the city of Marseille have come together in this committee, providing the mayor with a structure allowing dialogue with all religions at once. Officially, there are no tensions between the religious communities in France. Difficulties certainly exist at the local level, but the official motto seems to be for all to “live together in peace and dialogue”, illustrated by initiatives such as cherchons la paix (looking for peace, http://www .cherchonslapaix.fr/). The Palestinian conflict, nevertheless, did raise some tensions between Jews and Muslims. All religious national leaders, however, including the Grand Rabbi of France, Gilles Berheim, took part in the supper organised by the CFCM for the end of Ramadan together with the President of the Bishops’ Conference, Monseigneur André Vingt- Trois and the president of the Fédération protestante de France, Rev- erend Claude Baty. An initiative of the Jewish community, the bus of Jewish-Muslim friendship, has travelled throughout France since 2005.74 Finally, the leaders of the main religious groups in France (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist and Orthodox) met for the first time, on 23 November 2010, in Paris. They declared that they intended to hold such meetings on a regular basis, with a view to issuing common statements on matters of social and ethical importance.75

72 http://istr-marseille.cef.fr/pages/chemins-de-dialogue.htm, accessed 13 Decem- ber 2010. 73 http://www.marseille.fr/sitevdm/jsp/site/Portal.jsp?page_id=689, accessed 13 December 2010. 74 http://www.judaicultures.info/Le-Bus-de-l-amitie-judeo-musulmane.html, accessed 13 December 2010. 75 http://www.protestants.org/index.php?id=23&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=988&tx_ ttnews[year]=2010&tx_ttnews[month]=11&cHash=2e0e55b176, accessed 13 Decem- ber 2010. france 217

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Public opinion has mostly focused on the question of religious symbols, specifically clothing. For example, theHaute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité (High Authority against Discrimination and for Equality—HALDE) recently had to deal with questions of wearing the burka, and of some pupils’ parents wearing a head scarf when taking part in school outings. Issues related to gender always lead to discussion (special opening hours in swimming pools for women or men only, for example). The question of religious practice regarding food is also an issue, especially in schools, but the debate is not very intense. It was recently livened up by the fast food chain Quick offering halal burgers, but this did not lead to intense discussion. Also in the field of religious symbols, the debate on the building of minarets in Switzerland has stirred some passions in France. Several surveys were conducted,76 mostly showing that French are divided on the question, 46% opposing construction of mosques and 40% accepting them, while 14% do not answer. The tensions are seemingly on the increase, 19% of people only saying that mosques are to be built if the Muslim community asks for them, while 33% were of this opinion in 1989; during the same time, opponents were 38% in 1989, 31% in 1994, 22% in 2001 but are 41% in 2009. Minarets raise more passions than mosques: 46% would agree to ban their construction, while only 41% are against the building of a mosque.77 More than Islam itself, the public visibility of Islam seems to challenge the French. Some signs of tension between Muslims and non-Muslims are noticeable. In a 2007 poll, 57% of French people said they would rather “not have a Muslim as neighbour”.78 A certain openness, at the same time, can be perceived: according to a survey for Metro, February

76 IFOP survey on the French and building minarets in France, les Français et la construction des mosquées et des minarets en France, http://www.ifop.fr/?option=com_ publication&type=poll&id=1000&utm_source=feedburner&utm_ medium=email, accessed 15 December 2009. 77 IFOP survey, December 2009, http://www.ifop.fr/?option=com_publication &type=poll&id=1000&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium =email, accessed 7 December 2009. 78 Borooah, V.K., K. Vani, and Mangan, J., “Love thy neighbour: how much bigotry is there in western countries?”, in Kyklos, International Review for Social Sciences, vol. 60, no. 3 (August 2007), pp. 295–317. 218 anne-laure zwilling

2010, 54% of people interviewed said they would not be disturbed by a colleague wearing a head scarf.79 Such an attitude remains weak: when the left-winger Olivier Besancenot said he was supporting a candidate wearing a head scarf for regional elections, Ilham Moussaïd, reactions in the political world were very negative.80 On the whole, however, a majority of French (54%) affirm that being a Muslim is compatible with living in the French society.81

16 Major Cultural Events

The UOIF organises an annual meeting of French Muslims Rencontre( Annuelle des Musulmans de France). The 27th meeting took place in April 2010 in Le Bourget and gathered around 150,000 people, as in 2009; some 115,000 people participated in 2008. In Marseille, the Muslim community regularly organises a festival, l’Aïd dans la Cité (‘Id in the city) just before ‘Id. The 7th meeting took place in November 2010 and has included concerts, art exhibitions, conferences, theatre, and many other cultural or artistic events.82 The big Ramadan (legrand Ramdam)83 is an initiative of the Ministry of Culture and Communication, and took place in the park of la Vil- lette and the Cité de la musique. 18,000 visitors came for a festival of music from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Tea and dates were offered in the evening. Many Senegalese Muslims in France belong to a Sufi order, the main one being the Tijaniya. A meeting of members of this order takes place every year in Mantes-la-Jolie (near Paris), and gathers up to 5,000 members coming to meet their shaykh.

79 http://www.metrofrance.com/info/le-triomphe-de-la-diversite/pjbg!6pz2Ns6K@ tWbNd7GexN78w/, accessed 13 December 2010. 80 Le Nouvel Observateur, vendredi 5 février 2010, http://www.fairelejour.org/spip .php?article2114, accessed 13 December 2010. 81 CSA survey on the French and the place of religion in the French society, December 2009, http://www.csa-fr.com/dataset/data2009/opi20091203-les-francais- et-la-place-de-la-religion-dans-la-societe-francaise.pdf, accessed 13 December 2010. 82 http://www.ufm13.org/accueil.html, accessed 13 December 2010. 83 http://www.lefigaro.fr/sortir-paris/2010/08/26/03013-20100826ARTFIG00427- le-grand-ramdam-un-voyage-musical-au-maghreb-gratuit.php, accessed 13 December 2010. GEORGIA

Satenik Mkrtchyan1

1 Muslim Populations

Georgia has been a majority Christian country for centuries and has remained so through periods of Muslim rule and longer periods of having immediate Muslim neighbours. Nevertheless, Georgia has long had a significant Muslim population.2 The first Muslims appeared in Tiflis as far back as the second half of the 7th century, at the time of the Arab conquests. For centuries (especially during the 8th–early 12th) the Muslims played a leading political and economic role in the life of the city.3 In the Middle Ages and early modern period, due to intensive contact between Georgia and the Islamic world Islam was widely introduced to Georgia. In addition, Turkic speaking Muslims began to move into the country, migrants who became known as ‘Tatars’ in the Tsarist era and would then be reclassified as ‘Azerbai- janis’ during the Soviet era. By the end of the imperial period, the population of Georgia was 20% Muslim. While the Russian imperial authorities were usually tolerant of Georgia’s Muslims, Soviet authorities were considerably less so. The militantly atheistic Soviet state launched a campaign against religious institutions and ecclesiastical authorities in the 1920’s and 1930’s but reached an accommodation with the USSR’s traditional religions during the Second World War. Of the four Muslim Reli- gious Boards to oversee Muslim affairs in the USSR, one for the entire South Caucasus region was based in Baku (Azerbaijan).4 Georgia, like other parts of the Soviet Union, witnessed a notable ‘Islamic revival’

1 Satenik Mkrtchya is a PhD student at Iv. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Georgia, and works as a researcher at the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnology, National Academy of Sciences, Armenia. 2 Sanikidze, G., and Walker, W. (Ed.), ‘Islam and Islamic practices in Georgia’, BPS Working Paper Series, University of California, Berkeley, 2004, p. 3. 3 G. Asatrian, and H. Margarian, “The Muslim Community of Tiflis (8th–9th centuries)”, Iran and The Caucasus, N 8.1; 2004; 29–52, p. 29. 4 Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic practices in Georgia, p. 46. 220 satenik mkrtchyan in the Gorbachev era and the early post-Soviet period5 mainly through a renewal of ties with foreign, especially Turkish and Iranian Islamic organisations.6 Georgian scholars have estimated that the number of ‘Muslims’ in the republic in 1989 was as high as 640,000, or 12% of the total population at the time (5.4 million). However, the 1989 Soviet census did not inquire into religious identity or practices, and the number of Muslims used to be deduced with reference to traditionally Muslim nationalities in the republic. There are also other Muslims, particularly Georgians in the Autonomous Republic of Ajara in Georgia’s southwest. The reliability of the other census conducted in 2002, which included a question on religion, remains questionable given the extent of disorder in the country at the time.7 According to this census8 the number of Mus- lims in Georgia was 433,784, which constituted 9.9 per cent out of the total population. Apart from the census data, different estimates are given by the mass media, Muslim community and academic circles. According to one of the estimates, the total number of Muslims in Georgia is 300,000.9 The European Stability Initiative gives the number of 430,000 Muslims living in Georgia,10 while Azerbaijani mass media provide the number of 500,000 Muslims in Georgia,11 the same number given by the Tbilisi mosque representative.12

5 Sanikidze and Walker, ‘Islam and Islamic practices in Georgia’, p. 46. 6 B. Balci and R. Motika, ‘Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia’, Central Asian Survey (Sep- tember 2007) 26(3), 335–353, p. 335. 7 Sanikidze and Walker, ‘Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia’, p. 5., Balci, B., and Motika, R, ‘Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia’, Central Asian Survey (September 2007) 26(3), 335–353, p. 338. 8 The 2002 census did not include Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. 9 Х. Баиндурашвили, Ислам в посткоммунистическом Тбилиси, Человек постсоветсткого пространства: Сборник материалов конференции. Выпуск 3 / Под ред. В.В. Парцвания.—СПб.: Санкт-Петербургское философское общество, 2005.—С.85–91 (Kh. Baindurashvili, “Islam in post-Communist Tbilisi” in V. Parts- vania (ed.), The Human-being of the post-Soviet Space. (St. Petersburg: Philosophical Union of St. Petersburg, 2005), pp. 85–91 (87). 10 http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=321&country_ID=1&slide_ID=1, accessed 08 November 2010. 11 http://open.az/index.php?newsid=15826, accessed 08 November 2010. 12 N. Popuashvili, “Islam” in Z. Kiknadze (ed.), Religions in Georgia. (Tbilisi: Public Defender’s Office, 2008). pp. 336–364. georgia 221

In Georgia, there are strong correlations between ethnic groups and religious affiliations, and often, geographic areas13 which is significant in terms of defining the main characteristics of Islamic practices. This is most clearly the case with the Azerbaijanis, the biggest among the Muslim communities (approximately 284,761, or 6.1% of the population according to the 2002 census), comprising the largest ethnic minority group.14 They are largely Muslim and most of them live in the south eastern region of Kvemo Kartli, constituting there a majority. Some 15,65415 live in Tbilisi, and 33,600 reside in the eastern region of Kakhetia. The majority of Azerbaijanis in Georgia belong to the Shi’i branch of Islam, although in the Kvemo Kartli religion is rather weak.16 The other major Muslim group consists of the ethnic Georgian Mus- lims of Ajara. According to the 2006 estimates by the Department of Statistics, 63% of the Ajara population are Georgian Orthodox Chris- tians and 30% Muslim, predominantly Sunnis. Another source, based on the results of the 2002 census, mentions the number of 131,536 for Muslim population in Western Georgia, which include Ajara, Chokha- tauri, Ozurgeti, Khobi regions of the country.17 Besides, the two major groups mentioned there are other small Muslim ethnic groups: a portion of the Abkhaz population,18 Kists,19 Avars, Tatars, Kazakhs,

13 US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 2009: Georgia, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127311.htm, accessed 08 November 2010. 14 Azerbaijanian sources often speak about 500,000 Azerbaijani population in Geor- gia based on the “unofficial” sources. (http://en.trend.az/news/society/diaspora/1613337 .html, accessed 08 November 2010.) 15 Sanikidze, though, mentions this number equal to 18,000 (see in Sanikidze and Walker, ‘Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia’, p. 21.) 16 J. Weattley, ‘Obstacles Impeding the Regional Integration of the Kvemo Kartli Region of Georgia’, ECMI Working Paper #23, February 2005, p. 5. 17 თ. შიოშვილი, რ. ბარამიძე, მ. ჭიჭილეიშვილი, ჯ. ვარშალომიძე, გ. მახარაშვილი, ყქართველი მულსიმები თანამედროების კონტექსტში (ბათუმიღ ნიკო ბერძენიშვილის ინსტიტუტი, 2010) (T. Shioshvili, R. Bar- amidze, G. Nizharadze, M. Chichileishvili, J. Varshalomidze, G. Makharashvili, “The Georgian Muslims in the context of modernity” (Batumi: Niko Berdzenishvili Insti- tute, 2010)), p. 9. 18 Abkhazians were in part converted to Islam throughout the 17th and 18th centuries under the Ottoman domination. Islam has been weak and also mixed with Christian and pre-Christian elements there, though connections with Muslim communities in the North Caucasus, as well as the return of the descendants of the muha- jirs (Muslim population who had massively left Georgia during the Tsarist period and later during the Soviet period) from Turkey, appear to have resulted in a modest increase in the role of Islam among the Abkhaz Nevertheless, there is little evidence 222 satenik mkrtchyan

Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kurds. A population of some 100,000 Meskhets was deported by Stalin from the south-west during the Second World War. The 2002 census counted about 1000 Meskhets, but it is expected that a 2006 law of repatriation will increase that number. There are also Muslims, citizens of other countries such as Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, etc., who are in Georgia, mainly in the capital Tbilisi, working in diplomatic missions, for business and tourism.19

2 Islam and the State

The Georgian Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, thought, conscience, belief and religion, and prohibits persecution on the basis of the expression of opinions or thoughts and on the basis of religion or belief (Article 19, paragraph 2). These freedoms are also protected by Georgia’s Criminal Code (Articles 115, 155 and 156), which also penalises unlawful interference through violence, the threat of violence or misuse of authority in the setting up for activities of political, social or religious organisations (Article 166). However, the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) has a dominant position and has particular relations established between it and the State. Article 9 of the constitution states that, “The state recognises the special importance of the GOC in Georgian history but simultaneously announces complete

of the presence of Islamist extremists in the region (See in B. Balci, “Is there a place for Islam?” in Mikheil Saakashvili, Christian Georgia[1/3]”, http://www.caucaz.com/ home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=177, accessed 08 November 2010, Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, p. 21.) Currently Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain outside the control of the central Government, and reliable information from those regions was difficult to obtain, however according to a survey in 2003 16% of the respondents reported to be Muslim. There is no mosque in Abkhazia, awareness of Islam is low and Muslim practices are held modestly. (See in Ал. Крылов, Единая вера Абхазских “Христиан” и “Мусульман”. Особенности религиозного сознания в современной Абхазии, Н. Лежава (ред.), Роль православия в государствах и обществах Грузии и Росии (Тбилиси: Генрих Белл Фонд, 2004), стр. 104–121 (106) (A. Krylov, Common Face of Abkhazian “Christian” and “Muslim”.) Specifications of Religious Consciousness in Modern Abkhazia in N. Lejava (ed.) Role of Orthodoxy in the States and Societies of Georgia and Russia, Materials of Georgian-Russian Confer- ence. (Tbilisi: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2004) pp. 238–249 (238–241). 19 They live mostly in and around the Pankisi Gorge villages in Georgia’s northeast: Jokolo, Birkiani, Omalo, Middle and Upper Xalatsani, Duisi. The 2002 census gives 7,110 as the number of Kists living in Georgia, while the 1989 census suggests the number 5,455. (See in N. Sardjveladze, N. Shushania, l. Melikishvili, and M. Baliash- vili, Tolerance in Multiethnic Georgia: Training Methodology Manual for Educators, (Tbilisi: Mtsignobari, 2009), p. 33.) georgia 223 freedom of religious belief and the independence of the church from the state.” The 2002 concordat between the government and the GOC gives the patriarch immunity, provides GOC clergy exemption from military service, allows only the GOC the right to staff the military chaplaincy, and grants the GOC a consultative role in government, and other privileges, which are denied to other religious denominations and groups. While the Georgian Orthodox Church is recognised and protected as both a Church and a public entity, other religious groups can only register20 as non-governmental organisations or non-profit-making private-law associations. This means that religious organisations gain registration only as non-commercial entities, a status that some religious communities—among them the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Catholic Church and the Muslims—regard as demeaning. How- ever, one Muslim organisation, the Congress of Georgian Muslims received registration on 2 September 2005.21

3 Main Muslim Organisations

In Tbilisi, the Iman (Faith) foundation has an office right in front of the Tbilisi Jumma mosque (35, Botanikuri str., Tbilisi 0105, tel: +99532 721786).22 It organises Islamic courses, houses a library of Shi’i literature translated from Persian and a conference room, where religious events take place. The director follows the instructions of amarja’ al-taqlid, in this case the Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran.23 Another foundation called Ahli Beyt is active in Marneuli and has an office in Tbilisi (10, Kalandadze, Tbilisi 0114, tel: +99558 618653, +99593 966966). Aside from Arabic lessons and Shi’i theology, it offers lessons in English, computer literacy and

20 Registration of religious organisations became possible—for the first time in 15 years—after parliament on 6 April 2005 approved amendments to the Civil Code, allowing religious communities to register with the Ministry of Justice. President Mikheil Saakashvili signed the amendments into law on 27 April. 21 F. Corley, “Georgia: Religious minorities still second-class faiths?”, November 2005, Forum 18 News Service, http://www.forum18.org. 22 During the personal interview, the director declared that the organisation acts independently, though he emphasised the close connections with Iman Foundation and its great support while setting up the local organisation. (Interview conducted by Irakli Pipia, 27 March, 2010). 23 Balci, “Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia”, pp. 343–344. 224 satenik mkrtchyan

Georgian in order to help young people to integrate into independent Georgia. It belongs to the international network of another marja’ at-taqlid, namely the Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hoseyni as-Sistani of Najaf.24 A Fund for Muslim Revival has been operating in Tbilisi with the aim of fundraising for restoration activities of the mosque and addressing various needs of believers.25 Another Shi’i scholar with growing influence is Fadil Lankarani.26 Since the late 1980s, in Ajara as in other parts of the former Soviet Union and South-Eastern Europe, Turkish transnational religious movements mixing trade, business and mission, have encouraged the re-Islamisation of the formerly Muslim peoples.27 Currently, most of these Turkish movements and Islamic institutions operate without registration either with the Administration of the Muslims of the Cau- casus based in Baku, or with the Georgian Ministry of Justice, and have an uncertain status preferring to work with their local partners in small madrasas (locally known as medresses).28 In the early 1990s, in parallel with the existing Muslim Religious Board (dukhovnoe upravlenie) of Transcaucasia (with its centre in Baku), the Muslim Religious Board of Ajara-Muftiate was created, situated in the only mosque in Batumi, to be independent from the mentioned Board of Transcaucasia. However, officially the Muslim Religious Board of Transcaucasia has not been cancelled, and currently Tbilisi is the residency of the official representative of the Board. After the Rose revolution in Georgia, the Ajaran Muftiate has undergone restructuring and a change of leader. Since 2004, the Muftiate has been working on the legal basis of a new charter, which establishes a hierarchical structure of central, regional, and local muftis with their personnel and council (majlis).29

24 Ibid. 25 Baindurashvili, “Islam in post-Communist Tbilisi”, p. 90. 26 B. Balci, “Is there a place for Islam in Mikheil Saakashvili Christian Georgia? [2/3]”, http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=179, accessed 12 December 2009. 27 Balci, “Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia”, pp. 347–348. 28 For the description of the movements called Süleymancıs with their Koranic schools, Nurcus with their madrasas active in Tbilisis, Batumi, Kutaisi (See in Balci, “Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia”, pp. 347–349). 29 Р. Барамидзе. “Ислам в Аджарии” Азербаиджан в Мире 4 (6) 2006, pp. 86–93, (87–88) (R. Baramidze, Islam in Ajara“ Azerbaijan in the World 4 (6) 2006, pp. 86–93 (87–88)). georgia 225

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

According to a recent publication by the Public Defender’s Office of Georgia (2008), there are 286 mosques and prayer houses in Georgia; another five are under construction. However, some mosques (prayer houses) have been functioning with uncertain status and without registration, a fact which makes it difficult to give an accurate figure. Moreover in some parts of the Muslim communities (e.g. mountain- ous parts of Ajara) there are also local religious schools, so called madrasas by the locals, which also serve as prayer houses (see details in section 5). Similarly, in Ajaran Muslim communities various buildings and places serve as prayer houses, possibly more than 100.30 According to the chief editor of the Azerbaijani magazine Gurjistan, during the years of independence, in Georgia more than 30 mosques have been built and many others have been renovated counting up to around 160 operating mosques currently.31 In Tbilisi there is one mosque called Jumma, where both Shi’i and Sunni Muslims of Georgia as well as Muslim guests of the capital attend Friday worship.32 Another mosque is now being built in Tbilisi, at the entrance to the city.33 In Batumi (the regional centre of Ajara), there is one operating mosque with a minaret built in the beginning of 2000s, which is open every day. The exact number of mosques in Ajara or Western Georgia varies from source to source. Thus, the website of the government of Autonomous Republic of Ajara mentions about eleven mosques in the Ajara, Khulo, Shuakhveri, and Kobuleti regions.34 According to a recent publication, the Muftiate of Ajara has 95 mosque schools, 41 mosques, 18 colleges (uchilish’a), and two others.35 According to another recent Georgian publication,

30 Р. Барамидзе, “Ислам и его особенности в Аджарии”, Идентичность, власть и город в работах молодых ученых Южного Кавказа. Сборник статей. Ред. Н. Лежава. Тбилиси.: Фонд им. Генрича Белля, 2005, pp. 39–70 (48) (R. Baramidze, “Islam and its Peculiarities in Ajara” in N. Lejava (ed.), Identity, Power and City in the works of the Young scholars of The South Caucasus (Tbilisi: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2005) pp. 39–70, (48)). 31 Interview conducted by the author, January 2010. 32 By 1996 Shi’is and Sunnis used to pray in the mosque separated by a curtain, but upon the arrival of a new Imam, Shi’i Ali Aliev, the curtain was removed. 33 Interview conducted by the author, December, 2009. 34 http://www.adjara.gov.ge/eng/index.php?page=about, accessed 08 November 2010. 35 რ. ბარამიე, სასულიერო სამუსლიმანო გაერთიანების ორგანიზაციისა და ფუნქციონირების თავისებურებანი აჭარაში,. (R. Baramidze, “Peculiarities 226 satenik mkrtchyan

128 mosques, 17 prayer houses and 25 seasonal mosques operate in Western Georgia.36 The Marneuli mosque, which opened a few years ago, is now the biggest in Georgia. There are mosques in other cities of eastern Georgia as well, including Mskhaldidi, Dmanisi and Bolnisi. Recently, another mosque is being built near Gori, as well as the construction of the mosque in Telavari village (Bolnisi region) has been resumed this year.37 Many Azerbaijani villages are also home to holy shrines and pilgrimage sites, and the worship of saints (or holy persons) is widespread.

5 Children’s Εducation

All citizens of Georgia, Muslim or Christian, go to the general, private or public schools, where curriculum does not include a compulsory course on religion. There are Georgian, Russian, Azerbaijani and Armenian schools based on the language of instruction. Azerbaijanis traditionally have been more included in Russian and Azerbaijani schools than in Georgian schools. According to Article 13 (2) of the Law on General Education 2005, religious indoctrination, proselytising and enforced assimilation are not allowed to be part of the education process in schools. The Ministry of Education has decided to prepare new textbooks describing the different religions in neutral terms, and to arrange to carry out regular monitoring of the work of the teachers concerned38 to ensure full respect for the right to freedom of religion of persons belonging to minorities. Georgian law has no provision for regulating Muslim religious educational establishments and does not recognise documents and certificates issued by them. However as mentioned in the previous

of Functioning and Organisation of the Muslim Religious Union in Ajara”) http:// www.islam.ge/rf/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11:2009-12-01- 14-13-08&catid=9:2009-09-30-07-11-30&Itemid=11&lang=ka, accessed 08 November 2010. 36 თ. შიოშვილი, რ. ბარამიძე, მ. ჭიჭილეიშვილი, ჯ. ვარშალომიძე, გ. მახარაშვილი, ყქართველი მულსიმები თანამედროების კონტექსტში (ბათუმიღ ნიკო ბერძენიშვილის ინსტიტუტი, 2010) (T. Shioshvili, R. Bar- amidze, G. Nizharadze, M. Chichileishvili, J. Varshalomidze, G. Makharashvili, “The Georgian Muslims in the context of modernity” (Batumi: Niko berdzenishvili Insti- tute, 2010)), p. 467. 37 Interview with the Akhund of the Tbilisi mosque by I. Pipia. (November 2010). 38 COE Report, Opinion on Georgia, Public ACFC/OP/I(2009)001, Advisory Com- mittee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Stras- bourg, 10 October 2009. georgia 227 section, several educational units, so called madrasas, have been formed where people, mostly children, can get some elementary Islamic education. The new brotherhood descended from the Nurcu movement founded by Fethullah Gülen is present in Ajara, which, however, has autonomy. One of the four teaching establishments of the Gülen movement in Georgia is located in Batumi, the others are in Tbilisi and Kutaisi but none are recognised by the government. The main specificity of the Gülen group is that it gives priority to a modern secular education with an emphasis on scientific subjects, computing and English language. In the town of Batumi and the surrounding area, six small madrasas controlled by Georgians are today tuned into the Süleymanci tradition.39 Turkish religious influence is not limited to these private initiatives. The Department of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in Ankara regularly sends representatives to meet with the Muftiate. Through the consulate in Batumi, the Diyanet also spreads Islamic literature, occasionally sends religious personnel to preach in the mosques and is in charge of selecting students who wish to study theology in Turkey.40

6 Higher and Professional Education

In Soviet Georgia, Muslims had two options to get Islamic schooling: they either go to the Bukhara College or to the Tashkent Col- lege in Central Asia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, students from Georgia (as well as from all over the Caucasus) could get their education at the faculty of theology aimed at Turkish Sunnis and an Islamic university with Iranian Shiite leanings in Azerbaijan.41 Some young Shi’is of Georgia headed for Qom or Mashhad or to a lesser extent to Tehran or Qazwin to study theology. The Islamic University of Baku, which is dependent on the Administration of the Muslims of

39 The movement of the Turkish Islamist leader, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888– 1959), promotes “everything by the Qur’an, all for the Qur’an” and has actively campaigned for more Qur’anic schools across Georgia as well. 40 B. Balci, “Is there a place for Islam in Mikheil Saakashvili Christian Georgia? [3/3]” at http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=180, accessed 08 November 2010. 41 B. Balci, “Is there a place for Islam?” in Mikheil Saakashvili, Christian Georgia [1/3]” at http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=177, accessed 8 November 2010. 228 satenik mkrtchyan the Caucasus and follows the interpretations of Grand Ayatollah as- Sistani, has Azerbaijani students from Georgia.42 In Tbilisi a religious college for girls is operating whose instructors have studied in Qom (Iran).43 The Tbilisi Jumma mosque also has an operating madrasa. A small private faculty of theology has been operating in Tbilisi which was founded by a charity foundation from Iran, linked to the Iman foundation.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Burial rituals are one of those few Islamic practices somehow preserved during the Soviet period of ‘religious ignorance’, which in turn brought to overall modest or low religiosity.44 Currently, the Muslim population of Georgia conducts burials according to the main Mus- lim norms.45 All rural areas and those towns with significant Muslim population, either now or historically, have Muslim cemeteries. There are two Muslims cemeteries in Tbilisi. Very often in Ajara near to the mosque, which is generally situated in the central inhabited areas, are located the local family cemetery or a famous individual’s tomb.46

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Currently, law does not permit the activities of Muslim clergy in the armed forces, hospitals or prisons.

9 Religious Festivals

After the Rose Revolution in 2003 it has become a common practice for the President of Georgia or other members of Government

42 Balci, “Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia”, pp. 343–344. 43 http://open.az/index.php?newsid=15826, accessed 08 November 2010. 44 About religiosity issues regarding Muslims of Georgia see Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, pp. 6, 24. Saroyan, Rethinking Islam in the Soviet Union, p. 12, Balci and Motika, “Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia”, p. 346. 45 Interview conducted by the author, December 2009. 46 Details for burial ceremonies see in Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, pp. 14, 20, 24. Baramidze, “Islam and its Peculiarities in Ajara”, p. 49. georgia 229 to visit mosques and meet with Muslims on the celebrations of ‘Id al-Adha (Kurban-Bairam), the most popular and widely celebrated festival for the Muslim population of Georgia. These visits are usually covered intensively in the mass media. President Mikheil Saakashvili has visited Gardabani and Marneui regions to mark their festivals. In Ajara, the Chairman of the Government of Ajara, members of the Cabinet and other officials pay a visit either to the Batumi mosque or to other mosques. Such celebrations are usually marked by the ceremonial slaughter of animals. The Association of Aid for Georgian Youth, though not directly a Muslim organisation, has arranged to provide meat for poor families to be able to take part. Another holiday, Nowruz Bairam, which is celebrated by the Azerbaijanis of Georgia, is not a religious holiday itself, however, this holiday is perceived as mostly a Muslim holiday. On 23 March 2010, President Saakashvili signed a decree on declaring Nowruz (21 March) as a holiday.47 But none of the Muslim holidays have been declared as national holidays or officially recognised as non-working days. Other religious festivals and holidays are celebrated locally with different participation rates and publicity, either in mosques or separately in the families.48

10 Halal Food

The already mentioned modest religiosity of Georgian Muslims (see sections 7, 8 and 9), has had its impact on halal food norms among the wider part of the Muslim population. However, in cases when a family wants to obtain halal meat they would rather go to the open or indoor markets, where they would know traditionally who sells halal food. As to the rural population, they conduct their own slaughter. Addition- ally, in Tbilisi there are several restaurants and food shops owned by Muslims, significantly by Turks, who can offer halal food.

11 Dress Codes

No Muslim dress code is practised and women in hijab are not seen in the streets of Tbilisi or other towns, unless they are guests or

47 http://www.president.gov.ge/index.php?sec_id=252&lang_id=ENG&searchq= Nowrus+Bairam, accessed 15 November 2010. 48 See details in Sanikidze and Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, p. 14. 230 satenik mkrtchyan representatives of diplomatic missions. In the villages, women usually have the habit of covering the head with a scarf, especially the older part of the population.

12 Publication and Media

Recently eight “public boards” with an advisory role were set up, one of them to deal with religious issues.49 The local media for the Azerbaijani population includes religion in the broad range of themes. A regional television channel called Marneuli TV has programmes in Azerbai- jani, including a 20-minute weekly news programme. In its region, the Kvemo-Kartli channel offers programmes in Georgian and Azerbai- jani. Where private radio stations are concerned, Azerbaijanis have 30 minutes of news bulletins and an entertainment programme.50 The Muftiate of Ajara publishes daily magazine “Faith”Rtsmena ( ).51 There is one newspaper in Georgia published in Azerbaijani and financed by the State (along with the Armenian and Russian ones), Gurjistan, which is a continuation of the Soviet tradition. This is the most popular among the Azerbaijanis of Georgia, and now has circulation of 2000 copies.52 In an interview with the editor-in-chief, seven other publications were mentioned, predominantly local and with minor circulation with changing permanence. Though they are not purely religious they include religious issues. Gurjistan covers all the Muslim holidays and events, as well as including a special section of “questions and answers”.53 In 2007 a website (www.muslimgeorgia.org) was started by a group of Georgian Muslims living or studying in Turkey. According to a media publication, this was the first website about Islam in Georgian. The website has also English, Turkish and Arabic versions. The other website about Islam is www.islam.ge which, according to the information posted on it, is for “not only to preach the religion, but also to

49 COE Report, Opinion on Georgia, Public ACFC/OP/I(2009)001, Advisory Com- mittee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Stras- bourg, 10 October 2009, p. 29. 50 COE Report, p. 30. 51 Popualishvili, “Islam”, p. 360. 52 http://2000-online.ru/news/10646023.html, accessed 01 November 2009. 53 Interview conducted by the author, January 2010. georgia 231 give information about Islam”.54 It has Georgian, Turkish and English versions.

13 Family Law

The religious marriage ritual of the Muslims is not recognised by the State. Legitimacy is given only to the civil marriage documents.

14 Interreligious Relations

The Imam of the Tbilisi mosque regards relations with other religious communities as well established and friendly.55 The synagogue, mosque, Georgian and Armenian churches situated side by side on one of the central street in Tbilisi, are very often stated to indicate religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence and cooperation in Geor- gian society. In 2005, two interreligious councils were established; one was gathered at the initiative of the Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia, the other by the Public Defender of Georgia. The Council attached to Public Defender’s Office, consisting of various religious groups, is a specific discussion forum for religious minorities to consider issues of preservation of identity, defining their needs and structuring their communication with the state.56 In those places where the Muslim and Christian populations have had a long history of coexistence, popular forms of Islam have developed which include Christian and national (ethnic) elements in addition to Muslim elements.57

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Generally speaking, the subjective importance of religiosity in Georgia is quite high. According to a public opinion poll (2003) related to the issues of religion conducted by the International Centre on Conflict

54 http://2000-online.ru/news/10646023.html, accessed 01 November 2009. 55 http://open.az/index.php?newsid=15826, accessed 08 November 2010. Interview conducted by the author, December 2009. 56 COE Report, Opinion on Georgia, Public ACFC/OP/I(2009)001, Advisory Com- mittee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Stras- bourg, 10 October 2009. 57 See in N. Popualishvili, “Islam”, pp. 363–363. 232 satenik mkrtchyan and Negotiations (ICCN) among the urban population of Georgia, 95% of the respondents considered themselves believers.58 The 2007 Data Initiative of the Caucasus Research Resource Centre showed that 72.1% referred to the importance of religion in life.59 Approximately 84% of the population identify themselves as members of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC). Public opinion supports the idea of granting specific status to GOC. The same survey shows 65% of the respondents agree to grant the Orthodoxy a status of state religion. Nevertheless, the Muslim community in the country is considered one of the “traditional” confessions (together with the Armenian Apostolic Church, Catholics and Jews) as compared to the other Christian groups who are regarded as “sects”.60 Similarly, the survey showed more tolerance towards Muslims and Jews than towards other groups of Christianity. Specifically, 49.1% of respondents reported their positive attitude towards Muslims, 40.8% of the respondents were familiar with or had contacts with Muslims.61

16 Major Cultural Events

No data available.

58 Г. Нижарадзе, Е. Джгеренаиа, Я. Качкачишвили, Р. Мшвидобадзе, Г. хуцишвили, “Городское население Грузии о вопросах связанных с религией: Результаты социологическоги исследования”, Н. Лежава (ред.), Роль православия в государствах и обществах Грузии и Росии (Тбилиси: Генрих Белл Фонд, 2004), стр. 104–121 (106) (G. Nizharadze, E. Jgerenaya, Ya. Kachkachishvili, R. Mshvido- badze, G. Khutsishvili, “Urban Population of Georgia on issues related to religion: results of survey” in N. Lejava (ed.) Role of Orthodoxy in the States and Societies of Georgia and Russia, Materials of Georgian-Russian Conference. (Tbilisi: Heinrich Beoll Foundation, 2004) pp. 104–121 (106)). 59 R. Charles, Religiosity and Trust in Religious Institutions: Tales from the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), Summer 2009, p. 9 at http://iseees .berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/u4/2009-08-Charles.pdf, accessed 08 November 2010. 60 G. Nizharadze, “Urban population”, pp. 115–119. 61 G. Nizharadze, “Urban population”, pp. 108–109. GERMANY

Mathias Rohe1

1 Muslim Populations

The presence of considerable numbers of Muslims in Germany is a relatively new phenomenon, as compared to the UK or France. The majority of Muslims living in Germany are of Turkish origin. Since the 1960’s thousands of so-called “Gastarbeiter” (guest workers) were attracted to work in Germany with many of them being Turkish nationals. Therefore in sum Islamic life in Germany is very much of a Turkish character. Besides that, there was a continuous immigration of often well-educated people from the Middle East (physicians, engi- neers etc. mainly from Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Afghanistan), but of a limited number. A third motivation of Muslim immigration to the country was the search for asylum. Their countries of origin are mainly to be found in the Middle East, the Indian Subcontinent and Northern Africa; since the wars on the Balkans many refugees fled from Bosnia, Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo. In addition to that there are Muslim merchants, students and scientists living in the country for a shorter or longer period. The majority of the Muslims in Germany belong to the Sunni denomination, but there are also significant groups of Twelver-Shi῾is (particularly from Iranian, Lebanese and Iraqi origin) which may reach 200,000 persons as well as an estimated number of 500,000 Alevis mostly from Turkey and some 30,000 Ahmadis from Pakistan, the oldest organized Muslim group in Germany. As with everywhere in the world, their opinions and beliefs range from a very devout attitude to a mere cultural link to Islam; Sufism is widespread especially among Turkish immigrants.

1 Mathias Rohe has studied Law and Islamic Studies. He holds the chair for Civil Law, Private International Law and Comparative Law at the University Erlangen- Nuremberg and is the founding director of the Erlangen Centre for Islam and Law in Europe. He has been a judge at the Court of Appeals of Nuremberg and a member of the first Deutsche Islam Konferenz (working group on constitutional issues) in 2006–2009 and of several project groups of the second Deutsche Islam Konferenz which started work in 2009. 234 mathias rohe

Most immigrants initially planned to stay in Germany only for a couple of years, to earn some money for a better existence in their home-country or to find a temporary refuge until the political situation in the country of origin changed. German legislation and administration tended to share these expectations. Therefore Muslims—except the relatively small number of German converts—behaved and were treated as temporary guests. After 30 years of a significant Muslim presence in Germany things have altered fundamentally. Muslims realized that their initial intention to return to the country of origin sooner or later turned out to be a mere illusion. The same is true for the approach of the German administration, which by and large followed a policy of mere provisional solutions. Legislation and administration now have to cope with a stable and meaningful group of Muslims as a part of German society. There are no official statistics regarding the religious affiliation of the German population. According to figures based on representative polls published in June 2009 by the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees and the German Islam Conference, there are between 3.8 and 4.3 million Muslims living in the country. Among them there are about 2 million German citizens, mostly of a migrant background. Most of the Muslims—German and foreign citizens—are of Turkish origin (c. 2.5 million), more than half a million from former Yugosla- via, over 300,000 from the Middle East (mainly from Iraq and Leba- non), around 300,000 from North Africa, 60,000 from other parts of Africa, around 180,000 from South/Southeast Asia and 70,000 from Iran.2 The number of German converts is unknown; according to a rough estimate it can be anywhere between 10,000 and 100,000. As a result of the migration (“guest workers) history of many Muslims in Germany, there is a concentration in the main industrial areas in Western Germany (Northrhine-Westphalia, Rhine-Main-region, regions of Stuttgart, Munich, Nuremberg, Hamburg) and in Berlin.

2 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees/Deutsche Islam Konferenz,Muslim Life in Germany, Nuremberg 2009, pp. 54–76. Cf. www.deutsche-islam-konferenz .de/cln_110/nn_1883514/SubSites/DIK/EN/InDeutschland/ZahlenDatenFakten/ StudieMLD/studie-mld-node.html?__nnn=true, accessed 5 November 2010. germany 235

2 Islam and the State

Secularity is the leading principle regulating the relationship between the state and religion, which means individual and collective freedom of religion, religious neutrality of the state and the separation between state and religion. In Germany a system of secularity accepting of religions prevails. All religious communities enjoy far-reaching rights to act in the public space and to participate/cooperate with the state on various levels. The underlying idea is that the secular state alone is unable to guarantee the principles it is based on, and that religion may positively contribute to this basis. These principles are common in Germany as a whole. Nevertheless, Germany being a federal state consisting of 16 states (Länder), the role of religion in the public sphere is slightly different from state to state. While the most important legislative competence lies at the federal level, the states are in general responsible for administrative affairs. In addition to that, they have prime legislative responsible in educational, cultural and police issues. Thus, in daily practice the states are usually the key actors in cooperat- ing with Muslim communities. Some laws do differentiate between legally recognised/registered religious communities, others do not. In many cases it is sufficient to be registered as an association under private law, which is easily achieved and this is the case for most of the Muslim organisations, in particular those running mosques and Islamic cultural centres. The prerequisites for being recognised as a religious community according to the laws regulating the cooperation between the state and such communities vary greatly. They are linked to the respective importance of the issue at stake for the state. Article 140 of the constitution regulates the conditions for religious societies (communities) to apply for the status of a corporation under public law (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts). Those communities holding this status when the constitution came into force kept their status. Others may apply for it and shall be granted the same rights, if their bye-laws and the number of their members give assurance of per- manency. The state administrations would usually grant status in cases when an organisation has already existed for 30 years and represents at least 0.1% of the state’s population (membership has to be clearly regulated), but exceptions and reduced requirements can be applied from case to case. This status grants far-reaching rights and privileges, e.g. tax exemptions and access to state institutions for collecting taxes 236 mathias rohe

(against payment), rights to have members appointed to broadcast advisory boards and to cooperate in matters of youth social care, the right of refusing testimony in court for those carrying out pastoral care, rights to regulate labour relations and the relations to members including internal jurisdiction, and more. No Muslim organisation has obtained this status so far. On the federal level, in 2006 the Ministry of the Interior established the Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK, German Islam Conference) to bring forward a more structured dialogue between Muslims and the state on crucial issues.3 There was a plenum consisting of 15 representatives of the state (federal, state and communal level) and of 15 Muslim representatives. The latter were chosen by the Ministry; five of them represented the major organisations, the rest were prominent individuals covering different sectors of society. Since the beginning, this choice has (naturally) been disputed by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Most of the practical work took place in three working groups dealing with “German social order and consensus of values”, “Religious issues under the German constitutional order” and “Economics and media as a bridge” and one “dialogue circle” covering security issues. There have been few immediate results, but the working group on constitutional issues has produced papers on the regular establishment of Islamic instruction in public schools, on building mosques and establishing Muslim cemeteries etc., which are now brought forward in the states responsible for the implementation and administration of these issues. After the 2009 elections, the Ministry decided to continue the DIK in a somewhat different setting. The main objectives defined by the Ministry are integration, social cohesion and resolving security problems through long-term dialogue and cooperation.4 Only three out of five major Muslim organisations are still members of the new DIK: DITIB, VIKZ and the AABF (cf. 3. below). Since serious judicial inquiries have been conducted against major organisations and representatives of the Islamrat (see sect. 3) the ministry suggested a sleeping

3 Information in English is available from the DIK website at http://www.deutsche- islam-konferenz.de/SubSites/DIK/EN/Startseite/home-node.html?__nnn=true, accessed 5 November 2010. 4 Cf. the description on the website, available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/ cln_110/nn_1917164/SubSites/DIK/EN/DieDIK/AufgabenZiele/aufgabenziele-node .html?__nnn=true, accessed 5 November 2010. germany 237 membership until the inquiries are finished.5 The organisation rejected this solution and withdrew totally from the DIK, followed by the ZMD.6 They were replaced by organisations from the Bosnian Islamische( Gemeinschaft der Bosniaken in Deutschland, Islamic Community of the Bosniaks in Germany, IGBD, http://www.igbd.eu) and Moroccan (Zentralrat der Marokkaner in Deutschland, Central Council of the Moroccans in Germany)7 communities. The Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland (Turkish Community in Germany, TGD, http://www.tgd .de/), was invited to participate in spite of being an immigrant rather than a religious organisation. Ten prominent Muslim individuals, who are not identical with those having participated in the first DIK, were chosen to represent Muslim plurality. On the state side, the federal and state levels are represented by six members each; the local level was strengthened by now sending five members. The idea is to concretely develop feasible action plans concerning the broader establishment of Islamic religious lessons in schools according to the German legal model, the establishment of Islamic theological studies in German universities and of programmes for educating and training imams. The former fixed working groups were replaced by more flexible and concentrated project groups preparing the work of the “plenary”. The first group working on imam training8 started in September 2010 and will finish its work in early 2011. At the state level, “round tables” have been established to promote concrete projects, in particular regarding pilot projects of Islamic instruction in public schools. In most of the states only some of the existing major organisations are involved; in some cases, local Muslim initiatives are accepted as preliminary partners for cooperation.

5 Meanwhile, the inquiries have been concluded with Oguz Ücüncü and several others. Cf. e.g. http://www.faz.net/s/Rub594835B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/ Doc~EE178064D5C8F4339A77E60CBEF6FD36F~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html, accessed 8 November 2010. 6 An important part of the dispute was the question whether the ministry involved the Muslim side appropriately in defining the relevant topics; for critical voices cf. the newly appointed chairman of the ZMD Ayman Mazyek, “Über Islamkritiker, Islamhasser und die Islamkonferenz-Kritik”, available at http://islam.de/15570.php, accessed 5 November 2010. 7 No website could be found. 8 The author is the only external member from German universities. 238 mathias rohe

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The vast majority of Muslim organisations act at a local level, running mosques in particular. Usually they are organised as associations under civil law.9 In some states, regional organisations have emerged in recent years. On the federal level, the major (umbrella) organisations are the following:

• Diyanet Işleri Türk İslam Birliği DITIB (Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion, Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution for Religious Affairs) (Subbelrather Strasse 17, 50823 Köln; Internet: www.ditib.de, E-Mail: [email protected]). At the moment DITIB is establishing sub-organisations on the state level. It is by far the largest organisation, running nearly 900 mosques all over the country. • Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren VIKZ (Union of Islamic Cultural Centres) (Vogelsanger Strasse 290, 50825 Köln; Internet: www.vikz.de; E-Mail: [email protected]). The VIKZ has 300 local member communities with more than half of them owning their premises. • Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany) (Osterather Strasse 7, 50739 Köln, Internet: www.islamrat.de; E-Mail: via the “contact” icon on the website). Its most important member is Milli Görüş, which is under surveillance by several German services for the protection of the constitution. • Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland ZMD (Central Council of Muslims in Germany) (Steinfelder Gasse 32, 50670 Köln, Internet: www.islam.de; E-Mail: [email protected]). This is an umbrella organisation of 19 other umbrella organisations, most of them having relatively few members. Some significant member organisations, like the Islamische Gemeinde Deutschland (IGD Islamic Community of Germany) which is close to the Muslim Brotherhood ideologically, are under surveillance by services for the protection of the constitution. In 2002 the ZMD published an Islamic Charta defining its positions towards the German state and society (an English version is available at http://zentralrat.de/3037.php).

9 Cf. Rohe, “On the recognition and institutionalization of Islam in Germany”, in Marie-Claire Foblets/Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens/Alison Dundes Renteln (eds.), Cultural Diversity and Law. State Responses from around the World (Brussels: Bruylant, 2010). germany 239

These four organisations are loosely united in theKoordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland (KRM, Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany). It was created parallel to the establishment of the German Islam Conference, attempting to create a unified cooperation partner for the German administration. Nevertheless, the member organisations are far from being united in their interests and goals. DITIB enjoys a veto right within the Council. The KRM has no legal standing and does not have any infrastructure like a website etc. News is usually published by the websites of the member organisations. The KRM is also split regarding the participation in the DIK (cf. 2. above). The Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschlands, Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu, (Alevi Community of Germany), AABF (Stolberger Strasse 317, 50933 Köln; http://www.alevi.com; [email protected]) is the federal umbrella organisation for local and regional Alevi communities. The AABF is the only organisation within the spectrum of Islam so far which has been recognised by the state as meeting the legal requirements of a religious community in the sense of article 7 section 3 of the German constitution. It is thus able to co-operate with the state in establishing religious instruction in public schools according to the legal system prevailing in most of the states except Berlin and Bremen. In March 2009, 110 Shi’i communities created an umbrella organisation called Islamische Gemeinschaft der schiitischen Gemeinschaften Deutschlands (Islamic Community of the German Shi’i communities; www.igs-de.de; [email protected]). The extent to which these organisations are representative of Mus- lims in Germany is highly disputed. Whereas the government usually would count 15–20% of the Muslims to be represented by them, they claim to represent the vast majority of practising Muslims.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Approximately 2,600 buildings are used as mosques, in addition to an unknown number of Alevi cem houses. While most of them are established in buildings not originally intended for that purpose, such as former factory buildings etc., some 180 are shaped in more or less traditional mosque architecture, and another 150 of this type are under construction. The establishment of mosques and prayer houses is one of the elements of religious freedom guaranteed by article 4 of 240 mathias rohe the Constitution. Thus, in September 2009 the Administrative Court of Appeals of Koblenz (Rhineland-Palatinate)10 decided in favour of Muslim applicants despite the fears of some future mosque neighbours that the increasing traffic might unduly infringe their property rights. Unlike in Switzerland it would be impossible in Germany to sup- press the constitutional rights of a minority by a democratic majority decision. Contrary to the legal situation, the heated debate on “Mus- lim integration” in Germany (see section 15 below) has shown that according to recent polls11 58.4% of the German population agrees to considerably restrict the religious freedom of Muslims in the country, whatever that exactly means. Generally, in the public debate the mosque has replaced the head scarf as a core issue of potential conflict between Muslims and parts of the broader society.12 Particularly projects of major mosques in Cologne, Berlin, Frankfurt and Munich have triggered protests by strange coalitions of extreme right-wing enemies of Islam, small groups of Christian fundamentalists and (former) left-wing personalities like Ralph Giordano, all of them denouncing “Islam as such” to be a problem for German society. Nevertheless, there is a very broad political majority supporting strongly and publicly the constitutional rights of Muslims. The former federal Minister of the Interior Wolf- gang Schäuble repeatedly declared Islam to be an integral part of Germany. The new German president Christian Wulff affirmed that in his speech on Unification day (October 3, 2010).13 The Deutsche Islam Konferenz (see section 2) issued a paper on the relevant legal

10 Judgement of 2 September 2009, 8 A 10291/09.OVG http://www3.justiz.rlp .de/rechtspr/DisplayUrteil.asp?rowguid={A622926D-CE2F-427E-B8D9-CC3D12 BF5D0A, accessed 5 November 2010. Cf. also the similar judgement of the Admin- istrative Court of Berlin (19 A 355.04) from 18.02.2009 (http://www.gericht sentscheidungen.berlin-brandenburg.de/jportal/portal/t/2398/bs/10/page/sammlung .psml?pid=Dokumentanzeige&showdoccase=1&js_peid=Trefferliste&documentnum ber=1&numberofresults=1&fromdoctodoc=yes&doc.id=JURE090030918%3Ajuris- r02&doc.part=L&doc.price=0.0&doc.hl=1#focuspoint, accessed 5 November 2010). 11 Cf. Oliver Decker et al., Die Mitte in der Krise. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2010 (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2010). Available at: http://library .fes.de/pdf-files/do/07504.pdf, accessed 5 November 2010, p. 134. 12 Cf. Bärbel Beinhauer-Köhler/Claus Leggewie, Moscheen in Deutschland (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009). 13 Christian Wulff, “Valuing Diversity—Fostering Cohesion”. Available at: http://www .bundespraesident.de/Anlage/original_667212/Speech-in-English.pdf, accessed 5 Novem- ber 2010. germany 241 framework including advice on how practically to solve potential conflicts on mosque building.14

5 Children’s Education

Article 7 section 3 of the German constitution, which is valid in all federal states except Bremen and Berlin (for historical reasons, see to Article 141 “Bremen clause”), declares confessional religious instruction to be a regular subject in public schools.15 It has to be taught in cooperation between the state and the respective religious community. Since 2008–9 the Alevi community has been recognised by several states (North-Rhine Westphalia, Hesse, Bavaria) to have a structure which enables it to cooperate with the state in this manner.16 In the state of Berlin, Islamic religious instruction, including Alevi, has been established since the beginning of this decade. The state of Hamburg has introduced an inter-confessional model of “religion for all” under the oversight of the Protestant church. Recognition as a religious community in terms of school law is a major goal of the main existing Muslim organisations on a federal and regional level. Until now, a number of states (North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate) have introduced models of Islamic instruction, including two Alevi classes in Baden-Württemberg. The nature of such cooperation is very dependent on the particular state’s practices and expectations, but in all cases Muslims are intensely involved in elaborating the curricula and appointing the teachers. In 2009 the state of Bavaria established

14 Cf. http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_117/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/ DIK/Downloads/Plenum/DIK-viertes-Plenum-en,templateId=raw,property=pub licationFile.pdf/DIK-viertes-Plenum-en.pdf, accessed 5 November 2010. See also http://www.deutsche-islamkonferenz.de/cln_117/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/DIK/ Downloads/DokumenteDIK/20100310–moscheebau,templateId=raw,property=public ationFile.pdf/20100310-moscheebau.pdf, accessed 5 November 2010. 15 Cf. the thorough study of Dietrich, Myriam, Islamischer Religionsunterricht (Frankfurt: Lang, 2006), and more recently Irka-Christin Mohr/ Kiefer, Michael (eds.), Islamunterricht—Islamischer Religionsunterricht—Islamkunde. Viele Titel—ein Fach? (Bielefeld: transcript 2009); Kuld, Lothar /Schmid, Bruno (eds.), Islamischer Religionsunterricht in Baden-Württemberg (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2009); Kiefer, Michael /Gottwald, Eckart /Ucar, Bülent (eds.), Auf dem Weg zum Islamischen Religionsunter- richt. Sachstand und Perspektiven in Nordrhein-Westfalen (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2008). 16 Cf. Kaplan, Ismail, Alevitischer Religionsunterricht an den Schulen, Die Stimme der Aleviten, July 2009, pp. 28–32. 242 mathias rohe

Islamic instruction on a state-wide level according to the model developed in the city of Erlangen in close cooperation with the Ministry of Education, The Islamic Community of Erlangen and the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg.17 Other states are also planning to broaden their models, although some intricate legal problems relating to the necessary structure of Muslim communities remain to be solved. In 2008 the Deutsche Islam Konferenz published a detailed paper18 identifying these topics and suggesting solutions. Applications of Muslim pupils for exemption from obligatory classes in swimming where these have been mixed sex have gone to court. According to a landmark decision of 1994 by the Federal Administra- tive Court,19 they are entitled to such exemption if they have reached the age of puberty and the school is unable to arrange unisex classes. Now, more and more courts tend to give superior weight to the educational purposes of the school over possibly conflicting religious needs. This is particularly the case concerning younger pupils.20 A notable case occurred in the state of Berlin, where a then 15-year old Muslim pupil wanted to perform the ritual noon prayer within his free time in any available discreet space. The school director refused, relying on her understanding of secularism. The Berlin Administrative Court decided in September 200921 that the federal constitution and

17 Cf. e.g. http://www.km.bayern.de/km/asps/presse/presse_anzeigen.asp?index=1831, accessed 5 November 2010. 18 Available at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_117/SharedDocs/Anlagen/ DE/DIK/Downloads/Sonstiges/2008-IRU-zwischenresumee-der-dik,templateId=raw ,property=publicationFile.pdf/2008-IRU-zwischenresumee-der-dik.pdf, accessed 15 November 2010. 19 Bundesverwaltungsgericht DVBl. 1994, pp. 168. 20 Cf. Administrative Court of Appeals Münster (19 B 1362/08), decision from 20.05.2009, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht—Rechtsprechungsreport 2009, pp. 923; Administrative Court of Gelsenkirchen (4 L 5267/08), decision from 11.08.2008; Administrative Court of Augsburg (Au 3 E 08.1613), decision from 17.12.2008; Administrative Court of Düsseldorf (18 K 301/08 from 07.05.2008). See also the recommendations of the Deutsche Islam Konferenz, available at http://www .deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_117/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/DIK/Downloads/ DokumenteDIK/2008–anhang-zwischenresumee-schulpraktische-fragen,templateId =raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/2008-anhang-zwischenresumee-schulpraktische- fragen.pdf, accessed 5 November 2010. 21 VG 3 A 984.07, http://www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/senatsverwaltungen/ justiz/gerichte/vg2/entscheidungen/03_a_0984_07___090929___anonymisiert___ anonymisiert.pdf?start&ts=1255675977&file=03_a_0984_07___090929___anonymisiert___ anonymisiert.pdf, accessed 5 November 2010. A short report is available at www .kostenlose-urteile.de/Gebetsraum-fuer-islamisches-Gebet-in-der-Schule-Mus limischer-Schueler-darf-in-der-Schule-beten.news8539.htm, accessed 5 November 2010. germany 243 the constitution of the state of Berlin alike follow a system of secularism open to religions and beliefs in private and public space. Since the school did not present any concrete arguments on whether the wish to pray of this single pupil would cause organisational problems or contribute to tensions among the pupils, there was no good reason to prevent him from doing so. This decision attracted enormous public interest. Very often reports wrongly stated that the school would be forced to establish prayer rooms now, which was obviously demanded neither by the pupil nor by the Court. The churches and some political voices from all moderate sides supported the Court’s decision. In May 2010, the senate of Berlin succeeded in its appeal against the judgement. The Administrative Court of Appeals of Berlin-Brandenburg22 held that the state of Berlin is entitled to weigh up state neutrality and freedom of religion in a more restrictive way with respect to the latter. In addition to that, the appellant obviously produced more concrete arguments than in the first stage of the procedure. In October the pupil used his right of appeal to the Federal Administrative Court.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

The Universities of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Münster and Osnabrück have established programmes to train Muslim teachers and appointed Muslim professors as core staff members. Some first teaching materials have been developed and published,23 triggering a vivid debate on modern Muslim religious pedagogy among traditionalist Mus- lims. The legal issues involved are similar to those mentioned above (see section 5). Whereas in Erlangen-Nuremberg and Osnabrück the programmes were introduced on a broad consensual basis between Muslims and the authorities, there were serious conflicts in Münster, particularly after the holder of the chair for Islamic theology publicly declared no longer being a Muslim, and a new professor for educating teachers was appointed after a longer period of uncertainty. The existing capacities are still far from being sufficient, since there is a

22 Judgement (OVG 3 B 29.09) from May 27, 2010, available at http://www.berlin .de/imperia/md/content/senatsverwaltungen/justiz/gerichte/ovg/entscheidungen/03_ b_0029_09___100527___urteil___anonymisiert.pdf?start&ts=1288621975&file=03_ b_0029_09___100527___urteil___anonymisiert.pdf, accessed 5 November 2010. 23 Lamya Kaddor/Rabeya Müller/Harun Behr (eds.), Saphir 5/6, Religionsbuch für junge Musliminnen und Muslime (Munich: Kösel, 2008); Serap Erkan et al. (eds.), Mein Islambuch (Munich: Oldenbourg 2009). 244 mathias rohe need for an average of 4,500 teachers to be trained to cover Germany as a whole in the future. Concerning imam training, the University of Osnabrück started a residential programme for 30 imams in 2010; the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg has developed teaching programmes in a more decentralised way in cooperation with the local levels. Some Muslim organisations train their imams in internal programmes. State-funded political organisations and a number of bigger cities like Munich, Frankfurt and Berlin have offered programmes for imams as well, in particular concerning citizenship issues, which have been evaluated and used in the new DIK project group (see section 2 above). There is a widespread desire among Muslims to professionalise the training of imams, since their role among non-Muslim majority societies as well as broad political support is increasing; but in terms of organisation and particularly financing, no solutions are in sight for the near future. In a broader academic perspective, forms of Islamic theology (called “Islamic studies” for more legal-technical reasons) aiming at a confession-orientated education and research are being established in a small number of universities. In Frankfurt/Main, the Turkish Republic is financing three professorships for such purposes. Following the recommendations published by the German Wissenschaftsrat (German Council of Science and Humanities),24 the universities of Osnabrück and Münster (joint planning), Tübingen and Erlangen-Nuremberg are establishing departments for such studies in close cooperation with other theologies and with Muslim representatives gathered in advisory boards according to the German legal system of cooperation in such fields. Some more or less anti-Muslim movements are heavily criticising these developments.25

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Many Muslims still prefer to be buried in their country of origin. This is due to sentiments of “feeling home” there more than in Germany,

24 Cf. http://www.wissenschaftsrat.de/download/archiv/9678–10.pdf, accessed 5 November 2010. 25 Cf. e.g. statements of the so-called Central Council of ex-Muslims in Germany, at www.bild.de/BILD/politik/2010/10/14/imam-ausbildung-ein-skandal/sagt-der-zen tral-rat-der-ex-muslime.html. germany 245 particularly within the first generation of immigrants, but also due to relatively high costs for burials in Germany and a lack of appropriate facilities for Muslim burials in their neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, an increasing number of Muslims are buried in Germany. There are only a few Muslim cemeteries, but many cemeteries run by the state or by churches have established special Muslim burial areas. Facilities for washing the deceased’s body have been built, and the possibilities of maintaining a grave for more than the usually permitted time of 10–20 years are broadened (while costly). In addition, there is an increasing consensus that graves could be re-used, provided that the still existing mortal remains are buried in a lower stratum of the grave, like in many heavily populated regions in the Muslim world. From a legal point of view, most of states require the status of a corporation under public law (Körperschaft des Öffentlichen Rechts, see section 2) as a prerequisite for establishing a religious cemetery, which is difficult to obtain. The State of Northrhine-Westphalia has lowered these very strict and thus potentially unconstitutional prerequisites. Other legislation has abolished the duty to bury bodies in a coffin, thus allowing the traditional burial in white linen.

8 “Chaplaincy” in State Institutions

Chaplaincy in state institutions is run in cooperation between the state and the recognised religious communities to fulfil the necessary organisational conditions. No Muslim organisation has achieved this status so far. Until now, there are only provisional solutions on a local level, particularly in hospitals. The city of Wiesbaden has started a model project funded by the EU on offering spiritual care and educating suitable volunteers in the main hospital and in the local prison with considerable success. The legal basis for that is an “integration agreement” between the municipality and most of the local Muslim organisations (the local DITIB branch was prevented from doing so by the central administration in Cologne for unclear reasons).

9 Religious Festivals

Political authorities increasingly take notice of Muslim religious festivals, sending messages of congratulation or inviting them/accepting invitations e.g. in the month of Ramadan. Muslim holidays are not 246 mathias rohe legally recognised as state holidays like the major Christian holidays, but are legally protected to a certain extent. Employees are in general entitled to apply for leave during the major festivals, pupils may stay away from school for a number of days (during the ‘Id al-Adha and at the end of the month of Ramadan, ‘Id al-Fitr). The Labour Court of Cologne26 decided in favour of a Muslim woman working as an attendant for pupils in school buses who wanted to perform the ritual pilgrimage to Mecca. The employer had refused her application for leave, telling her to wait for a time when school holidays and the days of pilgrimage would coincide (after 14 years!), and ignoring the fact that her already aged mother was able to care for her disabled child at the moment, but probably not 14 years later.

10 Access to Halal Food

Halal food can be imported to Germany, which regularly occurs. According to a verdict of the Federal Constitutional Court in 2002,27 Muslims are entitled to apply for an exemption from the general prohibition of slaughtering without pre-stunning according to the Animal Protection Act (para. 4 a sect. 2). Since then, some Muslim butchers have applied for such exceptions, which were often refused by administrations or only granted under very restrictive conditions. The Federal Administrative Court has repeatedly decided in favour of Muslim applicants,28 but administrative and lower court resistance has not totally ceased yet. In September 2009 the Federal Constitu- tional Court29 in an unusually clear judgement quashed decisions by the Administrative Court of Giessen30 and the Administrative Court of Appeals of Hesse31 which were unfavourable for the Muslim applicant. Nevertheless, in a questionable decision of November 2009 the

26 Available at www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/arbgs/koeln/arbg_koeln/j2008/17_Ca_51_ 08urteil20080812.html, accessed 5 November 2010. 27 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vol. 104, pp. 337. 28 Federal Administrative Court judgement from 23.11.2006, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, p. 461. 29 Decision from 28.09.2009, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht—Rechtsprec- hungsreport 2009, p. 945. 30 Decision from 25.02.2009 ( 10 L 80/09.GI), available at http://www.kostenlose- urteile.de/Verwaltungsgericht-erlaubt-Schaechten-unter-Auflagen.news7501.htm, accessed 5 November 2010. 31 Decision from 26.05.2009 (unpublished). germany 247

Bavarian Administrative Court of Appeals32 stated that the claim of a Muslim applicant to slaughter animals for ‘Id al-Adha was taken to be merely culturally based, thus not coming under freedom of religion. In March 2010 the Bundesrat (Upper House)33 launched an initiative34 to virtually ban slaughtering without pre-stunning, since the applicant would have to prove the religious necessity for that and that the way of slaughtering would not cause additional considerable pain to the animal. The federal government declared its doubts on whether this initiative would meet the constitutional balance between freedom of religion and the protection of animals. No decision has been made so far. DITIB has called on believers to avoid unnecessary pain for the animals to be slaughtered at ‘Id al-Adha, declaring that there is no objection to using electric stunning methods before slaughtering the animal.35

11 Dress Codes

Male Muslim dress codes are practically unnoticed by law and by public debate. The contrary is true for the female head scarf. There is a widespread rejection of the head scarf in German society, perceiv- ing it simply as an instrument to oppress women and demonstrate male supremacy. Extremists including anti-Islam feminists like Alice Schwarzer declared it to be “the flag of Islamism”, not distinguishing between actual cases of oppression36 and women wearing the head scarf voluntarily. Legally, wearing the head scarf is allowed in public space including schools and universities, except for school teachers according to

32 Decision from 26.11.2009 (9 CE 09.2917), not yet published. Cf. e.g. http:// www.vgh.bayern.de/BayVGH/documents/PM-20091127_000.pdf, and http://www .kostenlose-urteile.de/Tuerkischer-Metzger-erhaelt-keine-Erlaubnis-zum-Schaechten .news8836.htm, accessed 5 November 2010. 33 It is the legislative institution representing the states on the federal level. 34 Draft amendment to the Animal Protection Act, Bundestag Drucksache 17/1226 (24.03.2010); the statement of the federal government is added in this document. 35 Cf. the message of the Secretary General Sadi Arslan (25.11.2009), available at http://www.ditib.de/detail1.php?id=180&lang=de, accessed 5 November 2010. 36 Cf. for such cases the judgement of the Administrative Court of Karlsruhe (Az. 9 K 4270/07) from 30.04.2009 (residence permit for a shortly married Serbian woman who was forced to wear a headscarf by her Turkish husband who had unofficially entered into a polygamous marriage besides that). 248 mathias rohe newer legislation in eight states which have banned the wearing of “religious symbols” in public office. Such regulations are neutral in their wording but are clearly aimed at the Muslim head scarf only. In Baden-Württemberg, nursery staff is also targeted.37 The states of Hesse and Berlin38 have gone even further, including practically all state officers. Berlin has banned all kinds of religious symbols (including Christian and Jewish ones). The Federal Constitutional Court39 has opened the two existing ways of legislation: either a general ban of religious symbols or a general permission. It has stressed that in any case all religions have to be treated equally. In contrast to that, the respective laws of some states include exceptions of the ban for culturally accepted (Christian or Jewish) symbols, which is a clear contradiction of the Constitutional Court’s verdict which enjoys legal status according to German law. The Federal Administrative Court40 has declared the respective law of Baden-Württemberg to meet the constitutional requirements, but stressed that symbols of other religions have then to be banned equally. In the states having banned head scarves, the courts have now to enter into bizarre reflections on whether caps or wigs are to be considered as headscarves or not in a legal sense.41 The Constitutional Court will have to decide again following the Baden- Württemberg teacher’s appeal against the judgement of the Federal Administrative Court. In September 2010, the case of a physician in Hesse who wanted to strictly forbid his patients to wear the Islamic head scarf in his rooms attracted public attention. At the same time he declared not to treat “Islamist families with more than five children”.42 Since the physician was contractually obliged to treat all members of the German public

37 Cf. the judgement of the Labour Court of Appeals Baden-Württemberg from 19.06.2009 (7 Sa 84/08), available at http://lrbw.juris.de/cgi-bin/laender_rechtsprec hung/document.py?Gericht=bw&GerichtAuswahl=Arbeitsgerichte&Art=en&Datum =2009–6&nr=11917&pos=5&anz=10, accessed 5 November 2010. 38 Cf. the critical expertise by Susanne Baer, available at www.berlin.de/imperia/md/ content/lb_ads/neutrg_agg.pdf?start&ts=1257943367, accessed 5 November 2010. 39 Judgement from 24.12.2003 (2 BvR 1436/02), available at www.bundesverfas sungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20030924_2bvr143602.html, accessed 5 November 2010. 40 Judgement from 16.12.2008, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2009, p. 1289. 41 Cf. Federal Labour Court, judgement from 20.08.2009 (2 AZR 499/08); Admin- istrative Court of Cologne, decision from 17.11.2008 (3 K 2630/07). 42 “Kopftücher und Großfamilien verboten”, report available at www.faz.net/s/Rub 8D05117E1AC946F5BB438374CCC294CC/Doc~E5A912BAFE9CB42FFB4984C2283 C78 258~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html, accessed 5 November 2010. germany 249 insurance system, he finally had to withdraw his announcements under pressure from the health authorities. In 2010 the debate on the “burka ban” in France, Belgium and elsewhere had certain repercussions in the German public debate, including an expert hearing on the freedom of religion43 in the Committee on Human Rights of the federal parliament in October 2010. Neverthe- less, except for some single voices a broad political majority from left to right, including the president and the federal government, refuse to take specific measures for a ban of the burka or the niqab worn voluntarily. The existing laws relating to security measures (controls etc.) and to work in public institutions like schools are taken to be sufficient. A total ban without any specific reasons is held unconstitutional by the vast majority in parliament and broader politics.

12 Publication and Media

Some Muslim organisations are issuing magazines and brochures on religious issues and are maintaining websites (see section 3 above). Most of them only reach a rather limited number of readers. Besides that, some newspapers address the Turkish Muslim community, in particular Zaman, which regularly deals with religious topics and is related to the Fethullah Gülen movement.

13 Family Law

Islamic norms (as formulated in the laws of Islamic states) are primarily applicable according to the rules of private international law (PIL) within the limits set by public policy (art. 6 EGBGB).44 In family matters, German PIL still uses citizenship as the main connecting factor, thus obliging courts and administrations to apply foreign law to “foreigners” living in Germany even after several generations. Thus, in Germany it is much more often necessary to apply foreign norms than in other European states following the principles of immigration countries, which usually prefer residence as the main connecting factor.

43 The author was one of the six experts invited; cf. http://www.bundestag.de/ presse/hib/2010_10/2010_349/03.html, accessed 5 November 2010. 44 Cf. Mathias Rohe, Das islamische Recht: Geschichte und Gegenwart, 2nd ed. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009), p. 349. 250 mathias rohe

In practice, public policy would lead to the non-application of Islamic legal norms in a considerable number of cases to the extent that they preserve traditional gender inequality and the inequality of religions. According to the German system these norms are not considered in the abstract, it is only the result of their application in the concrete case which is taken into consideration. Thus, if this result would be similar to the legal solution German substantive law provides, the foreign norm can be applied. In addition to that, the application of public policy requires strong factual relations of the case to be decided in Germany. In 2010 the Court of Appeals of Hamm45 confirmed this attitude in a case concerning the recognition of talaq (divorce) under Moroccan law. While the unilateral talaq by the husband as such is undoubtedly unacceptable for German law, the fact that the wife con- sented to the divorce and the spouses lived separately for more than a year would meet the requirements of German divorce law as well. Thus, the result of the application of these foreign norms would not contradict German public policy without giving further reasons. On the other hand, public policy (equal treatment of sexes and religions) prevented the application of Iranian succession law.46 Secondly, such norms may also be brought into German substantive family law, as far as private autonomy offers individual preferences to be enforced within the scope of non-compulsory rules. Marriage contracts containing mahr/sadaq provisions (regulating dower payments) have been approved by the Federal Supreme Court.47 The same court48 has ended a long lasting debate on the qualification of the dower in private international law by attributing it to the norm regulating general effects of marriage (art. 14 EGBGB). In an interreligious case under German substantive family law the Court of Appeals of Oldenburg49 has decided that a Muslim father of a child who was baptized on the Catholic mother’s initiative after the separation of the parents cannot claim the right of declaring the child’s leaving the Catholic Church. The Court held that the parents have to decide on that together and that in the concrete case—the child living

45 OlG Hamm (27.01.2010—2 WF 259/09), NJW-RR 2010, p. 1090. 46 Court of Appeals of Düsseldorf, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Ver- fahrensrechts 2009, p. 520. 47 Cf. Federal Supreme Court, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 1999, p. 574; Court of Appeals of Celle, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht, 1998, p. 374. 48 Federal Supreme Court (09.12.2009—XII ZR 107/08), NJW 2010, p. 1528. 49 NJW-RR 2010 (09.02.2010—13 UF 8/10), p. 796. germany 251 with the mother—there would be no sound reason to let the father decide solely. Only little information is available on the informal sector. Some mosques offer mediation in family conflicts. The Islamic centre of Munich seems to offer further (semi-legal) services concerning marriage and divorce.50 In a couple of cases Muslim refugees from Iraq who were unable to procure the necessary documents for an official marriage from their home country resorted to merely religious marriages concluded by imams. These marriages are without any legal standing in Germany, but can cause problems if they are socially binding within a marginalised community. Thus, some improvisation is required in cases where such “wives” seek a divorce which cannot be granted by courts due to the lack of a legally valid marriage. In 2010, a broad and often very simplifying debate on “Sharia and the German constitution” started as a consequence of President Wulff ’s statement on Islam “belonging to Germany” (see section 4 above). It has shown that vast parts of the population, including legally trained politicians, obviously do not know the existing framework dealing with these issues in nearly the same manner for more than 100 years.51

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious relations between Muslims and the major churches are well established and intense. The Catholic and Protestant churches have appointed commissioners for Islamic affairs on a federal level and within their regional entities. The Roman Catholic Church has issued a paper supporting the establishment of mosques in general, which caused some opposition and even departures by members rejecting Islam. Interreligious festivals and mutual invitations are very common—but usually Muslims would invite Christians more often to their festivals than vice versa. In some parts of the churches there are

50 Cf. the information given at www.islamisches-zentrum-muenchen.de/html/ services_-_eheschliessungen.html, accessed 5 November 2010. 51 It is bizarre that people like the well-known feminist Alice Schwarzer accuse German lawyers (including the author) for applying and explaining the existing law for “replacing German law by Sharia”; cf. Schwarzer, Alice: “Die Realitäten in Deutschland.” In: Schwarzer, Alice (ed.), Die große Verschleierung. Für Integration, gegen Islamismus, 5th ed. (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch 2010), pp. 18–28, here p. 26. A study of her Islamophobic campaigns and those of other “panicers” like Sar- razin has appeared in Bahners, Patrick, Die Panikmacher (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2011). 252 mathias rohe anti-Islamic tendencies, in which Islam is perceived to be incompatible with the structure of a secular democratic state. Others would still feel more solidarity with Muslims in view of broad common convictions and interests and preservation of freedom of religion for everybody. For instance those rejecting the establishment of Islamic instruction in public schools (according to the German constitutional system, article 7 section 3 basic Law) are usually demanding similarly to abolish the current Catholic and Protestant system of faith-based instruction which is different from mere information about religious culture. In general, while openness is still predominant, there is a marked shift from a “charitable” approach toward migrants in need to a more competitive approach, which is not unnatural considering the fact that Muslims are no longer perceived to be only temporary guest(worker)s in the country. There are only very few inter-religious activities including Muslims and Jews bilaterally or multilaterally, e.g. in the remarkable Frank- furt Council of Religions (Rat der Religionen) established in 2009.52 Obviously the Palestine conflict largely overshadows attempts to come to terms in Germany. Nevertheless, some prominent Jewish voices defended Muslims against attacks on their rights to freedom of religion.53

15 Public Opinion and Debate

There are significant differences between official statements and widespread public opinion concerning Islam. Apart from some small right- wing and fundamentalist Christian extremist groups, all non-extremist political parties and state officials still stress the necessity of distinguishing between Islam as a religion and its political abuse. No anti- Muslim party of any political importance has emerged yet. Some of the

52 Cf. http://www.rat-der-religionen.de/. 53 Cf. e.g. http://www.zentralratdjuden.de/de/article/2773.html and http://www.faz .net/s/Rub594835B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/Doc~E9660F440C5784B5694417 D4BB090538E~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html, accessed 5 November 2010. But see also the extreme anti-Muslim propaganda of Ralph Giordano: http://www.nytimes .com/2007/07/05/world/europe/05cologne.html?_r=2&pagewanted=2&oref=slogin, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/deutschland/giordano-moschee-bau-ist-kriegserk laerung/1016290.html, and http://www.ksta.de/html/artikel/1191475994461.shtml, accessed 5 November 2010, or the former porn-writer Broder, Henryk, Hurra, wir kapitulieren—Von der Lust am Einknicken (Berlin: wjs Verlag, 2006). germany 253 right-wing parties openly declare to “safeguard” the rightist political spectrum against extremism.54 In this sense, chancellor Merkel stressed in a public statement shortly after the president’s remarks on Islam being part of Germany now (supra n. 13) that “in Germany the Basic law (sc.: the German constitution) is dominant, not Sharia”.55 Factually, this is absolutely correct on the level of legal hierarchies. Nevertheless, the very same constitution allows and even demands to grant Muslims their religious rights defined by Sharia-rules; in addition, German private international law leads to the application of Sharia-based law to a certain extent.56 Thus, to a large extent German law and Sharia rules are compatible rather than mutually exclusive. But in the course of a broader debate on the integration of migrants, Muslims are often perceived to be the “most problematic” group. In many cases social, cultural and religious issues are simply mixed up. In general, the debate on Muslims is very often linked to security matters. Thus, a broad majority in Germany would perceive Islam as such to be backward, ill-prepared for the necessities of the 21st century and potentially violent. To the surprise of many, a former member of the board of the German Federal Bank, Thilo Sarrazin, had success in selling more than 1,000,000 copies of his book Deutschland schafft sich ab (“Germany Does Away With Itself ”) within a few months. His crude, scientifically ill-founded57 ideas on the dangers of immigration in general and on Muslims in particular, including speculations on genetic specificities of Jews and others, were heavily rejected by most political officials including the federal government. He agreed to leave his office in the Federal Bank, and procedures for his expulsion from the Social Democratic Party are under way. Nevertheless, he seems to have

54 Cf. e.g. Alexander Dobrindt, Angela Merkel and Horst Seehofer in http://www .faz.net/s/Rub594835B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/Doc~E2E5F9ACFEB264FA8B C09CD06708FA7FC~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html, accessed 8 November 2010. 55 Cf. only the report in http://www.focus.de/politik/weitere-meldungen/merkel- in-deutschland-gilt-das-grundgesetz-und-nicht-die-scharia_aid_559638.html, accessed 20 April 2011. 56 Cf. the reaction of some scientists including the author in http://www.spiegel.de/ politik/deutschland/0,1518,722220,00.html, accessed 20 April 2011. 57 Cf. the following examples: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518, 714567,00.html, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/political-bookworm/2010/08/ger man_politicians_new_book_ab.html, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/ article-1307188/Jews-share-certain-gene-German-banker-Thilo-Sarrazin-sparks-out rage.html#ixzz0y27p2xl4, http://www.abendzeitung.de/politik/208262, http://www .webcitation.org/5sKUDhNd3, and http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/2010–08/sarrazin- bildung-faktencheck, accessed 5 November 2011. 254 mathias rohe formulated widespread fears among the population concerning Islam, immigration and the future of the country under the auspices of the well-known German angst. Some political statements seem to reflect these fears, but others have stressed the remarkable success in solving immigration-related problems during the last few years. On the other hand, there is still a lot of respect and mutual understanding between most Muslims and non-Muslims in daily life. Obvi- ously the fear of Islam is much more abstract than related to concrete experiences. This is underlined by the fact that in Eastern Germany, where (except in the state of Berlin) only few Muslims live, the rejection is considerably more widespread than in regions of dense Muslim population. In some cases prejudice causes strange results: An insurance company refused to pay compensation for housekeeping costs to a Muslim victim of a road accident, arguing that a Muslim man would never do housework, thus he was not entitled for compensation.58 The decision was revised later.

16 Major Cultural Events

There is a rich religious and cultural Muslim life in several parts of Germany now. Many mosques use the holiday of 3 October (Unifica- tion day) as a “day of the open mosque” inviting the public for information about Islam. In the month of Ramadan and during ‘Id al-Adha, Muslim organisations often invite political and social representatives to join their celebrations. In recent years, senior political officials have started to send congratulation messages to Muslims for ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha and sometimes organise receptions for them. In some cities Muslims and representatives of other minority religions are invited together with their Christian colleagues to participate in celebrations on the occasion of the inauguration of public buildings.

58 Cf. “Ein Muslim spült nicht ab”, available at www.nw-news.de/lokale_news/ guetersloh/guetersloh/3788789_Ein_Muslim_spuelt_nicht_ab.html, accessed 5 Novem- ber 2011. GREECE

Konstantinos Tsitselikis1

1 Muslim Populations

At the establishment of Greece as an independent state (1830), Mus- lims constituted a very small group within the then borders of Greece with almost no institutional special protection. By 1881 and with the annexation of Thessalia, Muslim communities (numbering about 40,000 at that time) were protected as a minority by the Treaty of Constantinople. In effect, the Ottomanmillet system (ethno-religious communal institutional autonomy) was preserved and the local muftis acquired quasi-judicial authority in personal status matters. Muslim schools and religious foundations (waqfs) were recognised in Greek law and were administered by local Muslim Community Councils. By the end of the Balkan Wars (1912–13) and with the annexation of the New Territories by Greece, the same status was extended to more than 500,000 Muslims who opted to stay and become Greek citizens. The legal status of the Muslim communities was consolidated, community schools and the waqfs were kept under their authority, and the muftis acquired advisory jurisdiction on personal matters. After the Greek-Turkish war of 1919–1922, a population exchange took place under the Lausanne Convention (1923) and 450,000 Mus- lims left Greece for Turkey. 92,000 Muslims with Greek citizenship remained in Thrace (Turkish-speakers and Bulgarian-speakers or Pomaks) and 26,000 Albanian-speakers in Epirus.2 The latter were forced to flee to Albania in 1945 at the end of the German occupation. In 1947, when the Dodecanese Islands were annexed by Greece, a population of about 12,000 Muslims (Greek and Turkish speaking) became Greek citizens. Today, Muslims with Greek citizenship

1 Konstantinos Tsitselikis is an assistant professor in the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki. He holds degrees in international law and human rights and is co-director of the Series of Studies of the Research Centre of Minority Groups (www.kemo.gr). 2 Tsitselikis, K., “The legal status of Islam in Greece”, inDie Welt des Islams, vol. 44, no. 3 (2004), pp. 402–431 (402). 256 konstantinos tsitselikis

residing in Greece (in total about 105,000) are mainly concentrated in Thrace (about 85,000) and on Rodos and Kos (Dodecanese Islands), with about 2,000 on each island. Another 15,000 have emigrated from Thrace for economic reasons to Athens or other Greek cities. For political and economic reasons in the context of Greek-Turkish confrontations in the 1960s and 1970s, a wave of Muslims emigrated from Thrace to Turkey and Germany (more than 120,000 are estimated to live abroad).3 Muslims of Greek citizenship are mostly Turkish-speakers and express Turkish national feelings. About 20,000 of them have Pomak (a Bulgarian dialect) as their mother tongue, partly expressing an ethnic Pomak identity, often along with a Turkish (national) identity, and about 5,000 speak Roma (partly expressing an ethnic Roma identity), although most of the Muslim Roma are monolingual Turkish speaking. The identity issue in Thrace has remained controversial insofar as Turkish nationalism, backed by Turkey, attempts to absorb the Mus- lim minority into a Turkish identity, and Greek policies attempt to foster internal divisions. As religion and mother tongue ceased to be a question in the national census after 1951, all the above figures are rough estimates. Immigrant Muslims have had an important presence in Greece since 1990 as part of the general flow of migration.4 Muslim immigrants come from African and Asian countries, and from Albania. In 1998, 14% of Greece’s immigrants in the area of metropolitan Ath- ens were Muslims from these regions. Sunnism is the most popular form of Islam and is followed by immigrants from Africa, Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Arab countries. Shi’ism is far less widespread, existing mainly among Kurdish, Pakistani and Iranian communities, while Alevism is found mostly among Turks and Kurds. In the 2001 census, immigrants exceeded 820,000, or 8% of the overall population. Around 200,000 of them were Muslims, not including

3 Hersant, J., Mobilisations politiques, co-gouvernementalité et construction ethnique: Sociologie du nationalisme turc à travers le cas des Turcs de Thrace occidentale (Grèce, Allemagne, Turquie) (Political motivations, co-governance and ethnic building: Sociol- ogy of Turkish nationalism with reference to the Turks of W. Thrace (Greece, Turkey, Germany)), PhD thesis, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 2007. 4 Marvakis, A., D. Parsanoglou and M. Pavlou (eds.), Μετανάστες στην Ελλάδα (Immigrants in Greece) (Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 2001). See comment above; Christopoulos, D. and M. Pavlou (eds.), Η Ελλάδα της μετανάστευσης (Greece of immigration) (Athens: Kritiki, 2006). greece 257

Albanians, the majority of whom are of Muslim background, but without expressed affinities with Islam.5 The estimated Muslim population in 2008 (Greek and non-Greek citizens) was 350,000, making 3.1% of the total population of 11,000,000. By 2009, according to Muslim leaders, among the immigrants with an Islamic affiliation, the Afghani community numbers 20,000, the Pakistani 70,000, the Ban- gladeshi 25,000, Palestinians and Jordanians 12,000, Syrians 15,000 and Egyptians, Iraqis and others more than 40,000.6 Such figures are highly unreliable, as there is a large number of clandestine immigrants and constant population mobility, and leaders of Muslim bodies are tempted to exaggerate community figures in support of political and social claims.

2 Islam and the State

According to the Greek constitution (article 3) the dominant religion is Greek Orthodoxy. Islam enjoys the status of a recognised religion. In Thrace, three muftiates (in Xanthi, Komotini and Didimotiho) function as public authorities, financed by the state. As a result of political confrontation between the Greek government and the pro-Turkish minority elite, there have been since the 1990s two ‘parallel’ (though not officially recognised) muftis, elected in Komotini and Xanthi, who exert a strong political influence.7 The imams serving in the mosques of Thrace are supposed to be contracted by the government under Act 3536/2007. So far the imams (hired in each mosque of Thrace) are appointed and paid (out of the waqf income) by the three official muftis and partially by the two elected muftis who are granted financial support from Turkey. After the Ministry launched a call for the imam posts (Min. D. 106535/A3/12.8.2008, FEK G of 14.8.2008), the muftiates made their own selection and sent the list to the Ministry

5 13% of the immigrant population of metropolitan Athens come from Muslim Asian and African countries (Kavounidou, Tz. and A. Hatzaki, Αλλοδαποί που αιτήθηκαν προσωρινής άδειας παραμονής (Aliens who applied for temporary stay permit) (Athens: Ethniko Institouto Ergasias, 1999)). 6 Data according to leaders of the Muslim communities, To Vima, 31.5.2009. 7 Aarbakke, V., The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace, 2 vols, PhD dissertation, University of Bergen, 2000. Two of the mufti offices have websites: the official one of Komotini (www.muftikomotini.com) and the unofficial/elected one of Xanthi (www .iskecemuftulugu.org). 258 konstantinos tsitselikis for approval.8 The Ministry of National Education and Religion had launched a call for appointment to the secretariats of the three muftiates (Min. Dec. 29424/A3 of 16.3.2009) which after a month was recalled (Min. Dec. of 16.4.2009), further complicating the issue. The waqfs of Thrace and of the Dodecanese are administered by management committees under the supervision of the local authorities and the government. A new law on the waqfs of Thrace (3647/2008), which provides for elections of these committees, has not so far been implemented. When requested (before a court, in parliament, or in the army), there is provision for an Islamic oath. Act 2190/1994 (as amended by Act 3647/2008) provides for a quota of 0.5% of appointments in the public sector to be allocated to members of the Muslim minority, but it has not yet been implemented. Members of the minority of Thrace participate actively in political life and they get elected to the national parliament through the main political parties. In the elections of 2007 two such deputies were elected, both with the then opposition social democratic party PASOK. In the municipality and regional elections of 7/14 November 2010 that implemented the new administrative bodies (‘Kallikratis’ reform) immigrants with a permanent residence in Greece acquired the right to vote. However their participation was lower than expected. In Thrace, three minority Muslims have been elected mayors and many others members of the municipality and regional councils. It is worth noting that an independent ticket with a pro-Turkish orientation ran for the municipality of both Komotini and Xanthi, both failed to get more than 8% of the votes. After long discussions on challenging racial references in the content of Greek-ness, the new government of PASOK (elected in Octo- ber 2009), passed a series of new regulations and amended the Code of Citizenship (Act 3838/2010, FEK A 49) that rendered naturalisation far simpler to acquire for those immigrants with sustainable ties to the country (requiring legal residence of seven years). Thus the Greek citizenship law was brought closer to a paradigm favouring inclusive policies. Although it did not abolish the division between omogeneis/ allogeneis (native/expatriate), the law of citizenship for the first time

8 Announcement of the Mufti of Komotini in: www.muftikomotini.com/index .php?m=art&c=18&n=224. greece 259 introduced jus soli elements and thus triggered reactions from the nationalist political circles asserting that the pure character of the nation is under threat with special references to Islam. Islam was seen as “an alien element impossible to get assimilated into Greek society”, or it was predicted that “60 extremist Muslim deputies will fill up the Greek parliament to the satisfaction of Ankara”, and much more of the like.9 Against this xenophobic discourse, arguments in favour of social dynamics of inclusion were also voiced and the need for legali- sation to regulate cultural contact between Greeks and immigrants was highlighted.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There is no central national Muslim organisation, but there are many associations of Muslims of Greek citizenship as well as of immigrant Muslims. Very limited contacts are observed between minority and immigrant associations and these occur only in Athens. In Thrace, there is a number of cultural, educational and sports associations that are Turkish in character, a few regarded as Muslim Roma, and one Pomak. There are also a few that may be identified as Bektashi or Alevi. Two of the most important associations led by the Turkish political and professional minority elite in Thrace are:

• Σύλλογος επιστημόνων μειονότητας Θράκης/Bati Trakya Azınlığı Yüksek Tahsilliler Derneği (Association of University Graduates of the Minority of Thrace); president: Mustafa Katrancı (Egnatias 75, 69100 Komotini, tel: 0030 25310 29705). • Τουρκική Ένωση Ξάνθης/İskeçe Türk Birliği (Turkish Union of Xan- thi), not yet registered, president: Ahmet Kara (P. Ydras 2, 67100, Xanthi, tel: 0030 25410 23614, email: [email protected], www .iskeceturkbirligi.org).

Minority associations bearing in their title the appellation ‘Turkish’ face a ban by the Greek courts which since 1983 have upheld that such associations should have a clear definition on a religious and not

9 Greek Parliament, Minutes, Sessions of 10 and 11 March 2010, see the interven- tions of the deputies of LAOS, Plevris, Markakis, Georgiadis, Polatidis and the president of the LAOS, Giorgos Karatzaferis. 260 konstantinos tsitselikis national basis. The Turkish Union of Xanthi is one of these associations that have brought their case before the European Court of Human Rights (Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis and Others v. Greece, No. 26698/05). Although the Court in Strasbourg ruled it a violation of the right to set up an association without such a limitation, the Greek courts still do not implement the judgments issued by the court of Strasbourg. In Athens, a number of national associations have been set up by immigrant communities, such as the Pakistanis, the Egyptians, the Bangladeshis, the Kurds, the Palestinians, and the Afghanis etc. Most noteworthy are the Ελληνο-αραβικό Μορφωτικό Κέντρο (Arab- Hellenic Centre for Culture and Civilization) (Kyprou 2 & Pireos str., Moshato 18346, Athens, tel: 0030 2106910492, www.ahccc.gr, email: [email protected]) and the Ένωση Μουσουλμάνων Ελλάδας (Mus- lims Association of Greece); president: Naim Elghandour (9 Galaxia str N.Kosmos, Athens, tel: 0030 2106916055, http://equalsociety.com, email: [email protected]). The latter has a supra-national character and a high position as an interlocutor with the Greek authorities. Intra-Muslim dynamics are not obvious, as no clear discourse is articulated, but they are all united by concerns about practical problems regarding places for worship and cemeteries. Their survival strategy, faced with an indifferent Greek society and alien Greek Orthodox mainstream ideology, is to keep a low profile while supporting the national (Turkish) character of the minority. Internal divisions regarding interpretation of Islam, the application of Shari’a, Sunni and Shi’i Islamic practices, and ethnic origins, occur but without open conflict, under the shadow of the global tensions engendered by the 11 Septem- ber 2001 event. With regard to Islam in Thrace, religious dialogue and attempts to discuss the application of Shari’a, or other subjects, are very weak. Religion is entrapped in Greek-Turkish politics.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

About 300 mosques in Thrace, two on Kos and one on Rodos are officially open and more than 80 unofficial prayer houses function in greater Athens (also in Thessaloniki and other cities) run by immigrant Muslims.10 According to Act 2833/2000 (art. 7), a mosque should have

10 Tsitselikis, K., “Religious freedom of immigrants: The case of the Muslims” (in Greek), in Christopoulos and Pavlou, Η Ελλάδα της μετανάστευσης (The Greece of immigration), pp. 267–302. greece 261 been built in Paiania (a suburb of Athens) for the Olympic Games. When this law was not implemented, the new Act 3512/2006 provided for the construction of a mosque in Athens (run by a foundation controlled by the state) through state funding, but this has still not been implemented. The issue has become of major importance for Muslim communities, especially in Athens. After long discussions and periods of silence, the government announced on 7 April and again on 6 October 2010 that works are going to start and that the mosque is going to be built in the quarter of Votanikos. On the other hand the president of the Union of Muslims of Greece declared that just one mosque could not host the overwhelming needs of the Muslims of Athens.11

5 Children’s Education

Religious education in public schools is Greek Orthodox, to which are added occasional modules on world religions, Islam included. Parents have the right to withdraw their children from religious education. In 2009 there were 188 elementary and two high schools as well as two madrasas (high schools with a full mainstream Greek curriculum plus extra Islamic subjects) that provide bilingual minority education in Thrace and are funded primarily by the state and also partially out of waqf income for about 7,830 Muslim students. These schools, as well as five public high schools, all in Thrace, provide Islamic instruction.12 More than 100 Qur’an courses (kuran kursu) are offered outside school hours by private minority groups, and on Kos (Platani), the local imam has also been offering Qur’an courses since 1994. A foreign school run by Libya since 1979 (the “7th April School”) caters exclusively to pupils from Arab countries and provides Islamic religious education. In a few immigrant mosques and in the Greek-Arabic educational cultural centre in Athens, Islamic instruction is available to the vast majority of Muslims who cannot afford private school fees and attend Greek public schools, but very few students attend these courses.

11 http://www.tanea.gr/default.asp?pid=2&ct=1&artid=4572266. 12 Baltsiotis, L. and K. Tsitselikis, “Η μειονοτική εκπαίδευση στην Θράκη: Νομικό καθεστώς, προβλήματα και προοπτικές (The minority education of Thrace: Legal status, problems and perspectives)”, in Fragkoudaki, A. and Th. Dragona (eds),Πρόσθεση όχι Αφαίρεση, Πολλαπλασιασμός όχι ∆ιαίρεση. Η μεταρρυθμιστική παρέμβαση στην εκπαίδευση της μειονότητας της Θράκης (Addition vs. Subtraction, Multiplication vs. Division: The Reformative Intervention to the Minority Education of Thrace) (Athens: Metaihmio, 2008), pp. 57–87. 262 konstantinos tsitselikis

6 Higher and Professional Education

Islam is offered for non-Muslim students as a subject in the theological schools of Greece over one or two semesters (Universities of Athens and Thessaloniki). Since 1997, due to a special quota, 0.5% of student places in universities are available to Muslims from Thrace: about 700 Muslim students were granted the right to enrol to technical or university schools in 2010. An imam training school was envisaged by Act 1920/1991, but this was never implemented. Some imams are graduates of one or other of the two madrasas of Thrace or from Islamic faculties in Turkey, while others are self-taught.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Islamic cemeteries exist only in Thrace, Kos and Rodos, and the lack of a Muslim cemetery outside these areas causes serious hardship for Muslims who have to pay large amount of money so their relatives can be buried in Thrace. The construction of an Islamic cemetery is planned on the outskirts of Athens following the donation of a plot of land by the Church of Greece. However, for bureaucratic reasons and underlying political reluctance, work to establish the cemetery has not commenced up the time of writing. On 13 August 2010 the main Muslim cemetery of Komotini was vandalised by ultra-nationalists.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

No prayer facilities for Muslims are provided in state institutions or public buildings. Voluntary initiatives are permitted.

9 Religious Festivals

In Thrace, all Islamic religious festivals şeker( and kurban bayram), and the five blessed nights kandils:( ragayip, mevlut, berat, miraç and kadir) are celebrated and led by official and elected muftis. Minority schools also officially mark these Islamic religious holidays. In the rest of Greece, the state is neutral on the subject of Islamic celebrations and halal slaughter. Employment law grants Muslim workers the right greece 263 to free time for prayer and religious festivals, but implementation of this in practice is limited. Muslim immigrants face practical restrictions in the celebration of religious festivals, as there are not sufficient mosques, but they are free to organise celebrations as best they can using their own resources. In 2010, Ramadan was celebrated by 2,000 Muslims in an open prayer in Kotzia square and other public spaces in Athens. In some cases Greek nationalists reacted strongly to these gatherings.

10 Halal Food

Halal food is freely accessible in Thrace and there are no restrictions. Similarities with Christian Orthodox Easter slaughter practices make qurban (the slaughtering of animals for ‘Id al-Adha) socially acceptable. In Athens and other towns, access to halal food depends on personal networking.

11 Dress Codes

There are no legal restrictions on Islamic dress. In Thrace, the head scarf is widely worn, but pro-Turkish secularist circles tend to be intolerant of Islamic dress, especially as far as the wearing of the head scarf in minority schools is concerned. In Athens, as the active female Muslim population is very limited, cases of intolerance have not been reported.

12 Publication and Media

There are about seventeen Turkish newspapers and magazines and about seven radio stations broadcasting in Turkish which are run by and for the minority in Thrace. Some, such asAkide , edited by the Muf- tiate of Komotini,13 have a Muslim ethos and some, such as Gündem,14 have a pro-Turkish orientation. There is one bilingual Greek-Turkish

13 www.muftikomotini.com. 14 www.gundemgazetesi.org. Among others: www.rodopruzgari.com, www.millet .gr, www.batitrakya.net and www.birlikgazetesi.info. 264 konstantinos tsitselikis magazine, Azinlikca.15 Paratiritis, a Greek newspaper, contains some pages in Turkish. Local state radio broadcasts a limited news report in Turkish. In Athens, five daily and weekly newspapers are published in Arabic and one in Urdu. Many more Albanian newspapers (mostly imported from Albania, but a few printed in Greece in the form of newsletters) circulate in Greece, but they make little, if any, reference to Islam. A few websites promote the discussion of issues related to Islam in Greece. The most important among them is available in three languages (Greek, Arabic and English) run by the Muslim Association of Greece.16 Act 3592/2007 on “granting permits for media enterprises” provides that the broadcast and print media should use Greek as the main language, or translation into Greek. Both limitations burden Muslim minority and immigrant papers as they mostly do not use Greek and have low budgets. The National Council of Radio-Television for the first time so far issued Kral/King FM with a 3,000 euros penalty (Deci- sions 416/2010 and 588/2010) for having broadcasted—like any other minority radio—almost exclusively in Turkish. Issues regarding Islam are discussed by the mainstream media when a ‘problem’ comes up, or out of curiosity about Islamic practices regarding celebration held by Muslim immigrants in Athens, for example. The issue of the lack of an official mosque and cemetery in Athens has become the most familiar topic of discussion. The issue of the minority in Thrace (and more rarely the Muslims in the Dodecanese) has more political connotations and is presented from this perspective by the media, often linked to the question of Greek-Turkish relations.

13 Family Law

In the context of minority protection, which stems from Greece’s international commitments dating from 1881, 1913 and 1923, Islamic law is applied by the muftis’ courts of Thrace (Komotini, Xanthi and Didim- otyho). The muftis have jurisdiction (under Act 1920/1991) in specific family law disputes such as divorce, pensions, alimony (nafaqa) and

15 www.azinlikca.net. 16 www.equalsociety.com. greece 265 custody,17 and their decisions are automatically ratified by the Greek courts. Although Muslims are in theory free to choose between Greek civil courts and Islamic courts, the overwhelming majority of Muslim family cases are judged by the latter. Women rarely apply to the Greek courts while men overwhelmingly opt for the Mufti. There are no rules to deal with conflict of jurisdiction. Important issues of constitutional principle, especially with regard to gender equality, are not accommodated in the muftis’ courts. Greek courts adjudicating cases of Muslims from an immigrant background can apply Islamic family law through the rules of International Private Law. No instances of this have been reported so far.

14 Interreligious Relations

No data available.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In general the media reflect mainstream attitudes, which are quite indifferent if not hostile to Islam, which is strongly linked with Tur- key. Recent public debate on Islam in Greece has had two focuses: Thrace and immigrants. The former is related to the broader issue of the minority’s Turkish identity, while the latter occasionally appears in debates around Greece and its Orthodox character.18 Gradually, the position of the Muslim immigrants in Greece has attracted publicity and brought to light a series of crucial issues which were absent from the public agenda, such as the lack of a mosque and an Islamic cemetery in Athens. On the other hand, state authorities did not take any immediate action to respond to Muslims’ (and other

17 Ktistakis, Y., Το ιερό ∆ίκαιο και Μουσουλμάνοι Έλληνες πολίτες. Μεταξύ φιλελευθερισμού και κοινοτισμού (The Holy Law and the Muslim Greek citizens. Between communitarianism and liberalism) (Athens/Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas, 2006), and Tsitselikis, K., “Personal status of Greece’s Muslims: A legal anachronism or an example of applied multiculturalism?”, in Aluffi, R. and G. Zincone (eds.),The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), pp. 109–132. 18 Anagnostou, Dia and R. Gropas, “Domesticating Islam and Muslim immigrants: Political and church responses to constructing a central mosque in Athens”, in Pro- dromou, E., V. Makrides and V. Roudemetof (eds.), The Orthodox Church of Greece in the 21st Century: Religion, State and Society in an Era of Transition (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009). 266 konstantinos tsitselikis immigrants’) complaints. After a period of almost 20 years in which Muslim immigrants have remained in the shadow of social dynamics, the protest of 22 June 2009 against the Greek police opened new discussions about the position of Muslims in Greek society. Gradu- ally new voices in favour of the rights of Muslims were reflecting social and legal problems while a fierce anti-Muslim discourse was endorsed by ultra-right political forces, such as LAOS and the rising neo-Nazi Hrysi Avgi.19 Islamophobic discourses centred on the issue of citizenship, voting in local elections and the mosque in Athens. In 2010 the Minister of Defence abrogated the requirement that candidates for the School of Officers of the Greek Army should be of Greek descent. In the parliament the ultra-right wing LAOS asserted that this opens the gate for Muslims to become officers, and thus the national character of Greece’s army is threatened.20 Moreover their candidate for the regional elections connected the Muslim presence in Greece with a possibility of a future terrorist activity.21 In another case, the Bishop Amvrosios wrote, “One million Muslims today and many more tomorrow will strike against Orthodoxy! They have it in their blood. They are the sword of Mohamed”.22 The Bishop of Pireaus Serafim publically declared “Muslim faith is a catastrophic religion, incompatible with article 13 of the Greek Constitution, [. . .] as a priori it enhances itself and the Qur’an declares so, through crime, violence, terrorism and death. Consequently, the adopted Act on the establishment of a mosque in Athens does not comply with the Constitution”.23 This kind of discourse was coupled by cases of racist violence targeting Muslims: Among other incidents, on 18 October and 2 November

19 http://www.laos.gr/load_file.asp?epilogi=\press\txtfiles\ΠΑΤΡΑ231010.txt, http:// www.elora.gr/portal/interviews/9–-/2559-2010-11-04-14-41-49, http://xryshaygh.wordpress.com/. 20 http://www.mod.mil.gr/Pages/ViewPressObject.asp?HyperLinkID=4&MainLin kID=124&ObjectID=4296 and http://www.parliament.gr/ergasies/showfile.asp?file= syne100429.txt. 21 Adonis Georgiadis, http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9- 4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/syne101021.doc. 22 http://www.romfea.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4275:- l-qq-r&catid=26:2009-12-18-08-38-40. 23 http://www.romfea.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6896:- l------r&catid=26:2009-12-18-08-38-40. greece 267

2010, groups of ultra-nationalists attacked masjids and homes of Mus- lims in Athens. 24

16 Major Cultural Events

Events are mostly related to traditional religious festivals. Apart from that, cultural events in Thrace include wrestling contests in the northern mountain areas, often related to the Alevi-Bektashi calendar.

24 http://www.islam.gr/cgi-bin/pages/page3.pl?arlang=Greek&arcode=1011022009 38&argenkat=Αποκόμματα%20τύπου.

HUNGARY

Norbert Pap1

1 Muslim Populations

Muslims have never formed a significant part of the Hungarian population. In the 9th and 10th centuries there were a few Muslims, particularly so called Kaliz people, who originated from Khorezm and joined the wandering Hungarians with the Kabar Muslims. Buzurman or “Böszörmény” was the comprehensive name for the Muslims in the early Middle Ages and these terms survive in place names. In the era of the kings of the Árpád dynasty, 11th–13th centuries, the so called Ismaelita immigrants had an outstanding status due to their financial expertise and both their tax-collecting and minting work in the service of the state/king. Their assimilation was completed in the 14th century. In the 15th century the Hungarian state got into conflicts with the neighbouring and continuously expanding Ottoman Empire.2 From the beginning of the 16th century, with the defeat of the Hun- garian army at Mohács in 1526, Hungarian territory, including parts of today’s Croatia and Serbia, became a part of the Muslim world for 150 years. All the Muslim religious sites in Hungary, such as mosques, minarets and tombs date from that time. A similar ethnic and cultural condition developed in the southern and in one third of the middle areas of the historical Hungarian Kingdom. There was no significant Islamisation of the Hungarian people: the Bosnian, Albanian and Vlach population mixed with a few Turkish people formed the Islamic community. In the first decades of the 18th century, the wars of independence continued so all the historical territories of Hungary were freed from Ottoman regime, and a relatively peaceful relationship lasting two

1 Dr Norbert Pap, PhD, is Associate Professor at the Institute of Geography, Uni- versity of Pécs, Hungary. 2 Dávid, Géza and Fodor, Pál (eds.), Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe: the Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest (Leiden: Brill, 2000). 270 norbert pap centuries developed with those neighbouring territories that remained under Ottoman dominance. Hungary became a refuge for soldiers fleeing the Ottoman ranks during the wars in the region during the 19th century. A new dimension was opened up by the Turkish alliance during World War I and it also contributed to the legal recognition of Islam (Act XVII of 1916). Between the two World Wars it was mainly Bosnian migrants and a few representatives of the turkophile Hungar- ian intellectual class who formed a Hungarian Muslim community. Nowadays, the Muslim community is made up of Arab, Turkish, Afri- can, Afghan and Iranian immigrants and the growing number of converted Hungarians who form the Muslim community. According to the census in 2001 the number of Muslims was 3201. This number is regarded as an underestimate, and some suggest Muslims amount to between 20 to 30 thousands, although this is difficult to document. They concentrate in Budapest and some other cities (Pécs, Szeged, and Miskolc).

2 Islam and the State

The Hungarian Republic is a secular state with religious freedom ensured by Act 4 of 1990. State regulation differentiates the four “historical communities”: Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Evangelic and Jewish. The Muslim community is not counted among these. Citizens may offer 1% of their personal income tax to a community that is registered. It is the State Secretary for Religious, Ethnic and Civil Society Relations that is responsible for connecting the directors of the religious communities with the state. Relations with the Muslim community are regular. Questions of refugees, establishing and maintaining cultural institutions and mosques are the main issues. In political discussions the issue of Islam is raised when it comes to terrorism, cari- catures of Mohamed, Hungarian military participation in Afghanistan, the Palestinian-Israel conflict, and the case of Eduardo Rózsa-Flores.

3 Main Muslim Organizations

There are three registered Islamic communities in Hungary. The Hun- garian Islamic Community (HIC, 104 Károly Róbert Street, Buda- pest, the imam is György Jakab, www.magyariszlam.hu) is the oldest one which was established by Balázs Mihálffy in 1988. The current leader is the Hungarian Zoltán Bolek and its members are mainly ethnic Hungarians. Beside religious commitment, nationalism and hungary 271 patriotism are also characteristics of the community. They regularly organise national and international charitable activities, moreover, they maintain Muslim missions in refugee camps and they do missionary work in prisons, too. HIC is in close correspondence with the Hanif Cultural Foundation (www.hanif.hu/English/index.htm). The Community of Hungarian Muslims (CHM, Islamic Cultural Centre at 43, Sáfrány Street, Budapest, www.iszlamweb.hu) was established in 2000. It has two branches, in Szeged and Pécs. It is a member of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe. The leader of CHM, which has many foreign members as well, is the Hungarian Zoltán Sulok. The third and youngest organization is the Islamic Community (Dar as-Salam mosque, 29 Bartók Béla Street, Budapest, www.iszlam. hu). The IC was established in 2003 after seceding from the Commu- nity of Hungarian Muslims. The religious leader is Palestinian Tay- seer Saleh who follows Salafi tenets. Hungary is allocated a significant quota of Saudi pilgrim visas for the annual Hajj, and these are shared between the three communities. There are other Muslim groups in Hungary as well that are not registered. The most significant is led by the Egyptian Sheikh Abdu Abdel-Moneim (21 Dobozi Street, Budapest). It is supposed in Hun- gary, although the rumours are denied, that the communities and Sheikh Abdu receive some kind of financial aid from the rich Gulf States. There are two functioning Sufi tariqas. One of them is the Sül- eymanci (6 Makk Street, Budapest) while the other one is the Fetül- laci (7. Nagydiófa Street, Budapest, www.dialogusplatform.hu/index .php?lang=en). The Dialogue Platform organisation was established in 2005 with both Turkish and Hungarian members. The Aluakf Founda- tion (31 Huba Street, Miskolc) maintains a chapel.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Mosques and chapels are obliged to fulfil the duty of registration when they are established and start to function. Dozens of these can be found in the country. There are no penalties attached to failing to register a place of regular worship. The most important registered ones are:

• Mosque: 104. Károly Róbert Boulevard, Budapest • Islamic Cultural Centre: 43. Sáfrány Street, 1116 Budapest • The Jami of Pasha Jakovali Hassan: 2. Rákóczi Street, 7623 Pécs • Mekka Mosque: 23. Gogol Street, 6722 Szeged 272 norbert pap

• Dar al-Salam Mosque: 29. Bartók Béla Street, 1114 Budapest • El Tawba Mosque: 21. Dobozi Street, Budapest • Chapel in Miskolc: 30. Huba Street, 3526 • The Jami of Malkocs Bej: 15. Kossuth Square, Siklós • Oratory: Turkish Lorry parking place in Kecskemét

This overall number of Muslim places of worship is many times this.

5 Children’s Education

There is a primary school at 2 Kavics Street, XV district, Budapest, which is maintained by the Libyan state and allows children to study in Arabic. Religious instruction is freely available in mosques, partly for children as well. Islamic religious education is not available for children in state schools. Although MIC is trying hard to establish an Islamic nursery school, its efforts seem unsuccessful for the time being.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There is no Muslim institution for higher education in Hungary. Hun- garian Muslims pursue their religious studies mainly in Turkey and in the Middle East, at Al-Azhar University in Egypt for example. In Hun- gary the only possible way to learn about the Islam is to study at the Faculty of Eastern Languages and Cultures at either a religious or state university. Studies in connection with Islam are available in the following forms: Islam Master’s Degree programme at the Eötvös Lóránd University, Modern Islamic specialisation related to Balkan Studies at the University of Pécs, Security Policy Studies at the Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defence, International Relations at the Corvi- nus University of Budapest, canonical law at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Altaic Studies and Mediterranean Studies Doctoral programme at the University of Szeged.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The MIC was the only organisation that made the idea of a Muslim cemetery possible. There is a burial ground in Kozma Street, Budapest, which is basically a renovated cemetery for Turkish soldiers who died hungary 273 in World War I. Besides that, there is a well-known Muslim burial place in Sopron and one can find smaller, separate Muslim areas in other public cemeteries.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

It is primarily the MIC that organises visits to jails and refugee camps in the context of formal agreements. Apart from that the CHM organises visits to the same places at regular intervals. Chairman Bolek of the MIK has been invited to explain Islam to Hungarian military personnel sent on missions to Muslim countries (Iraq and Afghanistan).

9 Religious Festivals

In Hungary the Islamic communities celebrate the common Islamic festivals. They do not even differ either in ceremonies nor celebration from customs in any other Arabian countries (Ramadan, ‘Id al-Fitr, Iftar, Muslim New Year, ‘Ashura, ‘Id al-Adha, etc.). These occasions are not recognised as “official” holidays.

10 Halal Food

It is not a problem for believers in Budapest to buy halal food because there are many specialist restaurants and shops. Cities like Szeged or Pécs also have shops that offer halal food products. Halal slaughtering in households occurs in the rural areas of the country. Those who live in the countryside inform each other about the occasional opportunity on the internet.

11 Dress Codes

Hijab and beards are not everyday phenomena in Hungary because of the low number of believers but those who decide to wear them are freely allowed to do that—however, in Hungary one never sees a woman wearing full face covering. It is really rare to hear about harassment due to Muslim dress practice but it sometimes occurs and is instigated, for example, by extreme right-wing activists and skinheads. 274 norbert pap

12 Publication and Media

The magazinesHívó Szó (Calling Word) and the Új Gondolat (New Idea) are published irregularly. Mosques and Islamic foundations maintain websites like: www.iszlam.com, www.dialogusplatform.hu/ index.php?lang=en, www.iszlam.hu, www.iszlamweb.hu, www.hanif .hu/English/index.htm, www.magyariszlam.hu. Communities and foundations publish good-quality missionary, religious books and booklets. The Hanif Cultural Foundation rises above the others in its publishing activity. A substantial number of published works are available in the translation of Halima Zsuzsanna. News related to Hungarian Muslims is rare to hear.

13 Family Law

State laws do not recognise marriage in a religious setting. However, mosque leaders give advice based on the Shari’a for those who take part in preparations for marriage. It is possible to have a pre-nuptial agreement but it is no effect outside the mosque.

14 Interreligious Relations

Cultural and religious variety in Hungary has been present since the Middle Ages. There has been a good deal of religious conversation and numbers have grown in the last twenty years due to growing international contacts. The Muslims’ connections with historical churches are well-regulated though the impact of their conversation is questionable due to their huge difference in size. Smaller, Eastern Catholic Churches can be better compared to them in size. Relations with the Hungarian Copts, who opened their first church recently in Budapest, are more complex. The connection with some neo-Protestants Churches or with the members of the Hungarian Jewish community is quite sensitive at the same time.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Public opinion towards Islam is limited but perceivable. Works of rep- utable scholars contribute to the process of introducing the Middle East or the culture of the Islamic world and help understanding. Such hungary 275 scholars and their works have influenced the Hungarian perception of Islamic culture and art in a positive way. Unfortunately, the daily press focuses on negative news like the Eduardo Rózsa-Flores case in 2010 and the shooting death of MIC Vice-president and two fellows by Bolivian policemen because they were supposedly preparing an attack against the president and public institutions. The MIC considers him as a martyr. In the last few years, mainly in smaller towns, a mild antipathy towards Muslims and Turks is noticeable. The opposite is true in university towns where Muslims are visibly present and experiences in coexistence are definitely good.

16 Major Cultural Events

Muslim communities organise lectures on religious themes and summer camps for believers on a regular basis. From time to time they invite international Muslim scholars to visit Hungary and to give lectures. There is interest in Hungary in Muslim art too. An excellent example was the Kuwaiti Islamic Calligraphy exhibition and the organization of a symposium at the Helikon Castle Museum in Keszthely July 2009. The most famous calligraphers in the world had a meeting in the country. Within the scope of the Pécs 2010 European Capital of Culture programme the Community of Hungarian Muslims organised an Islamic day both for the Muslims and non-Muslims. Many Arab embassies organised cultural celebrations under the aegis of the programme. The occasion when the muezzin called the believers five times from the tower of the city hall to prayer on 4 May 2010 was a special event because it last happened 300 years ago. At the end of 2010 a travelling exhibition was opened in Pécs and in Budapest to display the findings of excavations in Margati, Syria. High-ranking Muslim and Christian church leaders, politicians and diplomats were present at the opening ceremony.

ICELAND

Göran Larsson1

1 Muslim Populations

The data for this country report are primarily based on official statistics, online information published by the Association of Muslims in Iceland (Félag múslima á Íslandi) and media reports.2 There are hardly any academic studies of Islam and Muslims in Iceland, the main reason being that very few Muslims live in this geographically remote part of Europe. According to historical records and folklore traditions, the first contact Iceland had with Muslims goes back to the summer of 1627, when a group of so-called ‘Turkish pirates’, who had actually travelled from North Africa, raided settlements on the south-west coast, the Westman Islands and the eastern fjords. This episode is of no importance for the composition of the Muslim community in Ice- land today, but is significant because it is the first recorded Icelandic contact with Islam and Muslims. According to information provided by the International Religious Freedom Report 2009,3 commissioned by the US Department of State, the great majority of Icelanders (79%) are members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, and 5% are members of the so-called free churches, out of a total population of about 309,000. The number of Muslims is estimated at approximately 800 to 1,200 individuals. The Muslim community is made up of immigrants of diverse ethnic and linguistic

2 Islam and the State

Even though the state provides for and guarantees freedom of religion, the official religion of Iceland is Lutheranism.4 It is, however, possible to start religious associations as long as they do not involve preaching or practices that are “prejudicial to good morals or public order” (Article 63). According to Article 62 of the Constitution of Iceland, the Evangelical Lutheran Church is the state church. Consequently, the state pays the salaries of the church’s clergy, who are employed as public servants under the Ministry of Judicial and Ecclesiastical Affairs. All taxpayers over the age of 16 must pay a tax to the Evangelical Lutheran Church or to another officially recognised religious affiliation (for example, to one of the two Muslim organisations). If this is not possible or not desired by the taxpayer, the ‘religious tax’ is paid to the secular university of Iceland (Article 64). Even though the judicial and economic systems favour the Christian traditions (for example, by observing the days of the Christian calendar as national holidays) and grant the Lutheran Church a privileged position, most Icelanders are generally not interested in religion. Most children are baptised and people usually marry and hold funerals in church, but the Lutheran religion is primarily seen as an expression of Icelandic culture.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

According to Statistics Iceland there are two recognised organisations that promote Muslim interests. The Association of Muslims in Ice- land (Félag múslima á Íslandi, Dalseli 34, 109 Reykjavík; http://www .islam.is/) was established in 1997 by a Palestinian immigrant, Salmann Tamini, and has 373 members for the year 2010. The Association has

4 The Constitution of the Republic of Iceland (No. 33, 17 June 1944, as amended 30 May 1984, 31 May 1991, 28 June 1995 and 24 June 1999), http://government.is/ constitution/; see especially Articles 62, 63 and 64. iceland 279 been in contact with Muslims in England, Sweden and Saudi Arabia. During Ramadan it invited the guest imam Sheikh Adel from Libya to lead the taraweeh prayer.5 The other organisation, the Islamic Cultural Centre of Iceland ( Menningarsetur múslima á Íslandi, Gardastræti 11, 121 Reykjavík) was registered in 2009 and has 218 members for the year 2010.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The Association of Muslims in Iceland and the Islamic Cultural Centre of Iceland have their own houses of worship, with daily prayer nights and weekly Friday prayers that attract a core group of approximately 30–50 and 60–70 individuals, respectively. There are no purpose-built mosques, and the two organisations use rooms for both prayers and meetings. The Association of Muslims in Iceland has not been allowed to erect a purpose-built mosque in Reykjavík, which some Muslims interpret as indicating that Muslims are treated differently from followers of other religions. According to media reports in 2010, a private group of foreign Muslims have tried to buy a house in order to use it as a mosque. This project was, however, criticised by Salmann Tamimi, chairman of the Association of Muslims in Iceland while it was perceived as an attempt by so-called foreign and radical Muslims to take control over the Muslim community in Iceland.6

5 Children’s Education

The teaching of religion is obligatory in public schools. According to the International Religious Freedom Report 2009, teaching for grades 1–10 (ages 6–15) should be based on “the Christian heritage of Icelan- dic culture, equality, responsibility, concern, tolerance, and respect for human values”. The instruction is, however, open and there have been complaints that teachers have been indoctrinating pupils by overem- phasising Christian traditions, even though non-Christian traditions,

5 This information is retrieved from the homepage of the organisation and its year report for 2003. 6 “House purchased for private Reykjavik mosque”, IceNews, 9 October, 2010, http://www.icenews.is/index.php/2010/10/09/house-purchased-for-private-reykjavik- mosque/#more-18495, accessed 11 November 2010. 280 göran larsson pluralism and multiculturalism all form part of the curriculum. In response to a report published in 2010, the Minister of Education Katrin Jakobsdottir stressed that the school system should be more neutral when it comes to confessions. For example, it is recommended that there should be a general ban for religious representatives from visiting schools and after school clubs in their official capacity.7 It is possible for students to be exempted from so-called Christian classes, but there are no alternatives for Muslim pupils within the school system. Most schools are public institutions, and there are no independent or free Muslim schools.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

The Theology Department of the University of Reykjavík has religious studies programmes with modules on the history or sociology of religions, but not on Islam as a separate subject. The Department has organised open lectures on Islam together with the US Embassy in Iceland.8 There is no training programme for imams in Iceland.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Iceland operates and cares for all cemeteries, to which all the recognised religious organisations and traditions have access.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Religious data are not kept in prisons, and there are no arrangements for Muslim pastoral services.

7 “Icelandic church and schools discuss relationship”, IceNews, 29 October 2010, http://www.icenews.is/index.php/2010/10/29/icelandic-church-and-schools-discuss- relationship/, accessed 12 November 2010. 8 “Imam holds open lecture on Islam in Iceland”, Iceland Review, 27 February 2008, http://www.icelandreview.com/icelandreview/daily_news/?cat_id=16539&ew_0_a_ id=301632, accessed 18 April 2010. iceland 281

9 Religious Festivals

There is no detailed information about religious festivals, but the webpage of the Association of Muslims in Iceland contains basic information about the celebration of Islamic religious festivals.

10 Halal Food

There is no specific information about the availability of halal food in Iceland but, according to Salmann Tamimi, the chairperson of the Association of Muslims in Iceland, there is one Pakistani restaurant in Reykjavík that serves halal food.9 The difficulty in finding halal food in Iceland is also confirmed by a question posted by a Muslim woman in a so-called live dialogue organised by the webpage IslamOnline.10

11 Dress Codes

Although there are no legal restrictions, there have been some earlier reports about discrimination against Muslim women wearing hijab but, according to the International Religious Freedom Report 2009, there were no reports for this year (i.e. 2009).

12 Publications and Media

The website of the Association of Muslims in Iceland www.islam( .is) contains general information about Islam, the Qur’an and activities organised by the group. While activity on the homepage is low, the online discussion group for Muslim women (http://groups.yahoo .com/group/kvennafundir/) linked to the webpage is more active. The language used for communication is either Icelandic or English.

9 Iceland Review, 29 July 2008, http://www.icelandreview.com/icelandreview/ search/news/Default.asp?ew_0_a_id=309477, accessed 6 January 2010. 10 Sheikh Muhammad Ali Al-Hanooti, “General fatwa session. Date Thursday, Jul 11, 2002”, http://www.islamonline.net/livefatwa/english/Browse.asp?hGuestID=5527fC, accessed 12 January 2010. 282 göran larsson

Because there are so few Muslims in Iceland, there is no market for translations of Islamic books, and Islamic publications are therefore limited to online forums, especially those referred to above.

13 Family Law

No data available.

14 Interreligious Relations

The state in Iceland does not directly support any interfaith programmes, but according to the International Freedom Report 2009 a number of churches and religious groups are involved in interfaith and dialogue groups. There are no national interreligious councils, but in 2006 the Forum for Interfaith Dialogue was set up to work for peaceful coexistence and tolerance in Icelandic society. The Evangelic Lutheran Church of Iceland supports this endeavour. The Forum consists of thirteen religious groups registered with the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs.11 For the month of Ramadan (2009), a prayer room was opened for Muslims at the University of Iceland.12

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Public debate about Islam and Muslims is informed by global and international events rather than by local Muslim affairs. Nonetheless there are indications that there are more negative opinions about Mus- lims than about immigrants in general.13 Plans to construct a purpose- built mosque in Reykjavík have been covered by the media, and the Muslim community perceived the delay in issuing the building permit as a case of discrimination and Islamophobia. It is also alleged that

11 “Forum for interfaith dialogue created in Iceland”, The Lutheran World Federa- tion, http://www.lutheranworld.org/News/LWI/EN/1969.EN.html, accessed 6 January 2010. 12 “Multi-faith prayer room at the University of Iceland”, IceNews, 12 August 2009, http://www.icenews.is/index.php/2009/08/12/multi-faith-prayer-room-at-the- university- of-iceland/, accessed 11 November 2010. 13 Strabac, Z. and O. Listhaug, “Anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe: A multi- level analysis of survey data from 30 countries”, Social Science Research 37 (2008), pp. 268–286, especially p. 278. iceland 283

Omega, a Christian television station, has broadcast negative opinions about Islam.14

16 Major Cultural Events

No major cultural events are reported that concern Islam and Mus- lims in Iceland. However, a so-called ‘sound sculpture’ by art student Thórarinn Jónsson, echoing a recording of the Islamic prayer, was installed on the balcony of the Iceland Academy of the Arts in Reykjavík in 2008. According to the artist, the aim of the installation was to counterbalance the negative image of Islam that prevails in the society. Because of its controversial nature and because it disturbed public order, the installation was removed from the building and the school asked the artist to close it down.15

14 Larsson and Svanberg, “The Faroe Islands and Iceland”, p. 12, in International Religious Freedom Report 2009. 15 Roberts, R., “First interview with fake ROM bomber. Few regrets, and a new stunt in Iceland”, http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/toronto/archive/2008/10/31/ first-interview-with-fake-rom-bomber-few-regrets-and-a-new-stunt-in-iceland.aspx, accessed 6 January 2010.

IRELAND

Victoria Montgomery1

1 Muslim Populations

Ireland’s most recent census, carried out in 2006, showed that out of a total population of 2.24 million there were 32,539 Muslims in Ire- land, which was a massive 69% increase on the 2002 census.2 However, the Islamic Foundation of Ireland has now estimated the figure to be approximately 50,000, a claim which was reiterated in the Irish Times by Ali Selim, a key figure in the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland.3 Unlike the UK and France, where the Muslim communities are linked to their former colonies, there is no dominant national or ethnic background within the Muslim community in Ireland. The community is made up of 50 nationalities.4 The census does, however, show that the majority of Muslims are non-Irish, which obviously correlates to high levels of immigration.5 Oliver Schardbrodt states that around 90% of the Muslim community in Ireland arrived in the last 20 years.6 The vast majority of Muslims in Ireland are Sunni; in 2007 the Shi’i Mus- lim community in Ireland was estimated to number approximately 5,000.7

1 Victoria Montgomery is a research fellow and teaching assistant within the School of Politics at Queen’s University, Belfast. She has recently completed her PhD entitled, “Identity, Integration and Belonging: Muslims in Ireland”, and is the author of “Are you a Protestant or a Catholic Muslim? The path of Muslim integration into Northern Ireland”, in Rehman, J. and S. Breau (eds.), Religion, Human Rights and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), pp. 489–519. 2 The Republic of Ireland Census (2006), available atwww.cso.ie . 3 Taylor, C., ‘Muslim group urges acceptance of niqab’, The Irish Times, 6 February 2010, available at: http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2010/0206/12242638 87684.html, accessed 10 March 2010. 4 McGarry, P., “Muslim community in plea for more burial grounds”, The Irish Times, 30 August 2008, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/ 2008/0830/1220023440449.html, accessed 5 September 2008. 5 Those citing an Irish nationality in the 2006 census numbered 9,761 while non- Irish numbered 21,613. 6 Scharbrodt, O., ‘Islam in Ireland’, Interview on Press TV, 22 July 2010, www .youtube.com/watch?v=cEg7cBy2t24, accessed 1 September 2010. 7 Interviews with members of the Shi’i community in Ireland in 2007. 286 victoria montgomery

While Muslims are found in every county in Ireland, more than half of the community live in Dublin county and city, with Cork home to Ireland’s second largest Muslim community.8 The number of Muslims in other areas of Ireland has also been increasing. It has been estimated for example, that there are now 3,000 Muslims in Galway.9 There are no exclusively Muslim residential areas in Ireland. Muslim communities in Ireland are comparatively well-off financially, which is linked to patterns of Muslim settlement in Ireland. Sustained Muslim settlement from the 1950s until the early 1990s was made up primarily of students who came for higher education and then stayed, or those wishing to set up businesses. Thus, they had solid educational and professional backgrounds. The Islamic Founda- tion of Ireland (IFI) for example, estimates that there are more than 4,000 Muslim doctors in Ireland,10 which accounts for 8% of the total community. However, Ireland’s economic boom since the 1990s has diversi- fied the face of Muslim immigration. The early 1990s saw groups of Muslim refugees arrive from Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo. Growing numbers of Muslim asylum-seekers have also arrived from Nigeria, Algeria, Libya and Iraq, as well as large numbers of economic migrants from across the world.11 Therefore, it is likely that the socio-economic make-up of the community may alter in the coming years. There is a dearth of research and literature relating to the active participation of all minority ethnic groups in Ireland, although a report from 2005 did indicate that there was evidence of a growth in activism among immigrants in Ireland.12 While there are currently no Muslims in political office in Ireland, a group called the Muslim Community Lobby was established in May 2007 to encourage Irish Muslims to

8 The Republic of Ireland Census (2006),www.cso.ie . 9 Siggins, L., ‘‘First Irish imam promotes mosque”, The Irish Times, 19 June 2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2010/0619/1224272869696_pf.html, accessed 5 August 2010. 10 The Islamic Foundation of Ireland,www.islaminireland.com . 11 Flynn, K., “Understanding Islam in Ireland”, in Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 17, no. 2 (2006), pp. 223–238 (231). 12 Ugba, A., Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Ireland (Oldenburg: POLI- TIS, 2005), available at http://www.politis-europe.uni-oldenburg.de/download/ Ireland .pdf, accessed 10 March 2009. ireland 287 vote.13 Furthermore, the main Muslim organisations do participate in government consultations on a wide range of issues.14

2 Islam and the State

Ireland is an independent republic based on representative democracy. Although the Irish constitution originally contained a clause (Article 44) which made explicit mention of the special position of the Catholic Church in Ireland, this was removed by referendum in 1973. The constitution now guarantees freedom of conscience and freedom of profession and practice of religion (subject to public order and morality) to every citizen. It also guarantees that the state will not endow any religion or impose any penalties for religious belief.15 The constitution also makes blasphemy a criminal offence. However, until 2009 there was no exact legal formulation of this offence. Despite the Law Reform Commission arguing in 1991 that blasphemy had no place in Irish law, the government decided that a referendum to change the constitution would be too costly. Consequently, in July 2009, the blasphemy law was passed in the Daíl as part of the Defamation Act.16 This makes it an offence to utter or publish matter that is grossly abusive or insulting thereby causing outrage among substantial adherents of a religion. Muslims are therefore protected under this law. However, due to substantial anger about the Blasphemy Law among sections of Irish society, the Justice Minister Dermot Ahern announced in March 2010 that a referendum may take place to repeal the legislation, although no further government commitment to this has been given. Religions and religious organisations are not publicly funded in Ireland with the exception that the state will fund denominational schools. However, religious organisations are eligible for charitable status, which allows for some tax exemptions. The IFI, for example, has been accorded the status of a Friendly Society (charitable status). Muslims are given legal protection from discrimination in Ireland. The Equal Status Acts 2000–2004 prohibit discrimination on religious

13 The Muslim Community Lobby:www.muslimcommunitylobbyireland.blogspot .com. 14 See Islamic Foundation of Ireland: www.islaminireland.com, and Islamic Cul- tural Centre of Ireland: www.islamireland.ie. 15 Irish Parliament: http://oireachtas.ie. 16 Ibid. 288 victoria montgomery

(and other) grounds and aim to promote equality, while incitement to hatred legislation also applies to religious communities. In addition to these laws there are several state agencies which enforce equality and work on behalf of minority communities. These include the Equal- ity Authority and the Garda Racial and Intercultural Office (GRIO). Indeed the GRIO has intervened in two cases where Muslim women were refused passports due to wearing the hijab and resolved the cases in their favour.17 The Finance Bill, published in February 2010, may introduce Islamic finance practices into Ireland. It proposes new measures and tax changes, which would comply with Sharia law and thus, not only attract business from the Muslim world but make it possible for religious Muslims in Ireland to conduct their business as Sharia law requires.18

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The first Islamic organisation in Ireland, the Dublin Islamic Soci- ety, was established in 1959. The name was changed in 1990 to the Islamic Foundation of Ireland (IFI) (163 South Circular Road, Dub- lin, Dublin 8, tel: +353 (0)1 4533242, www.islaminireland.com, email: [email protected]). The IFI established Ireland’s first mosque in 1976 and other branches of the IFI have been established throughout Ireland. The IFI has a written constitution and an elected council. Membership is open to all Muslims in Ireland and every Mus- lim is an honorary member. The IFI, on its own website, cites itself as the official representative of Muslims in Ireland. However, the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland (ICCI) (19 Roebuck Road, Clonskeagh, Dub- lin 14, tel: +353 (0)1 2080000, www.islamireland.ie, email contact via a contact form on the website) with a large purpose-built Mosque and Islamic Centre, which regularly welcomes politicians and other visiting groups, has become the public face of Islam in Ireland.19 The ICCI was established in 1996 with funding from Sheikh Hamdan Bin Rashid

17 Islamic Human Rights Commission, “Briefing: Good practice on the headscarf in Europe”, 9 March 2004, available online at http://www.ihrc.org.uk/show.php?id=1030, accessed 20 May 2009. 18 Irish Parliament: http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/bills28/ bills/2010/0910/document1.htm. 19 Flynn, “Understanding Islam in Ireland”, p. 226. ireland 289

Al Maktoum, the Hereditary Prince of Dubai. It performs a wide range of religious and social functions, such as translation services, marital and funeral services, a library, a gymnasium and a women’s section. A community welfare office was established in 2005, which facilitates conferences and workshops for service providers. There are no significant differences between the ways in which the IFI and the ICCI publicly represent Islam in Ireland, and while clearly the leadership of the two organisations differs, many Muslims tend to pray at both centres, depending on which is most convenient on a particular day.20 Representing Shi’i Muslims in Ireland is the Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre (Milltown Bridge, Dundrum, Dublin 14, tel: +00353 (0) 1 2604491, http://homepage.eircom.net/~ahlulbyteassociation/). As well as being a mosque, the centre runs social activities, lectures and acts as the main point of contact for the Shi’i community in Ireland. In addition, the Bab-ul-Ilm Society (86 Beach Park, Easton Road, Leixlip, Co. Kil- dare, tel: +353 (0) 61 56922, www.babulilm.ie, email: babulilm.ireland @gmail.com) is a recently established group, formed to help meet the needs of Shi’i Muslims in Ireland. Other Muslim organisations include the Galway Islamic Society established in 1978 (13 Sandyview Drive, Riverside, Galway, tel: +353 (0) 91 751621, www.gicc.ie), the Cork Muslim society established in 1984 (Unit D, Sitecast Industrial Estate, Togher, Cork, tel: +353 (0)21 4320301, www.corkmosque.org, email: [email protected]), the Limerick Islamic Soci- ety (Old Dooraday Road, Limerick, tel: +353 (0) 61 635151) and the Waterford Islamic Society, established in 1999 (Waterford Mosque, 1 Viewmount, Waterford). Like the IFI and ICCI, these organisations also perform religious and social functions but on a much smaller scale. All of these societies can also be contacted via the IFI. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Association (6–7 Well Park Grove, Galway, tel: +353 (0) 91 68832, www.islamahmadiyya.ie) is a vibrant organisation with a women’s and youth branch, which has gained more attention in light of the new Ahmadiyya Mosque being built in Galway. A religious body called the Irish Council of Imams was set up in September 2006, with the aim of representing both Sunni and Shi’i imams (The council can be contacted via its secretary Ali Selim at the ICCI.). The Coun- cil recently spoke out against attempts to ban the niqab in Europe.21

20 Interviews with members of the Muslim community in Ireland, 2006–2007. 21 Taylor, C. ‘Muslim group urges acceptance of niqab’. 290 victoria montgomery

For young Muslims, the various universities in Ireland have vibrant Islamic societies and another group called Muslim Youth Ireland (www.muslimyouthireland.wordpress.com) established its website in May 2009, and has been active in organising activities for Muslim teenagers including a summer camp. Several controversial figures are associated with smaller Muslim organisations in Ireland. The Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland (15 Westmoreland Street, Dublin 2, tel: +353 (0)1 6729038, email: [email protected]) is an organisation set up by Sheikh Sha- heed Satardien. Despite his claim to have seventeen Muslim organisations affiliated to the Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland,22 Satardien’s unpopularity with the main organisations has meant that the council has not been successful in establishing itself as the umbrella group for Muslims in Ireland.23 An organisation which has been attracting some publicity is the Muslim Public Affairs Committee Ireland. This organisation, which describes itself as an empowerment system, defending Muslim interests and Islam in Ireland, was set up and run by an Irish convert, Liam Egan, whose intolerant views on homosexuality for example, have been criticised within the Muslim community in Ireland.24 However, despite organising the protest outside the Belgium embassy in May 2010 (see section 15), the MPAC Ireland website, domain name and Twitter page have all been removed, suggesting that MPAC Ireland may no longer exist. One final controversial figure is Khalid Kelly, an Irish Muslim convert who was previously linked to the radical Islamist group al-Muhajiroun. After undergoing weapons training in Pakistan, he returned to Ireland in 2010 and has since announced in media that he plans to set up a new organisation called Islam for Ireland,25 although to-date there is no information this planned group has taken form.

22 Satardien, S., The Great Debate—Islamic Reformation or Counter- Reformation (2008), available at http://www.themuslimleader.info/documents/Islamic%20reformation.doc, accessed 1 October 2009. 23 Sheikh Satardien has been vocal about what he perceives as growing extremism among Ireland’s Muslim communities, something which has been disputed by the IFI and ICCI. He has also accused the ICCI of inviting hard-line extremist clerics to preach: Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland Press Release, 29 October 2007. 24 AlKabour, M., ‘An Irish Muslim Response to MPACIE’, available at: http:// antimpacie.wordpress.com/, accessed 1 November 2010. 25 Fitzgerald, Mary, ‘Islamist Irishman comes home, with a plan’ (31.07.10), The Irish Times, 31 July 2010, available at: http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ weekend/2010/0731/1224275874801_pf.html, accessed 5 August 2010. ireland 291

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Ireland currently has three purpose-built mosques. The first, the Bally- haunis Mosque in Co. Mayo was built in 1986 by a local Muslim businessman. The ICCI in Dublin is a large and impressive mosque, which was opened in 1996. Both ICCI and Ballyhaunis are Sunni mosques. Also in 1996, Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre in Dublin was opened. Com- monly referred to as Husseinia, it is a mosque and Islamic centre for the Shi’i community and is the only Shi’i mosque in Ireland. Shi’i Muslims outside Dublin tend to pray in private or rented houses or apartments. In addition to these, there is also the large Dublin Mosque and Islamic Centre which is run by the IFI and is currently raising money for an extension, for which planning permission has been granted. Fundrais- ing for new mosques is also taking place in Galway and Cork. Most recently, the foundation stone for the first purpose built Mosque in County Galway was laid in September 2010. This Mosque is associated with the Ahmadiyya Muslim community in Ireland. There are also rented or purchased houses used as mosques throughout Ireland.26 There has been some opposition to mosques in Ireland, usually related to traffic and planning issues. In Cork for example, the mosque was forced to shut in 2001 over a lack of planning permission for it to be used as a mosque. The community are now based in an industrial park, although in November 2010 planning permission was granted to rezone the site from industrial to social and community use and for a permanent Islamic centre to be built there, for which fundraising in ongoing.27 Outside of Dublin therefore, the key issue is a lack of finances to build or acquire a suitable space to accommodate the growing numbers of Muslims.28 In addition to the mosques, there are also prayer rooms or halls in many hospitals and universities such as the Royal College of Surgeons and Roscommon County Hospital. It is quite difficult to quantify the number of prayer rooms in Ireland, as the number is continually increasing and the locations may change according to circumstance.

26 The IFI website lists mosques in Galway, Dundalk, Carlow, Portlaoise, Mullin- gar, Waterford, Limerick, Kerry Cavan and Clare, as well as smaller prayerhalls and mosques in Dublin. 27 Cork Muslim Society: www.corkmosque.org. 28 Sakaranaho, Tuula, Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism, Islam: Cross-reading Finland and Ireland (Leiden: Brill, 2006), p. 307. 292 victoria montgomery

While the main mosques, particularly in Dublin, are attended by Mus- lims of all ethnic and national backgrounds, there are growing numbers of prayer rooms based on particular schools of thought or language.29 The Blackpitts Mosque in Dublin is a Deobandi mosque with preaching in Urdu while the Tablighi Jamaat group are based around a mosque in Lucan (Dublin), and the Nigerian community worship in a business park in Dublin preaching what they term ‘African Sufism’.30 In addition to these groups, there have been unconfirmed links between the ICCI and the Muslim Brotherhood. While Sheikh Satardien, the leader of the Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland, has made many such allegations in his publicised criticisms of the ICCI,31 this link may also be explained by the fact that the headquarters of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) is based at the ICCI. The ECFR is a group that was established in March 1996 with the aim of guiding and meeting the needs for juridical advice of Muslims in Europe.32 The president of the ECFR is Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. He is seen as one of the spiritual leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, although he claims to no longer be a member, and in fact was offered the leadership of the Brotherhood in 2004, although he declined it.33

5 Children’s Education

There are currently two Muslim primary schools in Dublin, which are funded by the Department of Education. The Muslim National School was set up by the IFI in 1990 and the North Dublin Muslim School was established in 2001. They follow the Irish school curriculum but have an Islamic ethos, teaching Arabic and Qur’anic studies. Both schools have large waiting lists and consequently both plan to expand.34 However, while plans by the Muslim National School have

29 Fitzgerald, M., “Ireland’s Muslims forging an identity”, The Irish Times, 10 Octo- ber 2006), available at http://www.irishtimes.com/focus/gageby/underthecrescent/ identity.htm, accessed 2 November 2009. 30 Ibid. 31 Satardien, S., “Combating extremism in religion worldwide”, Metro Eireann, 8 and 15 November 2007, available at http://www.metroeireann.com/article/combating- extremism-in-religion,791, accessed 20 May 2009. 32 The European Council for Fatwa and Research: www.e-cfr.org. 33 Belen Soage, A., “Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Portrait of a leading Islamic cleric”, Mid- dle Eastern Review of International Affairs, vol. 12, no. 1 (March 2008), pp. 51–68 (55). 34 Campos, Adelina, ‘City’s Muslim school is eyeing up new site as waiting list swells’, The Irish Herald, 25 August 2010, available at: http://www.herald.ie/national-news/ ireland 293 been put on hold for now due to economic considerations, the North Dublin Muslim School is expected to lodge an application with Dub- lin City Council to temporarily move while new facilities are built at its current location.35 Plans have also been put forward to the New Schools Advisory Committee to establish five new Muslim schools in Lucan, Clonee, Tallaght (Dublin), Tralee and Sligo, where Muslim populations have been growing rapidly,36 although the current economic crisis in Ireland may delay permission and building. There are no Muslim secondary schools in Ireland, so most Muslim children in Ireland attend mainstream Irish schools, the majority of which are denominational. Religious education is a part of the school curriculum in Ireland, and can often take the form of religious instruction. This is particularly the case at primary level where Catholic children are prepared for communion. However, in recent years there have been initiatives to organise Islamic instruction in some primary schools, or in a number of schools with large numbers of Muslim pupils, the school has invited someone from the Mosque to visit on Fridays and give Khutba to the children.37 Moreover, parents do have the legal right to exempt their children from religious education. In the 58 ‘Educate Together’ primary schools in Ireland, where an ethics curriculum is taught instead of religious education, the school facilities are made available for religious instruction after school.38 New legislation, the Education (Amendment) Bill 2010, has also been published, which will allow for a new type of primary school run by Vocational Educational Com- mittees (VEC). These schools may be considered multidenominational but, unlike Educate Together schools, religious education is part of the curriculum. Ideas from all religious traditions are taught, although the children are separated into their separate religious traditions for some of the time. It is not yet clear how this will impact on Muslim pupils and certainly a programme by RTE shown in April 2010, criticised these new VEC schools for giving primacy to the Catholic religion among other things.39 city-news/citys-muslim-school-is-eyeing-up-new-site-as-waiting-list-swells-2310756 .html, accessed 1 September 2010. 35 Ibid. 36 Department of Education and Science: http://www.education.ie. 37 Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism, Islam, pp. 404–405. 38 Educate Together: www.educatetogether.ie. 39 Primetime, ‘Problems with the new state schools’ RTE, 8 April 2010, available at: http://www.rte.ie/news/2010/0408/primetime_av.html?2733098,null,230. 294 victoria montgomery

There are also many weekend schools for Muslim children run by the mosques and Islamic societies in Ireland. The ICCI established the Nur Al-Huda School in 1999 and have since extended it to two areas outside Dublin. There is currently a waiting list to attend the school. It also runs the Libyan school, which follows the Libyan curriculum recognised throughout the Arab world. The IFI runs the Al-Falah Week- end Islamic School as well as the Sunday madrasa and the Children’s Quranic School where classes are held in the evenings. The Al-Falah school currently has 94 children attending.40 There are also weekend schools attached to mosques in Cork, Galway, Limerick and Water- ford among others. These weekend schools are not supervised by the Department of Education.

6 Higher and Professional Education

University College Dublin offers modules in Islam and the Crusades, Islam and Christianity and the Politics of the Middle East. Middle Eastern Politics is also offered in the Limerick University as part of its MA in Peace and Development Studies. Studies in Contemporary Islam form part of the Religions and Global Diversity Programme at University College Cork. Also at University College Cork, political Islam is studied within the modules of Decolonization and Revolu- tion, the Politics of Extremism and the Politics of Terrorism, and the history department offers a course on the Crusades. At Trinity College Dublin, the Near Eastern and Jewish Studies course charts the development of the Islamic religion and cultural traditions, while various modules on Islam including Medieval Islam and Islam and Gender are offered as part of the World Religions and Theology course. A module on the Crusades is offered in the School of History and Per- ceptions of Islam is a module offered within the Medieval Languages, Literature and Culture Masters degree. Trinity College also offers a degree in Jewish and Islamic Civilizations and is the only university in Ireland to offer this course. The School of Ecumenism at Trinity also offers courses in Muslim-Christian relations. There is no institution offering imam training in Ireland. The full-time teaching staff at the Muslim primary schools in Dublin is appointed by the Department of

40 The Islamic Foundation of Ireland: http://www.islaminireland.com/alfalah_weekend_ school.html. ireland 295

Education. In addition, there are part-time religious teachers who are privately appointed by the school, and whose salaries are not met by the state.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

In 1976 the Dublin Islamic Society bought a section of the Mount Jerome cemetery in Dublin. However, this was full by the end of the 1980s and in 1990 the South Dublin City Council reserved a section of the Newcastle cemetery in Dublin for Muslim use only. The IFI and ICCI both arrange funerals and perform the religious rituals. Outside of Dublin, a designated area in St. James Cemetery in Cork has been set aside for Muslims. While many of the smaller Islamic organisations do not have the resources of the IFI and ICCI, they will advise on funeral arrangements and perform the religious rituals.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are currently no Muslim chaplains within the state institutions. However, within the prisons in Ireland and the health service, Muslim representatives will be contacted upon request. There are no Muslim chaplains in the universities in Ireland, although many universities do have Muslim prayer rooms.

9 Religious Festivals

The main mosques in Ireland organise their‘Id celebrations separately, within the mosque if it is large enough. The ICCI, for example, has a large hall which is used for ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations, as well as breaking the fast during Ramadan. Outside of Dublin the largest ‘Id al-Fitr celebration takes place in Cork, where in 2006 more than 2,000 people attended. The community tends to rent space in order to accommodate such numbers.41 Apart from children attending Muslim primary schools or adults working for the Muslim organisations,

41 Fitzgerald, M., “Ireland’s Muslims forging an identity”, in The Irish Times, 10 October 2006, http://www.irishtimes.com/focus/gageby/underthecrescent/identity .htm, accessed 6 June 2011. 296 victoria montgomery

Muslims have no automatic legal right to take holidays during the main religious festivals. This must either be negotiated with schools and employers or, in the case of working adults, taken as annual leave if agreement cannot be reached.

10 Halal Food

Ritual slaughter is legal in Ireland and there are many halal butchers in Dublin as well as other Irish cities. Frozen and tinned halal meat is also widely available. Indeed, in the recent past Ireland had a thriving halal industry which exported halal meat and dairy products to Mus- lims countries outside Ireland.42 However, the foot and mouth epi- demic has negatively impacted the halal slaughter industry in Ireland, although lamb and increasing amounts of halal diary produce, which are certified by the IFI, are still exported from Ireland.

11 Dress Codes

The main debate concerning Muslims in Ireland in 2008 centred on the issue of the hijab in schools, which gained international media attention after the education spokesmen from the two main opposition parties stated that public schools should not allow hijab.43 As a result, the Minister for Integration issued guidelines which essentially confirmed the status quo: that individual schools should decide their own uniform policy but that it should not act to exclude students of a particular religious background. In practice therefore, this allows for the hijab in Irish schools, although it did not recommend clothing which obscured the face (i.e. burqa and niqab) which was deemed a barrier to communication.44 In September 2010, Guidelines on the Inclusion of Students of Other Faiths in Catholic Secondary Schools were circulated around more than 450 Catholic schools in Ireland, which prohibit the niqab on the grounds that a teacher would not be

42 Halal Certification Information is available on the Islamic Foundation of Ireland website, www.islaminireland.com. 43 Heimani, Z., (2008) “Opposition in Ireland calls for headscarf ban”, The Mus- lim News (online), www.muslimnews.co.uk/paper/index.php?article=3580, accessed 10 October 2008. 44 A summary of the guidelines and other documents relating to this issue can be found on the IFI website: http://www.islaminireland.com. ireland 297 able to engage properly with the student.45 Indeed, the guidelines also state that it is reasonable for a female teacher to ask a pupil’s mother to uncover her face for a meeting, on the understanding that no man will come into the room.46 There are no rules limiting the wearing of Muslim dress in other public institutions although in organisations such as the Gardaí (police) which have a uniform, Muslims must conform to that uniform, which at present does not include a hijab option. It is now quite common to see Muslim women and men in religious dress, particularly in Dublin. With regard to women, this is mainly the hijab and jilbab; women wearing the niqab on Ireland’s streets are still quite rare. In a report by Mary Fitzgerald on ‘the veil’ in Ireland, it is estimated that fewer than 80 women wear the niqab in Ireland.47

12 Publications and Media

The women’s section of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Ire- land is currently planning a magazine for Muslim women and girls in Ireland called Maryam.48 No further data is available on Muslim newspapers and magazines published in Ireland. However, foreign newspapers, including some in Urdu and Arabic, are widely available. The main organisations each have their own websites which contain extensive articles in English, Urdu and Arabic and audio and video resources available to download. There is also a website dedicated to the Shi’i community in Ireland, Shia Muslims in Ireland (www . shiamuslimsinireland.com). In addition, Muslims in Ireland are util- ising more mainstream media. Organisations such as Muslim Youth Ireland, the Cork Muslim Society and the Royal College of Surgeons Islamic Society, are using resources such as Facebook, Bebo and You- Tube to network and highlight their organisation.

45 Mulally, Aiveen, (2010) “Guidelines on the Inclusion of Students of Other Faiths in Catholic Secondary Schools” JMB [online], available at: http://www.jmb.ie/, accessed 30 September 2010. 46 Ibid. 47 Fitzgerald, Mary, ‘Beyond the veil’, The Irish Times, 7 August 2010, available at: http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/weekend/2010/0807/1224276368541_pf.html, accessed 1 September 2010. 48 Women’s Auxiliary of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community Ireland: http://www .islamahmadiyya.ie/publications.html. 298 victoria montgomery

Mainstream media have also shown some interest in issues to do with the Muslim community in Ireland. Mary Fitzgerald, for example, did an in-depth report on the veil in Ireland in August 2010, which challenged more reductionist arguments, and the weekly Metro Eireann newspaper regularly has interviews with members of the Mus- lim community on various topics (www.metroeireann.com). During 2010, RTE Radio 1 has broadcast programmes, such as ‘Homosexual- ity and Islam’ (19 January 2010) and ‘Do Muslims pose a threat to Western society?’ (9 May 2010), which have included a range of views from the Muslim community in Ireland.49

13 Family Law

Marriages can be conducted by an imam at a mosque which has been registered with the state; the married couple sign the official marriage register which the mosque returns to the appropriate Registrar in the area. However, beyond marriage, the legal system in Ireland is almost entirely secular. Catholicism did play a central role in the identity and politics of post-independence Ireland and Catholic teachings became enshrined in law. Divorce, contraception and abortion were all made illegal in Ireland, although these laws have either been revised or reversed in recent years in response to growing secularism within the country. While laws on contraception were gradually relaxed from 1980 onwards and divorce was made legal in 1996, abortion still remains illegal in Ireland, except where there is real and substantial risk to the life (not health) of the mother.

14 Interreligious Relations

While there is no national interreligious council in Ireland, Muslims in Ireland do participate in interfaith organisations and events and have good links with the Irish state, although Ali Selim of the ICCI has argued that interfaith relations could be strengthened if leaders

49 Details and podcasts of these programmes are available at: www.rte.ie/radio1. ireland 299 and peoples of various faiths were invited and encouraged to attend events of local and national significance.50 An important interreligious organisation is the Three Faiths Forum of Ireland which was launched in 1999 and aims to increase dialogue and break down prejudices. It has had some impact, for example, in issuing a statement in 2003 concerning the war in Iraq which helped to minimise hostility towards Irish Muslims.51 However, this organisation does not have links outside the three Abrahamic religions and therefore, Muslims in Ireland have no official relations with other religions. Some Muslim organisations have developed interfaith links, primarily through conferences. The Turkish Irish Education and Cultural Soci- ety (TIECS) (6 the Drive Haydens Park, Lucan, Dublin, tel. +353 (0) 876 409 610, www.tiecs.ie) is one such organisation.52 The Ahmadiyya Muslim Association of Ireland also organised an interfaith peace conference in July 2010 in Galway, which included representatives from other religions as well as local politicians and police officers. Another form of interfaith dialogue has been through organised visits to the mosques for religious leaders and school children. Furthermore, a new multi-faith school is currently being set up in Co. Kildare which would come under Christian, Jewish and Muslim joint patronage.53

15 Public Opinion and Debate

In spite of the police’s denial that Islamist extremism is rife in Ire- land, there have been several negative newspaper articles in recent years linking the Muslim community in Ireland, particularly young Muslims, with extremism.54 The issue of Islamist extremism in Ireland was of significant public interest again in March 2010 with the arrest

50 Selim, Ali, Interfaith Relations in Ireland, (2008) available at http://islamireland .ie/print/439, accessed 1 September 2009. 51 Skuce, Stephen, The Faiths of Ireland, (Dublin: Columba Press, 2006), p. 168. 52 For a full discussion of the activities and objectives of TIECS please see Lacey, Jonathan, ‘Exploring the Transnational Engagements of a Turkic Religio-cultural Community in Ireland’, Translocations: The Irish Migration, Race and Social Trans- formation Review 2 (2007), pp. 153–174. 53 Islam Online, ‘Multifaith School for Irish Pupils’ (January 13, 2008) available at http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&pagename=Zone-English- News/NWELayout&cid=1199279515166, accessed 5 June 2008. 54 National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI) (2006), “Challenging myths: The Muslim community in Ireland”, available at http:// www.nccri.ie/pdf/ChallengingMyths-Muslims.pdf, accessed 30 August 2007. 300 victoria montgomery of seven Muslims in Waterford and Cork in connection with a plot to murder Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks. Several were later released or charged with lesser offences. Statements such as that by Ali Al-Saleh, the Imam of the Shi’a mosque in Dublin that extremists are operating in Ireland,55 increased the media coverage of this issue, although it has been rather short-lived. In May of 2010, a group of Muslims held a protest outside the Belgian embassy in Dublin against the proposed ban of the burqa in public. Protesters carried placards with slogans such as, ‘Europe’s crusade against Muslims’. Although speakers included key figures in the Muslim community in Ireland such as Imam Yahya Al-Hussein of the South Circular Road mosque in Dublin, the protest was a rather small affair.56 Also in May 2010, the Israeli attack on the Gaza flotilla, which included an Irish owned ship and many Irish activists, led to demonstrations and huge media attention in Ireland. On 31 May 2010, approximately 1700 people protested in Dublin and afterwards hundreds of protesters formed a human barricade around the Israeli embassy in Dublin. Smaller demonstrations were held in Sligo, Gal- way, Monaghan and Cork. These demonstrations included large numbers of Muslims and there was discussion of the issue on many of the Muslim organisation websites. The only poll taken with Irish Muslims was in 2006. While a minority of young Irish Muslims took a more negative view of Ireland, the poll found that overall more than two thirds of Muslims felt Islam to be compatible with Irish life and 77% felt accepted.57 A more recent poll of the Irish population taken in September 2010, and dealing with issues of religion and morality, found that 57% of Irish people aged 45 or over believed that wearing the burqa in public should be banned, compared to 42% of those aged under 45 years expressing the same opinion.58 Perhaps of significance to such beliefs, is that in an

55 Tighe, M., ‘An enemy within Irish Society?’, The Sunday Times, 14 March 2010, available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ireland/article7061014.ece, accessed 17 March 2010. 56 Fitzgerald, Mary, ‘Muslims protest at Belgian move to ban face veils in public’, The Irish Times, 24 May 2010, available at: http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ ireland/2010/0524/1224271011535_pf.html, accessed 1 June 2010. 57 Lansdowne Market Research (2006), “RTE Primetime investigates Muslims in Ireland”, available at http://www.lansdownemarketresearch.ie/archives.html#2006, accessed 2 November 2009. 58 McShane, I., ‘Public morality of more concern’, The Irish Times, 16 Septem- ber 2010, available at: http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ ireland/2010/0916/ 1224278995046_pf.html, accessed 17 September 2010. ireland 301

interview with the media the imam of the Shi’a Mosque in Dublin argued that in Ireland the niqab and burqa means extremism and radicalism and their presence in Ireland is a sign that extremism has not been defeated.59

16 Major Cultural Events

The ICCI hosts an annual Qur’an competition attended by several hundred Muslim children from throughout Ireland. It also hosts an annual conference with a different theme each year which is attended by Muslims throughout Ireland including Northern Ireland.60

59 Tighe, M., ‘An enemy within Irish Society?’, The Sunday Times, 14 March 2010, available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ireland/article7061014.ece, accessed 17 March 2010. 60 The 2009 conference was advertised on the websites of the two main Mus- lim organisations in Northern Ireland: the Belfast Islamic Centre (http://www .belfastislamiccentre.org.uk) and the Northern Ireland Muslim Family Association (http://www.nimfa.org).

ITALY

Stella Coglievina1

1 Muslim Populations

The history of Islam in Italy dates back to the seventh and eighth centuries, when the general expansion of Islam in Europe took place. In the ninth century, Muslim Arabs invaded Sicily and some regions in Peninsular Italy. Arab dynasties ruled Sicily until the Norman conquest (eleventh century). Arabic and Islamic art and science continued to be heavily influential in Sicily and some Arabic-speaking communities have survived in Sicily from that time (especially near Mazara del Vallo). Thereafter, Islam was almost absent in Italy until the 1970s. By the 1970s (and more consistently by the 1980s), Italy had begun to attract migrant workers, among them Muslims from North Africa (especially Morocco) and Albania. Today, Islam is the second largest religious presence in Italy, after Catholicism (an estimated 87 % of native-born citizens are nominally Roman Catholic).2 There is no official census of religious communities and little reliable data on the Muslim population in Italy. According to latest estimates, the number of Muslims, who are mostly Sunnis, is between 1.25 and 1.42 million (2% of a total population of just over 60 million).3 According to the Immigration

1 Stella Coglievina is PhD Fellow in Ecclesiastical and Canon Law in the Faculty of Law of University of Insubria (Como) where she is also research assistant. Her research activity is focused on antidiscrimination law in the EU and on the status of religious denominations in the European Union. She is the editor of Le Conferenze episcopali in Europa (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2010) and author of various papers about religious freedom and non-discrimination in Europe. 2 US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2009 (Italy), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127317.htm, accessed 15 Novem- ber 2010. 3 According to the U.S. International Religious Freedom Report 2009, Muslims in Italy are 1.25 million; Caritas Migrantes, indicates about 1,354,000 Muslims (Dos- sier statistico immigrazione 2010) (Immigration Statistical Dossier 2010), see www .stranieriinitalia.it, accessed 4 November 2010. According to www.islamicpopulation .com, Muslims are 1.42 million (data from 2008). According to the Pew Forum, in 2009 Muslims in Italy are estimated to be 1,583,000 (see Muslim Networks and Movements 304 stella coglievina

Statistical Dossier of 2007, Muslims, defined by nationality, make up about 31.4% of immigrants; the main countries of origin are: Alba- nia, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Bosnia, Algeria, Turkey and Somalia.4 Muslims in Italy are mainly registered residents without Italian citizenship. There is no reliable data about how many Muslims have Italian citizenship.5 Italian citizenship laws are very strict, while obtaining work and residency permits is easier; so many immigrants who have lived in Italy for years cannot obtain Italian citizenship. The high number of Muslim non-citizens, including illegal immigrants, is one of the obstacles to their integration into Italian society: as immigration is a quite recent phenomenon in Italy, most foreign Muslims are still first-generation immigrants, living in poor socio-economic conditions. However, the rising number of family reunifications and the growing number of young Muslims (second generation and new families) are changing the picture of the Islamic community living in Italy. Muslims are often perceived as an extremely diverse community, without ties to Italy. Muslim groups have settled throughout Italy; they tend to be concentrated in urban areas (especially in the major Italian cities such as Milan and Rome). Recently, Muslims have begun to make a place for themselves in Italian politics, mostly at the local level, while there are two Muslim members of parliament.6 In contrast, even though they are a small group, native

in Western Europe, 2010, at http://pewforum.org/Muslim/Muslim- Networks-and- Movements-in-Western-Europe.aspx, accessed 15 November 2010). 4 See Caritas Migrantes, Dossier statistico immigrazione 2007 (Immigration Statis- tical Dossier 2007) (Rome: IDOS, 2008), pp. 192ff. Detailed data on the countries of origin of Muslim immigrants in 2004 are available in “Le religioni degli immi- grati all’inizio del 2004: gli effetti della regolarizzazione. Ricerca del Dossier Statis- tico Immigrazione Caritas/Migrantes, (Immigrants’ Religions at beginning of 2004: the consequences of regularization. Research of the Immigration Statistical Dossier Caritas/Migrantes)”, available at http://www.csvbasilicata.it/Archivio/Immigrazione/ religio_immigra.htm, accessed 15 November 2010. 5 Data from 2002 indicate about 40,000–50,000 Muslims with Italian citizenship and among them about 10,000 converts from Christianity: see Open Society Insti- tute, “Rapporto di monitoraggio della protezione delle minoranze nell’Unione Euro- pea: la situazione dei musulmani in Italia, (Monitoring report on the protection of minorities in the European Union: the situation of Muslims in Italy)” (2002), available at http://www.abuondiritto.it/liberta/religiosa/pdf/rapporto_osi_italia.pdf, accessed 15 November 2010. 6 See http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/italy/, accessed 15 November 2010 (Euro-Islam is a Research Network Sponsored by GSRL Paris/CNRS France and Harvard University). It should be noted that immigrants who do not have Italian citizenship have no voting rights. italy 305

Italian Muslims are very active in Islamic organisations and in political, cultural and social life, and they contribute towards making Islam visible in public opinion and public policies.

2 Islam and the State

Italy is a secular republic with no state religion. Roman Catholics nominally constitute the majority of the population and the Catholic Church enjoys some privileges, stemming from the sovereign status of the Vatican and its historical political authority, which are not available to other religious groups. According to the Constitution (Articles 7 and 8), relations between the state and religious confessions are governed by bilateral agreements between the state and each confession: for the Catholic Church, the 1929 Lateran Pacts as amended in 1984; for non-Catholic confessions, separate accords (intese) with the government. The absence of an accord does not affect a religious group’s right to worship freely, but a religious community without an accord cannot benefit from direct financial support. In particular they do not have access to the system of the otto per mille, a tax of 0.8% on income paid to the Catholic Church and to religious confessions that have reached an intesa, or to certain specific rights (such as automatic access by ministers of religion to state hospitals and prisons, the right of employees and students to observe religious holidays, etc.). Islam, like other confessions that have not signed an agreement with the state, is subject to the legislation of 1929 on Recognised Religions. Divisions among the country’s Islamic organisations, as well as the existence of multiple Muslim immigrant groups, have hindered the community’s efforts to sign an accord. Some attempts have been made over recent years to regulate relations between the state and Islamic communities. A decree of 10 September 2005 established a Consultative Council of Italian Islam (Consulta per l’Islam italiano)7 at the Ministry of Interior, with the aim of discussing the status of Islam in Italy and the process of reaching an agreement with the state. In the last two years the Council was no longer active and in 2010 a new Consultative Com- mittee (Comitato per l’Islam Italiano), made up of 19 members (representatives of Islamic organisations, scholars, professors and journalists

7 Web page at www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/temi/religioni/ sottotema003.html, accessed 17 November 2010. 306 stella coglievina who are experts in Islam), was established at the Ministry of Interior.8 The committee has been performing consultative functions and the Ministry has been listening to their views on some of the current topics (mosques, Imam training, proposed bill on burka ban, etc.). In 2007 (decree of the Minister of the Interior of 23 April 2007), the government published in the Official Gazette a “Charter of shared values for citizenship and integration”, prepared by the Minister of the Interior and presented to the members of the Consultative Council, with the aim of reaffirming the values of a secular state and freedom of religion.9 A Declaration of Intent (Dichiarazione di intenti per la federazione dell’Islam italiano),10 prepared by representatives of Mus- lim groups and professors of law and presented on 13 March 2008, was intended to pave the way for the institution of a federation of Islamic groups to facilitate reaching an agreement with the state, but that prospect continues to be illusory. Despite the absence of an accord with the state, all religious communities, including the Muslim community, are eligible for public funds for the construction of places of worship. According to Italian legislation, it is for the regional and local administration to approve requests for such funding, as well as to make publicly owned land available for their construction. There are no consistent data about what is happening at the local level: many Muslims report experiencing difficulties in building a mosque and obtaining funding because of political concerns (mistrust of some Muslim organisations; concerns about the improper use of mosques; objections to minarets near Christian churches or historic places of worship in order to preserve the ‘identity’ of Italian towns, etc.; see section 4 below). Sometimes, funds for building mosques come from the governments of Muslim countries.11

8 See OLIR.it, Osservatorio delle Libertà ed Istituzioni Religiose (Observatory for Religious Freedoms and Institutions) law research database, headed by professor Antonio Chizzoniti, Catholic University of Piacenza, http://www.olir.it/news .php?notizia=2459, accessed 16 November 2010. 9 An English translation is available at http://www.interno.it/mininterno/ export/sites/default/it/assets/files/14/0919_charter_of_values_of_citizenship_and_ integration.pdf, accessed 17 November 2010. 10 Text available at www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/ 15/0679_DICHIARAZIONE_DI_INTENTI.pdf, accessed 17 November 2010. 11 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Muslim Integration: Chal- lenging Conventional Wisdom in Europe and the United States (2007), p. 41, avail- italy 307

3 Main Muslim Organisations

As Italy’s Muslim community mainly consists of immigrants and various groups that are not ethnically homogeneous scattered across diverse geographic areas, there are many Muslim organisations that represent only a fraction of Muslims living in the country. The relationships between them are not close and are sometimes even characterised by disagreements, leaving Italy’s Muslims without a unified leadership. The main Muslim organisations are:

• Unione delle Comunità e delle Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy, UCOII, via Quattro Fontane 109, 00184 Roma, tel: +39-06-48939934, e-mail: [email protected], [email protected], www.islam-ucoii.it), established in 1990 and promoted by a former organisation, the Unione degli Studenti Musulmani d’Italia (Muslim Students’ Union in Italy, USMI), created in 1971 by the first Muslim Sunni groups in Italy. UCOII is the main Muslim organisation in Italy and the best known, is connected with the most important Islamic centres (such as the Mosque of Segrate). Its leadership includes politicians, professionals and other well- integrated people whose national origin (mainly Syrian, Jordanian and Palestinian) is often different from that of the majority of Muslims living in Italy. • Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia (Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy, viale della Moschea 85, 00197 Roma, tel: +39-06-8082258, fax: +39- 06-8079515; e-mail: [email protected], www.lega-musulmana. it). This is the Cultural Centre of the Mosque of Rome, connected with the embassies of Muslim states and with the Muslim World League. It has a central role in the organisation of cultural and prayer centres and in establishing relations with public authorities. • Comunità Religiosa Islamica (Islamic Religious Community, Co.Re. Is., via Giuseppe Meda 9, 20136 Milano, tel: +39-02-8393340, fax: +39-02-8393350, email: [email protected], www.coreis.it) is made up of Italian converts to Islam and is active in public debate.

able at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070920_muslimintegration.pdf, accessed 15 November 2010. 308 stella coglievina

• Unione Islamica in Occidente (Islamic Union in the West, UIO— Italian Branch of the (Libyan) World Islamic Call Society, WICS, via del Giorgione 18, 00147 Roma, tel: +39-06-59606683/685, fax: +39-06-59601150, email: [email protected], www.wics-it.org), one of the first Muslims associations in Italy. It is connected with the Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia and it organises some cultural initiatives (such as Arabic courses). • Unione dei Musulmani in Italia (Union of Muslims in Italy, U.M.I., corso Giulio Cesare 6, 10152 Torino, http://umislaminita- lia.blogspot.com/), founded in 2007 by Moroccan religious leaders in Torino. The aim of the group is to represent moderate Islam and to develop interreligious dialogue; it has good relationships with Co.Re.Is. and with Moroccan Government. • Giovani Musulmani d’Italia, Young Muslims in Italy, GMI (at Torino Youth Centre, Via Faà di Bruno, 2—Torino tel: +39 01119703145, e-mail: [email protected], www.giovanimusulmani.it), association of Young Muslims, with rising visibility on a national scale. • Unione Musulmani d’Italia (Union of Italy’s Muslims, e-mail: [email protected]), association led by the Italian convert Adel Smith, famous for his radical opinions and often provocative speeches (especially his polemic against the crucifix and some lawsuits against Italian writers and scholars). Today it seems that the group is less relevant than in the past.12 • Associazione Musulmani Italiani—Assemblea Musulmana d’Italia (Italian Muslims Association—Italian Muslim Assembly, AMI, via dei Sabelli 18, 00185 Roma, e-mail: [email protected], http:// www.amislam.com/index.htm) was established by Italian converts to Islam. Its importance has recently diminished.

There are also many other smaller organisations (a review is available at http://www.cesnur.org/religioni_italia/islam.htm), associations of young Muslims and, in several cities, centres connected with the main mosque. The majority of Muslims, however, participate only in the cultural and religious life of their own mosque or prayer house, and participation in the activities of the various organisations is not so widespread.

12 See Centre for Studies on New Religions (CESNUR), Le religioni in Italia, available at http://www.cesnur.org/religioni_italia/i/islam_09.htm, accessed 16 November 2010. italy 309

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are only three ‘great mosques’: in Catania (no longer in use), Segrate (Milan) and Rome. Other mosques are under construction in the municipality of Colle Val d’Elsa (Siena) and in Ravenna but opposition by political parties and local inhabitants, as well as the difficulty of raising funds, have hindered the completion of works and opening until now. There are over 200 places of Islamic worship (258, according to US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2009; 774, including prayer houses and associations, according to the National Agency for Internal Information and Security—AISI);13 Muslim groups often gather for prayer in private apartments and other unofficial prayer halls (basements and garages). With regard to future construction, there are problems with funding and planning, often due to the lack of representation of Islamic communities and opposition by local authorities to granting permits to groups considered untrust- worthy. In some cases (e.g., Lodi, Padua, Genoa, and also Colle Val d’Elsa) the municipality decided to grant land for an Islamic place of worship, but mosque projects have been opposed, both by political parties14 and by the population. Sometimes municipalities impose questionable conditions for the construction of a mosque and the proposed plans for building or enlargement of places of worship are suspended (as in Bologna in 2008 and in Brescia in 2009); questionable conditions are often imposed also for granting permits for the use of existing buildings (such as disused gyms, warehouses or garages) as places of worship. In other cases provisional adjustments are found, instead of developing a building plan (in Milan, some attempts were done to give an appropriate place for praying to Muslims of the so- called ‘mosque of viale Jenner’, but the local authorities only grant a temporary site to celebrate the Ramadan).15

13 Dossier statistico immigrazione 2010 (Immigration Statistical Dossier 2010), http:// www.camera.it/_dati/leg15/lavori/documentiparlamentari/indiceetesti/033/004_RS/ INTERO_COM.pdf, p. 69, accessed 1 October 2010 (data of 2007). Caritas Migrantes indicate the same estimates: around 750 mosques and prayer houses. 14 Many right-wing Italian politicians, especially those of the Northern League (Lega Nord, a party of the government coalition, wide spread in the North of the country) often make controversial remarks about the growth of mosques in Italy. 15 About these and other examples see S. Allievi, Conflicts over Mosques in Europe, Network of European Foundations, London 2009, at http://www.nefic.org/sites/ default/files/NEF%20RelDem%20-%20RELIGION%20%26%20MOSQUES%20-%20 Final.pdf, accessed 6 November 2010. 310 stella coglievina

5 Children’s Education

As set forth in the agreement between the state and the Catholic Church, public schools provide Catholic religious education, which is optional. Non-religious pupils and those of other faiths are offered an alternative class, which is also optional, or they can leave school during those lessons. A minority of pupils opt out of Catholic religious education lessons (around 9%, varying between regions and schools),16 but there is no data about their religious affiliation. Neither is data available on the school attendance of Muslim pupils: estimates by Caritas-Migrantes indicate that in 2006/2007 they were 184,861.17 All religious communities, including those without an agreement with the state, such as the Islamic community, may use the classrooms of state schools for classes on religious culture if there are substantial numbers of pupils of that religion, and when no places of worship are available (art. 23 of decree no. 289 of 1930). The costs of such teaching are paid by the religious community, and a prior agreement with the Director of the Regional School Office is required. In practice, this option has never been taken up by Muslims. In October 2009 some members of the government proposed to offer courses on Islam in public schools, as a possible alternative to Catholic religion classes. The proposal, according to the government parties, would be aimed at keeping young Muslim students away from “fundamentalist” Islamic schools. No legislative initiative followed this proposal. Article 33 of the Constitution grants organisations and private citizens the right to found schools and educational institutions without state funding. No Islamic private schools have yet been established under Article 33, but several foreign schools have been founded by the governments of foreign states, including Libya (in Rome and Milan), Egypt (in Milan) and Tunisia (in Mazara del Vallo, near Trapani).18 These schools are authorised by Italian law but their curricula (including language classes) are set by the country in question, which may

16 Data of Italian Conference of Bishops for the year 2008/2009, available at http:// www.chiesacattolica.it/cci_new_v3/allegati/4662/tav.1%20nazionali.pdf, accessed 17 Nov- ember 2010. 17 Caritas Migrantes, Dossier statistico immigrazione 2007, p. 201. 18 Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, R., “The legal treatment of the Muslim minority in Italy”, in Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, R. and Zincone G. (eds.),The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minori- ties in Europe, (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), p. 146. italy 311 hinder the integration of pupils into Italian society. There is no data about how many pupils attend these schools.19 Some cases of ‘illegal’ Muslim schools (i.e., unauthorised private schools) have been reported.20 According to media reports (not official data) Muslim children sometimes attend this type of school instead of public schools.

6 Higher and Professional Education

In Italian universities there is an increasing interest in the study of religion and Islamic culture and society. Several faculties of law provide courses or seminars on Islamic Law. As for imam training, there is no special legal provision and little is known about courses and lessons organised by the various Islamic groups. In 1996 the Muslim Universities League approved a project to run a school to prepare imams and female social workers. The UCOII has also planned the establishment of an educational centre in Bologna to train imams, community leaders and teachers of Islam. However, none of these initiatives has come to fruition. From May to Decem- ber 2010 a number of Italian universities, associated in the Interna- tional Forum Democracy and Religion (FIDR), organised a course for religious guides and representatives of Italian Muslim communities—Nuove presenze religiose in Italia (New religious communities in Italy)—with the support of the Ministry of the Interior.21

19 Ferrari, A., “La scuola italiana di fronte al paradigma musulmano (The Italian school confronting multiculturalism)”, in Ferrari, A. (ed.), Islam in Italia/Islam in Europa (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008), pp. 194ff. 20 The Ministry of Interior has reported 88 unauthorised Islamic schools (in Islamic cultural centres, etc.): see “In Italia 88 scuole islamiche rapporto segreto al Viminale”, La Repubblica, 21 September 2007, available at http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/ archivio/repubblica/2007/09/21/in-italia-88-scuole-islamiche-rapporto-segreto.html, accessed 6 November 2010. Some of these cases were reported in Parliament (among others, parliamentary question of 13 July 2006: http://legxv.camera.it/resoconti/ resoconto_allegato.asp?idSeduta=25&resoconto=bt47¶m=n4-00543#n4-00543, accessed 10 November 2010). 21 The course is intended to give useful knowledge about the religious framework of Italian society and about laws and current problems relating to Islam. Workshops are scheduled in order to discuss how to manage the practical problems of Muslim communities in their relationship with the Public authorities. See the website http:// fidr.it/progetto1.asp, accessed 17 November 2010. 312 stella coglievina

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Special and separate sectors of public cemeteries can be reserved for the burial of people belonging to religious minorities. Muslim communities have already taken advantage of this opportunity in cities such as Florence, Ragusa, Turin and Milan (where the cemetery is connected with the mosque of Segrate). There is also a Muslim cemetery in Trieste, which was established for Muslim subjects from the Balkans when the city still belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Similarly to what happens for the building of mosques, in some cases the establishment of Muslim sections in municipal cemeteries has faced opposition from local inhabitants (e.g. in May 2008 in Arezzo, Tuscany, where Muslim burial plans was approved, despite strong opposition by some residents).

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Ministers of religious denominations without an agreement under Article 8, paragraph 3 of the Constitution, including Islam, in theory have access to prisons and hospitals to give assistance to prisoners or patients who have requested it. They also have access to military bases to give pastoral care to soldiers who seek it. Religions that have an agreement with the state can benefit from an easier system of access to state institutions (their ministers are recognised by the state and they can freely access public institutions), while Islamic representatives need authorisation to access. Moreover, as Islam does not have religious ‘ministers’ recognised by Italian legislation, representatives who intend to give religious assistance in public institutions often need a certificate issued by the relevant Islamic organisation. In practice, situations differ depending on legislation at the local level or on the decisions of each institution. In prisons for example, Islamic ‘ministers’ normally have to obtain the director’s permission to access and give spiritual care, and sometimes they have had trouble.22 Local authorities and hospitals have specific jurisdiction to make provisions for religious support in the health service: in Tuscany, the Hospital of Flor- ence (Careggi) has an agreement with the local Muslim community

22 Source: personal contact with Muslims representatives in Milan. italy 313 to cater to the needs of Muslim patients;23 in other cities, Muslim representatives can access hospitals according to the time and rules of the ordinary visits, or they can be authorised by the manager. In Turin hospital a ‘quiet room’ for prayer exists, open to patients of all religions.

9 Religious Festivals

Italian legislation recognises some Catholic festivals and Sunday as a day of rest. Two of the agreements signed between the state and non-Catholic confessions (the Jewish community and the Seventh- Day Adventist Church) give the faithful the right to time off work for religious observance, with the proviso that employers’ needs must be taken into account, and allows pupils to be absent from school. Because there is not yet an accord with the state, current legislation does not cover the specific needs of Muslim workers or recognise any Islamic festivals. However, agreements have been reached between employers and the trade unions (mainly through collective agreements) to allow Muslim workers to take part in Friday prayers and to modify their normal working hours during Ramadan.24 In the last two years Ramadan fell in August and early September, when high temperatures can be reached. The national confederation of agricultural employers (Coldiretti) highlighted the risks for health of Muslims farm workers who were fasting during Ramadan. In 2010 Imam Ahmad al Sakka of the Rome Mosque said that Muslim farm workers are not breaking Islamic law if they have an occasional sip of water.

10 Halal Food

According to the laws currently in force, animals must be stunned before being slaughtered, but an exception has been made for ritual slaughter performed by the Muslim and Jewish communities. With regard to availability of halal products, there is a growing interest in so-called “ethnic marketing” (including halal food and

23 Text at http://www.olir.it/documenti/?documento=2226, accessed 10 November 2010. 24 For example in Ragusa (Sicily): http://www.olir.it/documenti/?documento=4357, accessed 10 November 2010. 314 stella coglievina business), even though there is no formal regulation about production and certification of halal products.25 In June 2010 a pilot project was launched by the Milan Chamber of Commerce and the COREIS (Islamic Religious Community in Italy), with the support of the Min- istry of Foreign Affairs, in order to create an ItalianHalal stamp of certification. The project’s aim is to set up a special internal body with its own registered brand that will be able to issue Halal certification for food, cosmetic and pharmaceutical products compliant with Islamic law and with Italian and European health laws.26 There are few data on the availability of halal food in school, hospitals, prisons or at work, but normally religious needs are taken into account and an alternative meal for Muslims is offered on request.

11 Dress Codes

There is no ban on wearing head scarves in public buildings and schools. Under a circular issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (14 March 1995), Muslim women are allowed to wear their head scarves in identity document photos as long as their facial features are recognisable. A 1995 anti-terrorism law, amended in 2005, forbids the wearing of garments, such as a burka, that can hide their identity. In 2009 some MPs from the government coalition presented a bill proposal to amend again the 1995 law and make wearing a burka or a niqab explicitly illegal.27 In the last year, despite the lack of a general prohibition of wearing burka, a number of municipalities have

25 Mercato Halal sempre in crescita. Anche in Italia attenzione ai mercati islamici (“Halal market on the rise. In Italy attention grows on Islamic market”), in “Il Sole 24 Ore”, 24 November 2008, at http://www.minareti.it/14/33/7cc947100cb799abfc9 53bcc88ed765a/mercato_halal_sempre_in_crescita_anche_in_italia_attenzione_ai_ mercati_islamici.html, accessed 18 November 2010. 26 See the press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at http://www.esteri.it/ MAE/EN/Sala_Stampa/AreaGiornalisti/NoteStampa/2010/06/20100625_firma_Halal_ Italia.htm?LANG=EN, accessed 18 November 2010. 27 “Italy: Proposal to ban burqa”, 6 October 2009, at http://islamineurope.blogspot .com/2009/10/italy-proposal-to-ban-burqa.html, accessed 18 November 2010. The text of the proposal is available at http://www.camera.it/126?action=submit&leg=16 &pdl=2422&stralcio=&navette=&cerca=cerca (website of the Parliament), accessed 18 November 2010. In 2010 the consultative Committee on Italian Islam was heard on this point; see http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/ files/19/00036_Comitato_Islam_-_relazione_Burqa_07_10.pdf, accessed 18 Novem- ber 2010. italy 315 been taking measures against that garment in their police regulation, adopted on the basis of 2008–2009 laws on public security. Some incidents have been reported, especially in northern cities, where women wearing burka have been asked to remove at least the face veil or fined for wearing niqab in public places.28 In summer 2009 there was also a dispute about the “burkini”, a bathing costume that is suitable for Islamic dress. Muslim women who have used swimming pools wearing “burkinis” in Italy have occasionally been asked to leave, on the basis that these garments allegedly are unhygienic and unauthorised.29

12 Publication and Media

There are several publications about Islam: for the most part researches and studies conducted by Italian scholars or writers. Some Muslim organisations publish books and journals about Islam in Italy (for example Co.Re.Is.: www.coreis.it/pubblicazioni); the Centro Islamico di Milano (the cultural centre of the Mosque of Segrate) has an Islamic publishing house (Edizioni del Calamo, www.edizionidelcalamo.com), which has published several books and the series Quaderni Islamici. Muslim periodicals include: Il Messaggero dell’Islam, published by the Centro Islamico di Milano; Il puro Islam, published in Naples by the Shi’i association Ahl al Bait. Both are in Italian, but not widespread; there is little data on the latest issues published. A recent editorial project, that has gained quite good visibility, is Yalla Italia, monthly supplement of the magazine Vita (a journal of not-for-profit organisations), edited by a group of young Muslims. It’s available also online: www.yallaitalia.it/archivio.html (accessed 15 November 2010). In December 2009 the first issue of a new Islamic magazine,Il Muslim, appeared. Published in Milan, the magazine is distributed in Islamic centres and is now in its second year (http://www.muslim.it/). Other journals about Islam are published by Catholic centres, with the aim of promoting interreligious dialogue and mutual knowledge: the most known and widespread are Oasis (edited by the “Oasis”

28 “Italian police fine Muslim woman for wearing veil”,The Guardian, 4 May 2010, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/04/italian-police-fine-muslim-woman, accessed 18 November 2010. 29 At http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/2009/08/italy-mayor-bans-burkini.html, accessed 18 November 2010. 316 stella coglievina

Foundation in Venice, http://www.oasiscenter.eu/it/rivista) and Il dialogo—Al hiwâr (by Centre “Federico Peirone” of the diocese of Turin).30 Online publications and websites are undoubtedly the most important and widespread resources on Islam. Main websites and blogs are:

• Islam online, www.islam-online.it (administered by UCOII); • Giovani Musulmani d’Italia, www.giovanimusulmani.it (administered by the Organisation of Young Muslims in Italy); • Minareti, www.minareti.it, collects news and comments on Islam; its director is Khalid Chaouki, a Muslim journalist, former president of Young Muslims in Italy; • www.sufi.it , website on Sufism, with documents and news; • Mondo Arabo, www.mondoarabo.it; • Islamicità—La rivista dell’Islam italiano, www.islamicita.it.

13 Family Law

Religious marriages, recorded in the civil status registry, are recognised in law in Italy if performed by a Roman Catholic priest (art. 8 of the Agreement of 1985 between Italy and the Holy See), or by a minister of a denomination that has an agreement with the state, or by ministers authorised by the Italian Ministry of Interior to perform a religious ceremony (articles 7–12 of Law n. 1159 of 1929). No Islamic ‘minister’ has so far been recognised by Italian legislation, so religious marriages celebrated in a mosque have no legal validity. Muslim couples who want their union to be legally recognised must go through a civil ceremony in addition to their religious marriage. Polygamy is illegal in Italy and repudiation (talaq) as a form of dissolution of marriage has no legal validity. However, some aspects of Islamic family law have acquired some relevance because most Muslims in Italy are foreign citizens, so their family status, as defined in their country of origin, can warrant consideration under private international law. Case law on this issue is very limited. Problems have arisen, for example, in some cases of reunification of spouses in polygamous marriages or in

30 http://www.diocesi.torino.it/pls/diocesitorino/v3_s2ew_CONSULTAZIONE .mostra_pagina?id_pagina=24880, accessed 18 November 2010. italy 317 cases concerning inheritance.31 A directive of the National Institution of Social Security (INPS) states that Italy will not pay welfare benefits to multiple wives.32 Kafala (the Islamic legal institution analogous to foster care) has been recognised as a form of adoption.33 The Italian Conference of Bishops has, on some occasions, urged parish priests to discourage Muslim-Christian marriages.

14 Interreligious Relations

Most interreligious events in Italy take place between Muslim communities and the majority religion of the country, the Catholic Church; this is also due to the presence of the Vatican in Rome, where many interfaith meetings at international level are hosted. Every Decem- ber an annual interfaith dialogue conference takes place, organised between the Vatican (Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue) and the World Islamic Call Society. In 2008 the “Catholic-Muslim Forum” took place, formed by the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue and a delegation representing the 138 Muslim signatories of the open letter called “A Common Word”; its first seminar was held in Rome on 4–6 November 2008. Also religious associations, such as the Comunità di Sant’Egidio, promote meetings and try to spread a “culture of dialogue” at the national and international levels (e.g. the well-known meeting of Assisi between leaders of various religions). At the national level, Italian Muslim organisations often participate in meetings and debates with the Catholic and other Christian churches, and with Jewish communities as well.34 The Italian Federa- tion of Protestant Churches (FCEI) also established a special commission in order to promote mutual relations between Protestants and Muslims in Italy (“Churches’ Commission on Dialogue with Islam”).35 At the local level, many events are organised, mainly between Cath- olic groups or dioceses and local Muslim communities (among others,

31 Some examples can be found in Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, “The legal treatment of the Muslim minority in Italy”, pp. 150–155. 32 See http://www.olir.it/documenti/?documento=3927, accessed 15 November 2010. 33 See, among others, Judgement of Court of Cassation, 2 July 2008, at http://www .olir.it/documenti/?documento=4749, accessed 15 November 2010. 34 See for example the activities of the Co.Re.Is.: http://www.coreis.it/frame2_ dialogo%20interreligioso.htm, accessed 15 November 2010. 35 Website at http://www.fedevangelica.it/en/comm/ccedi02.php, accessed 15 Novem- ber 2010. 318 stella coglievina the diocese of Padua and Turin).36 There is also a “Day of Christian- Islamic Dialogue”, organised by “ildialogo.org”, a Christian web magazine, and supported by dozens of groups and associations from both faiths. The initiative, held in Rome and in other Italian cities in Octo- ber 2010, is now in its ninth year. Despite all these initiatives, relations between Muslims and Catho- lics (or other faiths) are not always easy. For example, disputes have arisen between certain groups of Muslims and Catholic leaders over the building of mosques while, on some occasions, Catholic leaders have been supporting the Muslim community requests for a place of worship.37

15 Public Opinion and Debate

There is good coverage of the situation of Muslims in Italy in newspapers and other media and many issues have been recently taken up by the media and public discussion, such as the building of mosques, the issue of religious symbols and the head scarf, and the status of Islamic communities in major Italian cities. However, the media often create erroneous ideas and negative stereotypes of Islam, alleging that a huge number of Muslims are fundamentalists. Some Muslim organisations (UCOII) are alleged to be connected with the Muslim Brotherhood and to support fundamentalism and terrorism. This view leads to a widespread anti-Islamic feeling in the Italian population and, in some cases, to Islamophobia. Moreover, Muslims and Muslim leaders have little opportunity, compared with other religious communities (especially the Catholic Church) to be heard by the media and the general public. Negative feelings towards Islam are also fuelled by some political discourse: often initiative and debates on the situation of Islam are focused only on controversial practices, not necessary ascribable to

36 See respectively: http://www.padovaislam.it/index.html, and http://www.diocesi .torino.it/diocesitorino/s2magazine/index1.jsp?idPagina=24873, accessed 15 Novem- ber 2010. 37 In Milan, cardinal Tettamanzi made a call to local authorities saying that Muslims have the right to practice their faith in an appropriate place. See http://islamineurope .blogspot.com/2010/09/milan-catholic-church-backs-muslim.html, accessed 18 Novem- ber 2010. italy 319 religious laws (such as the burka,38 the status of women, incidents of violence in Muslim families,39 female circumcision, etc.) or the linkage between Islam and international terrorism, contributing to the stereotype of the foreign Muslims as a danger to national security. Percep- tions of Muslim-West relationships were measured in a poll conducted in 2007 by Gallup and the World Economic Forum. A majority of Ital- ian respondents (67%) saw the interaction between the West and the Muslim world as a threat and only 40% considered Islam compatible with democracy and Western life.40 A 2005 poll was conducted for the Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane (Union of Jewish Communi- ties in Italy—UCEI) by ‘La Sapienza’ University in Rome on intolerance among young people. More than 50% of the sample (sample size: 2,000, aged 14–18, from more than 100 different towns in Italy) stated that Muslims “support international terrorism” and have “cruel and barbaric laws”.41 A 2009 EU-MIDIS—Minorities and Discrimination Survey (issued by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency) provides data on how Muslims throughout the EU experience discrimination and racist crime in everyday life. It is said that Muslims of North Afri- can origin in Italy experienced the highest levels of discrimination. Nevertheless, the majority of Muslim respondents in Italy consider racial discrimination to be more widespread than discrimination on the basis of religion or belief.42

38 For example, in September 2009 an incident occurred, during the celebration of ‘Id al-Fitr in Milan, between a group of Muslims and extreme-right politicians who protested against the wearing of the burka. See http://www.corriere.it/cronache/09_ settembre_20/santanche_milano_4bef004c-a5ca-11de-a2a4-00144f02aabc.shtml, accessed 15 November 2010. 39 For example, an incident occurred in Modena, where a Pakistani man attacked his daughter and killed his wife for having refused arranged marriage, got a lot of coverage in the media and caused public debate. See http://islamineurope.blogspot .com/2010/10/italy-daughter-in-coma-wife-murdered.html, accessed 18 November 2010. 40 World Economic Forum, Islam and the West: Annual Report on the State of Dia- logue, January 2008, available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/C100/Islam_West.pdf, accessed 18 November 2010 (World Economic Forum is an independent international organisation based in Geneva, Switzerland). 41 See http://www.e-brei.net/old/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=967 and European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, 2006, p. 37, available at website of EU Fundamental Rights Agency: http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/ Manifestations_EN.pdf, accessed 15 November 2010. 42 Fundamental Rights Agency, Data in Focus Report—Muslims, 2009, at http://fra .europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/EU-MIDIS_MUSLIMS_EN.pdf, accessed 15 Novem- ber 2010. 320 stella coglievina

16 Major Cultural Events

In Rome, the AIMI (Associazione Intellettuali Musulmani Italiani) participated in the organisation of the Festival of Mediterranean Cultures (November 2010).43 Muslim representatives are sometimes invited (mostly at the local level) to meetings about cultures and religions in multicultural society, or about immigration. Most events are mainly of academic interest and participation is still small.

43 http://www.romamultietnica.it/it/news/eventi/item/7004–festival-delle-civiltà- del-mediterraneo-incontri-di-letteratura-e-musica-all’insegna-del-dialogo- interculturale.html, accessed 18 November 2010. KOSOVO

Besa Ismaili1

1 Muslim Populations

Having declared its independence in 2008, Kosovo is the newest independent state in the Balkans. Kosovo was retaken from the Ottomans by Serbia in the Balkans wars of 1912–13. In 1974 it became an autonomous province and constitutive part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Its autonomy was suspended in 1989 by the Slobodan Milošević regime. After a decade of repression, an escalating armed conflict that started in 1997 between Kosovo Albanians and Serbian forces was ended by NATO intervention against Serbia in 1999. Kos- ovo came under UN administration pending talks on its final status and then, in February 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo declared its independence. Serbia sought international validation and support for its stance that the Kosovo’s declaration of independence was illegal at the International Court of Justice. On 22 July 2010 the ICJ ruled that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not in violation of international law. By April 2011, independent Kosovo had been recognised by 75 UN member states, including 22 EU countries. No census has been carried out since 1981, and estimates of the total population vary widely, from 1.8 to 2.2 million. Ongoing is the first ever since general census scheduled for April 2011. Question number 10 of the Registration Form asks about religious affiliation, with option 1 out of 6 being Islam. Nevertheless, based on previous census and other estimations, the majority of the population, about 90%, is ethnic Albanian, and the vast majority of those are Muslims. The Mus- lim community also includes other ethnic groups such as Bosniaks, Turks, Gorans, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian community.2 The ethnic

1 Besa Ismaili holds an MA in English Literature and has been working as an inter- preter with international missions in Kosovo since 2003. She also lectures English in the Faculty of Islamic Studies and University College “Dardania”. She is an active member of a Muslim women’s network. 2 Gorans live in the Gora region south of Prizren. They are Slavic Muslims deriv- ing their name from the region they live in. Roma, Ashkalis and ‘Egyptians’ (often 322 besa ismaili

Serbs and Montenegrins are Orthodox Christians. Islam in Kosovo dates back to the conquest of the Balkans by the Ottoman Empire in the late fourteenth century, and the majority of the urban population, particularly the Albanians, became Muslims between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, but there are traces of Islam even earlier than that, such as a mosque from the thirteenth century in Mlina village in the region of Dragas, Kosovo South.3 The majority of Kosovan Muslims are Sunnis,4 most of whom belong to the Hanafi School. There is a persistent orientation to follow Hanafi School which is perceived as the traditional largely endorsed Islam in Kosovo.

2 Islam and the State

Kosovo is a secular republic with no official state religion.5 The Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK) has been asking the government and the parliament to pass a law on religious communities that will clarify their legal status. Currently the state refers to Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy as traditionally present religions.6 In 2005, a law on religious freedoms was adopted whose provisions, if implemented,7 provide certain privileges to the traditional religious communities. Due to the non-implementation of the law, the ICK and the Catho- lic Church continue to function within the legal framework inherited from the time of the former Yugoslavia, and several agreements have been reached between the government and the ICK.8

grouped as ‘RAE’) differ in their use of Romani or Albanian language and their narratives of origin. 3 Malcolm, Noel, Kosovo: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1998). 4 Norris, H.T., Islam in the Balkans (London: Hurst, 1993). 5 “The Republic of Kosovo is a secular state and is neutral in matters of religious beliefs.” (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (2008), Article 8). 6 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (2008), Chapter III, Article 57. 7 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission in Kosovo, in its regular reports on the implementation of legislation (http://www.osce .org/documents/mik/2008/09/32879_en.pdf, accessed 22 May 2010), continuously calls for a more effective implementation of legislation adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo. In line with this, Resul Regjepi, advisor to the ICK, has expressed serious objections to the adopted Law on Religious Freedoms (http://bislame.net/web/ content/view/137/27/, accessed 22 May 2010). 8 Interview with the Grand Mufti Naim Ternava to Dituria Islame: http://bislame .net/web/content/view/139/27/, accessed 2 February 2010. kosovo 323

The Report of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General on Kosovo’s future status (the Ahtisaari Plan),9 in its chapter on decen- tralisation, foresees the establishment of Municipal Security Councils (MSC) for each Kosovo municipality, which would involve all security sector stakeholders, including religious community representatives. The ICK has been represented at MSC’s meetings, which are held three times a year. Apart from the ICK, many other Islam-based NGOs were registered by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kos- ovo (UNMIK) after the 1999 war, but most have now ceased their activities.10 That there is no transparency about NGOs (active or inactive) is shown in a failed attempt to have a database of NGOs available in Kosovo such as http://www.cso-ks.org/.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The main national Muslim organisation is the Islamic Community of Kosova (Bashkësia Islame e Republikës së Kosovës, ICK, Bajram Kel- mendi St., No. 84, 10000 Prishtina, tel: +381 38 224 024, fax: +381 38 245 700, http://www.bislame.net), which has been headed by Grand Mufti Naim Tërnava for the last six years. The ICK has 25 branches around the country (called regional Islamic councils).11 The ICK is the only independent religious community for all Kosovo Muslims (Albanians, Bosniaks, Turks and RAE communities), whether living in Kosovo or living and working abroad. It represents Islam vis-à-vis the state. The ICK is the main institution responsible for the organisation

9 http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html, accessed 22 May 2010. 10 At the eighth joint meeting of Islamic civil society organisations held at the Hotel Grand in Prishtina on 30 November 2009, the participants pointed to several reasons for the fall in of the numbers of Islamic NGOs in Kosovo, particularly bad management, the hostile attitude of the authorities, and lack of legal protection mechanisms: http://www.khajansi.com/index.php/haberler/images/images/?option=com_content& view=article&id=766:perfaqesuesit-e-shoqatave-islame-jane-takuar-ne-kosove&catid =59:aktualitete&Itemid=110&fontstyle=f-smaller, accessed 3 February 2010. Nexhat Ibrahimi, a prominent Kosovo Islamic scholar, also emphasises “double standards” and “hostility and prejudices” against Islamic humanitarian organisations in Kos- ovo as reasons for this (“Fushata kunder organizatave humanitare ne Kosove” (The campaign against Islamic based humanitarian organizations in Kosovo), http://www .zeriislam.com/artikulli.php?id=751, accessed 1 March 2009). 11 Kushtetuta e Bashkësisë Islame të Kosovës (Constitution of the Islamic Commu- nity of Kosovo) (Prishtina: ICK, 2003). 324 besa ismaili and administration of Islamic educational institutions and other Islamic affairs. All mosques, imams and muezzins are under the ICK’s authority. There are two specialised departments within the ICK: the Department for Women (est. 2005) and the Department for Youth (est. 2007). The Grand Mufti regularly receives diplomatic representatives and heads of international missions and is invited to official state occasions.12 The budget of the ICK is mostly made up of donations by the Muslim population, such as zakah, sadaqat al-fitr, the hides of animals sacrificed during ‘Id al-Adha’, and other forms of contributions. Since the ICK does not receive any support from the state budget, it depends solely on donations from the people in order to run its activities and cover the salaries of its 1,200 employees.13 As for other Islamic-based foundations and organizations, many of the International NGOs have been taken over by Kosovan associa- tions14 and there are also a large number of small local organisations that deal with minor religious, educational and publishing activities. There is seldom, if ever, any well-established cooperation or networking between these organizations, but a partial exception is the Asso- ciation for Culture and Education (Asociacioni per Kulture Edukim dhe Arsim, AKEA http://www.facebook.com/NGO.AKEA) established as an umbrella association for Islamic charity organisations active in Kosovo prior to the war in 1999. During 2009 they have been quite active working with university students, women, and children.15

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are currently 750 mosques in Kosovo. In major cities, such as Prishtina, Prizren, Gjakova and Peja, there are several monumental mosques built during the time and in the style of the Ottoman Empire. The biggest mosque in Kosovo is the seventeenth-century Sinan Pasha Mosque in Prizren, and the most beautiful is Xhami e Hadumit in

12 http://www.bislame.net. 13 Interview with Grand Mufti on 28 January 2009. 14 EMTEC, sponsored by Yusuf Islam, had an international management team till 2005, and the centre is now run by the local Muslim women. Similarly, associations such as Sfera, Magbuleja, are currently run by local people with scarce funds. 15 More information available at: http://www.studentet.info/modules/ipboard/ index.php?showtopic=23034, accessed February 2010. kosovo 325

Gjakova, built in the fifteenth century.16 During the 1997–1999 conflict, Serbian paramilitary and military forces destroyed and burned 218 mosques across Kosovo, most of which were historical monuments.17 Around 211 have been (re)constructed since 1999, thanks to the contributions of the local community and donors, including some from Islamic countries.18 Seven other mosques are located in the Serbian enclaves in Kosovo, including one beside the River Ibar in Mitrovica North, which remains in ruins with little hope of ever being rebuilt. Nevertheless, the Islamic Council in Mitrovica and the Muslim community living in the North of Mitrovica have filed the request for reconstruction of this mosque to UNMIK administration in the North on 1 March 2010. There are about 120 new mosques, mainly in the areas where the former Communist regime did not allow mosques, including major municipalities, such as Skenderaj, Gllogovc, Lipjan, Malishevë, Klinë, Istog, etc.19 Some non-Islamic NGOs and donors have contributed to the reconstruction of mosques in Kosovo, including the Italian INTERSOS, the Jewish community in the USA, Swed- ish organisations, Turkish TIKA, etc. All the mosques, but the one in Marina village in Skenderaj,20 and other gifted properties have been

16 Drançolli, Fejaz, Xhamia e Hadumit në Gjakovë (Hadum Mosque in Gjakova), Arkivi i Kosovës Vjetari, vols. 18–19 (Prishtina: Sh. Botuese Rilindja, 1984). 17 Barbaria Serbe ndaj monumenteve Islame ne Kosove (Serbian Barbarities against Islamic Monuments in Kosova) factography published by the Presidency of Islamic Community of Kosovo, 2000. 18 Interview with Sabri Bajgora, head of Kosovo imams, on 1 February 2010. 19 Barbaria Serbe ndaj monumenteve Islame ne Kosove (Serbian Barbarities against Islamic Monuments in Kosova) factography published by the Presidency of Islamic Community of Kosovo, 2000. 20 In Marina village, Drenica. The mosque and other facilities have been built by a British Islamic charity, Mercy-Rahma. As the negotiations were underway to hand over this last mosque to ICK administration, Kosovo Police intervened based on the request of the Municipality of Skenderaj and some other local imams, closing the Mosque and expelling the imam Kastriot Duka on 2 March 2010. This action also followed after around 6000 signatures were gathered by a local NGO to expel the imam from the mosque. The Marina story continued to be present in the media, and the representatives of Rahma Mercy from London characterised the action as an Islamo- phobic one and also as an act of hatred against foreign citizens and their presence in Kosovo. They have also initiated a court procedure against the decision, declaring on Radio Television of Kosovo for “Pa RRotlla” programme on 20 March 2010 at 23:15 hrs that they had difficultieseven “ to find a defence council as they were either threatened or declined to take over the job”. To other Islamic analysts (Qemajl Morina “Closure of the Mosque—A negative image for Kosovo” http://www.islamgjakova.net/artikulli.php?id=227; accessed 13 April 2010) this was a clear example of interference of state into religious affairs. The Ministry of Interior reissued the ban for Kastriot Duka in October to enter 326 besa ismaili handed to ICK management. According to the Grand Mufti, more than 100 requests for the construction of new mosques have been submitted to the ICK by local congregations because there are insufficient places to pray. In the largest suburb of the capital, Dardania, there is a prayer hall in the building where the Saudi Joint Relief Committee (SRJC) is based.21 As the only place of worship for more than 80,000 inhabitants, it remains the most frequented mosque in Kosovo.

5 Children’s Education

There is one Islamic high school, the Alaud-din Madrasa, established in 1952 (under the Communist regime). It is based in the capital, Prishtina, has two branches, one in Prizren and one in Gjilan, and provides education for both boys and girls. The curriculum combines religious and secular subjects and more than 1,300 students have graduated between 1952 and 2008.22 As of 2008, the Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) has been paying the salaries of its teaching staff and this has been much appreciated by the ICK and the Muslim community because of the financial difficulties they have been facing. An Institute of Hifz (memorising the Qur’an) was established in Gjakova/Djakovica in 2005 with the support of the International Istanbul Humanitarian and Cultural Organization (IIARC) known as Istanbul Association, which had about twenty students in 2009.23 On-going religious education programmes and Qur’an courses are run at almost all Kosovo mosques. Some NGOs provide free of charge computer and language courses. There is only one private Islamic

Kosovo, as the media informed that the imam returned to the village and distributed assistance to the families (http://www.koha.net/index.php?cid=1,7,38064; accessed 22 February 2011). 21 The SJRC is an umbrella organisation representing several charities sponsored by the government of Saudi Arabia. The director, Mr. Khalid, in an interview by Ted Siefer (available at: http://www.tol.org/client/article/10177-heritage-or-sacrilege.html, accessed on 15 January 2009) emphasised that in the SJRC’s humanitarian activities, the agency has spent over $100 million on caring for and resettling refugees, on rebuilding schools and houses, and on health care. Construction and restoration of mosques represents just one part of this investment in Kosovo’s social welfare. 22 www.medreseja.org. 23 http://www.islamgjakova.net/aktivitete/drejtori_i_medreses_se_mesme_alau- din_ne_prishtine_viziton_medresene_e_madhe_ne_gjakove.htm, accessed 15 January 2009. kosovo 327

pre-school education institution, which is in Pristina and is accredited by MEST.24 The ICK has undertaken several attempts to introduce confessional religious education in public schools on its own. With the start of the academic year 2009–2010, the Grand Mufti started meeting the heads of the political parties to discuss this matter,25 meeting first with the opposition parties, who promised him their support. The most discussed event organised by ICK was the international conference on “Teaching religion in public schools: experiences from the region and the possible options for Kosovo”. The conference brought together expertise and experience from USA, Austria, Croatia, B&H, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Serbia. Obtaining a common knowledge about the regional experience in this regard, and exploring possible modalities that might be applied in Kosovo case by looking at the needs, capacities and discuss proper instruments and methodologies that might be adequate and acceptable for Kosovo, the common conclusion drawn was that the Croatian and Austrian models were the most appropriate to Kosovo.26

6 Higher and Professional Education

Kosovo’s first Faculty of Islamic Studies (http://www.fsi92.tk/) was established by the ICK in 1992, with the aim of giving the young an opportunity to study Islam in their mother tongue and in their own country. Students apply to this faculty from various parts of the Alba- nian territories in the Balkans, such as Montenegro, Albania, Macedo- nia and the Presheva Valley in Serbia, as well as Kosovo. A four-year undergraduate programme is offered. By April 2011, 200 male and female students had graduated from the Faculty.27 The students’ diplomas were accepted and recognised by MEST up to 2008. As the higher education accreditation process and reforms in the education system

24 http://www.lulishtjaedritave.com. 25 http://www.gazetaexpress.com/web/index.php/artikujt/lexo/14578/C4/C13, accessed 10 September 2009. 26 Conference conclusions and recommendations published at ICK official website are available at: http://bislame.net/web/content/view/492/9/, accessed on 12 April 2011. 27 http://www.FIS-ks.org/index_files/te%20diplomuarit.htm (list of graduated students from FIS, last accessed 25.05.2010). Interview with Vedat Shabani, secretary of FIS on 13 April 2011. 328 besa ismaili in Kosovo is ongoing, the FIS needs first to wait for the Assembly of Kosovo’s scheduled session to discuss the law on the legal status of religious communities, when they would eventually pave the way for the solution of FIS status as well. FIS has nevertheless reached agreements on mutual recognition and academic exchange and cooperation with several regional and European universities.28 On 22 April 2010, the Dean of FIS and former Mufti of ICK was appointed by the President of Kosovo as chargé d’affaires of Kosovo in Saudi Arabia.29 But the now vacant position of Dean of FIS sparked a dispute that was closely followed by both: the public (jamat) and the media. Namely the attention was drawn due to what was considered to be “a vain attempt of the former secretary to be self-appointed as the Dean of FIS”.30 The academic leadership of FIS and to the Presidency of ICK as the legal founder of this Faculty, considered the act as ten- dentious and as they put it: “it represents a violation of FIS Statute and the Constitution of the Islamic Community of Kosovo”.31 The academic year 2010/2011 found The Faculty of Islamic Studies in a large new and modern building, with increasing numbers of students and, finally, a new dean.32

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Most of the Muslim cemeteries in Kosovo are located alongside mosques, especially those in rural areas. Larger cities have their cemeteries in municipal or privately owned land granted to ICK for this purpose. Cemeteries are under the control of municipalities, and Mus- lim cemeteries are separate from those of other religious communities

28 E.g., University of Vienna, Department of Educational Sciences (11 March 2008); Faculty of Islamic Studies in Skopje (15 November 2007); University of Helsinki, Insti- tute for Asian and African Studies (13 October 2008), etc. 29 On 22 April 2010, President of the Republic of Kosovo, Fatmir Sejdiu appoints Rexhep Boja chargé d’affaires for Saudi Arabia, http://www.koha.net/index.php/player .swf?cid=1,7,18889, accessed 22 June 2010. 30 Report of TV Klankosova on 04.10.2010; video available at http://www.klankas- ova.tv/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5966:04102010&catid=56:o ra-e-pasdites&Itemid=97, accessed 2 February 2011. 31 Presidency of ICK, Communiqué, http://bislame.net/web/content/view/386/9/, accessed 12 August 2010. 32 Dr. Qazim Qazimi has been elected the new Dean of FIS on 15 May 2011 (http:// www.fsi92.tk/). kosovo 329

(Catholics and Orthodox). There is a continuous need for more cemetery space.33

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The law on religious freedoms34 guarantees the availability of spiritual counselling in hospitals, custody facilities, prisons, and social care institutions, but there are no recorded cases of this provision being put in place by the authorities. Officially, ‘chaplaincy’ is still unknown in Kosovo and no imams are appointed to serve in public institutions, whether in the armed forces, police, prisons or hospitals. However, some informal activities are occasionally conducted by Islamic-based civil society organisations, individual imams or women activists in correctional centres, old people’s homes, kindergartens etc.

9 Religious Festivals

‘Id al-Fitr’ and ‘Id al-Adha’ celebrations are organised every year. Both are recognised as official holidays by the state and all public institutions are closed. UNMIK introduced the practice of granting staff a holiday on the first day of Ramadan and other international missions have followed suit. Representatives of state authorities and international and diplomatic missions, and the heads of other religious communities, etc. attend the reception organised by the Grand Mufti on the day of ‘Id’. The visits are broadcast, along with other ‘Id’ activities. During Ramadan, representatives of the government and the ICK visit each other for iftar, and the ICK organises a traditional Qur’an recitation competition, with an international flavour.35 The Women’s Department of the ICK runs a major annual multi- religious and multi-ethnic religious and cultural event for women.36

33 Interview with the Grand Mufti on RTK; video available at http://bislame.net/web/ component/option,com_seyret/task,videodirectlink/Itemid,/id,80/, accessed 30 January 2009. 34 Law No. 02/L-31, http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/training/hrgi/docs/RE2006_48_ ALE02_L31.pdf, accessed 23 May 2010. 35 The Presidency of ICK in cooperation with the waqf office in Kosovo organised a Qur’an competition in Ramadan 2009 in Prizren: Dituria Islame, no. 218, p. 57. 36 http://bislame.net/web/content/view/307/9/, accessed 15 January 2009. 330 besa ismaili

The birthday of the Prophet Muhammad is another significant day for Kosovo Muslims and is celebrated in mosques in various parts of the country. Sufi and Bektashi communities also celebrate the Sulltan Nawrus and the Day of “Ashura”. On 14 February 2011, ICK Depart- ment for Youth and Islamic Council of Pristina co-organised Tradi- tional Mevlud Evening at City Red Hall in Prishtina gathering 900 guests from Kosovo and Balkan.37

10 Halal Food

Halal meat is available in supermarkets in Kosovo and this is not an issue that is raised in daily life. All food products are generally halal, but several private producers have recently begun marketing ‘halal’ labelled products. Halal slaughter is performed in most private butchers’ establishments. Madrasas collect money for collective halal slaughter for ‘Id-Al-Adha and distribute the meat to students in student hostels and to poor families.38

11 Dress Codes

The Kosovo Muslim community, regardless of ethnic background, has inherited a unique Islamic dress culture which was more visible prior to the recent war with Serbia. Women in both urban and rural areas used to wear head scarves and clothing that covered their body. This became unpopular under the Communist regime and in 1951 the hijab was banned, including for Catholic, Orthodox and Jewish women, and women were excluded from public and social life, as well as the education system.39 This unpopularity increased after the war with Serbia in the late 1990s when most cultural values moved aggressively towards so-called Westernisation and modernisation. As part of the Islamic revival which took place largely after the end of the totalitarian Milosevic regime in 1999, many young people returned to their religion and young women increasingly started to wear hijab.

37 http://bislame.net/web/content/view/474/9/, accessed 23 March 2011. 38 “Dituria islame” no. 231, advertisement in the back cover page. 39 Krasniqi, Milazim, “Lehtesia e padurueshme e intolerances (The unbearable easiness of intolerance)”, http://www.gazetashqiptare.eu/milazim/feja_islame.html, accessed 31 January 2009. kosovo 331

Hijab wearing women claim that that this is a renewed assertion of their centuries old religious and cultural identity and regard the hostility against it [hijab] as an inherited Yugoslav anti-Muslim ideology. Nevertheless, the year 2010 may rightly be named the year of head scarf debates. Enver Hoxhaj, Minister in the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology re-enforced the controversial Administra- tive Instruction (AI) that bans religious symbols in public schools by imposing its implementation in Kosovo primary and secondary schools through municipal directorates. The anger against this ban first arose as it had not been through all the normal legal channels. When the instruction reached Prishtina Municipal Assembly for discussion, protests against the ban were voiced. First the Ombudsman Institution reacted against the ban. And shortly after the Department for Youth of the Presidency of ICK organised a public debate where almost all actors present in the roundtable opposed the ban.40 A major protest, for many a historic one, was organised in the centre of Prishtina gathering more than ten thousands protesters of different ethnicities on 18 June 2010. The Islamic Community of Kosovo then publicly asked the authorities to lift the ban. The ICK made its position public that it would fight the discrimi- native AI by legal means. So it filed a complaint to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo to test the legality of the ban. As legal procedure envisages, the ICK sent the complaint via Ombuds- man Institution to the Constitutional Court of Kosovo. So far the Ombudsman has declined to proceed with the claim due to political pressure from the top.41 On the other hand, Prime Minister Hashim Thaci and the deputy Prime Minister Hajredin Kuqi, in a separate meeting on 29 Novem- ber 2010 at ICK HQ, provided guarantees to ICK and the majority Muslim community that “the position of religious communities shall be settled with a separate law and be financially supported by central

40 The Debate was held on 9 June 2010 with panelists: President of Kosovo Council for Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms, Kosovo Ombudsman Mr. Sami Kurteshi, President of Kosovo Pupils Association, Students’ Association Representative and Prishtina Municipality MP, Mr. Amir Ahmeti, etc. 41 Sabri Bajgora, Head of Kosovo Imams assumes this is due to the fear that the AI may most probably be adjudicated as anti-constitutional and such a verdict would be perceived “threatening”. 332 besa ismaili government budget, and that the issue of headscarf shall be resolved based on EU standards.”42

12 Publications and Media

The Presidency of the Islamic Community has been publishing the monthly religious, cultural and scientific reviewDituria Islame (Islamic knowledge) since 1986, the quarterly magazine Edukata Islame (Islamic education) since 1971, and an annual Islamic calendar, called Takvim, since 1970. Beside these official Islamic publications, there are some newspapers and magazines, such as Paqja (Peace) and Argumenti (The Argument), published by private organisations. Muslims from the non-Albanian minorities do not have Islamic periodicals in their own languages (Turkish, Bosnian, Serbian or Romani) published in Kosovo, but literature is received from abroad. Madrasas and the FSI have published around 30 titles for educational purposes and the ICK has published more than 50 books since 1999.43 In 2009, two private cable television stations were contracted by the ICK to broadcast Ramadan programmes. There is a very popular Islamic affiliated private weekly newspaper and television channel “BESA” (www.rtvbesa.com, tel: +377 44 150 049). In 2010 however, several other TV stations provided rich religious programs such as Peace TV, Vali TV, Balkan TV, etc.

13 Family Law

Members of all religious communities are obliged by law to obtain their marriage certificate from the state authorities. Muslims may conclude marriage contracts in mosques and obtain a certificate of marriage and such certificates were recognised by the state authorities until 2003.44 The reason why they have ceased to be recognised is assumed to be the lack of joint tracking mechanisms and a database shared between the municipal and religious authorities.

42 Islamic Community of Kosova official website: http://bislame.net/web/content/ view/453/9/, accessed 11 April 2011. 43 Interview with Sabri Bajgora, head of Kosovo imams, 1 February 2010. 44 Interview with Bahri Sejdiu. kosovo 333

From 2000 to 2009, a total of 568 marriage contracts and two divorces were recorded at the Islamic Council of Pristina.45 The Muslim community usually concludes marriage contracts informally in private family environment. The regional Islamic Councils have been busy during 2010 with retrieving the data lost during the war time when their respective archives were burned. They aim at centralising the database of fatwas, certificates and other administrative paper works.

14 Inter-religious Relations

The Kosovo Inter-religious Council was officially established on 13 April 2000.46 Several international meetings were held until 2006.47 Kosovo’s religious communities have complained that the Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo favours the Serbian Orthodox community over others, and no attempt has been made to revive the relationship between the leaderships of religious communities. In addition, the Kosovo Serbian Orthodox Church leadership has been facing allegations of misuse of charity funds and Bishop Artemije, long known as the main authority who has been obstructing any political attempt to integrate the Serbian community in Kosovo, has been asked to resign.48 The new Catholic cathedral was inaugurated in the capital city centre in late 2010, and the Grand Mufti of Kosovo was present. Special and focused women’s inter-religious groups are more active.49 Women of all religious communities are disappointed and dissatisfied with the lack of Government support to provide incentives to further develop inter-religious dialogue by providing grants for joint projects or other activities.50

45 Interview with Bahri Sejdiu, who provided direct access to the register at the ICK in Pristina. 46 http://www.kosovakosovo.com/view_file.php?file_id=61, accessed 3 February 2010. 47 The last meeting was held on 2–3 May 2006 at Pec Patriarchate Monastery; information available at: http://www.kosovakosovo.com/view_file.php?file_id=61, accessed 3 February 2009. 48 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=02&dd= 16&nav_id=65221, accessed 17 May 2010. 49 The World Council of Religions for Peace (WCRP) has been the mediator for both women’s and men’s groups. Muslim and Catholic women have paid several visits to Orthodox women in Gracanica. Muslim and Catholic women’s groups regularly visit each other on major religious festivals. 50 Different faiths, same wishes—women’s inter-religious network in Kosovo: http:// www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5854471,00.html, accessed on 8 March 2011. 334 besa ismaili

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The public media in Kosovo devote little space to Islamic religious matters. Television stations do cover the main annual Muslim celebrations for ‘Id al-Fitr’ and ‘Id al-Adha’ and, during the month of Rama- dan, national television and other privately owned stations provide some space for religious scholars to speak about religion. Nevertheless, the Kosovo media appear eager to cover events related to any sort of dispute or violence that occur involving imams or mosques. Public opinion too, reacts against everything and everybody that they regard as a threat to what they perceive traditional Kosovo Islam.51

16 Major Cultural Events

Turkish PM Tayyib Rejap Erdogan paid a visit to Kosovo during the first week of November 2010. His visit was widely celebrated by the state authorities, ICK and the citizens. He was awarded an honorary doctorate by Prishtina University and Honorary Citizen of Prizren Municipality. He inaugurated the reconstruction works completed on the Grand Prishtina Mosque. And the Kosovo public had for the first time after the war the unique opportunity to see its senior state official, Prime Minister Hashim Thaci, perform religious prayers alongside Erdogan and Grand Mufti Naim Tërnava.52

51 The Hanafi school is regarded as the traditional Kosovo form of Islam, and the Grand Mufti thinks that by introducing religious education in public schools “traditional Hanafi Islam will be preserved and cultivated in these areas”—Grand Mufti Opening Speech at the Conference on 14 March 2011. The speech is published in the magazime Dituria Islame, no. 250, April 2011. 52 This news covered the headline of TV news programs and the video is also available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gnhTn2uYESo, accessed 01 April 2011. LATVIA

Egdūnas Račius1

1 Muslim Populations

Though Muslims (mainly Tatar immigrants and other Muslims decom- missioned from the Russian tsarist army) started arriving and settling in the then Russian ruled Latvia in the second part of the nineteenth century, the first Muslim congregation in Riga was established only in 1902. By World War I it had grown to around 1,000 members, but during and immediately after the war (by 1920) the Muslim community in the now independent Latvia had shrunk to a mere 150 and further declined to less than 70 by 1935. Today, most Latvian Mus- lims are settlers and descendants of settlers from the Soviet period, when scores of people from the then Soviet Central Asian republics moved to the Baltics. The last Soviet census of 1989 reported more than 12,000 people of Muslim background (Tatars, Azeris, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, etc.) living in Soviet Latvia, although most of them did not practise Islam. It appears that the majority of them chose to leave Lat- via after it regained independence in the early 1990s. A small Muslim congregation (less than 70 members) was re-established in Riga in 1993. In 1994, a congregation in Daugavpils founded the Daugavpils islāma centrs (Daugavpils Islamic Centre). These were soon followed by other (among them splinter) congregations. As the last official census did not include a question on religious identity, no official figures for the size of the Muslim community in Latvia are available. Unfounded estimates range between 500 and 10,000,2 but none of them distinguish between nominal (‘of Muslim

1 Egdūnas Račius is an Associate Professor at the Institute of International Rela- tions and Political Science of Vilnius University, Lithuania, where he chairs the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies section. His research interests encompass Muslim revivalism throughout the world and specifically developments in the Muslim communities in the Baltic States. 2 Banks, Elena, “Latvia’s Muslim community reaches out”, The Baltic Times, 29 July 2004, http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/9385/, accessed 4 March 2009. 336 egdūnas račius background’) and practising Muslims. Islam in the European Union3 gives a figure of 5,000. In 2001, the head of the Latvian Islamic Com- munity estimated the number of nominal Muslims to be in the range of 5,000 (indeed, according to the latest statistics, there are some 2,800 Tatars, 1,700 Azeris, and 300 Uzbeks currently living in Latvia), but added that only 10% were practising. The total number of nominal Muslims in Latvia for 2010 (taking into account the steady emigration of Russian-speaking Muslims from Latvia and the conversions to Islam of several hundred Latvians) could be as high as 5,000 (of whom only a quarter are citizens of Latvia), but Muslims practising on a daily basis would hardly exceed a few hundred. The overwhelming majority of Latvia’s Muslims are located in and around the capital city Riga, and Daugavpils.

2 Islam and the State

Latvia is a constitutionally secular republic with no state religion, though Lutheran and Orthodox Christians nominally constitute the majority of the population. Moreover, the state makes a distinction between the ‘traditional’ faiths (Lutheran, Orthodox, Catholic, and Jewish) and the ‘new’; Islam falls into the latter category. Under the Constitution, the state cannot finance religious organisations, nor can religious institutions or their representatives take part in governing of the state. Relations between state and religion are regulated by the Law on Religious Organisations (adopted in 1995). Religious organisations registered with the Board of Religious Affairs at the Ministry of Justice attain legal status and certain rights and privileges not available to those that chose to remain unregistered, but there is no compulsion for religious communities to register with the state. Religious organisations of ‘non-traditional’ denominations are required to re-register annually for the first ten years of their existence. Ten registered congregations of the same faith can form a religious association or union to represent that religion vis-à-vis the state. Only one such association can register per religion. Currently Muslims in Latvia are in the process

3 Felice Dassetto, Silvio Ferrari and Brigitte Marechal, “Islam in the European Union: What’s at stake in the future”, 23 July 2007, European Parliament, http://www .libertysecurity.org/article1582.html, accessed 6 April 2011. latvia 337 of registering new like-minded congregations in order to attain the required number of ten to be eligible to form an association.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia records 15 registered independent Muslim religious congregations as of 2009. The Latvian Islamic Community (Latvijas islama kopienas, Brivibas Street 104–22, Riga, tel: +371-282-98292, fax: +371-292-12512, http://www.islam.lv/, dir@ triz.lv) includes the Islamic Information Centre and a prayer hall and is headed by Zufar Zainullin. It is the main Muslim organisation in the country and is dominated by Russian speaking Muslims (Tatars and those with origins in the former Soviet Central Asian republics). It has several affiliate (friendly) congregations established with the purpose of forming a union of Muslim congregations, for which the law requires a membership of ten registered congregations, each with at least 20 members. There are several rival congregations with minus- cule memberships that oppose the establishment of the union under the leadership of the Latvian Islamic Community. In October 2009, a new congregation, Latvian Muslim Consultative Centre (Musulmaņu konsultatīvais centrs Latvijā), headed by the former imam of the Lat- vian Islamic Community, was established in Riga with a separate prayer hall (Ernesta Birznieka-Upīša Street 16-5, Riga, tel: +371-268- 83284, [email protected]). The second largest congregation is the Daugavpils Islamic Centre (Daugavpils musulmanu draudze “Idel”, Imantas iela 25, Daugavpils) also dominated by Russian speakers.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

In the early twentieth century, a prayer hall was opened in Riga but did not survive the Soviet period. A prayer hall in purchased premises in an apartment at Brivibas Street 104–22 was opened in 2005 by the Latvian Islamic Community. In October 2009, a new prayer hall on Ernesta Birznieka-Upīša Street 16-5 was opened by the former imam of the Brivibas Street prayer hall. There are at least two other locations in private homes in Riga where some Muslims occasionally gather for communal prayer. The Daugavpils and Ventspils communities have makeshift prayer halls. Since the early 1990s there has been much talk of constructing a purpose-built mosque in Riga, but no practical steps 338 egdūnas račius have been taken towards achieving this goal, and the leader of the Lat- vian Islamic Community acknowledged that for the time being there is no need for a new purpose built mosque.

5 Children’s Education

Optional religious education (Christian and Jewish, e.g. of ‘traditional’ denominations) is part of the state schooling system. Islamic education (Islam being formally a ‘non-traditional’ religion) is not offered in state schools, but some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. The congregations in Riga and Daugavpils provide Islamic education for young people in improvised informal weekend ‘schools’. There are no private primary or secondary level schools run by Muslims.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Academic courses on the Middle East (especially Arabic language) are regularly offered at the University of Latvia (Department of Modern Language). Teachers in schools who deal with Islamic history and/or religious dogmas have either history or religious studies degrees and certificates but not specifically Islamic education. There is no institution for imam training in Latvia. Apparently, all acting imams in Riga and elsewhere are self-taught.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims have a separate cemetery in Riga dating back to the late nineteenth century. Though now rarely used for burial, it is still maintained by the Latvian Islamic Community. Muslims have been assigned separate sections in cemeteries in Riga and other major urban places. So far no need has arisen for a new separate Muslim cemetery.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

While Lutheran, Orthodox and Catholic religious services are offered in the armed forces, prisons and hospitals, there are no imams because there are so few Muslims in need of their services. latvia 339

9 Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations in Riga and Daugavpils take place in rented premises. They are open to the public and are attended by between 300 and 500 people. During ‘Id al-Adha, animals are slaughtered in rural areas.

10 Halal Food

In the first part of 2009, at least three halal cafes opened in Riga: two, the Halal and the Taj Mahal on Brivibas Street are run by the same company, and an Noor on Kalēju Street, run by several Latvian converts to Islam. The last, however, was forced to vacate the rented premises and close down the business in October of the same year. In September 2009, the Latvian Parliament passed amendments to the Animal Rights Protection Law granting religious communities the right to slaughter animals according to their religious rites. Sev- eral Latvian meat processing companies have started practising halal slaughter (primarily for export to Sweden). Since then, at least one halal butcher’s shop run by a local company named Halal Latvia has opened in Riga (on Stirnu Street).

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. Latvian laws allow head coverings (including hijab) in photos on official documents. However, only a handful of Muslim women wear hijab (and a few wear niqab); mainly on Fridays while attending communal prayer.

12 Publication and Media

There is no regular Muslim print media in Latvia, though ethnic minorities, among them those of Muslim background (Tatars, Azeris), do occasionally publish brochures and pamphlets with sections related to Islam. One of the few websites run by Latvian Muslims is www.islam .lv (in Russian). Since October 2009 Russian translations of the weekly khutba given at Brivibas Street prayer hall have been posted there (since 340 egdūnas račius

July 2010 regularly), with other practical information added as needed. The website has an on-line forum (also in Russian). Another website is http://www.islammuslim.lv/ (in Latvian run by Latvian converts to Islam) with an online forum in the Latvian language. A third site with limited material on Islam in Latvian is at http://www.islamlv.netfirms .com/. In late 2009 a new Russian language female-focused website “Muslima—zhenshchina v nikabe” (Muslima—a woman in niqab) at www.muslima.lv ,with proselytising tone, was set up with the aim of providing guidance (in the form of question-answer) for (presumably converted) female Muslims.

13 Family Law

Muslims, like others, have to register marriage at a municipal civil registry office as imams are not authorised to act on behalf of the state. A dozen or so marriage contracts (nikah) are signed every year under the supervision of imams in Riga. Inheritances can be apportioned according to Islamic norms if that is accepted by all the parties involved. Otherwise the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and the religious affiliation of the parties is irrelevant in any litigation.

14 Interreligious Relations

No information available.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Though there is generally very little coverage of the situation of Mus- lims in Latvia. In the local media, between September 2009, when the Latvian Parliament (Saema) started deliberating amendments (namely allowing ritual slaughter) to the Animal Rights Protection Law, and November 2009 heated debates took place in the print media and television, with animal rights activists vehemently opposing the amendments. With the law passed and enacted attention to the issue dwindled by the end of the year. Throughout 2010 a dozen interviews and articles on Islam in Latvia were aired and published in local media, some with a focus on security issues. latvia 341

16 Major Cultural Events

Sabantuj is an annual several-day gathering of Tatars and Bashkirs with festivities (songs, dances, games and sports). It is not a religious festival, though religious attendees may hold communal prayers and some lectures on religious issues may be offered.

LIECHTENSTEIN

Thomas Schmidinger1

1 Muslim Populations

Islam in the Principality of Liechtenstein is a very recent phenomenon. Muslims immigrated in the last 20 years predominately from Turkey, Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo. While in 1990 only 2.4% of the population were Muslims, in 2000 it doubled to 4.8% or 1,593 persons.2 The results of the next census in December 2010 will not be available until 2011 but it is estimated that the Muslim population continued to grow. The large majority of Muslims in Liechtenstein are Sunnis. There is no reference to Shi’i Muslims in Liechtenstein. There are some Alevis, but their numbers are uncertain.

2 Islam and the State

The present legal situation concerning the relation of state and religion in Liechtenstein is still based on the laws set up by Prince Johann II in the 19th century, when Liechtenstein was nearly entirely Roman Catholic. Until now the Principality and the Catholic Church are closely related. Article 37 of the constitution still defines the Roman Catholic Church as the official religion Landeskirche(“ ”) of the Prin- cipality, but also guarantees freedom of religion to other religious denominations. Since the 1990s, debates about the separation between church and state have been going on, and the Principality is trying to establish a new secular legal order with a new relationship between the state and the religious communities. While the Catholic and the Protestant churches are financially supported by the state, Islam is not regularly financed. The government has announced that it would be willing to support an Islamic religious community if the two Muslim

1 Thomas Schmidinger is a lecturer at the Institute of Political Science at the Uni- versity of Vienna and a Research Fellow at the University of Minnesota (US). 2 Liechtensteinische Volkszählung 2000. Religion und Hauptsprache. Band 2; p. 12. 344 thomas schmidinger

organisations would unite.3 Until now it has not been possible to realise this. In 2004 the European Institute for Intercultural and Interreligious Research (Europäisches Institut für interkulturelle und interreligiöse Forschung) was established by the government. Since then the Muslim communities also receive some minor funding. The government issues a residence permit for one imam. During Ramadan a second visiting imam is permitted.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamische Gemeinschaft des Fürstentum Liechtenstein (Islamic Community in the Principality of Liechtenstein, Alleestraße 8, 9495 Triesen) is affiliated to theDachverband islamischer Gemeinden der Ostschweiz und des Fürstentums Liechtenstein, DIGO (Umbrella association of Islamic Communities in the East of Switzerland and the Principality of Liechtenstein). The Liechtenstein Türk Birliği,4 that runs the Yeşil Camii (Industriestraße 32, 9495 Triesen), is affiliated to the Turkish Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı. Despite the fact that a significant minority of the Muslims of Turk- ish origin in Liechtenstein are Alevis, there is no Alevi organisation in the Principality. Some Alevis from Liechtenstein participate in Alevi activities in nearby regions of Austria and Switzerland. The activities of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat, which calls its Swiss branch Ahmadiyya Bewegung des Islams in der Schweiz und in Liechtenstein (Ahmadiyya Movement of Islam in Switzerland and Liechtenstein), that happened in 2009 did not continue in 2010.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are only two prayer houses in Liechtenstein. The Yeşil Camii (Green Mosque) and the Islamische Gemeinschaft des Fürstentum Liechtenstein (Islamic Community in the Principality of Liechtenstein) run both prayer rooms in the village of Triesen.

3 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/132836.pdf, accessed 25 Septem- ber 2010. 4 http://www.tuerkische-vereinigung.li/, accessed 25 September 2010. liechtenstein 345

5 Children’s Education

In the school year 2007/08 Islamic religious education started in five elementary schools. The curriculum was developed by the Institute for Interreligious Pedagogics and Didactics in Cologne (Germany). The government agreed to establish such a pilot project on condition that the teachers will be trained educationalists, the language of education would be German, the curriculum would be supervised by experts, the classes would be controlled by the Schulamt (Department of Educa- tion) in accordance with the laws and constitution of Liechtenstein.5 An evaluation in 2008 demonstrated that these conditions were fulfilled and the project continued. Until now it is not a regular school subject, but a voluntary project that is taught in the afternoons after the regular school lessons. According to the Schulamt, 30 children attended the classes in the first year and 80 in the school years 2008/09 and 2009/10, which means that 45% of the Muslim school-children attend the Islamic religion classes.6 For the year 2010/11 the number decreased to 75 attendees.7 The two teachers were trained in Tur- key and Austria and serve the schools in Liechtenstein from nearby Austria.

6 Higher and Professional Education

As a small country with only one small town Liechtenstein has no long tradition of higher education. The first private university8 opened only in 2000, but until now it has no field of study with specific relevance for Muslims. Neither has the state-run Hochschule Liech- tenstein9 any sections that deal with Islam. Only the Catholic Opus Dei-affiliated International Academy for Philosophy in the Principal- ity of Liechtenstein 10 has been active in some interreligious dialogue with Islamic organisations, like the Islamic Educational, Scientific and

5 http://linewsletter.typo3web.net/fileadmin/newsletter/files/04_07/Islamischer_ Religionsunterricht.pdf. 6 e-mail of Stefan Hirschlehner from the Schulamt, 2 March 2010. 7 e-mail of Stefan Hirschlehner from the Schulamt, 29 November 2010. 8 http://www.ufl.li, accessed 25 September 2010. 9 http://www.hochschule.li, accessed 25 September 2010. 10 http://www.iap.li, accessed 25 September 2010. 346 thomas schmidinger

Cultural Organization, ISESCO.11 But it does not offer any studies related to Islam itself.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There is no Muslim cemetery in Liechtenstein. But since the construction of a Muslim cemetery in nearby Vorarlberg (Austria) was initiated, a debate has also started in Liechtenstein about the construction of a Muslim cemetery. Already in 2007 vicar-general Dr. Markus Walser from the Catholic Archdiocese of Liechtenstein12 and Prince Hans-Adam II issued statements in favour of a Muslim cemetery. In 2008 an opinion poll showed that more than half of the population of Liechtenstein favours the opening of Christian cemeteries to Mus- lims, while only 35% would like to see a separate Muslim cemetery in the Principality.13 Until now only few Muslims are buried at Christian cemeteries. Most Muslims still return the bodies of their dead to their former homeland.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Islamic chaplaincy service in the hospital and the prison in Vaduz is offered by the Yeşil Camii, if requested. As Liechtenstein abolished its army in 1868, there is also no military chaplaincy.

9 Religious Festivals

Islamic festivals have no legal status in Liechtenstein, but they are celebrated by Muslim families and in prayer houses.

11 http://www.iap.li/files/Dialogue%20among%20Civilisations%20and%20Cultures_ IAP_Oct_2002.pdf. 12 http://www.erzbistum-vaduz.li/medien/20071105.htm, accessed 25 September 2010. 13 Marxer, Wilfried, “Religion in Liechtenstein. Umfrage im Auftrag der Regierung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein über Glauben, Religiosität, religiöse Toleranz und das Verhältnis von Staat und Religionsgemeinschaften,” in Beiträge, 40/2008, p. 59, at http:// www.liechtenstein-institut.li/Portals/11/pdf/lib/LIB_40_Religion.pdf, accessed 25 Sep- tember 2010. liechtenstein 347

10 Halal Food

As a very small country Liechtenstein has no infrastructure for ritual slaughter. Halal food has to be imported from abroad.

11 Dress Codes

There are no legal dress codes that prohibit Muslims from wearing the Islamic head scarf.

12 Publication and Media

There are no Muslim newspapers in Liechtenstein. Only the Liechten- stein Türk Birliği,14 its Yeşil Camii15 and its Parents Association16 run Muslim websites.

13 Family Law

Polygamy and the unilateral repudiation of a woman (talaq) under Islamic law are prohibited. Muslims are permitted to conduct marriage ceremonies in prayer houses, but only after a civil marriage is registered.

14 Interreligious Relations

There are few interreligious activities carried out by Catholic and Prot- estant parishes and the Catholic Archdiocese, the European Institute for Intercultural and Interreligious Research (Europäisches Institut für interkulturelle und interreligiöse Forschung), the Academy for Philoso- phy in the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Liechtenstein-Institut.

14 http://www.tuerkische-vereinigung.li/, accessed 25 September 2010. 15 http://camii.turkbirligi.li/, accessed 25 September 2010. 16 http://oab.turkbirligi.li/, accessed 25 September 2010. 348 thomas schmidinger

15 Public Opinion and Debate

As in many European states, debates in Liechtenstein on Islamic terrorism and the role of Islam in public have also increased since 2001. A survey by the Liechtenstein-Institut demonstrated an overall climate of tolerance. However Islam is viewed more negatively than Christianity or Judaism.17 Prince Hans-Adam II has publicly supported the equal treatment of Islam and the right to erect mosques.18 European debates like the ban on mosques in Switzerland or the debates on banning the burqa were also followed in Liechtenstein, but no similar suggestions were made. Contrary to other European countries, there is no right wing populist or right-extremist political party that mobilises against Muslims, but there are adolescent Nazi skinhead activities, connected with networks in neighbouring Germany, Switzerland and Austria.19 In February 2010 a Turkish restaurant in the village of Nendeln was destroyed with Molotov cocktails. Security officials and newspapers spoke about the increase of racist attacks and estimated that the number of violent right-extremist skinheads could be about 30 to 40.20

16 Major Cultural Events

There are no typically Muslim festivals and cultural events specific to Liechtenstein.

17 Marxer, Wilfried, ‘Religion in Liechtenstein’, p. 26. 18 http://www.llv.li/llv-portal-informationen/aktuelles.htm?reference=105520&check Sum=5E6381E59871ADC55DBF1B511DD6A00D, accessed 25 September 2010. 19 See Davolio, Miryam Eser Davolio and Matthias Drilling, Rechtsextremismus im Fürstentum Liechtenstein. Eine qualitative Studie zu Hintergründen und Herangehens- weisen im Auftrag der Gewaltschutzkommission des Fürstentums Liechtenstein. Eine Studie im Auftrag der Gewaltschutzkommission des Fürstentums Liechtenstein. Basel: Fachhochschule Nordwestschweiz, 2009. 20 http://www.vaterland.li/index.cfm?ressort=vermischtes&source=lv&id=8028, accessed 25 September 2010. LITHUANIA

Egdūnas Račius1

1 Muslim Populations

The most recent official census, in 2001, included a question on religious identity and gave the following figures: 2,860 Sunni Muslims (no data on Shi’is are available), or 0.1% of the total population, of whom 1,679 (or 58.7%) were ethnic Tatars, 362 (12.6%) Azeris, 185 Lithuanians and 74 Russians. Tatars have been living in Lithuania (especially the eastern part of today’s Republic of Lithuania) since the fourteenth century when they started settling in what was the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, primarily as mercenaries and political immigrants. They were given land by the Lithuanian rulers whom they served. Although over time Lithuanian Tatars lost their mother tongue, they retained their religion and survived as a distinct ethno-cultural yet well integrated group. Most of the other Muslims in Lithuania are descendants of immigrants from the Muslim Central Asian and Caucasian republics who settled in Lithuania during the Soviet period. In the official census, a substantial number (around half of Tatars and Azeris) of Lithuania’s inhabitants with Muslim backgrounds did not indicate their affiliation to Islam, but can potentially be considered nominal Muslims. This applies particularly to Azeris, traditionally Shi’is, who might have chosen not to identify with Sunnis but might nonetheless be practising. By 2010, the number of Muslims in Lithuania must have increased due to immigration (around 1,000, mainly Chechens [Department of Migration data]) and conversion (between 200 and 300, mainly through marriage).2 The total number

1 Egdūnas Račius is an Associate Professor at the Institute of International Rela- tions and Political Science of Vilnius University, Lithuania, where he chairs the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies section. His research interests include Muslim revivalism throughout the world and specifically developments in the Muslim communities in the Baltic States. Račius is the author of the chapter on Islam in Lithuania in Göran Larsson (ed.), Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 116–132. 2 Data from observations of on-line Muslim Internet forums and personal experience of the author. 350 egdūnas račius of nominal Muslims in 2010 could be as high as 7,000, but the number of Muslims practising on a daily basis is unlikely to exceed a tenth of the total. Almost two-thirds (over 64%) of Lithuania’s Muslims are concentrated in the capital city Vilnius, the second largest city Kaunas and the districts surrounding these cities. Local media and Muslims use the official figures but foreign (Muslim) sources sometimes produce unfounded numbers exceeding 10,000 (Islam Online in 2004 even gave a figure of 110,000!).3

2 Islam and the State

Lithuania is a secular republic with no state religion, though Catholics nominally constitute a majority (79% according to the 2001 census) of the population. Sunni Islam (the traditional faith of the Lithuanian Tatars) is recognised by law (adopted in 1995) as one of the nine ‘traditional’ faiths in Lithuania, and the Muslim community, through its official representative institution, the Muftiate (first established in Vil- nius in the inter-war period by the Polish authorities, who then controlled eastern Lithuania, including Vilnius, disbanded in the Soviet years, and re-established in 1998) is entitled to a modest annual state subsidy which is used for the maintenance of mosques and other communal buildings. The leader of the Lithuanian Muslim community (the officially recognised mufti, who also is the imam of the Kaunas mosque) is routinely invited to official meetings and celebrations at the Presidential Palace and the Parliament. Other Muslim denominations (such as Shi’is) have the right to freedom of religion and conscience but do not have the same official status as Sunni Muslims. Religious organisations affiliated to non-traditional denominations may seek official state recognition 25 years after registration.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There are almost a dozen registered Muslim organisations all around Lithuania. The main one is the Spiritual Centre of the Lithuanian

3 Ahmed, Damir, “Lithuanian Muslims Fearful After ‘Terror’ Arrests”, Islam- Online.net, 22 July 2004, http://islamonline.net/English/News/2004–07/22/article01 .shtml, accessed 16 November 2009. lithuania 351

Sunni Muslims—Muftiate Lietuvos( Musulmonų Sunitų Dvasinis Centras—Muftiatas, Vivulskio Street 3, Vilnius, currently headed by the mufti Romas Jakubauskas, tel: +370–674–17710, ramadan@inbox .lt), (re)established in 1998 and dominated by Lithuanian Tatars. The mufti is elected for a term of five years by representatives of local Mus- lim congregations, which up to now are exclusively Tatar. Though the Muftiate has been functioning for more than a decade, neither the current nor the previous mufti has engaged in the primary function of a mufti—issuing fatwas. The first incumbent (served 1998–2008) had a very limited religious education (and poor knowledge of Arabic), while the current mufti, although he has a reasonable level of education, has not yet established his status as a competent ‘alim. Most other Muslim organisations (also dominated by Lithuanian Tatars) are subordinate to the Muftiate. A much more active organisation is the Arab dominated Kaunas-based Lithuanian Muslim Youth Society (Lietuvos musulmonų jaunimo bendrija, Totorių Street 6, Kaunas) which is engaged in translating and publishing religious literature, organises and takes part in religious education for local Muslim youth. There is no other Muslim organisation of note; though some are engaged in propagating Islam via the Internet (e.g. Klaipėda based al-Tauhyd, http://www.at-tauhyd .lt/, and al-Iman, http://www.imanislam.lt/, congregations). For several past years the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam has been trying to establish its presence in Lithuania by sending missionaries from Ger- many but so far has only one family in Lithuania. There is as yet no specifically Shi’i religious congregation.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Though a century ago there were well over a dozen purpose-built mosques, there are currently four (three wooden, built in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and one brick, built in early 1930s), of which only the Kaunas (brick) mosque (Totorių Street 6) is regularly used for Friday prayers by both local Tatars and foreign (mainly Arab) students. The other mosques, in the villages of Raižiai, Nemėžis and Keturiasdešimt totorių, are open only during religious festivals. In addition, in the capital city Vilnius there is a prayer hall adjacent to the Muftiate, which is used by Tatars, Turks and others. A purpose-built mosque is expected to be erected in the near future on the outskirts of Vilnius, as the Vilnius City Municipality finally allocated 352 egdūnas račius a plot for that purpose in 2008. However, the Muslim community as of 2010 has not yet formally accepted the offer. It is known that some Muslim groups (presumably ethnically/nationally orientated) gather for prayer in private apartments and other unofficial prayer halls (in Vilnius, Klaipėda, Panevėžys).

5 Children’s Education

Religious education in public schools is optional but exclusively Cath- olic (or, in ethnic Russian schools, Orthodox); non-religious pupils and those of other faiths are offered an alternative class in ‘ethics’. Some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. As there are no private primary or secondary schools run by Muslims, Islamic religious education is entirely extra-curricular, occasionally offered by Muslim communities in improvised weekend schools.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are regularly offered at Vilnius University (at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science and the Centre of Oriental Studies) and the Lithu- anian Military Academy. The Centre of Oriental Studies temporarily (between 2000 and 2006) offered a BA degree in Arabic Studies but this has been abandoned owing to lack of academic staff. Else- where (Vilnius Pedagogical University, Vilnius Catholic Seminary and Vytautas Magnus University) teaching on Islam tends to be on an ad hoc basis. There is no institution for imam training in Lithuania. As of 2009, three of the five acting imams had received their formal education abroad (one in Lebanon, two in Russia) while the remaining two are self-taught.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Tatars have had separate cemeteries since they first settled in Lithu- ania. Most Muslim cemeteries were located next to mosques. A dozen cemeteries (in the villages of Nemėžis, Raižiai, Keturiasdešimt totorių, lithuania 353 and on the outskirts of Vilnius and elsewhere) have survived till the present and some (especially in Raižiai, Nemėžis) still serve as burial sites for the community. A fair number of non-religious Tatars use general public cemeteries for burial. No need has so far arisen for a new separate Muslim cemetery.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the armed forces, prisons or hospitals, as there is virtually no need for their services. Catholic religious services are provided in these institutions and most of them have a separate non- denominational space allocated for prayer and contemplation. Mus- lims can use these spaces for private prayer.

9 Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations in Vilnius, Kaunas and Raižiai (Alytus district) are open to the public. In 2010, ‘Id al- fitr was attended by over 100 worshipers in Kaunas and around 50 in Keturiasdešimt totorių, with similar numbers in Nemėžis and Raižiai. ‘Id al-Adha is attended annually by up to 500 people, with several dozen animals being sacrificed in Raižiai. Permission has not been granted to sacrifice animals near the mosque in Kaunas.

10 Halal Food

There are as yet no halal butchers’ shops. Frozen halal meat (usually chicken) is available in several supermarkets. Several individual Muslims (among them the mufti) perform ritual slaughter privately after purchasing livestock from local farmers and sell the meat to their coreligionists. The mufti has occasionally presided over the halal slaughter of animals destined for the meat export market at a small local butchery.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. Muslim women wishing to be photographed in hijab for official documents need to supply the state authorities with certification 354 egdūnas račius from the Muftiate confirming that they belong to the Islamic faith. However, only a handful of Muslim women (chiefly converts) wear hijab in public, mainly on Fridays while attending prayer. Some foreign Muslim women (mostly Turkish exchange students) wear hijab in public on a daily basis. There is no record of women being observed wearing niqab.

12 Publication and Media

The sole printed periodical (with an on-line version) is a 32-page monthly Lietuvos Totoriai (Lithuanian Tatars), which has a circulation of 800. It is in Lithuanian with inserts in Polish and Russian and is published by the Union of Lithuanian Tatars’ Communities (Lietuvos totorių bendruomenių sąjunga). The periodical is ethnically focused with occasional articles on religion. The two main websites in Lithuanian run by Muslims for Mus- lims and people wishing to get acquainted with Islam are http:// www. islamas.lt (administered by Lithuanian converts to Islam residing abroad) and http://www.musulmonai.lt (run by the Lithuanian Muslim Youth Society). The former used to host an extensive on-line forum, which however in May 2010 was closed by admin. In summer of 2010, a new on-line forum at http://islam.tai.lt was set up and many of the users of the defunct forum moved over to it. The Lithuanian Muslim Youth Society has published a range of translated books and brochures on various aspects of Islamic beliefs and practice, which are distributed at Kaunas mosque. There is a separate Shi’i site at http:// www.shia.visiems.lt/. In summer of 2010 a second attempt (the first appeared in 2008) at a translation of the Quran into Lithuanian was published by a non- Muslim publisher. This latest translation was revised from the earlier translation, which had been carried out by a Lithuanian poet from Russian, by the mufti himself and the translation endorsed by him as fit for Muslims.

13 Family Law

Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriage in mosques. Such marriages are recognised (and should be promptly registered) by a municipal civil registry office. In 2010, over a dozen marriage lithuania 355

contracts were signed under the supervision of the mufti. Inheritance, if accepted by all the parties involved, can be apportioned according to Islamic regulations. Otherwise, the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is irrelevant.

14 Interreligious Relations

A semi-public (with invited guests) function organised by the Mufti- ate and devoted to commemorate the birthday of Muhammad was held at the historical Vilnius City Hall in April 2010 with the Mufti and several others delivering speeches. The main aim of the organisers was to present Islam to the general (non-Muslim) public as a peaceful religion adherents of which in Lithuania have been for centuries a well-integrated group of loyal citizens.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

There is very little coverage of the situation of Muslims in Lithuania in the local media. Local Muslim leaders are occasionally approached to comment on events and processes involving Muslims elsewhere in the world, but otherwise Muslims avoid publicity. No opinion poll of relevance was conducted in 2010.

16 Major Cultural Events

Sabantujus is an annual Tatar gathering, lasting several days, featuring singing, dancing, games and sports. There is an annual youth summer camp with a certain amount of religious instruction.

LUXEMBOURG

Sylvain Besch1

1 Muslim Population

It is impossible to assess the exact number of Muslims in Luxembourg, since the registration of religious affiliation is prohibited,2 but in May 2004 the Muslim population was estimated at 8,898 (1.48% of the total population).3 This estimate is based on the nationalities of people from predominantly Muslim countries (source: Répertoire Général des Per- sonnes Physiques RGPP/The civil register) and on estimates from the Centre Culturel Islamique (Islamic Cultural Centre) for the numbers of people of various nationalities who have converted to Islam. According to this estimate the ‘European’ Muslim population accounts for 79% of the total Muslim population in the country. As of 1 January 2009, on the basis of nationality alone, the largest Muslim groups were as follows: Bosnians—2,871; Moroccans—469; Turks—401; Albanians—319; Iranians—303; Tunisians—233; Algerians—223 (source RGPP). The ‘nationality’ ‘Serbian-Montenegrin’ (7,909 people) includes many of Muslim background, particularly people from Sandjak and Kosovo.4 Muslims are concentrated in urban areas: 27% of the members of the biggest Muslim groups5 live in the city of Luxembourg, and 43% live in the four biggest cities (RGPP). The municipality of Wiltz, in the north of the country, has a significant Bosnian community (5.4% of the total population). The majority of Muslims arrived in Luxembourg in the

1 Sylvain Besch is director at the CEFIS (Centre d’Etude et de Formation Intercul- turelles et Sociales) and a member of the Consultative Commission on Human Rights in Luxembourg. 2 Article 15 in the law of 31 March 1979 on the use of data in a databank forbids the collection and registration of data concerning individuals’ activities and opinions in the following fields: politics, trade union activities, philosophical and religious affiliation. 3 Estimates by SESOPI-CI and CCIL (Centre Culturel Islamique du Luxembourg/ Islamic Cultural Centre); Besch, Sylvain, et al., Discrimination à l’emploi/Discrimina- tion at the workplace, Cahiers PSELL no. 151 (Luxembourg: CEPS/INSTEAD, 2005), pp. 91–92. 4 The number was estimated at 2,985 persons in 2004. 5 Concerns the 7 nationalities mentioned above. 358 sylvain besch

1990s as war refugees. There have been several waves of refugees from the former Yugoslavia: Bosniaks from Bosnia, Albanians and other Muslims from Kosovo, Serb and Montenegrin Muslims from Sandjak. By 2005, 13% of the Bosnians aged 18 years or over had registered on the electoral roll in order to be able to vote in the municipal elections that year. Currently about 300 adults attend Friday prayer regularly in the mosques.

2 Islam and the State

There is no state church in Luxembourg, although the Roman Catholic Church is the most important. The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, freedom to exercise one’s religion in public and freedom to express religious opinions (art. 19). The Constitution allows the state to enter into agreements with the various religions6 (art. 22), which regulate the relationship between the state and the religions. The various agreements confer the status of legal personality on the religious communities. On 6 July 2007, the government approved a proposal for an agreement that will regulate the relationship between the state of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Muslim community, represented by the Muslim Community of Luxembourg. In order to come into force, the agreement must be passed into law. Before this can take place, the Muslim community must adopt a satisfactory form of association, and this must be approved by the minister of religion on the recommendation of the government. The government’s political programme, issued in 2009, confirmed its continuing support for the principal of entering into such agreements with religious communities that have a significant presence in the country and commit themselves to respecting the Constitution, the rule of law and public order.7 Religions—whether recognised or not—are permitted to create profit and non-profit associations, which can obtain subsidies from

6 On 31 October 1997, agreements were made between the state and the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish Council, the Protestant Church of Luxembourg and the Orthodox Church of Greece, and these came into force on 10 July 1998. Later, agreements were made with the Romanian and the Serbian Orthodox Churches and the Anglican Church of Luxembourg and these came into force on 11 June 2004. 7 http://www.sante.public.lu/publications/systeme-sante/politique-nationale-sante/ programme-gouvernemental-2009/programme-gouvernemental-2009.pdf, p. 3, accessed 20 November 2009. luxembourg 359 the state and the municipality. Some of these associations have already benefited from this opportunity for the organisation of public events, particularly through grants from the state (Ministry of Family—Office Luxembourgeois de l’Accueil et de l’Intégration). The proposed agreement envisages that employed clergy, in this case a mufti, would have the status of a civil servant as in other recognised religions. The mufti’s nomination would be approved by the minister of religion after the mufti has taken an oath before him, five imams and a secretary.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic Cultural Centre of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg (Centre Culturel Islamique du Luxembourg, CCIL, 2 rte d’Arlon, L-8210 Mamer, tel: 31 00 60, fax: 26 31 04 26, http://www.islam.lu/) is the oldest (founded in February 1984) and the most important of the Muslim organisations. A regional branch of this centre was established on 1 February 2007 in Wiltz. It has about 600 paying members of 30 different nationalities, particularly Bosnians (2,500 people, including their families). The Islamic and Cultural Association in the South (44 rue de Lux- embourg, L-4220 Esch-sur-Alzette, tel/fax: 26540788, http://www .islam.lu) was established on 1 March 2002, and its members are mainly Muslims from Sandjak region in Montenegro and Serbia. The Islamic Cultural Centre in the North was created on 26 September 2000 and was initially named the Cultural Centre of Sandjak. Its main building is in Wiltz (26 rte de Noertrange, L-9543 Wiltz, tel: 26950680, fax: 26950681, http://www.ccin.lu) and it is mainly frequented by Muslims from Sandjak. The Islamic Religious and Cultural Center in the West in Differdange-Niederkorn (64 rue de l’Eglise, L-4552 Niederkorn) was established on 15 June 1999 as the Association of Muslims in Luxem- bourg. Its members are first and foremost Bosnians from Bosnia and Kosovo and Montenegrins from Sandjak. An Islamic association called the Middle Way (Le Juste Milieu, LJM, Al Wassat, 32 Dernier Sol, L-2543 Luxembourg-Bonnevoie, tel: 26 48 11 53) was established on 1 February 2008; its founding members are mostly people of Arab descent. Two other centres, have been created, both affirming their collaboration in the national Muslim structures in Luxembourg: the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ettelbruck (Centre Culturel Islamique Ettelbruck, 360 sylvain besch

4 Chemin du Camping, L-9022 Ettelbruck), established on 18 October 2008, with members mostly from B&H and Sandjak, and the Luxem- bourg Islamic Centre (Centre Islamique au Luxembourg, 18 rue du Fort Wallis, L-2714 Luxembourg-Gare), established on 22 December 2008, with mostly Bosnian members. Apart from the Islamic Cultural Centre of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg (CCIL), all these centres are currently organised within the framework of the Shoura, the Council of the Muslim Religion, established in 2003.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are six mosques/prayer houses associated with the abovementioned associations, in buildings in Mamer, Differdange, Esch/ Alzette, Luxembourg–Bonnevoie, Luxembourg-Gare and Wiltz. Two imams are currently employed in Luxembourg and they are paid by the community.

5 Children’s Education

The Catholic Church benefits from an arrangement concerning religious education in primary schools.8 In elementary schools, the Cath- olic Church organises religious education and the archbishop is the employer of the religious education teachers and responsible for their training. Legislation also provides for religious education in post- elementary schools. Pupils can choose at both levels to take lessons in either religion and ethics or ethics and civics. There is no third option. The religion and ethics syllabus in primary schools anticipates the inclusion of intercultural and interreligious topics.9 The major religions are covered in the syllabus for religion and ethics, ethics and civics and, in post-elementary schools, in history.10 All the Islamic organisations offer Islamic instruction for children and some of them also offer courses for adults in mosques. Currently 370 children participate in such Islamic education courses.

8 Memorial A No. 67, 21 August 1998. 9 Erzbischöflisches Ordinariat, Bildungsplan für den Religionsunterricht in der Grundschule, pp. 14, 15, 20; Praxisteil Zyklus 2, p. 21; Praxisteil Zyklus 3, pp. 30, 31. http://www.reliounsunterricht.lu/dok/bildungsplang.html. 10 Memorial A No. 184, 1 September 2009. luxembourg 361

6 Higher and Professional Education

Education in Islam is part of the basic education offered by the Insti- tute for Higher Education of Teachers of Religion (basic theology and history). In 2010/2011 the programme of further education for teachers of religion provides, among other things, a workshop on dialogue between Christianity and Islam.11 The Emile Mayrisch hospital in Esch/Alzette has produced guidelines for staff on meeting religious expectations related to death. Both of the imams in the principality were educated abroad.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There are no Islamic cemeteries in Luxembourg, but the Muslim community has at its disposal a parcel of land in the Merl cemetery in Luxembourg City and another in the Esch-Lallange cemetery in Esch- Alzette, so that they can bury their dead according to the Islamic rite. In 2001, the CCIL established a mutual insurance company12 and, when a member dies, an allowance is paid to meet the costs of the funeral service, which is carried out with the assistance of the imam from CCIL. The costs of transporting the coffin to the home country of the deceased can also be met.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Neutral prayer rooms and/or ‘farewell-rooms’ can be found in hospitals. In quite a few hospitals the nursing staff tries to take account of the needs of the various religious communities. In Schrassig prison Islamic prayers can be organised and the imam visits regularly. The law on the creation and organisation of the detention centre13 for people without a residence permit specifically stipulates that the religious convictions of the detainees must be respected and provides for the availability of cultural, educational and spiritual activities.

11 http://www.icl.cathol.lu/Fortbildung/fortbildung.html. 12 Memorial B No. 22, 2 April 2001. 13 See articles 3(1) and 12(3) in the law of 28 May 2009 on the creation and organisation of the detention centre, cf. Mémorial A No. 119, 29 May 2009. 362 sylvain besch

9 Religious Festivals

Before ‘Id al-Adha, the Minister of Education informs teachers of the date of the holiday, and asks them to accept parents’ letters asking permission for their children to take a day off school. Employment legislation does not provide for any specific arrangements and employees need to book a day’s leave to participate in the religious holidays. A study of discrimination in the workplace shows that in some cases employers respect the religious diversity of the workforce and have taken account of employees’ religious practices and established facilities for them to practise their religion.14 In the public sector, flexible working hours give a better opportunity to combine the work with religious practices, such as the fast.

10 Halal Food

Halal slaughter is forbidden in Luxembourg,15 but there are two Mus- lim butcher’s shops and about ten Balkan grocery stores that sell halal meat, which is also available in the Auchan supermarket in the city of Luxembourg. Muslims also buy halal meat in Belgium, France and Germany. Because of the prohibition of ritual slaughter, some Mus- lims send money to their home country so that people there who are less well-off can make the sacrifice on their behalf, especially at ‘Id al-Adha.

11 Dress Code

In 2004, the Minister of Education drew attention to the regulations for student dress, which require that students should dress “correctly” and that “special clothes can be required for lessons in gymnastics, art and manual and practical classes”.16 There have been no cases of students refusing to participate in sport activities because of their religious convictions.

14 Besch et al., Discrimination à l’emploi, p. 99. 15 Article 8 in the law of 15 March 1983 on animal welfare forbids the killing of animals without anaesthesia, cf. Mémorial A No. 15, 19 March 1983. 16 Article 10 in the regulation of 29 June 1998, on ‘order and discipline in primary and secondary professional schools’. luxembourg 363

The law on compulsory education17 stipulates that, with the exception of teachers of religion and ethics, teachers are not allowed to demonstrate their religious or political affiliation by means of conspicuous dress or symbols.

12 Publications and Media

Al-Qalam (The Pen), the journal of the Muslims in the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg has been edited by the CCIL and published six times a year since 1990.

13 Family Law

Civil marriage must precede religious marriage. Polygamy is forbidden. Luxembourg law provides a legal basis for the annulment of forced marriages. The recognition of a marriage can be refused if the marriage is clearly in violation of the laws of Luxembourg (if it involves polygamy, for example). All foreign legal decisions and acts not sanctioned under a treaty or an EU directive are subject to a formal process of recognition before they can be legally accepted in Lux- embourg. Divorce by repudiation is considered to be in violation of public order. It is possible for partial legal recognition to be given; for example, an Islamic divorce may be recognised, but not necessarily its consequences, such as arrangements for the custody of children.

14 Interreligious Relations

An informal interreligious group called Action Groupe Inter-religions (AGIR) (c/o SESOPI, 5 avenue Marie-Thérèse, L-2132 Luxembourg, tel: 44743-517, fax: 44743-515) has existed for 15 years. Every year it arranges meetings, debates and interreligious prayers. Since 2008, the Luxembourg Council of Christian Churches (Conseil des Églises Chrétiennes au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg) has organised, in collaboration with ING-Europe Marathon Luxembourg and AGIR, the

17 Article 5 of the law of 6 February 2009, in Memorial A No. 20, 16 February 2009. 364 sylvain besch

3rd InterFaith-Marathon for a United World in Luxembourg,18 which involves clergy and representatives of the world religions. The initiative ‘All together’ brings together young Muslims and Christians for a programme of sporting, cultural and religious activities and arranges meetings between the Catholic and Muslim communities.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Some media sources have covered Ramadan.19 Most media reporting has focused on developments outside the country, such as the burqa bans in neighbouring countries, especially France, and the Swiss minaret ban.20 A call to ban the public wearing of complete body covering in public was launched by a number of associations21 followed by numerous readers’ letters to the press. The print media have paid some attention to the development of Islamic finance in the banking sector.22 According to the European Val- ues Survey 19% of residents prefer not to have a Muslim neighbour,23 5% more than ten years previously.

16 Major Cultural Events

Various Muslim organisations have organised events. The Shoura has invited various organisations, ministers and media representatives to programmes in connection with Ramadan, and the CCIL hosted ministers and representatives of other religions at its ‘open house’ day in September.24 The Islamic Cultural Centre in Mamer organises celebrations at the end of the school year.

18 www.interfaith.lu/flyer_f.pdf, accessed 28 April 2010. 19 Quotidien, 11 August 2010. 20 Tageblatt, 27 January 2010, Radio 100.7, 2 February 2010. 21 Tageblatt, 16 February 2010. 22 Journal, 27 February 2010, Lëtzebuerger Land, 2 July 2010, Quotidien, 3 Septem- ber 2010, 9 September 2010. 23 Fleury, Charles, Monique Borsenberger, Les résidants du Luxembourg et leurs voisins: Attitudes et sentiment de solidarité, Working Paper no. 2010–25 Discrimina- tion à l’emploi/Discrimination at the workplace, Cahiers PSELL no. 151 (Luxembourg: CEPS/INSTEAD, 2010). 24 Quotidien, 13 September 2010. MACEDONIA

Muharem Jahja1

1 Muslim Populations

The most recent official census (2002) recorded 660,492 Muslims (mainly Sunnis), or around 31% of the total population (2,022,547). Of these, 509,083 (or 77%) were ethnic Albanians, 77,959 (12%) Turks, 53,879 Roma, and 17,018 Bosniaks.2 Albanians, who speak a different language from Macedonian, which is a Slavic language, started to become Muslims with the arrival of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans in the fourteenth century. Turks are the descendants of immigrants from Ottoman times. By 2009, the number of Muslims in Macedo- nia has probably increased due to a high fertility rate (around 2.5%). Conversions are relatively rare and may number between 20 and 30 in total since the fall of Communism.3 In the official census, Macedo- nian-speaking Muslims, as they are officially labelled (also informally known as Torbeshi, Pomaks or Gorani, and increasingly likely to call themselves Turks or Albanians), are classified under the ‘other’ category of the census and are not included among the country’s Mus- lims, but they constitute a considerable number (around 20,000), so the total number of Muslims in 2009 is probably over 700,000. Since the break up of Ottoman Empire, the Muslims of Macedo- nia have undergone three main periods of transformation. The initial one, between 1911 and 1991, can be categorised as decline. It saw a decrease in religious freedom for Muslims. The second period between 1991 and 2001 can be characterised as stagnation due to difficulties for the Muslims to find their rightful place in the society and in their

1 Muharem Jahja is a researcher at the Institute for Cultural and Spiritual Heritage of Albanians, Skopje, and a lecturer in the Department for Oriental Studies at the State University of Tetovo. He holds a BA in Islamic Law and an MA in Islamic History. His research and writings relate to the sociology and history of Islam and Albanians in the Balkan region, specifically in Macedonia. 2 The State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002 (Skopje: State Statistical Office, May 2005). 3 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. 366 muharem jahja relations with the state. The third period post-2001 has all the features of post-conflict with a number of important reforms in the religious sector, including elevation of the position of non-majority Muslims with that of majority Orthodox Christians. The number of Muslims practising on a daily basis might amount to 200,000 and another 300,000 might pray on Fridays and fast in Rama- dan.4 Almost two thirds of Macedonia’s Muslims are concentrated in the north-western part of the country, in the capital city, Skopje, the second largest city, Tetovo, and in the districts surrounding these cities and others such as Gostivar, Debar, Kicevo, Kumanovo, Resne, Struga, and Ohrid. The rest live in the southern and eastern parts of the country in scattered communities.

2 Islam and the State

Macedonia’s Constitution describes it as a secular republic with no state religion, though Orthodox Christians constitute the majority of the population, 66% according to the 2002 census, including the ethnic Macedonians, Serbs, and Vlachs who are Orthodox Christians. The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and provides for the right to express one’s faith freely and publicly, individually or with others. The Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Reli- gious Groups (Komisija za odnosi so verskite zaednici i religiozni grupi, http://www.kovz.gov.mk), with a director appointed by the government, regulates the legal aspects of the position of the religious communities and religious groups, and relations between the state and the religious communities and groups. The Commission has the status of an autonomous state institution. Islam is recognised by the Constitution as one of the five main faiths and is officially represented by the Islamic Religious Community in the Republic of Macedonia (Islamska Verska Zaednica na Republika Makedonija, IRCM).5 The state does not fund religious communities, and all costs related to maintenance of mosques and other communal buildings, as well as the salaries of religious leaders, are paid from private and voluntary contributions of the members of the community

4 Interview with representatives of the IRCM in Macedonia, Skopje, January 2009. 5 The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Article 19. macedonia 367 and income from waqf institutions. Leaders of the Sunni Muslim community are routinely invited to official meetings and celebrations by parliament and the government and at the presidential palace, but, unlike Orthodox clergy, they are not invited to openings or construction launches of infrastructure or buildings. Other Muslim denominations, such as the Bektashis and Shi’is, have freedom of religion and conscience but do not hold the same official status as Sunni Muslims. Beside the Bektashis, there are Sunni Sufitariqa s, such as the Khalwa- tis (mainly located in the cities of Kicevo, Ohrid and Struga), Malamis, Naqshbandis, Qadiris and Rifa’is (mainly in the capital Skopje).6 The IRCM and other Muslim religious communities and groups are free to establish schools and other social and charitable institutions by following a legally prescribed procedure.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The main Muslim organisation is the Skopje-based Islamic Religious Community in the Republic of Macedonia (Islamska Verska Zaednica na Republika Makedonija, IRCM, Çairska str. no 52, 1000 Skopje, tel: +389-2-3117410, fax: +389-2-3117883, http://www.bim.org.mk), (re)established in 1994 after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. It is dominated by Macedonian Albanians. The IRCM, which follows the Hanafi legal school,7 is organised into thirteen separate muftiates in the major cities around the country, each headed by a local mufti. The head of the IRCM is known as Rais al-ulama (the current Rais al-ulema is Sulejman Rexhepi). Other active organisations, including the Skopje-based Logos-A (http://www.logos-a.com.mk), are engaged in translating and publishing religious literature, generally on Islamic thinking and Islamic jurisprudence. The main charity is the Skopje-based El-Hilal. There are tens of political parties affiliated to the Muslim communities in the country, some of which take part in government coalitions and are represented in the parliament by more than 30 MPs. Their politics are ethnic rather than religious.

6 The Constitution of the IRCM, Article 55. 7 The Constitution of the IRCM, Article 1. 368 muharem jahja

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Currently, there are around 600 purpose-built mosques,8 some from the fifteenth century, of which 570 are regularly used. Twenty-one historic mosques have survived in the capital, Skopje, among which the most famous are those that date from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, namely the mosques of Yahya Pasha, Isa Bey, Mustafa Pasha, Murat Pasha, and Sultan Murat. Other famous mosques include: in Tetovo, the Aladja (painted) Mosque, and the Saat (clock) Mosque; in Bitola, the Isaac Mosque, Haydar Kadi Pasha and New Mosque; in Prilep, the Charshi Mosque; in Gostivar, the Saat Mosque; in Ohrid, the Hayati Baba Tekye and Ali Pasha Mosque. Purpose-built mosques continue to be constructed in a number of places. A number of waqf institutions that belonged to the IRCM were nationalised with the advent of Communism after World War II. Despite the de-nationalisation process after 1991, not all waqfs, including mosques, have been returned to the ownership of the community. There are alsoteke s that are used for prayer. The languages used for preaching include Albanian, Macedonian, Turkish, Bosnian and Roma.

5 Children’s Education

The 2008 measure to introduce religious education as an option in public schools offered classes in Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism to 11-year-old pupils only, but was annulled in 2009 by the Constitutional Court. The constitutional judges decided that religious education in schools was contrary to Article 19 and the seventh amendment to the Constitution, which provide for the separation of state and church. According to the Court, the Constitution guarantees the right to practise religion, but citizens should not be influenced as to whether or how they should do so. Classes in ‘history of religions’ continue to be offered to 11-year-old pupils and some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum.9

8 Interview with representatives of the IRCM, Skopje, January 2009. 9 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. macedonia 369

There is a Skopje-based private religious secondary school (Isa Bey Madrasa), established in 1984 and run by the IRCM.10 It provides Islamic instruction as a core curriculum subject and has branches in the major Muslim cities around the country, such as Tetovo, Gostivar and Shtip. Isa Bey Madrasa has the status of a secondary school under the auspices of the IRCM, but its curriculum is not subject to approval by the Ministry of Education and Science or any other state agency, and as such it is funded not by the state but by the IRCM. However, the Ministry of Education and Science decided in 2009 that Isa Bey Madrasa would become a publicly funded school under the Ministry of Education. The school will receive funding from the state budget, in addition to donations from other sources. The changes will also entail alterations to the curriculum, including the introduction of a large number of non-religious courses. In addition, Muslim children aged 6–15 are sent to mosques or maktabs (facilities adjacent to mosques) to study the Qur’an and basic Islamic teachings as an extra-curricular voluntary activity.

6 Higher and Professional Education

The main higher Islamic educational institution is the Skopje-based Faculty of Islamic Sciences (Kondovo, 1000 Skopje, Macedonia, http:// www.fshi.edu.mk), established in 1997 by the IRCM. In 2008, parliament enacted a law on higher education institutions of religious communities, providing for the Faculty of Islamic Sciences to be changed from a private institution to a private-public non-profit educational institution. The Faculty is expected to receive funding from the state in the future, in addition to donations from other sources. Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East in non-theological universities or faculties are provided on an ad hoc basis. In the 2009– 2010 academic year, the State University of Tetovo launched a degree course in ‘Orientalism’, with courses offered on the history, culture and literature of Islam.

10 Centre for Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe—Southeast Europe (CEDIME-SE), MINORITIES IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE: Muslims of Macedo- nia (Greece: 2000). 370 muharem jahja

Imams receive their formal education from Isa Bey Madrasa, the Faculty of Islamic Sciences and/or from abroad (mainly Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria).11

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims have separate cemeteries in each town where they live. Most Muslim cemeteries were historically located next to mosques, but cemeteries have increasingly been established away from mosques as space has become limited. Special plots have been allocated for this purpose by Muslims themselves as waqf. Muslim Roma tend to use separate Roma Muslim cemeteries for burial. As the Muslim community grows, a need has arisen for new separate Muslim cemeteries around the country.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the armed forces, prisons or hospitals. Though provided for by legislation, there has been no practice of chaplaincy involving any of the religions in the country. Efforts are being made to build or allocate separate spaces for prayer in prisons and hospitals.12

9 Religious Festivals

There are annual ‘Id al-Fitr (ramazan bayram) and ‘Id al-Adha (qurban bayram) celebrations in major Muslim towns such as Skopje, Tetovo, Gostivar, Struga, and Kumanovo. The first day of ‘Id al-Fitr is an official public holiday and the first day of ‘Id al-Adha is an official holiday for Muslims only. Bayram prayers are attended by the large majority of Muslims and are open to the public. In recent years, they have been attended by the president or prime minister (who are usually Orthodox Christians). ‘Id al-Adha is celebrated around the country, with thousands of Muslims attending qurban rites. Other festivals include the first day of Ramadan, Mi’raj Night, the Birthday of the Prophet, and the Day of Hijra.13

11 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. 12 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. 13 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. macedonia 371

10 Halal Food

No specifically halal abattoirs have yet been opened, but a number of slaughter houses and local butchers do produce halal meat. Frozen halal poultry is available in several supermarkets, mainly imported from Brazil and Slovenia. Individual Muslims sometimes perform ritual slaughter privately after purchasing livestock from local farmers. A number of restaurants owned by Muslims sell halal food using meat from animals they slaughter themselves. In 2009, the IRCM signed an agreement with the Bosnian Agency for Certification of Halal Quality (http://www.halal.ba) for the establishment of a unit within the IRCM that will issue halal certificates to companies producing halal food. Halal certificates started to be issued in 2010.14 Only those companies that have implemented HACCP (Hazard analysis and critical control point) system in their chain of production are certified by the new system. Generally speaking, consumer awareness of halal obligations is low, however awareness on the part of the producers has been increasing and as a result consultancy companies have emerged that offer services to producers how to set up production system that meets halal requirements.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting the wearing of Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. Neither are there rules against the wearing of hijab for photographs for ID cards. Approximately half of Muslim women, mainly the older generation, regularly wear hijab in public, while the rest wear it mainly when attending prayers or funerals. A few Muslim women in Skopje wear niqab.15

12 Publications and Media

The main periodical is the monthlyEl Hilal (Hena e re in Albanian), published in Albanian (formerly also in Macedonian and Turkish) by the IRCM. Its main focus is on Islamic religion. The mainstream Albanian-language print media (such as Koha, Fakti, Lajm) and

14 Interview with representatives of the IRCM, Skopje, December 2010. 15 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. 372 muharem jahja

electronic media occasionally include news on religion, particularly in the month of Ramadan or at the time of other Muslim festivals. Zaman Macedonia, part of the Zaman daily published in Turkey and associated with the Gülen movement, publishes a weekly local newspaper in both Albanian and Turkish and regularly includes articles on religion. The Asr publishing house produces Dritarja (Window), a children’s magazine with Islamic religious content. Websites such as http://www.bim.org.mk (administered by the IRCM), http://www.fri.org.mk (administered by the Islamic Youth Forum) and http://www.makislam.info are the main websites maintained by Muslims in Macedonia both for the Muslim public and for interested non-Muslims. The main media outlets owned by Muslims and dedicated to general daily political issues include AlsatM TV, ERA TV and TV2 Macedo- nian National Television.

13 Family Law

Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriages in mosques or muftiates. However, the mosque or mufti certificate is not an official document; the marriage must be registered with a municipal civil registry office. Muslims continue to conductnikah (religious marriage contract) under the supervision of an imam, with two witnesses from the family and setting of the amount of mahr (dowry) before proceeding to sign a civil marriage contract at a municipal registry office. Inheritance is not usually apportioned according to Islamic rules, although some Muslims try to do so. Such arrangements are not recognised by the courts. The legal system is entirely secular and affiliation to any creed is irrelevant in legal matters.16

14 Inter-religious Relations

Parliament has a Committee for Inter-Community Relations consisting of 19 members of parliament, of whom seven members each are from the ranks of the Macedonian (Orthodox Christians) and Alba- nian (Muslims) members, and one member each from the Turks

16 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. macedonia 373

(Muslims), Vlachs (Orthodox Christians), Roma (Muslims), Serbs (Orthodox Christians) and Bosniaks (Muslims). The Parliament elects the members of the Committee, which considers and assesses issues in inter-community relations in the Republic and makes proposals for their solution. Parliament is obliged to take the Committee’s assessments and proposals into consideration and to make decisions regarding them. Similar committees also exist at the municipal assembly level. The Second World Conference on “Inter-Religious and Inter- Civilization Dialogue: Religions and Cultures—Strengthening Links among Nations” took place in May 2010 in Ohrid. The Conference represented a continuation of the First World Conference “Contribu- tion of Religion and Culture to Peace, Mutual Respect and Coopera- tion” held in Ohrid in 2007.17

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The construction of a mosque in the main square in Skopje and a fight inside a Skopje-based mosque instigated by pro-Wahhabi elements led the Islamic Religious Community for the first time to recognize officially that Wahhabi elements in the country are controlling four mosques in Skopje. The media devoted substantial attention to these issues.

16 Major Cultural Events

There are several ethnic cultural events, but no specifically Islamic cultural events, apart from Nawruz, which is celebrated only by Bektashis. Another major cultural event is Hidrelez, a spring celebration on 6 May by various ethnic and religious groups, including Muslims.

17 Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Macedonia, The World Conference on Dialogue among Religions and Civilizations, Ohrid: 2010, http://www.world conference ohrid.kultura.gov.mk.

MALTA

Martin R. Zammit1

1 Muslim Populations

The National Statistics Office (NSO) of Malta has never conducted a census that records the numbers of Muslims in Malta.2 Malta’s main Imam estimates that there are about 6,000 Muslims in Malta, which is 1.45% of the total population of 412,970.3 The majority are Libyan Sunnis, while most of the rest hail from North Africa, the Middle East and Europe. A number of Lebanese and Iraqi Shi’is worship with the Sunnis at the mosque of the Corradino Hill Islamic Centre (Paola). Around 1,000 Muslims hold Maltese citizenship. The same Imam reports that about 300 native Maltese have converted to Islam. Islam reached Malta in 870 CE with the Aghlabid occupation of Malta. Under Norman rule (1091–1194), Muslims co-existed peacefully with the other inhabitants, but they were expelled by the Hohen- staufen King Frederick II of Sicily sometime before 1250. During the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Islam was practised in Malta by Muslim slaves captured during maritime raids. In modern times, Islam returned to Malta during the 1970s, with the establishment of close political and economic relations with the Arab world, particularly Libya. Muslims from various Arab countries settled in Malta and in 1984 the Islamic Centre at Paola was established. The 1992 United Nations sanctions against Libya over the Lockerbie issue led to Malta being Libya’s only gateway to the world, and the number of Libyans in Malta increased substantially. Since Malta’s accession to the European Union in 2004, the number of Libyan visitors has fallen dramatically as a result of visa restrictions. In general, Arab Muslims in Malta

1 Dr Martin R. Zammit is a senior lecturer in the Department of Oriental Studies, University of Malta. 2 The inhabited islands of the Maltese archipelago (315.2km2) are Malta, Gozo, and Comino. Source: National Statistics Office, Valletta, Malta. 3 NSO figures from theDemographic Review 2009. Valletta, National Statistics Office, 2010. See: http://www.nso.gov.mt/statdoc/document_file.aspx?id=2840, page 4, accessed on 15 November 2010. 376 martin r. zammit retain Arabic as the language of communication among themselves, but switch to Maltese or English with other members of Maltese society. Although retaining their ethnic and cultural identities, Malta’s Muslims generally integrate well into the Maltese context. They live in various towns and cities on the island of Malta, with a minority living on the smaller, second island, Gozo.

2 Islam and the State

Malta’s Constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the religion of the state, but provides for religious freedom.4 The main Imam of the Islamic Centre is appointed by the World Islamic Call Society (WICS) (see below, section 3) and his appointment is endorsed by the Mal- tese state.5 He enjoys substantial autonomy in the local affairs of his community, and he is the official point of contact between the Mus- lim community and the Maltese administration. In accordance with a protocol between the WICS and the government of Malta, the Islamic Centre and its officials enjoy diplomatic immunity. The Imam maintains good relations with state and religious authorities, and has regular access to them. Nevertheless, Islam is not recognised by law, and so the Islamic Centre does not receive any state funds, nor do Muslims enjoy any educational, cultural, or social privileges. The state does allocate money to Catholic schools, however, which prompts the Muslim community to make representations to receive a similar treatment.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

In 1984, the World Islamic Call Society (WICS) in Tripoli, Libya, established the Islamic Centre (Islamic Centre, Corradino Rd., Paola PLA 9037, Malta, tel: 00356-21-697203, fax: 00356-21-697574). The Centre aims to provide services for the Muslim community, to acquaint the Maltese public with Islam, and to foster interfaith dialogue. It provides religious services in the mosque (which has an area of 225m2 and space for about 500 worshippers), organises seminars and meetings on interfaith dialogue, offers Arabic and English language courses, conducts marriages, assists the poor and needy (including prisoners

4 About 95% of the Maltese are Roman Catholics. 5 The imam is Sheikh Muhammad el-Sadi and he is of Palestinian origin. malta 377 and refugees), and arranges for the burial of the dead. Apart from the mosque, the Centre includes a conference hall, a library, offices, a play- ground, and the Imam’s residence. The Centre is responsible for the translation and publication of religious literature, organises journeys to Mecca for the Hajj, and promotes a number of cultural and social activities, particularly during the month of Ramadan. In 1997, the Mariam Albatool School ([email protected]) was established within the Islamic Centre’s precincts. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat is also represented in Malta. There are no Muslim political parties in Malta and migrant communities are not officially organised on an ethnic basis. A number of Muslims endeavour to participate in the Maltese political scene.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Apart from the official mosque at Paola, which is regularly frequented by both local and foreign Muslims, including students, Muslims use five other unofficial places of worship.

5 Children’s Education

Whereas Roman Catholic religious education in state schools is guaranteed, neither state nor private schools include Islam in their curriculum. Muslim students are given the option of attending religious education classes or taking alternative subjects. This situation has prompted local Muslims to establish the Mariam Albatool School. It was opened in 1997 and is situated within the precincts of the Islamic Centre, Paola. A board of volunteer trustees administers the school, which operates at kindergarten, primary and secondary levels under Ministry of Education licenses (1998 and 2007). While following the Maltese national curriculum, the school also offers Islamic courses. The school accepts students from all national, religious, and cultural backgrounds and during the school year 2010–2011 the number of registered students reached 260, mostly Maltese nationals. The school employs 26 members of staff, mostly Maltese Catholics and operates on a strictly charitable basis, with fees kept to a minimum. It receives no government funding and often faces financial difficulties, prompt- ing the school authorities to apply for subsidies from the Ministry of Education. As yet, no government financial assistance has been secured. The school is constantly expanding and the WICS has requested the 378 martin r. zammit

Maltese government to allocate additional land adjacent to the Islamic Centre. This matter is under government consideration. In addition, the Libyan Secretariat for Education maintains the Al- Fateh Libyan School at Ta’ Giorni, St Julians. This school is open to Arab students and follows the Libyan educational curriculum. Tuition is in Arabic.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

The Department of Oriental Studies in the Faculty of Arts at the Uni- versity of Malta runs academic courses on Islam and the Near East, including undergraduate, Masters and PhD programmes in Arabic and in Near Eastern Studies. Courses covering Islamic philosophy are also offered at the Faculty of Theology. Both the Islamic Centre and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat have donated books to the university library. Malta was one of the first countries to offer university scholarships to Palestinian students, and the University of Malta offers mentoring services to Arab students. There is no institution for imam training in Malta. Imams currently serving in Malta have received their formal education abroad. It is unlikely that the need for local imam training will arise in the near future.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

In 1874, a Muslim cemetery was built in the town of Marsa at the expense of the Ottoman government—hence its appellation ‘the Turkish cemetery’. It replaced an older Muslim burial ground and is a fine example of Moorish architecture. Till the 1970s, in the absence of any other mosque, the Turkish cemetery was also used for Friday prayers. Between 1996 and 2006 a number of Muslim burials took place at the Maria Addolorata Catholic cemetery at Paola. Meanwhile, the Maltese government allocated a piece of land adjacent to the Islamic Centre in Paola to the WICS for burial purposes, although the land belongs to the Maltese state. The first burials took place there in 2007.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the Maltese armed forces. Maltese prisons and illegal migrants’ detention centres have spaces reserved for Muslim malta 379

worship, and a space has been allocated for interfaith worship at the Mater Dei hospital. The Imam of the Islamic Centre presides over prayers in Maltese prisons during the main feasts of the Muslim calendar.

9 Religious Festivals

‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are celebrated both communally, at the Islamic Centre, and privately. Even though the state does not recognise Muslim festivities, iftar is often attended by senior officials of the Maltese government, members of the diplomatic corps, representatives of the Catholic Church and friends of the Muslim community. ‘Id al-Adha is also attended by a substantial proportion of the Muslim community, and several dozen animals are slaughtered at the Maltese Civil Abattoir in Marsa.

10 Halal Food

There are at least four halal butchers in Malta, and a local private company offers a variety of halal products. Frozen halal meat and other halal foodstuffs are also available in most supermarkets and shops.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public. The same applies to pupils in local state and private schools. The hijab is worn quite commonly by Muslim women, including university students. There are also a few cases of Muslim women wearing the niqab.

12 Publication and Media

The WICS weekly newspaperAl-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya (‘The Islamic Call’), and the periodical Al-Tawasul (‘The Contact’) are regularly available at the Islamic Centre. The Centre regularly publishes books and brochures on various aspects of Islamic belief and practice, including a Maltese translation of the Qur’an.6 Moreover, it has regularly participated in the

6 Zammit, M.R. and M. el-Sadi, Il-Qoran Imqaddes (Tripoli: World Islamic Call Society, 2008). 380 martin r. zammit annual Malta Book Fair organised by the Ministry of Education and Culture. Both the Islamic Centre and the Mariam Albatool School are preparing internet websites. The Imam and other members of the community often take part in television and radio debates on religious and social issues.

13 Family Law

On the basis of a special agreement between Malta and the WICS, Muslims are allowed to contract Islamic marriages at the mosque of the Islamic Centre, although such marriages are not legally recognised. Later, or sometimes alongside the signing of the Muslim contract, an official from the Marriage Registry administers the civil marriage. The Maltese state only recognises this civil marriage. Islamic divorce documents are not recognised either. With regard to inheritance, the division of property depends on the wishes of the parties involved, and they may, on the basis of a will, choose to follow either Islamic law or the secular law of the state.

14 Interreligious Relations

In June 2010, the World Islamic Call Society organised, at the Islamic Centre in Kordin, a one-day seminar entitled “The Identity and the Role of the Family in a Globalised Society: A Muslim-Christian Per- spective.” The seminar was addressed by Malta’s Archbishop, Mgr. Paul Cremona, Imam El-Sadi and a number of Muslim and Catho- lic theologians and scholars. The seminar discussed, amongst other, matters related to the family as a natural institution, divorce, polygamy, same-sex marriages, secularism and the media. The Imam par- ticipates regularly in interfaith events, including prayer meetings for peace, and other similar occasions.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The local media sporadically cover the situation of Muslims in Malta. Such coverage is often triggered by immigration issues. Occasionally, local Muslims are approached to comment on Middle Eastern issues, or events involving Muslims worldwide. malta 381

The relationship between the Maltese public and the Muslim community is, in general, unproblematic. Muslims enjoy a substantial degree of tolerance, without, however, being immune (especially the Libyans) to some negative prejudice and racism.7 Such sentiments tend to surface when Arabs are arraigned in court on criminal charges, or when African, Arab or Asian illegal immigrants reach the Maltese islands on dilapidated boats, thus exacerbating an already critical situation at the various detention centres on the island.8 In general, the Maltese are uneasy with this situation, believing it to have potential negative long-term economic, social and cultural repercussions, especially in view of Malta’s limited size and resources.

16 Major Cultural Events

During the month of Ramadan, a number of cultural, sporting and social activities are organised at the Islamic Centre, from early evening till late at night, including talks on various topics given by local and foreign guest speakers, as well as poetry evenings, which are very much appreciated by the members of the Muslim community. On the 15 May 2010 the Islamic Centre commemorated Nakba Day.9 This event was very well-attended by members of the local Arab community and the Maltese public in general.

7 According to the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU- MIDIS): Data in Focus Report 2: Muslims, published on 28 May 2009, 71% of young North and Sub-Saharan African Muslims in Malta feel discriminated against. The report states: “The high levels of experienced discrimination should be nuanced as they affect primarily asylum seekers, who enter the country in disproportionate numbers to those in other Member States and to the size of the country’s population, as UNHCR figures show” (p. 6). The survey can be accessed at: http://fra.europa.eu/ fraWebsite/eu-midis/eumidis_muslims_en.htm. 8 During 2009, 17 boats arrived in Malta carrying 1,475 people. A year earlier, in 2008, 84 boats reached Malta with 2,775 people on board. (Demographic Review 2009, p. 77). Apart from the illegal migrants held at detention centres, 2,783 other migrants reside in 5 open centres and other institutional households. The majority of these migrants are from Somalia (1,624). Other numerically important groups are from Eritrea (340), Nigeria (158), Mali (122), Sudan (115), Ivory Coast (113) and Ethiopia (109). (Demographic Review 2009, pp. 84–85). 9 This commemoration marks the loss of parts of Palestine to the new state of Israel in 1948.

MOLDOVA

Aurelia Felea1

1 Muslim Populations

The territory of the present Republic of Moldova, with the exception of the land to the east of the River Nistru, was historically an integral part of the Principality of Moldavia, which was constituted in the mid- fourteenth century. Contacts between the sedentary population of the region between the Nistru, Prut and Danube rivers and the Black Sea and the populations originating in Central Asia (the Pechenegs [Patzi- naks], Cumans, Tatars etc.), who later became Muslims, date back to the tenth-thirteenth centuries.2 The impact of Islam on the history of the country increased particularly under the influence of the Ottoman Empire, which annexed extensive areas in the eastern part of the principality (the fortresses of Chilia, Akkerman, Tighina [called Bender by the Turks] and Hotin and the regions surrounding them) in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. Here, Ottoman military, administrative and religious structures were established and consequently Turkish and Tatar Islamic populations settled there at various times.3 The new authorities built mosques and other buildings needed for Islamic religious practice, and their remains were still evident in the first half of the twentieth century. The Dormition Church at Cauşeni is a Christian monument

1 Aurelia Felea is Associate Professor in the Department of Social Sciences, State University of Tiraspol, Chisinau, Moldova. 2 Nesterov, Tamara, “Monumente de arhitectură musulmană la Orheiul Vechi (Monuments of Muslim architecture in Old Orhei)”, Sud-Est. Revistă de artă, religionură şi civilizaţie, vol. 2, no. 48 (2002), pp. 118–122; Chirtoagă, Ion, “Orhei”, Destin Românesc. Revistă de istorie şi religionură, vol. 1, no. 45 (2006), pp. 122–125. 3 Maxim, Mihai, “Principatele Române şi Imperiul Otoman (1400–1878) (The Romanian principalities and the Ottoman Empire (1400–1878))”, in Stephen Fischer- Galaţi, Dinu C. Giurescu and Ioan-Aurel Pop (eds.), O istorie a românilor (A His- tory of the Romanians) (Cluj-Napoca: Fundaţia Religionurală Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 1998), pp. 128–147; Chirtoagă, Ion, Sud-Estul Moldovei şi stânga Nistrului (1484–1699). Expansiunea şi dominaţia turco-tătară (The South-East of Mol- dova and the Left Bank of the Nistru (1484–1699): The Turkish-Tatar Expansion and Domination) (Bucharest: Fundaţia Religionurală Română, 1999), pp. 89–103. 384 aurelia felea from those times. The walls of the church, built in the second half of the eighteenth century in the region administered by the Tatars, are half-buried into the ground, in compliance with Ottoman laws, which forbade the building of Christian churches higher than mosques.4 As a result of the continuous expansion of the Russian Empire to the south, in the last quarter of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Turkish and Tatar populations from the North Pontic area fled to the south of the Danube or were resettled in Russia by the tsarist administration. By the end of World War I, the region situated between the Nistru and the Prut (called Bessarabia during the period of tsarist domination) seceded from Russia and united with Romania. The census carried out by the Romanian authorities in 1930 registered 148 Muslims in the region, mostly of Turkish or Tatar descent.5 The census carried out in the Republic of Moldova on 5–12 October 2004 recorded 3,383,332 inhabitants.6 Two-thirds of Moldovans are of Romanian descent, the languages are virtually identical and the two countries share a common cultural heritage. With regard to religion, 3,158,015 people (over 93% of the total population) declared themselves to be Orthodox Christians and 1,667 people (0.05%) declared they were Muslims, of whom 1,075 were male and 592 female; 339 were children under 15. Most Muslims (1,353 people) live in urban areas, the majority in the capital of the country, Chişinău (995) and in the city of Bălţi (106); 314 live in rural areas.7 In addition, there are Muslims who are temporary residents in the country for educational, business, cultural or personal reasons as well as students from Muslim countries studying at Moldovan universities. According to the data provided by the Bureau for Migration and Asy- lum, a part of the Ministry of Interior, a significant number of immigrants, repatriated persons and visitors coming to Moldova (including

4 Ciobanu, Constantin, Biserica Adormirii Maicii Domnului din Căuşeni (The Dor- mition Church from Căuşeni) (Chişinău: Ştiinţa, 1997). 5 Enciu, Nicolae, “Recensământul populaţiei din 29 decembrie 1930 (The population census of 29 December 1930)”, Destin Românesc. Revistă de istorie şi religionură, vols. 3–4, no. 43–44 (2004), pp. 98–115 (105). 6 This report contains information only about the territories effectively controlled by the Government of the Republic of Moldova and does not refer to the situation in the separatist region of Transnistria, including the city of Bender, unless specifically stated. 7 Recensământul populaţiei 2004, vol. I Caracteristici demografice, naţionale, lingvistice, culturale (Population Census. Demographic, National, Linguistic, Cultural Characteristics) (Chişinău: Tipografia Centrală, 2006), pp. 476–485. moldova 385 tourists) hail from countries with sizable Muslim populations. For example, from the total number of 2,008 registered immigrants who entered Moldova in 2009, 606 persons originated from countries with an important Muslim population. The Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens and of People Lacking Citizenship in the Republic of Moldova No. 275-XIII of 10 November 1994 (with amendments adopted in 1998–2008) guarantees them freedom of conscience, opinion and expression. Also, in late 1994 the Moldovan parliament granted autonomous status to the Turkic-language speaking Gagauz region in the southwest of the republic. It has powers over its own political, economic and cultural affairs.

2 Islam and the State

Moldova is a secular state with no state religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience and religion. Law No. 125-XVI of 11 May 2007 on religions and their component parts stipulates the legal equality of religions and their equal status before the public authorities. However, the law emphasises “the special importance and the primordial role of the Christian-Orthodox religion, and particularly of the Moldovan Orthodox Church in the life, history and culture of the people of the Republic of Moldova”. According to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour International Religious Free- dom Report 2010, the Metropolitan of Chisinau and of All Moldova, the highest-ranking cleric in the Moldovan Orthodox Church, holds a diplomatic passport and, before the Alliance for European Integra- tion government took power in September 2009, was the only religious leader who regularly participated in national celebrations alongside state officials.8 Only Moldovan citizens are allowed to establish and lead religious organisations. Religious activities of foreign citizens in public places require prior permission from the local public authorities. The legality of most collective religious activities is, however, dependent on the registration of a religious organisation. In the period 1998–2007,

8 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour International Religious Free- dom Report 2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148963.htm, accessed 18 February 2011. 386 aurelia felea the registration of religious organisations was the responsibility of the State Service on Religious Issues, but in October 2007 this function was transferred to the Ministry of Justice.9 The Law on Religions regulates the registration process. Registration provides confessional groups with equal status, including permission to: acquire property; open bank accounts; receive, as legal entities, donations from physical and legal entities from within the country and from abroad; hire employees; and obtain authorisations for the building of religious institutions and places of worship. However, the law does not define clearly the right of a religious group to be registered as an official religious entity, including the possibility of acquiring full legal status and the right to appeal against the rejection of an application for registration. A state body, the Bureau for Interethnic Relations (Alexei Mateevici Str., 109/1, Chişinău MD-2009, tel: 373 22 235040, email: brimoldova@bri .gov.md, http://www.bri.gov.md), is responsible for the promotion of state policy in the area of interethnic relations, including the granting and coordination of state funding. According to the 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom, released by the US State Department, the Muslim communities of the Republic of Moldova were subject to less pressure and harassment by the state authorities, in comparison with the previous period. The police, security and immigration officials and employees did not, as a rule, check the identity of the Muslim believers gathering for Fri- day prayers, film their meetings or require them to report to the local police authorities in order to write explanatory notes concerning their religious activities, as was customary in the past. However, some Mus- lim organisations claim that the authorities continue to reject, as of 2010, their demands for official registration. The community led by Talgat Mashaev has been attempting to register at the Ministry of Jus- tice since 2002, but it still has not succeeded in doing so.10 In 2009, the Chisinau Court of Appeal ruled that the organisation should be immediately registered, but in February 2010 the Ministry of Justice contested this decision and appealed to the Supreme Court, which gave a final verdict favourable to the authorities. Talgat Mashaev claims that the refusal of the Moldovan judiciary and legal system to register the

9 http://rson.justice.md/organisations, accessed 18 February 2011. 10 Corley, Felix, “Government ‘should register Muslims’, says OSCE”, Forum 18 News Service, 26 July 2005, http://wwrn.org/articles/18043/, accessed 18 February 2011. moldova 387

Spiritual Gathering of Muslims has no legal grounds or motivation. However, the Moldovan Ministry of Justice argues that the documents submitted for the organisation’s registration procedure do not fulfil the current legal requirements.11 The US Report on International Religious Freedom indicates a general practice of confusion and avoidance on the part of the authorities dealing with the registration application.12

3 Main Muslim Organisations

People of Muslim religious background (Azeris, Tajiks, Tatars, Turks, Turkmens, Uzbeks) are entitled to express and develop their cultural and religious identity under the Law on the Rights of People Belonging to National Minorities and the Legal Status of their Organisations No. 382-XV of 19 July 2001. According to this Law, representatives of ethnic/national minorities have the right to create educational, cultural, religious, and charitable associations and societies which are officially registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Moldova and have the status of public organisations. Active organisations include: the Organisation of the Tatar Community of the Republic of Moldova “Idel”, the Tatar Association of the Republic of Moldova “Tugan-tel”, the Cultural Centre of the Azeris of the Republic of Moldova “Azeri”, the Moldova-Azerbaijan Organisation for Cooperation, and the Uzbek Community of the Republic of Moldova, the Organisation for the Pro- tection of the Children of African Origin “Fatima”, the ASSALAM Society for Islamic Culture of the Republic of Moldova (Zelinski Str., 7, P. O. Box 940, Chişinău, MD-2025; email: [email protected], tel: +37 322 50 32 66, fax: +37 322 50 32 67; www.assalam.md).13

11 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour International Religious Free- dom Report 2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148963.htm, accessed 18 Feb- ruary 2011. 12 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127325.htm, accessed 15 May 2011. 13 http://www.bri.gov.md/files/files/Lista%20liderilor.pdf, accessed 18 February 2011. Most of these organisations are small and have no websites, but many are traceable via the Bureau for Interethnic Relations (Alexei Mateevici Str., 109/1, Chişinău MD-2009, tel. 373 22 235040, email: [email protected], http://www.bri.gov.md). 388 aurelia felea

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are at least three premises in the capital where Islamic worship takes place, attended by both Moldovan citizens and foreign residents, but, since Muslim groups have not acquired legal status, their activities are not transparent. Some reports indicate that financial support from abroad contributes towards the rent and maintenance of Muslim prayer houses, and that students and immigrants from Muslim countries perform the function of imams.14

5 Children’s Education

During the Communist period (1944–1989), the educational system and the official statements presented a negative image of the “many centuries’ yoke of the Ottoman enslavers” compared with positive presentations of Russia and the “liberating” Russian army.15 Today, the Moldovan educational system and mass media are attempting to revise these descriptions of relations with the Ottoman Empire and evaluations of the Romanian-Turkish military confrontations are more balanced. History textbooks cover religious, cultural issues and everyday life in the Islamic world.16 Under the Law on Education No. 547 of 21 July 1995, state education is secular. The Law also makes ‘moral-spiritual education’ compulsory in state primary schools and optional at secondary and university levels. During the first half of 2010, the leadership of the Moldovan Orthodox Church actively lobbied for the introduction, within the system of elementary and secondary education, of a mandatory course tentatively called “The Bases of Orthodoxy.” It also organised parish- ioners’ and believers’ meetings in order to exercise pressure upon the

14 Jurnal de Chişinău, no. 147, 12 September, 2002. 15 Russev, E., “Jugul otoman în Moldova (The Ottoman yoke in Moldova)”, inEnci- clopedia Sovietică Moldovenească (Chişinău: Academia de Ştiinţe a Republicii Soviet- ice Socialiste Moldoveneşti, 1971), vol. 2, pp. 520–521; Dragnev, D. and P. Sovetov, Istoria RSS Moldoveneşti, manual pentru elevii claselor a VII–VIII-a (History of the Moldavian SSR. Textbook for 7th–8th grades) (Chişinău: Lumina, 1983), pp. 38–144. 16 Parasca, Pavel et al., Istoria românilor. Epoca antică şi medievală, manual pentru clasa a X-a, ciclul liceal (History of Romanians. The Ancient and Medieval Epochs. Textbook for 10th grade, lycée level) (Chişinău: Asociaţia Istoricilor din Republica Moldova, 2002), pp. 95–113. moldova 389 government on this controversial issue.17 The government rejected this initiative, arguing, inter alia, that such an innovation and policy change could lead to the straining of relationships between Moldova’s religious communities. It would also have required important amendments to the existing legislation, which could not be introduced hastily or at short notice.18 On June 15, 2010, the Chisinau Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the 17 NGOs who had earlier contested the consti- tutionality of a referendum on the subject, supported and actively promoted by the Moldovan Orthodox Church. During the rather heated public debate that followed, several experts in the field of children’s rights also emphasized that the opinion of the children had not been taken into account either. Finally, the Government issued a Decision (Decision Nr. 596 of July 2, 2010), according to which the subject of religion would be included in the curriculum of the primary and high school educational establishments, starting from the 2010–2011 academic year. The new course would be optional (non-compulsory). Religious education in schools only takes place with the agreement of parents and depends on the availability of the necessary funds. The textbooks and the materials used for this subject are mostly based on the Christian religion, though there are references to other religious systems, including Islam.19 The children of Muslim families can acquire basic knowledge of Islam at special meetings organised every Saturday and Sunday, on the premises of certain Muslim public organisations.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

There are no Islamic theological institutes in Moldova. The Moldova State University, Ion Creangă Pedagogical State University and the Free International University of Moldova offer courses that deal with the Muslim countries in their history departments. The civilization of the Arab world is currently studied within the Department of Modern Languages at the State University of Moldova.

17 Moldova Suverană, no. 91 (920), 23 June 2010. 18 http://www.edu.md/?lng=ro&MenuItem=8&Article=1025, http://www.edu.md/? lng=ro&MenuItem=8&Article=1137, accessed 24 February 2011. 19 Cara, Angela and Tatiana Niculcea, Educaţia moral-spirituală, manual pentru clasa a IV-a (Moral-Spiritual Education, textbook for the 4th grade) (Chişinău: Univ- ers Pedagogic, 2005), p. 60. 390 aurelia felea

7 Burial and Cemeteries

According to the Law on Religions and their Component Parts, only the officially registered faiths have the right to their own spaces in public cemeteries. The procedures for creating, maintaining and dis- continuing cemeteries are stipulated in the government Regulations on Cemeteries. There are no separate Islamic cemeteries in the Repub- lic of Moldova. The Muslim dead are usually buried in Orthodox Christian cemeteries. Difficulties arise in relation to the positioning of graves. According to the 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom, released by the US State Department, practising Muslim believers are not currently complaining about the authorities’ refusal to provide Muslims with separate Islamic sections within existing cemeteries. Also, they do not have to pay the double tax for a single burial space reservation within the cemeteries of other religions (as they were required to do in the past).

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The Law on Religions, in force since 2007, includes the right of religions to conduct worship in orphanages, homes for the elderly and disabled, in prisons, in medical and educational institutions, in police stations and other types of institutions, at the request of the people residing or detained there, and with the agreement of the administration of the respective institutions. So long as no Muslim religious organisations have been registered, Muslims do not have access to these rights.

9 Religious Festivals

The list of Moldovan official holidays, celebrated at the state level does not include any Muslim festival. Islamic religious celebrations are organised in private. Muslims and non-Muslims who are close to the hosts are invited to participate. Muslim students can petition the universities for temporary changes or adjustments in the course schedule, on the occasion of the most important Islamic religious holidays. In most cases, these requests are accepted by the university administration.20 Staff in educational institutions that have Muslim

20 Personal interviews conducted by the author. moldova 391 students from abroad report that they take account of the fasting practices of Muslim students during Ramadan and reduce homework in this period.21

10 Halal Food

In the main cities there are numerous establishments, including famous luxury restaurants, which serve traditional Turkish and Arab halal food. In a number of small shops, mostly situated on the premises of the Chisinau Central Market (the largest of its kind in the city), halal meat is available. Recently, the Chisinau supermarkets started offering imported halal products. Muslim believers sometimes request that animals be sacrificed according to Islamic tradition. In these cases, they often directly negotiate with the local small producers in the Moldo- van countryside. Such orders are especially frequent during the main Islamic religious festivals.22

11 Dress Codes

Women wearing the hijab can sometimes be observed in public places. These are often Moldovan women married to foreign Muslims or women who have come to Moldova from Islamic countries with their husbands. The authorities do not allow the Muslim women to be photographed wearing a head scarf for official documents.

12 Publication and Media

Under the Law on Religions and their Component Parts, only religious institutions have the right to publish materials for their members, and to purchase, import, export and spread religious literature. Publishing and printing houses, radio and TV stations and publications can be owned by religious bodies. The situation for Muslims is ambiguous. On the one hand, because the Islamic religion is not recognised by the state, the believers cannot enjoy the same rights as religions registered as legal entities. On the other hand, Islamic literature brought from abroad (for example, published by Muslim organisations in Ukraine

21 Personal interviews conducted by the author. 22 Personal interviews conducted by the author. 392 aurelia felea

(Odessa, Kiev) and in Romania) circulates freely and the authorities do not control or hinder this process.

13 Family Law

The Family Code, adopted by Parliament on 26 October 2000, includes monogamy in the range of principles on which family relations are based. To be legal, a marriage has to be performed according to the civil regulations. Religious weddings have no legal standing. Men from Muslim countries frequently marry local women. Foreign citizens and people without citizenship enjoy the same rights and responsibilities in family relations as Moldovan citizens.

14 Interreligious Relations

The Embassy of the United States of America in Moldova traditionally organises an annual meeting with the representatives of the country’s major religions. The 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom from the US State Department mentions that, even after the recent change in government, the authorities do not send their representative to this meeting.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Local magazines and newspapers occasionally debate topics connected with the Muslim presence in Moldova, and issues related to the situation of foreign students and intellectuals from majority Mus- lim countries temporarily resident in the country. Prestigious cultural journals (Contrafort, Sud-Est) have published numerous articles and even whole issues dedicated to Islamic teachings, literature and art. Events and topics debated by political analysts and local journalists in connection with international Islam provoke serious discussions. Information provided by various news portals, newspapers, radio and TV channels mostly deal with the following subjects: the relationships between Muslims and members of other confessional groups in different countries and regions of the world; wearing of the hijab in public (exemplified by the recent debates in France and elsewhere); the discussions concerning photos for official papers in cases when the moldova 393 concerned persons, including women, were required to uncover their head.23 Moldovan mass-media are gradually becoming more interested in the concrete ways in which confessional and religious freedom is exercised in other European countries, including with regard to practice and attitudes towards Islam. For example, the news portals and the private TV channels, proliferating after the July 2009 parliamentary elections, have broadcast much more substantial and ample information on subjects related to Muslim religious practices than was the case previously.24 Thus, they have included an extended coverage of the annual pilgrimage of the Muslim believers to Mecca and of the Festival of the Sacrifice during the fall of 2010.25

16 Major Cultural Events

The foreign students mark the national holidays of their countries on the premises of the universities where they study. The 10th Festival of Ethnicities of Moldova took place on 19 September 2010 in Chisinau and representatives of all the significant ethnic/national minorities in the country took part. The festival is organised by the ethno-cultural communities with the support of the local public administration, the Ministry of Culture and the Department of Interethnic Relations and features exhibitions of handicrafts, national cuisine and folk music and dance.26 During the annual celebration of the symbolic date of Chisinau’s founding, organised on October 14, on the occasion of a major Christian Orthodox festival, various art, graphics and handicrafts exhibitions, as well as book fairs and other similar events are

23 http://www.jurnal.md/ro/news/cu-val-in-pasaport-189049/; http://unimedia.md/? mod=news&id=27409; http://www.protv.md/sport/international/ciocniri-violente- intre-crestini-si-musulmani-in-nigeria.html; http://www.jurnal.md/ro/news/talibanii- au-revendicat-atacul-esuat-de-la-new-york-185753/; http://www.jurnal.md/ro/news/ peste-35-de-morti-in-urma-unor-explozii-la-o-moschee-somaleza-185732/; http://www .jurnal.md/ro/news/o-noua-incercare-de-a-opri-al-qaeda-149220/, accessed 24 February 2011. 24 http://unimedia.md/?mod=news&id=16282; http://www.jurnal.md/ro/news/merkel- cere-demisia-unui-bancher-german-care-a-facut-remarci-rasiste-191971/; http://www .jurnal.md/ro/news/spania-politia-a-arestat-doi-musulmani-in-timpul-rugaciunii-183909/; http://www.jurnal.md/ro/news/germania-banci-cu-specific-oriental-in-occident-152971/, accessed 24 February 2011. 25 http://www.publika.md/tag/mecca_90531, http://unimedia.md/?mod=news&id= 26021, accessed 24 February 2011. 26 Timpul, no. 169 (1373), 20 September 2010. 394 aurelia felea held.27 All these events are organised by the ethno-cultural societies of the Republic of Moldova. On June 1, 2010, a children’s festival, including representatives of different ethnic communities, took place in Chisinau.28 The ethno-cultural associations of the Azeris, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, etc. organise impressive annual spring festivals. These initiatives are often supported by diplomatic missions.

27 Timpul, no. 188 (1392), 15 October 2010. 28 Moldova Suverană, no. 79 (908), 2 June 2010. MONTENEGRO

Sabina Pacariz1

1 Muslim Populations

According to the last official census2 of the population of Montene- gro, performed in November, 2003, the total population of Monte- negro counts 620,145 inhabitants, out of which 17.7% are Muslims. In terms of ethnicity, the Muslim community of Montenegro recognises three main groups: Bosniaks (7.77%), Albanians (5.03%) and Muslims “by nationality” (3.97%), whereby national belonging differs from religion—Muslims for nationality and Muslims for religion. The next census of the population of Montenegro is being planned for May 2011. The Bosniak population is mostly concentrated in the north of the country, in the so-called Sandzak region, even though lately it has been gravitating towards the capital. The Albanians of Montenegro mostly live in the south-east area, neighbouring Albania, and around the capital Podgorica. The “Muslims” by nationality are present in the central and south-eastern part of the country. The concept of “Muslim” by nationality was created during the communist Yugoslavia, to refer to all Muslims by religion who were living in the federal Yugoslav republics and recognised the Serbo-Croatian language of the time as their mother tongue. Muslims of Montenegro accepted Islam mostly during Ottoman rule, although the earliest contact with Islam took place during the eighth and ninth centuries, with the arrival of Arab sailors trading on the Montenegrin coast. Islamisation reached its peak in the fifteenth

1 Sabina Pacariz has graduated at the University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje, Macedonia, Department of Interpreting of English and German language. She did her M.A. studies at the Marmara University in Istanbul and is about to finish her Master thesis in the field of Migrations of Bosnians from Former Yugoslavia to Turkey in the period 1945–1970s. She researches migrations, identity and society. 2 www.monstat.org. Official web page of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Montenegro. See Popisi/Popis stanovništva 2003 (Census of Population, Households and Dwellings 2003). 396 sabina pacariz century, in the period of the Ottoman Empire, when local people were converting to Islam in large numbers. After the 1878 Berlin Congress, followed by the withdrawal of the Ottoman Turks, local Muslims faced serious pressure from the new Montenegrin state, including forced assimilation, exodus and even persecution. After the Second World War, Montenegro became one of the six federal republics of Commu- nist Yugoslavia. Taking communist ideology into consideration, it may be said that officially none of the represented religions was especially privileged. Still, in this period Muslims migrated out of the country in much larger numbers than the other religious groups. Another very important period was the collapse of Federal Yugoslavia, 1991–1995, followed by much sharpened relations between the various religious and ethnic groups, as well as nationalistic political propaganda. The Independence Day of Montenegro, 21 May 2006, bears a special significance for the Muslim community of the country, marking a ‘new era’. It is well known that the majority of Muslims voted for independence and therefore significantly contributed towards gaining it.

2 Islam and the State

According to Article 14 of the Montenegrin Constitution, religious communities are separate from the state and all of them enjoy equal rights and freedoms. The state is secular. Under the jurisdiction of the Commission for Religious Issues, functioning within the Government of Montenegro, finances are granted for specific projects of religious communities but they are insufficient to meet the needs of the Islamic community. There are also certain tax reliefs that the state provides to religious communities in general.

3 Main Muslim Organizations

All Muslims of Montenegro are organised in a single Islamic Community of Montenegro (Islamska zajednica u Crnoj Gori, Ul. Gojka Radonjica br 54, pf 42, 20 000 Podgorica, tel: +38220622408, fax: +38220623812, www.islam.org.me and www.monteislam.com). The Islamic Community functions through 14 regional branches. Its main administrative body is the Mashihat (Mešihat Islamske zajednice). The head of the Islamic Community is the Chief Mufti Reis( ) elected every six years. The current chief mufti is Rifat Fejzic, elected for that position for the first time in 2003 and re-elected in 2009. montenegro 397

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The first mosque built on Montenegrin territory is the Mariner Mosque in Ulcinj, constructed by African Arab sailors in the 14th century. In 1931 it was fully devastated, while its reconstruction has been recently completed. The Mariner Mosque has not been officially opened yet. Most of the 162 mosques,3 out of which 90 were destroyed in the first half of the twentieth century, were built under Ottoman rule. During the 1980s, mosques began to be rebuilt and 48 new mosques had been built by 2008. Nowadays there are around 120 mosques on the territory of Mon- tenegro. Of noticeable beauty is the Hussein Pasha Mosque, built in 1569 in the city of Pljevlja; while biggest is the Sultan Murat Mosque in Rožaje, rebuilt in 2008. In 2010 the reconstruction of Nizami Mosque in Tuzi, Podgorica was completed. The mosque was opened for religious service in September 2010 on the 27th night of Ramadan.

5 Children’s Education

The public education system of Montenegro does not allow for any of religious education within schools. As far as the Muslim community is concerned, primary Islamic education is individually organised by local imams. Classes are usually held within the mosques or mektebs, where they teach pupils who attend on a voluntary basis. Secondary Islamic education is offered at the Madrasa of Podgorica, opened in 2008. It is the only secondary school of Islamic confessional character in Montenegro. Similar to vocational schools, the curriculum of the Madrasah includes certain subjects present in the state high schools, plus religious ones. For the time being, due to limited capacities, education is provided only for boys, with a plan to expand the school to female students as well. So far three annual intakes have been enrolled in the Madrasa and by the time the first intake completes in June 2012 it is expected that the process of accreditation will be completed, whereby the Madrasa would be fully recognised by the state. The process has been partly prolonged due to the frequent changes of ministers of education (three ministers have been changed within a

3 Agović, Bajro, Islamska zajednica u Crnoj Gori (Islamic Community in Montene- gro), (Podgorica: Mešihat Islamske zajednice, 2007), p. 71. 398 sabina pacariz year and a half ). The Madrasa has become a very important symbol of identity for the Montenegrin Muslims.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There are no institutions of higher and professional Islamic education.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims of Montenegro generally practise traditional Islamic burial. In villages and towns where a Muslim population is present separate Mus- lim cemeteries are usually to be found. Only in bigger cities, where the interaction between the religious groups was much higher, and where religious identity was much less preserved, have Muslims been buried within the general city cemetery. Some graves kept the traditional local features, typical for Muslim graves, while others have not.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no ‘chaplaincies’ in state institutions of Montenegro. Still, there are some exceptions, like the example with the main state prison, when an imam nominated by the Mashihat has led the ‘Id (bayram) prayers.

9 Religious Festivals

The state of Montenegro officially recognises two Muslim holidays— the two ‘Ids/Bayrams. Muslim workers have the right to be absent from work for one day. On that occasion state officials usually publicly present congratulations to the Muslim population.

10 Halal Food

Even though there is no food company or restaurant in Montenegro that has a certificate for halal food, Montenegrin Muslims are quite familiar with the concept. They usually buy food from Muslims. As far as meat is concerned, it can easily be provided through individual slaughter. montenegro 399

11 Dress Codes

Montenegrin laws are not restrictive in any sense in terms of female dress code. The Montenegrin law on ID documents allows citizens who wear a hat or a head scarf for national or religious reasons to have pictures in their ID documents in such manner.4 In year 2010 one saw the first cases of women enrolled in the public institutions wearing hijab: a student of economics at the State Pub- lic University in Podgorica, and a civil servant working in the Public Administration of the Centre for Children’s Care in the city of Bijelo Polje. Neither of them has faced any official obstacles due to their dress code. However on 20 August 2010 a security officer stopped a woman, Mekic Velida, from entering a bank as she was wearing a head scarf. Subsequently the bank apologised and the security officer was suspended.

12 Publications and Media

The Islamic community of Montenegro issues a periodical namedElif . This is a bilingual magazine, with 19 pages written in Bosnian and 5 in Albanian. Apart from its monthly, the Islamic Community has also published several books with religious content—originals and translations. Its web site www.monteislam.com is of huge importance for the Muslim community, since it provides news and information on a regular basis.

13 Family Law

Since Montenegro is a secular state, family matters are under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The state recognises only civil marriages. However, Muslims practise religious marriage ceremonies whereby the mahr is fixed in the presence of an imam and relatives.

14 Interreligious Relations

No activities reported.

4 Official Gazette of Montenegro—Službeni list Crne Gore no. 12/07. 400 sabina pacariz

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Generally speaking there were no events of great significance that could attract the attention of the media. Neither relevant opinion polls, nor debates concerning the Muslim community were organised.

16 Major Cultural Events

The Islamic Community of Montenegro usually organises religious concerts (Ilahije i Kaside) in the local cultural centres during the two ‘Ids and Mawlid, as well as for the Muslim new year. In 2010, for the first time in 19 years, the ‘Id prayer was publically broadcast on the first channel of the Montenegrin National Television. On 5 September 2010, on the 27th night of Ramadan, the Nizami Mosque in Tuzi, Podgorica was re-opened. The Islamic Community, in cooperation with the Turkish International Development Agency TİKA, which sponsored the renewal of the mosque, organised a ceremonial opening, where the Minister of Culture of Montenegro, the Ambassador of Turkey, the President of TIKA and other important officials from the Montenegrin community were present. NETHERLANDS

Martijn de Koning1

1 Muslim Populations

After the Dutch East Indies (1949) and Surinam achieved independence, a large number of immigrants came to the Netherlands from those countries. However, the largest groups of Muslims are migrants from Turkey and Morocco, who were recruited as labourers during the 1960s and 1970s, and their descendants. A large number of those from Turkey are Kurds. Other large Muslim groups have arrived later from Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia. Most of them are asylum seekers who were persecuted in their home country and/or fled because of violence there. A small group of asylum seekers fled to the Netherlands because of their political-religious activities in countries such as Egypt and Syria; five of them continue their activities in the Netherlands and are considered to be ‘radical’ imams. Earlier assessments by Statistics Netherlands provided estimates of Muslim numbers based on ethnic origins,2 but in 2005 and 2006 a new methodology was introduced that was based upon self-identification surveys3 and this has led to a new assessment of the numbers. Accord- ing to the 2007 figures, there are 857,000 Muslims in the Netherlands, of whom 318,000 are Turkish-Dutch, 297,000 are Moroccan-Dutch, and 12,000 native Dutch converts.4

1 Martijn de Koning is a post-doctoral researcher at Radboud University in Nijme- gen. His PhD thesis (2008) was entitled “Searching for a ‘true’ Islam: Religious beliefs and identity formation among Moroccan-Dutch youth”. He has studied anthropology and his research focuses on Islamic movements, public religion and Muslim youth. See also http://religionresearch.org/martijn. 2 Phalet, Karen and Jessica Ter Wal, Moslim in Nederland (Muslim in the Nether- lands) (The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureay, 2004). 3 Herten, Marieke van and Ferdy Otten, “Naar een nieuwe schatting van het aantal islamieten in Nederland (Towards a new estimate of the number of Muslims in the Netherlands)”, Bevolkingstrends, 2007, pp. 48–57. 4 Statistics Netherlands, http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/vrije-tijd-cultuur/ publicaties/artikelen/archief/2007/2007-2278-wm.htm, accessed 10 March 2009. For more on converts in the Netherlands, see Nieuwkerk, Karin van, “Gender, conversion, and Islam. A comparison of online and offline conversion narratives”, in Nieuwkerk, 402 martijn de koning

Besides Sunni Muslims, there are also Shi’is, Alevis and Ahmadis. The Shi’i Muslims are mainly part of the Iranian diaspora, but it should be noted that they often have a secular outlook with little sympathy for the Islamic regime in Iran.5 Alevi Muslims form an important section of the Turkish-Kurdish community. Among the Surinamese Muslims, the Ahmadi-Lahore community is well represented and very active, with its own mosques and national organisation and very sympathetic press reviews, which present them as ‘liberal’ Muslims. Turkish migrants are divided along other lines: the Milli Görüş movement, the Nurçu and the Suleymançis all have strong networks in Dutch society. Most Muslims live in the west of the Netherlands, in the migrant areas of the so-called Randstad area: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. Several smaller cities in the east and the south also have relatively large Muslim populations (usually with either Moroccan-Dutch or Turkish-Dutch Muslims dominating), because of the labour intensive industries that used to operate there. Unem- ployment among Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch Muslims is high compared with native Dutch people. The recent economic crisis led to a significant growth in unemployment in 2009 (11%) among non-Western migrants (including Muslims) and their descendants compared with 8% in 2008 (8%) and 3% and 4% for native Dutch in 2009 and 2008 respectively. Unemployment among the non-Western population was highest in the age category 15−25, rising in one year from 5% to 19%. Notwithstanding this crisis, unemployment rates among female non-Western migrants are significantly lower than in the 1990s, although they remain particularly vulnerable because of their relatively low educational level and because many of them have flexible contracts.6

K. van (ed.), Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), pp. 95–120; Nieuwkerk, Karin van, “Biography and choice: Female converts to Islam in the Netherlands,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 19, no. 4 (2008), pp. 431–447. 5 Hessels, Thomas,Iraniërs in Nederland, een profiel(Iranians in the Netherlands, a profile) (The Hague: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2002), available at http://www.justitie.nl/images/Iraniers_in_Nederland_tcm74-38879_tcm34- 18120.pdf, accessed 10 March 2009; Ghorashi, Halleh, Ways to Survive, Battles to Win: Iranian Women Exiles in the Netherlands and the US (Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 2001). 6 Statistics Netherlands, ‘More non-western immigrants unemployed due to recession’ CBS Webmagazine, http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/themas/arbeid-sociale- zekerheid/ netherlands 403

Since 1986, non-nationals have had voting rights in municipal elections if they have been legally resident in the Netherlands for five years or more. The migrant turn-out rates at municipal elections are very diverse. The turn-out of immigrants in Rotterdam has increased in every election since 1994, while in Amsterdam it declined between 1994 and 1998 but seems to have recovered in 2006.7 The Hague has one Islamic party, the Islam-Democrats (Islam-Democraten, ID), which is represented on the municipal council. However, Muslim organisations have generally been involved in trying to protect specific rights, such as the wearing of headscarves by women and the establishment of Islamic schools.8

2 Islam and the State

The Netherlands does not have a state religion nor does it have a policy of officially recognising religious denominations. However, the relationship between the Dutch state and religion has always been characterised by extensive involvement of the state with religious expression in public life. In 1917, for example, the settlement of the ‘education struggle’ meant the passage of Article 23 of the Dutch Constitution, establishing full state funding for religious (Christian) schools and safeguarding the freedom of those schools to determine their curricula. With this settlement, the foundation for what is known as ‘pillarisation’ (verzuiling) was laid.9 Society was deeply divided into distinct and mutually antagonistic religious and ideological groups, but the overarching cooperation of ‘pillarisation’ at the elite level and maximum autonomy for each group was what made stable democracy

publicaties/artikelen/archief/2009/2009-2965-wm.htm?Languageswitch=on, accessed 17 November 2009. 7 Heelsum, Anja van, “Turn out and party choice in the local elections in the Neth- erlands”, 2006, available at http://users.fmg.uva.nl/avanheelsum/paperelections2006 .pdf, accessed 10 March 2009. 8 Koning, Martijn de, “Understanding the ‘others’: Salafi politics in the Nether- lands”, in Amel Boubekeur and Olivier Roy (eds.), Whatever Happened to the Isla- mists? Salafis, Heavy Metal Muslims and the Lure of Consumerist Islam(London: Hurst, forthcoming). 9 Kennedy, James and Markha Valenta, “Religious pluralism and the Dutch state: Reflections on the future of article 23”, in W.B.H.J. van de Donk et al. (eds.),Geloven in het publieke domein: Verkenningen van een dubbele transformatie (Religiosity in the Public Domain: Explorations of a Double Transformation) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), pp. 337–338. 404 martijn de koning possible.10 Although the country has gradually moved towards a more secular model since the 1960s, Muslim immigrants have been able use those parts of the ‘pillar’ model under which religious organisations were considered legitimate forms of representation and community organisation. Muslims have the same rights as other religious groups and, if they comply with the same principles as those applied to other religious groups, such as Christians, they can achieve recognition of their claims (although often after considerable struggle).

3 Main Muslim Organisations

There have been several attempts by both Muslims and the Dutch to establish a single representative body for all Muslims in Netherlands. Most of them have failed because of internal religious differences among Sunni and Shi’i Muslims and between Sunni and Ahmadiyya Muslims, and because the Dutch authorities have refused to cooperate with associations that have emerged, considering them not representative enough of the general Muslim population. After several incidents— for example, when imams have given controversial opinions about homosexuality, and in particular after the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 by a Moroccan-Dutch Muslim—pressure from the Dutch state for Muslim organisations to unite under one umbrella increased significantly. First, the Muslim Contact Agency Contact( Moslims Over- heid, CMO, Koninginnegracht 63, 2514 AG Den Haag, Postbus 85518, 2508 CE Den Haag, http://www.cmoweb.nl) was established, but the Turkish and Moroccan Sunni organisations excluded the Ahmadiyya organisations. The CMO unites five Turkish organisations: Islamic Foundation Netherlands (Islamitische Stichting Nederland, ISN, Javas- traat 2, 2585 AM Den Haag, http://www.diyanet.nl), Turkish Islamic Cultural Foundation (Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie, TICF, Afrikaanderplein 40, 3072 EC Rotterdam, http://www.ticf.nl), both sections of the Milli Görüş movement, and the Foundation Islamic Centre the Netherlands (Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland, SICN Suleymanci, Van Lieflandlaan 3, 3571 AA Utrecht, www.sicn .nl). The CMO also includes the Union of Moroccan Mosque Organi- zations The Netherlands Unie( van Marokkaanse Moskee Organisaties

10 Lijphart, A., The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). netherlands 405

Nederland, UMMON, Weesperzijde 74, 1091 EH Amsterdam, Post- bus 94384), the Surinamese-Hindustani World Islamic Mission (WIM, Iqra Moskee, Hoogoord 257, 1102 CN Amsterdam, http://www . wimnet.org, http://www.worldislamicmission.nl), and the Shi’i Asso- ciation (Overkoepelende Sjiitische Vereniging, OSV, Postbus 1113, 3260 AC Oud-Beijerland, http://www.shiaparlement.com), which is mainly Iraqi Shi’i. These organisations claim to represent 369 mainly Sunni mosques and about 500,000 Muslims. Later two other umbrella groups were established: the Contact Group Islam (Contact Groep Islam, CGI, Paul Krugerlaan 16, 2571 HK’s-Gravenhage), which includes Sunni, Shi’i and Ahmadiyya Muslims, and the Dutch Muslim Council (Ned- erlandse Moslim Raad, NMR), a national Sunni organisation, Ahma- diyya Muslims and Alevi Muslims. The CMO and the CGI now both function as representative bodies and take part in regular meetings with the Dutch Minister of Inte- gration and Immigration where the Dutch government consults and informs them. During the debate about Geert Wilders’ filmFitna , the CMO and CGI and their various member organisations played an important role in establishing dialogue between Muslims and Dutch civil society organisations and with local and national authorities. However, the CMO, CGI and their member organisations do not have much credibility among Muslim youth, who regard them as cliques of first generation men and see them as too compliant with the Dutch government and anti-Islam politicians.11 There are several other national organisations includingAl Nisa, the national organisation of Muslim women in the Netherlands (Stichting Al Nisa, Postbus 9, 3500 AA Utrecht, http://www.alnisa.nl), and the Association of Imams in The Netherlands (Vereniging van Imams in Nederland, VIN, Van der Vennestraat 20, 2525 CG Den Haag, http:// www.imamonline.nl), which has 110 members, mostly of Moroccan descent. Both are Sunni. Islam and Dialogue (Rochussenstr. 221–223, 3021 NT Rotterdam) and Dialogue Academy (Rochussenstraat 221, 3021 NT Rotterdam) are both associated with the Fethullah Gülen

11 Koning, Martijn de, Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam: Geloofsbeleving en identiteits- vorming van jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims (Searching for a ‘Pure’ Islam: Religious Beliefs and Identity Construction of Young Moroccan-Dutch Muslims) (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008); Ketner, Susan, Marokkaanse wortels, Nederlandse grond: Exploratie, bindingenen identiteitsstrategieën van jongeren van Marokkaanse afkomst (Moroccan Roots, Dutch Soil: Exploration, Belonging and Identity Strategies of Youth of Moroccan Descent) (Groningen: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2008). 406 martijn de koning movement. Ihsan (Dr. Cuyperslaan 51, 5622 MA Eindhoven http:// www.ihsannet.nl) is a social work organisation active at the national level. The Islamic Women’s Network Landelijk( Islamitisch vrouwen- netwerk, LIVN, http://www.livn.nl) is particularly active in activities aimed at interreligious dialogue and the emancipation of women. Hizb ut Tahrir (http://www.kalifaat.org) aims at uniting Muslims in one state and reviving the caliphate, but does not seem to be a strong organisation, although they do get a lot of exposure because of particular actions, such as the campaigns against Geert Wilders’ Fitna. The Foundation Islamic Committee of Ahlu Sunnah Stichting( Islamitische Comité van Ahlu-Sunnah is a Salafi foundation including As Soennah Mosque in The Hague (As Soennah Mosque, Fruitweg 5–9, 2525 KE Den Haag, http://www.al-yaqeen.com) and El Tawheed Mosque in Amsterdam (El Tawheed Mosque, Jan Hanzenstr. 114, 1053 SV Amsterdam, http://www.eltawheed.nl). Together with other Salafi networks these organisations have become the most important targets of counter-radicalisation.12

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The general policy framework on mosques is usually set by the state, but its implementation is a local matter and this means that there is a wide variation between municipalities. For example, some municipalities have in the past funded social and cultural activities run by mosques, while in other cities such activities receive no funds.13 Plans

12 NCTb (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisme bestrijding [National Coordinator Counterterrorism]), Salafisme in Nederland(Salafism in the Netherlands) (The Hague: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, 2008); AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst [General Intelligence and Security Service]), Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current Trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat(The Hague: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 2006); Koning, Martijn de, “Changing worldviews and friendship: An exploration of the life stories of two female Salafists in the Netherlands”, in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement(London: Hurst, 2009), pp. 372–392; Buijs, Frank, Froukje Demant and Atef Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem: Radicale en democratische moslims in Nederland (Home Grown War- riors: Radical and Democratic Muslims in the Netherlands) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006). 13 Landman, Nico, Van mat tot minaret: De institutionalisering van de islam in Nederland (From Rug to Minaret: The Institutionalisation of Islam in the Netherlands) (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1992); Koning, Martijn de, “Institutionele grenzen: De hulpverlening van RCJ/Het Woonhuis en moskee Nour (Institutional boundaries: The netherlands 407 to build large mosques in Rotterdam and Amsterdam have caused much debate.14 Resistance to mosques seems to be largely unrelated to the kind of mosque that is planned. Features such as the minaret or the call to prayer are negotiable and restrictions are usually already taken into account in the initial plans.15 Nowadays, there are over 450 mosques in the Netherlands. Of these mosques 245 are affiliated to Turkish organisations (particularly Diyanet with 140 mosques, the Milli Görüş with 35 mosques and the Süleymancis with 38 mosques), and 150 are run by Muslims of Moroc- can descent. The Surinamese community has 25 mosques, affiliated to the World Islamic Mission (headquarters in Bradford, UK), which have a Hanafi Barelvi orientation. In the past they have been hostile to Ahmadiyya Muslims (also mainly of Surinamese descent), who have five mosques. Other communities, such as the Somalis, have also established their own organisations and have 62 mosques.16 Of these 453 mosques there are about 100 purpose-built mosques.17 Most research shows a decline in mosque attendance since 2000. Whether this points to secularisation is questionable. Among second-generation Moroccan-Dutch Muslims, going to a mosque for prayer is increasing since 2002 (while between 1998 and 2002 it was decreasing).18

social work of RCJ/Het Woonhuis and the An Nour mosque)”, Sociale Interventie, vol. 11 (2002), pp. 5–14. 14 Roose, Eric, The Architectural Representation of Islam: Muslim-commissioned Mosque Design in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009); Landman, Nico and Wessels, Wendy, “The visibility of mosques in Dutch towns”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1125–1140; Maussen, Marcel, Making Muslim Presence Meaningful: Studies on Islam and Mosques in Western Europe, Amsterdam School for Social Science Research working papers series (Amsterdam: ASSR, 2005); Lindo, Flip, Heilige wijsheid in Amsterdam:Ayasofi a stadsdeel De Baarsjes en de strijd om het Riva terrein (Sacred Wisdom in Amsterdam: Ayasofi a City Area De Baarsjes and the Struggle for the Riva Terrain) (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1999); Sunier, Thijl, “The Western mosque: Space in physical place”, ISIM [Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World] Review, no. 18 (2006), pp. 22–23. 15 Sunier, “The Western mosque”; Landman and Wessels, “The visibility of mosques”. 16 Douwes, Dick, Koning, Martijn de and Boender, Welmoet, Nederlandse moslims: Van migrant tot burger (Dutch Muslims: From Migrant to Citizen) (Amsterdam: Salomé/Amsterdam University Press, 2005). 17 Allievi, Stefano, Conflicts over Mosques in Europe, p. 30. 18 See Phalet, Karen, Gijsberts, Merové, and Hagendoorn, Louk, “Migration and religion: Testing the limits of secularisation among Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in the Netherlands 1998–2005”, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 408 martijn de koning

5 Children’s Education

There are 41 Islamic schools within the public education system, two secondary and the rest primary. This is 0.6% of all primary schools in the Netherlands, and they have a total of 7,500 pupils (0.5% of all the pupils in the Netherlands or 5% of all the pupils of immigrant origin). Like public schools and all other schools established by religious groups, they are funded by the state and come completely under the Dutch system of freedom of education and financial equality between confessional schools and public schools. The Islamic character of the schools is evident in their Islamic ethos, but the school curriculum is the same as in other confessional and public schools. There have been reports by the Ministry of Education for several years now about problems in Islamic schools with regard to the educational regime and in some cases problems with anti-integration content and suspicions of financial mismanagement.19 Public schools are not obliged to offer Islamic lessons to their pupils. However, if the parents submit a request for Islamic lessons, public schools have to comply and offer such lesson within the regular curriculum. The same applies for religious education for Christian children or others. External teachers provide these lessons. Religious lessons in public schools are financed by religious institutions (designated by municipalities as religious outreach organisations) but can be subsidised by municipalities as well, although this often is not the case.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There are two Islamic (Sunni) universities, the Islamic University of Rotterdam (associated with the Gülen movement) and the European Islamic University (also in Rotterdam), but they are not officially recognised as universities. After long discussions between Muslim organisations and the Dutch state, two academic centres for imam training were established in vol. 48 (2008) pp. 412–436. Gijsberts, Merové and Dagevos, Jaco, Jaarrapport Inte- gratie (Annual Integration Report) (The Hague: Sociaal-Cultureel Planbureau, 2009). 19 Driessen, Geert and Merry, M.S., “Islamic schools in the Netherlands: Expan- sion or marginalization”, Interchange, vol. 27, no. 3 (2006), pp. 201–223; Driessen, Geert and Valkenberg, P.,“Islamic schools in the Netherlands: Compromising between identity and quality”, British Journal of Religious Education, vol. 23, no. 1 (2000), pp. 15–26. netherlands 409

2005: the Centre for Islamic Theology at the Faculty of Theology, Free University (VU) Amsterdam, and the Institute of Religious Studies of the University of Leiden.20 The Institute for Higher Vocational Studies in Amsterdam has its own vocational degree (HBO) programme for teacher training. All of the institutions cooperate with the national umbrella organisations, the CMO and CGI. Academic courses on Islamic and/or Middle East studies are offered at Utrecht University, Leiden University, University of Amsterdam and Radboud University Nijmegen. Several universities, such as VU University Amsterdam and Radboud University, have set up their own institutes for religious studies.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

In 1991 the Law on Disposal of the Dead (Wet op de Lijkbezorging) was amended to allow Muslims to bury their dead within 24 hours and without a coffin. Funeral rituals of Muslim migrants have changed since their migration.21 Parts of the ritual, such as the washing of the body, are performed in hospitals, the mosque or in the room where the funeral service takes place, rather than in people’s homes. In 2007, the Organisation of Cemeteries (Landelijk Organisatie van Begraaf- plaatsen) published a handbook for Islamic burials.22 There are more than 70 Islamic burial sites within municipal cemeteries. None of these sites are managed by Islamic institutions. The Islamic Burial Society (Islamitisch Begrafeniswezen IBw) is currently negotiating with local authorities for the founding of one or more dedicated Islamic cemeteries.23

20 Landman, Nico, Imamopleiding in Nederland: Kansen en Knelpunten. Eindrap- portage van een terreinverkenning in opdracht van het Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen (Imam Education in the Netherlands: Opportunities and Bottlenecks. Final Report of an Exploratory Study on Behalf of the Ministery of Edu- cation, Culture and Sciences) (Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht, 1996); Shadid, W.A.R. and Van Koningsveld, P.S., “Islamic religious education in the Netherlands”, Euro- pean Education, vol. 38, no. 2 (2006), pp. 76–88. Boender, Welmoet, Imam in Neder- land: Opvattingen over zijn religieuze rol in de samenleving (Imam in the Netherlands: Opinions about his Role in Society) (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2007). 21 Dessing, Nathal M., Rituals of Birth, Circumcision, Marriage and Death among Muslims in the Netherlands (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 2001). 22 Handboek Islamitisch Begraven (Handbook Islamic Burials), 2007 (see http:// www.begraafplaats.nl/publicaties, accessed 1 May 2010). 23 Wojtkowiak, J. and Wiegers, G.A., “Moslims doen het helemaal zelf. Veran- derende islamitische uitvaartrituelen in Nederland (Muslims do it all themselves. 410 martijn de koning

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are Muslim chaplains geestelijk( verzorgers) in several hospitals, prisons and homes for the elderly. Several universities have prayer rooms for Muslims, paid for by the universities. In 2009, the Dutch army recruited two Muslim (one Moroccan-Dutch and one Turkish- Dutch) clerics to give spiritual support to both Muslims and non- Muslims in the army. They are civilian employees but are required to wear uniforms.

9 Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are widely celebrated in Muslim circles. ‘Id al-Fitr has in recent years become a public event since most mosques have opened their doors to celebrate the iftar meal with non- Muslims. Several of these iftar events take place under the umbrella of the Ramadan Festival, a series of lectures, debates, music events and so on, coupled with the iftar meal. The festival was founded by Mex-IT, a commercial organisation for intercultural management. Nowadays it is organised by the Foundation Ramadan Festival and sponsored by several municipalities, NGOs and commercial partners. There have been discussions about making ‘Id al-Fitr a national holiday, but there are as yet no serious plans to implement this. The different dates of ‘Id in the various Muslim ethnic groups make it difficult to set one date for a national holiday and some political parties strongly oppose these plans, calling them the ‘(self-)Islamisation of Dutch society’.

10 Halal Food

Almost every city with a Muslim minority has at least one or two halal butcher’s shops. The total number is not clear, but the butchers’ trade association estimates that there are about 3,500 butcher’s shops in the country, of which 10% are halal butchers. Under Dutch law, animals

Changing Islamic burial rituals in the Netherlands)”, in H.J.M. Venbrux, M. Heessels and S.H. Bolt (eds.), Rituele Creativiteit (Ritual Creativity) (Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2008), pp. 31–44. netherlands 411 must be rendered unconscious before slaughter, but exceptions are made for Jewish and Islamic ritual slaughter. This is opposed by some political parties and animal rights groups. Numerous shops and restaurants sell halal food. Several of the larger supermarket chains have special shelves with halal products. There have been attempts to produce a unified certification for halal food, but they have not so far been successful. In many cases it is local imams who decide whether slaughtering is halal or not. There are currently a variety of certifications, such as the Halal Feed and Food Inspection Authority (Halal Voeding en Voedsel, HVV/HFFIA, Postbus 16786, 2500 BT Den Haag, http://www.halal.nl) and Halal Correct Certifica- tion (HCC, P.B. 179, 2300 AD Leiden, http://www.halalcorrect.com), which is active in the Netherlands and France. The latter is member of The World Halal Council (WHC) in Jakarta and both are member The European Association of Halal Certifies (AHC-Europe) in Brussel. A third organisation is the Control Office of Halal Slaughtering (COHS- Laan van Meerdevoort 53d, 2517 AE Den Haag, The Netherlands, tel: +31(0)70 3469795, fax: +31(0)70 3450033, http://www.halaloffice. com). COHS is also a member of the World Halal Council.24

11 Dress Codes

The head scarf is an important issue in public debate and with regard to Muslim women’s religiosity and identity.25 Muslim girls and women

24 Bonne, K., and Verbeke, W., 2008, “Religious values informing Halal meat production and the control and delivery of Halal credence quality,” Agriculture and Human Values Vol. 25 (2008), pp. 35–47; Kijlstra, Aize and Bert Lambooij, Ritueel slachten en het welzijn van dieren Een literatuurstudie (Ritual slaughtering and animal welfare. A literature study) (Wageningen: Animal Sciences Group Wageningen University, 2008). 25 Buitelaar, Marjo, “Negotiating the rules of chaste behaviour: Re-interpretations of the symbolic complex of virginity by young women of Moroccan descent in the Netherlands”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 25, no. 3 (2002), pp. 462–489; Duits, Linda and Liesbeth Van Zoonen, “Headscarves and porno-chic: Disciplining girls’ bodies in the European multicultural society”, European Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (2006), pp. 103–117; Hirsi Ali, Ayaan, The Caged Virgin: An Emanci- pation Proclamation for Women and Islam (Detroit MI: Free Press, 2006); Bartels, Edien, ‘Eén dochter is beter dan duizend zonen’: Arabische vrouwen, symbolen en machtsverhoudingen tussen de sexen (‘One Daughter is Better than a Thousand Sons’: Arab Women, Symbols and Power Constellations between the Sexes) (Utrecht: Jan van Arkel, 1993); Bartelink, Yvon, Vrouwen over Islam: Geloofsvoorstellingen en prak- tijken van Marokkaanse migrantes in Nederland (Brabant) (Women on Islam: Beliefs 412 martijn de koning are allowed to wear hijab in public schools and public institutions (including for lawyers) and companies, except for the police force and law court officials. Under certain conditions, Christian schools may forbid the wearing of hijab by pupils and staff. There are cases of women who have been refused jobs because of wearing a head scarf. The Commission for Equal Treatment usually regards these practices as unlawful. The decisions made by the commission are not binding and are to be seen as advice based upon its interpretation of the law. In recent years, the head scarf issue has been linked with concerns over social cohesion, integration and national identity.26 In 2003, the Ministry of Education prepared an optional dress guideline, but in 2005 parliament supported a resolution to ban the public use of the burqa. The cities of Amsterdam and Utrecht have proposed cutting social benefits to unemployed women wearing a burqa, on the grounds that it makes them unemployable in a non-Muslim country.27

12 Publication and Media

Before 2009 there were two Islamic broadcasting companies: the Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Company (Nederlandse Moslimomroep, NMO, Postbus 418, 1200 AK Hilversum, http://www.nmo.nl) and the Dutch Islamic Broadcasting Company (Nederlandse Islamitische Omroep, NIO, Sumatralaan 45 1217GP Hilversum, http://www.nioweb.nl). The NMO and NIO decided not to renew their licences for the period 2010–2015 after years of antagonistic relations between them. After five organisations applied for the licence for this period, it was granted to the Netherlands Foundation for Muslim Broadcasting (Stichting Moslim Omroep Nederland, SMON). This was an initiative of several national Moroccan-Dutch and Surinamese-Dutch Islamic organisations. One of the major conditions was that they would cooperate with a second initiative: Broadcasting Company Universal Muslim Association and Practices of Moroccan Female Migrants in the Netherlands (Brabant)) (Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit, 1994); Shadid, W.A.R. and Van Koningsveld, P.S., “Muslim dress in Europe: Debates on the headscarf ”, Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (2005), pp. 35–61. 26 Saharso, Sawitri and Lettinga, Doutje, “Contentious citizenship: Policies and debates on the veil in the Netherlands”, Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society, vol. 15, no. 4 (2008), pp. 455–480. 27 For more on face-veil controversies, see Moors, Annelies, “The Dutch and the face- veil: The politics of discomfort”,Social Anthropology, vol. 17, no. 4 (2009), pp. 393–408. netherlands 413

(Stichting Academica Islamica/Omroep Universele Moslim Associatie (OUMA). A number of attempts to make this cooperation work failed so the licence was withdrawn. For the time being there is still no broad- caster focusing on Muslims and Islam. There are several small circulation magazines, such as theAl Nisa Maandblad (Al Nisa Monthly, http://www.alnisa.nl), produced by the Al Nisa women’s organisation, which also publishes Anti Wa Anta, a quarterly magazine for children and As Siraata (for young women over 16). Wij Moslims (We Muslims) is published by Momtazah Publishers, one of the publishers that also produce books about Islam in Arabic, English and Dutch. There are bookstores, such asBoekhandel Nour and Islam Boeken (http://www.islam-boeken.nl), which sell books on the internet. Time Media Group (related to the Fethullah Gülen Move- ment) publishes Zaman Nederland (http://www.zamanhollanda.nl), a free monthly newspaper distributed among researchers, universities, Islamic institutions, policy makers and so on. The Ahmadiyya branch has its own monthly magazine, Al-Islaam (http://www.ahmadiyya-islam .nl). Hizb ut Tahrir publishes Expliciet (http://www.expliciet.nl) four times a year. There are several mailing lists, discussion sites and mosques sites on the internet. One of the best known Dutch weblogs is Wij Blijven Hier (We are here to stay, http://www.wijblijvenhier.nl) and another important meeting place for discussions about Islam and Muslims is Marokko.nl (http://www.marokko.nl).28 A new initiative in 2010 is the Nieuwemoskee (New Mosque, http://www.nieuwemoskee.nl). The administrators of this site call it an Islamic platform for contemporary critical thinkers. The website aims to encourage debates about Islam (in the West) and dialogues with other religious and secular groups about Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands.

28 Brouwer, Lenie, “Dutch-Muslims on the Internet: A new discussion platform”, Journal of Muslim Affairs, vol. 24, no. 1 (2004), pp. 47–55; Koning, Martijn de, Identity in Transition. Connecting Online and Offline Internet Practices of Moroccan-Dutch Muslim Youth (London: London Metropolitan University, Institute for the Study of European Transformations (ISET), 2008), available at http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/ londonmet/library/c52116_3.pdf, accessed 10 March 2009. For an overview of the most important Dutch blogs see: http:/religionreserach.org/martijn/blogview. 414 martijn de koning

13 Family Law

There are no demands by Muslims for the establishment of Islamic family law. So-called ‘informal marriages’ take place, often with Salafi imams officiating, which are not recognised by law and therefore have no legal effect. Polygamy is not recognised by law, although it has happened that polygamous marriages contracted outside the Netherlands have been registered. If a polygamist wishes to acquire Dutch citizenship and nationality, he must divorce all his wives but one. It is possible for couples to record their relationship in a contract witnessed by a notary as a so-called ‘co-habitation agreement’ which in theory leaves open the possibility for multiple partners. It is possible to deal with inheritance in the same way, by registering a will.29 Following debates in the UK, in June 2009 a debate was launched about the presence of ‘Shari’a courts’ in the Netherlands. After a Dutch television programme reported that Shari’a law is being practised in the Netherlands, for example with regard to informal marriages, several politicians and opinion leaders took up the issue and called for zero tolerance towards of ‘Shari’a courts’. Radboud University Nijme- gen conducted research into the prevalence of Islamic arbitration. They concluded that there were no formal courts applying Islamic arbitration. A practice of advice and consultation based upon Shari’a (or particular understandings of it) does exist.30

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious dialogue is a long-standing tradition in the Nether- lands.31 The number of Islamic institutions specifically focused on

29 Berger, Maurits, “Sharia in Nederland is vaak keurig Nederlands” (Shari’a in the Netherlands is often neatly Dutch), Mens en Maatschappij (People and Society), vol. 57, no. 6 (2007), pp. 507–510; Dessing, Rituals of Birth; Dessing, Nathal M., “An Islamic wedding in a Dutch living room”, ISIM Newsletter, no. 31 (2002). 30 L. Bakker, e.a., Sharia in Nederland. Een studie naar islamitische advisering en geschilbeslechting bij moslims in Nederland (Shari’a in the Netherlands: A study of Islamic counselling and dispute resolution among Muslims in the Netherlands) (Nijmegen: Instituut voor Culturele Antropologie en Ontwikkelingsstudies Instituut voor Rechtssociologie Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 2010). 31 This definition is derived from Greco Idema/Bureau Intermonde. Much of the information here is provided by G. Idema and J. Slomp. See also for the period before 2000: Slomp, J., “Christians and religious pluralism in the Netherlands”, in Martin Forward, Stephen Plant and Susan White (eds.), A Great Commission: Christian Hope netherlands 415 interreligious dialogue has remained stable over recent years, but there is an increase in general Islamic institutions that also engage in interreligious dialogue (although not always labelled as such). More than 75% of the mosques in the Netherlands have been involved in small- scale dialogue activities—during an open day, for example. Many Islamic organisations are also involved in local councils for religion and worldviews, which include Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Baha’i and other organisations (depending on the local circumstances). Islamic student associations such as Mashriq in The Hague and Rotterdam, and the Muslim Student Association (Moslim Studenten Vereniging) also engage in dialogue activities. National organisations such as Islam and Dialogue, Dialogue Acad- emy (both associated with the Fethullah Gülen movement), Al Nisa, Ihsan, the Dutch Muslim Council and the Islamic Women’s Network are among the most important organisations sponsoring larger dialogue activities, which range from debates and iftars to publishing books. The Ramadan Festival is by far the most important country-wide initiative, and several Islamic organisations have participated in celebrating the Liberation anniversary (5 May, commemorating the liberation and end of World War II), the Day of Dialogue in November and the Charter of Compassion (http://www.charterofcompassion.org). Interreligious themes also feature prominently on Dutch Islamic websites: Wij blijven hier (http://www.wijblijvenhier), IslamWijzer (http:// www.islamwijzer.nl), Maroc.nl (http://www.maroc.nl), Marokko.nl (http://www.marokko.nl) and Hababam (http://www.hababam.nl). Interreligious websites such as Nieuwwij.nl (http://www.nieuwwij.nl) and Bruggenbouwers (Bridgebuilders, http://www.bruggenbouwers.com) also are important in mediating and promoting interreligious dialogue. Important dialogue publications from Islamic organisations include Erasmus and Gülen (published by Dialogue Academy and the House of Erasmus) and It’s the culture, I believe, as well 15 articles about misconceptions pertaining to Muslim faith and culture. The current Islam debate, in which anti-Islam politicians and opinion leaders feature prominently, has led to an increase in interreligious dialogue activities and, contrary to the past, many of these activities no longer involve only highly educated people.

and religious Diversity. Papers in Honour of Kenneth Cracknell on his 65th Birthday (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2000), pp. 200–223. 416 martijn de koning

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Geert Wilders’ Popular People’s Party (PVV) and the Conservative Liberal Party (VVD) have initiated a debate about women wearing the burqa or niqab in 2009 that is continued in 2010. They are seen as a sign of lack of integration (or even refusal to integrate), demeaning to women, and a threat to safety in the public domain, which are all issues of wider debate in relations to Islam.32 Wilders’ film Fitna and his anti-Islamic comments led several Mus- lim organisations, the Dutch anti-discrimination group ‘The Nether- lands Shows Its Colours’ and others to take legal action in 2007. In June 2008, their attempts to prosecute Wilders under Dutch anti-hate speech laws failed. The public prosecutor stated that Wilders’ comments contributed to the debate on Islam in Dutch society and had been made outside parliament. “That comments are hurtful and offensive for a large number of Muslims does not mean that they are punishable. Freedom of expression fulfils an essential role in public debate in a democratic society. That means that offensive comments can be made in a political debate.”33 The decision not to prosecute was over- turned in January 2009 and the court case was due to start in January 2010. In this trial Wilders defended his freedom of speech moreover because he ‘told the truth about Islam’. When right before the last day of the trial it appeared that one of the judges who had ordered the prosecutors to proceed with the case had talked to one of the key witnesses of Wilders (Prof. Jansen who is a scholar in Arab language) during a dinner, the whole court case collapsed. Coupled with other irregularities earlier in the trial, this prompted a special panel to dismiss the court and order a retrial because these incidents may lead to the impression the court is biased. It is not clear yet when the retrial will take place. In June 2010 there were national elections. The conservative liberals (VVD) won the elections with (only) 31 out of 150 seats and the radical

32 Cf. Vellenga, Sipco, “The Dutch and British public debate on Islam: Responses to the killing of Theo van Gogh and the London bombings compared”,Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 19, no. 4 (2008), pp. 449–471. 33 New York Times, “Holland declines to prosecute anti-Islam politican”, New York Times, 30 June 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/30/world/ europe/30iht-dutch.4.14108722.html?_r=1, accessed 12 November 2009. netherlands 417 populist anti-Islam Freedom Party (PVV) of Geert Wilders managed to earn 24 seats (previously they had 9). After some difficulties the conservative liberals (VVD) and Christian- Democrats (CDA) managed to establish their coalition government run by VVD Prime Minister Rutte. Because this coalition has no majority in Parliament they are backed by Wilders’ PVV. The three parties agreed on plans to cut immigration, reduce spending on development aid and the European Union, banning the full face niqab, tightening the rules and policies on immigration and increasing the number of police officers.

16 Major Cultural Events

The most important cultural event is the Ramadan Festival held throughout the country during the month of Ramadan (http://www .ramadanfestival.nl). The Turkish-Dutch Süleymançi organisation SICN organises a large event every year called Multifestijn; a four day event taking place in the old Market Halls of Utrecht, with debates, markets for products, services and jobs, lectures and music. The Dar al ‘Ilm institute in 2010 organised the National Islam Congress (for the second time), a one day event in Amsterdam with lectures, debates, music and markets. Speakers here vary from Salafi preachers (who make the congress somewhat controversial) to Muslim politicians, from the Netherlands as well as abroad, and artists.

NORWAY

Christine M. Jacobsen and Oddbjørn Leirvik1

1 Muslim Populations

Immigrants from Muslim countries started arriving in Norway in the late 1960s. Although a general ban on labour immigration was introduced in 1975, family reunification and the continuing influx of refugees and immigrants have made for a steady growth in the Muslim population. In 1980, only 1,000 out of ca. 10,000 immigrants had registered themselves as members of a Muslim organisation (see sect.2). In 1990, the number of registered Muslims had risen to 19,000 out of an estimated total of 36,000 immigrants with a Muslim background. Recent estimates indicate that in 2008 more than 160,000 Norway residents had a Muslim background.2 This means that Muslims (according to the widest definition) constitute 3% of a total population of 4.9 million.3 In 2010, 99,000 people (i.e. almost 60% of those with a Muslim background) had signed up as members of a Muslim organisation. Approximately half of these are resident in Oslo, which means that about 6%–7% of Oslo’s population (560,000) are now members of a

1 Christine M. Jacobsen is a senior researcher at IMER (International Migration and Ethnic Relations) at Uni Rokkansenteret and a post-doctoral fellow at the Depart- ment of Social Anthropology, University of Bergen. She has researched and published on Muslims in France and Norway, including Islamic Traditions and Muslim Youth in Norway (Leiden: Brill, 2010). Oddbjørn Leirvik is Professor of Interreligious Studies at the Faculty of Theology, Univesity of Oslo. He is a specialist in the field of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations, and his publications include Human Conscience and Muslim-Christian Relations: Modern Egyptian Thinkers on al-damir(London: Rout- ledge, 2006). 2 Gunnlaug Daugstad and Lars Østby: “Det flerkulturelle Norge. Et mangfold av tro og livssyn (Multicultural Norway: Many faiths and life stances)”, Oslo: Statistics Norway 2008. 3 These figures are based on estimates that calculate immigration statistics in relation to the percentage of Muslims in a given country of emigration. Statistics of this kind are highly problematic for a number of reasons, not least because they are increasingly arrived at on the basis of competing political arguments. For updated statistics about Islam in Norway, see the website edited by Oddbjørn Leirvik: “Islam i Norge. Over- sikt, med bibliografi (Islam in Norway: Survey and bibliography)” (http://folk.uio.no/ leirvik/tekster/IslamiNorge.html, accessed 2 May 2010). This page also contains an updated bibliography of relevant studies and research on Muslims in Norway. 420 christine m. jacobsen and oddbjørn leirvik

Muslim organisation. A survey among youth in Oslo, conducted in 2006 among pupils in 9th, 10th and 11th grades, showed that 17.6% gave Islam as their religion, up from 13.2% in 1996.4 Among those Muslims who first came as migrant labourers and later experienced family reunification and growth in Norway, by far the most numerous group are those with a Pakistani background, who in 2010 amounted to 31,100. In the same year, Turks numbered 16,000 and Moroccans 8,000. Among those who came as refugees and asylum seekers, Iraqis (26,400) and Somalis (25,500) were the most numerous in 2006, followed by Iranians (16,300), Bosnians (15,900), Kosovo-Albanians (12,700) and Afghans (10,500).5 Converts constitute a small percentage (approximately 1.5%) of the Muslim community.6 The entire spectrum of Pakistani (Barelwi, Deobandi, etc.)7 and Turkish (Diyanet, Süley- manci, Milli Görüs) Islamic traditions is now well established, whereas the Bosnians and the Somalis represent radically different popular traditions.8 In 2006, 27% of Muslim respondents said in a Gallup opinion poll that they attended “religious ceremonies together with others” on a monthly basis or more frequently, while 31% stated that they never took part in such activities.9 In a different survey of the frequency of attending religious meetings organised by faith communities, Paki- stanis reported an average of 31, Somalis 25 and Turks 23 times a

4 Øia, Tormod and Viggo Vestel, “Møter i det flerkulturelle (Multicultural encounters),” NOVA Rapport 21/07, pp. 162f. www.nova.no/asset/3131/1/3131_1.pdf, accessed 20 December 2010. 5 The cited figures refer to country background, not to citizenship. Statistics Nor- way includes both people who themselves migrated to Norway and their children, regardless of their actual citizenship. Acquisition of Norwegian citizenship is regulated by a law of 2006 (http://www.udi.no/templates/Tema.aspx?id=7394), accessed 2 May 2010. 6 Roald, Anne Sofie,New Muslims in the European Context: The Experience of Scan- dinavian Converts (Leiden: Brill, 2004). 7 See for instance Ahlberg, Nora, New Challenges—Old Strategies: Themes of Varia- tion and Conflict among Pakistani Muslims in Norway (Helsinki: Finnish Anthropo- logical Society, 1990). 8 For an overview of various tendencies, see Vogt, Kari, Islam på norsk (Islam in Norwegian) (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2008 [2000]); Jacobsen, Christine M., “Norway”, in Larsson, Göran (ed.), Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge 2009), pp. 18–40. 9 TV2: Holdninger til integrasjon og internasjonale konflikter blant muslimer i Norge og den norske befolkningen generelt (Attitudes towards integration and international conflicts among Muslims in Norway and the Norwegian population in general) (Oslo: TNS Gallup, Politikk & Samfunn, April 2006), http://pub.tv2.no/multimedia/TV2/ archive/00248/TNS_Gallup_-_muslim_248757a.pdf, accessed 2 May 2010. norway 421 year, whereas the corresponding figures reported by Iraqis were 7 and for Bosnians and Iranians 2.10

2 Islam and the State

Norway is a social-democratic welfare state with a state church whose status in the Constitution (where Evangelical-Lutheran Christianity is stated to be the public religion of the state) is currently being reviewed. Since the 1960s, religious pluralism has been increasingly accommodated, and a 1964 supplement to the Constitution guarantees that “All inhabitants of the Realm shall enjoy free exercise of religion.” The Lutheran Church of Norway, to which 83% of the population belong, retains a dominant public position, and is almost fully financed from the public purse (including salaries for clergy and much of the running costs of parishes, including maintenance of buildings). Under com- pensatory measures introduced in 1969, every faith and (from 1981) life stance community that registers is entitled to public funding; this today includes registered Islamic organisations.11

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic Council of Norway (Islamsk Råd Norge, Pb. 658 Sentrum, 0106 Oslo, tel: +4722357613, http://www.irn.no/), founded 22 October 1993, is the umbrella organisation. An invitation from the Church of Norway to set up a Contact Group between Christian and Muslim leaders in Norway played some part in this process.12 As of 2008, it comprised the majority of Sunni Muslim congregations in Norway (according to the web-page around 40 member organisations, totalling more than 60,000 members). The political authorities have gradually established regular communication with the Islamic Council (as with other established faith communities and their umbrella organisations), and since 2007 the Council has also received a financial grant from the government which enables the Council to pay a full-time general

10 Statistics Norway (SSB), “Levekår blant innvandrere i Norge 2005–2006 (Living conditions among immigrants in Norway)”, SSB Rapport 2008/5. The survey was based on interviews with 3,053 non-Western immigrants and descendants of immigrants. 11 Registration is easy and does not require a minimum number of members. 12 Vogt, Islam på norsk, p. 167. 422 christine m. jacobsen and oddbjørn leirvik secretary. In addition to its function as an ecumenical body for intra- Muslim consultation, the Islamic Council is a co-founder of the Coun- cil for Religious and Life Stance Communities (www.trooglivssyn.no), in which all the major religious communities in Norway as well as the Humanist Association participate. Through the interfaith council and sometimes directly, it is regularly consulted by the government in matters pertaining to the politics of religion. The Council is also an active and visible participant in public debates about religion and society in Norway. Transnational movements such as Tabligh-i-Jamaat, and the Mus- lim Brotherhood, several different Shi’ite groups, and a small but active Ahmadiyya community also have a presence. From the mid- 1990s, separate youth and students’ as well as women’s organizations have been formed, largely independent of national background.13 In the last few years several new youth and student organizations, with different theological orientations, have appeared, some with a presence in major university towns such as Bergen, Stavanger and Tromsø in addition to Oslo.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

In 2009, the total number of registered Muslim congregations was 126. A list of mosques, including contact information, is available on the internet.14 The varieties of Norwegian Islam are evident in different kinds of adapted architecture.15 Most of the 40 or so Muslim prayer locations in Oslo are in converted flats, factories or office premises, but four mosques are purpose-built, all of them by Norwegian-Pakistani organisations (the most recent being an Ahmadiyya mosque). There are no purpose-built mosques outside Oslo, but there are numerous prayer locations in other cities and towns throughout the country (with concentrations in cities such as Stavanger, Kristiansand and

13 See for instance Jacobsen, Christine M., Islamic Traditions and Muslim Youth in Norway (Leiden: Brill, 2010), and idem, “Religiosity of young Muslims in Norway: The quest for authenticity”, in Cesari, Jocelyne, and McLoughlin, Sean (eds.), European Muslims and the Secular State (Aldershot UK: Ashgate 2005), pp. 155–168. 14 See http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/tekster/IslamiNorge.html#organisasjonar, accessed 2 May 2010, and http://www.islam.no. 15 Naguib, Saphinaz-Amal, Mosques in Norway: The Creation and Iconography of Sacred Space (Oslo: Novus forlag/The Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 2001). norway 423

Drammen). In 2010 a major controversy erupted over plans to build a mosque in Tromsø. The plans were abandoned after the foreign ministry refused to approve private Saudi donations that were meant to finance the mosque.16

5 Children’s Education

Private schools are relatively few in Norway and took in only around 2.2% of primary school pupils in 2006 (up from 1.7% in 2000), which reflects the extraordinary strength of the ‘one school for all’ (enhetsskolen) system. The Urtehagen Foundation runs a couple of Muslim kindergartens in Oslo, but there are currently no Muslim private schools. Most mosques offer some kind of Qur’an instruction.17 In public primary and lower secondary schools, a joint course on religion and ethics was made compulsory for all students in 1997 (called “Knowledge of Christianity with Information about Religions and Life Stances” and from 2002 “Knowledge about Christianity, Religions and Life Stances”).18 Muslims, Jews, Buddhists and secular humanists protested against this because of the strong emphasis on Christianity. After a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, the government initiated a revision of religious education (renamed “Religion, Life Stances and Ethics”) and of the schools’ traditional statutory statement of Christian purpose. Islam has been given increasing space in the religion and ethics curricula for both primary/lower secondary and upper secondary/high school, in line with its growing presence in Norwegian society. The subjects in question take a historical as well as doctrinal approach to world religions, the ideal being to present each religion on its own terms. Ethics is dealt with as a separate subject. In addition, both the ability to dialogue about religion and ethics and familiarity with modern criticism of religion are stated as competence aims. Any qualified teacher, of any background, may teach religion and ethics.

16 The private donor had explicitly asked for approval from the authorities. 17 For a discussion of Islamic nurture and education, see for instance Østberg, Sis- sel, Pakistani Children in Norway: Islamic Nurture in a Secular Context, Monograph Series (Leeds: University of Leeds, Community Religions Project, 2003). 18 See, for example, articles by Geir Skeie, Sissel Østberg and Heid Leganger-Krog- stad in Jackson, Robert (ed.), International Perspectives on Citizenship, Education and Religious Diversity (London: Routledge Falmer, 2003). 424 christine m. jacobsen and oddbjørn leirvik

6 Higher and Professional Education

No initiative to establish a national training programme for imams has been taken in Norway, but the University of Oslo has discussed the possibility of establishing a ‘centre for Islamic studies’ and a proposal was presented to the University in 2007 by a committee which included representatives of the Islamic Council. In 2007, the Univer- sity of Oslo’s Faculty of Theology set up a programme for continuing education for imams, as well as for other religious leaders with a foreign background, under the heading “Being a religious leader in Norwegian society”. The Islamic Council is part of the reference group for this programme and largest groups of participants in the courses have been imams, but no imams have received their basic training in Norway.19 In 2010 a suggestion by The Liberal Party to establish an academic imam training program was debated but not passed in the Parliament.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Several funeral agencies around the country offer assistance to Muslim funerals. There is also a Muslim funeral agency that provides Muslim funerals in a large part of the country. The Muslim funeral bureau Al-Khidmat is a member of the Islamic Council of Norway, which has a funeral working group to look into the issue of Muslim burial sites. Several ordinary undertakers have developed their competence in Islamic (and other religious) burial traditions. In Oslo hospitals, rooms are set aside for the ritual washing. Muslims in Oslo have been allocated burial sites within existing cemeteries. Many Muslim migrants are buried in the country of origin, but the proportion buried in Norway is increasing as people develop more important and permanent links with Norway.20

19 Leirvik, Oddbjørn, “Islam and education in Norway”, in Aslan, Ednan (ed.), Isla- mische Erziehung in Europa/Islamic and education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau verlag, 2009), pp. 301–324. 20 Døving, Cora Alexa, Norsk-pakistanske begravelsesritualer: En migrasjonsstudie, (Norwegian-Pakistani Burial Rituals: A Migration Study) (Oslo: Unipub Forlag, 2007). norway 425

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

A study in 200321 concluded that, in spite of the fact that a growing number of prisoners and military personnel either are not members of any religion, or belong to other faiths, the Church of Norway retained its dominant position in military and prison chaplaincies. Up till now, state institutions provide only Christian chaplaincy on a regular basis, although the need to provide chaplaincy for minority religions too has been addressed several times. In prisons, some imams have offered chaplaincy on a voluntary basis, but the Islamic Council in Norway as well as a number of other actors have called for a more permanent structure to offer Friday prayers and religious guidance to inmates. In 2008, the Soldiers’ National Conference (Soldatenes landskonferanse) decided to promote a religiously neutral military and to hire imams and personnel from other registered faith communities outside the Church of Norway in the Field Corps, but this has not been followed up politically. The possibility of employing imams in Norwegian hospitals has also been discussed, but not yet implemented.

9 Religious Festivals

’Id al-Fitr and ’Id al-Adha are celebrated by Muslims throughout Nor- way. A law of 13 June 1969 guarantees those who are not members of the Norwegian Church two days’ leave from work or school per year on the occasion of religious festivals. Sacrificing animals is not permitted, and some Muslims send their qurban to Muslims in poorer parts of the world through relief organisations.

10 Halal Food

The Islamic Council in Norway has worked actively for a number of years to secure access to halal food for all Muslims in Norway. In cooperation with existing slaughterhouses, methods that satisfy both Islamic and Norwegian regulations have been developed, and halal

21 Furseth, Inger, “Secularization and the role of religion in state institutions”, Social Compass, vol. 50 no. 2 (2003), pp. 191–202. 426 christine m. jacobsen and oddbjørn leirvik meat (including beef, lamb and chicken), as well as a range of halal- products such as pizzas, burgers, sausages, and cheese is now available on the Norwegian market. Norwegian rules say that the animal must be anaesthetised before slaughter. In 2007, a group of imams issued a declaration that chicken produced in Norway was not halal and advised Muslims against eating it. This declaration did not oppose the use of anaesthesia as such, but was based on information that a small percentage of the chicken slaughtered died from the anaesthesia given before the cutting of the carotid arteries. The issue of anaesthesia was also debated in 2009 in relation to the revision of the Norwegian law on animal welfare and new EU directives on animal welfare and religious slaughter. The Norwegian law on animal welfare that comes into force in 2010 continues the prohibition on slaughtering without anaesthesia. Both Muslims and Jews have lobbied against this prohibition on the grounds that it limits religious freedom. Although halal meat is available in some public institutions (in state universities, for example), there is still a need to ensure access to halal meat in hospitals, prisons, etc.

11 Dress Codes

Occasional calls have been made to ban religious headgear and the niqab from (parts of ) public space, but there are no rules limiting Muslim dress in public or for teachers or pupils in schools. In 2007, a debate occurred over the wearing of niqab in institutions of higher education, but the institutions have so far decided against the need for a ban. A suggestion by representatives from the Progress Party to ban face-covering clothing in public space was debated in the Par- liament in 2010, but not adopted. The right of employees to wear religious headgear is not explicitly regulated by Norwegian law, but nevertheless follows from the dominant interpretation of the Work- ing Environment Act and the Gender Equality Act. The Norwegian Labour Inspectorate defines a refusal to allow religious headgear in the work place as discrimination, and several cases have been reported to the Equality and Discrimination Ombudsman. Hijab has been accommodated in combination with uniforms in the army, the health care system, and customs and excise, and in a few work places (notably IKEA, the Ullevål University Hospital in Oslo, and Nortura) there is a hijab version of uniform. In 2008/2009 a debate occurred over whether norway 427 religious headgear should be allowed in combination with uniforms in the police force. After initially signalling amendments to the police uniform regulations in order to accommodate hijab, the Ministry of Justice and the police decided not to revise the existing rules. On the basis of the debate about the hijab in the police, the Board of Directors of the National Courts Administration initiated a process to regulate the use of religious and political clothing in the court room. After consulting relevant institutions and organisations the National Courts Administration decided against introducing any changes, referring to existing principles of neutrality and disqualification provisions. A suggestion from representatives from the Progress Party to ban hijab, niqab, burka and other religious and political symbols for employees at the courts was under evaluation by the Justice Committee in December 2010.

12 Publication and Media

Some Muslim organisations22 in Norway (including notably the Islamic Information Association, the Islamic Cultural Centre, the Ahmadiyya, and the Idara Minhaj ul-Quran) publish books and leaflets in Norwe- gian, most of which are translations. The Muslim students’ association has published the magazine Salam (previously Tankevekkende) since 1997, as well as booklets on various aspects of Islamic beliefs and practice. There are a number of online forums, of which the most significant is http://www.islam.no, which provides practical information (on prayer times, etc.), as well as information on ‘Muslim events’ and a number of Islamic issues, and has a very active discussion forum. Sev- eral mosques and organisations actively use the Internet, and there are also a number of private-initiative blogs and info-pages about Islam. The web-portal www.imam.no is run by a network of imams and scholars calling themselves Jamiat Ulama Norway (JUN) and aims to provide information on Islam and advice in fiqh questions. Social media have become more important, and a number of organizations are active on Facebook. YouTube is also increasingly used for

22 For contact information, see http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/tekster/IslamiNorge.html, accessed 2 May 2010. 428 christine m. jacobsen and oddbjørn leirvik

distributing videotaped lectures and seminars, not least by the student organisations IslamNet and Al-Hidayah. With regard to state broadcasting, the issue of allowing other religions than Christianity access to broadcast devotional programmes is currently under discussion.

13 Family Law

By applying to the Fylkesmann (County Governor), mosques can obtain the right to conduct marriages, which are then registered with the City Recorder’s Officebyfogdembete ( ) or the District Court (tin- grett). The Norwegian marriage act guarantees the right to divorce, but divorces obtained under religious law or the law of other countries may not be recognised. A controversial 2003 amendment to the marriage act, targeting the problem of so-called ‘limping marriages’,23 introduced a new condition for the conduct of marriages, namely that spouses grant each other equal rights to divorce, a move that upset the Roman Catholic Church. Critics have argued that this amendment will have little practical impact on solving the problem of so-called limping marriages. The possibility of establishing a Shari’a council or a Muslim divorce council has also been discussed as options for dealing with these issues, but has met with considerable resistance from many quarters. Currently, several non-governmental organisations offer counselling on family-related conflicts, including ‘limping marriages’. Inheritance is regulated by the law of inheritance. Distribution of inheritance can be public or private; in the latter case the heirs themselves distribute the inheritance, but regulations covering minimum inheritance must be observed.

23 This is when a civil divorce has been granted but one party refuses to recognise it with reference to religious principles and thereby limits the possibility of the other party to remarry. For a discussion of the debates and political processes on ‘limping marriages’, see Ferrari de Carli, Eli, “Muslimske kvinner, haltende ekteskap og skilsmisse: Prosessen rundt politiske initiativ til lovendringer (Muslim women, limping marriages and divorce: The process around political initiatives to change the law)”, Norsk tidsskrift for migrasjons-forskning, vol. 9, no. 1 (2008), pp. 5–26, and idem, “Shari’a-råd til diskusjon (Shari’a councils under discussion)”, Tidsskrift for Kjønnsforskning, vol. 32, no. 2 (2008), pp. 58–72. norway 429

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious dialogue is commonly regarded as rather well-established in Norway.24 Since 1993, the Islamic Council in Norway has taken part in regular bi- and multilateral dialogues with other faith and life stance communities in Norway. A Contact Group for the Church of Norway and the Islamic Council Norway was formed in 1992–93.25 Central issues on the Contact Group’s agenda have been religion in school; Muslim minority concerns in Norway; Islamophobia; the precarious situation of Christians in some Muslim countries; religion and violence; issues related to gender equality and the situation of women; freedom of expression and moral responsibility; homosexuality; and the question of conversion. In connection with the cartoon crisis in 2005–6, joint Muslim-Christian delegations from Norway went to the Middle East and Pakistan, symbolising a more conciliatory approach than that seen in neighbouring Denmark. In 2007, the Contact Group published a “Joint declaration on the freedom of religion and the right of conversion”,26 which also received much attention internationally. In 2009, a “Joint Statement on Violence in the Family and in Close Relationships” was launched.27 Since 1996, the Islamic Council has also taken an active part in the multilateral Council for Religious and Life Stance Communities,28 which coordinates the faith communities’ interests vis-à-vis the authorities, works for mutual respect between different faiths and life stances (the Humanist Association is part of this council), and jointly addresses social and ethical issues of common concern. Muslim organisations also take part in a number of regional interfaith councils, for instance in the cities of Drammen and Stavanger.29

24 See for instance Leirvik, Oddbjørn, Religionspluralisme: Mangfald, konflikt og dialog i Norge (Religious Pluralism: Diversity, Conflict and Dialogue in Norway) (Oslo: Pax, 2007), and “Christian-Muslim relations in a state church situation: Politics of religion and interfaith dialogue”, in Jamal Malik (ed.), Muslims in Europe: From the Margin to the Centre (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004), pp. 101–114. 25 See http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/Kontaktgruppa.htm, accessed 2 May 2010. Cf. Leir- vik, Oddbjørn, “15 år med kristen-muslimsk dialog i Norge (15 years of Christian- Muslim dialogue in Norway)”, Norsk Tidsskrift for Misjon, no. 3 (2003), pp. 131–145, http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/tekster/Dialog15aarNTM03.htm, accessed 2 May 2010. 26 See http://www.kirken.no/english/news.cfm?artid=149142, accessed 2 May 2010. 27 See http://kirken.no/english/news.cfm?artid=265872, accessed 2 May 2010. 28 See http://www.trooglivssyn.no/. 29 See http://www.trooglivssyn.no/index.cfm?id=136727, accessed 2 May 2010. 430 christine m. jacobsen and oddbjørn leirvik

In the spring of 2010, when the Norwegian Broadcasting Coopera- tion reported on anti-Jewish attitudes among Muslim pupils in Oslo, the government appointed a committee to propose measures against racism and anti-Semitism in school. Both the Islamic Council and the Mosaic (Jewish) Community took part in the committee’s work.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The coverage of issues related to the Muslim population and Islam is quite significant in the Norwegian media. Studies indicate that most of the coverage is problem-oriented and stereotypical. From the mid- 1990s, most media discussions have focused on women-related issues, such as arranged or forced marriages, the question of whether a Mus- lim woman may marry a non-Muslim man, female genital mutilation, and the head scarf.30 A particularly controversial theme from 2007 to 2009 has been the situation of homosexual Muslims and Islam’s position on homosexuality.31 This issue has partly come to the fore in connection with the gender neutral Marriage Act that was enacted from 1 January 2009, but also reflects also a strong focus on gay rights in the general media, as well as the emergence of a few gay Muslims who have decided to go public. After a two years’ media debate on the Islamic Council’s position on homosexuality, in September 2009 a news magazine reported “full reconciliation” between the Islamic Council and the Norwegian Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Association,32 implying that the Islamic Council (notwithstanding their continuing moral reservations against homosexuality) denounced the harassment of homosexuals and took a clear stand against capital punishment for homosexuality in Muslim countries. Another significant debate has been on secularism and public religious expression, partly following a much debated essay about ‘secular extremism’ which was published by a young Muslim in one of the

30 For a discussion of debates on gender and Islam in Norway, see for instance Roald, Anne Sofie,Er muslimske kvinner undertrykt? (Are Muslim Women Oppressed?) (Oslo: Pax, 2005). 31 Gressgård, Randi and Jacobsen, Christine M., “Krevende tolerance: Islam og homoseksualitet (Demanding tolerance: Islam and homosexuality)”, Tidsskrift for Kjønnsforskning, vol. 32, no. 2 2008, pp. 22–39. 32 “Full forsoning (Full reconciliation)”, Ny Tid, 11 September 2009, http://www .nytid.no/nyheter/artikler/20090911/full-forsoning/, accessed 2 May 2010. norway 431 mainstream newspapers. Muslims representing a variety of positions increasingly initiate and participate in public debate. Among the general public, inclusive attitudes compete with mounting anxiety in relation to Islam and Muslims. In 2007, a liberal think tank launched a report33 based on a survey conducted by Gallup to find out what the general public thought Norwegian Muslim’s attitudes would be on a number of ethical, social and political issues. According to the think tank, the survey demonstrated that most people think Muslims are less liberal and less positive towards integration than a survey (conducted by TV2 the previous year) had in fact shown them to be. The report and its results were criticised on a number of methodological and political accounts. According to another survey, underlying the so- called ‘Integration barometer’ (IMDi 2007),34 eight out of ten respondents thought that the authorities should not further facilitate Muslim religious practices in Norwegian society. Half of the respondents opposed the building of mosques, and a clear majority the wearing of headscarves in public. Several indicators in the ‘Integration barometer’ point to an increase in negative attitudes towards Muslims. In the 2008 report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Norway was for the first time urged to take action against mounting Islamophobia. The report “strongly recommends that the Norwe- gian authorities monitor the situation as concerns Islamophobia in Norway and take swift action to counter any such manifestations as necessary. It encourages the Norwegian authorities to cooperate with representatives of the Muslim communities of Norway in order to find solutions to specific issues of their concern.”35 Among the political parties, the populist right wing Progress Party (which received 22% of the votes in the 2009 parliamentary elections) repeatedly warned against ‘Islamisation’ during their electoral campaigns, most recently in 2009, when the party suggested that new and covert forms of Isla- misation (snikislamisering—creeping Islamisation) could be identified in Norway. Similar stands have been voiced by groups associated with

33 Martin E. Sandbu for Liberalt Laboratorium, Hva vet vi om hverandre? (What do we know about each other?), Rapport/Report 02/2007 (October 2007). 34 Integreringsbarometeret 2006, Om befolkningens holdninger til integrerings- og mangfoldsspørsmål (Integration barometer 2006, On the population’s attitudes to questions concerning integration and diversity), IMDi Rapport/Report 7/2007. 35 ECRI Report on Norway, 2008 (published 2009), paragraphs 91–92, http://www .coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Norway/NOR-CbC-IV-2009- 004-ENG.pdf, accessed 2 May 2010. 432 christine m. jacobsen and oddbjørn leirvik the New Christian Right, although their warnings against Islamisation have regularly been countered by mainstream Christian leaders.36 In 2009/2010 fear of ‘radicalisation’ of Muslim youth has been a recur- rent topic in public debate—in particular in relation to demonstrations staged against the Israeli attack on Gaza in winter 2008/2009 and a demonstration against the republishing of another offending Muhammad-cartoon by a major Norwegian newspaper in 2010.

16 Major Cultural Events

Since 2007, the Islamic Cultural Centre has staged an annual Eid Mela (festival) in Oslo, which attracts around 5,000 visitors. The event includes food, exhibition stalls, children’s activities, and concerts featuring popular nasheed (Islam-oriented songs) artists. There is also a yearly ‘multicultural’ Mela featuring music styles and artists from around the world. In the city of Stavanger, the regional Muslim Coun- cil stages an annual Ramadan festival with a broad spectrum of public events. In winter 2010, a Norwegian Muslim talent competition was staged, featuring also a concert with the popular UK-based nasheed group Shaam.

36 Cf. Leirvik, Oddbjørn, “The cartoon controversy in Norway: The new Christian right and liberal fundamentalism confronting Islam?”, in Mårtensson, Ulrika (ed.), Communicating ‘Fundamentalism’ in the Global Public Sphere. Vol. 3: Mass Media and Popular Culture (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010, forthcoming). POLAND

Agata S. Nalborczyk and Stanisław Grodź1

1 Muslim Populations

The presence of Muslims in Poland goes back to the turn of fourteenth/ fifteenth centuries when some Tatars (prisoners of war and refugees from the Golden Horde, officially Muslim from the thirteenth century)2 were settled in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (at that time in a shared monarchy with Poland, later forming the Kingdom of Two Nations).3 By the sixteenth century, they had lost their mother tongue, but they retained their religion and customs.4 In the second part of the seventeenth century a new wave of Tatar settlers was given land in Podlachia (Polish Podlasie, present day north-east Poland).5 When the Polish state regained independence after the World War I, only 19 Muslim religious communities with their mosques and cemeteries existed within its new borders. After World War II and the move of Polish state borders westward, only a tiny part (about 10%) of the Tatar settlement territories remained within the new Polish state. Post- war migrations dispersed the Tatars, resulting in small communities living in Gdańsk, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Szczecin or Wrocław places far from their original settlements in the Białystok district (north-east of the country) and Warsaw. The Communist regime did not formally

1 Dr Agata S. Nalborczyk is Assistant Professor in the Department for European Islam Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw. Dr Stanisław Grodź teaches in the Department of the History and Ethnology of Religion, Faculty of Theol- ogy, Catholic University of Lublin. 2 Borawski, Piotr and Aleksander Dubiński, Tatarzy polscy: Dzieje, obrzędy, leg- endy, tradycje (Polish Tatars: History, Rituals, Legends, Traditions) (Warsaw: Iskry, 1986), p. 15. 3 Tyszkiewicz, Jan, Z historii Tatarów polskich 1794–1944 (From the History of the Polish Tatars, 1794–1944) (Pułtusk: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna, 2002), p. 15. 4 Borawski, Piotr, Tatarzy w dawnej Rzeczpospolitej (Tatars in the Erstwhile Com- monwealth [of Poland and Lithuania]) (Warsaw: LSW, 1986), pp. 199–202. 5 Sobczak, Jacek, Położenie prawne ludności tatarskiej w Wielkim Księstwie Lite- wskim (Legal Situation of the Tatar Population in the Grand Dutchy of Lithuania) (Warsaw-Poznań: PWN, 1984), pp. 34–38. 434 agata s. nalborczyk and stanisław grodź revoke recognition of religions but in practice, in an atmosphere generally unfavourable to religion, Tatar communities kept a low profile.6 Muslim foreign students began to arrive in the 1970s. Some of them married locally and stayed in Poland. After the changes towards democracy of the late 1980s, they were joined by Muslim refugees, traders and professionals.7 Some of the immigrants have become Pol- ish citizens and some have residence permits. They come from the Arab world (Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen) and the Balkans and live mainly in cities that are academic centres (Warsaw, Gdańsk, Lub- lin, Wrocław, Bydgoszcz, Kraków, Poznań, Opole, Łódź, Rzeszów). The refugees are mainly from Chechnya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ban- gladesh, and Iraq.8 There are no official data on the total number of Muslims (the Con- stitution [sect. 7, art. 53] rules out asking a question about religious affiliation in the census). Estimates by various offices and organisations place the number within the range 15,000–30,000 (0.04%–0.08% of the total population). The latest firm figures on the Muslim Reli- gious Union (Muzułmański Związek Religijny, MZR) are from 2002 and give a membership of 5,123.9 The Muslim League in the Republic of Poland (Liga Muzułmańska w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, LM) claims about 180 registered members. There are also some Polish converts but no figures are available.

2 Islam and the State

The republic of Poland is a secular state and various acts of parlia- ment10 regulate relations between the state and the main religions

6 Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Islam in Poland: The past and the present”,Islamochristi- ana, vol. 32 (2006), pp. 229–230, 234. 7 Nalborczyk, “Islam in Poland”, p. 230. 8 Settlers, people on contracts and refugees are categorised according to their former/present citizenship, not their religious affiliation. 9 Mały rocznik statystyczny 2003 (Small Statistical Yearbook) (Warsaw: GUS, 2003), pp. 135–137. The statistical yearbooks from 2004 on do not contain any data on MZR membership. In a television programme in early March 2009, the Mufti said that there were about 12,000 Muslim Polish citizens and official residents. 10 For more details see: Nalborczyk, Agata S., “The Outline of the Legal Situation of Muslims in Poland”, Rocznik Orientalistyczny, vol. 63 (2010), no. 2, pp. 222–223. poland 435

organisations.11 Other religious organisations must be registered in the government register of churches and religious associations. On the basis of the law of 21 April 1936, Islam gained official recognition by the Polish state with the MZR (established in 1925) as the only Muslim organisation representing Muslims in Poland.12 This law stated that the Mufti (elected by democratic vote), imams and muezzins would receive their salaries from the state.13 The act was not repealed by parliament after World War II or after the democratic changes of 1989, though the 1997 Constitution overruled some of its regulations (relating to financial support from the state, the official seat of the MZR (until this point still formally located in Vilnius), and the obligation for Muslims in Poland to belong to it).14 The act still gives the MZR the right to conduct religious education in schools and provides for the teachers to be paid by the state. The state does not fund religious organisations, but they can obtain public funding for specific projects. For example, the MZR has reported on its webpage the acquisition of national and local government funding for cultural projects (e.g. workshops, social events for the general public on Muslim feast days, Bayram Days of Podlasie, Muslim Culture Days of Podlasie, printing of calendars). The legal regulations created in consultations with Polish Muslims in 1936 made provision for only one official organisation to represent Muslims in Poland, i.e. the MZR. However, new legal regulations after 1989, made provision for the registration of new Muslim religious organisations; any religious group with at least 100 members can now register with the government. The MZR has thus ceased to have the monopoly,

11 There are 15 of these: 12 Christian churches, the Union of Jewish Religious Groups, the Karaim Religious Union and the Muslim Religious Union (the last two on the basis of the law of 21 April 1936 governing recognition of religions). 12 Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Monitor of the Acts of the Republic of Poland), vol. 30 (1936), point 240. Sobczak, Jacek, “Położenie prawne polskich wyznawców islamu (Legal situation of Polish Muslims)”, in R. Baecker and Sh. Kitab (eds.), Islam a świat (Islam and the World) (Toruń: Mado, 2004), pp. 186–197. 13 Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of the New Acts), Ministerstwo Wyznań Religi- jnych i Oświecenia Publicznego (Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education) 1432, p. 80. The Mufti received a salary equal to that of a diocesan bishop. 14 The Communist regime put an end to funding any religious body from the public purse. Vilnius, located within Polish state borders before World War II, was the official seat of the MZR. Compulsory membership of the MZR for Tatars was intended to ensure that there was only one Muslim organisation to represent Muslims vis-à-vis the state authorities. 436 agata s. nalborczyk and stanisław grodź but has retained its privileged position.15 Two small Shi’i groups were registered in 1990 and a new Sunni organisation called the Muslim League (Liga Muzułmańska, LM) was registered in 2004.16 In 2010, another round of consultations took place between the MZR and representatives of the Ministry of the Interior and Admin- istration on updating the regulations of the 1936 Act. A new version of proposed law is almost ready, in the last stage of consultation with MZR, but the process still seems far from conclusion. This followed a petition submitted on 24 April 2007 by the MZR to the Polish government requesting new legislation to regulate the relationship between the state and the MZR. On 15 April 2010 an MZR delegation with the Mufti Tomasz Miśkiewicz paid its respects to the President and other victims of the plane crash in Smoleńsk during the wake at the presidential palace in Warsaw.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Registered religious communities (związki wyznaniowe):

• The Muslim Religious Union in the Republic of Poland Muzułmański( Związek Religijny w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, MZR, 15–052 Białystok, ul. Piastowska 13F, 42; tel: +48 85 664 3516, http://www. mzr.pl) is a Sunni organisation established in 1925. The Mufti of the Republic of Poland and Chairman of the Highest Muslim Board of Muslim Religious Union in Poland is Tomasz Miśkiewicz, who was elected by the council of imams on 20 March 2004 (the first council since World War II). Apart from his religious/legal functions, he assumes the role of the official representative of Muslims. Member- ship of the MZR is voluntary and open to Muslim Polish citizens and all Muslims who have permanent residence in Poland.17

15 Borecki, Paweł, “Położenie prawne wyznawców islamu w Polsce (Legal status of Muslims in Poland)”, Państwo i Prawo, vol. 63, no. 1 (January 2008), pp. 72–84 (73). 16 Nalborczyk, “Islam in Poland”, pp. 231–233; Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Status prawny muzułmanów w Polsce i jego wpływ na organizację ich życia religijnego (Legal status of Muslims in Poland and its influence on the organisation of their religious life)”, in A. Parzymies (ed.), Muzułmanie w Europie (Muslims in Europe) (Warsaw: Wyd. Akademickie Dialog, 2005), pp. 232–233. 17 The MZR has traditionally been regarded as a mainly (at times almost exclusively) Tatar organisation, which in fact is not true—15% of members are non-Tatars poland 437

• The Muslim League in the Republic of Poland Liga( Muzułmańska w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, LM, 01–046 Warsaw, ul. Niska 25/43, http://www.islam.info.pl) is a Sunni organisation established in 2001 and registered on 6 January 2004. The chairman of the General Council is Samir Ismail. Membership is open to Polish Muslims, Muslims with Polish citizenship, and Muslims holding a permanent or temporary residence permit.

Two quite small registered Shi’i organisations:

• The Association of Muslim Unity Stowarzyszenie( Jedności Muzuł- mańskiej, 02–679 Warsaw, ul. Pieńkowskiego 4/91, http://www .al-islam.org.pl) was registered on 31 January 1990 and is led by Zbigniew Żuk. • Ahl-ul-Bayt Islamic Assembly (Islamskie Zgromadzenie Ahl-ul-Bayt, 05–840 Brwinów, Moszna 4a, contact address: skr.poczt.108, 05–800 Pruszków; [email protected]; http://www.abia.pl/) was registered on 17 December 1990 and its chief imam is Ryszard Ahmed Rusnak.

Muslim cultural organisations:

• The Muslim Students Society in Poland Stowarzyszenie( Studentów Muzułmańskich w Polsce, 60–272 Poznań, ul. Biedrzyckiego 13, (ul. Hetmańska 63, 15–727 Białystok, tel: +48 85 6514021, http:// www.islam.org.pl) has branches in Białystok, Poznań, Wrocław and Katowice. • The Muslim Association for Cultural Formation Muzułmańskie( Stowarzyszenie Kształtowania Kulturalnego, ul. Kolejowa 15, skr. poczt.109, Białystok, http://www.mskk-islam.8m.com).

(i.e. immigrants from Turkey, Azerbaijan, Chechen Republic and converts). This fic- titious exclusiveness led to the creation of other organisations and associations by non-Tatar Muslims, including Muslim students’ cultural organisations. Formation of the new religious organisation, the Muslim League (LM), was a step further taken by Muslims (of mainly Arab origin and Polish converts associated with them) around the turn of the century. Separate cultural associations continue to exist. Officially, the relationship between the MZR and the LM is amicable. The Mufti takes part in events organised by the LM and some prayer rooms are used by members of both organisations. The emphasis on ‘holding a residence permit’ is intended to maintain an orderly relationship with the state authorities. Both organisations were brought into existence by the will of members of the Muslim community and not at the instigation of or under pressure from any state authorities. 438 agata s. nalborczyk and stanisław grodź

• The Tatar Union of the Republic of Poland Związek( Tatarów Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, 16–100 Sokółka, Bohoniki 24,) was established in 1992. Its president is Stefan Korycki.

These organisations are involved in various ways in organising religious education for their members and for Muslim children, public lectures on various aspects of Islam, and publication of Polish translations of Muslim authors’ works (mainly on ‘religious’ topics).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are three mosques (in Bohoniki and Kruszyniany in north- eastern Poland dating from the eighteenth-nineteenth century, and one in Gdańsk that opened in 1990). Muslims distinguish between so-called Islamic centres (places for prayer, plus offices, libraries, meeting halls) and small ‘prayer houses’ (places for prayer), which are almost unnoticeable from the outside. There are Islamic centres in Białystok (one running (Muslim Cultural Centre, ul. Piastowska 13f) and another under construction), Warsaw, Lublin, Wrocław, Poznań and Katowice. There are prayer houses in Białystok, Suchowola, Łódź, Katowice and Poznań,18 but the total number of them is not known. Some of the Islamic centres and prayer houses named on the official websites of the MZR and LM are used by members of both organisations, or used by one but listed by both. A new Centre of Islamic Culture is being constructed by the LM in Warsaw. In the first half of 2010 it became a focus of a very hot public debate (see sect. 15).

5 Children’s Education

The MZR, as a religious organisation operating under an act of parliament, has the right to teach religion in public schools and its teachers are paid by the state. The ministerial regulation of 1992 states that a minimum of seven pupils having a particular religious affiliation in the same school is required in order for separate religious education

18 http://www.mzr.pl/pl/info.php?id=16, accessed 12 November 2010. poland 439 classes to be provided. In 2004, the Ministry of Education approved a school curriculum for Muslim religious instruction prepared by the MZR. In Białystok and in nearby Sokółka, Islamic religious instruction is provided for Muslim children in public schools. In Warsaw, the LM runs an interschool group for Muslim religious instruction at primary school level for pupils from Mazowsze district (Warsaw area). In other parts of the country, religious education for Muslim children is provided by the local Muslim communities independently of the school system (weekend classes). At school, these children attend ethics classes together with all the others who do not wish to attend Roman Catholic or other religious instruction classes. There are no Muslim schools.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There are no facilities to train imams locally and no Muslim higher education institutions. Islam features in the academic curricula of several universities, but the courses are mainly run by non-Muslims. Courses on the history of the Muslim world, Arabic language, and some aspects of Islamic doctrine are taught. Muslim religious education teachers and imams have to acquire their formal Islamic education abroad (formerly in Sarajevo, but now elsewhere). On the 15th anniversary of the Department for European Islam Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw held a conference titled “Muslims in Europe. Richness of Variety or Source of Conflicts” in Warsaw on 17–18 November 2010.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Three Muslim cemeteries are currently in use (at Bohoniki, established in the second half of the eighteenth century; at Kruszyniany, established in the seventeenth/eighteenth century; and in Tatarska St, Warsaw, opened in 1868). Two more that existed from the late seventeenth century have been closed (Lebiedziew after World War I and Studzianka after World War II). Two other disused cemeteries still exist at Bohoniki (from the late seventeenth century in the village—the Bohoniki cemetery that is in use is located outside the 440 agata s. nalborczyk and stanisław grodź village) and Młynarska St, Warsaw (in use from 1838 to 1868).19 Sep- arate sections are reserved for Muslims in communal cemeteries in Gdańsk, Wrocław and Poznań.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no Muslim ‘chaplaincies’. This is due to the fact that numbers of Muslims are small and their needs can be met informally through the community, rather than to any official obstacles.

9 Religious Festivals

Muslim religious festivals are not public holidays. Muslims can take a day off provided they make up the time missed. Qurban Bayram (‘Id al-Adha) is celebrated by MZR members in one of the north-eastern locations and is a public event. Sometimes non-Muslims are invited as guests. Ramadan Bayram (‘Id al-Fitr) has generally been celebrated more privately, though the LM has started a practice of organising a so-called Wieczór ramadanowy (Ramadan evening), an iftar for representatives of Muslim communities and invited non-Muslims. MZR also organised Ramadan Bayram celebration called Podlaskie Dni Bajramowe—Bayram Days of Podlasie, open iftar for Muslims and non-Muslims guests in Warszawa and Białystok, and celebration of Mievlud and Muslim New Year.

10 Halal Food

An Act of 17 May 1989 (art. 2, act 9) allows for exceptions from the approved method of animal slaughter (i.e. permits for not stunning animals prior to slaughter). Under the 1936 Act, the council of imams and the Mufti of the MZR had the sole right to issue halal certificates for food products in Poland. An agreement with the Chief Veterinary Officer in 2006 was based on that Act; see http://www.halalpoland .pl). This agreement was challenged by the LM as incompatible with freedom of religious practice and was recently revoked. At present,

19 http://www.mzr.pl/pl/info.php?id=18, accessed 12 November 2010. poland 441 the LM also has the right to issue halal certificates, for which the food producers pay a fee.20

11 Dress Codes

There are no regulations restricting the wearing of hijab orniqab . Some young Muslim women, mainly converts of Polish origin but more recently also young Tatar women, wear hijab in public. Other- wise Tatar women usually wore hijab only during prayers.21

12 Publication and Media

Muslim periodicals cover various aspects of Muslim culture and religious matters. Those listed here are all in Polish:

• Rocznik Tatarów Polskich is published by the Polish Tatar Union. It is academic in character and covers topics on Islam in general and particularly in eastern-central Europe; • Życie Tatarskie is published by the local action group Szlak Tatar- ski (Tatar Trail). It is a socio-cultural periodical and covers ethnic topics. There have been 96 issues since 1934, including 34 of the new edition since 1998. • Quarterly Przegląd Tatarski is similar in character and is published with financial support from the Ministry of the Interior and Administration. Four issues were published in 2010 (accessible on the MZR webpage). • Muzułmanie Rzeczypospolitej—published by the MZR, 4 issues in 2010 (accessible on the MZR webpage). • As-Salam (http://www.as-salam.pl) is published by the LM and 21 issues have appeared between 2004 and 2010. It addresses general and local socio-political and religious issues and is aimed at

20 http://rada-imamow.pl/certyfikacja-halal/11-oferta-certyfikacji-halal, accessed 20 March 2011. 21 Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Muslim women in Poland and Lithuania: Tatar tradition, religious practice, hijab and marriage”, in Adamiak, E., et al. (eds.), Gender and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe (Poznań: Wydział Teologiczny Uniwersytetu Adama Mickiewicza, 2009), p. 66. 442 agata s. nalborczyk and stanisław grodź

the general reader. Al-Hikmah is older but is distributed mainly among Muslims.

Internet sites include:

• http://www.mzr.pl—the website of the MZR. • http://www.islam.info.pl—the website of the LM (contains links to local centres), undergoing reconstruction at the end of 2010. • http://rada-imamow.pl—run by the LM imams and includes legal advice. • www.tatarzy.pl—run by the MZR; history and current matters of the Tatar minority. • http://www.tatarzy.tkb.pl/ or http://www.tataria.pl—a Polish Tatar site about Tatar history, religion and culture. • www.muzulmanie.com—ownership not stated, but probably run by the members of the LM. • http://poland-muslims.de.tl/Home.htm—a site on a German server providing information about Muslims in Poland; ownership not stated. • http://sites.google.com/site/oislamie—a private independent initiative by a group of Polish Muslim women providing information on Islam using high quality translations and sources; see also: http://muzulmanki.blogspot.com/. • http://islam.pl/home/—reactivated website presenting Islam; ownership not stated. • www.arabia.pl—run by an association of alumni and staff of the Oriental Institute (now Faculty), University of Warsaw. • www.islamweuropie.info—a private site about Islam in Europe administered by a staff member of the Department for European Islam Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw.

Internet fora include:

• http://www.islam.fora.pl • http://www.ummainlodz.fora.pl/

13 Family Law

Only marriages conducted in a state civil ceremony at a state registry office can be registered, so Muslims usually follow the civil ceremony poland 443 with a Muslim ceremony on Muslim premises. Marriages of couples who are not Polish citizens are valid under international private law, but polygamy is illegal.

14 Interreligious Relations

The Joint Council of Catholics and Muslims Rada( Wspólna Katolików i Muzułmanów, http://www.radawspolna.pl/) was established in 1997 with the aim of fostering friendly relations between Christians and Muslims, and disseminating reliable information about Christianity and Islam and their mutual contacts. The Council is headed by two co-chairpersons (a Christian and a Muslim). Its main achievement has been the introduction of the Islam Day in the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, which is celebrated on 26 January. This initiative was met by a positive response from the Polish Bishops’ Conference and has been incorporated into the church calendar of events. It is celebrated locally, especially in places where there is a Muslim community, but is it gradually receiving a wider acceptance.22 The central celebration of the 10th Islam Day in the Roman Catholic Church in Poland was held in Warsaw with the participation of Muslim ambassadors and representatives of all Muslim organizations. In November 2010, the Council, together with Collegium Bobolanum and Laboratorium Więzi, and in cooperation with the Groupe d’Amitié Islamo-Chrétienne (see www.semaineseric.eu) and others organised a session on “Church and mosque—places of celebration for Christians and Muslims”. “Assisi in Gdańsk”, an interreligious meeting organised by the Fran- ciscans (OFM) in cooperation with others and held to commemorate the original event of 1986, gathers representatives of various religions for prayer and discussion on an agreed theme, which in 2010 was “Solidarity”.23 “Christian-Muslim dialogue. History and the present, threats and challenges”—a conference organised by the Mikołaj Kopernik Univer- sity in Toruń, 18–19 October, 2010.

22 Grodź, Stanisław, “Christian-Muslim Experiences in Poland”, Exchange, vol. 39, no. 3 (2010), pp. 270–284. 23 http://franciszkanie.tv/tag/asyz-w-gdansku/, accessed 12 November 2010; http:// www.franciszkanie.gdansk.pl/2010/10/29/asyz-w-gdansku-2010/, accessed 12 Novem- ber 2010. 444 agata s. nalborczyk and stanisław grodź

The 2nd Wrocław Convention for Interreligious Dialogue was organised by the Wrocław section of the LM in cooperation with non- Muslim bodies on 12 October, 2010. The theme was: “To be for the other. Image of a neighbour and image of God in various religious traditions.”24 The MZR and LM often include an interreligious element in events they organise.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Usually coverage of matters concerning Muslims is scarce. Instances of local reporting on Islam in Poland are often linked to interreligious encounters (e.g. the Day of Islam in the Roman Catholic Church in Poland on 26 January). In May 2010, the media highlighted a decision by the LM to collect money for the victims of the severe spring floods in the country. The controversy in Poznań reported in 2009 ended with the non- Muslim artist not getting permission to remodel an old factory chimney as a minaret. There was a public happening—a “March Backwards” from the RC cathedral by the chimney to the building of the erstwhile synagogue on 29 June 2010, and a public debate on the reasons for the disputed project on 30 June. The artist announced her intention to frame the chimney as a minaret with fluorescent tubes (no permission needed from the municipal authorities) in November. A big controversy was caused when reports on the construction of a Centre of Islamic Culture in Warsaw by the LM appeared in the local media in February and March 2010. It was quickly picked up by all the major newspapers, radio and TV stations.25 Opponents indicated that the LM is connected to Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe and that construction of the centre is being sponsored in a big part by a Saudi businessman. Representatives of the LM were interviewed on radio programmes and talk shows. Apart from the initial broadcast on TVP Info (25 February 2010), the others showed that—save for small groups of staunch opponents—there seemed to be a positive attitude towards the construction of the Islamic centre. A demonstration against the on-going building of the centre in Warsaw

24 http://www.konwencja.wroclaw.pl/, accessed 12 November 2010. 25 http://warszawa.gazeta.pl/warszawa/1,34882,7599215,Powstaje_meczet_dla_11_ tys__warszawskich_muzulmanow.html, accessed on 12 November 2010. poland 445 on 27 March gathered less than 100 people.26 From a legal point of view it was pointless because the LM carried the work with the official approval of its plans by the appropriate Warsaw municipal authorities. Construction work was stopped for some time (financial issues were given as a reason) but resumed later during the year.

16 Major Cultural Events

In previous years “Muslim Culture Days” (Dni Kultury Muzuł- mańskiej)—a series of occasional cultural events were organised in various cities (Gdańsk, Białystok, Wrocław) in Białystok Muslim Cul- ture Days of Podlasie in March and May.

• Tatar Culture Days—organised by the MZR in Suchowola, 22 May 2010 and in Studzianka 24–25 July 2010. • Sabantuj—an annual Tatar gathering (with songs, dance, games and sports); • Podlaskie Dni Bajramowe (Bayram Days in Podlasie Region— Białystok region, September–October 2010); • XII Letnia Akademia Wiedzy o Tatarach Polskich (12th Sum- mer Academy of Polish Tatar Lore) organised by the local action group Szlak Tatarski (Tatar Trail) together with local authorities in Sokółka, 30 July–1 August 2010.

26 http://warszawa.gazeta.pl/warszawa/1,34889,7708462,Protestowali_przeciw_ budowie_meczetu_na_Ochocie.html, accessed 12 November 2010.

PORTUGAL

Nina Clara Tiesler1

1 Muslim Populations

Portugal has a rather small Muslim population which has grown mostly since the empire ended in 1974. Estimates of the communities themselves and by researchers suggest between 48,000 and 55,000 people, among them ca. 8,000 Isma’ilis, but mainly Sunni Muslims of South Asian origin from Mozambique and numerically stronger Sunni Muslims from Guinea-Bissau. Other Muslim groupings from Pakistan (4,0002) and Bangladesh (5,0003) have arrived more recently (noticeably since the early 1990s). Small numbers of Muslims stem from Morocco and Algeria (1,000–1,300), Senegal (1,500–1,900) and India (1,700). The recent increase of the Muslim population mainly derives from family reunifications among Bangladeshis (and less among Paki- stanis), which now count more women, elderly people and children (for notable consequences see 3 and 5), together with some numerically rather small and predominantly male influxes from Senegal, Guinea Conakry and Guinea Bissau.4 While smaller Muslim communities

1 Nina Clara Tiesler is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon (Centre of Excellence) and coordinator of the Luso-Afro-Brazil- ian research network on Muslims in Lusophone Areas (MEL-net). She holds a PhD in Comparative Studies of Religion and has researched on Muslims in Europe since 1990. She is author of Muslime in Europa. Religion und Identitätspolitiken unter veränderten gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen (Muslims in Europe. Religion and identity politics in new societal settings), (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2006), and editor of Islam in Portuguese- Speaking Areas, Lusotopie, vol. 14, no. 1 (special issue, 2007). 2 This number derives from a crossing of data from the SEF and estimations from inside the community. Pakistanis use to live in the centre of—and near Lisbon (Odi- velas), as well as in Porto. No significant research is done to date about/among this population. 3 This number derives from a crossing of data from the Service of Foreigners and Borders (SEF) which announces 3,500 individuals, and from the data provided by the Consulate of Bangladesh in Lisbon (5,000). The number 5,000 corresponds with the estimations by researchers with ethnographic field experience. Bangladeshis mostly live in the centre of Lisbon, but also in and around Porto. See Mapril, José, “ ‘Ban- gla masdjid’: Islão e bengalidade entre bangladeshianos em Lisboa”, Análise Social, vol. XXXIX, no. 173 (Winter 2005), pp. 851–873. 4 Many recent male immigrants are settling at the Algarve to work in constructions. 448 nina clara tiesler are established from the north (mainly in Porto and Coimbra) to the south (in the Algarve) and on the island of Madeira, the overwhelming majority of Muslims live in and around the capital city Lisbon. The majority of Moroccan Muslims live in and around Porto and at the Algarve. In and near Lisbon, one can speak of a certain (but not massive) geographical concentration in single neighbourhoods, such as in Laranjeiro and Odivelas (both having well established, representative mosques), Damaia and Sintra (Cacém). The “official” figures, from the immigration control/monitoring service (SEF, Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras) or from the census,5 do not reflect realities, with numbers usually lower than the estimates of researchers and the communities themselves. For example, according to the 2001 census, Portugal’s total population was 10,356,117 persons, of which 12,014 were declared to be Muslims.6 The reasons are, firstly, that religious affiliation is not recorded in the census and, secondly, that Portuguese citizenship is quite widespread and so nationality and ethnicity are unsatisfactory starting points. Additionally, in many cases the proportion of Muslims within the population of the country of origin cannot simply be transferred to the equivalent population in Portugal, especially not in the case of those coming from Mozambique or Guinea-Bissau.

2 Islam and the State

The Constitution, which recognizes freedom of religion and conscience and prohibits all discrimination in this respect, provides for a system of equality and separation between the State and religious denominations. However, the Roman Catholic Church enjoyed privileges not granted to other religious groups.7 A decisive change came with the Religious Freedom Act of 22 June 2001, with important improvements for religious minorities implemented from the year 2006 on. Before the implementation of the new law, the Islamic Community of Lisbon (CIL, see sect. 3), as well as smaller Islamic communities and other

5 National Institute of Statistics, www.ine.pt. 6 Leitão J., “The New Islamic Presence in Portugal: Towards a progressive intregra- tion”, in R. Aluffi B.-P. and G. Zincone (eds.), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minori- ties in Europe, Leuven: Peeters, 2004, p. 180. 7 Ibid., p. 291. portugal 449 religious minorities, could only be officially recognised as “associations in private law”. Those days, the community had once received financial support for the third of the (up to day) five phases of construction work of the Central Mosque which took place in 2002–2003. The State’s Commission for the Coordination of the Lisbon and South Targus Region (CCR, Commissão de Coordenação da Região Lisboa e Sul de Tejo) contributed 40% of the total costs to this phase of ongoing constructions/improvements. Later in 2004, the CIL has received a minor fund to support the daily costs of the Central Mosque from the City Hall of Lisbon (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa). Various donors had made the first phase of construction of the Central Mosque possible, which was concluded in the year of 1985 (the year of its inauguration, see sect. 16): The City Hall had offered the land (as it did later also for the cemetery in Lumiar, see sect. 7), and various Islamic majority countries had contributed with financial donations, as did the community members themselves.8 Once it was possible in 2006, the CIL converted to a registered religious community. It meant obtaining a legal status substantially equal to the one of the Catholic Church, including agreements with the State with regard to marriages (see below) and the optional benefit of the voluntary consignment by individual tax payers of 0.5% of income tax, but no general public funding. Several inequities remain, as privileges depend on the number of adherents of the religious groups and on the duration of their establishment in the country, with a minimum of 30 years required (the CIL was founded already 40 years ago). In practice, the CIL can benefit from tax advantages e.g. when spending on buildings. Whenever the main Islamic communities (Sunni and Isma’ili) celebrate an anniversary or special occasion, the Portuguese State is often represented at the highest level. Besides that, former presidents of the republic and also the present president have all been given the status of Honorary Members of CIL, and the current CIL president was one of the consultants of the president of the republic during his visits to India, Turkey and other countries. During the visit of the Dalai Lama to Portugal in 2007, the CIL organised and hosted a huge interreligious meeting in the Central Mosque, with the Dalai Lama

8 For details see N.C. Tiesler 2001, “No Bad News from the European Margin: the New Islamic Presence in Portugal”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 12(1), pp. 71–91, p. 79. 450 nina clara tiesler being the guest of honour—an important event, taking into account that the Portuguese government had been facing the same problems as other governments regarding the impact on official relations with China.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The role of a small group of Muslims from Mozambique (a Portuguese colony until 1975), who were studying at the faculties of law, medicine and economics in the then metropolis was decisive in laying the foundations of Muslim organisations. Most of these community founders as well as other Sunni Muslims of South Asian origin had been Portu- guese citizens already under colonial rule. Consequently, they did not perceive themselves as “immigrants”. Many African Muslims gather around their Sufi leaders. Muslims from Bangladesh have founded a mosque (Mesquita Martim Moniz) closer to their work place some years ago, and Senegalese inaugurated a prayer hall in the downtown district Anjos in 2010. However, the vast majority of at least ca. 40,000 Sunnis and their local communities are linked to and occasionally take part in the life of the central Islamic Community of Lisbon (CIL, for contact details see Mesquita Central de Lisboa, below). The first and best known is the CIL, founded in 1968, which acts as an umbrella organisation in formal and informal ways for Sunni Muslims. The founding of an official umbrella organisation of/for Islamic communities in Portugal, akin to a Federation, has been in preparation since 2010, and will be starting with a first national congress of this kind in 2011. The Mesquita Central de Lisboa, founded 1985, (Rua da Mesquita in Bairro Azul (à Praça de Espanha), 1070–283 Lisboa, tel: +351 21 387 41 42 / 21 387 91 84; fax: +351 21 387 22 30; e-mail: info@comunidade islamica.pt; www.comunidadeislamica.pt) has as its imam Sheikh David Munir. This is the home of the Islamic Community of Lisbon (CIL). Alongside common religious, cultural and social infrastructures (including a bookstore, chatrooms or the community website), three types of associations were founded in the thirty year old Cen- tral Mosque in the heart of Lisbon: the Women’s Association, several groups of Guinean Muslims, and the Youth Association of the Islamic Community (CILJovem) which is organised and frequented mainly (if not only) by young people of South Asian origin, including some portugal 451

Isma’ili Muslims. The Central Mosque also provides space for meetings and projects of other associations of Muslims, such as the one founded by Senegalese.

The other main Muslim organisations are:

• Comunidade Islâmica de Palmela (Av. Vila Amélia, lote 171, 172, Cabanas, 2950–805 Palmela, tel: +351 21 211 05 30, fax: +351 21 211 05 39, email: [email protected]), a local community in the suburbs of Lisbon where the Islamic secondary school, Colégio Islâmico de Palmela is also located. • Centro Cultural Ismaili e Fundação Aga Khan (Rua Abranches Ferrao, 1600–001 Lisboa, tel: +351 217 229 000, fax: +351 217 229 045, email: [email protected]). The Aga Khan Founda- tion Portugal is currently running a quite efficient capacity developmental project, called K’Cidade,9 the first project which focuses on the improvement of individual (education, integration into the labour market, citizenship training programmes) and community (child care, children’s education) capacities in urban environments of a developed country (www.kcidade.com and see 5). • Comunidade Shi’ta de Portugal (Ithna Ashari) (Avenida das Forças Armadas, 11 D, Almada; tel: +351 218106030; email: Bremtula__ [email protected]).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Besides the Central Mosque mentioned above, there are two other “representative” mosques near Lisbon (in Odivelas and Laranjeiro), in Coimbra and since the year 2010 also in Funchal (Madeira Island). Altogether, one counts 36 cultural centres and prayer halls across the country, around twelve madrasa, as well as the Jamatkhana of the Shi’i Imami Isma’ili Muslim Community. Madrasa in the Portuguese context does not refer to a physical place, like a school building or class room, but announces the offer of religious instruction classes which are held in the main mosques and prayer halls.

9 In Portuguese pronunciation, this concept reads “capa-cidade”, as such including the term “city” in the term “capacity”. 452 nina clara tiesler

5 Children’s Education

A recognised, private secondary Islamic school exists in Palmela (near Lisbon). It counts approx. 200 pupils, with nearly 10% of them being non-Muslims. In 2009, it achieved the status of being the best school in the national ranking of public and private secondary schools (see sect. 15). Apart from the parents’ engagement, most young Muslims receive their Islamic education in one of the madrasas and/or by private tutors who visit them at home. One consequence of the recent family reunifications among Muslim groupings from South Asia and from African countries is that the number of small, local community projects which focus on children’s education (as well as citizenship training programs for adults) has increased over the past years. Some are initiatives of broader programs, as is e.g. the project at the Ama- dora mosque which makes part of the K’Cidade program of the Aga Khan Foundation.10 Religious curricula are increasingly combined with academic training, incl. alphabetization, language classes (Por- tuguese or, in the case of children e.g. from Guinea Conakry, French) and general capacity training (computer courses etc.). The Law of Religious Freedom allows Islamic instruction in public schools, depending on the number of pupils/parents who require it (min. 10). In practice, there is currently no public school in Portugal with enough Muslim pupils of more or less the same age who could benefit from this offer. The parents do not complain about the lack of such service, as their children attend the instruction in the madrasas.

6 Higher and Professional Education

The Religious Freedom Act (no. 16/2001) governs the position of imam in detail, equating imams with Roman Catholic priests in terms of legal status, and providing for the possibility of setting up specific training institutions.11 As a higher institution for the training of imams does not exist, imam training is partly provided at the Islamic school of Palmela. 15–18 women were educated there as alimas (Portuguese

10 While this developmental project is an initiative of the (Isma’ili) Aga Khan Foun- dation, the majority of communities and groupings where it provides necessary support are Sunnis. 11 Leitão, p. 300. portugal 453 feminine plural version of Arabic alim). Some imams have received their education abroad (mostly in the UK, with only few exceptions where Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia had been the preferred destination).

7 Burial and Cemeteries

There is no exclusively Islamic cemetery in Portugal, but several municipal cemeteries reserve areas for Muslims and their communities (Odivelas, Feijó). Officially since 2005 (and since 1998 in practice), such an area exists at the cemetery of Lumiar (a district of Lisbon), donated by the Municipality of Lisbon and open to Muslims from all over Portugal. More than 500 graveyards carry Muslim names. It has become the most important cemetery for both Sunni and Shi’i, both Isma’ili and Ithna-Ashari families, being called “our cemetery”. Due to these facilities and probably due to the fact that most Muslims in Por- tugal are either Portuguese citizens or in other ways deeply attached to the country, it is very rare that families prefer arranging for a relative to be buried abroad.12

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The Religious Freedom Act (no. 16/2001) grants members of the Islamic and other communities the right to practise their religion in special situations (such as at military service, admission to public hospitals, and imprisonment). In practice, there are no imams working exclusively or on a regular basis in such institutions due to the lack of need. If the need arises in hospitals, the Commission of Social Affairs (Comissão de Assuntos Sociais) of the CIL provides special care and support for the individuals and their families which includes, of course, the visits of an imam. With regard to imprisonment, imams made visits on an informal basis until the official protocol was registered in the Diário de República I/185 (23.09.2009), and came into effect from 13 November 2009. Since then, community members, for

12 Exceptions are made by people from Bangladesh, Pakistan and partly from Guinea Bissau. 454 nina clara tiesler example, provide late night meals to prisoners during the month of Ramadan.

9 Religious Festivals

The State does not officially recognise Islamic festivals or holidays but permits absence from work and school on the main occasions on request. On these occasions, the CIL distributes information to the public, the Ministry of Justice, schools and employers and provides the respective forms for applying to the authorities for time off. Workers and employees are expected to maintain a flexible schedule and to compensate working hours. Students may take their exams on alternative dates.

10 Halal Food

Ritual slaughter according to Islamic tradition is permitted, according to a spokesman of CIL, since 1975. Nevertheless, most ritual slaughter for Muslims was performed by the Rabbi of the Lisbon Synagogue until the first halal butcher shops were established in 1982. Today there are at least six halal butcher shops in Lisbon, three in Odivelas, one at the downtown square Martim Moniz, one in Laranjeiro, and another downtown in Alvalade (owned by a non-Muslim), and two in Porto. Halal chicken is even available at the major shopping malls/ super market chains (Continente and Jumbo). At least twelve halal restaurants exist in the main cities, nine of them in Lisbon. Muslims who are living in the South of Portugal complain about the lack of halal food supply, with only chicken being available twice a week in supermarkets located in Faro and Albufeira. One can assume that this holds true for other places/regions outside Lisbon as well. A Muslim halal food supplier commented in an interview that this works according to the rules of the market, namely that if clients would ask for more (regular) supply of halal chicken, the supermarkets would order more.

11 Dress Codes

A law which targets the banning of religious dress is neither discussed among political parties, nor in the public and press in Portugal. Accordingly to spokesmen of CIL, the use of the head scarf or other portugal 455 special dress at school and workplaces has not caused any conflict or controversies. In the Portuguese context, the Qur’anic concept of the “modesty of the woman” does not translate into the use of specific dress codes. Consequently, the latter is not a very common practice, neither among women nor men, apart from the occasions of religious festivals and visits at the mosque.

12 Publication and Media

With other religious groups, Muslims take part in two television programmes on the public channel RTP2, where the presentation time is divided according to the numerical strength of the communities. In practice, the time is mostly occupied by the Roman Catholic Church and, secondly, by Protestant and Pentecostal churches. A radio programme at a public broadcasting station (Antena 1), which follows the same pattern, was inaugurated on 1 November 2009. The CIL runs a website (http://www.comunidadeislamica.pt) and some younger community members have created a chatroom (www.aliasoft.com/ forumislam) where one can also submit questions to be answered by the imams. Several blogs are used by young Muslims (muculmana .blog.com; islamicchat.blogspot.com; Portugal-islamico.blogspot.com). Some of these virtual spaces are also frequented by Portuguese- speaking Muslims from outside Portugal (mainly from Brazil, but also from Mozambique or Portuguese Muslims who live in the UK). There is currently only one printed journal,Al-Furqan , which is also available online (http://www.alfurqan.pt). It has a long standing tradition, is a private initiative and not related to CIL. During the last year, it even disappeared from the shelves of the book store at the Central mosque. The CIL publishes newsletters and other occasional grey literature and provides updated information on several matters on the above named community’s website.

13 Family Law

As noted above, since Islamic communities (and other religious minorities with long-standing tradition in the country) can register and be recognised as religious communities (and not only as associations of private law, as used to be the case until 2006), they can perform religious marriages which, by submission of respective declarations, will be 456 nina clara tiesler accepted by civil law. As with the Jewish and Evangelical communities, which have already solemnised a few of such marriages in 2008, the Islamic communities were able to realise the first marriages in 2010.

14 Interreligious Relations

Portuguese Muslims look back at a long tradition of interreligious relations, the latter having been informally established among leading personalities of different religious minorities already under Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique. The closest “cooperation” partner during the early years in Portugal had been the Jewish Community (see Halal slaughter). This relationship had been maintained during the negotiations about the new law of Religious Freedom which took place in the early 1990s and gained official character with the founding of the Abrahamic Forum (Forum Abraâmico de Portugal) in 2007 which joins Muslim, Jewish and Catholic representatives and is linked to the Three Faiths Forum (http://www.threefaithsforum.org.uk) with links with groups worldwide. The Abrahamic Forum organises cultural events (including lectures and debates) and assistance to people in need (of any religion and also for “the ones who might not profess any religion at all”). Such assistance is mainly organised through a task force composed of young people from the three religions joining hands to work with a selected Portuguese NGO and making food available. In 2008, the CIL joined the Municipal Board for Interculturality and Citizenship (Conselho Municipal para Interculturalidade e Cida- dania), which joins 37 religious groups and immigrant associations and is hosted at the City Hall of Lisbon. CIL is also a party to the International Movement of Charter for Compassion (http://charterforcompassion.org/). Again, it was CIL, together with the Abrahamic Forum, which took the initiative and provided the space where 150 people met on a Sunday, 15 November 2009, for the Day of Compassion to reflect upon concepts of compassion (and follow up action), with speakers from 17 different religious and non-religious groups.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The historically recent “new” Muslim presence (in distinction to the historical presence on the Iberian Peninsula before the 15th century) portugal 457 did not attract much attention before 9/11 which brought more curiosity and questions about Islam and Muslims. The rhetoric of the “war on terror” is dealt with by the Portuguese Muslims and their spokesmen in their normal, utterly patient and calm way. Researchers and Muslims know about harassment. But public Islam in Portugal always stresses: “Muslims in Portugal are not suffering discrimination. They are well integrated citizens and members of society.” The media mainly cover special occasions (anniversaries and famous visitors at the communities) and festivities (first and foremost the beginning and end of Ramadan), or mentions the Portuguese Muslim community when reporting on Muslims in other European countries or at international scale. Among the few recent occasions when Portuguese Islamic communities called the attention of the national-wide press had been the classification of the Islamic Secondary school (Palmela) on top of the national ranking (Jornal de Notícias, 13 November 2009), and the 25th anniversary of the Central mosque (O Público, 13 March 2010, see 16).

16 Major Cultural Events

The Day of Compassion (see section 14) on March 15 can be seen as the major cultural event in the year of 2009. In 2010, it was the 25th anniversary of the Central mosque, the first mosque in Portugal since the 15th century, when Muslims and Jews had been expelled from the Iberian Peninsula. The celebrations took place on Sunday, 14 March 2010 with the usual important guests, such as the President of the Por- tuguese Republic, the President of Lisbon’s City Hall and main representatives of other religions, governmental and non-governmental institutions. Portugal’s Prime Minister, José Socrates, was the guest of honour and one of the speakers in front of the numerous visitors. In his speech he highlighted the contribution of the Islamic community for “the growth and reinforcement of the Portuguese humanist and universalist tradition”, commenting that the state was secular, but not the society. The Central mosque published the following text on its website: The celebrations will as always be an inter-religious event, counting on the presence of diverse religious confessions with which we have frater- nal relationships, including as well our non-believing brothers, whether they be atheists or agnostics. 458 nina clara tiesler

The year of 2010 was the “year of elections”. As usual, CIL elections were contested by rival lists of candidates, presenting, e.g., activity plans for the near future which include social, cultural and humanitarian aid projects. The CIL has now a new leading committee, in total 31 people (21 at the Executive Committee/Directory Board, among them five women, one of them became one of the four Vice-Presidents; five at the General Assembly; five at the Fiscal Committee). The president remained the same as during the last decades, namely Abdool Karim Magid Vakil. One of the projects, presented by candidates during the election campaigns, is getting started as a bi-monthly action in early 2011: “Soup for All” (as well as bread, fruits and juice) is provided to a general public at Fridays at the Central mosque. ROMANIA

Irina Vainovski-Mihai1

1 Muslim Populations

The first Muslim communities in Romania were formed (mainly in northern Dobrudja and along the lower Danube) in the fourteenth century when Ottoman rule was established in the region. Dobrudja remained part of the Ottoman Empire for five centuries. After the Russian-Romanian-Ottoman War (1877), Romania gained its independence and the Treaty of Berlin (1878) acknowledged Dobrudja as a Romanian territory. As a result of the economic and political conditions in the early twentieth century, Turks and Tatars migrated massively from Dobrudja to Turkey.2 Since its establishment as an independent state, the constitutions of Romania and special laws have guaranteed the rights of certain religious groups, in addition to Orthodox Christians, who represent the majority of the population. The law on religious denominations issued in 1923 lists the Muslim faith among the recognised ‘historical faiths’.3 The establishment of the Communist regime (1948) introduced many formal changes with regard to the recognition of religious denominations, but put them under strict state control. Between 1948 and 1989, the Communist state acted systematically to impose atheism and limit the impact of religious creeds. After 1959, education in the Tatar and Turkish languages was gradually eliminated and in 1967 the Muslim Theological Seminary was closed. Today, the majority of Muslim communities live in Dobrudja and are mainly made up of the historical ethnic groups.

1 Irina Vainovski-Mihai is Lecturer in Arabic Literature at Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Bucharest. She holds a degree in Arabic language and literature and a PhD. in Philology. She has published studies in Arab literature, comparative literature and intercultural stereotyping. 2 Bara, Maria, “Relaţii interetnice dintre creştinii ortodocşi şi musulmani în Dobro- gea. Studiu de caz: Medgidia şi Cobadin (Muslim-Orthodox Christian interethnic relations in Dobrudja. A case study: Medgidia and Cobadin)”, Philologica Jassyensia, vol. 2, no. 1 (2006), pp. 93–104 (94). 3 Gillet, Oliver, Religie şi naţionalism (Religion and Nationalism) (Bucharest: Com- pania, 2001), p. 6. 460 irina vainovski-mihai

The most recent official census (2002) recorded 67,257 Muslims (0.3% of the total population of Romania), of whom 31,118 were ethnic Turks, 23,641 Tatars, and 3,310 Romanians.4 As regards levels of education, out of the total Muslim population over the age of ten (i.e., 57,687 individuals), 2,637 have a university degree.5 The main Muslim ethnic groups, the Turks and the Tatars, follow Sunni Islam. In the official census, a relatively small number of Turks and Tatars declared themselves to belong to religions other than Islam, to be atheists or to have no religion (980 Turks out of 32,098, and 294 Tatars out of 23,641).6 The total number of Muslim families is 16,807, out of which there are 12,584 families in which both spouses are Muslims.7 By 2009, the number of Muslims in Romania should have increased slightly due to immigration from Middle Eastern countries, and conversion (mainly consequent on marriage). Updated estimates for 2008 vary: 70,000 according to the Muftiate in Romania, with 87% living in the south-eastern county of Constantza,8 approximately 67,300 according to the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs (Secretariatul de Stat pentru Culte),9 and up to 213,440 in other estimates.10 After the fall of the Communist regime in 1989, new Mus- lim groups appeared in major cities such as Bucharest, Iasi, Cluj and Timisoara. These groups are made up of Middle Eastern businessmen, former students who studied in Romania before 1989, and refugees. They are mostly Palestinians, Kurds (from northern Iraq and south- eastern Turkey), Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese and Jordanians. These new

4 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t5.pdf, accessed 25 November 2010. 5 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t13.pdf, accessed 25 November 2010. 6 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t5.pdf, accessed 25 November 2010. 7 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t30.pdf, accessed 25 November 2010. 8 Figures from the Muftiate in Romania, available at http://www.muftiyat.ro/ comunitatea, accessed 25 November 2010. 9 Figures from the Ministry of Culture, Religious Affairs and National Patrimony, State Secretariat for Religious Affairs available at http://www.culte.ro/DocumenteHtml. aspx?id=1745, accessed 25 November 2010. 10 “Muslim population statistics”, appendix in Esposito, John, and Kalin, Ibrahim (eds.), The 500 Most Influential Muslims in the World (Washington DC: Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre, Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 2009), pp. 174–181 (179). romania 461 communities have not joined the old Muslim communities in Roma- nia, and the two groups live almost parallel lives,11 so discussion does not run around the question of who is a Muslim, but rather what kind of Muslim someone is and to which extent.12 As of June 2009, most Middle Eastern immigrants were of Turkish origin (17% of the total number of legal immigrants and 25% of expelled immigrants).13 For 2010 no updated information is available in this regard, but the data on asylum seekers show that out of a total of 885 asylum applicants 115 were from Afghanistan and 70 from Turkey.14

2 Islam and the State

Romania is a secular republic with no state religion, though Ortho- dox Christians constitute the majority (86.8% according to the 2002 census).15 The Islamic faith, as one of the 18 religious denominations recognised by law (Law 489/2006), is considered a public-utility legal entity.16 Expenses are covered primarily from the Muslim communities’ own income. Through their officially recognised national leadership and representative body (the Muftiate), Muslims can receive material support from the state for the maintenance of mosques, monuments and other communal buildings. According to the law, the Muftiate is the only religious institution that represents the followers of the Islamic faith in Romania and has the right to organise pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina. Any other individual or legal entity that wishes to organise pilgrimages must have the Muftiate’s approval.17 The

11 Grigore, George, “Muslims in Romania”, ISIM Newsletter, 3 July 1999, p. 34. 12 Kozák, Gyula, “Romániai muzulmán intézmények diskurzusa az identitásról és integrációról (The discourse of Muslim institutions from Romania on identity and integration)”, Korunk, no. 5 (May 2009), pp. 54–61 (54). 13 Romanian Office for Immigration figures available at http://ori.mai.gov.ro/api/ media/userfiles/InfoStat_Octombrie_2009_text.pdf, accessed 25 November 2010. 14 Eurostat figures available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/ 3-29032011-AP/EN/3-29032011-AP-EN.PDF, accessed 12 April 2011. 15 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t5.pdf, accessed 25 November 2010. 16 “Hotărâre de guvern privind statutul cultului musulman (Goverment Deci- sion regarding the Recognition of the Muslim Denomination)” on the website of the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, http://www.culte.ro/DocumenteDownload .aspx?ID=1189, accessed 25 November 2010. 17 Cf. Chapter III, Art. 3.e and Art. 4(1) of the “Goverment Decision regarding the Recognition of the Muslim Denomination”, officially published on 25 June 2008. 462 irina vainovski-mihai

Synodal Council (Romanian: Consiliu Sinodal, Turkish: Şura-i Islam), headed by the mufti, takes decisions regarding the functioning and organisation of the Muslim community. According to the same Law of 2008, the Synodal Council is made up of the mufti, four members nominated by the Democratic Union of the Turkish-Muslim Tatars in Romania (Uniunea Democrată a Tătarilor Turco-Musulmani din România, UDTTMR), four members nominated by the Turkish Dem- ocratic Union of Romania (Uniunea Democrată Turcă din România, UDTR), the principal of the Kemal Ataturk Muslim Theological and Pedagogical High School (Liceul Teologic Musulman şi Pedagogic Kemal Atatürk) and 15 clerics.18 The UDTTMR and the UDTR are two of the nineteen political parties and cultural associations representing ethnic minorities in the Romanian parliament. The mufti must be a Romanian citizen, born in Romania and with no other previous citizenship, and a graduate of an Islamic theological institute in Romania (or abroad, provided his qualification is recognised by the Romanian state). Because the position of the head of a religious denomination is regarded as equivalent to a high-ranking public position, after being elected by the Synodal Council, the mufti is confirmed by a decree of the president of the republic. Although the Muftiate has a longer history in the region of Dobrudja, it has functioned as the only institution representing the Muslims in Romania since 1943. The present mufti, Murat Yusuf (b. 1977 in Medgidia, Constantza), was first elected to this position in 2005 and was re-elected in June 2010.19 He studied in Romania and Turkey (at the Theological High School in Edirne and the Faculty of Theology, “Ondukuz Mayıs” University, Samsun), holds an MA in Comparative Religion from the Faculty of Orthodox Christian Theology (University of Târgovişte) and is currently a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Orthodox Christian Theology (University of Constantza).20

18 List of the present members available on the Muftiate’s website at http://www .muftiyat.ro/muftiatul/organizare, accessed 25 November 2010. 19 http://www.muftiyat.ro/muftiatul/organizare/muftiu (The Muftiate of Romania), accessed 25 November 2010. 20 http://www.univ-ovidius.ro/teologie/ (Faculty of Theology, University of Con- stantza), accessed 25 November 2010. romania 463

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The traditional Muslim denomination (Sunni) engages in public activities mainly through the Muftiate (http://www.muftiyat.ro) together with the UDTTMR (they share an address at Constantza 900613, Str. Bogdan Voda nr. 75, tel: +40241 61 66 43; +40241 52 01 86, http:// www.tatar.ro) and the UDTR (Constantza 900613, Str. Bogdan Voda nr. 75, tel/fax: +40241 55 09 03, http://www.udtr.ro). However, newly established associations and foundations21 dominated by immigrants from various ethnic backgrounds are also actively engaged in public activities, charities, translating and publishing religious literature, and teaching Arabic. The main such organisations are:

• Crescent Islamic Cultural Centre Foundation (Fundaţia Cen- trul Cultural Islamic Semiluna, Bucharest, sector 6, Str. Munţii Gurghiului nr. 50–52, http://www.scoala-araba.ro and http:// www.musulman.ro/) • Taiba Foundation (Fundaţia Taiba, Bucharest, sector 2, Şos. Colentina, nr. 373; Constantza, Str. Maior Şofran, nr. 11, http:// www.islamulazi.ro) • Association of Muslims of Romania (Asociaţia Musulmanilor din România, at the same address as the Taiba Foundation in Con- stantza, www.asociatiamusulmanilor.ro) • Muslim Sisters Association (Asociaţia Surori Musulmane) (at the same address as Taiba Foundation in Bucharest and Constanza, http://femeiamusulmana.blogspot.com/) • Tuna Foundation (Fundaţia Tuna, Bucharest, Bd. Regina Maria, nr. 34, http://www.tuna.ro and http://www.tunaforum.ro/) • Islamic and Cultural League in Romania (Liga Culturală şi Islamică din România, Bucharest, sector 2, Str. Fabrica de Gheaţă, nr. 14, http://www.islam.ro) • Association of Romanian Converts to Islam (Asociaţia Românilor Convertiţi la Islam, Bucharest, sector 1, Str. Lugoj, nr. 20, http://www .arci.ro/).

21 See the National Registry of Foundations, the Ministry of Justice, available at http://www.just.ro/Portals/0/WWWW/files/registrul_ong/Fundatii26112010.pdf, accessed 25 November 2010. 464 irina vainovski-mihai

The most active of them appears to be the Taiba Foundation, which has several websites—one dedicated to children, The Little Muslim (Micul musulman, http://www.miculmusulman.com)—as well as blogs and Internet discussion groups in Romanian, handbooks on Islam in Romanian, stands in book fairs, charitable activities, and Internet broadcasting (see Section 12 below). Most of the other organisations are offshoots of the Taiba Foundation, apart from the Tuna Foundation, which is linked to the Gülen Movement. Under the Law of Denomina- tions (489/2006) and particularly the Government Decision regarding the Recognition of the Muslim Denomination (officially published on 25 June 2008), all Islamic NGOs, associations and foundations need to be endorsed by the mufti. However, the mufti considers that many of these associations are harmful to traditional Hanafi Islam in Romania because of their persistent propaganda and conservative views, which come from Arab schools of Islam, and also that they have taken advantage of legal ambiguities and the need for religious education after the collapse of Communism.22 The Taiba Foundation rejects this opinion and has accused the mufti and the Synodal Council of libel. The case is pending.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are 73 purpose-built mosques in the region of Dobrudja and one in Bucharest (built in 1960).23 Ten of them are historical monuments and still in use. The oldest, Esmahan Sultan Mosque in Mangalia, was built in 1590. In June 2010, the centenary anniversary of King Carol I Mosque was attended in Constantza by Muslim clerics, officials from Romania and Turkey and the ambassador of the USA to Bucharest.24

22 “Daca musulmanii ar respecta ceea ce scrie in Coran ar exista unitate (There would be unity if Muslims respected what is written in the Qur’an)”, interview with the mufti, Ziua de Constanta, 25 November 2010, available at http://www. ziuaconstanta .ro/rubrici/interviu/%22daca-musulmanii-ar-respecta-ceea-ce-scrie-in-coran-ar- exista-unitate%22.html, accessed 25 November 2010. 23 See Ministry of Culture, Religious Affairs and National Patrimony, State Sec- retariat for Religious Affairs, http://www.culte.ro/DocumenteHtml.aspx?id=1745, accessed 25 November 2010. 24 “Moscheea Regele Carol I a împlinit 100 de ani (The centenary anniversary of King Carol I Mosque)”, evz.ro, 1 June 2010, available at http://www.evz.ro/detalii/ stiri/moscheea-regele-carol-i-a-implinit-100-de-ani-897044.html, accessed 25 Novem- ber 2010. romania 465

Although the Muftiate can receive financial aid from the Romanian state, the costs of new buildings and maintenance of historical monuments are mainly provided by the Turkish state (the Diyanet) and/ or foreign Muslim citizens with businesses in Romania. For example, the cost of restoring the sixteenth-century Esmahan Sultan Mosque in Medgidia, amounting to €1,000,000 was covered by the Muftiate, the Consulate of Turkey in Constantza and a Turkish businessman. In 2010 the government offered a financial support of 490,000 Lei (approx. €120,000) for the building of a new mosque and the extension works for a second one in two villages from Constanza county. In addition to the main mosque, it is estimated that there are fifteen other mosques in Bucharest funded by foreign residents,25 but these are in fact prayer halls adjacent to the buildings of associations and foundations established in the capital city and principal towns.26

5 Children’s Education

The Law of Education adopted in 1995 introduced religion as a compulsory subject in public schools. A national curriculum is set for the legally recognised denominations, including Islam. National curricula for religion are set by each denomination and submitted first to the Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs and then to the Ministry of Education for approval. Pupils can express their wish to take courses in a particular religion, those under 16 being spoken for by their parents or guardians. Pupils are exempted from attending religious education classes if they declare themselves to be non-religious or if the school cannot provide instruction in the religion requested. The basics of Islam are also introduced in classes on the history and traditions of the Turkish-Tatar Minority, which are part of the national curriculum for the Turkish and Tatar minorities. According to the Law of Education (Law 4/1995, Ch.XII, Art.120.4), each legally recognised ethnic minority can draw up a curriculum for special subject teaching

25 Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future? (Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, 2007), p. 155, available at http://www.euromedalex.org/sites/default/files/Islam_in_Europe.pdf, accessed 25 November 2010. 26 For a list, see http://www.islamulazi.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=597, accessed 25 November 2010. 466 irina vainovski-mihai on their history and the traditions. The curriculum and textbooks are approved by the Ministry of Education. Islam is also taught in mosques and by religious and cultural associations on an extra-curricular and private basis, mainly in weekend schools, or within an Arabic language programme. In November 2009, the Association of Muslims of Romania launched an on-line version of such weekend schools.27 The Crescent Islamic Cultural Centre has also launched, starting with December 2010, a series of courses in Roma- nian for those who have Arabic as their mother tongue and of tutorials for those who are preparing to pass the required exams for obtaining the Romanian citizenship.28 In 1996, an Islamic secondary school (Liceul Teologic Musulman şi Pedagogic Kemal Atatürk) was opened in Medgidia, a city with a sizable Turkish and Tatar population, which is now functioning with the support of the Turkish government.29 A similar institution existed before the Communist period and was closed in 1967.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are offered at several universities and consist of a general overview within courses on Arabic language, history of Arab culture and civilisation and history of Arab literature. All holders of academic degrees in Islamic theology have studied abroad, as no such higher education qualifications are offered in Romania. Diplomas issued abroad are subject to the recognition of the Romanian Ministry of Education after endorsement by the mufti. In 2007, disputes emerged after the mufti refused to endorse diplomas obtained from Islamic theological institutes in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Sudan. The mufti officially requested the Ministry of Educa- tion not to recognise diplomas obtained by seven Tatars on the ground

27 http://www.asociatiamusulmanilor.ro/index.php?option=com_content&view=ca tegory&layout=blog&id=69&Itemid=74, accessed 25 November 2010. 28 http://www.musulman.ro/ (Crescent Islamic Cultural Centre), accessed 25 Novem- ber 2010. 29 See the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.mae.ro/ node/1746, accessed 25 November 2010. romania 467 that they had studied a radical form of Islam,30 and recognition of their diplomas was denied.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The Muftiate owns 108 cemeteries. In some cities, e.g. Bucharest, there is an acute need for a cemetery, while in others, e.g. Constantza, there is need for additional provision. The creation of a Muslim cemetery in Bucharest was put on the Municipality’s agenda some ten years ago. At present, Muslims who die there are usually taken to Constantza (250 km away) for burial. The matter seemed to have been settled recently after the Muslim community was allotted land for this purpose on the outskirts of Bucharest, but until now the situation was not solved.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams in the armed forces. The Muftiate can assign an imam to visit a prison inmate at the inmate’s request and at the Mufti- ate’s expense. The same applies to patients in hospitals. Most prisons and state hospitals have Orthodox Christian chapels. In hospitals in the towns of Dobrudja, where there are a significant number of Mus- lims, quotations from the Qur’an are often displayed on the walls of the wards.

9 Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations take place in the main cities (with popular music concerts, etc.) and in villages with a significant Muslim population. They are open to the public. In Ramadan, iftar dinners offered by Turkish and Arab restaurants are open to the public. Non-Muslims participate in events organised in public places (including sharing food), while in the regions without a historical tradition of Muslim-Christian coexistence (as in Dobrudja),

30 “Plangere catre Sura-i Islam (Complaint to the Sura-i Islam)”, Clubul român- arab de presă şi cultură (Romanian-Arab Club for Press and Culture), 19 April 2007, available at http://www.ana-news.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&i d=440&Itemid=171, accessed 25 November 2010. 468 irina vainovski-mihai they attend iftar meals in restaurants only if accompanied by a Mus- lim, being wary of behaving inappropriately. Large-scale iftars are also organised in cities with a quite small Muslim population.

10 Halal Food

In the main cities, there are several halal food shops with both Muslim and non-Muslim customers, as well as numerous ethnic restaurants (which offer halal food and Arabic and Turkish television programmes, and do not serve alcohol). The meat for the shops and restaurants is supplied by halal slaughter houses functioning in Romania and certified by the Muftiate.

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools, but it is mostly in villages with a large Muslim population that women wear head scarves. No women have been observed wearing niqab.

12 Publications and Media

The main printed media are the monthlyHakses (The Authentic Voice, published by UDTR (Constantza 8700, Bd-ul Tomis nr. 99, bl. SO, ap. 3, tel/fax: +40241 55 09 03; on-line issues: http://www.udtr.ro/ hakses/index.htm) and the periodicals published by the UDTTMR: Karadeniz (The Black Sea),Kadinlar Dunyasi (The World of Women) and Cas (The Youngster) all the three with the same address (Con- stantza 8700, Str. Stefan cel Mare nr. 66, tel/fax: +40241 61 66 43) and also available on-line at: http://www.tatar.ro/publicatii.php?arhiva. The website http://www.tatar.ro, although it focuses on information about the Tatar community, also offers extended articles on the Mus- lims in Romania in general. In March 2009, UDTR, UDTTMR and the Muftiate opened a broadcasting station, Radio T, in Constantza with programmes in Romanian, Turkish and Tatar, which adds to the already long-running similar programmes aired by the local station of the state-owned Romanian Broadcasting Society (Societatea Română de Radiodifuziune, SRR). DDTV (a television channel broadcasting from Bucharest nationally, romania 469 although with a small audience) hosted a weekly programme, Isla- mul azi (Islam Today) presented in Romanian by the Taiba Founda- tion. The programme was cancelled after DDTV started broadcasting movies only. Webcasting is used increasingly: video clips (in Romanian or with Romanian subtitles) on dailymotion (http://www.dailymotion. com/AsociatiaSuroriMusulmane), YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/ islamulazi, http://www.youtube.com/muhlisun) and Ikhwan Tube (http://www.ikhwantube.org/), and audio streaming on websites such as Radio Islam (http://www.radioislam.ro/radio.html).

13 Family Law

According to the Family Code, marriages are only recognised if they are performed and registered by a state (secular) authority. Marriages in mosques (as in the places of worship of other religions) have a rather ceremonial function. The Romanian legal system is secular. In litigation, a non-denominational premarital contract may be taken into account. The Family Code prohibits polygamy, but marriages are recognised if they were legal in the jurisdictions where they were contracted. There are circumstances (almost exclusively among Arab expatriates) when marriages contracted in countries with legal systems different from the Romanian are officially recorded as such in the Romanian civil status register. Painful litigation (mainly over custody of children) emerges in cases of separation when the spouses bring to court the laws of their respective countries. Generally, such cases are not resolved because they end with two separate court decisions pronounced under different legal systems.

14 Interreligious Relations

Muslim festivals and special events are regularly attended by non- Muslim representatives of local authorities (see Section 9). On 2 September 2010, Mark H. Gitenstein, the ambassador of the US to Bucharest, offered at his residence aniftar dinner to Muslim diplomats, the mufti of Romania and representatives of the Romanian- Muslim community. 31 Government agencies, such as the Department

31 See the Embassy of the United States website: http://romania.usembassy.gov/ policy/remarks/amb_09022010.html, accessed 25 November 2010. 470 irina vainovski-mihai for Interethnic Relations (Departamentul pentru Relaţii Interetnice, http://www.dri.gov.ro/) and non-governmental institutions, such as the Intercultural Institute Timisoara (Institutul Intercultural Timişoara, http://www.intercultural.ro/rom/index.html) are promoting dialogue through symposia, publications and websites, such as Intercultural Calendar (Calendar Intercultural, http://www.calendarintercultural. ro/index.php), comprising both ethnic and religious festivals. Prob- ably as a result of the long tradition of coexistence with Muslims, those who are long-established in Romania are regarded as familiar. Others, while outsiders (i.e., Muslims from other countries, including the Bal- kan countries), are regarded with suspicion (even if contact is indirect, through media coverage, etc.).

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Media coverage concerning Muslims in Romania at the national level focuses almost exclusively on significant events (cultural exhibitions, ethnic festivals and public performances) (see also Section 16). The regional media (in Dobrudja) covers in detail the life of the community, as it addresses a broad audience and presents both religious and ethnic points of view. Internal debates within the community and tensions between the version of Islam professed by the historical Muslim community and that professed by new-comers are irrelevant to the non-Muslim population and not understood by them. Media focus on Islam tends mostly to be related to international events and presentations and debates about international Islam-related subjects are usually presented by non-Muslim commentators, Middle East experts and ad-hoc analysts.

16 Major Cultural Events

Nawruz, the annual spring holiday, is observed with public festivities organised by the Turkish and Tatar minorities, as well as Kurd- ish immigrants. There are several other festivals and contests with a mainly ethnic dimension, such as Küreş (traditional Tatar wrestling) and Hîdîrlez (the Turkic spring festival). RUSSIA

Elmira Akhmetova1

1 Muslim Populations

There is no official record of the number of Muslims in the Russian Federation as the 2002 census did not include a question about religious beliefs.2 However, according to that census, the total number of members of Muslim ethnic groups indigenous to Russia is about 15 million, and there are significant numbers of labour migrants from newly independent Central Asian republics, mainly Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan among the approximately eight million officially registered labour migrants in Russia. In addition, the Federal Migration Service estimates that there are around five million illegal immigrants.3 According to Ravil Gainutdin, head of the Russian Council of Muftis (RCM) and the head of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Euro- pean Part of Russia, 80% of labour immigrants in Russia are Muslims by cultural background.4 Accordingly, the RCM estimates that there are over 20 million Muslims in Russia, which is about 14%–15% of the total population (about 142 million in January 2009). In 2003, Russia’s then-president Vladimir Putin, addressing the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, also said the Muslims of Russia numbered about 20 million.

1 Elmira Akhmetova is a PhD student in history and civilisation at the Interna- tional Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM). She has published her MA thesis, Ideas of Muslim Unity at the Age of Nationalism: A Comparative Study of the Concept of the Ummah in the Writings of Musa Jarullah and Said Nursi (Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2009) and her latest book, Islam in Russia: Historical Facts and Modern Developments, is due to be published in Malaysia by the International Islamic Institute for Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) in 2011. 2 Since results of the 2010 census are not available at the present time, we refer to the results of the 2002 census. 3 This number may be even higher as some unofficial agencies estimate there are 10 to 15 million unregistered foreigners in the country: http://search.japantimes.co.jp/ cgi-bin/eo20060921a1.html, accessed 10 November 2010. 4 http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2009/03/11/2323_type63378type63381_214089 .shtml, accessed 14 November 2010. 472 elmira akhmetova

In 2000, the Muslims of Russia celebrated fourteen centuries of Islam on Russian soil. Islam first entered the territory of the modern Russian Federation through Dagestan from the mid-seventh century and from there started to spread to the entire Northern Caucasus. In 641 CE, the Muslim army under the leadership of ‘Abd Rahman ibn Rabi’a al-Bakhili reached the Southern Caucasus. In 685–6 CE, the Arabs took the town of Derbend, which subsequently became the focus for the Islamisation of the north-eastern Caucasus, referred to as bab al-jihad (the gateway of jihad).5 In the other part of modern Russia, the upper Volga basin, Islam gradually took root through trade and other economic relations with the Muslim world. The first Muslim state in modern Russian territory was the Bulghar Kingdom,6 which voluntarily recognised Islam as an official state religion in 922 CE in the presence of a delegation sent by the Abbasid Caliph Ja’far al-Muqtadir Billah (r. 908–932).7 From there, Islam spread to other parts of modern Russia. The second wave of the spread of Islam in Russia took place during the period of the Golden Horde (Altyn Urda), a western province of the vast Chenghizid Empire, which was established in 1242 as a result of the Mongol invasion of the Bulghar Kingdom and other neighbouring territories. Under the rule of Uzbek Khan (1312–42), Islam became the official religion of the state and, from the mid-fourteenth century until the demise of the Golden Horde in 1437, the Volga Bulghar elite dominated the cultural and Islamic discourse of the empire.8 At the beginning of the fifteenth century a number of independent Islamic khanates (or states), including the Kazan, Crimean, Siberian, Noghay, and Astrakhan khanates, emerged from the gigantic Golden

5 Galina Yemelianova, “Islam in Russia: An historical perspective,” in Hilary Pilk- ington and Galina Yemelianova (eds.), Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Public and Private Faces (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 28. 6 The Bulghar Kingdom existed in the Middle Volga region, a territory of the modern republic of Tatarstan, from the eighth century until the Mongol invasion in 1236 CE (see http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=120375791695 3&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout, accessed 14 November 2010). 7 Marjani, Shihabetdin, Mustafadu al-Akhbar fi Ahwali Qazan wa Bulghar (Useful information about the conditions of Kazan and the Bulgars) (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Nashriyaty, 1989), pp. 124–130; Wimbush, Enders, “Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, in John Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), vol. 2, pp. 271–272; Yemelianova, Galina M., Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 7. 8 Yemelianova, “Islam in Russia”, p. 21. russia 473

Horde. From the sixteenth century, these Muslim states were conquered one after another and incorporated into a newly centralised Muscovite state of proto-Russians: Kazan in 1552, Astrakhan in 1556, and Western Siberia in 1598.9 By the end of the seventeenth century, the Russian advance had reached the Northern Caucasus too. In 1859, the Muslims of Dagestan (Chechnya and Ingushetia were also part of Dagestan) lost their country to the Russian Empire after 34 years of resistance under Imam Shamil (1797–1871).10 Today the majority of Muslims live in their historical territories of the Volga-Urals basin, western Siberia and the Northern Caucasus. Other parts of Russia, including large cities such as Moscow, Nizhniy Novgorod and St Petersburg also have significant Muslim populations. The Muslim population of Moscow alone is estimated to be more than 2 million (about 20% of the total), and St Petersburg’s Muslim community is about half a million11 (out of a population of about 4.6 million, according to the 2002 census). Russia’s Muslims belong to more than 40 ethnic groups,12 such as the Volga Tatars, the Siberian Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Bashqorts, Dargins, Balkars, Avars, Karachays, Circassians, Kabardins and many others. In the Dagestan region alone, there are tens of indigenous Muslim ethnicities. The majority of Russia’s Muslims follow two Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence—the Hanafi and Shafi’imadhhab s. Muslims of the Volga-Urals region and the Nogais, Karachays and Balkars in the Northern Caucasus follow the Hanafimadhhab , while Muslims of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia are Shafi’is. Shi’ites are a small minority to be found almost exclusively in the Caucasus, among Azeri Turks and the Azeri diaspora and part of Dagestan’s small Muslim ethnic group, the Lezgins. Ethnic Muslims are predominant in seven out of the 21 republics of the Russian Federation: Bash- kortostan and Tatarstan in the Volga-Urals region, and Chechnya,

9 On Russian expansion into Muslim territory, see Wimbush, “Islam in Central Asia”, p. 272. 10 Lieven, Anatol, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 304–318; Blanch, Lesley, The Sabres of Paradise: Conquest and Vengeance in the Caucasus (London: Tauris Parke, 1960). 11 Hahn, Gordon M., Russia’s Islamic Threat (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 19–20. 12 If we include the tiny ethnic groups of the Caucasus region, this number may be even higher. For example, President Medvedev, during his visit to the Grand Mosque in Moscow on 15 July 2009, noted that 57 of Russia’s 182 ethnic groups identify themselves as Muslim. 474 elmira akhmetova

Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia in the Northern Caucasus.13

2 Islam and the State

The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation stipulates that Russia is a secular state and that “no religion can be established as the official or compulsory [religion]” (Article 14). It guarantees freedom of conscience and religion, including the right to profess individually or collectively any religion or not to profess any religion, and freely to choose, possess and disseminate religious and other convictions and act in accordance with them (Article 28), and prohibits “all forms of limitations of human rights on social, racial, national, language or religious grounds” (Article 19). The 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience, a supplemental law on religion, does not recognise a state religion. But its preamble identi- fies Russian Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism as traditional religions and recognises the special contribution of Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and the establishment and development of Russia’s spirituality and culture. Islam is repeatedly affirmed to be part of Russian society by the Russian authorities and political leaders. On 29 June 2005, the Russian Federation obtained observer status at the OIC. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, during his visit to the Grand Mosque in Moscow on 15 July 2009, stressed the importance of Islam in the country’s internal affairs and declared: “We are a nation of many ethnicities and faiths, and the Muslims of our nation have due respect and influence in our country. Muslim religious organisations make important contributions to supporting civil order, to providing spiritual and moral guidance to an enormous number of people, and to fighting extremism and xenophobia.”14 The central and provincial muftiates are on good terms with the Kremlin and the regional leadership. On 2 November 2009, the grand mufti Ravil Gainutdin was

13 http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1229319098125 &pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout, accessed 14 November 2010. 14 Medvedev, Dmitry, “Opening remarks at meeting with Muslim spiritual leaders of Russia”, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/07/15/1219_type84779_219684. shtml, accessed 14 November 2010. russia 475 decorated by the government with the fourth degree Order “For Ser- vices to the Fatherland” in recognition of his contribution to propagating spirituality and strengthening harmony between the nations of the Russian Federation. The Russian government assists Muslim institutions by financing some educational and cultural developments. In December 2006, a Fund for Supporting Islamic Culture, Sciences and Education (http:// www.islamfund.ru/) was founded by the Russian president, with an annual budget of about 200 million Russian Roubles (about €5 million) to support scholarships, Islamic events, conferences, seminars and festivals and the Muslim press. It should be stated that the Islamic factor played a minor role in the declaration of war by the Russian government against Chechnya in 1994 and 1999. Many experts agreed that the Caspian Sea’s oil- fields and the strategic significance of oil pipelines passing through the Caucasus were major incentives for Moscow to use force against the separatist movement in Chechnya during the two Chechen wars of 1994–1996 and 1999–2000. The horrible consequences of these wars, together with the 9/11 attacks in the United States, played a fundamental role in creating a negative image of Islam and Muslims in Rus- sia (see sect. 15 below). In the wake of the Russian Extremism Law of 2002, adopted by the Russian government after the declaration of the US-led global ‘war on terror’, cases of discrimination and violation of Muslims’ rights under the pretext of ‘fighting against religious extremism’ or ‘Islamic terrorism’ have significantly increased in Russia. Dozens of mainstream Islamic books such as the Risale-i Nur by the Turkish intellectual Said Nursi (1877–1960), Muhammad Ali Hashimi’s Lichnost’ Musul’manina (The Personality of a Muslim), some books under general titles asJizn’ Proroka Muhammada (The Life of the Prophet Muhammad),Osnovy Islama (Foundations of Islam) and Islam Segodnya (Islam Today) have been indiscriminately banned in several district courts in Russia, for allegedly inciting interreligious and interracial hatred, and promoting exclusivity and superiority on the basis of religion. A number of Muslim organisations, movements and societies such as Hizb al-Tahrir, Jama’a al-Tabligh, Nurcular (followers of Said Nursi), the so-called ‘Ahl as-Sunna’, Islamic Jamaat, Salafism, Wahha- bism and others have been banned in Russia as being ‘extremist’ and “contradictory to the traditional Hanafimadhhab ”. These bans have 476 elmira akhmetova inevitably led to the arrest of dozens if not hundreds of Muslims in Russia on allegations of belonging to “extremist groups”.15 In fact, only the Hanafi madhhab is considered acceptable and traditional in Rus- sia, while other schools of thought and fiqh, apart from the Shafi’i madhhab (which can be tolerated as indigenous Muslims of the Northern Caucasus, such as the Chechens and Ingush, are Shafi’is), are ‘non-traditional’ and unwelcome.16 The monopoly of the Spiritual Directorate and regional authorities over the religious practices of Muslims arouses feelings of suspicion about everyone who does not follow the ‘traditional’ Hanafimadhhab .

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The voice of the Russia’s Muslim population is mainly represented by two competing Islamic structures. The most influential among them is the Russian Council of Muftis Soviet( Muftiyev Rossii, RCM, 7, Vypol- zov by-street, 129090, Moscow, tel/fax: 0074956–814904, http://www .muslim.ru), founded in July 1996 by the decision of the first Assembly of the Heads (muftis) of Regional Spiritual Boards of Russia, which elected Ravil Gainutdin, the head of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European Part of Russia (Duxovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Evro- peiskoi Chasti Rossii), as its first chairman.17 The RCM is an umbrella organisation that unites religious Muslim associations in the Russian Federation on a voluntary basis. Among its main tasks are: consolida-

15 On the banning of Islamic books and organisations, see Fagan, Geraldine, “Rus- sia: The battle with ‘religious extremism’—a return to past methods?”, http://forum18. org/Archive.php?article_id=1288, accessed 10 November 2010; idem, “Russia: Reli- gious freedom survey, October 2008”, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_ id=1196, accessed 10 November 2010; Akhmetova, Elmira, “Time to burn Islamic books: Russia 2008”, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1 203758662613&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout, accessed 10 November 2010; “Fabrication of ‘Islamic extremism’ criminal cases in Russia: Campaign continues”, http://www.memo.ru/2008/09/04/0409082.htm, accessed 10 November 2010; and Fagan, Geraldine, “Russia: Raids continue as doubts grow over Nursi ban”, http://religionandpolicy.org/cms/index2.php?option=com_content&do_ pdf=1&id=4178, accessed 10 November 2010. 16 The Oslo-based Forum 18 News Service also reports on the existing Hanafi monopoly in Russia (see Fagan, Geraldine, “Russia: Any school of Islam, as long as it’s Hanafi”, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1324, accessed 10 Novem- ber 2010. 17 Hunter, Shireen, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004), p. 56. russia 477 tion of Muslim religious organisations of the Russian Federation with the aim of finding solutions to problems affecting the whole Muslim community in Russia; coordination and mutual assistance with respect to activities organised by individual religious boards; clarification of the Council’s official position with regard to various issues in relations with public authorities on federal and local level, organisations representing other confessions, international and foreign organisations; organisation of Hajj, conferences, public relations campaigns concerning the Mus- lim population, the government, and the non-Muslim population. The second but oldest Muslim religious organisation is the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia and European countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Tsentral’noe Duxovnoe Uprav- lenie Musul’man Rossii i Evropeiskix Stran SNG, CSBM, 50, Tukaeva str., Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, tel: 0073472-508086/ 25080 79). It was established in post-Soviet Russia in 1992 and is located in Ufa, Bashkortostan; its head is Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin. The CSBM began in 1788, when the Empress Catherine II ordered the establishment of the Ufa Spiritual Gathering for Mohametan Law (Ufimskoe Duxovnoe Magometanskogo Zakona Sobranie), which was renamed the Central Muslim Religious Board of Inner Russia and Siberia (Tsentral’noe Dux- ovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Vnutrennoi Rossii i Sibiri) in 1917 and then the Muslim Religious Board of the European part of USSR and Siberia (Musul’manskoe Duxovnoe Upravlenie Evropeiskoi Chasti SSSR and Sibiri) in 1948. Regional Muslim religious boards are registered with either the RCM or the CSBM and every local Muslim community must be affiliated to the regional Muslim religious boards in order to be officially recognised as a legal organisation. These two organisations enjoy equal rights and status in the government structure and are recognised by the state as umbrella Muslim organisations of Russia. In 2009, the CSBM suggested they might unite, together with the Muslim Coordination Centre in the Northern Caucasus, under one centralised organisation, and discussions are on-going. There are no Muslim political parties in Russia, but Muslims are integrated into Russian political life. At present, two ministerial positions are occupied by ethnic Muslims: Rashid Nurgaleev is the Minis- ter of Internal Affairs, and Elvira Nabiullina is the head of the Ministry for Economic Development of the Russian Federation. In republics with a Muslim majority, especially in the Northern Caucasus, major posts in the government structure and industry are largely occupied by ethnic Muslims. 478 elmira akhmetova

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Mosques or prayer houses are to be found in almost every Russian city and town that has a Muslim community. Ravil Gainutdin, the head of the RCM, estimates that at least 7,200 officially registered mosques are functioning in Russia at the moment and their number continues to increase.18 New mosques have been opened in ancient Russian cities such as Tver, Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Nizhniy Novgorod and many others. In regions with a Muslim majority, there is a boom in opening mosques. In the small Republic of Dagestan alone, with a population of about 2,577,000, more than 1,700 mosques are registered. The first mosques that opened after the collapse of the Soviet Union have often been reconstructed on the historical sites of old mosques, which were confiscated and in some cases destroyed by the government in the 1930s. The mosques are purpose-built and their size depends on the size of the community. Village mosques are usually designed for several dozen Muslims, while city mosques can accommodate from several hundred up to several thousand believers. On 24 June 2005, one of the largest mosques in Europe, the Qul-Sharif Mosque, was opened inside the Kazan Kremlin, Tatarstan. In addition to a prayer hall, this mosque also includes an Islamic museum, library and publishing house, and has become an important mark in the Kazan architectural landscape. Its prayer hall is designed to hold 1,500 people, while the open space outside the mosque can accommodate around 9,000 more for prayer. The construction cost around 375 million rubles (€9,430,000), most of which was donated by the Tatar people. On 16 October 2008, another large mosque, Ahmad Kadyrov Grozny Central Dome Mosque, was officially opened in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. It is believed to be the biggest mosque in Europe (excluding Turkey), with space for 10,000 people to pray. There is no official record of the number of prayer housesmolel’niyi ( komnaty) in the Russian Federation. They are commonly single rooms opened in universities, schools, workplaces, hospitals, prisons and in small towns with a Muslim minority. In 2002, a Muslim prayer room with an area of 35 square metres was opened at Domodedovo

18 http://www.tatar-inform.ru/news/2010/11/11/245036, accessed 14 November 2010. See also Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, p. 13; Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, pp. 137–138. russia 479

International Airport, Moscow; it is the only Russian airport prayer room. More mosques and prayer houses are needed by practising Mus- lims in many regions of Russia, especially in Moscow. There are currently five mosques in Moscow, which together can only accommodate about 10,000 believers. According to different records, about 70,000 Muslims gathered around the Moscow Cathedral Mosque building alone on 16 November 2010 to perform the ‘Id al-Adha prayer. Since the mosque can only accommodate several hundred, worshippers had no choice but to pray wherever they could find a space—neighbouring streets, garage roofs and adjacent Macdonald’s and church precincts— several blocks away from the mosque itself. The same happened in other Russian cities. Construction of new mosques is therefore a burn- ing issue for Russia’s Muslims. Work recently began on the restoration of the Moscow Cathedral Mosque (7, Vypolzov by-street, 129090, Moscow, Russia, tel: 0074956-814904), which was originally built in 1904 by local Muslims and remained open even during Soviet times. There are no restrictions in Russia, including Moscow and St Peters- burg, on the adhan being called outside the mosque, although it is usually conducted discreetly.

5 Children’s Education

The 1997 law on religious freedom establishes the secular nature of public school education in Russia. However, in November 2002, the Ministry of Education announced that a course in ‘Fundamen- tals of Orthodox Culture’ (FOC) would be taught in public schools. Optional classes in Orthodox culture began appearing across the country in the late 1990s, but from 1 September 2006, FOC became part of the required curriculum in all schools in Belgorod Oblast, and in some schools in Bryansk, Kaluga and Smolensk Oblasts. All students, including Muslims, Jews, Protestants and Buddhists have to study this subject for two hours a week for 11 years. Representatives of other religions—Muslims, Protestants, Old Believers and others—have protested against FOC being compulsory, and the Muslim republics of Russia rejected it. From September 2007, for instance, in several schools in Tatarstan, pupils study ‘history of religions’, which outlines the general ideas of Islam, Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism. In July 2009, in order to solve the problem, President Medvedev proclaimed the first national plan to teach the basics of major religions 480 elmira akhmetova and secular ethics in Russian schools. Under this scheme, pupils will be offered the choice of studying Russia’s four federally recognised religions—Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism or Judaism—as well as a course in comparative religion. This scheme will be expanded to all schools in the country by 2012. Russia’s Muslim children can learn about Islam in maktabs (mektebe in Russian) or Sunday schools and private Islamic schools, which are expected to follow the state school curriculum. The first such school, the Islamic Usmaniyya school, was opened in Kazan in 1995 (38, Musa Bigiev st., 420047, Kazan, tel: 0078435-119364). In addition to all the compulsory secular subjects, the pupils also study Arabic, Qur’an recitation, tafsir, basics of fiqh and theology. There are currently around 110 pupils studying at primary and secondary levels. Muslim children who do not have the option of attending an Islamic school may get basic knowledge about Islam at maktabs or Sunday schools in mosques in the cities and some villages. Some madrasas (see section 6 below) also have their own maktabs. For example, the Mahinur madrasa operates a number of maktabs and 15 summer schools, where children, in addition to enjoying themselves, study Arabic, Qur’an, basics of fiqh, and stories of the prophets and rightly guided caliphs. In Tatarstan alone, about 5,600 children participated in Islamic summer school programmes in 2010.

6 Higher and Professional Education

Professional Islamic education in Russia is carried out primarily in madrasas.19 There are currently over 20 licensed madrasas in the Euro- pean part of Russia, excluding the Northern Caucasus region.20 Eight are in Tatarstan, seven are branches of the Russian Islamic University set up by CSBM in various regions, and three are run by the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Bashkortostan. In addition, the Spiritual Boards of Muslims of the European part of Russia, Saratov and Nizhniy Novgorod each have one madrasa.21

19 The term madrasa in the modern Russian context usually refers to a higher Islamic educational institution, equivalent to a higher technical college or specialist high school. 20 The exact number of madrasas in the Northern Caucasus is unknown, but is in the hundreds. 21 Muhetdinov, Damir, “Sovremennoe medrese dlya Sovremennoi Ummy (Mod- ern madrasa for a modern nation)”, in D. Muhetdinov (ed.), Problema Stanovleniya i russia 481

Branches of the Russian Islamic University established by the CSBM in Ufa are: Khadji Tarhan in Astrakhan, Bilyar in Ulyanovsk, Nur in Samara, Husainiya in Orenburg, Nurul-Islam in Oktyabrsk, and Gulistan in the village of Shigirdani in Chuvashiya. The three madrasas established by the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Bashkortostan, the RCM, are as follows: Imeni M. Sultanova madrasa (3, Sotsialisticheskaya str., Ufa, tel: 0073472-723858) and Galiya (3, Mustay Karim str., Ufa, tel: 0073472-721987), and Nur al-Iman in Sterlitamak (73, Bogdan Hmelnitskiy str., 453100, Sterlitamak; tel: 0073473-252223). The Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European part of Russia runs the Moscow Spiritual Islamic College (7, Vipolzov by-street, 129090, Moscow, tel: 0074952-844704), Sheikh Said madrasa in Saratov, and Mahinur in Nizhniy Novgorod (6, Kazanskaya Naberezhnaya str., Nizhniy Novgorod). There are no madrasas for women only in Russia, but theMuham- madiya madrasa in Kazan (35, Gabdulla Tukay st., 420021, Kazan, tel: 007 8432-931706), the Fanis in Yutazi and the Nur al-Iman madrasa in Sterlitamak accept both men and women as full-time students, using separate class rooms, and all madrasas accept women as part-time students. Male madrasa graduates can receive diplomas as ‘imam-khatib’, ‘Islamic sciences teacher’, ‘Arabic language translator’ and ‘teacher of Arabic language and Islamic ethics’. Female graduates can qualify as ‘teacher-advisor’, ‘teacher and translator of Arabic language’ and ‘teacher of Arabic language and Islamic ethics’. Study programmes last from two to five years and these diplomas are recognised by the state. The majority of madrasa graduates enrol at Islamic universities in Russia to obtain higher religious education. Higher Islamic education in Russia is provided by Islamic universities and institutes. According to Damir Mukhetdinov, the well-known religious and intellectual figure among Russia’s Muslims, and rector of an Islamic Institute named after Husain Faizkhanov in Nizh- niy Novgorod, there are sixteen higher Islamic educational institutes and universities operating currently in Northern Caucasus Republics.22

Razvitiya Musulmanskogo Obrazovaniya v Postsovetskom Prostranstve (The Question of the Establishment and Development of Islamic Education in Post-Soviet Space) (Nizhny Novgorod: Knijniy Dom Medina, 2009), p. 11. 22 See, Damir Mukhetdinov, “Sistema Rossiyskogo Islamskogo Obrazovaniya: Puti Razvitiya,” http://www.idmedina.ru/books/islamic/?1982, accessed 20 November 2010. 482 elmira akhmetova

Another four institutions of higher Islamic education are located in central parts of the Russian Federation: Moscow Islamic University (Moskovskiy Islamskiy Universitet, 12, proyezd Kirova, Moscow, tel: 007495-3513067, http://www.miu.su), Russian Islamic University, Kazan (Rossiyskiy Islamskiy Universitet, RIU, 19, Gazovaya str., Kazan, Tatarstan, tel: 0078432-775536, http://www.e-riu.ru), and Russian Islamic University, Ufa (Rossiyskiy Islamskiy Universitet, 5, Cherny- shevskogo str., 450076, Ufa, Bashkortostan; tel: 0073472-519787). The biggest and best established Islamic university in Russia is the RIU. Currently about 400 students (male and female) from 20 regions of Russia are studying at this university. It also has a centre for memori- sation of the Holy Qur’an and its own mosque, called Anilar (Mothers). In addition, the Russian Centre of Islamic Economics and Finance (RCIEF) was launched in 2008 at the RIU in response to the increasing interest in Islamic finance and banking (http://eng.rcief.com). Practically all madrasas and universities have their own buildings and student hostels and there are currently about 3,000 Muslims studying at Islamic tertiary educational institutions. Tuition at all educational institutions is free. In addition, hostel accommodation is free, and full-time students are given three meals a day free of charge. About US$10–12 million a year from the federal budget is spent to support Islamic education.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslim cemeteries exist in all parts of the predominantly Muslim republics and also in Muslim populated villages in other regions, such as Orenburg, Saratov, Yekaterinburg, Penza and Chelyabinsk. Special sections are reserved for Muslims in communal cemeteries in most Russian cities, including Moscow (e.g. Perepechenskoe Cemetery) and St Petersburg (Novovolkovskoe Cemetery, established in 1820). When no special areas are available locally, relatives bury their dead in Mus- lim cemeteries in neighbouring regions. Most of the ethnic Muslims take the observance of burial customs seriously. Russia’s Muslims widely practise the custom of the Qur’an Ashy (literally ‘Banquet of the Qur’an’) on the third, seventh, forti- eth and fifty-first days and the first anniversary after the funeral. On those days, the family of the deceased invite relatives and everyone who took part in the funeral to a meal, and verses from the Qur’an russia 483 are recited by the local imam or, in the case of female gathering, by the most knowledgeable woman (abystai). Prayer (du’a) is said for the dead and his/her family, and gifts of money sadaqa (usually a very small amount) are distributed among the guests and those who took part in the funeral ceremony. Men and women usually gather separately. Recitation of the whole Qur’an and the slaughter of an animal as a sacrifice qurban( ) in the name of the dead person is also widely practised.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There have been officially appointed Muslim chaplains in some parts of the Russian army in the Northern Caucasus since 1 February 2010, and this will expand to other regions in coming years. In some places imams pay occasional visits to the armed forces, and Muslim religious representatives are often invited to new soldiers’ swearing-in ceremonies. Some private hospitals in Moscow, Kazan and cities of the Northern Caucasus have prayer rooms for Muslim patients and staff. There is a Muslim prayer room in the military hospital in Oren- burg regularly attended by a representative from the local Karavan- Saray mosque. There are no officially appointed Muslim chaplains in prisons, although some prisons in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Nizhniy Novgorod, Chelyabinsk, Mordovia, Penza and other regions have mosques and prayer houses with regular imams, usually appointed from among the detainees. In the prisons in Tatarstan alone, there are currently seven mosques and eight prayer houses with libraries and basic Islamic training facilities.

9 Religious Festivals

The Muslim religious festivals‘Id al-Adha (Qurban Bayram) and ‘Id al-Fitr (Uraza Bayram) are public holidays in almost all the predominantly Muslim republics. Muslims living in other regions can usually take a day off work, provided they make up for their absence later. The Russian president officially congratulates Muslim citizens at their religious festivals every year. On festival days and during the month of Ramadan, Muslim communities organise fundraising for local orphanages, prisons, hospitals, old people’s homes and homes for the disabled. In Moscow, the RCM organises the so-called Shater Ramadana 484 elmira akhmetova

(the Ramadan Tent), a cultural charity project, where diplomats from Muslim countries, as well as local Muslim and non-Muslim political leaders, activists, scholars, public figures, the media, representatives of other religions and soldiers, as well as ordinary citizens, are invited to attend cultural programmes and share iftar with Muslim religious leaders. Public cultural events, such as lectures, competitions, sports and performances, are often organised at these times. On festival days, Muslims also often visit cemeteries and pray for deceased family members, and during Qurban Bayram Muslim charities, such as the Solidarity Foundation (Solidarnost, 18, Polbina str., Moscow, tel/fax: 0074953–546601, http://www.solidarnost.su) organise the slaughtering of sacrificed animals and distribute meat to orphans, elderly people, the disabled and others in need. The Muslim New Year, the ‘Blessed Night’ and especially the Proph- et’s birthday (Mawlid Bayram) on 12 Rabi‘ al-Awwal are also widely celebrated. During the Mawlid Bayram (and through the whole month) Muslims gather together for talks and Friday sermons on the life and importance of the Prophet Muhammad, and to read from the Qur’an and perform qasidas (Arabic poems about the Prophet Muhammad, particularly the Burda), prayers and munajats (nashids). Charitable donations, gifts and sweets are distributed and congratulations are exchanged with relatives and neighbours.

10 Halal Food

Halal restaurants and shops are widespread in predominantly Muslim Republics. In Kazan alone, meat with a halal logo is sold by a number of supermarket chains such as Bahetle, Metro, Edel’veis, Perekrestok, Real and Patterson. Also, almost every mosque has its own shop, where visitors can buy halal food, Islamic garments and literature. Halal meals are provided in 12 Tatar schools and 16 kindergartens in Kazan and in all schools and kindergartens in Nizhnikamsk, another large city in Tatarstan. In cities with a minority Muslim population, halal food, mostly meat and processed meat products, is usually available at local mosques. Imported halal goods may be found in major supermarkets. In Moscow, there is a halal supermarket called “Apelsin” (apt. 1, house 3, Gospitalniy val, M. Semenovskaya, Moscow). The largest Russian retail company, X5 Retail Group, recently signed an agreement with the halal meat manufacturer Safa of the Moscow region russia 485

(http://www.safahalal.ru) to supplying halal meat products to major Russian supermarket chains such as Karusel’, Pyaterochka and Pat- terson in Moscow, Voronedz, St Petersburg, Kazan, Ufa, Novosibirsk and other cities. A number of confectionary and bakery companies in Tatarstan produce halal cakes, sweets, chocolate products and pastries and, in 2009, the Mustella Talir Group in Kazan began producing cosmetics with a halal logo.23 On 19 November 2010, Halal Industrial Park “Baltach” was launched in Baltach district of Tatarstan. This first halal business park in Russia currently produces processed meat products and plans to house 20–30 small halal manufacturers in future. Halal certification is carried out by Muslim religious authorities, who issue halal certificates to food manufacturers and suppliers. Halal standards have been recognised by the governments of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Most regional Muslim religious boards have established halal committees for the development and promotion of halal standards. They issue the halal logo, control its usage, and notify the authorities of the illegal use of the halal sign on manufactured products. According to Mr Azizbaev, head of the halal standards department of the RMC, as of March 2009 there were 17 major halal meat manufacturers in Russia. The First International Halal Exhibition in Moscow—Moscow Halal Expo—was organised by the RCM in partnership with Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation MATRADE and Interna- tional Exhibition Centre “Crocus Expo” in 7–9 June 2010 in the largest exhibition centre of Russia “Crocus Expo.” Sixty companies from different countries such as Russia, Belarus, Germany, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Palestine, Malaysia and Indonesia took part in the exhibition displaying food and beverages, cosmetic products, medicine and clothes. Seminar on Islamic finance, banking and insurance as well as Islamic business meetings were held during the exhibition. The programme also included the Day of Islamic culture, in which visitors observed new styles in Muslim fashion-industry and listened to Muslim religious songs—nasheeds.24

23 http://www.talir.ru/catalog.php?parent=1, accessed 5 May 2010. 24 On program and exhibitors list, see http://www.muslimeco.ru/eng/doc/halalexpo, accessed 20 November 2010. 486 elmira akhmetova

There is no Islamic bank in Russia, but Islamic banking, finance and insurance have become a popular topic among Russia’s Muslims within last few years as alternative financial solutions, especially after the last global economic and financial crisis. International and domestic conferences and seminars were organised in different cities of the country discussing the principles of Islamic economic system, and prospects of founding Islamic banks in Russia. The most noteworthy among them is KAZANSUMMIT—International Islamic and Finance Summit, which takes place annually in the month of June starting from 2009 in Kazan (http://kazansummit.com). The last Summit in 2010 hosted about 500 participants from 25 countries. The participants were inves- tors, financial officers, bankers, Sharia experts, lawyers and politicians. The 1st International Trade Fair of Halal goods KAZANHALAL 2010 was opened two days before KAZANSUMMIT 2010. More than 40 halal producers from different regions of Russia demonstrated various types of products and more than 10,000 visitors of different faiths had attended KAZANHALAL 2010. The next International Islamic and Finance Summit is scheduled for June 2011.

11 Dress Codes

There are no restrictions on the wearing of Muslim dress in public. Muslim women wearing head scarves are no longer an unusual sight. In 2002, Muslim women won a court case that allowed them to be photographed with the head scarf for identification documents. There are also some cases of Muslim women wearing the niqab, particularly in the republic of Dagestan. However, wearing black, particularly black hijab, is taboo among Muslim Tatar women, as black is traditionally the colour of mourning.

12 Publication and Media

Within a short period of the collapse of the USSR, Russia witnessed a boom in the field of Islamic literature and periodicals, as well as a proliferation of Islamic books and audio and video materials produced in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Great Britain. Within two decades, a number of publishing houses, such as Iman in Kazan (27, Qayum Nasiyri str., Kazan, tel/fax: 0078432–934292) and Ummah in Moscow (http://ummah.ru) have become Russia’s leading specialist russia 487

Islamic publishing houses and Islamic books are appearing in increasing numbers and improved quality. Annual Islamic book fairs have become customary. Among other influential Muslim publishers is the Medina Publish- ing House in Nizhniy Novgorod (http://www.idmedina.ru), which produces four academic journals and a newspaper; it also aims to produce a 12-volume encyclopaedia, Islam v Rossiyskoi Federatsii (Islam in the Russian Federation) by the year 2012. By 2010, six volumes had appeared (in Russian): Islam in Nizhegorodchina, Islam in Saint Peters- burg, Islam in Moscow, Islam in Central Russia, Islam in the Volga Region, and Islam in the Urals. In addition, it has produced important books on fiqh and also organises international and local symposiums, conferences and seminars. In Tatarstan alone there are about 25 Muslim publishing houses producing newspapers and magazines amounting to 66,000 copies per year in both the Russian and Tatar languages. The major ones are: Islam info, Iman, Vera and Umma. The Spiritual Board of Tatarstan issues the Islam Nury (Light of Islam) newspaper and a magazine called Deen ve adap (Religion and Morality). In 2003, the Muslim Journalists’ Union was set up under the auspices of the RCM and with the support of the Russian Journalists Union (http://muslim-press.ru). There are no Islamic radio or TV stations in Russia that broadcast on air but in 1997 the RCM, together with private individuals, established the TV Company Islamskiy Mir (Islamic World, http://www. islamtv.ru), which in 2007 launched the first Islamic internet channel in Russian, Islam TV. The channel currently broadcasts daily for 14 hours online. Its programmes include Islamic lectures, documen- taries, news, children’s programme, sermons, etc. Islamskiy Mir also produces audio, video and printed Islamic materials. In August 2009, during his meeting with political and religious leaders of the Caucasus region, President Medvedev stressed the necessity of creating an Islamic satellite channel under Russian state television, but this has not yet come to fruition. Since 2002, Russian state television has been broadcasting a weekly programme called Musul’mane (Muslims) which is devoted to the traditions, customs and culture of Russia’s Muslims, and state radio stations have similar programmes. Muslim leaders often take part in television and radio debates on religious and social issues. The most popular Islamic websites are http://www.islam.ru, http:// islamnews.ru, http://umma.ru and http://islamrf.ru. 488 elmira akhmetova

13 Family Law

Russian law does not recognise Muslim marriage contracts conducted in mosques or marriage or divorce certificates issued by local imams. Russia’s Muslim couples usually first perform nikah rituals, and then, on the same day or later, have a civil marriage ceremony at state offices, which is the only form of marriage recognised by Russian law. Both ceremonies are widely celebrated by the Muslim community. Regarding inheritance, the division of property depends on the wishes of the parties involved and they may, on the basis of a will, choose to follow either Islamic law or the secular state law.

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious relations in the Russian context mean interactions between the followers of the minority creeds such as Islam, Judaism, Buddhism and the dominant Russian Orthodox Christianity, with its centre, the Moscow Patriarchate. All these religions have coexisted in the territory of the Russian Federation over a thousand years. Over time there have been periods of peaceful relations, competition and even ruthless confrontations, especially between the victorious Ortho- dox Christians and their Muslim subjects. This deep-seated historical antagonism as well as recent developments such as war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the emergence of anti-Russian moods in the Muslim- majority republics of Central Asia and Caucasus, the two Chechen wars of 1994–1996 and 1999–2000, and, the most importantly, the events of 11 September 2001 have played an important role in creating the stereotype image of Islam as an aggressive, militant religion, associated with separatism, terrorism and drug-trafficking. This stereotype was adopted by the great part of Orthodox believers and the Russian Orthodox Church authorities.25 Another problem of the relations between Muslims and Orthodox Christians is related to a recently evolved wave of competition for “human souls” between their official institutions. In the last few years, the most active priests have begun to propagate Christianity among

25 See, Alexander Sotnichenko, “Islam-Russian Orthodox Church Relations and the State in the Post-Communist Russia,” http://www.politicsandreligionjournal.com/ images/pdf_files/srpski/godina3_broj2/Analiza%203.pdf, assessed 22 November 2010. russia 489 traditionally Muslim peoples of Russia.26 Muslim leaders, on their part, have started to involve new converts to Islam from Christianity in the management structures of official Muslim organisations. As a result, mutual mistrust and the opposition between Islam and Christianity have been significantly increased. It should be also noted that this hostile attitude is not shared by all leaders of the Moscow Patriarchate and Muslim officials. In recent years, the movement for peace, dialogue and co-operation between Muslims and Christians has become quite popular in Russian educated circles. On 23 December 1998, the Inter- religious Council of Russia (Mezhreligiozniy Sovet Rossii) was founded at the initiative of the country’s religious leaders. This council unites all the country’s traditional religious associations and has undertaken an important role in coordinating social projects with religious organisations. A contribution to interreligious dialogue is being made by multilateral and bilateral meetings and conferences. For instance, on 3–5 July 2006 the World Summit of Religious Leaders was held in Moscow on the margins of the G8 Summit and discussed the most pressing problems of the international community. More than 200 religious leaders from 40 countries took part. On 13–16 September 2007, the International Conference “Intercul- tural and Interreligious Dialogue for Sustainable Development” was held at the Russian Academy for Public Administration in Moscow under the President of the Russian Federation, with the support of UNESCO, with the aim of developing a dialogue between representatives of different confessions and cultures. The issues of inter-religious dialogue were discussed with the active participation of representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate, the RCM, the Consultative Council of Protestant Churches of Russia, the Congress of Jewish Communities of Russia, the Federation of Jewish Organisations of Russia, the Bud- dhist Sangha of Russia and others.27

26 For instance, one of the most aggressive missionary priests Daniil Sisoev turned up at the Tatar national festival Sabantuy to convert visitors to Christianity. This resulted in a scandal which was covered by the media from many positions, and relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and Islamic organisations became more difficult than before; see http://www.politicsandreligionjournal.com/images/pdf_files/ srpski/godina3_broj2/Analiza%203.pdf, assessed 22 November 2010. 27 Egorov, V.K. (ed.), Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue for Sustainable Development: Proceedings of the International Conference, Moscow, 13–16 September 2007 (Moscow: Publishing House of the RAPA, 2008). 490 elmira akhmetova

Russia’s Muslims and their umbrella organisations are engaged in various local and international interfaith activities. The RCM is one of the founders of the Interreligious Council of Russia and has also initiated a number of international conferences on interreligious dialogue, including “The Civilisational Aspects of the Unity of Today’s Islamic Community” (November 2003), “Islam and Christianity: On the Road of Dialogue” (November 2005), “Islam and Judaism: The Prospects of Dialogue and Cooperation” (June 2006), and the public forum “The New Bridges of Inter-civilisational Interaction” (May 2007). In fact, organising round tables, seminars, conferences and public lectures on interreligious dialogue, greeting followers of other faiths at their religious festivals and inviting them to iftars and other Islamic festivals has become a tradition in modern Russia. Joint sports, cultural and religious events between followers of different faiths also occasionally take place.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

As in many other countries, the September 11 attacks were the catalyst for Russia’s decision to focus on ‘Islamic extremism’. Earlier attacks within Russian territory, such as the September 1999 apartment bombings in Moscow, were in most cases seen as an overspill from the localised conflict in Chechnya and the product of separatism rather than any religious ideology. A new phenomenon of Islamophobia has emerged very rapidly in Russia. Along with the beginning of the US- led ‘war on terrorism’, the Russian Federation adopted a new law “On Fighting Extremist Activity” in June 2002. The Beslan school seige in September 2004 was a turning point in the emergence of the politics of hatred towards all things Islamic in Russia.28 The Russian media and cinema industry also adopted a hostile stance towards Islam and Mus- lims and played a vital role in creating a negative image.29 As a result, several negative developments took place, such as cases of public and official objections by the Orthodox Church, regional administration

28 Hunter, Islam in Russia, p. 6; Dow, Leah, “Religious discrimination in Russia important issue: Muslims, Jews, non-Orthodox Christian groups targeted”, http:// www.america.gov/st/democracyhr-english/2008/September/20080919173838clwod9.5 07388e-02.html, accessed 22 November 2010. 29 For instance, in most of the recent Russian movies good guys fight against bad guys with expressed Muslim identity. russia 491 and non-Muslim populations to the construction of new mosques and the refusal to give jobs to head scarved women and bearded men. There is no single mosque in the city of Voronezh, which is the house to about 30,000–40,000 Muslim residents. The appeal of the local Muslim organisation to obtain land for a mosque was rejected by the regional administration. Muslims of Kolomna, a city in the central European part of Russia, continue appealing repeatedly to the city administration to get a land for mosque for 13 years without any results. The harshest public objection to the construction of new mosque occurred in Tekstilchiki, the South-eastern District of Moscow, in September 2010. Local residents justify their complaint citing potential increase in traffic and amount of Muslim population as well as loss of green space in the case of building a mosque in the area. These negative developments have had an overwhelming impact on the security, rights and well-being of Russia’s Muslims. In fact, the most integrated traditional Russia’s Muslims such as Tatars and Bashqorts, whose religious adherence is not noticeable, do not face serious adverse public opinion on the part of the non-Muslims. Muslims of the North Cau- casus region and Central Asian immigrants, however, are unwelcome in Russian cities. This intolerant nature of ethnic Russian population toward Muslims is evident in the opinion polls conducted by Russian Public Opinion Research Centre in May 2010. 29% of respondents acknowledged their antipathy towards Caucasian nations due to fear of terrorism.30 Moreover, in recent years ethnic Russian nationalism has increased. The reported skinhead attacks have been mainly directed against immigrants from Central Asia and are largely confined to a few cities within the Russian Federation such as Moscow, St Petersburg and Nizhniy Novgorod. Leaders of Muslim organisations and scholars are involved in public debate on various social issues, such as the issue of immigrant workers, crime, religious and racial tolerance. As the majority of Russians fear ‘Islamic terrorists’ or ‘Islamic fundamentalists’, Muslim officials and activists publicly express their rejection of all forms of terrorism and call on the media and their compatriots not to link the phenomenon of terrorism with Islam. Pub- lic statements in this vein were made after the double suicide bomb- ing of the Moscow subway on 29 March 2010. On 5 April 2010, the

30 http://wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-vypusk/single/13515.html, accessed 25 May 2010. 492 elmira akhmetova

RCM organised a roundtable on the topic “Islam: Tolerance, Peace and Refusing Violence”, which ended with the issuing of a joint declaration. Diplomats from Muslim countries and Russian officials, as well as local Muslim activists, were invited to the event.

16 Major Cultural Events

The diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds of Russia’s Muslim population give rise to numerous cultural events throughout the year. They range across sporting, arts and religious events, and attract local as well as international participants. The major arts event is the Kazan Interna- tional Festival of the Muslim Cinema (the previous name before 2010 was Altyn Minbar—The Golden Minbar), which takes place annually in the capital city of Tatarstan. This event is mainly sponsored by the government of Tatarstan, and has become internationally recognised. Another annual event, which brings together diverse Russian Mus- lim communities, is the celebration of the acceptance of Islam by the Volga Bulghar Kingdom, organised by the CSBM in June since the 1990s. Several thousand Muslims from all parts of Russia31 gather at the ruins of the ancient city of Bulghar (present-day Spasskiy district, Tatarstan) to perform prayers and make special supplications for their forefathers. In June, the Russian Islamic Book Fair, where major Muslim publishers exhibit their new issues, takes place in Kazan. Qur’an recitation competitions for men, women and children are organised by Muslim communities every year in various parts of Russia. The main event is the Moscow International Qur’an Reciting Competition, which attracts representatives of Muslim countries and Muslim communities in non-Muslim countries. 25 participants from Arab countries, Malay- sia, Finland, South Africa, USA, Central Asia and Russia participated in 2010 competition. In October 2010 a week of Islamic fashion show took place in Kazan. The programme included international contest of designers of Islamic clothes and the round table related to problems in creating Muslim garments. About 60 designers from Russia, Turkey, Indonesia, Iran and Iraq participated in this international contest.

31 According to unofficial sources, about 20,000 in 2009: http://bulgar-portal. ru/1120let, accessed 30 March 2010. SERBIA

Srđan Barišić1

1 Muslim Populations

Muslims are one of the traditional religious communities that have been present in Serbia for centuries. Serbian Muslims are almost all Sunnis following the Hanafi School of Islamic law. Islam started to spread in the territories of Serbia with the Ottoman conquest of the late fourteenth century and parts of Serbia remained under the Otto- mans for three to five centuries. After the incorporation of the medieval Serbian state into the Ottoman Empire, Islam over time became the majority religion in some regions mainly due to the voluntary conversion of the local population, as well as to migration. The Ottomans withdrew from the territories of today’s Serbia slowly over centuries, starting with the Treaty of Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci) in 1699. The withdrawal process was completed after the Balkan wars in 1912–13, when Serbia doubled its territory by taking over the Ottoman regions of Sandžak, Kosovo and Macedonia. At that time there were about 500,000 Muslims in Serbia. In the territories left by the Ottomans prior to 1912, Muslims were in various ways very quickly reduced to insignificant numbers. Soon after the first phase of Ottoman withdrawal in 1834, only 12,000 Muslims remained in the then Serbia (much smaller than today’s Serbia), and by 1866 there were only 5,000 Mus- lims, mostly Roma. Many of the expelled Serbian Muslims settled in Bosnia and Sandžak, which were then still under the Ottomans. Some migrated all the way to Anatolia, where there is today a significant Bosniak community. The migrations continued after World War I but on a smaller scale, so that most Muslims in the territories acquired by Serbia after 1912 and 1913 stayed where they were.2

1 Srđan Barišić is a postgraduate (MA) student at Sociology Department, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade. 2 Zirojević, Olga, Srbija pod turskom vlašću 1459–1804 (Serbia under Turkish Rule 1459–1804) (Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2007); Bandžović, Safet, Iseljavanje musliman- skog stanovništva iz Srbije i Crne Gore tokom XIX stoljeća (Migration of the Muslim Population from Serbia and Montenegro during the Nineteenth Century) (Sarajevo: 494 srđan barišić

According to the latest census of 2002, there are 239,658 declared Muslims among total Serbian population of 7,498,001 citizens. As 3.2% of the population, they constitute the third largest religious group in Serbia after Orthodox (6,371,584) and Catholics (410,976).3 As a result of historical developments, the Muslim population today is concentrated mostly in south-western Serbia, known as Sandžak4 (where, according to the 2002 census there are 142,685 Muslims, or 60.57% of the local population in the municipalities of Novi Pazar, Tutin Sjenica, Prijepolje, Priboj and Nova Varoš), and in southern Serbia, known as Preševo Valley (municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa, where there are 58,903, or 66.2% of the local population). In addition to these two regions, a significant Muslim community is present in Belgrade (20,366, or 1.3% of the local population). Sandžak is home to 59.5% and Preševo Valley to 24.6% of Serbia’s Muslims. They are majority in municipalities of Tutin (95.2%), Novi Pazar (78.3%), and Sjenica (75.6%) in Sandžak, and Preševo (87.4%) and Bujanovac (59.1%) in southern Serbia. In the province of Vojvodina, the northern part of Serbia, 8,073 declared Muslims live, which is 0.4% of the local population. Ethnically speaking, Bosniaks make an absolute majority of total Muslim population (mostly concentrated in Sandžak), then come Albanians (mostly concentrated in Preševo Valley), Roma and other ethnic groups. Most of a few thousand Arabs living in Serbia, mostly in Belgrade, are also followers of Islam. Conversions to Islam are rare today but do happen. Some Muslim representatives question the accu- racy of the 2002 census data and refer to much higher number of Mus- lims, up to 700,000. There are no surveys on levels of practice but, generally speaking, the Muslims of Sandžak and Preševo Valley are said to be more religious than those in other parts of the country.

no publ, 1998); Avdić, Hakija, Položaj Muslimana u Sandžaku (The Status of Muslims in Sandžak) (Sarajevo: Biblioteka Ključanin, 1991); Karčić, Fikret, Muslimani Balkana ‘Istočno pitanje’ u XX vijeku (Muslims of the Balkans: The ‘Eastern Question’ in the Twentieth Century) (Tuzla: Behram-begova medresa, 2001). 3 “Book 3: Confession, Mother Tongue and National Identity or Ethnicity Accord- ing to Age and Gender—Data by Municipalities” (2003), Belgrade: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia; See the details at http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/axd//en/popis.htm. 4 The part of Sandžak belongs to Montenegro. serbia 495

2 Islam and the State

The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia states that religious communities are equal and separate from the state. Article 11 of the Con- stitution rules out the possibility of state or mandatory religion in the Republic of Serbia, while Serbia is defined as a secular state in which churches and religious communities are separate from state. The secular character of the state is also stipulated in Article 44, which guarantees that churches and religious communities are “equal and free to organise independently their internal structure, religious matters, to perform religious rites in public, to establish and manage religious schools, social and charitable institutions, in accordance with the law.” The prohibition of discrimination on the ground of religion and the incitement to religious hatred are stipulated by Articles 21 and 49, while the freedom of religion is guaranteed by Article 43 of the highest legal act.5 The mentioned provisions of the highest legal act have been confirmed by the Law on Churches and Religious Communities,6 which is adopted on 20 April 2006. Namely, Articles 2 and 6 stipulate that there is no state religion and that churches and religious communities are equal. Article 4 stipulates the “entities of religious freedom”, which include “traditional churches and religious communities, confessional communities and other religious organizations”. The Law distinguishes between seven “traditional churches and religious communities”, including the Islamic community, and all other “entities of religious freedom”, and these seven enjoy the privilege of having inherited their legal status from the days of the Kingdom of Serbia, which the Republic of Serbia automatically recognised. This does not prevent the Serbian government from being an actor in the current dispute within the Muslim community.7 The

5 The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia; see details at http://www.parlament. gov.rs/content/eng/akta/ustav/ustav_1.asp. 6 The Law on Churches and Religious Communities (Official Gazette of the Repub- lic of Serbia, No. 36/2006). 7 The instruction of several policemen (in boots) into central mosque in Sjenica and the physical assault on two imams of the Mashihat of the Islamic Community in Serbia, on October 2007, represented the direct interference of the executive authority with the settlement of the dispute between the conflicting religious organizations. A similar incident took place on March 2008 in Tutin during the preparation of the stage for the ground-breaking celebration for the construction of a madrasa. As many times before, such actions by the bodies of the executive, the Ministry of Internal 496 srđan barišić law particularly mentions the historical role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the development of the national identity of the Serb people. In practice, the Serbian Orthodox Church enjoys a privileged status and plays an important social and political role in the country.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Today, two independent Islamic communities exist in Serbia: the Islamic Community in Serbia, with its headquarters in Novi Pazar (Islamska zajednica u Srbiji, Ul. 1. Maja 70/b, 363000 Novi Pazar, www .islamskazajednica.org), and the Islamic Community of Serbia, with its headquarters in Belgrade (Islamska zajednica Srbije, Ul. Gospodar Jevremova 11, 110000 Beograd, www.rijaset.rs, www.mesihatsandzaka .rs). The Islamic Community in Serbia is an autonomous organisational unit within the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Islamic Community of Serbia is an independent organisation. The disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and international recognition of newly formed countries caused the creation of new organisational forms of Islamic communities adjusted to the new state and administrative borders. The autonomous Islamic Community’s establishment is formalised by the changes of the Con- stitution of the Islamic Community in SFR Yugoslavia, which were accomplished by the Riyasat8 session in Skopje on February 5th 1993. By the time, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro had their own autonomous Islamic communities, and the Islamic Commu- nity of Serbia Mashihat9 settled in Priština was renamed in the Islamic Community of Kosovo.10

Affairs, violated Articles 11 and 44 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, which assert the separation of the churches and religious communities from the state and guarantee the right of religious communities to manage their internal organisation and religious affairs independently. 8 The Riyasat of the Islamic community is the Community’s highest executive religious and administrative organ. The Riyasat is headed by the Rais-ul-ulama. 9 The Mashihat is an autonomous authority, on the basis of which it creates its own internal organisation founded on the needs of the Mashihat, as well as an autonomous status in the making of internal decisions. 10 Meeting of new-formed Mashihats’ representatives, to who joined Sandžak Islamic Community’s representative, in Istanbul, by the end of October 1994 represent the formal end of the Islamic Community in SFR Yugoslavia (Novaković, Dragan (2007): “Process of the Internal Organisational Consolidation of the Islam Religious serbia 497

A separate Islamic Community of Sandžak (Mashihat of the Islamic Community of Sandžak), which covers the part of Sandžak within Serbia,11 was established on 30 October 1993 as an autonomous organisational unit within the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina,12 while the Islamic Community of Serbia was founded in Niš in 1994, as an autonomous Mashihat which covers the territory of Serbia, without Kosovo and Sandžak. For more than ten years, these two Islamic communities operated independent from each other. Since the Law on Churches and Religious Communities of 2006 envisages the registration of only one organisation, with the words ‘in Serbia’ in its name, for each of the seven traditional religious communities, the initiative for uniting all the Muslims in the territory of Serbia in a unique Islamic community, during 2006, was intensified. Both Mashihats were interested in the unification of all Muslims in Serbia into one organisation, but the stumbling block in the negotiations between the two Islamic communities included the relations of this unique Islamic Community with the Riyasat of the Islamic Com- munity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the future seat of the organisation. In spite of numerous meetings among high representatives of Islamic communities from Novi Pazar and Belgrade, agreement on fundamental issues was not achieved. The Sandžak Islamic community’s Mashihat persistently insisted on the tradition of relations with the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas the Serbia Islamic community’s Mashihat persistently insisted on the tradition of Serbian Muslims, a heterogeneous ethnical structure of the Muslims in Serbia and on territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia.

Community in the Socialist Yugoslavia”, in: Đorđević, D.B. et al., Islam at the Balkans in the Past, Today and Future, (Niš: YSSSR, 2007), p. 80. 11 The part of Sandžak that exists within the territory of Montenegro is under jurisdiction of the Islamic community of Montenegro, which is an autonomous and independent Islamic community. 12 After reorganisation initiated with the Constitution decision of the Council in Sarajevo in 1993, the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina consist at present of Islamic communities in Croatia, Slovenia and Sandžak according 1997 Constitution (Article 1 of the Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Mashihat of the Islamic Community in Croatia, Mashihat of the Islamic Community in Slovenia and Mashihat of the Islamic Community of Sandžak (Mashihat of the Islamic Community in Serbia since March 2007), as autonomous organisational units, acknowledge the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina as their mother community, and Rais-ul-ulama as their religious chief. 498 srđan barišić

After a halt in the negotiations about the forming of a unique Islamic community in Serbia, on February 19, 2007, the Council of the Islamic Community of Serbia passed the Constitution of the Islamic Community of Serbia in Belgrade and formed the Riyasat. According to this Constitution, the elections for representative bodies and organs of the Islamic Community of Serbia were scheduled, and the current Belgrade mufti Hamdija Jusufspahić was elected as acting director of the Riyasat pending a full election for Rais-ul-ulama.13 This decision of the Islamic Community of Serbia’s Council was interpreted in Novi Pazar and Sarajevo as a unilateral and illegitimate act. After about more than one month, on 27 March 2007 the Council of Unification of the Islamic Community in Serbia, held in Novi Pazar, enacted the new Constitution of the Islamic Community in Serbia and constituted the Mashihat of the Islamic Community in Serbia, headquartered in Novi Pazar. The current Sandžak mufti Muamer Zukorlić was appointed the Mashihat’s president, and the Rais-ul-ulama from Sarajevo, who also attended the Council, as the community’s supreme head. This decision of the Sandžak’s Islamic community was not recognised by the Islamic Community of Serbia, headquartered in Belgrade. Today, the Islamic Community in Serbia14 is organised into four muftiates (Sandžak, Preševo,15 Belgrade and Novi Sad), which are currently headed by three muftis. Its executive body is the Mashihat of the Islamic Community in Serbia, headed by a Chief Mufti with office in Novi Pazar. The main institutions of the Islamic Community in Serbia are the Faculty of Islamic Studies and “Gazi Isa-beg” madrasa, both located in Novi Pazar. Also there are two female madrasas, one in Novi Pazar and one in Rožaje (Montenegro). There are also the International Humanitarian Organisation (IHO), a media centre, an agency for halal quality certification, a library and two kindergartens. It also has three associations: for women, Islamic scholars (ulama) and youth.

13 Rais-ul-ulama is the supreme mufti of the Islamic community and head of the Riyasat (the Community’s highest executive religious and administrative organ), if the Community is organised on the level of Riyasat. 14 Islamska zajednica u Srbiji (Islamic Community in Serbia): www.islamskazajed nica.org. 15 Muslims in Preševo Valley are connected with the Islamic Community of Kosovo (Bashkësia Islame e Kosovës). serbia 499

The Islamic Community of Serbia16 today consists of three organisational entities: Serbian Mashihat, Sandžak Mashihat and Preševo Mashihat. With headquarters in Belgrade, the executive body of the Islamic Community of Serbia is Riyasat, headed by Rais-ul-ulama. Head Imam Adem Zilkić from Tutin was elected as the first Rais- ul-ulama, and Belgrade mufti of that time Hamdija Jusufspahić was pronounced as lifelong honorary Rais of the Islamic Community of Serbia. Main institutions of the Islamic Community of Serbia are the Belgrade’s madrasa, located in Belgrade, “Bakije Hanume” madrasa in Prijepolje and “Sinan-beg” madrasa in Novi Pazar. In Belgrade there is an agency for halal quality certification. The two communities have been disputing each other’s legality and legitimacy since 2007, occasionally with violent outcomes. The Islamic Community in Serbia would like to stay formally connected to the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Islamic Community of Serbia wants complete independence. During 2010, prospects of possible unification seem less clear after a few years of struggle.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Today, there are some 190 mosques in Serbia: about 120 in Sandžak, 60 in southern Serbia, and one in Belgrade, Niš, Mali Zvornik, and Subotica. On the territory of Serbia, there are a few dozen masjids where Muslims practice their religious life.17 Almost every big town in Serbia has at least one masjid. A number of mosques are under construction, many of which are new in the regions where Muslims are majority, but some old mosques are under reconstruction, as well. In the last few years the initiative to build a new mosque and eventually Islamic centre in Belgrade has been widely discussed in the Serbian media, with fierce opposition from Serbian conservative politicians. In October 2009 when the Turkish President visited Belgrade, the initiative got support both from the Serbian President and him, who promised financial support for building an Islamic centre and mosque in Belgrade once the legal procedure has been completed.

16 Islamska zajednica Srbije (Islamic Community of Serbia): www.rijaset.rs. 17 In addition to only one survived mosque in Belgrade, there are more than ten masjids in the city. 500 srđan barišić

5 Children’s Education

The Law on Churches and Religious Communities guarantees the right to religious education in elementary and secondary public and private schools.18 Confessional religious education was introduced in the Ser- bian public school system as a confessional, segregated, multidenominational and optional subject by a governmental regulation published on 27 July 2001.19 The main lobbyist in favour of confessional religious education was the Serbian Orthodox Church, the majority religious institution that pressed the government to make quick decisions.20 In public schools, Islamic religious education is an ‘optional- compulsory’ subject, which means that pupils may choose the subject but may not later withdraw. It is taught by Muslims trained and licensed by the Islamic community and paid by the state. The subject is offered once a week in all the grades if there are seven or more interested pupils. New misunderstandings between the rival organisational structures of the Islamic community took place at the beginning of the 2008/2009 school year. The issue was the authority to select and allocate teachers of religious studies to primary and secondary schools in the towns of Tutin and Sjenica in Sandžak. Twenty-three deposed teachers of religious studies who had been installed by the Islamic Community in Serbia were prevented from holding classes of Islamic religious studies. The Mashihat of the Islamic Community in Serbia strongly condemned “the violation of religious rights of Muslims through obstruction of classes of religious studies”.21

18 Article 40 of the Law on Churches and Religious Communities. 19 The Regulation on the Organisation and Practicing of Religious Education and the Alternative Subject in Elementary and Secondary Schools (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 46/2001). Under the Regulation, seven “traditional” religious communities are privileged: the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish Community, the Islamic Community, the Slovak Evangelical Church, the Christian Reform Church and the Evangelical Christian Church. 20 Kuburić, Zorica and Vukomanović, Milan “Religious education: The case of Ser- bia”, in Kuburic, Zorica and Moe, Christian (ed.), Religion and Pluralism in Edu- cation: Comparative Approaches in the Western Balkans, (Novi Sad: CEIR, 2006), pp. 107–138. 21 The delegation of the Islamic Community in Serbia deemed it unacceptable that a representative of the rival organisation take part in the work of the Committee, and the invitation of precisely these representatives was understood as an act of provoca- tion by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. On this occasion, Chief Mufti of the Islamic Community in Serbia sent a letter to the President of the Republic, warning him “of serbia 501

The beginning of the next school year once again raised the issue of the right to provide religious education in elementary schools in the same towns. The appointment of new religion teachers, who are the followers of the Islamic Community of Serbia, sparked protests by the representatives of the Islamic Community in Serbia, who argued that newly appointed religion teachers were not qualified. The Islamic Community in Serbia also criticised the current provisions, stipulat- ing that the Ministry of Education should appoint religion teachers, as implying government interference with religious practices. The representative of the Mashihat of the Islamic Community in Serbia left the session of the Serbian Government’s Commission for Religious Education in Elementary and Secondary Schools, refusing to participate in the work of the Commission, because the representative of the Islamic Community of Serbia was also present. Due to the impossibility of solving the dispute triggered by the existence of two lists for the election of religion teachers, the members of the Com- mission appealed against “turning religious education into an area of confrontation to the detriment of the legal right of parents to see their children educated in their religion” (see also sect. 14).22

6 Higher and Professional Education

The Islamic Community in Serbia is the founder of the “Gazi Isa-beg” madrasa23 and the Faculty of Islamic Studies.24 The “Gazi Isa-beg” madrasa is an Islamic high school whose male section was established in 1990 while the section for girls was established in 1996. Another girls section in Rožaje (Montenegro) was opened in 2001. The Faculty was established in 2001 as a two-year Islamic Educational Academy.25 legal violence of the Ministry of Education”, which did not react when teachers of religious studies from the Islamic Community in Serbia were removed from their positions in Tutin and Sjenica schools. 22 Session of the Commission for Religious Education, Ministry of Religions of the Republic of Serbia, 25 September 2009: http://www.mv.gov.rs/cir/index. php?option=com_content&task=view&id=252&Itemid=68. 23 Medresa “Gazi Isa-beg” u Novom Pazaru (“Gazi Isa-beg” madrasa in Novi Pazar): www.medresa.net or www.medresa.edu.rs. 24 Fakultet za islamske studije u Novom Pazaru (Faculty for Islamic studies in Novi Pazar): www.fis.edu.rs. 25 In May 2001 Islamic community of Sandzak council brought a decision about establishing the “Islamic pedagogic academy” in Novi Pazar, as a college. The two year academy outgrown in three year academy named “Islamic academy”. According 502 srđan barišić

Today, it provides a four-year training for imams and Islamic religious education training for school teachers. Programmes are offered at undergraduate, MA and PhD levels. The language of instruction is Bosnian. Many members of the teaching staff are visiting lecturers from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. In addition to these two institutions, the Islamic Community in Ser- bia runs the International University of Novi Pazar,26 which is formally registered as a waqf. It is a secular university with several faculties and branches in four other towns in Serbia, which are attended by both Muslim and non-Muslim students. The Islamic Community of Serbia is the founder of the Belgrade madrasa,27 the “Bakije Hanume” madrasa28 for girls in Prijepolje and “Sinan-beg” madrasa for boys in Novi Pazar.29 There are few tens of students in Prijepolje and Novi Pazar. Many future imams attend higher education schools in Sarajevo (The Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo, the oldest and the most prestigious institution of the Islamic higher education in the Balkans), Skopje (the Islamic Faculty in the village of Kondovo, near Skopje), or in Muslim countries, especially in Egypt (Al-Azhar University in Cairo).

7 Burial and Cemeteries

As the status, history, problems, and ethnic and social composition of the Muslim community differ from one region to another, so does the situation with cemeteries. In Sandžak, Preševo Valley and some other parts of the country, Muslims have no difficulty in carrying out burial according to Islamic tradition. In a number of towns, where

to Mashihat’s decision, in May 2006. it has been renamed into “Faculty for Islamic studies”. 26 Internacionalni univerzitet u Novom Pazaru (International University of Novi Pazar): www.uninp.edu.rs. 27 On 18 March 2004, when was burnt the Bajrakli mosque in Belgrade, the Bel- grade’s madrasa was also burnt, and from that time, realisation of the education process in these institutions is very difficult. 28 “Bakije Hanume” medresa u Prijepolju (“Bakije Hanume” madrasa in Prijepolje): www.medresaprijepolje.com. “Bakije Hanume” madrasa was opened in 2009. 29 “Sinan-beg” madrasa was an extended section of the Belgrade’s madrasa in Novi Pazar, but from 2009 it’s separate madrasa. serbia 503 local Islamic community exists, there are Muslim cemeteries, often as parts of public cemeteries. In some towns where there are no Mus- lim cemeteries, Muslims choose to be buried in the nearest city where there is one. After many years of complaining about the need for a Muslim cemetery, today a cemetery for Muslims exists in Belgrade and the Islamic Community of Serbia has a deal with the local authority that every next alteration of cemeteries will include part for Muslims.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no chaplains in state institutions in Serbia. There have recently been statements suggesting that this may be introduced and legally regulated.

9 Religious Festivals

The two ‘Ids/Bayrams are the two main Muslim festivals in the country. On the occasion of both holidays the chief mufti holds an official reception. The manner in which the bayrams are celebrated varies significantly between Muslim majority and Muslim minority areas. In addition, Muslims in Serbia celebrate the Islamic New Year, the Birth- day of the Prophet Muhammad, and the five sacred nights.

10 Halal Food

Halal slaughter is permitted. Both Islamic communities have their own Halal Quality Certification Agency which operates on a commercial basis. Halal products can be found in some supermarkets. In addition, Muslims often slaughter animals privately following the halal practice.

11 Dress Codes

There are no legal restrictions on wearing hijab, but few women would do so outside the Muslim majority regions of Sandžak and Preševo Valley. Hijab is now allowed in photographs for personal documents. 504 srđan barišić

12 Publication and Media

The Mashihat of the Islamic Community in Serbia publishesGlas Islama (Voice of Islam), a monthly newspaper for religious, social and cultural issues,30 and El-Kalimeh publishing house31 is very active. The Riyasat of the Islamic Community of Serbia publishes Vakat, monthly newspaper for religious, science and cultural issues.32

13 Family Law

Only marriages conducted by a public registrar are legally valid. The Islamic community encourages ‘Shari’a weddings’ administered by an imam. Such weddings have no legal standing and are usually performed after the civil ceremony. Divorce is usually formalised only by the civil authorities. This is also true of inheritance: families may agree privately to divide an inheritance according to the norms of Islamic law but they must still go to the civil authorities to have it authorised. There have been cases of polygamy, including some involving officials of the Islamic Community in Serbia. No formal ‘Shari’a divorce’ procedure has been adopted.

14 Interreligious Relations

On 17 June 2010 the Interreligious Council of Ministry for religion33 was established, and its members are the Minister for Religions, the Orthodox Bishop of Bačka, Belgrade’s Archbishop of the Catholic Church, Rais-ul-ulama of the Islamic Community of Serbia, and Rabbi of the Jewish Community in Serbia. This institution was established as a permanent interreligious council to bring representatives of traditional churches and religious communities together. Representatives of the Islamic Community in Serbia were not included in creation of this Council.

30 Glas islama (Voice of Islam): www.glas-islama.com. 31 Izdavačka kuća El-Kalimeh (Publishing house El-Kalimeh): www.kelimeh.com. 32 Vakat (Vakat): www.vakat.rs. 33 Interreligious Council, Ministry of Religions of the Republic of Serbia, 17 June 2010: http://www.mv.gov.rs/cir/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=279 &Itemid=58. serbia 505

Although establishment of the Council was initiated by the Min- istry of Religion, representatives of the Islamic Community in Serbia have never been participants in the Council, due to the conflict that has been ongoing over the many years between the representatives of the religious community in question and the Ministry of Religion. On the other hand, the conflicting Islamic communities are willing to participate in the state agencies, but each of them on condition that representatives of the opposing community are excluded from those agencies. The Religious Education Commission (see sect. 5) is the main forum in which the religious communities regularly meet. But Muslim participation has suffered from the rivalry between the two opposed structures (see sect. 3). On 29 July 2010, the Government of the Republic of Serbia announced its decision to replace Professor Melvud Dedić from the Islamic Community in Serbia with the Rais-ul-ulama of the Islamic Community of Serbia, Adem Zilkić, as a new member to the Religious Education Commission. Referring to the Decree on the Organisation and Realisation of Religious Education in Elementary and Secondary Schools, which specifies the composition of the Commission,34 the Ministry of Religion tried to explain why the Islamic Community in Serbia had no representative in the new Commission, although they it had them in the past. Namely, pursuant to the 2004 decision concerning the composition of the Commission an exception was made and the then Mufti of the Islamic Community of Serbia, Hamdija Jusufspasić, and then Director of the “Gazi Isa-beg” madrasa, Melvud Dudić, from the then Islamic Community of Sandžk, were elected as members of the Commission. Like the Ministry of Religion, the Government’s Religious Educa- tion Commission dismissed the opinion of the Islamic Community in Serbia that the new Commission reflected a discriminatory attitude towards Muslims. In its statement, the Commission explains that there is no need to appoint two representatives of the Islamic Community, especially because the representative of the Islamic Community in

34 In accordance with Article 14 of the Decree on the Organisation and Realisa- tion of Religious Education and an Alternative Subject in Elementary and Secondary Schools (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 46/2001), the Commission is comprised of one representative each from traditional churches and religious communities and three representatives each from the Ministry of Education (and Sport) and Ministry of Religion. 506 srđan barišić

Serbia since 2008 “used to leave, boycott and obstruct the work of the Religious Education Commission” and conditioned his presence at its sessions on the removal of the representative of the other option of the Islamic Community. It is also stated that “since the Islamic Com- munity of Serbia has informed the Ministry of Religion in writing that it will designate a new representative to the Religious Education Com- mission and that the Islamic Community in Serbia has demonstrated by its moves that it has left the Commission, the Serbian Government has recognised the actual situation by forming the new Religious Education Commission and has appointed the person proposed by the Islamic Community of Serbia as the representative of the Islamic Community”.35 The then Rector of the International University in Novi Pazar, Mevlud Dudić, as a member of the Commission since its formation, denied that he left the Commission of his own accord. He stated to one Belgrade newspaper that he was not even officially informed that the Serbian Government had relieved him of membership. According to him, during the past years, the Commission made a great contribution to interfaith cooperation in boosting mutual understanding, but everything went wrong after the appointment of Bogoljub Šijaković as the Minister of Religion. Meetings were rarely held. The Commission did not meet for a year.36 Most of the interreligious events in which the Islamic Community in Serbia has participated, as well as the Islamic Community of Serbia, have been organised by few NGOs, like Belgrade Open School, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung etc.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The dispute between the Islamic Community in Serbia and the Islamic Community of Serbia and related violence and verbal attacks, has dominated public discourse on Islam and Muslims in Serbia during the last four years.

35 “Zašto Zilkić umesto Dudića? (Why Zilkic instead of Dudic?)”, Danas daily newspaper, 27 August 2010. 36 “Ministarstvo tvrdi da Zukorlić odbija saradnju (Ministry claims that Zukorlic refuses to collaborate)”, Danas daily newspaper, 30 August 2010. serbia 507

The arrest of fifteen members of so-called Wahhabi group raised the question as to whether they are a religious sect or terrorist group.37 Some experts on Islam agree that Wahabis are a typical puritan sect and not a terrorist organisation. Through the Wahhabi phenomenon the thesis about the threat of Islamic fundamentalism was revived. The issue of Muslim extremism has been on and off the public agenda. Two groups of so-called Wahhabis have been prosecuted in separate trials before the Special Court in Belgrade for illegal possession of arms and planning terrorist attacks. In June 2010, the Special Department for Organised Crime of the Court of Appeal in Belgrade confirmed the District Court judgment by which the five Wahhabis, accused of criminal conspiracy and preparing terrorist acts, were sentenced to a total of 37.5 years in prison, whilst five others, accused of association for anti-constitutional activity, were sentenced to a total of 13.5 years in prison. More precisely, one of the accused was sentenced to 13 years in prison, another one to six months in prison and the three others were released.38 During 2010, the unsettled dispute between the opposing organisational structures of the Islamic community was further complicated by increasingly aggravated and strained relations between the Islamic Community in Serbia and Belgrade authorities. The Chief Mufti of the Islamic Community in Serbia, Muamer Zukorlic, often appeared in front-page headlines and breaking news due to his public statements, while the situation in Sandžak became dramatic on a few occasions. The previous year was marked by events such as the elections for the Bosniak National Council, numerous misunderstandings between the

37 In mid-March 2007, in the village of Žabren on Mt Ninaja, in the municipality of Sjenica, the police discovered a camp in which the members of the Wahhabi group were trained. One month later, in the village of Donja Trnava, 70 km far from Novi Pazar, during the raid on the group of Wahabis, they clashed with the members of the special police units. As a result, one Wahhabi was killed and one policeman was wounded. Before that, the shooting in front of the Arap mosque in Novi Pazar, on November 2006, was preceded by an incident inside the mosque during the regular afternoon prayer. Namely, a group of Wahhabis interrupted the prayer in an attempt to impose their way of performing religious rites. According to the President of the Majlis of the Islamic Community for Novi Pazar, seventy or so Wahhabis attacked the employed and believers in the mosque in which occasion three persons were injured (Danas, 6 November 2006). Several months earlier, in early June, Wahhabis interrupted a concert by the group of musicians Balkanika in Novi Pazar. 38 Court of Appeal Belgrade: http://www.bg.ap.sud.rs/cr/articles/sluzba-za-odnose- sa-javnoscu/aktuelni-predmeti/organizovani-kriminal/ok-donete-odluke/donete- odluke-organizovani-kriminal-jun.html. 508 srđan barišić

Islamic Community in Serbia and the state concerning the status of waqf property, disputed status of the Islamic Community representatives in the Religious Education Commission, realisation of religious education in Serbian schools and continuing sharp criticism of the Belgrade authorities by the representatives of the Islamic Community in Serbia. The National Bosniaks Council election was another significant issue in 2010. Candidates for the elections for the National Bosniaks Council stood on three tickets: the Bosniak ticket, Bosniak Rebirth and the Bosniak Cultural Community (BKZ).39 The greatest media attention was paid to the Bosniak Cultural Community headed by Sandžak Mufti and Chief Mufti of the Islamic Community in Serbia Muamer Zukorlić. His candidacy was supported by the Council of the Islamic Community in Serbia. On the other side, this candidacy has been condemned as unacceptable meddling by the Islamic Community of Serbia in politics and judged as a poor move, especially by local politicians and representatives of the rival Islamic community. Chief Mufti of the Islamic Community in Serbia Muamer Zukorlić explained his participation in the elections as a wish to help preserve Bosniak identity, that it was his response to “injustice inflicted on Bosniaks” and that he wished to change Belgrade’s attitude towards Bosniaks. The constituent session, held on 7 July 2010, was attended only by the representatives of the Bosniak Cultural Community and two representatives of the Bosniak Rebirth. After the constitution of the national council, the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights did not recognise the national council so formed and announced a new constituent session, or new elections should convening a new session fail. The basic problem with the national council lay in the fact that on the eve of its constitution the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights changed some provisions of the Rules of Procedure. According to the Ministry, they were changed in an attempt to clarify some provisions: due to the specifics of the Bosniak minority it was necessary to add the provision on a qualified majority. As a reason for changing the Rules of Procedure, Minister for Human and Minority Rights also mentioned “his suspicion that the Ministry will succumb to the pressure of the list of the Bosniak Cultural Community and recognise the above-average

39 The largest number of seats was won by the Bosniak Cultural Community with 17, then the Bosniak ticket with 13, while the Bosniak Rebirth won 5. serbia 509 majority as being sufficient for the constitution of the national council. This concern was also based on the fact that specific pressure was exerted on two members of the Bosniak Rebirth to change sides and join the above mentioned list. Due to this suspicion, members of the two lists did not show up at the constituent session.”40 The Deputy Minister for Human and Minority Rights said that the provision on the two-third majority needed for the formation of the representative body was directly derived from the Serbian Constitution.41 The representatives of the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights left the session because the conditions for the constitution of the national council were not provided. Nevertheless, the present members of the election lists continued their work and constituted a new national council. The leaders of the Bosniak Cultural Commu- nity regarded the move of the Ministry’s representatives as another deception of the Belgrade authorities and announced criminal charges against those responsible in the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights.42 Some non-governmental organisations also pointed out that this change in the election rules caused post-election problems. Among other things, the Centre for Development of Civil Society warned that the situation was becoming heated and that the problems were mostly created in Belgrade and not in the field, and that the responsibility should rest with those in power, that is, the Serbian Government and its Ministries.43 The Declaration of the Bosniak National Council, adopted only several days after the formation of the national council, most severely condemned “the legal and political barbarism of the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights” and called for the urgent replacement of Minister and determination of the responsibility of the participants in changing the election will of Bosniaks. The situation was also aggravated in large

40 “Čiplić otvorio vrata zloupotrebama (Ciplic opened a door to misuses)”, Blic daily newspaper, 30 July 2010. 41 “Danas krčka, sutra može da iskipi (It simmers today, tomorrow it may be boiled over)”, NIN weekly newspaper, 22 July 2010. 42 “Bošnjački savet ipak konstituisan (Bosniaks’ Council constituted anyway)”, B92, 7 July 2010. 43 “Povodom pritiska Vlade Srbije na Bošnjačko nacionalno vijeće (With regard to pressure of Government of Serbia to the Bosniaks’ National Council )”, CDCS, 20 August 2010, http://cdcs.org.rs/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=445& Itemid=33. 510 srđan barišić measure by Mufti Muamer Zukorlić himself, who stated that “toying with Sandzak means toying with this part of Serbia. The state is like a building in which the tenants can love each other or not. If the majority of the tenants decide to burn down one of the flats, they risk setting the entire building on fire. This is why one should not play with fire. Either we will all be happy, or the fire will blaze from top to bottom. And our house won’t be the only one on fire.”44 This and other similar statements by Mufti Muamer Zukorlić provoked sharp reactions and were condemned as a violation of the Serbian Constitution and trying to usurp the constitutional rights of Bosniaks.45 The publishing of a photomontage in the daily newspaperBlic in which Chief Mufti Muamer Zukorlić was depicted wearing an Ortho- dox priest’s robe, provoked sharp criticism primarily from the Islamic Community in Serbia and then also from the Islamic Community of Serbia. In the public statement issued by the Islamic Community in Serbia immediately after the appearance of this photomontage, it was announced that the Chief Mufti would press criminal charges for the purpose of determining the responsibility of those in the daily newspaper Blic, in addition to bringing a civil action for damages amounting to “a symbolic sum” of 100 million euros. Following further protests the Blic editor-in-chief and editorial staff apologised to Mufti Zukorlić and all Muslims feeling insulted because of the photomontage, but the Chief Mufti of the Islamic Community in Serbia found this apology to be insufficient.46 Also, the problem of property belonging to the Islamic community has come to the surface after smouldering for some time. The trigger was the construction of a kindergarten on a parcel of land in Novi Pazar which the Islamic Community in Serbia claims to be the property of the waqf. The Council of the Islamic Community in Ser- bia described this as the culmination of violence, discrimination and trampling on the fundamental rights of Muslims, while the Mashihat issued proclamation calling the faithful to a protest to be held on the disputed land. The protest was prevented by the police, who were met

44 “Zukorlić pozvao Tadića i Cvetkovića na razgovore (Zukorlic invited Tadic and Cvetkovic to conversation)”, Glas javnosti daily newspaper, 15 July 2010. 45 “Zapaljive izjave dovele do incidenta (Flammable statements led to incident)”, Politika daily newspaper, 20 August 2010. 46 “Sutra zaseda Sabor Islamske zajednice (Assembly of the Islamic Community will be in session tomorrow)”, Danas daily newspaper, 24 June 2010. serbia 511 by a barrage of stones, roofing tiles and foul language. Because the Islamic Community in Serbia’s officials had not succeeded in having the police allow access to the disputed land, a number of protesters blocked access roads to the town.47 Only five days after his enthronement, the Patriarch provoked justified fierce reactions from both the Islamic Community in Serbia and Islamic Community of Serbia, and a large part of the civic community due to his statement in which he characterised “the philosophy and psychology of Islam”. “When in minority, they [Muslims] behave themselves and behave correctly. When equal in numbers, they raise their heads against the rest. And when in majority, they pressurise others either to move out or to join them. That’s the philosophy of Islam.”48 This is the statement for which the beginning of the mandate of the 45th Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church will be remembered. As could be expected, both the Islamic Community of Serbia and the Islamic Community in Serbia asked for the official interpretation of Patriarch Irinej’s statement and his public apology. While the Riyasat of the Islamic Community of Serbia expressed “its concern over the statement giving the inappropriate and impermissible characteristics of Islam and Muslims”,49 the Mashihat of the Islamic Community in Serbia issued a harsh statement in which the Patriarch’s words were interpreted as a call for genocide: “It is quite clear that this statement contains a call for genocide, since it unambiguously points out that Muslims are acceptable to the Patriarch only when in minority and living with their heads bowed down. Does that mean that it is necessary to take measures like those in Srebrenica when Muslims constitute a majority, like in Sandžak and the Preševo Valley, so that their number becomes acceptable to the Patriarch’s vision of Serbia?”50 The head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Irinej, apologised to the members of the Islamic community because of his “reck- less and arbitrary statement concerning the psychological profile of

47 “Incident u Novom Pazaru (Incident in Novi Pazar )” RTS (Serbian Broadcasting Corporation), 4 September 2010. 48 “Patrijarh Irinej: Krajnje je vreme za susret sa papom (Patriarch Irinej: It is time to meet the Pope)”, Blic daily newspaper, 27 January 2010. 49 “Islamska zajednica: nedopustive ocene (Islamic Community: Unacceptable judgments)”, Blic daily newspaper, 28 January 2010. 50 “Muslimani traže izvinjenje patrijarha Irineja (Muslims ask for an excuse from Patriarch Irinej)”, Press daily newspaper, 29 January 2010. 512 srđan barišić

Muslims, published in the daily newspaper Blic on Saint Sava’s Day”, and expressed his “deepest regret for this statement and its consequences.” Stating that his words “can really be interpreted in the way they were understood by those Muslim believers and religious leaders who felt offended”, the Patriarch pointed out that “he did not have such an intention and that this unfortunate statement does not express his real attitude towards Islam, based on absolute respect for the identity, dignity and integrity of Muslims as individuals, the Islamic Commu- nity as a whole and Islam as a great world religion”, and that his statement was taken out of context, so that the public was not acquainted with what he had said before and after the disputed words.51

16 Major Cultural Events

Most Muslim cultural events take place in Sandžak, which is the centre of both religious and cultural life. The most common of cultural events are concerts of religious songs (ilahije), literary evenings, various exhibitions, and book promotions.

51 “Nisam imao nameru nikog da povredim (I had never had an intention to harm anybody)”, Danas daily newspaper, 29 January 2010; “Patrijarh se izvinio musliman- ima (Patriarch apologized to Muslims)”, Politika daily newspaper, 30 January 2010. SLOVAKIA

Štěpán Macháček1

1 Muslim Populations

The last census in Slovakia in 2001 did not offer the respondents the option of stating they were Muslims because the Islamic community has not yet been registered as a religious community and so Islam has not been recognised by the state as a Slovakian religion. Those respondents who indicated Islam were classified in the official results of the census as belonging to ‘other churches and religious societies’ and those Muslims who did not indicate any religion were classified as of ‘unknown’ religion.2 Figures for the number of Muslims in Slovakia are therefore only estimates. It is generally accepted that they number about 5,000, including foreigners living temporarily in the country. Muslim community sources say there are about 4,000–5,000 Muslims, with only about 10% of them actively practising the faith.3 According to these estimates, Muslims constitute about 0.09% of the population of Slovakia. Despite the fact that some Muslims came to present-day Slovakia as early as the tenth century and today’s southern Slovakia was controlled by the Ottoman Empire for nearly 150 years, there is not (and most likely has never been) an ‘indigenous’ Slovak Muslim population and the overwhelming majority of today’s Slovak Muslims are people of foreign origin. Similarly to the Czech Republic, there are Muslims from mostly Arab countries who came to the former Czechoslovakia

2 Islam and the State

Slovakia has no state religion and the Constitution provides for religious freedom. The prevalent faith is Roman Catholicism, professed by an estimated 70% of the Slovak population. Registration of churches and religious communities is not obligatory. However, religious communities that do not register are not granted the right to public funding, or allowed to build places of worship for public religious services. The last mentioned restriction also applies in prisons and hospitals. The Muslim community has never been registered in Slovakia as a religious community and would probably not be able to meet the strict requirements for registration. The 2007 amendment to the 1991 law on churches and religious communities’ registration requires that communities wishing to register must have a minimum of 20,000 members permanently resident in Slovakia, and information must be provided about members’ personal details and their knowledge of the basic tenets of the faith. These regulations make it impossible for Slovak Muslims to become a recognised religious community in the foreseeable future.

4 In comparision with previous estimates, this recent one doubles the number of Slovak converts (cf. “Moslimovia pod Tatrami (The Muslims Under the Tatra Moun- tains)”, SME, 12 December 2009, http://www.sme.sk/c/5150676/moslimovia-pod- tatrami.html, accessed 15 January 2011. slovakia 515

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic Foundation in Slovakia Islamská( nadácia na Slovensku, PO Box 247 Bratislava 814 99, www.islamweb.sk) is generally regarded as an official institution of the Muslim community. It was established in 1999 by Mohamad Safwan Hasna (who is Syrian by origin). Its activities are limited to organising religious and cultural events and worship, providing information on Islam, giving interviews in the media and helping Muslim asylum seekers with their problems. The foundation publishes a bulletin called Al-Islam and runs a number of Facebook pages and a group. The General Union of Muslim Students in Slovakia Všeobecný( zväz moslimských študentov na Slovensku) was founded in 1993 as a civil association. Its declared aim is to help Muslims living in Slovakia and to provide ‘objective’ information on Islam and its culture. All organisational activities developed from this union. While Mr Hasna later founded the above mentioned Islamic Foundation in Slovakia, another Muslim activist, Abdulwahab Al-Sbenaty, a Slovak-Syrian, established The Association of Friends of Islamic Literature Združenie( priateľov islamskej literatúry, Žabotova ulica č. 2, 811 04, Bratislava), whose goal is to inform the Slovak public about Islamic culture and traditions. Mr Al-Sbenaty was also a founding person of The Institute of the Middle Eastern Studies (Inštitút blízkovýchodných štúdií ), established in 2006. Both latter organisations formally exist but their activities are very limited. For certain period of time, there was also The General Union of Muslims in Slovakia (Všeobecný zväz moslimov na Slovensku), an organisation that merged with the Islamic Foundation in Slovakia and that is no more active. The Muslim Foundation in Slovakia(Nadácia moslimov na Sloven- sku) was registered in 2009. It has its seat at the place of former prayer house in Staré Grunty (64, Karlova Ves, Bratislava). This organisation is very little known and information on its activities is hard to find. According to the available information, it has its preacher Ammar Qari of Saudi origin, as well as another activist of Algerian origin, whose name I failed to find out. This organisation is supposedly supported by Saudi sources and is close to Salafi or Wahhabi movements. Recently, it has moved its prayer house from its above mentioned address to a new one (see below). 516 štěpán macháček

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Bratislava is probably the only European capital without a proper mosque, and Slovakia the only European country without an Islamic shrine. All efforts to establish an Islamic centre in Slovakia, including a mosque, have so far been unsuccessful. In 2009, the Islamic Foundation in Slovakia represented by Mr Hasna succeeded in opening an Islamic cultural centre, called the Cordoba Centre for Intercultural Dialogue (Cordóba centrum pre medzikultúrny dialóg; Obchodná 31, Bratislava) in central Bratislava. The centre has a prayer room and library and its goal is to launch language courses and educational programmes for children, and also to help Muslim immigrants in Slovakia.5 The Cor- doba Centre is regarded as the first step to the planned larger Islamic centre with a mosque, which is not easily accepted by Slovak public. The above mentioned Salafist Muslim Foundation in Slovakia has opened its new prayer room in Bratislava, Podkolibská 1.

5 Children’s Education

Primary and secondary schools in Slovakia provide lessons in religious education, which are organised by officially registered churches and religious communities. Islam is not registered, so no Islamic religious education can be given. For those who do not wish to attend classes in an officially recognised (mostly Catholic) religion, classes in ‘ethics’ are provide, which include some coverage of history of religions. This is the option chosen by Muslim children.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There is no higher Islamic education or imam training institution in Slovakia. At the Faculty of Arts, Comenius University, in Bratislava, Arabic philology can be studied in the Department of Classical and Semitic Philology. Apart from Arabic language and literature, lectures on Islam and Islamic history are also part of the programme.

5 See http://www.islamweb.sk/stranky/spravodajstvo/domov/10.07.09.htm, accessed 15 January 2011. slovakia 517

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The only burial place assigned to Muslims is part of the large municipal cemetery, Slávičie údolie, in Bratislava. Islamic burials have taken place there for several decades. There are about 200 burial places and the Muslim community now faces the problem of the lack of space—a general problem in the capital, which is not specific to the Muslim community. Members of the Islamic Foundation perform burial rituals.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Because Muslims are not registered as a religious community, they cannot perform any of these activities in government institutions and services.

9 Religious Festivals

No data available.

10 Halal Food

Because Muslims are not registered as a religious community, they are not allowed to assist or slaughter in slaughterhouses, or to issue halal certificates. However, Vienna is only about 50 kilometres away and this means that Muslims in Bratislava and elsewhere in Slovakia have easy access to halal food. In Bratislava and a few other Slovak cities, there are fast food stalls serving imported halal meat.

11 Dress Codes

There is no law prohibiting or limiting the wearing of typical Islamic clothing by women, including hijab and niqab. No dress code incident has so far been reported.

12 Publication and Media

The only printed Islamic periodical publication isAl-Islam magazine, published irregularly, (usually several times a year) by the Islamic 518 štěpán macháček

Foundation. It was originally, from 1994, published by the General Union of Muslim Students. The Islamic Foundation has its own website (www.islamweb.sk), three Facebook pages and one Facebook group, which is regarded as an official medium of the Slovak Mus- lim community. The Association of Friends of Islamic Literature and the General Union of Muslims in Slovakia have a joint website (www .islam-sk.sk); the Slovak translation of the Qur’an by Abdulwahab Al Sbenaty is available here, as well as on the website www.koran.sk, managed by Mr Al-Sbenaty.6

13 Family Law

Islamic marriages are not officially recognised by the state because Muslims are not registered as a religious community. Muslims can (and do) perform Islamic marriage ceremonies, but must also have a civil marriage in order for the marriage to be registered. However, some Muslim countries recognise marriages conducted by the Islamic Foundation in Slovakia.

14 Interreligious Relations

Members of the Islamic Foundation in Slovakia regularly take part in interreligious meetings and conferences.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

There is generally very weak Slovak media interest in the local Muslim community. In 2010, no significant event caused any noticeable public debate. A few articles appeared on news web sites on the occasion of the feast of Ramadan bringing some general information on the Muslims in Slovakia and on the significance of Ramadan.7 The tone of the article

6 The first translation of the Qur’an to Slovak language was published in 2001. It was translated from English and in a strange, somehow essayistic style. Another, more precise translation, was published in its full version in 2008 in two volumes, this time done by Abdulwahab Al Sbenaty. An improved edition of this translation, this time supplemented by rich commentary, is to be published soon. 7 See for example, “Na Slovensku je 5tisíc moslimov: Bude v našej krajine mešita?” (There Are 5,000 Muslims in Slovakia. Will There Be a Mosque built in Our Coun- slovakia 519 where Mr Hasna is interviewed is neutral. Members of the Islamic Foundation appeared in print media: SME, Pravda, Hospodárske noviny, Radio station Sro1, and televisions: STV1, Tv JOJ.

16 Major Cultural Events

No data.

try?), Čas.sk, 11 August 2010, http://www.cas.sk/clanok/176603/na-slovensku-je-5- tisic-moslimov-bude-v-nasej-krajine-mesita.html, accessed 15 January 2011.

SLOVENIA

Christian Moe1

1 Muslim Populations

According to the last census, 47,488 Muslims made up 2.4% of Slovenia’s population (2002). Though markedly higher than in the 1991 census, the figure may be low, as the 23% of the population whose religion is not known probably includes some Muslims. Census data on (ethnic) nationality, however, do not suggest that there are many more people of Muslim cultural background. The figure does not include guest-workers. The Islamic Community counts roughly 7,000 families as its members, based on contributions.2 It is in the process of developing a detailed database.3 Over 4,000 people joined this year’s central prayer during Kurban-Bayram; no data are available on everyday participation in religious practice. For centuries, Slovenes encountered Muslims primarily as Otto- man armies, though in World War I Bosnian Muslims fought for the Habsburg Empire on Slovenian soil. Significant numbers of Muslims first arrived from the 1950s onwards as internal migrants from other parts of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to meet the need for low-skilled workers in the growing economy of the most-developed Yugoslav republic. Consequently, nearly all Slovenian Muslims are urban dwellers, concentrated in industrial towns. In the 1990s, after Slovenian independence, they were joined by thousands of refugees from Bosnia. The Islamic Community began to organise itself in the

1 Christian Moe (PhD candidate, History of Religion, University of Oslo) is a free- lance writer and researcher in Slovenia, focusing on Balkan Muslims, human rights and religious reform. He is co-editor of New Directions in Islamic Thought (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009). 2 The Mufti estimated 6,500 families in Delo, 12 September 2010, http://www.delo .si/clanek/121091, accessed 15 November 2010; the brochure “Are you a member of the Islamic Community” puts the number at 7,130 families, of which 4,772 pay regular membership dues. 3 Personal communication from Nevzet Porić, secretary of the Islamic Community, 26 December 2010. The author wishes to thank Mr Porić for updates on various points in this chapter. 522 christian moe early 1960s, and the first local Islamic community council was founded in Ljubljana in 1967.4 Census data on the ethnic makeup of Slovenia’s Muslims are open to interpretation, as some categories are contested, fluid or overlapping. Of those who declared themselves Muslims by confession, some 74% declare themselves Bosniaks, Bosnians, or Muslimani (the Yugoslav- era category of ‘Muslims in the national sense’);5 they originate mainly from northern Bosnia or the Sandžak region. They are followed by Albanians (11%), mainly from Kosovo and Macedonia; Slovenes (6%); people of unknown nationality (ca. 4%); Roma (ca. 2%); and Monte- negrins, Macedonians, and others (ca. 1% each).6

2 Islam and the State

Slovenia is a secular state. The 1991 Constitution provides inter alia for freedom of conscience and for the separation of the state and religious communities. Religious communities (including two Islamic ones) are registered by a state Office for Religious Communities. The Religious Freedom Act (2007) replaced a Communist-era law on religious communities with a more accommodating model providing inter alia for state-funded spiritual care in public institutions. Some provisions of the Act were struck down by the Constitutional Court in April 2010, and the Office for Religious Communities wishes to draft a new law on religious and world-view communities, but the major churches and the Islamic Community (IC) oppose a new law.7 In 2007, the Islamic

4 Pašić, Ahmed, Islam in muslimani v Sloveniji (Islam and Muslims in Slovenia) (Sarajevo: Emanet, 2002), pp. 103–106. 5 On these overlapping identities, see Kalčič, Špela, “Changing contexts and redefi- nitions of identity among Bosniaks in Slovenia”, Balkanologie, vol. 9, no. 1–2 (Decem- ber 2005), pp. 149–171. 6 Komac, Miran (ed.), Priseljenci: Študije o priseljevanju in vključevanju v slovensko družbo (Immigrants: Studies on Immigration and Inclusion into Slovenian Society) (Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, 2007), p. 536 (Table 10). 7 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, decision no. U-I-92/07–23 of 15 April 2010; Office of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for Religious Communities, Izhodišča za pripravo Zakona o verskih in svetovnonazorskih skupnostih (teze) (Ljubljana, 27 October 2010); Statement of the representatives of the Council of Christian Churches and the mufti of the Islamic Community in Slovenia on the proposal for a new Religious Freedom Act [in Slovene], 9 November 2010, http:// aktualno.rkc.si/?id=10895. slovenia 523

Community became the fifth Slovenian religious community to conclude a separate agreement with the state detailing its legal status and rights.8 The state contributes part of the mandatory social security payments for religious employees, including imams on the payroll of the Islamic Community. The IC also benefits from an arrangement that lets individuals designate up to 0.5% of their income tax as donations to NGOs or religious communities of their choice. The state also gives minor sums to religious communities as direct material support. The Islamic Community has so far not managed to benefit from the opportunities for religious communities to apply for state funding for social programmes (probably because of limited capacity) or for maintaining cultural heritage (as they have little material heritage to maintain). There has so far been no public financial support for any mosque project.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The Islamic Community in the Republic of Slovenia Islamska( skupnost v Republiki Sloveniji, IC, Grablovičeva 14, SI-1000 Ljubljana, tel: +386(1)2313625, fax: +386(1)2313626, www.islamska-skupnost.si), headed by Mufti Dr Nedžad Grabus, is the main religious organisation that represents Islam, employs imams and organises the religious life of nearly all Slovenia’s Muslims through fifteen local chapters and two smaller congregations. It is a branch of the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and stands for Sunni Islam of the Hanafi School (see Bosnia-Herzegovina for details). Its membership is multi-ethnic, but the large majority are Bosniaks. In March 2010, Grabus was re- elected president of the Mešihat, and re-confirmed by the religious authorities in Sarajevo as mufti of Slovenia for a second mandate lasting until 2015. Noteworthy cultural initiatives in the IC’s orbit are the Zemzem women’s group (address: same as the IC) and the Averroes Institute

8 See documentation in Čepar, Drago (ed.), State and Religion in Slovenia (Ljubljana: Office of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for Religious Communities, 2008), http://www.uvs.gov.si/fileadmin/uvs.gov.si/pageuploads/razni_dokumenti/DRZAVA_ IN_VERA_V_SLOVENIJI_THE_STATE_AND_RELIGION_IN_SLOVENIA .pdf, accessed 27 December 2010. 524 christian moe

(Proletarska cesta 4, p.p. 2725, 1001 Ljubljana, tel: 01 5211 341, fax: 01 5211 342, www.averroes.si). A very small Muslim Community of Slovenia (Slovenska musliman- ska skupnost, MCS, Ledina Center room 33, Kotnikova 5, SI-1000 Lju- bljana, tel: +386 1 430 4866, fax: +386 1 430 4866, www.smskupnost .si) was registered in 2006 by former mufti Osman Đogić. The MCS is independent of Bosnia, but similar to the IC in ethnic make-up and doctrinal orientation.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Slovenia has no purpose-built mosque with a minaret. Muslims have sought to build a mosque in Ljubljana since 1968 and have stepped up their efforts in the last decade. Anti-mosque referendum initiatives have twice been quashed by the courts. At the end of 2008, a location was approved for an Islamic cultural centre and mosque, and the IC bought most of the land from the city, taking on substantial debt. The IC’s activities largely revolve around paying off the debt and preparing for the eventual construction of the mosque. Local congregations have prayer-houses of varying quality; in 2010, those in Koper and Krško were renovated. The IC has a house on the outskirts of Ljubljana, used for meetings, prayers and a halal restaurant. The MCS has a space in the city centre.

5 Children’s Education

There is no religious instruction or other confessional activity in public schools. An optional non-confessional course in religions and ethics exists, but is not widely taught. There are no separate Muslim schools. Religious communities may establish private schools (eligible for 85% state funding if they teach the public curriculum), but due to limited capacity this is not on the agenda of the IC. Some Slovenian youths attend Islamic boarding school (madrasa) in Croatia (Zagreb) or Bosnia. Islam is taught to children in mekteb classes organised in about a dozen towns by local congregations of the IC. Classes take place outside school hours and sometimes in inadequate facilities. A Slovenian curriculum is taught with Bosnian textbooks; though the first Slovene- language textbook is expected to be ready for use starting September slovenia 525

2011 (much of the material is in any case in Arabic). Some adult religious instruction is also offered.9

6 Higher and Professional Education

Slovenian imams typically receive their higher Islamic education at institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see that section). The IC holds some internal training courses, and the Egyptian embassy has arranged short-term scholarships to Al-Azhar in Egypt. Slovenian universities have only recently begun to offer Religious Studies, let alone Islamic Studies, though some relevant courses are found in departments of sociology, anthropology and theology. Teacher training for the optional school subject on religion is offered jointly by the Faculty of Arts and the (Catholic) Theological Faculty in Ljubljana.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Imams may officiate at burials. The lack of Muslim cemeteries is a concern in many places. Cemeteries are publicly owned and, while a few towns have allotted separate cemetery sections for Muslims (Jesenice, Maribor, Kranj, Krško, Tržič) or are reportedly working on it (Celje, Koper, Postojna, Kočevje), most, including the capital, have not. An important heritage site to Slovenian Muslims is a cemetery for Muslim troops from Bosnia who fought for Austria-Hungary in World War I. It was marked with Muslim tombstones in 2007.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

The 2007 Religious Freedom Act guarantees the right to pastoral or spiritual care for hospital and nursing home patients, detained persons, police and the army (The Act also opened for direct state employment of chaplains, but this provision was struck down in 2010 as contrary to the constitutional separation of religion and state.). The right to provide such care is also stated in the IC’s agreement with the state.

9 Moe, Christian, “Islamic education in Slovenia”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2008); Porić, personal communication. 526 christian moe

The IC has raised the issue with the authorities, but Muslim spiritual care in state institutions remains ad hoc and informal, and receives no public financial support. One imam is responsible for prison visits, and there is cooperation with the public official coordinating spiritual care in penal institutions.

9 Religious Festivals

No Muslim festivals are public holidays. Celebration of the two Bayram holidays is publicly recognised by official greetings and a nationally televised short address by the mufti. For lack of a mosque or other suitable facilities, communal Bayram prayers have to be held in rented sports halls. To mark the importance of the mosque project, in Rama- dan both iftar and a Friday prayer were held on the future site. Mev- luds (mawlids) and other events are also held to mark other important dates in the Muslim calendar (e.g., Muslim New Year, blessed nights). Forty people went on hajj in 2010.

10 Halal Food

A new initiative to institutionalise the certification of halal meat was taken by the IC in 2007, and the first butcher’s shop so certified opened in Ljubljana in 2008, but halal products are not generally available in grocery stores. Several food companies have long held halal certificates, chiefly for export. The law requires the animal to be rendered unconscious before slaughter, but veterinary authorities may grant exceptions for ritual slaughter. The IC has met with veterinary authorities to discuss the matter, but says some slaughterhouses still lack information. Private slaughter, common on farms and formerly the occasion of a folk holiday, is allowed (regulated in 2004) for the personal consumption of one’s own animals, but as there are hardly any rural Muslims, the legality (and social acceptance) of private Mus- lim ritual slaughter is unclear.

11 Dress Codes

While some older women may wear traditional head scarves, and new Islamic dress (often colourful) with hijab was adopted by some young slovenia 527 women in the 1990s, most Muslim women do not cover their heads. A Muslim women’s fashion show was held in Ljubljana in May 2009. The law does not regulate religious attire, and hijab in schools has not been an issue. Slovene politicians have not joined the burqa-banning bandwagon, whereas the IC leadership has spoken out against burqas as an obstacle to education. The major contribution to the ethnography of Islam in Slovenia remains a monograph on Muslim dress and identity published in 2007.10

12 Publications and Media

The IC operates a website (www.islamska-skupnost.si), and distributes the (Bosnian) Preporod bi-weekly. Two small Salafi groups have their own website (www.resnica-haq.com). Other Slovenian media that are not specifically religious reach a Muslim audience and include Islamic contents, as they report on everything of interest to the Bosniak community. They include the biweekly student radio broadcast Podalpski selam (Salaam under the Alps), the website www.bosnjak.si, and the monthly Bošnjak magazine.

13 Family Law

Family law is secular, and a valid marriage can only be performed by a public registrar in a secular ceremony. Couples may choose to have an additional religious ceremony. The IC encourages Islamic marriages (‘Shari’a weddings’) performed by imams, and has recently begun to register them. Unofficial Islamic marriages exist,11 though the IC dis- courages the practice. A proposed new family law has met religious resistance due to provisions for same-sex marriage.

10 Kalčič, Špela, Nisem jaz Barbika: Oblačilne prakse, islam in identitetni procesi med Bošnjaki v Sloveniji (I Am Not a Barbie Doll: Dress Practices, Islam and Identity Processes among Bosniaks in Slovenia) (Ljubljana: Filozofska fakulteta, Oddelek za etnologijo in kulturno antropologijo, 2007). 11 Kalčič, Nisem jaz Barbika, pp. 64–66. 528 christian moe

14 Interreligious Relations

Interreligious dialogue and cooperation takes place on an ad hoc basis. There is no permanent interreligious institutional framework, except that the state Office for Religious Communities regularly convenes consultations with religious community representatives. Mufti Grabus is a frequent participant in dialogue events at home and abroad, and sits, inter alia, on a task force on intercultural dialogue in the Western Balkans supported by the Slovenian government. In 2010, the Mufti attended the investiture of the new Catholic archbishop. The IC was also represented at a visit by the Dalai Lama. Academic contacts were developed between the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo and the Theological Faculty in Ljubljana. (See also points 15 and 16.)

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Media attention to Islam has continued to focus on plans for an Islamic cultural centre and mosque in Ljubljana, but this is no longer a prominent issue in public debate. Summer 2010 saw brief media curiosity about a small Salafi group. Muslims are not very evident in the media, but their visibility has increased, particularly around Mus- lim holidays, and the quality of reporting has improved over the last decade. In 2010, the IC and its mufti have twice joined the Roman Catholic Church under its new Archbishop Stres in statements on public policy: against same-sex marriage in the proposed new family law, and against the plans for a new law on religious and world-view communities. This is a new development both in inter-religious relations and in the public role of the IC.

16 Major Cultural Events

The most successful event in terms of public outreach may be the annual Bosnian Food Festival in the centre of Ljubljana. In addition to lectures and exhibitions, the Averroes Institute organised an academic conference, “Toward mutual respect through dialogue”, with papers presented by Muslim and non-Muslim scholars from Slovenia and Bosnia. SPAIN

Jordi Moreras1

1 Muslim Populations

The 1978 Spanish Constitution (article 16.2) prevents the development of a statistical census of religious groups in Spain. The number of Mus- lims in Spain is the subject of estimates that are not always based on objective criteria. Some Muslim voices speak of two million Muslims, while others reduce this figure to 800,000. The Observatory Andalusi,2 an entity created by the Union of Islamic Communities in Spain in 2003 (sect. 3), produces an annual report on the Muslim population in Spain. Despite methodological corrections that need to be borne in mind, it constitutes a solid basis for estimating the number of Muslims in Spain. Given the degree of settlement of Muslim communities in Spain, it is no longer sufficient to use statistical data of foreign residents alone. It is necessary to take into account the people of Muslim origin who have been naturalised over the past 40 years (representing between 1958 and 2009, a total of 110,200 new Spaniards),3 the Spanish populations of Muslim origin in Ceuta and Melilla (a total of 60,853, according to the estimate by the latest report of the Observatory Andalusi),4 and

1 Dr. Jordi Moreras is Professor of Social Anthropology at the Faculty of Humani- ties, University Rovira i Virgili (Tarragona, Spain). He is the author of Musulmans a Catalunya. Radiografia d’un islam implantat (Barcelona: Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània, 2008) and ¿Garantes de la tradición? Expresiones de autoridad religiosa islámica en Cataluña (Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2011). 2 http://observatorioandalusi.blogspot.com/, accessed 18 February 2011. Data from the 2010 report shows certain variations from the previous report, with some down- ward revisions. 3 Foreigners may apply for Spanish nationality after living in Spain for ten years (except for those from Latin America, Philippines, Equatorial Guinea and Andorra, which only need two years’ residence). Access to citizenship is also available by marriage and by birth in Spanish territory, after a year’s residency. 4 Observatorio Andalusí, Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana. Explot- ación estadística del censo de ciudadanos musulmanes en España referido a fecha 31 de diciembre de 2010 (Demographic study of the Muslim population. Statistical analysis of the Census of Muslim citizens in Spain conducted 31 December 2010) (Madrid: Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España, 2011). According to this Observatory, 530 jordi moreras the estimated 18,728 new Muslims). The sum of these data, together with the foreign residents of Muslim origin in Spain (977,380 people in September 2010) provides a total of 1,167,161 Muslims,5 a lower estimate than that proposed by the Observatory (1,498,707). Taken together, these data represent between 2.5 and 3.2% of the total Span- ish population.

2 Islam and the State

The 1978 Constitution defines the Spanish state as following a principle of non-confessionalism (aconfesionalidad), which guarantees religious freedom and establishes cooperative relationships with representatives of religious denominations. There is no state religion, but the Catholic Church enjoys some privileges not available to other faiths. This framework of religious freedom was developed in law in 1980. The government of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero during his second term proposed the reform of this law of religious freedom to reflect a new context of increasing pluralism. This reform seeks to introduce a ‘positive’ concept of ‘laicity’ (laicidad positiva), which has drawn serious criticism from the Catholic Church. In recent years Zapatero’s government has been heavily criticised by the Catholic Church on issues such gay marriage, abortion, and the presence of religious symbols in public space. Although the government produced a first draft of amendments to the law, the new political situation created by the economic crisis caused the withdrawal of the project in November 2010. With regard to Islam, the Spanish government continues to promote cultural activities in Muslim communities through the annual grants programme of the Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence (Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia),6 which in 2010 amounted to

the Muslim population of Ceuta and Melilla represent, respectively, 41 and 50% of these territories in North Africa. These data contain a special symbolic meaning in these cities that officially claim their “Spanishness” as synonymous with their Catholic roots. 5 Data provided by the Ministry of Labour and Immigration. The children born after naturalisation of the parents are included in this data, unlike the illegal immigrants since it is not possible to estimate those with Muslim origin. 6 “Pluralism and Coexistence Foundation is a foundation of the public sector, created by agreement of the Council of Ministers of 15 October 2004, at the proposal of the Ministry of Justice. Its purpose is to contribute to the implementation of programs and projects of cultural, educational and social integration of minority faiths that have spain 531

€592,325, representing 36% of the total awarded to minority religious communities. In July 2009, the Catalan Autonomous Government (Generalitat of Catalonia) passed a law on places of worship, with which it wants to regulate the opening of places of worship, and to prevent conflicts that have led in recent years to the establishment of ‘Islamic prayer boards’ in Catalonia. The law provides that municipalities must make reservations of public land for religious facilities, according to its possibilities. In early 2009 in Grenada the Renaissance and Union Party of Spain (Partido Renacimiento y Unión de España, PRUNE), the first Muslim political party outside Ceuta and Melilla was established. On 23 July the same year, it was registered with the Ministry of the Interior, and intends to stand in municipal elections in May 2011. It has opened regional offices in Granada, Asturias, and in the Basque Country and seeks to open new offices in Madrid, Catalonia and other Spanish regions. Its main leader and promoter is Mustafa Bakkach, a leading journalist from Tangier, with 18 years in Spain, who is considered close to the Moroccan government. The party proclaims its “Span- ishness”, and advocates the social and moral regeneration of society based on the principles of Islam as a way to attract the votes of the Muslim population.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

In 1992, on the occasion of signing the Cooperation Agreement with the Spanish State, the Islamic Commission of Spain was created, with the de facto union of the two major Muslim federations: the Span- ish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI, Calle Brescia 17, Madrid 28028, http://www.feeri.eu) and the Union of Islamic Com- munities of Spain (UCIDE, Anastasio Herrero 5, Madrid 28020, http:// es.ucide.org). The FEERI was created in 1989, and until 2006 was managed by members of the Junta Islámica,7 an organisation made up

concluded cooperation agreements with the State or set roots in Spain, as well as promoting the full exercise of religious freedom.” http://www.pluralismoyconvivencia.es/. 7 Junta Islámica is an Islamic religious association established in 1989. This entity maintains Webislam (www.webislam.com), the main portal on Islam in Spain, and the Instituto Halal, dedicated to the certification ofhalal products. 532 jordi moreras of Spanish converts, with Mansur Escudero8 as president. The UCIDE was created in 1991 by Riay Tatary Bakri, of Syrian origin, who in 1971 had created Muslim Association of Spain (Asocición Islámica de España), which manages the Abu Bakr mosque in Madrid. Since then, Riay Tatary continues to chair the federation that brings together the majority of Muslim communities in Spain. Tatary is considered to be ideologically linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. Currently, the FEERI is controlled by associations of Moroccan origin, related to the Moroccan government’s official policy. Its president, Mohamed Ahmed Ali, leader of the Union of Muslims of Ceuta, is close to Moroccan interests and, in 2006, said that Ceuta and Melilla should be returned to Morocco. In October 2009, during a regular meeting of the federation, a group of Moroccan associations linked with the movement of ‘Adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Charity) attempted to wrest control of the federation from Mr Ali. Both parties filed complaints in civil courts, which have not yet been heard. In November 2010, there were 862 Islamic religious institutions in the Register of the Ministry of Justice: 560 belong to UCIDE, 86 to FEERI, and 216 are not federated. In the absence of development of the 1992 Cooperation Agreement, and the lack of operational capability of the Islamic Commission of Spain, various Islamic organisations called for the modification of the representation model of Islam in Spain. In the early months of 2010, the Spanish government proposed to begin a process of electing Mus- lim representatives at the regional level, which then must choose the board that has to lead a renewed Islamic Commission of Spain. This proposal has sparked an intense debate within Muslim communities, generating new organisational initiatives and new strategies for cooperation between associations. This process of reorganisation of the Islamic Community of Spain was raised in parallel with the reform of the law of religious freedom. His suspension has hindered the change of this organisational model, which today is still pending.

8 Mansur Escudero, one of the most prominent figures of contemporary Islam in Spain, founder of Junta Islámica, died on 3 October 2010, in Almodóvar del Río. spain 533

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The 2010 report of the Observatory Andalusí estimates that in Spain there are some 785 Muslim places of worship, fourteen of them major Muslim centres. There is no official record of the number of Islamic places, which further contributes to their social invisibility. The spa- tial integration of Islam in Spanish society manifests a strong contrast between the great Islamic cultural centres, along with its architectural form clearly identifiable with its minarets, and prayer rooms in garages that were opened on the initiative of small immigrant communities, without any symbols that might identify them as a religious centre in the public space. The paradox is that while these notorious centres are part of the urban landscape of cities where they are located, it is the prayer rooms that despite their invisibility receive social opposition to their location. The analysis of conflicts around the mosques in Spain9 builds on two dynamics of creation of these religious centres: the first, induced and operated externally, through the intervention of Muslim countries to finance the construction of these centres, and second, through a process of self-organisation of religion by Muslim communities of immigrant origin. These dynamics cannot be presented as unconnected, but they incorporate different logics and interests. When in the early 1980s, the Saudi Prince Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud promoted the building of the mosque of Marbella (Malaga), as the first mosque opened in Spain in modern times,10 he probably was not thinking so much about meeting the worship needs of Muslims in Spain, as about the needs of his own entourage that accompanied him during his summer break in the lands of the former Al-Andalus. Located in the exclusive neighbourhood of Las Lomas de Marbella, its minaret of 25 metres and its 400-person capacity do not disturb local residents.

9 See Moreras, Jordi, “A mosque in our neighbourhood!—Conflicts over mosques in Spain”, in Allievi, Stefano (ed.), Mosques of Europe. Why a solution has become a problem (London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2010). 10 During the Protectorate of Northern Morocco (1912–1956), the Spanish colonial administration built mosques, prayer halls, and other Islamic religious buildings. The two main mosques of Ceuta and Melilla, the mosque Sidi M’barik and the mosque on the street Garcia Cabrelles, respectively, are good examples of this. 534 jordi moreras

Between the 1980s and early 1990s four new Islamic centres were opened in Spain, sponsored by several Muslim countries: Abu Bakr Mosque (Madrid, 1983, UCIDE’s headquarters), Omar ibn al-Jattab Mosque (Madrid, 1992, popularly known as the mosque of M-30, a highway that circles Madrid. Financed by the King Fahd Ben Abdu- laziz Al Saud), Islamic Cultural Centre of Valencia (1992, financed by Kuwaiti capital and under the authority of the Organisation of Arab Cities), and Suhail Islamic Community (Fuengirola, 1994, financed by Saudi Arabia and linked to the Muslim World League). During the rest of the 1990s no Islamic centres were opened. How- ever small prayer houses proliferate throughout the Spanish landscape, which are indicative of the first settlement of Muslim communities of immigrant origin in the Spanish territory. In the early 2000s two new Islamic centres in Andalusia were launched. First, in July 2001 the Cultural Association Azzagra built a mosque and the Centre of Andalusian Studies in La Puebla de Don Fadrique (Granada). Located on a 120-acre farm, this centre has the financial support of Shaykh Sul- tan bin Muhammad al-Qasim, Emir of Sharjah. Second, and after two decades of polemics concerning its placement in the Albaicin neighbourhood, in July 2003, the Great Mosque of Granada was officially inaugurated. Various Islamic countries (Libya, Morocco, the Arab Emirates and Malaysia) eventually contributed to its construction. The centre is managed by members of the Murabitun (a Sufi movement inspired by the Darqawi brotherhood, founded by the Scottish Muslim convert, Ian Dallas, in 1970s). Finally, the last major Islamic centre was opened in Malaga in August 2007, which occupies over 4,000 m2. Its construction has cost about €22 million euros, provided by Saudi Arabia. The Suhail Foundation owns this new mosque which can accommodate over 1,000 worshipers, and has nursery, auditorium, rooms for men and women, and translation service.

5 Children’s Education

The only Islamic school in Spain is theUmm al-Qura school, which forms part of the Madrid Islamic Cultural Centre complex. It provides pre-school, primary and secondary education. The school was recognised by the Spanish state. This school was recognised by the Spanish state in April 1998 and has 400 students. With regard to public schools, in 1996 the Spanish state and the Islamic Commission of Spain signed an agreement to include Islamic spain 535 religious education in the national educational system.11 Despite the fact that the agreement established that this teaching should have begun in the 1996–97 school year, its application was in fact delayed until the 2003–04 school year, when it began in some Autonomous Communities (regional authorities) to which the transfer of responsibility for education had not yet taken place (Ceuta, Melilla, Aragon, Valencia and Madrid). According to the Observatory Andalusí, in 2009–2010 school year there were 180,097 Muslim students in the Spanish educational system, and 46 teachers of Islamic religious education. According to UCIDE the full implementation of this agreement would require 400 teachers.12 Parallel to the development of this more formal Islamic religious education, the communities themselves have put forward various religious socialisation initiatives, focused on children, youth and women, and based on a traditional model of religious transmission (kuttab, or Qur’anic schools). Many of these initiatives are considered by parents to be complementary to the education their children receive in school, even though they are outside of the structured, formalised school environment. In 2006 the UCIDE, with funding from the Foundation for Plural- ism and Coexistence, published a textbook on Islam Conocer el islam (Understanding Islam) for primary education. In 2009, they edited the material for secondary education.

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

As a result of the history of Al-Andalus, there is a long tradition of Arab and Islamic studies in Spain, including in many departments in Spanish universities and research centres (such as the universities of Madrid, Granada, Barcelona, Seville and Alicante). A recent shift to the study of contemporary Islam has generated new initiatives in

11 See Roson, Javier, Sol Tarrés and Jordi Moreras, “Islamic religious education in Spain”, in Alvarez Veinguer, A., G. Dietz, D.P. Jozsa and T. Knauth (eds.), Islam in Education in European Countries: Pedagogical Concepts and Empirical Findings (Münster/New York: Waxmann, 2009). 12 Observatory Andalusi (2011). No official data are available on the number of students who have received Islamic religious instruction. One of the problems for the development of this education is the rejection by various regions to implement these programmes. 536 jordi moreras training and interdisciplinary research in other academic fields.13 The Cooperation Agreement of 1992 recognises the right of Muslim communities to open training colleges. The only example was the Interna- tional University Ibn Rushd of Cordoba, founded in 1992, but it closed as a result of the loss of institutional and financial support, after the death of its director, Ali Kettani, in 2001. With regard to the training of imams, the first formal initiative began in the 1980s at the initiative of various associations and Islamic centres in Spain. After the Cooperation Agreement of 1992, the Islamic Com- mission of Spain began an internal consultation to propose a training programme for imams. No projects were completed because of internal disagreements. The Spanish university system has undertaken two initiatives to train imams and Muslim leaders. The private University Camilo José Cela has organised, with Junta Islámica, an online course on Islamic culture and religion offered to the general public. This course was previously (from 2006) organised by the National University of Distance Learning (UNED, http://www.uned.es) and in 2010 organised its fifth edition.14 Secondly, in January 2009, the UNED, sponsored by the Foundation Pluralism and Coexistence, initiated a training programme for Islamic religious leaders, under the title “Islam and democratic principles”. The second edition, to be developed in 2010, will be held in Madrid, Valencia and Terrassa (Barcelona).15 The Muslim communities have organised two training courses for imams: in Catalonia, the Islamic and Cultural Council of Catalonia has run a training programme specifically for imams since 2006, coordinated by the Moroccan Ministry of Religious Affairs, with support from the Department of Religious Affairs of the Generalitat of Catalonia. Similarly, the Muslim Federation of Murcia has since 2007 organised several training sessions with teachers and imams from Bel- gium, France, Spain, Morocco and Egypt.

13 See a review of the advanced training in Islamic Studies in Miguel H. de Larra- mendi-Bárbara Azaola, “Studies of Contemporary Arab World and the Mediterranean in Spain”, in Gillespie, Richard and Martin, Iván (eds.), Researching the Mediterra- nean (2nd ed.) (Barcelona: British Council-CIDOB Foundation-Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània, 2009), pp. 85–144. 14 “Experto Profesional en cultura y religión islámicas (Professional expert in Islamic culture and religion)”, www.catedraelearning.es/Islam/, accessed 10 November 2009. 15 http://www.fundacion.uned.es/cursos/derecho/diploma-actualizacion- profesional/islam_principios_democraticos/index.html, accessed 10 November 2009. spain 537

The former Spanish Deputy Director of Relations between State and Religions (Ministry of Justice) and Professor of Law, Juan Ferreiro Galguera, was commissioned in July 2008 by the Council of the Euro- pean Union, to prepare a report on the training centres for imams in Europe.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The need to provide space for the Muslim population in municipal cemeteries has arisen recently, with the increasing settlement of Mus- lims in Spain. Until now, the existing cemeteries were either those in Ceuta and Melilla (whose Muslim cemeteries were managed by the different communities in both cities), or historical cemeteries (like those in Seville and Granada, opened in 1936 by the Franco regime to bury Moroccan troops who fought in the Civil War), or cemeteries that belonged to the governments of Muslim countries and were used for their employees or citizens (such as the cemetery of Griñón in Madrid, which has now reached capacity). In Andalusia, various groups of Spanish Muslims have always called for spaces, which were ultimately acquired and maintained by personal initiatives; they did not always provide appropriate conditions and are filling rapidly. Since 1992, the Cooperation Agreement has recognised the right of Muslims to make use of sites in public cemeteries. There are reserved spaces in a number of cities and towns. However, there are not enough spaces and this leads to a significant number of families returning the bodies of their deceased to their home country. Recognition of the right to an Islamic burial is conditional on there being no contravention of other legal principles, which require the use of a coffin, and the burial at least 24 hours after death. In April 2007, the Barcelona City Council opened a room in one of the local funeral homes to perform mortuary practices that are required by Islam. The Department of Religious Affairs of the Generalitat of Cata- lonia released in 2008 a “Guide to the respect for diversity of beliefs at funerals”, and in 2009 “Recommendations for the management of religious diversity in cemeteries”, addressed to the municipalities.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Articles 8 and 9 of the Cooperation Agreement of 2002 regulate Islamic pastoral care in public hospitals, prisons and the army. In 2006, the 538 jordi moreras

Spanish government has developed the regulations that facilitate this care. However, unlike that provided by the Catholic Church, Muslim pastoral care is still inadequate and is offered on a voluntary basis. In the case of hospitals, there are difficulties in the spiritual care of Mus- lim patients, especially in the treatment of the bodies of the deceased. In December 2005 the Department of Religious Affairs of the Gener- alitat of Catalonia published the “Guide to the respect for diversity of beliefs in hospitals”. In Spain there are about 7,000 Muslim prisoners (2008). An agreement was reached in October 2007, which states that Muslims chaplains will be paid by the Spanish state, provided they gather a group of ten or more prisoners. The fear of the influence of radical imams who may visit prisoners, has led efforts to control pastoral care there. The imams in charge of this service must be accredited by the Islamic Commission of Spain. In addition, prison authorities have in mind the reports by the Spanish National Intelligence Centre, which determine the adequacy of these imams. The Military Honours Regulation still states the obligation of Span- ish soldiers to participate in Catholic religious events. The Defence Ministry in July 2009 introduced a new draft of the regulation, more consistent with the principle of non-confessionalism, and with the growing presence of non-Catholic soldiers (Muslims especially in Ceuta and Melilla). The new regulation will introduce voluntary attendance at religious military ceremonies.

9 Religious Festivals

Article 12 of the Cooperation Agreement recognises the right to take time off to celebrate the major Muslim festivals by prior agreement between Muslim workers and their employers. Prisons organise cultural and religious activities during the month of Ramadan. The celebration of the major prayers for ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha is becoming increasingly visible in neighbourhoods and towns with a substantial Muslim presence. City councils tend to assign public facilities or the use of public streets for these celebrations. In 2010, the celebration of ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha were official holidays in Ceuta and Melilla, by agreement of both governments with the local Muslim communities. spain 539

10 Halal Food

The 1992 Cooperation Agreement recognises the right of Muslims to apply for food produced in accordance with Islamic requirements at public facilities such as schools, prisons and the army. So far there have been no major problems regarding this law, partly because these areas of public office have developed alternative menus with unpro- cessed pork products. The emergence of initiatives for producing and marketing halal products is beginning to take shape in Spain. In the neighbourhoods of the large cities, where populations of Muslim immigrant origin are concentrated, a good number of halal butchers and grocery shops can be found as well as other types of establishment offering products and services that specifically target the Muslim community. All these commercial initiatives are in response to an incipient demand for these products on the part of the Muslim community, which then generates an infrastructure of production and distribution. In view of the potential of this new market, and as a way of guaranteeing the proper use of the term ‘halal’ to describe these products (as Article 14 of the 1992 Cooperation Agreement states), the Junta Islámica has promoted the creation of the Instituto Halal (Halal Institute, c./ Arco, Nº13 Almodovar del Río, 14720 Córdoba, tel: +34 902431937, http:// www.institutohalal.com), which since 1999 has certified and regulated the use of the halal label.16 For some time now, Muslim communities have been asking the political authorities for the facilities necessary for slaughter on ‘Id al- Adha. Various political institutions have developed recommendations to comply with current health regulations, but variations exist across the country. While some regions provide sites for sacrifice (Ceuta, Melilla and Aragon), others threaten severe economic sanctions to those who slaughter animals outside the slaughterhouses. Meanwhile, Muslim families continue discreetly to carry out the ritual sacrifice discreetly in private.

16 The Halal Institute is a facility for companies to certify their products as halal, but it does not organise the halal trade. 540 jordi moreras

11 Dress Codes

There is no legal restriction prohibiting the wearing of Muslim dress in public places such as schools and workplaces. However, since 2002 there has been some controversy regarding the wearing of hijab in schools, as well as some complaints about the police’s refusal to photo- graph Muslim women with hijab when preparing identity cards. How- ever since November 2009, a regulation of the Ministry of Interior has allowed Muslim women to wear hijab in these photographs. Since the xenophobic party Platform for Catalonia (Plataforma per Catalunya) put forward in 2007 a motion to ban the wearing of the burqa in Vic (Barcelona), representatives of other political parties have referred to the desirability of establishing a limit to use of clothing by Muslim women. In 2010, fifteen municipalities in Catalonia passed motions against the use of face covering in public spaces. The first was Lleida, which included in their municipal laws to banning niqab in public buildings as municipal offices, schools or hospitals. The motions against the burqa responded to a restrictive immigration policy in a political context marked by regional and municipal elections. Meanwhile, the use of the niqab is rare among Muslim women.

12 Publication and Media

Since the appearance of the first Islamic religious associations in Spain in the 1970s, there have been numerous initiatives to edit and publish journals. Some have had a very short life span, and others have been irregular. Various Muslim communities have published translations of the Qur’an, doctrinal treatises and essays on contemporary Islam through publishing houses such as Junta Islamica, Editorial Kutubia Mayurqa, and Madrasa Editorial. It is interesting to note that in recent years some Muslim converts (such as Yaratullah Monturiol, Abdennur Prado, Abdelmumin Aya or Jalil Bárcena) have begun to publish with non-Muslim publishers. Muslim community leaders appear only occasionally in the media, in the context of conflicts involving Islam and Muslim communities. Since 1985, Spanish state television has broadcast “Islam Today”, produced by Mohamed Chakor, a Spanish journalist of Moroccan origin. More recently, Catalan public television broadcast live the final prayer spain 541 of Ramadan in 2006 and the ‘Id al-Adha prayers in 2007. Both programmes were discontinued in 2008. Muslim communities cannot be involved in setting the agendas for Catalan public television, but are sometimes consulted on certain topics such as Muslim women and the hijab, or Islamism. The Internet has been adopted by the Spanish Muslim community as an alternative way of expressing their views. There is a significant Muslim blogosphere, and the main internet portal is Webislam (http:// www.webislam.com) (created in 1997 by Junta Islámica). UCIDE also has its own website (http://es.ucide.org) and a blog (www.islam hispania.blogspot.com).

13 Family Law

The Cooperation Agreement of 1992 recognises the validity of a marriage celebrated in accordance with the form established by Islamic law, but the marriage must be registered in the Register of Births, Marriages and Deaths to be fully valid.17 Polygamy is not recognised in Spanish family law, although some instances of polygamy have occurred, especially among groups of Gambian and Senegalese origin. The main problems in relation to family law have to do with divorce by repudiation (talaq), a practice that is not recognised in Spanish law, which poses serious difficulties for divorced women.

14 Interreligious Relations

Since the 1970s numerous activities related to Islamic-Christian dialogue in Spain have been held. Many of them had the implicit support of Spanish Catholic Church, following the principles of the Second Vatican Council. The evolution of the Church’s participation in these activities has to do with the development of the Muslim community itself in Spain (especially accelerated since the immigration of the

17 Motilla, Agustín, El matrimonio islámico y su eficacia en el Derecho español (The Islamic marriage and its effectiveness in Spanish law) (Cordoba: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Córdoba, 2003). 542 jordi moreras

1990s), and with the change of the Vatican’s doctrinal approach in relation to Islam.18 The 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid were a real blow to public consciousness. In the weeks after the attacks, there were innu- merable meetings, demonstrations, and religious ceremonies, one after another, in which the representatives of the Muslim community openly expressed their rejection of these events. The media gathered the statements of the main Muslim bodies, which unanimously rejected terrorism in the name of Islam. The initiatives in favour of dialogue and mutual understanding which should have been carried out long before the attacks have multiplied throughout Spanish territory. The most influential are the activities of inter-religion dialogue which, in addition to the doctrinal content, make the presence of representatives of these groups actively visible with reference to Spanish society. Their intervention as mediators in resolving some local conflicts about the location of Muslim prayer sites has at times been very positive, making these initiatives seem viable and credible.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Spanish society appears to be having trouble coming to terms with the cultural contributions of certain groups, particularly Muslims. This perception of “otherness”, which is a combination of the accumulation of old stereotypes and the introduction of new images and demands, interferes with carrying out a debate on the Muslim presence in Spain and the place it is to occupy in Spanish society. One crucial factor that makes the full recognition of Islam difficult may be the insistence of many citizens on seeing the Muslim presence in Spain as a result of certain migratory cycles rather than as a result of a process by which a religious minority has been created. Islam is still seen as an import, an alien reality, in clear contradiction to the understanding of Islam as a permanent presence, which was one of the motivating factors for adopting the Cooperation Agreement. There is a feeling that, in Spain, mutual mistrust has become the cur- rency in relations of proximity between Muslims and non-Muslims.

18 For a synthesis of these activities, see Jose Luis Sánchez Nogales, El islam en la España actual (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2008). spain 543

Both groups end up expressing their intimate fears, so that communication is interrupted and encounters are avoided. After the recent impact of the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks, the old stereotypes were replaced by a feeling of diffuse and unpredictable threat that is, however, implicitly related to concrete faces and a concrete presence. Fear of terrorism, which continued to be one of Spaniards’ main worries thanks to the Basque political conflict, has, since the 11 March events, reached higher levels than ever before. The Observatorio Andalusí has reported and condemned the increasing Islamophobia among the Spanish public.19 According this report, during the year 2008, various controversies have included a clearly xenophobic discourse in relation to Muslims. New conflicts have arisen against the background of mosques being opened. Some statements by politicians in relation to certain Islamic practices, such as the wearing of hijab, have contributed further to reveal a latent bias against the Muslim presence. Police actions against suspected Islamist activists have further contributed to a widespread perception of mistrust and threat in relation to the presence of Muslims in Spain. On the other hand, according to a survey of 2,000 Muslims prepared by the Ministry of Interior in December 2008, the 31% of respondents said that the Islamic religion is rejected in Spain.

16 Major Cultural Events

Cultural events related to Islamic tradition tend to be linked to multicultural rather than specifically Islamic initiatives. Since 2006, Casa Árabe (Arab House)20 in Madrid annually organises an extensive programme of cultural and artistic activities, including debates on contemporary Islam. The city council of Barcelona has also joined this initiative with the cultural festival “Nights of Ramadan” in 2008 and

19 Observatory Andalusi, Informe especial 2008. Institución para la observación y seguimiento de la situación del ciudadano musulmán y la islamofobia en España (Annual Report 2008. Institute for the observation and monitoring of Islamophobia in Spain) (Madrid: UCIDE, 2009). 20 Casa Árabe (http://www.casaarabe-ieam.es) is a public institution established in 2006 as a centre for the study the Arab world and as a point of support for Spanish diplomacy in relation to Arab countries. It is a consortium established through an agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Spanish International Coop- eration Agency, the Government of Andalusia, the Community of Madrid and the municipalities of Madrid and Cordoba. 544 jordi moreras

2009. In 2009, the Arab House published the book Muslims in Spain. Reference guide, commissioned by the Office for Democratic Institu- tions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). This guide is intended for the media to improve their understanding of the realities of Muslim communities in Spain. In 2010 Arab House released the English version of this guide. SWEDEN

Göran Larsson1

1 Muslim Populations

The last official census to include information about religious affiliation was collected in 1930 and 15 individuals were recorded as Muslims in that year.2 However, larger numbers of Muslims started to arrive in the 1960s and 1970s, and the figure for today varies between 350,000 and 400,000 out of a total Swedish population of approximately 9,400,000. This estimate is not supported by hard evidence as it is against the law to collect personal data on religious belief in order to protect individual freedom, and official bodies are not allowed to maintain records that include potentially sensitive personal information. The figures are therefore necessarily problematic, but they suggest that Muslims constitute 3.8%–4.4% of the population. According to the Swedish Com- mission for Government Support to Religious Communities (SST), the number of practising Muslims (i.e. practising on a daily or at least regular basis) is estimated at 110,000. This estimate is probably on the low side, and 150,000 is probably a more realistic figure.3 The Muslim community in Sweden is heterogeneous and encom- passes a large number of ethnic, religious and political outlooks, as well as a wide range of different languages. Muslims have come to Sweden as both economic migrants and asylum seekers, and their educational background is varied. Up until the mid-1980s, the Turkish

1 Göran Larsson is Associate Professor and Lecturer in the Study of Religions/His- tory of Religions at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He is the author of Ibn García’s shuubiyya Letter: Ethnic and Theological Tensions in Medieval al-Andalus (Leiden: Brill, 2003), and editor of Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge 2009). 2 Svanberg, I. and D. Westerlund, “Från invandrarreligion till blågul islam? 50 år av organiserad muslimsk närvaro (From immigrant religion to blue-yellow Islam? 50 years of organised Muslim presence)”, in I. Svanberg, and D. Westerlund (eds.), Blågul islam? Muslimer i Sverige (Blue-yellow Islam? Muslims in Sweden) (Nora: Nya Doxa, 1999), p. 13. 3 Larsson, G. and Å. Sander, Islam and Muslims in Sweden. Integration or Fragmen- tation? A Contextual Study (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2008). 546 göran larsson group was numerically the largest, but today it is not possible to say that one ethnic group dominates the Swedish Muslim scene and it is incorrect to analyse, present or view the Muslim community in Sweden as a homogenous phenomenon or a static group. It consists of large groups of Turks, Arabs (from Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, etc.), Somalis, Iranians, Bosnians and a growing proportion of Swedish converts. Roald estimates the total number of converts to Islam in Sweden at between 1,000 and 3,000, though as there are no reliable data, this figure too must be considered problematic.4 The great majority of Muslims have settled in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö, the three largest cities in Sweden and approximately 50% of all Muslims in Sweden live in Stockholm.5 However, Muslims have also settled in other parts of Sweden when opportunities for employment have arisen. Estimates of the number of Muslims living in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö are also generally problematic and uncertain.6

2 Islam and the State

Since 1951, freedom of religion has been guaranteed in the Constitu- tion, and the Muslim community is able to organise various welfare, religious and cultural activities under the laws of association. The Swedish Commission for Government Support to Religious Communities (SST, www.sst.a.se) is the authority, under the Ministry of Culture, that provides religious minorities with state funding and it describes its grants as being divided into three categories:

• Organisational grants enabling ‘parishes’ to hold religious services, offer pastoral care and provide education;

4 Roald, “From ‘people’s home’ to ‘multiculturalism’: Muslims in Sweden”, in Y.Y. Haddad (ed.), Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens (Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 2002), p. 102. 5 Stenberg, L., Muslim i Sverige: Lära och liv (Muslims in Sweden: Teachings and Life) (Stockholm: Bilda, 1999), p. 67. 6 Larsson, G., Muslims in the EU. Cities Report (Sweden): Preliminary Research Report and Literature Survey (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2007), http://www .eumap.org/topics/minority/reports/eumuslims/country/sweden, accessed 4 Novem- ber 2009. sweden 547

• Working grants to support specific areas that the state wishes to subsidise, e.g. the Hospital Church, and theological training at certain seminaries; • Project grants, aimed at stimulating new forms of activity and cooperation.

In 2010, the six Muslim organisations recognised by the SST received SEK 5,299,000 (593,000 Euros) in organisational grants.7 The SST also supports spiritual care within the medical/hospital sector, and in 2009 granted SEK 5,310,000 to be distributed among the religious communities they have recognised. Out of this sum, the six Muslim organisations received only a small sum (around SEK 350,000).8 Economic support from the state is based on the principle that religious associations form important popular movements that contribute to society. However, it is the government that decides which religious communities are to be entitled to state grants. In order to receive this support, religious groups must guarantee and observe the principles of democracy and equality and ‘Swedish values’. Registration also makes it possible to use the taxation system to collect levies from members, but if this provision is adopted, the state automatically reduces the economic support that the organisation can receive from the SST. The Swedish Prison and Probation Service has signed an agreement with the Swedish Muslim Council (SMR) in 2002. According to the agreement SMR is responsible for coordinating the Islamic spiritual care in Swedish prisons and for this job they receive a grant (for 2009/2010, approximately SEK 600,000). In 1963, the Swedish government decided to give anyone who had lived in Sweden for more than five years the opportunity to apply for citizenship9 and in 1976, the right to vote and stand in local elections was extended to anyone who had lived in Sweden for three years. In the 1990s, the question of dual nationality was debated, and in 2000 the citizenship law was amended to allow dual nationality.10 On the basis

7 SST, Årsbok 2010 (Stockholm: Nämnden för Statligt Stöd till Trossamfund), p. 20. 8 SST, Årsbok 2009 (Stockholm: Nämnden för Statligt Stöd till Trossamfund), p. 16. 9 See, for example, Roald, A.S., “From ‘people’s home’ to ‘multiculturalism’. 10 Ibid., pp. 103–104; Lappalainen, P., Analytical Report on Legislation: Raxen National Focal Point Sweden (Vienna: European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, 2004), p. 5. 548 göran larsson of existing data, it is not possible to estimate the number of Muslims who hold Swedish nationality, but it is likely that many Muslims are full citizens of Sweden. It is the mother’s nationality that determines the nationality of the child, but if the father is a Swedish national, the child can apply for Swedish citizenship, even if the mother is not Swedish.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Even though Muslim communities in Sweden are split along political, economic and religious lines, a number of initiatives towards the formation of Islamic and Muslim umbrella organisations have been taken since the early 1970s. Today there are six umbrella organisations that operate nationally, and it is claimed that they serve approximately 75% of all Muslims in Sweden. However, this estimate is difficult to substantiate with hard facts, and the calculation is based on the statements of these six organisations. The first national Muslim organisation, the Union of Islamic Con- gregations in Sweden (Förenade Islamiska Församlingar i Sverige, FIFS, Kapellgränd 10, SE-116 25 Stockholm, http://www.fifs.se), was set up in 1974. It later split because of internal tensions and criticisms, and in 1982 a new national organisation emerged under the title Swedish Muslim Union (Sveriges Muslimska Förbund, SMF, Kyrkbacken 14, bv SE-169 62 Solna). Despite further tensions and conflicts over money and influence, the two organisations have been able to co-operate under an umbrella organisation called the Swedish Muslim Council (Sveriges Muslimska Råd, SMR, www.sverigesmuslimskarad.se). It is difficult to associate the three organisations with specific Islamic opinions, but it is clear that the ideology or ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood movement have influenced the SMR. The establishment of Muslim organisations in Sweden is also linked to international developments. For example, the beginning of the 1980s saw the establishment of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centres (Islamiska Kulturcenterunionen, IKUS, Box 61, SE-191 21 Sollentuna), an organisation heavily influenced by the Süleymançi movement and its counterpart in Germany. The Swedish Islamic Assemblies Svenska( Islamiska Församlingar, SIF, Moränvägen 13, SE-136 51 Haningen) was founded in 2002. The Islamic Shi’i Communities in Sweden Isla-( misk Shiasamfund, ISS, Box 690, SE-175 27 Järfälla, www.shiasamfund. sweden 549 se/sida1.html) is the first umbrella organisation for Shi’i Muslims in Sweden. In addition, it is also possible to identify a large number of ethnic and religious organisations, both local and national. For example, Bosnian (Bosniakiska Islamiska Samfundet, Barnarpsgatan 39 G, SE-553 33 Jönköping, http://www.izb.se), Shi’i, Ahmadi (Nasir Moské, Tolvskillingsgatan 1, SE-414 82 Göteborg, http://www.ahmadiyya.se) and Sufi organisations have been established in various locations and a number of youth organisations have also been set up with the aim of representing all Muslims in Sweden (especially those born and raised in Sweden). The most significant of these is Young Muslims of Sweden (Sveriges Unga Muslimer, SUM), but it is also important to mention the Eritrean Young Muslims of Sweden (Sveriges Eritreanska Unga Muslimer, SEUM, http://www.seum.nu) and the Muslim Youth Organization of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Bosnien-Hercegovinas Muslim- ska Ungdomsförbund, BEMUF, http://www.bemuf.org). “Islamic Peace Agents”, a project run by the educational associations Sensus and Ibn Rushd, should also be highlighted. Ibn Rushd (Brännkykagatan 111B, SE-117 26 Stockholm, http://www.ibnrushd.se) is the first recognised independent educational association with a Muslim profile. Among many other things, Ibn Rushd organises courses in the field of religion, culture and language. One of its aims is to strengthen the identity of the Muslim community and inform non-Muslim Swedes about Islam and Muslim cultures.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

There are six purpose-built mosques in Sweden (four Sunni mosques, in Malmö, Uppsala, and two in Stockholm), one Shi’i mosque in Troll- hättan, and one Ahmadi mosque in Göteborg (this is the oldest mosque in Sweden, being started in 1975/1976). In Gävle and Västerås, Mus- lims have adapted old churches and converted them into mosques. This demonstrates the difficulty in drawing a clear distinction between so-called purpose-built mosques and ‘basement’ mosques. There are plans to build mosques in Eskilstuna, Jönköping, Karlskrona, Växjö, Umeå and Örebro, and mosques are already under construction in Skövde and Göteborg. When a Muslim organisation applies for permission to build a mosque, it is the relevant town council that issues the building permit. 550 göran larsson

In the three largest cities in Sweden (Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö), the number of basement mosques is estimated at approximately 20 in Stockholm, 15–20 in Göteborg and 10–15 in Malmö. As in other European countries, the building of mosques in Sweden has given rise to public debates and strong anti-Muslim reactions.11 For example, on ‘Id al-Adha in 2008, the building site of a new mosque in Göteborg was desecrated with pigs’ heads and an anti-mosque demonstration was organised for ground breaking ceremony in 2010. This specific building was mainly attacked because it was supported and funded by Saudi Arabia (see, for example, the anti-Muslim website http://www.ramberget.com). The Swedish right-wing populist party, Sverigedemokraterna, has also publicly targeted Islam, Muslims and the building of mosques.12

5 Children’s Education

Religion is a compulsory subject in the Swedish school system, but is required to be taught in a balanced and neutral way, and pupils should not be indoctrinated into any specific religious system. Consequently, Islam should be presented as just one religion among many. Never- theless, some textbooks have been criticised for being anti-Muslim and negative about Islam.13 All teachers (no matter what their own personal beliefs) must follow the curriculum and teach pupils about religion without any attempts at indoctrination. In addition to traditional Islamic communal education, which takes place in the mosques (e.g. the Friday sermon, the teaching of the Qur’an and other types of study circle), the setting up of so-called independent, private or ‘free’ schools is the most distinctive characteristic of Islamic religious education in Sweden today. Since the school reform of 1992, it has become much easier to receive support and economic subsidies from the Swedish state to establish independent schools. These schools are obliged to follow the national curriculum, but they can be influenced by particular pedagogical or religious and

11 See Allievi, S., Conflicts over Mosques in Europe. Policy Issues and Trends (London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2009). 12 Åkesson, J., “Muslimerna är vårt största hot (The Muslims are our biggest threat)”, Aftonbladet, 19 October 2009. 13 Otterbeck, J., “What is reasonable to demand? Islam in Swedish text-books”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 4 (2005), pp. 795–812. sweden 551 cultural profiles, although they should “not have a content which devi- ates from the value premises of Swedish society.”14 In addition to the national syllabus, the independent Islamic schools also teach Islam in a normative manner. However, this freedom does not allow them to present their religion in an “unbalanced or indoctrinating way”, and pupils must follow the national curriculum for religious education. This means that they have to learn about other religions, world views and ethical outlooks, and that religious education cannot be restricted to Islam or Muslim doctrines or rituals. Generally, education on Islam is confined to a few extra hours per week.15 Permission to start an independent school must be granted by the Swedish National Agency for Education. By 2010, the number of confessional independent schools was estimated at 68, of which nine were Islamic, Muslim and/ or Arab.16 The first Muslim independent school was started in Malmö in 1993. When an independent religious school is recognised by the state, it receives 85% of the support given to public schools. However, it is important to stress that the great majority of pupils with a Muslim cultural background still go to municipal schools.

6 Higher and Professional Education

A large number of universities and university colleges offer courses in history of religions, Islam and Middle East studies, and there are a substantial number of researchers engaged in critical, academic study of Islam and Muslims.17

14 Daun, H. et al., “Educational strategies among some Muslim groups in Sweden”, in H. Daun and G. Walford (eds.), Educational Strategies among Muslims in the Con- text of Globalization (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 191. 15 On the content of religious education in Muslim independent schools in Swe- den, see Berglund, J., Teaching Islam: Religious Education at Three Muslim Schools in Sweden (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2009). See also Larsson, G., “Islamic religious education in Sweden”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 403–421. 16 See http://www3.skolverket.se/friskola03/l_sok_i_be_p.aspx?skolkategori=GR&i nriktning=B1&bidrag_enl=+&profil=&lan=&kommun=&tamed=G&omgang=&B1= Skick, accessed 11 November 2010. 17 See, for example, Larsson, G., “Islam and Muslims in the Swedish media and academic research, with a bibliography of English and French literature on Islam and Muslims in Sweden”, European University Institute Papers (RSCAS No. 2006/36), 2006. 552 göran larsson

In 2009, the Ministry of Education finalised an inquiry about the possibility of starting a training programme for Muslim clerics or imams in Sweden. The inquiry came to the conclusion that there was no need for a specific training programme for Muslim leaders. It was argued that the existing educational system could facilitate the current need and the state should not take part in confessional training programmes.18

7 Burials and Cemeteries

Muslims living in or close to larger Swedish cities have no difficulty in finding a burial site that follows prescribed Islamic norms. The practical organisation of burial sites, regardless of religious affiliation, is still in the hands of the dioceses belonging to the Church of Swe- den through the Cemetery Administration (Kyrkogårdsförvaltningen). According to the latest available statistics from 2000, approximately 111 municipalities in Sweden provide burial grounds for Muslims.19 There is no prohibition on Muslims being buried in a shroud rather than a coffin (as many Muslims require), and certain local offices of the Cemetery Administration, as in Malmö, specifically permit Mus- lims to be buried in this way.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

No Muslim religious leaders or theologians are employed by the state in the health service, prisons or armed forces. However, through grants from the SST and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, imams and religious leaders receive small grants to perform these kinds of social services. Since 2006, the SST is also funding a hospital imam at the Skaraborg hospital in Skövde (50%) and since 2008 the SST has paid for three 25% positions as coordinators for Muslim healthcare.20 It is nevertheless clear that most of the work in hospitals, prisons and other social institutions is done on a voluntary basis, and that there

18 SOU 2009:52 Staten och imamerna. Religion, integration, autonomi (The State and the Imams: Religion, Integration, Autonomy) (Stockholm: Fritzes, 2009). 19 Larsson and Sander, Islam and Muslims in Sweden, p. 336. 20 SST, Årsbok 2009, p. 16. sweden 553 is a great imbalance between non-Christian denominations and the Church of Sweden and other Christian denominations, which have a long history and an established platform for such work.

9 Religious Festivals

Even though the major religious festivals are highlighted by the media in a positive and neutral way, they are not recognised by the state. Muslims have to apply for leave to celebrate the ‘Id/bayram religious festivals, and the employer has discretion as to whether an employee should be given time off. For the third year running, the end of Rama- dan was celebrated in 2010 by the Museum of World Culture in Göte- borg, which organised a reception, lectures and a concert for the ‘Id (see http://www.eidfirande.se). The Muslim community in Gothenburg appreciated this initiative, and the Ramadan celebration was attended by a large number of Muslims and non-Muslims. There were games for children, lectures and dialogue meetings were arranged, and the cafeteria served traditional Muslim food from various countries. In addition to the Muslim initiatives, an academic book on the celebration of Ramadan in Sweden was also published in 2009.21

10 Halal Food

Halal slaughter without stunning has been prohibited by law since 1937. Methods of slaughtering animals are not regarded as a religious issue, but one of animal rights. There have been some attempts to organise halal methods of slaughter that comply with Swedish law (e.g., giving the animal an anaesthetic before it is killed), but this method is not accepted by all Muslims. There is, however, no difficulty in finding halal food in Sweden, and there is easy access to imported meat. There are no data on the availability of halal food in schools, public institutions or hospitals, but it is clear that most institutions have become aware of the fact that Muslims have certain requirements, and so-called ‘Muslim alternatives’ are generally available.

21 Berglund, J. and S. Sorgenfrei (eds.), Ramadan: En svensk tradition (Ramadan: A Swedish Tradition) (Lund: Arcus, 2009). 554 göran larsson

11 Dress Codes

There is no law prohibiting Muslim dress, but there have been some debates about women wearing hijab in the health-care sector, in schools, in the police, etc. In 2006, the National School Authority intervened to protect a student who had been banned from a school in Umeå because she wore hijab. Theniqab has also been extensively discussed in the media in 2009/2010 and some politicians have argued that it should be banned, but no law has been passed.22 The debate has often been focused on health issues, integration and practicalities rather than on religion, but it is clear that many Muslims perceive the discussion about the hijab and sometime the niqab as being coloured by Islamophobia and xenophobia. Figures published by the Board of Integration in 2005 suggest that women who wear hijab have greater difficulty in finding jobs, and that it is often associated with negative opinions about Muslims.

12 Publications and Media

Reports from the end of the 1990s have demonstrated that Islam, Mus- lims and the Middle East are generally associated with negative opinions and stereotypical media reporting. There is no current research on how Islam and Muslims are depicted in the media, but it is generally believed, at least among Muslims, that the Swedish media have a negative bias towards them. Most Muslim media are confined to the Internet (websites, blogs, discussion lists, etc.), and there are probably over 50 Swedish Islamic websites, such as http://www.islamguiden.com. The al-Ghazali institute (http://al-ghazali.org/sidan/) has recently translated a number of Arabic and English books into Swedish (including Martin Ling’s book on the Prophet Muhammad and a collection of hadith-texts). In addition to journals and books published by Sunni Muslims, the Ahmadi community has published a large number of Swedish translations of Ahmadi books (for example, a book on dhikr in the Ahmadi community).

22 Danielsson, S. and L. Pettersson, “Fel dölja ansiktet i öppet samhälle (It is wrong to cover the face in an open society)”, SvD, 16 October 2009. sweden 555

In 2008, three young Muslim women were given the opportunity to record a television series and broadcast it on national television. The series is called Halal-TV and addressed questions of equality, gender, Muslim identities and generational differences within the Muslim community. The series has received both critical and positive reviews from both Muslims and non-Muslims and, according to the critics, has contributed to presenting the Muslim community in a stereotypical way. One of the programme’s leaders was also severely criticised for her opinions about Shari’a penalties and for not taking a stand against those that conflict with Swedish law, such as the stoning of women. The Swedish Muslim poet Mohamed Omar (b. 1976) received a lot of media attention in 2009 because of his support for Islamism and his strong critique of the state of Israel, and for associating with international Holocaust deniers.23

13 Family Law

No exceptions are made to the laws of Sweden, which Muslims must follow. Consequently, Islam has no distinct legal status. Muslim leaders (imams) can apply for a permit to conduct marriages. If the imam is approved by the state and has the correct papers, the marriage is accepted as legally binding in Sweden. Sweden does not apply a so- called double marriage rule (i.e., that one must go both to the mayor or city hall and to one’s own religious or ideological organisation). Some Muslim communities have tried to develop specific Islamic marriage contracts and forms for divorce, inheritance, etc. that comply with both Islamic and Swedish law, but hardly any information about these documents is available. In 2006, the chairperson of SMF, Mahmoud Aldebe, sparked a row in the Swedish media, when he proposed that the Muslim community should be exempted from Swedish law and be governed by specific rules and regulations. This suggestion was primarily an attempt to start an advisory board for a so-called Shari’a council to protect

23 On Mohamed Omar, see http://www.mohamedomar.org/. 556 göran larsson

Muslim interests, but Muslims and non-Muslims alike generally dismissed it.24

14 Interreligious Relations

In the city of Gothenburg, a network for peace and dialogue including people of various religions (Jews, Christians and Muslims) organised lectures and a football match for peace on 11 September 2009. Similar activities were also organised in other Swedish cities. Currently, the Church of Sweden is funding a priest in Gothenburg who is working explicitly in interfaith relations and in Stockholm they have set up a centre for religious dialogue (Centrum för religionsdialog, Västra trädgårdsgatan 2, Box 16345, SE-103 26 Stockholm).

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Several studies indicate that many Swedes have negative views and preconceptions about Islam and Muslims, and Muslim leaders report instances of Islamophobia. Although it is very difficult to measure Islamophobic attitudes and incidents, mainly because of the lack of a clear definition, it is certain that many Muslims perceive themselves to be viewed as a problem, and that Islam is seen as something negative or even un-Swedish by many ethnic Swedes. Muslims have also been attacked by the nationalist party Sverigedemokraterna and, according to an open letter published in Aftonbladet (19 October 2009), the leader of the party, Jimmy Åkesson, argues that Islam and Mus- lims are the biggest threat to society. It is likely that the influence of Sverigedemokraterna will grow and in the national election in 2010 they were elected into the parliament. Since 2006, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) has included Islamophobia as a specific category in its report on hate crimes. For the year 2008, 272 incidents (45% of the approximately 600 reported anti-religious hate crimes) were included in this category.25

24 See, for example, Kihlström, S., “Muslimskt förbund kräver egna lagar (Muslim association demands its own teachers)”, Dagens-Nyheter, 27 April 2006. 25 Hatbrott 2008. Polisanmälningar där det i motivbilden ingår etnisk bakgrund, religiös tro, sexuell läggning eller könsöverskridande identitet eller uttryck (Hate crimes 2008. sweden 557

During 2009, Muslims have tried to make space for themselves in public debate and Mahmoud Aldebe is, for example, trying to win votes for Centerpartiet. His candidacy was stopped when he was portrayed as an Islamist in the media. Mehmet Kaplan, who is a former member of SUM, was also nominated as responsible for matters concerning integration for the Green Party (Miljöpartiet). In 2010, Abdi- risak Waberi, who is the headmaster of an Islamic school in Göteborg, was elected into the national parliament for the conservative party (Moderaterna).

16 Major Cultural Events

In 2010, the celebrations of both Ramadan and ‘Id al-Fitr were highlighted by the Swedish media.

Reports where the motivation for crime includes ethnic background, religious faith, sexual orientation or transgender identity) (Stockholm: BRÅ, 2009), pp. 50–56. For an English summary of this report, see “Reports where the motivation for crime includes ethnic background, religious faith, sexual orientation or transgender identity”, http:// www.bra.se/extra/measurepoint/?module_instance=4&name=Hatecrime_2008_ summary.pdf&url=/dynamaster/file_archive/090916/072681d84616ef1e0cda07047c76 ab62/Hatecrime%255f2008%255fsummary.pdf, accessed 4 November 2009.

SWITZERLAND

Stéphane Lathion1

1 Muslim Populations

Prior to 1960, the presence of Muslims within the Swiss population was rare. That changed with three waves of immigration: one economic- based, one family-based, and one politically-based. The first wave, in the late 1960s, was mainly caused by economic factors and consisted chiefly of men coming to work in Switzerland with no particular intention to stay permanently in the country. These immigrants were mostly from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia and Albania. The second wave came in the late 1970s, after Switzerland changed its legislation concerning foreigners to allow family regrouping. This decision had direct implications: from this point on, Islam was no longer only an ephemeral, male social factor in Switzerland but, with the presence of families, had become a lasting reality. The last, political, wave consisted of foreigners seeking asylum from oppressive dictatorships, various civil wars, famines and other situations. More accurately, this is not so much a wave as much as an ongoing movement, since it started in the 1960s (mainly from the Middle East) and continues today with the exodus of people from the Middle East, the former Yugoslavia, North Africa and other African countries. According to the 2000 census, the total Swiss population numbers 7,288,010. For the first time, a question related to religious belief was included in the census, and the census reported 310,807 Muslims, or 4.3% of the total population, although Muslims of Swiss nationality made up only 0.6%. The fact that statistics reveal the presence of

1 Dr Stéphane Lathion heads GRIS (Research Group on Islam in Switzerland) and is a researcher associated with l’Observatoire des Religions en Suisse, University of Lausanne. His last book has just been published in French, Islam et modernité, Iden- tités entre mairie et mosquée (Islam and modernity, Identities between Mosque and Secular State). (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 2010). 560 stéphane lathion

169,726 Muslim men compared with 141,081 Muslim women demonstrates that the Muslim presence has evolved and is no longer merely due to labour migration. Some estimates suggest that the number of Muslims today is much closer to 400,000 than the number indicated in the last census. It is a young community with about half under the age of 25. The great majority live in the urban cantons of Basel, Bern, Zürich, St Gallen, Vaud and Geneva. Automatic Swiss nationality is by descent and not by birth on Swiss territory and foreigners must generally have lived for a total of 12 years in Switzerland before they can apply for Swiss nationality, even if they were born in Switzerland. A federal referendum in 2004 eased access to Swiss citizenship for the descendants of immigrants. The majority of Muslims in Switzerland (58%) are from the former Yugoslav republics, followed by Turks (21%), Swiss (11%), North Africans (4%), Sub- Saharan Africans (4%) and Middle Eastern immigrants (2%).2 Muslim communities in Switzerland are 75% Sunnis, 7% Shi’is, 10%–15% Turkish Alevis, including some members of Sufi orders.

2 Islam and the State

Switzerland is a secular state but, under the Constitution, the Swiss state recognises both Catholicism and Protestantism as official religions and relations with religious communities are based on the fundamental rights to freedom of religion and philosophy and to equality before the law. However, since Switzerland is a federation of states, all matters of religion fall under the competence of the cantons, within the limits of federal (constitutional) law. This means that a canton is permitted to support a recognised religion. The only two cantons that have clearly separated the state and religion are Geneva and Neuchâtel.3 Muslims in Switzerland must abide by all Swiss laws and regulations. For example, no Swiss laws forbid Muslims from exercising their religious beliefs or practices, such as the five pillars. Since 2007, all the

2 For more details, see http://www.gris.info. 3 Mahnig, Hans, “L’intégration institutionnelle des Musulmans de Suisse: L’exemple de Bâle-Ville, Berne, Genève, Neuchâtel et Zurich (The institutional integration of Muslims in Switzerland: The example of Bâle-Ville, Berne, Geneva, Neuchâtel and Zurich)”, Tangram: Bulletin de la Commission Fédérale contre le Racisme, vol. 8 (2000), pp. 102–111. switzerland 561 main political parties developed a strategic paper on the place of Islam in Switzerland focusing on how to integrate Muslims in society.4

3 Main Muslim Organisations

At present, there are over 80 Muslim associations in Switzerland and the figure is constantly changing. It should be noted that most of the established Muslim associations have subsidiary youth sections, and women are also often organised within the framework of the main association. The range of activities varies; some associations focus on religious activities, while other are much more culturally orientated.5 Muslim associations are generally locally organised, but they are also starting to create representative bodies at canton level. In most cantons, the associations are grouping into federations (for example, the Union of Muslim Associations of the canton of Fribourg), which gives them more weight in discussion on important issues, such as cemeteries, swimming pools, construction of mosques, etc. At the national level, there are three main bodies: Muslim Men and Women of Switzer- land (Musulmans et Musulmanes de Suisse, MMS, www.islam.ch), the League of Swiss Muslims (Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse, LMS, www .rabita.ch); and the Federation of Swiss Islamic Organisations (Fédéra- tion des Organisations Islamiques de SuisseI, FOIS, Kappelenring 44c, 3032 Hinterkappelen), but there is no official representation as in France. The LMS and the MMS were both founded in 1994 with the aim of helping Swiss Muslims to find ways of integrating and participating constructively in Swiss society. Their wish to develop some form of Swiss federation of Muslim organisations has not so far met with success. However, since 2002, in most cantons, united bodies have started to emerge, including in the cantons of Geneva, Vaud, Fribourg, Zurich and Lucerne. Since the referendum against minarets in November 2009 a new hard-line association, the Conseil Central Islamique Suisse, has attracted some media attention. Based in Bern its

4 The Swiss Confederation, through the Federal Commission against Racism (CFR), has published a special issue of its Tangram review on hostility against Muslims in no. 25, June 2010. 5 Schneuwly Purdie, Mallory, De l’etranger au musulman, immigration et intégra- tion de l’islam en Suisse (From Foreigner to Muslim, Immigration and Integration of Islam in Switzerland) (Saarbrücken: Editions Universitaires Europeennes, 2010). 562 stéphane lathion purpose appears to be to benefit from the current situation to become a spokesman for Islam to the media and the state.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

Switzerland has more than 100 mosques and/or prayer halls, although statistics in this field are unreliable. Only five have the features of Islamic architecture, in particular a minaret: in Geneva (financed by Saudi Arabia), Zurich (Ahmadiyya), and more recently in Winthertour (Albanians), Wangen (Turks) and Langenthal.6 The rest are mainly prayer halls without any outward indication of their Islamic function. Some have facilities such as a library and/or cafeteria, but these are few and almost invisible from the outside. On 29 November 2009, the Swiss population voted in a referendum to prohibit the building of minarets in Switzerland (see section 15 below).

5 Children’s Education

The question of religious education is the responsibility of the cantons. Each canton’s department for public education decides autonomously what to do about religious education or whether to offer it at all (provision is usually no more than one hour per week). In order to provide religious education for their children, Muslims must therefore organise it themselves. Religious socialisation takes place through families and Muslim organisations, which offer various classes, such as intro- ductions to Islam, the Qur’an and Arabic. Until now, Muslim pupils (like pupils from other religious communities) are not given any time off school to attend such classes, which often take place on Saturdays or in the early evening. At the Swiss primary school level, religious education often takes the form of confessional instruction. However, this type of education is evolving and is slowly being replaced with non-religious and interreligious classes. In secondary school, only an introduction to the history of religions is offered and is usually taught in a non-dogmatic or non-confessional fashion. Enbiro (Enseignement Biblique Romand,

6 Patrick Haenni and Stéphane Lathion, Les minarets de la discorde, Infolio/Reli- gioscope, Fribourg, 2009. switzerland 563

ENBIRO, http://www.enbiro.ch/default_b.html) has developed a new pedagogy for teaching religion in school. This new programme gives an introduction to the world’s most influential religions and has been generally welcomed in French-speaking Switzerland, although not in the canton of Wallis, where a controversy erupted in November 2003. Some conservative Christian parents removed their children from the religious education class when they learned that Muhammad was presented as a prophet who received messages from God and that the Qur’an is a holy book. These parents were concerned that presenting Islamic teachings conflicted with the religious education they wanted to provide for their children. All the objections to this new kind of religious education were related to Islam, and not to the other religions taught. With regard to Islamic religious instruction, there is so far one exception. In the canton of Lucerne, two local authorities decided in the autumn of 2002 to introduce Islamic religious classes for their Muslim pupils. These classes are optional and given in German to all nationalities together. After a difficult start, this decision has now been accepted. A federal research report on religious education was published in summer 2010.7 There is an agreement that teachers of Islamic religion are needed, but the question is how to concretely organise a training course.

6 Higher and Professional Education

In Switzerland, there are a small number of university chairs in Islamic studies (Geneva, Berne, Zurich, Basel, for example), but they do not present a contemporary view of the Islamic world, concentrating more on the historical, civilisational and sometimes political aspects. Only occasional courses at Fribourg University (Islam and Modernity, Islam in Europe) or Basel University present a more contemporary picture. Today, it seems that Lucerne University and Lausanne University want actively to research on topics linked with contemporary Islam.

7 Formation des imams, instruction religieuse islamique et auatres aspects de l’islam dans la vie publique suisse, PNR 58 (Collectivités religieuses, Etat et société), Berne, 2010. 564 stéphane lathion

On 7 May 2003, in Wallis, a Catholic canton, an imam from Mace- donia was denied a work permit to work as an imam, largely due to the fact that he had studied in Medina (Saudi Arabia) and the canton authorities considered him to be a potential threat to religious harmony. As a result, the issue of imam training became a political issue and a study group was established which reported its findings in May 2009. The report, “Formation en Suisse des imams et des enseignants-es en religion islamique (Training in Switzerland for imams and teachers of Islamic religious education)”, confirms that the Muslim majority expect training courses for teachers based on the German model (educational studies, Arabic, Islam). The situation in the French part of Switzerland is quite different and seems more orientated towards an historical and ecumenical approach proposed by the NGO Ensei- gnement Biblique et Interreligieux Romand. Two models for training Muslim religious teachers are discussed. One is to establish an academic unit in a university. An intermediate solution is to provide adult continuing education to supplement the theological training that functioning imams already have, and also to make it available to leaders in Muslim associations.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The situation with regard to cemeteries for Muslims in Switzerland varies. As a federation of states, Switzerland has left this issue to the cantons, which usually allow the individual local authorities to find the solution that best suits their population. A number of Muslim cemeteries have been established in recent years. The oldest was started in Petit-Saconnex in Geneva in 1978, followed by Basel and Bern (2000), Lugano (2002), and Zurich (2004), but it was not till January 2008 that a law to make confessional cemeteries legal was proposed. In Neuchâtel and Fribourg, requests for Muslim sections to be allocated in existing cemeteries, or for a Muslim cemetery to be established, have recently been made but no official response has so far been given. With regard to funeral rites, Muslim organisations usually provide personnel to prepare the body for the funeral. When there are no local regulations governing the details of funeral rites, local parishes or civil authorities usually try to do their best to find a solution acceptable to the family. switzerland 565

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

No chaplaincy arrangements are formally organised for Muslims, and what services there are depend exclusively on the good will of institutions and individuals. There is a chaplaincy service in the Geneva hospital that works because of the involvement of some Muslim doctors.

9 Religious Festivals

No specific arrangements exist in Switzerland concerning Muslim religious holidays. However, Muslims are sometimes allowed to take days off work for Islamic festivals unless this would cause serious economic difficulties for the employer. There is no legal right to a reduction of working hours during the Ramadan fast, but arrangements can be made with the employer on an individual basis. Students fasting during Ramadan are exempted from gym class because of the risk of fainting or dehydration.

10 Halal Food

Halal slaughter is not permitted, although exceptions are made for special events. This is not a serious problem because halal food imported from France, Italy, Germany, Austria and New Zealand (60% of lamb meat) is readily available.

11 Dress Codes

There has been fierce debate on the subject of religious dress all over Switzerland, but emotions have been higher in the French part because of the impact of events in France and a similar perception of laïcité. Hijab is permitted in school for students and pupils but prohibited for teachers. Two cantons have had to deal with legal cases concerning hijab. As the result of a case in Geneva that went all the way to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, it was established that the principle of laïcité, which applies in Geneva, entitles the canton to rule that public officials may not wear ostentatious religious symbols, such as hijab. In theory this ruling could become a precedent for the whole of Switzerland, but the decision remains with individual cantons. 566 stéphane lathion

Since July 2009, as in France, the burqa has become a subject of public debate in Switzerland, but the polemic was mostly theoretical and hypothetical, coming about mainly because of French influences. The controversy is continuing in some cantons.

12 Publication and Media

Muslims do not have their own programmes on either television or radio. However, there are a certain number of religious programmes in which Islam is discussed in an inter-religious context. Themes such as creation, death, health and fundamentalism are examples of subjects covered. Similar topics are raised on the Internet, where Muslims are particularly active. Some of the Muslim websites that show how well organised the associations are becoming are: Islam en Suisse (http:// www.islam.ch/); Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse (http://www.rabita. ch/); Fondation Culturelle Islamique de Genève (http://www.mosque. ch/); Association Culturelle des Femmes Musulmanes de Suisse (http:// www.femme-musulmane.ch/); Centre Islamique de Genève (http:// www.cige.org/); Stiftung Islamische Gemeinschaft Zürich (http://www .islam-zh.ch/); Schweizerische Islamische Glaubensgemeindschaft (http://www.islamtoplumu.ch/). Er-Rahma—Die Barmherzigkeit: unahängige Zeitschrift von Mus- limen in der Schweiz (Er-Rahma—Mercy: Independent journal of Muslims in Switzerland, http://barmherzigkeit.ch/typo3/) is a quarterly journal. Bulletins du Centre Islamique de Genève (http://www .cige.org/cige/publications/bulletins_du_cig/) is a newsletter produced three times a year.

13 Family Law

In Switzerland, as in other European countries, polygamy is illegal; nevertheless, sometimes international private law obliges some exceptions. Conflicts may arise in inheritance law or in cases where women are called to testify in Swiss courts.8 Marriages can only be formalised according to civil law.

8 Pahud de Mortanges, René and Erwin Tanner (eds.), Muslime und Schweizerische Rechtsordnung (Muslims and Swiss law) (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 2002). switzerland 567

14 Interreligious Relations

In 2007 the Swiss Council of Religions (SCR) was established with the goal of contributing to the maintenance and promotion of religious harmony and freedom in Switzerland. It consists of representatives of the three national churches (Roman Catholic, Christian Catholic, Evangelical Reformed), the Swiss Federation of Israelite Communi- ties, the Liberal Jewish Forum of Switzerland, the Coordinated Islamic Organisations of Switzerland and the Federation of Islamic Organisa- tions in Switzerland. Since 2008, Bern has been home to a Maison des Religions (House of Religions, Schwarztorstrasse 102, 3002 Berne) whose ambition is to promote intercultural dialogue and integration. Each religion (Christi- anity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Bahaism) has its own reception area and meeting space. At the cantonal level there are a number of interreligious fora that conduct meetings, public debates, and joint prayers in connection with the main religious festivals.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The major public debate of 2010 was linked to the result of the referendum, held on 29 November 2009, in which the Swiss electorate was asked to vote on whether to ban the construction of minarets. The approach chosen was clearly provocative and polemical; since there are only four minarets in Switzerland and, despite the marked growth in the Muslim population, there has not been a proportional growth in requests for permission to build mosques with minarets. There has, for example, not been a single request for a minaret in the French- speaking part of Switzerland. It was an issue more about the Muslim presence than about minarets. The debate was very emotional because of the widespread ignorance about Islam among the population and politicians, an international climate which, as elsewhere in Europe, rejects a considered and nuanced approach to Islamic matters, and, finally, a national context infected by the Libyan government’s imprisonment of two Swiss citizens since 2008. The year 2010 has not showed any sign of change in the way politicians, media and Muslim association leader discuss the issues. 568 stéphane lathion

16 Major Cultural Events

In October 2010 the most important European rally of the international Soufi Alawiyya association was held in Geneva. More than 600 people were gathered to listen to lectures and concerts and to look at exhibitions. The aim of the spiritual guide of the Alawiyya order, Alge- rian Cheikh Khaled Bentounes, was to present another face of Islam. On Saturday 6 November 2010, the main Muslim associations opened their premises and mosques to non-Muslims visitors. TURKEY

Ahmet Yildiz1

1 Muslim Populations

The census conducted byTürkiye İstatistik Kurumu (the Turkish Sta- tistics Institution, TÜİK) on 31 December 2009 recorded the population of Turkey as 72,561,312.2 Following the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1924, the nation-building process envisaged a thoroughly homogeneous population in religious and ethnic terms. The extreme sensitivity of the state elites has led to the ethnic and religious affiliations of the population being excluded from the official census since 1965, so we do not have official data for these factors, but there have been some significant surveys, the most important of which was conducted in 2006 by the Milliyet-KONDA company.3 This survey found that there were 55,484,000 self-identified Turks (76.03% of the population), 11,445,000 Kurds (15.68%) and 6,460,000 people from other ethnic groups (8.3%). The same survey also indicates the religious demography of the Turkish population and found that around 99% of the Turkish population identify themselves as Muslim. In terms of denominational affiliations, Sunni Hanafi Turks comprise 82.14% of the total population, Sunni Shafi’is 9.06% (of whom 72% live in eastern and south-eastern Anatolia, 76% are Kurds, 13% Turks, and 10% Arabs). Alevis comprise 5.73% of the population (4,500,000 people), and are 43% Turks, 42% Kurds and 7% Arabs, with the remaining 8%

1 Ahmet Yıldız is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Research Centre of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara. He has specialised in Kemalist and Kurdish nationalisms as well as the role of Islam as a socio- political factor in Turkish democracy. He contributed the article “Problematizing the intellectual and political vestiges: From ‘Welfare’ to ‘Justice and Development’ ” in Cizre, Ümit (ed.), Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Devel- opment Party (London: Routledge, 2008). 2 TÜİK figures available at http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?tb_id=39&ust_ id=11, accessed 30 December 2010. 3 Milliyet-KONDA, Biz Kimiz? Toplumsal Yapı Araştırması 2006 (Who Are We? Survey of Social Structure 2006), http://www.konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/ttya_tr.pdf, accessed 30 December 2010. 570 ahmet yildiz of various other ethnicities. About a third of all Alevis live in Istanbul with other major concentrations in central Anatolia and the Mediter- ranean region. The Ja’faris are the country’s principal Shi’i community and number around 500,000 (concentrated mostly in eastern Turkey and Istanbul).4 Overall, Hanafis and Shafi’is regard their Sunnism as a powerful common denominator, while Alevis consider themselves a distinct group. In a survey carried out in 2006 by two prominent political scientists from the University of the Bosphorus, respondents were asked to reply, on a scale of 1 to 10, to the question: Where do you locate your- self in the continuum from ‘Islamist’ to ‘secular’? In reply, 20.3% of respondents identified themselves as ‘secular’, 48.5% as ‘Islamist’ and 23.4% as somewhere in between. One should not forget, however, that the meanings ascribed to the terms ‘Islamist’ and ‘secular’ are vague, so these results are open to interpretation.5

2 Islam and the State

Under its 1982 Constitution, Turkey is a secular state providing for freedom of belief and worship, and freedom to privately disseminate religious ideas. However, other constitutional provisions regarding the integrity and existence of the secular state restrict these rights. Turkish laiklik (laïcité) not only prescribes a separation between religion and the state but also requires religion to be kept under state control. Accordingly, state policy imposes some restrictions on religious groups and on religious expression in government offices and state-run institutions, including universities, symbolised in the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf. Article 219 of the penal code prohibits imams, priests, rabbis and other religious leaders from “reproaching or vilifying” the government or the laws of the state while performing their duties. As a corollary of the principle of laïcité, there is legislation against insulting any religion, interfering with a religion’s services or damaging its property.

4 US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2010, http:// www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148991.htm, accessed 30 December 2010. 5 Çarkoğlu, Ali and Binnaz Toprak, Değişen Türkiyede Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey) (Istanbul: TESEV, 2006), pp. 29–31, 38–39. turkey 571

The Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (The Directorate of Religious Affairs, Diyanet), which is under the authority of the Prime Minister’s office, administers Sunni Muslim religious facilities and teaching courses. The Diyanet is responsible for regulating the operation of the country’s registered mosques and employing local and provincial imams, who are civil servants, and also covers the cost of utilities at registered mosques. Some groups, par ticularly some Alevis, claim that Diyanet policies reflect mainstream Sunni Islamic beliefs and accuse the Diya- net of bias since it does not allocate specific funds for Alevi activities or religious leadership and does not cover the cost of utilities at ‘Alevi cem houses’ because they are not formally recognised as places of worship.

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The oldest Islamic groupings in Republican Turkey are the Nurcu movement founded by Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (d. 1960), and the Suleymancis originally led by Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan (d. 1959), the establishment of both dating back to the 1930s. Sufi and other mystical, religious-social orders, brotherhoods (tariqas) and lodges (cemaats) are banned under the “Law on the Closure of Religious Shrines and Dervish Convents and Prohibition of Some Titles” of 30 November 1925, but tariqats and cemaats have nevertheless remained active and widespread. Some prominent political and social leaders continue to associate with them and other Islamic communities. Calls for the lift- ing of this ban are part of the on-going agenda in Turkish politics, but Kemalists and neo-Kemalists are resolutely against the growing power of brotherhoods in the political and social life of the country. Apart from miscellaneous non-official Islamic groupings, the most important organisation is the Presidency of Religious Affairs(Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Eskişehir Yolu 9. km. Çankaya-Ankara, tel.: +90 312 295 70 00; http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/default.aspx), an official institution estab lished by Law 429 on 3 March 1924, the same day as the abolition of the caliphate. It represents the highest Islamic religious authority in the country. According to Article 136 of the Con- stitution: “The Department of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and 572 ahmet yildiz integrity.” It is empowered to regulate issues concerning Islamic belief, rituals and morality and to provide society with religious guidance. Other notable Islamic organisations are as follows:

• Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (The Turkish Foundation for Religious Affairs), Dr. Mediha Eldem Sokak no. 89, 06640 Kocatepe, Ankara, tel: +90 312 417 12 35, fax: +90 312 418 19 00, http://www.diyanet- vakfi.org.tr/) was established on 13 March 1975. It is a tax-exempt foun dation, has the right to collect donations without prior permission, and is the biggest foundation in Turkey in terms of its financial resources. Its purposes are to support the activities of the Director ate of Religious Affairs, to enlighten and guide the population in religious matters, to build mosques and to work towards strengthen ing social solidarity. The prestigiousIslam Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopaedia of Islam), the first of its kind in the Muslim World, is a product of Islami Araştırmalar Merkezi (the Islamic Stud- ies Centre, ISAM), İcadiye Bağlarbaşı Cad. 40, Bağlarbaşı 34662, Üsküdar-Istanbul, tel: +90 216 474 08 50, fax: +90 216 474 08 74, http://www.isam.org.tr/) established by the Foundation. • Türkiye Gönüllü Teşekküller Vakfi(The Foundation for Turkish Volunteer Associations, TGTV), Otakçılar Mh. Savaklar Cd. no. 134050, Edirnekapı/Eyüp/stanbul, tel: +90 212 534 04 07, fax: +90 212 534 04 08, http://www.tgtv.org) was established on 22 January 1994 and is based in Istanbul. It is an umbrella organisation made up of 700 foundations, associations and unions that have Islamic and Turkish nationalist leanings. • There is a network of organisations linked to the Gülen Community, the controversial Fethullahçi or neo-Nurcu movement, founded and led by a retired preacher, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi, now living in the USA, including Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı (the Jour- nalists and Writers Foundation) Cumhuriyet Cad. no. 129/5, 34230 Harbiye-Istanbul, tel: +90 (212) 232 17 10, fax: +90 (212) 232 15 88, http://www.gyv.org.tr/), established on 29 June 1994. The Founda- tion has three important organisational components through which it conducts its global outreach: The Dialogue Eurasia Platform, the Abant Meetings and the Intercultural Dialog Platform. • Anadolu Gençlik Derneği (the Anatolia Youth Association), Hükümet Cad., Hilal Sokak no. 10, Kat:1, Ulus-Ankara, tel: 0312 309 59 27, fax: 0312 311 56 71, http://www.agd.org.tr) is the successor of Milli Görüş Vakfı (the National Outlook Foundation), the most turkey 573

impor tant social organisation of the National Outlook Movement. It was founded in Ankara in 2002 and has 700 branches throughout the country. It follows the ideology and programme devised by the founder of the National Outlook, Necmettin Erbakan.

There are numerous socially and financially powerful Islamically oriented charitable associations that have become widely known and acquired popular support. Areas of their activities include: social aid, food aid, care of orphans, housing and clothing aid, vocational training, and support for educational and health facilities. The prominent charitable associations are: İnsani Yardım Vakfı (International Humanitarian Help, IHH), http://www.ihh.org.tr), Kimse Yok Mu? (Solidarity and Aid Association), http://www.kimseyokmu.org.tr/Default.aspx?hl=tr, Deniz Feneri (lighthouse), (http://www.denizfeneri.org.tr), Cansuyu (http:// www.cansuyu.org.tr) and Yardımeli (http://www.yardimeli.org.tr).

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

In 2009, there were 80,636 mosques in Turkey.6 Istanbul is the city housing the greatest number of mosques whereas Tunceli holds the least. The most famous are those built in Istanbul by the Ottoman Sultans, called Selatin mosques, while the Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara is the most important to have been built in the Republican period.

5 Children’s Education

The 1982 Constitution established compulsory religious and moral instruction in primary and secondary schools within the framework of the ideology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, developed by the military government in response to leftist movements. In January 2007, the religious education curriculum was changed so as to include a very basic introduction to Alevism. Only the Diyanet is authorised to provide courses in religion (Kuran Kursları) outside school, although clandestine and unofficial private courses do exist. Students who complete the first five years of primary school may enroll in Diyanet

6 http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/Diyanet-Isleri-Baskanligi-AnaMenu- sayisal-bilgiler–65.aspx, accessed 18 November 2010. 574 ahmet yildiz

Qur’an classes at weekends and during summer vacations. Only children aged 12 and older may legally register for official Qur’an courses, which include 32-week courses, summer Qur’an classes and classes for memorising the whole Qur’an. Since 1997, it has been compulsory for children to attend eight years of schooling, after which those who wish to receive Islamic religious education may continue their studies at Imam-Hatip high schools (lycees), which cover both the standard curriculum and Islamic theology and practice. There are currently 465 such secondary schools attached to the Directorate of Religious Education.7 Although they date back to 1924, Imam-Hatip schools were only named Imam-Hatip high schools in 1973, when they were authorised to provide education for both vocational and undergraduate study under Article 32 of the Basic Law of National Education of 1973. During the process of military intervention, the so-called “28 February 1997 post-modern coup”, the secondary school sections of these schools were closed down and the high school sections became four-year lycees providing only vocational education. As a result of this change, graduates of these schools were effectively barred from entrance to universities, apart from faculties of theology, and the number of students attending them fell from 500,000 to 60,000 in the span of five years. In July 2009, the regulation that discriminated against students from vocational schools, including Imam-Hatip high schools, was changed by the Higher Education Council so as to provide them with equal opportunities in university entrance examinations without restricting the university programmes they could apply for outside their vocational specialisation.8 Many religiously devout citizens consider the religious instruction provided in state schools to be inadequate and most families who enrol their children (especially girls) in Imam-Hatip schools do so to expose them to more extensive religious education, not to train them as imams. Apart from state-provided religious education and instruction, there are hundreds of private schools affiliated to Islamic associations. These schools are not designed as Islamic religious schools, but provide a more conducive environment for Islamic socialisation. Many

7 http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/istatistik/meb_istatistikleri_orgun_egitim_2009_2010.pdf, p. 96, accessed 08 January 2011. 8 http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=872057&title=meslek-liselilerin- katsayi-magduriyeti-sona-erdi, accessed 18 November 2009. turkey 575 of these schools are very popular and most are affiliated to the Gülen community. Boys and girls are usually taught together in the education system, in both public and private schools. Students are strictly forbidden to wear the head scarf in both primary and secondary schools.

6 Higher and Professional Education

There are 25 theology faculties offering undergraduate programmes.9 Since the 28 February 1997 military coup, only a few more have been opened. Student numbers had fallen drastically. In post-2007, the situation has begun to change. YÖK, the Higher Education Board, decided to quasi-equalise the quota used in the calculation of points in university entrance examinations and made all university programmes accessible to all applicants, including graduates of Imam-Hatip schools. The suit brought before the Council of State to annul the quota decision has been rejected by the Court on the ground that YÖK’s decision is compatible with the prior decision of the Court in this regard.10

7 Burial and Cemeteries

The TÜİK does not produce statistics on the number of Muslim cemeteries in Turkey. Municipalities deal with all issues related to Muslim funerals in accordance with Islamic practice and relevant legislation,11 including burial and cemeteries. Muslims in Turkey face no problems in observing Islamic burial practice or in creating and maintaining their cemeteries.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

Religious services in prisons date back to 1974, but were not well enough organised and established to be called ‘chaplaincy’. However,

9 http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/linkler/linklerkatagori.asp?kategori=5, accessed 17 May 2009. 10 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/14491964. asp, accessed 08 January 2011. 11 For the relevant national legislation regarding funeral services and cemeteries, see, for example, Belediye Kanunu (2005), http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5393. html, accessed 16 March 2009. 576 ahmet yildiz under a protocol signed between the Ministry of Justice and the Direc- torate of Religious Affairs on 15 May 2001, Diyanet officials provide religious services in prisons on a weekly or monthly basis.12 Since then, 10,000 copies of the Qur’an have been distributed in prisons. As of 2009, there are 42 ‘chaplains’ in prisons and 417 preachers have been commissioned in prisons following requests by public prosecutors.13 No religious services or moral guidance are provided in hospitals, and most hospitals do not have proper places of worship for patients. In 1995, religious services began to be provided by volunteers in some state hospitals, but this was stopped by the Council of State at the request of the Ankara Chamber of Doctors on the grounds that it violated the principle of secularism.14 There is a core army chaplaincy structure, but this is reserved for times of war and no army chaplains have been appointed since the 1974 war in Cyprus.15

9 Religious Festivals

Turkey observes Qurban Bayram (‘Id al-Adha) and Ramazan Bayram (‘Id al-Fıtr) as national holidays (the first lasting 3.5 days, and sec ond 4.5).16 Since the 1980s, the week that includes 20 April is celebrated as

12 See Kaya, Talha, “Cezaevi Vaizliği (Prison chaplaincy)”, in T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Din Hizmetleri Dairesi Başkanlığı, Din Hizmetleri Sempozyumu (Religious Services Symposium) (3–4 Kasım 2007), Vol. 2 (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2008), pp. 158–159. See also http://www.haber7.com/ haber/20090312/Diya- netten-cezaevlerinde-irsad-hizmeti.php, accessed 12 March 2009. 13 http://www.risalehaber.com/news_detail.php?id=64648, accessed 5 November 2009. 14 See Başar, Serpil, “Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığının Yürüttüğü Cami Dışı Din Hizmetleri Kapsamında Hastanelerde Din Hizmeti İhtiyacı (The Need for the Hospi- tal Chaplaincy within the Context of the non-Mosque-based Religious Services),” in T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Din Hizmetleri Dairesi Başkanlığı, Din Hizmetleri Sem- pozyumu (Religious Services Symposium) (3–4 Kasım 2007), Vol. 1 (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2008), pp. 621–623; also see, İlhan, Ayşegül, “Dünya Hasta- nelerinde Din Hizmetleri (Hospital Chaplaincy in the World),” http://www.onder.org. tr/projeleroku.asp?ID=7, accesssed, 10 March 2009. 15 See Acar, Erkan, “Din İşleri Subayı Ataması NedenYapılmıyor? (Why are No Military Officers Appointed as the Army Chaplains?),”Zaman , 11 May 2005. 16 For the relevant legislation regarding religious holidays, see “Ulusal Bayram ve Genel Tatiller Hakkında Kanun. Kanun no. 2429 (Law on National and Public Holidays. Law no. 2429)”, Official Gazette,no. 17284, 19 March 1981, http://www .alomaliye.com/ulusal_bayram_ve_genel_tatiller_.htm, accessed 6 May 2010. turkey 577 the Week of the Holy Birth of the Prophet Muhammad (Kutlu Doğum Haftası), pioneered by the Diyanet. The first day of this week is named as “gül günü” (the day of the rose), which symbolises the Prophet. In addition, there are other holidays known as kandils that are religiously important and celebrated, though not officially recognised. Apart from kandils, the Day of Ashura is observed by both Sunni and Alevi Mus- lims and all prepare a traditional dessert known as ashura to share with their neighbours. In 2010 for the first time in the Republic’s history, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan joined the commemorations held by the Ja’fari Community in Istanbul.17 Similarly, the Turkish State television, TRT, broadcasted several short videos inspired by the Shi’i-Alevi culture during that month.

10 Halal Food

Food in Turkey is usually prepared according to halal regulations, but in recent years there have been suspicions that some meat products are mixed with pork without being so labelled, a matter of serious concern for the great majority of the population. The Turkish Institute of Standards is working towards a system whereby food products can be certified halal upon request.18 In a public opinion poll conducted in 2010, 66% of the interviewees gave positive response to the question “will the existence of the halal certificate upon a product affect your buying choices?”19 There is no restriction on the slaughter of animals in accordance with Muslim religious and hygiene regulations, provided that the place should be allocated for slaughter by the local (usually municipal) authorities in accordance with the Law on the Protection of Animals.20

17 http://yenisafak.com.tr/Gundem/?i=292884, accessed 08 January 2011. 18 Malatyalı, Kenan, “Helal gıda nedir, ne değildir (Halal food: What it is, and is not)”, TSE Standart Dergisi, Eylül 2007, pp. 6–8. 19 http://www.haber7.com/haber/20101214/Salam-ve-sucukta-guvenmiyoruz-ama- satin-aliyoruz.php, accessed 08 January 2011. 20 For the Law on the Protection of Animals, see http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/ html/1386.html, accessed 7 March 2009. 578 ahmet yildiz

11 Dress Codes

The wearing of head scarves was banned in universities (1984) and by civil servants in public buildings (1982). The debate on this question revolves around whether the head scarf is religious attire or a political symbol, and whether it should be banned to protect the secular foundations of the state or permitted on the basis of individual freedom of religion as a corollary of secularism. The ban is the result of the various decisions of the Turkish Constitutional Court, although there is no law explicitly banning the wearing of head scarf in universities. In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkish universities had the right to ban the head scarf, while in February 2008, Parliament passed constitutional amendments designed to lift the ban on wearing head scarves on university campuses. However, on 5 June 2008, the Constitutional Court ruled that the amendments violated the secular nature of the state and were therefore unconstitutional.21 Apart from the hijab issue, there is also a ban on the wearing of religious attire by men of religion outside their places of worship. Only the leaders of religious non-Muslim communities and the President of the Directorate of the Religious Affairs are entitled to wear their religious attire in public.22

12 Publication and Media

There is an important representation of religious concerns, interests and claims in the media. Currently, the most widely sold daily newspaper is Zaman, which is known to be affiliated to the Gülen community. Apart from Zaman, dailies such as Yeni Şafak, Türkiye, Milli Gazete, Anadolu’da Vakit, Yeni Asya and Türkiye Gazetesi are known

21 Şentop, Mustafa, “Headscarf ban: A quest for the solution”, SETA Policy Brief 8, March 2008, available at http://www.setav.org/public/HaberDetay.aspx? Dil=tr&hid=7253&q=the-headscarf-ban-a-quest-for-solutions Mustafa_Sentop.pdf, accessed 6 May 2010. For the relevant legislation, see Article 17 of the Law on Higher Education, No. 2547, issued in the Official Gazette, 6 November 1981, No. 17506. For the relevant legislation regarding the wearing of the headscarf in state institutions, see the Articles 5 and 10 of the Regulation on the Dress of Public Employees, issued in the Official Gazette, 25 October 1982, No. 17849. 22 For the relevant legislation, see the Law Banning the Wearing of Some Attires (Law No. 2596), issued in the Official Gazette, 13 December 1934, No. 2879. turkey 579 to be affiliated to religious groups. There are also ‘Islamist’ colum- nists who write in some mainstream, non-religious newspapers such as Bugün, Star and Radikal. Aksiyon news magazine is among the most widely read Islamic weeklies. Among the national television channels sensitive to religious concerns, Samanyolu is among the top five most watched national television channels. Kanal 7, TGRT Haber, Ülke TV, Kanal A, TV NET, Ses TV, TV 5, Hilal TV, Dost TV are known to be affiliated to Mus- lim religious groups. There are, of course, various representations of Islamic topics on other television channels too. Two news agencies with religious roots, Cihan Haber Ajansı (Cihan News Agency, CHA) and İhlas Haber Ajansı (İhlas News Agency, İHA) are among the most important news agencies in the country. Burç FM, Radyo 15, Akra FM, Moral FM, TGRT FM may be counted as national radio stations with an Islamic orientation.

13 Family Law

The Turkish Civil Code prescribes equality between men and women in all respects, including role sharing within marriage, although the husband is considered to be the de facto head of the family. In practice, however, polygamous relationships and, more frequently, purely religious (i.e. officially unregistered) marriage ceremonies, still take place. The Civil Code does not recognise religious marriage contracts and no religious rituals are permitted during the official, secular wedding ceremony, but a religious marriage ceremony commonly takes place parallel to the official procedures. Muslims in Turkey are not permit ted by law to conduct marriage ceremonies in mosques, nor are imams (men of religion) entitled to register marriage contracts. ‘Honour killings’ and early religious marriages still occur. Adultery is not considered a crime, but is seen as a factor to be considered in divorce suits. According to the civil code, men and women are equal in terms of their entitlement to inheritance. The legal (and court) system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is irrelevant in litigation. In practice, however, in more traditional areas females are often prevented from receiving their share of an inheritance, or receive a smaller portion than male members of the family. 580 ahmet yildiz

14 Interreligious Relations

The most important interreligious occasion is the attendance of the President of Religious Affairs and the religious leaders of non-Muslim minorities, i.e., Orthodox Christians, Armenians and Jews, at iftar dinners during the months of Ramadan. In terms of public opinion, there is strong support for interreligious dialogue on the part of both the Presidency of Religious Affairs and some Muslim communities, particularly the followers of Bediuzza- man Said Nursi. Some neo-Kemalist and nationalist religious groups vehemently oppose the interreligious dialogue discourse on suspicion of underlying missionary activities, imperialism and alleged syncre- tism. Overall, there are few serious problems between communities of different religions. The locus of problems in terms of interreligious relations is not between communities but between the state and communities.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The year 2010 was a very eventful year in terms of the public debate. The dismissal of Ayşe Sucu, the President of the Women Branch of the Diyanet Foundation, on 24 November led to a public debate. Those who criticized this dismissal argued that Mrs Sucu was removed from her office because of her modernist stance while others countered this claim by pointing to her relations with Kemalist establishment.23 The invitation of V.S. Naipul as a keynote speaker to the European Writers Parliament held in Istanbul in November triggered great criticism. A cluster of writers led by the columnist Hilmi Yavuz argued that this invitation must be cancelled on the ground that Naipul espouses pejorative views regarding Islam. In the aftermath of this vivid debate, Naipul proclaimed that he would not attend the Conference.24

23 See http://bianet.org/bianet/din/126859-ayse-sucunun-yerine-atama-yapildi, accessed 07 November 2011, and for this debate, see, for example, this evaluation:http:// www.stargazete.com/gazete/yazar/hidayet-sefkatli-tuksal/medyada-ayse-sucu- depremi–319547.htm, accessed 7 January 2011. 24 For the debate, see http://sanat.milliyet.com.tr/edebiyat-dunyasinda-naipaul- gerilimi/edebiyatkitap/haberdetay/19.11.2010/1316082/default.htm, accessed 7 Janu- ary 2011. turkey 581

During the year, one of the most important public debates evolved around the removal of hijab restriction for university students. YÖK, the Turkish Higher Education Board, following an incident in Istan- bul University sent a declaration to the university rectorates that dress styles including hijab use by university students cannot be used as a pretext or valid ground to prevent them to attend classes or exams. This created a cumulative effect. Rectorates of many universities com- plied with this interpretation and removed the hijab ban on university campuses in de facto terms. The Republican People’s Party, the main opposition party known for its ardent secularist position, declared that it will support this decision provided that the government take a legal initiative to limit the liberty of hijab use to universities.25 In the Preliminary Report on the Alevi Workshops, initiated in 2009 and submitted to the Prime Ministry in 2010, it is emphasized that Alevism is an intra-Islam belief and rituals system based on the trio of “Hak-Muhammad-Ali”. Reorganisation of the Presidency of Religious Affairs as a non-denominational supra-body, instead of compulsory religious education courses, the adoption of voluntary religious education both for Sunnis and Alevis accompanied by compulsory religion courses free of indoctrination, and conferral of the same privileges mosques hold before the state to Cemevis, the Alevi ritual houses, without recognising them the status of the place of worship, however were the main points underlined in the report.26 The European Court of Human Rights upon a suit filed by a Turkish Alevi judged that the rejection of the entry of Alevism in the section of “religion” in identity cards is incompatible with freedom of religion.27 The decision was heavily criticised byTürkiye Diyanet ve Vakıf Görevlileri Sendikası (Turkish Employees of Religion and Foundations, Diyanet-Sen), a branch of Memur-Sen, the biggest civil servants syndi- cate in Turkey, on the ground that Alevism is not a separate religion distinct from Islam.28

25 http://www.haber7.com/foto-galeri.php?s=7&cID=8747, accessed 7 January 2011. 26 For a summary of the Report, see Anatolia News Agency, “The Preliminary Alevi Report,” 7 February 2010. 27 http://www.haberx.com/Dunya-Haberleri/Subat–2010/AIHMden-kimlikte-din- hanesi-karari.aspx, accessed 8 January 2011. 28 http://www.haberx.com/Gundem-Haberleri/Subat–2010/Diyanet-Sen-Din- hanesine-Alevi-yazilamaz.aspx, accessed 8 January 2011. 582 ahmet yildiz

16 Major Cultural Events

The Islamic practice of circumcision takes place in Turkish tradition at the age of 6–8. It has become the occasion for major family celebrations with attached ceremonial activities in which the boy is dressed in colourful, often military-style, clothes. The month of Ramadan preceding ‘Id al-Fitr creates a special atmosphere throughout the country, and book fairs organised by the Diya- net Foundation have become a complementary part of this. The Hajj, occurring at the same time as ‘Id al-Adha, also creates a very particular countrywide religious awareness. The Week of the Holy Birth of the Prophet celebrated in the third week of April under the auspices of the Diyanet, the Hacı Bektaş Festival in August celebrated by the Turkish Alevi community, and Ashura, complemented by the Muharram fast, particularly marked by Shi’is, may also be cited as important cultural events. The Commemorative Ceremony for Mevlana, the great Sufi saint (1207–1273), held every year in Konya, the ancient Seljuk capital, in the month of December, is one of the world’s greatest spectacles. More than a million people visit the city for this festival of Sema (the ‘Whirl- ing Dervishes’). UKRAINE

Elmira Muratova1

1 Muslim Populations

The number of Muslims in Ukraine is the subject of a certain amount of speculation. Muslim leaders and other interested parties insist that there are 1.5–2 million Muslims in the country, although the 2001 national census recorded only 436,000 Muslims by birth (0.9% of the population).2 There are 40 ethnic groups that traditionally practise Islam, the biggest being Crimean Tatars (248,000), Volga-Ural Tatars (73,000) and Azerbaijanis (45,000). The Crimean Tatars constitute about 57% of the all Ukrainian Muslims. They are the only indigenous Muslim people of Ukraine, having settled in the territory of the modern Crimean Autonomous Republic in the early fifteenth century. Today the Crimean Tatars live mostly in the Crimea, Kherson and Zapor- ozhe regions. The Ukrainian communities of the Volga-Ural Tatars appeared during the industrialisation of the Donbas area in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Today they predominately live in the Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson regions. The majority of the Azerbaijanis settled in the eastern regions of the country—Donetsk, Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk.3 The history of Islam in Ukraine is related to the history of the expansion and development of the religion in the Crimean peninsula. Islam came to Crimea with Muslim traders and Sufi missionaries from Asia Minor in the ninth to eleventh centuries. During the Crimean Khanate (1443–1783) Islam became the state religion. For several centuries Crimea was the centre of Muslim culture in the region, and a

1 Dr. Elmira Muratova is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Taurida National V.I. Vernadsky University, Simferopol, Ukraine. 2 CD “Natsional’nyi sklad naselennya Ukrainy ta yogo movni oznaki za danymi Vseukrains’kogo perepisu naselennya 2001 roku” (CD “National make-up of the Ukrai- nian population and its language features based on the 2001 All-Ukrainian census”) (Kiev: Derjkomstat, 2003). 3 Bogomolov, A. et al., Islams’ka identichnist’ v Ukra’ini (Islamic Identity in Ukraine) (Kiev: AMES Publishers, 2005), pp. 16–23. 584 elmira muratova huge number of mosques, madrasas, mektebes (elementary schools), and mausoleums were set up. By the end of the eighteenth century there were about 1,600 mosques, 25 madrasas and a lot of mektebes in Crimea.4 The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Empire in the late eighteenth century was a considerable blow to the independent and consistent development of Islam. The mass emigration of the Crimean Tatars resulted in many villages being abandoned and mosques, madrasas and mektebes closed down. By 1914, there were only 729 mosques left in Crimea and the number of Muslim clergy fell to 942.5 Soviet power delivered the final blow to the development of Islam in Crimea. By 1940, there were no active mosques in the peninsula; many were closed on the pretext that they were in a poor condition and turned into clubs, grocery stores, schools, etc. In May 1944, the remaining Muslim population of Crimea (about 200,000 people) were deported from their homeland to the Central Asian republics. The return of Crimean Tatars and collapse of the USSR contributed to the current Islamic revival in Crimea.

2 Islam and the State

Ukraine is a secular state where religion is separated from the state and the education system. According to the relatively liberal law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations” (Pro svobodu sovisti ta religiini organizatsii) passed in 1991, a religious community may be registered if it has a minimum membership of ten adults over the age of 18. On the basis of this law, 557 Muslim communities were registered in Ukraine by early 2010.6 The legislation on religion also includes two acts which were issued to help religious organisations

4 Aleksandrov, I., O musul’manskom dukhovenstve i upravlenii dukhovnymi delami musul’man v Krymu posle ego prisoyedineniya k Rossii (On Muslim clergy and Mus- lims affairs’ spiritual administration in Crimea after its annexation to Russia) (Simf- eropol: Tipografiya Tavricheskogo gubernskogo zemstva, 1914), p. 8. 5 Krichinsky, A., Ocherki russkoi politiki na okrainakh: k istorii religioznykh pritesnenii krymskikh tatar (Essays on Russian policy at the margins: towards a history of the religious oppression of the Crimean Tatars) (Baku: Izdanie soyuza musul’manskoi trudovoi intelligentsii, 1919), chapter 1, p. 43. 6 Report on the network of churches and religious organisations in Ukraine at 1st January 2010, Committee on the nationalities and religions affairs, Department of state-religious relations and freedom of conscience (www.scnm.gov.ua). ukraine 585 to repossess property taken from them under the Soviet regime. They are the Presidential Edict “On measures to return religious property to religious organisations” (Про заходи щодо повернення релігійним організаціям культового майна) issued in 1992 and the second Presidential Edict “On urgent measures on the final settlement of the negative consequences of the totalitarian policy of the former USSR toward religion and restoration of violated rights of churches and religious organisations” (Про невідкладні заходи щодо остаточного подолання негативних наслідків тоталітарної політики колишнього Союзу РСР стосовно релігії та відновлення порушених прав церков і релігійних організації) issued in 2002. Under this legislation, Ukrainian Muslims have regained part of their religious property. National religious policy is viewed positively by Muslims, but there is dissatisfaction with the policies of local authorities. For example, Crimean Tatar leaders complain that the Crimean authorities have discriminated against Muslim communities, accusing them, among other things, of sabotaging the above mentioned Presidential Edicts, treating representatives of Orthodox Christianity and Islam unequally with respect to involvement in state and regional events, delaying the allocation of land for the central mosque in Simferopol, and not giving official recognition to the Muslim festivals ofOraza-bayram (‘Id al-Fitr) and Qurban-bayram (‘Id al-Adha).7

3 Main Muslim Organisations

The main Ukrainian Muslim organisations fall into three categories: spiritual boards, charitable organisations and political organisations. There are six Muslim spiritual boards in Ukraine:

• The Crimean Muslim Spiritual Board Dukhovnoye( Upravleniye Musul’man Kryma, DUMK, 4, Kurchatova St, Simferopol, Crimea, tel./fax (3800652) 274353, http://www.qirimmuftiyat.org.ua) was established in 1992 in Simferopol. It is one of the biggest Muslim

7 Muratova, Elmira, Islam v sovremennom Krymu: indikatory i problemy protsessa vozrozhdeniya (Islam in Present-day Crimea: Indicators and Problems of the Process of Revival) (Simferopol’: Elinio, 2008), pp. 174–175. 586 elmira muratova

spiritual centres in Ukraine. By January 2010, it included 350 officially registered Muslim communities (62.8% of the total number in Ukraine) and is often called the “Crimean Tatar Muftiate”. • The Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Board Dukhovnoye( Upravleniye Musul’man Ukrainy, DUMU, 46, Luk’yanovskaya St, Kiev, 04071, tel. (38044) 4651877, http://www.islamyat.org) was registered in 1992 in Kiev. It includes 94 Muslim communities of various ethnic backgrounds registered in different regions of Ukraine. Since its inception, it has had only one leader—native Lebanese and now Ukrainian citizen sheikh Akhmed Tamim, who has a background in the Ahbash movement.8 • The Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Centre (Dukhovny Tsentr Musul’man Ukrainy, DTMU, 1, Prospekt Marshala Zhukova, Donetsk, 83071, tel./fax (380622) 521815) was created in 1995 in Donetsk. It coordinates the activities of 19 Muslim communities established mostly by Volga-Ural Tatars who live mostly in the Donbas area. • The Religious Board of Independent Muslim Communities of Ukraine “Kiev Muftiate” Religioznoye( Upravleniye Nezavisimykh Musul’manskikh Obshin Ukrainy “Kievskiy Muftiat”, RUNMOU, 10-A, Nevskaya St, Tatarskiy Dom, Kiev 03062, tel./fax (38044) 5013778, http://kievmuftiyat.wordpress.com) was registered in 2007 in Kiev. It unites 12 registered and 16 non-registered Mus- lim communities of the Volga-Ural Tatars who did not want to join any of the existing spiritual boards and has strong connections with Russian Muslim leaders. • The Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Board “Umma” Dukhovnoye( Upravleniye Musul’man Ukrainy “Umma”, DUMU, 25-A Deht- yarivska St, Kiev, 04119, tel. (38044) 4909900, http://www.umma. in.ua) was established in 2008 in Kiev. It now includes 19 Muslim communities of multi-ethnic origin (many of them native Ukrai- nian or Russian converts to Islam). • The Crimean Muslim Spiritual Centre Dukhovny( Tsentr Musul’man Kryma, DTMK, apt. 39, 60 Let Oktyabrya St. 20, Sim- feropol, 95000, tel. (38050) 1314601) was created in December 2010 in Simferopol. It unites Muslim communities of the Crimean Tatars who disagree with the position of the DUMK. Ideologically it is close to the leadership of the DUMU.

8 See http://2000.net.ua/2000/forum/9652, accessed 31 May 2011. ukraine 587

Of charitable organisations, one of the most active is the All-Ukrainian Association of Public Organisations “Alraid” (25-A Dehtyarivska St, Kiev 04119, tel. (38044) 4909900, http://www.arraid.org). It was established in 1997 and has 20 member organisations in various regions of Ukraine. Ideologically, it gravitates towards the European Council for Fatwas and Research (ECFR). The organisation contributes to the development of Islamic education and mosque construction, and initi- ates charitable projects to help the poor, orphans and widows. “Alraid” cooperates closely with Ukrainian Muslim Spiritual Board “Umma”. An active political organisation is the Hizb ut-Tahrir (http:// qirim-vilayeti.com). Although it is not officially registered, its followers (mostly Crimean Tatars) organise conferences (there have been five such conferences during the last three years) and control some Crimean mosques. It represents the so called ‘Islamic opposition’ to the national Crimean Tatar Medzhlis and DUMK.

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

As at early 2010, there were 89 new mosques in Ukraine (81 of them in Crimea) and 14 mosques under construction. Sixty-six old mosques have been rebuilt, renovated and returned to use (54 of them in Crimea). There are another 244 buildings throughout Ukraine in use as Muslim prayer spaces.9 Among the biggest problems facing mosques in Ukraine is bureau- cracy, so most of them function without the necessary permits and many were built without planning permission or the appropriate land documentation. For example, only thirteen new mosques in Crimea have the necessary documentation, and only five or six Muslim communities have formally registered the land on which their mosque is built. Thus the majority of mosques in Crimeade jure do not exist and can be treated as derelict buildings.10 The Crimean authorities impose

9 Report on the network of churches and religious organisations in Ukraine at 1st January 2010, Committee on the nationalities and religions affairs, Department of state-religious relations and freedom of conscience (www.scnm.gov.ua). 10 “Islam—real’nyi faktor obshestvennoi jizni—interv’yu s zamestitelem predse- datelya Respublikanskogo komiteta Avtonomnoi respubliki Krym po delam religii A. Bulatovym (Islam is a real factor of public life—interview with the deputy head of the Republican committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea on religion affairs A. Bulatov)”, Golos Kryma, 12 October 2009. 588 elmira muratova a penalty of 50% of the construction costs on religious organisations that use buildings without appropriate documentation.

5 Children’s Education

The school system in Ukraine is separated from the church so religious subjects used not to be taught in schools. However, several years ago the Orthodox Church introduced a course on “The basics of Ortho- dox culture” to be taught on an optional basis in Ukrainian schools. This initiative met with opposition from Crimean Muslims, who did not want their children to take this course at school, and the Crimean Tatar organisations designed a programme of the course on “The basics of Muslim culture”, which is now taught in schools where the language of instruction is Crimean Tatar. There are 125 Qur’an or Sunday schools in Ukraine where basic Arabic and the fundamentals of Islam are offered to anyone wishing to attend.11

6 Islam in Higher and Professional Education

There are eight Muslim educational institutions in Ukraine which provide imam and hafiz training with currently approximately 200 students.12 The biggest madrasa in Crimea, Kalai“ ”, founded in the village of Azovskoye by the private foundation Aziz Makhmud Hyudai, has been functioning since 1998. It runs a three-year course that is free for students, and has separate departments for men and women. Subjects taught include the Qur’an, the fundamentals of worship, Islamic ethics, the life of the Prophet Muhammad, Islamic law, Sufism, Turkish and Arabic. On graduation, students normally receive a diploma that qualifies them as imams.13 There are also two hafiz schools in Crimea which concentrate on teaching students to memorise the whole Qur’an. One

11 Report on the network of churches and religious organisations in Ukraine by 1st January 2010, Committee on the nationalities and religions affairs, Department of state-religious relations and freedom of conscience (www.scnm.gov.ua). 12 Report on the network of churches and religious organisations in Ukraine at 1st January 2010, Committee on the nationalities and religions affairs, Department of state-religious relations and freedom of conscience (www.scnm.gov.ua). 13 Muratova, Elmira, “‘He who pays the piper calls the tune’: Muslim sponsors of Islamic revival in Crimea”, Religion, State and Society, vol. 37, no. 3 (2009), p. 268. ukraine 589 has functioned since 2002 with the support of Alraid and the other since 2008 with the help of Aziz Makhmud Hyudai. There were two other institutions in Crimea that previously functioned as madrasas (“Seit-Settar” and the Higher Islamic madrasa) but were later down- graded to ‘Sunday schools’. The madrasa in Kiev was established by the RUNMOU “Kiev muftiate” with the support of Russian Muslims. In 2010 DUMK opened a new madrasa in Saki (Crimea). It has a single male department designed for 20 boys. There is one Islamic university in Ukraine, founded in Kiev in 1993 by DUMU. It has a Department of Shari’a and the Basics of Religion and a Department of Education and Eastern Linguistics. The programme is based on materials provided by the Association of Islamic Charitable Projects (http://www.aicp.org).14

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Muslims in Ukraine face certain problems regarding cemeteries. There are no major difficulties where there are significant Muslim populations, as in the Crimea, but in other places the situation is quite sensitive. In the major cities, such as Kiev or Kharkov, it is quite difficult for commercial reasons to acquire land for use as a cemetery, so Muslims often have to bury their dead in public cemeteries. In 2008, there were several acts of vandalism at Muslim cemeteries in Crimea.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

There are no imams or priests in state institutions—hospitals, prisons or armed forces.

9 Religious Festivals

Oraza-bayram (‘Id al-Fitr) and Qurban-bayram (‘Id al-Adha) are celebrated communally at Islamic centres, and privately. They do not have official status like some Orthodox festivals. This irritates Mus- lims, who insist that the state should adopt a neutral position towards

14 Bogomolov et al., Islams’ka identichnist’ v Ukra’ini, pp. 80–81. 590 elmira muratova the major religions in Ukraine. In 1993, the Council of Ministries of Crimea took a decision to declare the first day of Muslim festivals a holiday for Muslims. This gave Muslims the right to a day off work or school, while the rest of the Crimean population has to follow their regular schedule. At the initiative of the Crimean Tatars on 20 October 2010 the deputies of the Crimean parliament requested the President of Ukraine and the speaker of the Ukrainian parliament to introduce amendments into the labour law in order to give Muslim festivals a regional status in the peninsula.15 But the decision has not been taken yet. Ukrainian Muslims also celebrate Mawlid—the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. In 2010 the celebrations were organised in Crimea (by Alraid and the DUMK), in Donbas area (by Alraid and the DUMU “Umma”) and in its communities across the country by DUMU.

10 Access to Halal Food

The halal industry is well developed in areas with significant Muslim populations—in Crimea, Kiev, Kharkov, Donetsk. There are places in the markets, special shops and cafés where Muslims can buy halal products. For example, there are about ten fashionable cafés and restaurants in Crimea that serve Crimean Tatar cuisine compliant with Islamic norms. The situation is different in Western Ukraine, where the number of Muslims is rather small. The Muslim spiritual organisations intend to regulate the halal industry.16

11 Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting the wearing of Muslim dress in public, including in educational establishments. But while opportunities are ample for other professions, not many businesses in Ukraine are

15 Seitkhalilov Y., Neobkhodimo zakrepit’ v zakone sovmestnoe prazdnovanie khris- tianskikh i musul’manskikh prazdnikov (The joint celebration of Christian and Muslim festivals should be fixed in the law), www.qha.com.ua/haber.php?id=80598. 16 http://www.trademaster.com.ua/134/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1152&cHash=3881 a786a9, http://islam.com.ua/news/6248/. ukraine 591

prepared to hire a woman in hijab.17 It is quite common to see women wearing hijab in the streets of Crimea, especially younger generation Crimean Tatars. However, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has issued an instruction that hijab may not be worn for photographs used for passports. This was strongly opposed by Crimean Muslims and, at the end of 2009 they started to collect signatures on a petition to challenge the instruction through the courts. There were several court hearings of the case brought by Crimean Muslims against the Ministry of Inter- nal Affairs of Ukraine in 2010. The last one took place in June and ended with the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ instruction being upheld.

12 Publication and Media

Four of the spiritual boards in Ukraine have their own periodicals. The DUMK publishes a newspaper, Hidaet (Straight path), the DUMU the newspaper Minaret, RUNMOU “Kievskiy Muftiyat” issues a journal Ukraina i Islamskiy mir (Ukraine and Islamic World), and the DUMU “Umma” publishes the newspaper Umma (http://ummainua.wordpress .com/2009/05/28/gazeta1, accessed 9 January 2011). The “Alraid” Association issues the newspaper Alraid (http://gazeta.arraid.org) and runs a number of websites. Hizb ut-Tahrir publishes the newspaper Vozrodzdenie (Revival, http://vozrojdenie.crimea.ua) and has a website. Every Friday, representatives of the DUMK participate in a television programme Azan sedasy (The voice of azan) in which they talk about the basic tenets of Islam and current issues in Crimean society. The DUMK have published several books, the most recent being a book of sermons for imams written in Crimean Tatar, Minberden yukselgen ses (The voice reaching from minber). The DUMU publishing house “Al-Irshad” has published several dozen books on various topics, many of them devoted to the prevention of extremism. There are two translations of the Qur’an into Ukrainian, one from Russian by Valeriy Basyrov, and another one from English by Myhailo Yakubovych.

17 Muslim women navigate cultural, religious divides with beliefs intact, http:// www.kyivpost.com/news/guide/general/detail/78131/#ixzz0wllDWasx. 592 elmira muratova

13 Family Law

As well as civil marriage, Ukrainian Muslims contract Islamic marriages, nikah, which may be conducted in a mosque or in the home by an imam, who after the ceremony issues a certificate. These certificates are not recognised by the state.

14 Interreligious Relations

The leaders of Muslim spiritual centres are members of the All-Ukrai- nian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations created in 1996 in Kiev. This is a representative interfaith consultative body which ini- tiates meetings with high-ranking officials to discuss various issues of religious life in Ukraine. For example, a current issue is the question of improving the existing Law on Freedom of Conscience and Reli- gious Organisations. In 1992, an interfaith council called “Peace is a gift of God” Mir—dar( Bozhii) was created in Crimea. The DUMK was a member of this council until 2000, when conflict arose between the Muslim and Orthodox (Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Mos- cow Patriarchate) communities over the massive project for erecting crosses in Crimea. In June 2010 there was a new conflict around cross erecting in Bakhchisarai region of Crimea. The cross was erected along the roadway without the permission of the local authorities and provoked a protest of the local Muslim community. After the intervention of representatives of the regional authorities the cross was moved into the vicinity of the local church. Several Crimean mosques became an object of vandalism in the latter half of 2010, with a couple of mosques being set alight and two others subjected to vandalism.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

Coverage of Islam in the non-Muslim media is mostly within the context of extremism and terrorism associated with Muslims at the international level. It often happens during election campaigns in Crimea when politicians use the ‘Islamic card’ in order to mobilise the pro- Russian electorate by appealing to anti-Tatar or anti-Islamic feelings. In 2010 the issue of Islamic radicalism was raised several times by ukraine 593 representatives of several Cossack organisations warning against various networks of ‘radicals’.18

16 Major Cultural Events

There are annual competitions in Qur’an recitation organised by Alraid and DUMK. There is also a competition of researches dedicated to Islam organised by the Ukrainian centre of Islamic studies with the support of Alraid.

18 Netraditsionnyi islam v Krymu: kak voznikayut ‘goryachie tochki’ (Non-traditional Islam in Crimea: how ‘hot spots’ appear), www.novoross.info/5444-netradicionnyj- islam-v-krymu-kak-voznikayut-goryachie-tochki.html; Ne vashimi molitvami: Krym— ne Porta (Not your prayers: Crimea—not Porta), www.novoross.info/5809-ne-vashimi- molitvami-krym-ne-porta.html.

UNITED KINGDOM

Seán McLoughlin1

1 Muslim Populations

In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), Islam is the second largest religious grouping. While the most recent census of 2001, the first to include a question on religion since 1851, identified a total of 1,591,000 Muslims living in the UK, new estimates in September 2010 were published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) based on data from the Integrated Household Survey (IHS).2 The data on religion excludes Northern Ireland,3 but with an estimated Muslim population of 4.2% overall (4.7% in England and 1.2% in Wales and Scotland), the overall numbers projected were 2,520,000. This is smaller than another 2010 estimate, The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life’s figure of 2,869,000 (4.6% of population).4 Historically, the first significant numbers of Muslims to arrive in the UK were mainly Kashmiri and Bengali ‘lascars’ (merchant navy sailors) who jumped ship or were stranded in London and other ports having been employed by the British East India Company from the late eighteenth century.5 The Indians were later followed by Yemeni sailors, employed after 1869 in Aden; initially they settled in ports such as Liverpool, South Shields and Swansea, with some eventually moving

1 Dr Seán McLoughlin is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Theology and Reli- gious Studies at the University of Leeds. Information on Northern Ireland was supplied by Victoria Montgomery (see Ireland). The author is grateful to Dr Tahir Abbas for his work on previous versions of this report, some of which is retained here. 2 An excellent hub for statistical data and related commentary is British Religion in Numbers (BRIN): www.brin.ac.uk/news/?p=603, accessed 13 March 2011. 3 Belfast Islamic Centre’s annual report (2009–10) estimates 8–10,000 Muslims living in Northern Ireland: www.belfastislamiccentre.org.uk/NR/images/doct/BIC%20 Annual%20Report_2009–2010%20%282%29%20%283%29.pdf, accessed 15 April 2011. 4 See http://features.pewforum.org/muslim/number-of-muslims-in-western-europe. html, while BRIN commentary can be found at: www.brin.ac.uk/news/?p=598, accessed 13 March 2011. 5 Ansari, Humayun, The Infidel Within: The History of Muslims in Britain, 1800 to the Present (London: Hurst, 2004). 596 seán mcloughlin on to major industrial cities.6 The end of World War II saw significant migration to the UK from its former colonies, including those regions of the newly partitioned subcontinent from which chain migration had been established by the lascars, as well as Indian soldiers who had fought in World War I. As a result, thousands of Muslim men of mainly peasant farming background took up unskilled work in British factories and mills from the 1950s. Most Muslims in the UK are therefore the British-born descendants of immigrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. Pakistanis, at 43% of the Muslim total based on the 2001 census, form the dominant ethno-national sub-population, with the majority hailing from the disputed territory of Kashmir. Other smaller ethnic minorities come from West and East Africa (the latter usually stemming from late nineteenth- century and twentieth-century Gujarati migrants to present-day Kenya, Uganda and beyond), Cyprus and across the Middle East. Many Mus- lim communities, especially those of Bangladeshi and Kashmiri origin, have low incomes, poor health and housing conditions, limited educational success and relatively high unemployment amongst men and low participation in the labour market amongst women.7 East African Asians tend to be more socially mobile, and London is host to a high number of often very wealthy Arabs. More recent arrivals have been refugees, especially from Somalia and Iraq. Muslims remain concentrated in urban areas; the 2001 Census showed that around 40% are settled in London, forming 8.5% of the city’s population, with the highest concentrations in the boroughs of Tower Hamlets (36.40%), Newham (24.31%) and Waltham Forest (15.07%).8 Outside of London, Birmingham (14.3%) has the highest total numbers of Muslims, but it is northern towns such as Black- burn (19.4%) and Bradford (16.1%) that have the most significant concentrations. As for attempts to measure the religiosity of Britain’s Muslim population, the government’s Citizenship Survey of adults aged 16 plus suggests that four-fifths in England and Wales claimed to be ‘practising’ while only 32% of Christians did. Another study ‘records claimed

6 Halliday, Fred, The Yemeni Community in Britain(London: I.B. Tauris, 1992). 7 Peach, Ceri, “Muslims in the 2001 census of England and Wales: Gender and economic disadvantage”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 29, no. 4 (2006), pp. 629–655. 8 Ibid. united kingdom 597 weekly attendance at services amongst Muslims as higher than one- quarter, 30% for 18–34 year olds and 50% for over–35s’.9 Based on a survey of over 250 London mosques, a report from Swansea University, A Minority within a Minority, claimed that in 2010 alone there were over 5,000 conversions to Islam in the UK, the overall number of Muslim converts being said to have topped 100,000 overall (compared to 61,000 in 2001), with women in the majority (Times Online, 29 May 2010).10

2 Islam and the State

There is no common legal or constitutional regime governing the status of religion in the UK: each constituent country has its own arrangements.11 Although there is no written constitution, the accumulated legal tradition, and most recently the Human Rights Act (1998), guarantee freedom of religion and religious practice within the limits of public order. There is no established religion in Wales, Northern Ire- land or Scotland although in the case of the latter the monarch has a privileged status in relation to the Reformed (Calvinist) Church of Scotland. In England, the monarch is the head of the Church of Eng- land (Anglican) and, through the Prime Minister’s Office, appoints its bishops, some of whom are ex officio members of the House of Lords, the upper chamber of Parliament. Each of the other main traditional churches of England, both various Protestant denominations and Roman Catholics, as well as Jews, has a particular status established by legislation. Other smaller and more recently arrived religious communities, including Muslims, tend to register as private associations, or ‘companies’ under the Companies Act or ‘charities’ with the Chari- ties Commission. Most Muslim migrants of the 1950s and 1960s entered the UK with the nationality of countries within the Commonwealth of Britain’s former colonies. These Commonwealth citizens had full political rights and could thus vote and stand as candidates in local and national elections. During the 1970s and 1980s, the majority were able to acquire

9 See www.brin.ac.uk/news/?m=201010, accessed 13 March 2011. 10 See also www.brin.ac.uk/news/?m=201012, accessed 13 March 2011. 11 Weller, Paul, Time for a Change: Reconfiguring Religion, State and Society (London: T&T Clark, 2005). 598 seán mcloughlin

UK citizenship (Britain allows multiple citizenship), and children born in the UK acquire citizenship by birth. Currently, the vast majority of Muslims in Britain are UK citizens. The exceptions are those who have arrived as refugees from outside the Commonwealth since the 1980s. Until the last decade or so, the official UK response to migrant communities has not been formulated in terms of religion.12 The Race Rela- tions Act (1976) was designed to combat discrimination on grounds of ‘race’ and ethnic origin but the courts did not interpret this to include religion (although Jews and Sikhs are protected as ‘ethnic’ groups). During the 1980s, policy-making under the rubric of multiculturalism eventually offered greater, if ad hoc, local recognition for Muslims in arenas such as education, especially where there was a large community. In 1992, under a Conservative administration, the Department of Environment, in collaboration with the Church of England and the Interfaith Network for the UK (IFNUK), formed the Inner Cities Reli- gious Council (ICRC) as the first government forum for multi-faith representation on a national level and with a view to tapping into religious communities’ resources as a part of urban regeneration.13 In 1997, when New Labour came to power, government engaged ‘faith’ much more publicly and controversially, so much so that it was possible to speak of a ‘faith relations industry’ which was the responsibility of the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and seen as a way of encouraging a policy of ‘community cohesion’.14 An Act of 2006 also finally made it an offence to ‘incite to religious hatred’ after two previously unsuccessful attempts to pass the legislation. Since the events of ‘7/7’ (the terrorist attacks on London of 7 July 2005), state relations with Muslims have been conducted almost entirely in terms of counter-terrorism strategy including a ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ (PVE) strand.15 However, a cross-party committee of MPs concluded in early 2010 that the DCLG’s work as part of PVE

12 Modood, Tariq, Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005). 13 McLoughlin, Seán, “The state, new Muslim leaderships and Islam as a resource for engagement in Britain”, in Jocelyne Cesari and Seán McLoughlin (eds.), European Muslims and the Secular State (Farnham: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 55–69. 14 McLoughlin, “The state, new Muslim leaderships.” 15 Cf. also Lewis, Philip, Young, British and Muslim (London: Continuum, 2007) which discusses the response of various Muslim organisations to the issues raised by ‘7/7’. united kingdom 599 was ‘doing more harm than good’ (Independent, 31 March 2010) and had failed to demonstrate value for money.16 In related coverage during 2010, Labour Home Secretary Alan Johnson banned Islam4UK, a small Islamic organisation with roots in revolutionary Islamists, al-Muhajiroun,17 making membership a criminal offence punishable with a 10-year prison sentence. 2010 also marked the end of the New Labour era with a Conser- vative/Liberal-Democrat coalition government elected following a general election in May. 90 Muslim candidates, including 22 women, stood for election, the number of Muslim MPs finally doubling to eight (6 Labour, 2 Conservative) including the first three Muslim women MPs (Muslim News, 7 May 2010). Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, a peer in the House of Lords since 2007, also became Co-Chair of the Conserva- tive Party and the first Muslim woman to sit in the British cabinet. The new government announced a review of counter-terror legislation, in line with its commitment to introducing a Freedom Bill. In this regard it will also review the use of stop and search powers in section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000.18

3 Main Muslim Organisations

Inaugurated in 1997, the year that New Labour came to power with a new interest in faith as social capital, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB, PO Box 57330, London E1 2WJ, tel: 00 44 (0)845 26 26 786, www.mcb.org.uk) quickly established itself as the first Muslim port of call for government.19 Partly as a result of MCB lobbying, the government agreed to include religion as an identity category in the 2001 census. Closely associated with the MCB, in 2007, Scottish Muslims announced an umbrella body to represent their interests, the Muslim Council of Scotland (MCS, 27 Arlington Street, Glasgow, G3 6DT, tel: 00 44 (0)799 933 3850, www.mcscotland.org). There is also a Muslim Council of Wales (Broadway House, Broadway, Cardiff CF24 1PU, tel: 00 44 (0)2920 487667, www.muslimcouncilwales.org.uk/index

16 For a useful summary see www.policyresearch.org.uk/policyfocus/Prevent Inquiry0310.php, accessed 23 July 2010. 17 On al-Muhajiroun, see Wictorowicz, Quintan, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). 18 www.emel.com/blog/2010/08/100-days-of-coalition/, accessed 13 March 2011. 19 McLoughlin, “The state, new Muslim leaderships”. 600 seán mcloughlin

.html), while the main organisation serving Muslims in Northern Ire- land is the Belfast Islamic Centre (BIC, 38 Wellington Park, Belfast, BT9 6DN, tel: 00 44 (0)2890 664465, www.belfastislamiccentre.org.uk/ NR), established in 1978. A major Twelver Shi’ite group with roots in Iraq, the Al-Khoei Foundation (Stone Hall, Chevening Road, London, NW6 6TN, tel: 00 44 (0)20 7372 4049, http://al-khoei.org) represents Shi’a Muslims in Britain and overseas. The MCB started to fall out of favour with the New Labour government when it failed to back the so-called ‘war on terror’. Indeed, a MCB affiliate also founded in 1997, largely by Muslims of Arab heritage with historic connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB, 124 Harrowdene Road, Wemb- ley, Middlesex HA0 2JR, tel: 00 44 (0)208 908 9109, www.mabonline. net) became an important member of the Stop the War Coalition.20 After ‘7/7’ especially, relations between the MCB and the government deteriorated significantly with the media and think-tanks of the left and right exposing the ‘Islamist’ (Jama’at-i Islami) heritage of some MCB activists and affiliates. Unconvinced that the MCB ‘moderates’ could effectively challenge radicalisation and violent extremism, the government sought with public money to broaden the range of Mus- lim organisations it engaged.21 A well-known blogger who has also served as MCB media spokesman describes the ‘intense competition for access, funding and recognition that the Prevent policy created, as well as government sucking in several (Muslim) community advisors who seem to be working against each other’.22 Nevertheless, with over 500 affiliates, the MCB has proved more long-lived than other umbrella bodies and, as evidenced by its Muslim Vote 2010 campaign, continues to urge Muslims to participate in the political process.23

20 It campaigned against UK involvement in the war in Iraq, having a central role in the RESPECT coalition; a Muslim-Leftist political alliance which achieved some success in London’s East End in 2005 but won no seats in 2010. See Phillips, Richard “Standing together: the Muslim Association of Britain and the anti-war Movement”, Race & Class, vol. 50, no. 2 (2008), pp. 101–113. 21 McLoughlin, Seán, “From Race to Faith Relations, the Local to the National Level: The State and Muslim Organisations in Britain”, in Axel Kreienbrink and Mark Bodenstein (eds.), Muslim Organisations and the State—European Perspectives, (Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2010), pp. 123–149. 22 http://inayatscorner.wordpress.com/2010/07/31/secret-quilliam-foundation- memo-to-the-government-about-uk-muslims-is-leaked/, accessed 14 March 2011. 23 www.muslimvote.org.uk/, accessed 4 October 2010. united kingdom 601

The British Muslim Forum (BMF, Eaton Hall, Retford, Notting- hamshire, DN22 0PR, tel: 00 44 (0)1777 706441) claims to embody the largest number of Sunni (especially Pakistani Barelwi) related networks, with 500 member mosques/organisations and particular strongholds in the English North and Midlands. Formally launched in 2005, it benefitted from PVE funds to build up capacity, representing a belated attempt to respond to numerically less significant but hitherto better-organised and higher profile Jama’at-i Islami and Deobandi related rivals working on a national level through the MCB. Historically, Barelwi networks have been oriented to South Asia rather than Britain and highly fragmented in terms of allegiances to various Sufi shaykhs and‘ulama (religious scholars). Prepared to periodically adopt positions contradicting and openly criticising so-called ‘Isla- mist’, ‘Salafi’ and ‘Wahhabi’ influenced organisations, in 2010, vice- chair Shaykh Ahmad Nisar Beg Qadri supported the Home Secretary’s ban on Dr Zakir Naik’s proposed visit to the UK, a position which drew criticism from other Islamic activists (Telegraph, 18 June 2010).24 Overall, however, the BMF has been relatively inactive. The Sufi Mus- lim Council (SMC, 2a Wanlip Road, Plaistow London E13 8Q, tel: 00 44 (0)207 055 5355, http://sufimuslim.homestead.com), was also launched with government support in 2006, but despite claims to better represent the majority of peaceful Muslims, questions have been asked about its use of PVE funds and in 2010 the government made it clear no further funds would be forthcoming.25 Perhaps the highest profile Sunni organisation of 2010 was actually Minhaj ul-Quran, who’s founder, Canada-based Pakistani, Tahir ul-Qadiri, (re)issued a high profile fatwa in London challenging the Islamic legitimacy of suicide bombings (Times Online, 2 March 2010). In recent years, the state-backed Muslim counter-attack on Isla- mism in its apparently ‘moderate’ as well as more ‘radical’ guises has been most clearly manifest in the career of the Quilliam Foundation (QF, PO Box 60380, London. WC1A 9AZ, tel: 00 44 (0)207 182 7280, www.quilliamfoundation.org), which launched in 2008. Established by

24 http://inayatscorner.wordpress.com/2010/06/24/who-are-the-british-muslim- forum/, accessed 14 March 2011. 25 http://services.parliament.uk/hansard/Lords/ByDate/20100209/writtenanswers/ part038.html, accessed 14 March 2011. 602 seán mcloughlin former members of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT, www.hizb.org.uk/),26 some of the organisation’s ex-leadership channelled its skills and energies into “the world’s first counter-extremism think tank”, taking its name from English solicitor and convert to Islam, Henry (Abdullah) Quilliam (d.1932), as a symbol of integrated British-Muslimness.27 In receipt of £1 million of government funding (Times, 20 January 2009), at its height the QF employed 18 members of staff and has published a number of high profile reports critical of British-Muslim organisations, institutions and movements. However, lacking credibility amongst most British-Muslims, by the end of 2010 it was being rumoured by political blogs that an end to Home Office funding would see the organisation effectively close, although some limited Foreign and Commonwealth Office funding could remain.28 Having been first proposed in 2006 following the proposals of the PVE working groups in 2005, the Mosques and Imams National Advi- sory Board (MINAB, 20–22 Creffield Road, Ealing, London, W5 3RP, tel: 00 44 (0)20 8993 7141, www.minab.org.uk) was finally launched in 2009. As a self-regulatory collaboration between organisations representing many key Muslim constituencies (MCB, MAB, BMF and al-Khoei), it claims to be an “independent community led body to promote good governance and improve service standards in mosques”.29 However, in relying upon PVE funding to develop itself (as have other Muslim organisations), accusations of DCLG interference have not easily been dismissed, for example, amongst key stakeholders such as the Deobandis who for this reason are not well represented on the board.

26 On HT in the UK, see, for example, Hamid, Sadek “Islamic political radicalism in Britain: the case of Hizb-ut-Tahrir”, in Tahir Abbas (ed.), Islamic Political Radicalism: a European perspective (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 27 See Geaves, Ron, Islam in Victorian Britain: The Life and Times of Abdullah Quil- liam, (Markfield, Leicestershire: Kube Publishing, 2010) who notes how much Quil- liam was actually engaged in global Muslim politics of the day. 28 http://blogs.salaam.co.uk/article.php?story=20100709204757122; http://conservative home.blogs.com/thetorydiary/2010/12/lansley-and-health.html, accessed 14 March 2011. 29 www.minab.org.uk/news/press-releases/84-the-minab-launch, accessed 17 April 2011. united kingdom 603

4 Mosques and Prayer Houses

The first officially designated mosque in the UK was founded after Henry Quilliam, who had converted to Islam during travels in Morocco, returned to Liverpool in 1887, while the first purpose-built mosque was established during 1889 in Woking, Surrey, by Hungar- ian Orientalist, Dr Gottlieb Leitner.30 However, as post-war immigration began to impact in the early 1960s, there were only a dozen or so mosques listed with the Registrar General, most being conversions of existing buildings including terraced housing. More recently, most mosques have been purpose-built. Indeed, today there are estimated to be around 2,000 mosques and Islamic centres in Britain, although as many as 600 still may not have full planning permission.31 While formal religiosity has increased amongst Muslims in diaspora, the growth of mosques in the 1970s and 1980s accompanied the reuniting of families, which in turn raised issues concerning the transmission of Islam to a new generation.32 Over the years, mosque building has also aroused opposition in wider society. Plans for a new, purpose-built mosque in Dudley were scrapped by Muslims after an English Defence League (EDL) internet campaign, march and protest (Daily Mail, 4 May 2010), while a mosque in Stoke, where the British National Party has a number of councillors, was fire-bombed (Guardian, 4 December 2010). Tablighi Jama’at was also finally evicted from the temporary and illegal site of a planned ‘mega-mosque’ for 12,000 worshippers in East London (The Times, 18 January 2010). Mosques have tended to restrict the full participation of women in their activities and during June 2010, faith relations organisation, Faith Matters launched Developing Diversity, a directory of ‘women- friendly’ mosques in England, with 50 meeting all five stated criteria

30 Gilliat-Ray, Sophie, Muslims in Britain: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p. 184. N.B. the site of Quilliam’s mosque shifted to Brougham Terrace in 1889 with plans for a £3–4M restoration of that site set to be approved (Liverpool Daily Post, 16 June 2010). 31 Gale, Richard, “Representing the city: Mosques and the planning process in Birmingham, UK”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1161–1179. 32 McLoughlin, Sean, “Mosques and the public space: Conflict and co-operation in Bradford”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1045– 1066. 604 seán mcloughlin and a further 50 some four of five criteria Guardian( , 9 June 2010).33 About the same time, Raheel Raza, a Toronto-based Muslim feminist, also became the first Muslim-born woman to lead a mixed-gender congregation in Britain at a small gathering for Friday prayers in Oxford.34

5 Children’s Education

Until 1870, the churches dominated educational provision in the UK. Despite the clear secularisation of schooling, the place of religion has continued to be recognised in key Education Acts (for example, 1944, 1988, 1996).35 Religious Education (RE) is compulsory, as is a daily act of collective worship, but individual students can be withdrawn by their parents. Since the 1970s, RE syllabi, which have a locally agreed element, have had a more multi-faith emphasis and included content on Islam. In 1988, however, there was a restatement of the expectation that RE and collective worship should reflect the nation’s Christian character. Teachers of the subject are professionally trained (and at secondary level subject specialists); they do not require the approval of religious authorities or need to belong to any particular religion. Especially at primary school level, around one-quarter of publicly funded schools are managed by the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church, with much smaller numbers of Jewish, Methodist and other schools. Since 1998, six Muslim primary and five Muslim secondary schools have been admitted to this ‘maintained’ sector in England, though the Conservatives have also promised to allow parents to establish controversial ‘free schools’ on the Swedish model, with direct support from central government (Independent, 18 June 2010). More than 50 independent Islamic schools are government-inspected and must meet the minimum expectations of the national curriculum. The number of Muslim students attaining five or more GCSE passes at A* to C grade in all Muslim schools in 2009 was, at 61%, 11% higher than the national average (The Muslim News, 26 February 2010).

33 http://faith-matters.org/images/stories/publications/Developing_Diversity.pdf, accessed 14 March 2011. 34 See www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/programmes/2010/06/100614_outlook_prayer .shtml, accessed 17 April 2011. 35 Halstead, Mark, British Muslims and Education (Budapest and New York: Open Society Institute, 2005). united kingdom 605

Over the years, most state schools, which still teach the vast majority of Muslim pupils, have sought to accommodate the needs of ethnic and religious minorities. This applies to such matters as school uniform, where individual schools and local authorities have generally been flexible. More contentious, but usually resolved, are issues around appropriate dress for physical education and swimming, music (where some conservative Muslim groups have opposed such teaching), halal meat and religious holidays. From 2011, there will be mandatory sex education lessons for young people before the age of consent (i.e. 16 years old), but while faith schools will have to address issues such as contraception and homosexuality they can do so in a way consistent with their respective traditions (Guardian, 24 February 2010). Outside the state and independent sectors, Muslim children also receive Islamic education during the late afternoon or weekend in community based supplementary schools, usually at local mosques or associated ‘madrasas’. Learning to read (if not comprehend) the Qur’an in Arabic, and instruction in the basic beliefs and practices of the faith, have both been a feature of the institutionalisation of Islam in Britain for many decades. However, Muslims and non-Muslims alike have questioned the impact of such further studies on learning at school, as well as traditional pedagogical methods and discipline. Some Muslim parents have sought alternative arrangements for their children, while many mosques have begun to employ teachers keen to develop new approaches. Reforming the cultures of such institutions has also increasingly become a concern of local authorities required to address child welfare and protection issues, while government has also been keen to encourage Muslim efforts to address issues of cohesion, citizenship and radicalisation in the supplementary school curriculum. Initiatives include Nasiha (www.nasiha.co.uk) and the Islam and Citi- zenship Education project (www.theiceproject.com). However, elsewhere, the BBC Panorama programme (BBC 1, 22 November 2010) found that 40 weekend supplementary schools across the UK teaching a Saudi Arabian curriculum were using anti-Semitic texts, while The Sunday Telegraph (6 November 2010) established that UK education watchdog, OFSTED, praised a Muslim day school for its contribution to community cohesion even while the school stated openly that Mus- lims “oppose the lifestyle of the West”. 606 seán mcloughlin

6 Higher and Professional Education

Islamic Studies is offered at a large number of universities, usually in the context of departments of Arabic and Middle East Studies or Religious Studies, with the former sometimes funded by wealthy patrons from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and beyond. As well as traditional Western and Islamic scholarship, some universities now also offer Islamic studies components in conjunction with the professional training of teachers (Birmingham) and youth workers (Chester). In 2007 the Higher Education Funding Council for England designated Islamic Studies a strategically important subject following a review of all aspects of ‘Islam at Universities in England’.36 This prompted various debates about the nature of Islamic Studies as a scholarly project and the extent to which it should address issues concerning, or the needs of, Muslims in Britain. There is no imam training as such at publicly-funded universities, but several private Islamic colleges offer both part-time and residential courses leading to the status of imam, while some prospective imams also complete a degree at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Most of these private colleges are established on the dar al-‘ulum model of the Indian Deobandis.37 Other courses are offered by the Muslim Col- lege in London and, since 2009, the Cambridge Muslim College. The Islamic Foundation (www.islamic-foundation.org.uk), a research and training organisation in Leicester,38 founded the Markfield Institute of Higher Education (www.mihe.org.uk) in 2000; it offers postgraduate degrees in Islamic Studies, Muslim Community Studies and Islamic Banking and Finance Management.

7 Burial and Cemeteries

Although there is still a significant movement of the remains of the dead of migrant origins back to their homelands for burial, most Brit- ish cities and towns have cemeteries with areas reserved for Muslims

36 See www.hefce.ac.uk/AboutUs/sis/islamic/ for details, including a link to Dr A. Siddiqui’s report, accessed 31 January 2010. 37 See Lewis, Philip, Islamic Britain (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994/2002) and Gilliat- Ray, Sophie, “Educating the ‘ulama: Centres of Islamic religious training in Britain”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 17, no. 1 (2006), pp. 55–76. 38 McLoughlin, “The state, new Muslim leaderships”. united kingdom 607 although these are rapidly filling up. Perhaps this in part explains the emergence of dedicated Muslim burial sites such as MCB affiliate, the Gardens of Peace Muslim Cemetery Trust in Essex. Despite tensions with government in other regards, since 2001 a representative of the MCB has continued to sit on the Ministry of Justice’s Burial and Cem- eteries advisory group, while in areas of significant Muslim settlement negotiations with local authorities to provide for Muslim needs are much longer established. As well as a widespread expectation that the burial take place within 24 hours of death, such organisations have also sought to clarify Islamic requirements that the deceased be ritu- ally washed by members of the family or community (many mosques now have such facilities) and laid in the ground facing Mecca. Yet beyond established areas of settlement such as Leicester, public recognition for Muslims still meets with mixed reactions, stories of localised contestation increasingly picked up by the national press to amplify a generalised discourse concerning Muslims’ ever increasing demands and the creeping Islamification of British life. As public markers of a minority presence, graves and cemeteries sometimes also come under physical attack by vandals and those with more racist and politicised motivations, as was reported in Leeds, Manchester and Scunthorpe during 2010.

8 ‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

In the UK there are Muslim chaplains, male and female, employed full-time or part-time in Higher Education Institutions, the National Health Service and other public services, as well as the Prison Service, Police, Armed Forces and industry. On-going research at Cardiff Uni- versity39 reports that many chaplains are Darul Uloom (dar al-‘ulum) graduates and denominational, others more ecumenical. It also notes that Prison Services UK now employs 197 full-time and part-time imams in English and Welsh prisons and while they are required by the state to take a more active role in combatting terrorism, the religious nature of their role can also raise suspicions in the workplace. Indeed, Muslim prisoners per se tend to be treated as potential terrorists (Guardian 8 June 2010). However, prison chaplains do have an

39 www.cardiff.ac.uk/share/research/centres/csi/resources/Muslim%20chaplaincy %20Newsletter%20Sept%202010.pdf, accessed 14 March 2011. 608 seán mcloughlin extensive network of support and mentoring, most especially in terms of the Muslim Chaplain’s Association (www.mca-hmps.co.uk/). There is also an Association of Muslim Chaplains in Education (www.amced. org.uk/). Markfield Institute of Higher Education runs a Certificate in the Training of Muslim Chaplains.

9 Religious Festivals

Annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations are held throughout the UK, usually organised by local mosques and Islamic centres. Large halls or gymnasiums are sometimes rented to accommodate the significant number of people attending. In recent years, there have been celebrations of ‘Id al-Fitr in Trafalgar Square, while in 2010 Northern Ireland Assembly member, Robin Newton, welcomed more than one hundred guests including the Egyptian Ambassador to Stormont to celebrate the festival. Apparently, this is the first time that‘Id has been celebrated in any European parliament. Amongst Sunni Barelwi and Sufi communities especially,‘Id Mawlid al-Nabi is also celebrated with public processions, speeches, recitations of the Qur’an, poetry (na’at) and song (nashid) in praise of the Prophet Muhammad on the anniversary of his birth. Shi’ite Muslims in particular commemorate the death of the Prophet’s grandson, Hussain, on the day of Ashura (10 Muharram), although some of the more physical aspects of matam (ritualised mourning) have come under close public scrutiny. It is common practice for employers and institutions in both the public and private sectors to allow Muslims to take the religious festivals as part of their statutory holiday entitlement. However, given divergent sources of religious authority overseas, there has long been a tendency for different denominations to hold celebrations on different days. Some cities have attempted to co-ordinate religious holidays because of their impact on schools and workers in general.

10 Halal Food

Since the 1970s, animal rights groups have campaigned against exemption from animal slaughter regulations on religious grounds, but failed in the face of opposition from Jewish, Muslim and other lobbies. In 1994, the Halal Food Authority (109, Fulham Palace Road, London, W6 8JA, www.halalfoodauthority.co.uk), which has roots in the now united kingdom 609 largely defunct Muslim Parliament of Great Britain, was established to scrutinise and certify the Islamic slaughter of meat in the UK. The HFA lists approved and delisted members. The HFA allows for animals to be stunned before slaughter, a process which can be carried out mechanically. Indeed, according to the RSPCA, around 90% of halal meat in the UK is pre-stunned.40 However, the Islamic legitimacy of this is disputed by the Leicester-based Halal Monitoring Committee (HMC, established 2003, www.halalmc.co.uk), which maintains that for meat to be halal animals should be fully conscious at the time of slaughter, with no machinery involved. In 2010, the HMC joined with some British Jewish groups to object to proposed EU legislation to label the meat of animals not stunned prior to slaughter (Guardian, 19 December 2010). Industry estimates suggest that ‘about 40% of poultry and 25–30% of lamb consumed in the UK meets halal specification’.41 For some non-Muslims, including Sikh groups, there is a concern that not all of this meat is being marked as produced using halal slaughter methods, despite its very wide use by commercial outlets and public institutions (Daily Mail, 19 September 2010).42 However, when in Harrow, north London, only halal meat was being served in primary schools, Mus- lim organisations stressed the importance of non-Muslims retaining choice too (BBC Online, 5 August 2010). Elsewhere, high street chains such as Domino’s Pizza are reversing their decision to open halal only outlets in parts of Birmingham because of lack of business (Telegraph, 16 August 2010).

11 Dress Codes

Across the UK, it has long been common to see Muslim women wearing the dupatta (South Asian style scarf/head covering) and hijab (head scarf ), while the niqab (face veil), jilbab (long and loose garments, coat) and other forms of modest dress have become a more familiar

40 www.rspca.org.uk/servlet/Satellite?blobcol=urlblob&blobheader=application/ pdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=RSPCABlob&blobwhere=1109267162636&ssbinary= true, accessed 15 April 2011. 41 www.fwi.co.uk/Articles/2010/09/23/123611/Meat-industry-defends-halal- slaughter-policy.htm, accessed 14 March 2011. 42 www.sikhsangat.com/index.php?/topic/58824-halal-food-authority/, accessed 13 March 2011. 610 seán mcloughlin sight in the last decade. There is no legislation limiting the wearing of Muslim dress in UK public institutions, and questions of uniform in schools are a matter for individual school managers (see section 5 above). Schools, local authorities and employers have been successfully sued for imposing dress codes that directly or indirectly discriminate in terms of race and ethnicity. However, a 2006 decision by the House of Lords against Shabina Begum, a schoolgirl in Luton who wished to wear a jilbab although it was not part of the agreed uniform, illustrates that such cases have their limits.43 Both the armed forces and the police have an approved version of hijab for Muslim women. Prompted by plans for bans on face veils including the niqab and burka in France and Belgium, in 2010 Conservative MP for Kettering, Philip Hollobone, having already described them as ‘offensive’ and ‘against the British way of life’, sought to advance a Private Members’ Bill which would make it illegal for anybody to wear ‘certain facial coverings’ in public (Telegraph, 1 July 2010). He also refused to meet constituents covering their faces at which point human rights organisation, Liberty, offered legal support to any woman affected. While the bill had little chance of making it into law, new Immigration Min- ister, Damian Green, maintained that such an approach would be ‘a rather un-British thing’, running contrary to the values of ‘a tolerant and mutually respectful society’ (BBC Online, 18 July 2010). A survey commissioned by Channel 5 News from YouGov,44 which included an online sample of 2,205, found that ‘67% agreed with a ban on the burqa (42% strongly and 25% somewhat), 27% disagreed and 6% had no opinion’.

12 Publication and Media

The longest running Muslim newspaper in circulation isThe Muslim News (established, 1989; PO Box 380, Harrow, Middlesex HA2 6LL, www.muslimnews.co.uk). For many years another significant player was Q-News magazine (established, 1992 and ceased publication in

43 R (Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School, House of Lords 2006, UKHL 15: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2006/15.html, accessed 30 April 2011. 44 http://today.yougov.co.uk/sites/today.yougov.co.uk/files/YG-Archives-Pol- Channel5-burkhas–160710.pdf; see also www.brin.ac.uk/news/?m=201007, accessed 14 March 2011. united kingdom 611

2006 but with some back issues accessible online at www.q-news. com). A more recent title is EMEL Magazine (established 2003; Can- field Place, London, NW6 3BT, www.emelmagazine.com), which has its roots in the Islamic Society of Britain and focuses on Islamically inspired culture and lifestyle for Muslim professionals. In 2010, the left-leaning weekly magazine, The New Statesman, also dedicated an entire issue (15 February 2010) to prejudice against Islam and Mus- lims in Britain, boldly stating “Everything you know about ISLAM is wrong”. A number of local community radio stations, authorised by the Radio Authority, serve a Muslim audience, particularly during Rama- dan. There are also a number of satellite television channels that broadcast on Sky. The Islam Channel (established 2004 by Tunisian activist and political exile, Mohamed Ali Harrath), for instance, is said to be ‘watched regularly by three in every five British Muslims’.45 However, in 2010 it was found guilty by broadcast regulator, Ofcom, of breaking regulations following an exposé by the QF which linked programming to various extremist organisations, individuals and views.

13 Family Law

Marriage in England is a civil status but the right to conduct a marriage can be delegated to an appropriately registered religious official by the local Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (priests of the Church of England have the ex officio right to formalise marriages). An increasing number of mosques now have such an official, or else register the building for the conduct of marriage, so that a civil official can be in attendance to formalise a wedding conducted according to Islamic practice. With local variations, the situation is similar in the other parts of the UK. However, apparently, significant numbers of Muslim marriages in the UK take place outside this official framework (BBC News Online, 3 February 2010). In partnership with the Minis- try of Justice, MINAB is seeking to raise awareness with imams concerning the implications of this should a relationship fail or a partner

45 www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/stories/islamchannelreport.pdf, accessed 14 March 2011. 612 seán mcloughlin die e.g. in terms of inheritance tax relief, widows’ pensions, property rights, custody of children and passports.46 The persistence of Muslim religious and cultural marriage practices in a non-Muslim state, most especially in respect of polygamy, divorce and disputes involving children, also creates a number of potential conflicts with the English legal system.47 One response has been the establishment of licensed Muslim arbitration tribunals, which seek to provide Islamic solutions that both parties consent to within the requirements of English law. Reports that the president of the Islamic Sharia Council in Britain was of the opinion that men who rape their wives should not be prosecuted because ‘sex is part of marriage’ (Daily Mail, 15 October 2010) further encouraged the view that such tribunals could not be guaranteed to protect women’s rights.48 However, law firms have begun offering advice from a specialist in Muslim family law alongside civil law, while the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) reports that there has been a 15% rise in the number of non- Muslims using Shari’a arbitrations, though mainly in commercial law (The Guardian, 14 March 2010).

14 Interreligious Relations

The main focus for inter-religious activity in Britain is the Interfaith Network of the UK (IFNUK, www.interfaith.org.uk). Founded in 1987, it now has links to interfaith fora in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ire- land, as well as the English regions and localities. In collaboration with the DCLG, and following the publication of Face to Face and Side by Side—a Framework for Partnership in our Multi Faith Society (2008), Interfaith Week (www.interfaithweek.org/) was first held in 2009 and again from 21–27 November 2010 in England and Wales, and a week later in Scotland.

46 www.minab.org.uk/images/stories/Newsletters/MINABNewsletterIssue02.pdf, accessed 14 March 2011. 47 See, for example, Poulter, Sebastian, Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The Eng- lish Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), and Menski, Werner, “Mus- lim law in Britain”, in M. Koga, M. Naito and T. Hamaguchi (eds.), From Migrant to Citizen: South Asian Communities Overseas (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Lan- guages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 2000), pp. 294–318. 48 N.B. secular activism in this regard in terms of the One Law for All campaign (www.onelawforall.org/) and the Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain (www.ex-muslim .org.uk/). united kingdom 613

Muslim individuals are involved at all levels of inter-religious activity, but member organisations of the national body of the IFNUK include the BMF, MCB and MINAB, as well as the Islamic Cultural Centre, Jamiat-e-Ulama Britain, World Islamic Mission and the Islamic Foundation. The last named of these established an Interfaith Unit in 1977, both to pursue faith-based dialogue in a secular society but also to monitor post-colonial Christian missionary activity worldwide. Today it also works in partnership with the Citizen Organis- ing Foundation, which emphasises broad-based alliances, not least amongst faith-based organisations in London. Muslims also participate in more theologically focused interreligious dialogue, especially across the Abrahamic traditions, for example, through the Christian Muslim Forum (www.christianmuslimforum .org), Three Faiths Forum (www.threefaithsforum.org.uk) and Alif Aleph UK (www.aauk.org). The Pope’s visit to the UK in Septem- ber 2010 does not appear to have had a significant impact on interreligious relations.

15 Public Opinion and Debate

The publication of the British Social Attitudes Survey (2008) revealed far greater opposition to Islam than to any other faith in the UK (Tele- graph, 9 January 2010). Professor David Voas of Manchester University and BRIN concluded that ‘people were becoming intolerant towards all religions because of “the degree to which Islam . . . elicits so much disquiet” . . . the “size and visibility” of Islamic communities has led to serious concerns about their impact on British society’. Opinions are also frequently sought on a range of matters in the UK, with surveys administered by large polling companies such as NOP, MORI and YouGov. During 2010 BRIN summarised YouGov data on non-Muslim attitudes to Islam and Muslims:49

• 60% maintain that many Muslims lead completely separate lives and a further 21% that most lead completely separate lives (November 2009, n= 2,026).

49 It draws upon www.yougov.co.uk/corporate/archives/press-archives-intro.asp; accessed 14 March 2011. 614 seán mcloughlin

• Of adults believing Islamic terrorism to be a worse problem for Britain (62%), 38% attribute this to Britain’s relationship with the USA, 35% to the failure to punish or expel Islamic radicals who preach violence, and 24% to the number of Muslim immigrants in Britain (January 2010, n= 10,344). • 42% of young people aged 14–25 believe that Muslims often suffer unfair discrimination in Britain, as against 20% thinking this to be true of Jews (November 2009, n= 3,994).

A report on Muslim Integration in Scotland based upon quantitative and qualitative research by Ipsos MORI Scotland and part of the Brit- ish Council’s ‘Our Shared Europe’ programme found that while Islam- ophobia is growing in Scotland it is perhaps less marked there than in England and Wales.50 The 2009 Northern Ireland Life and Times Sur- vey, which was published online in 2010, showed that 63% of people would accept a Muslim as a friend and 52% would accept a Muslim as a relative.51

16 Major Cultural Events

Having started in 1994, Islamic Awareness Week took place once again in England and Wales, being organised as usual by the Islamic Society of Britain.52 While there was no MAB ‘Islam Expo’ in 2010, the ‘Global Peace and Unity Event’ (23–24 October) attracted large numbers of visitors to London. Organised by Islam TV, it included numerous Muslim and non-Muslim speakers and performers, as well as an art exhibition, marriage event, sports arena, food courts, Islamic tourism information, as well as health and education zones. Baron- ess Warsi was prevented from attending by Prime Minister David Cameron because she would be sharing a stage with speakers with seemingly questionable political attitudes, although Liberal Democrat politicians did attend (Observer, 24 October 2010). Key national cultural institutions periodically organise events with an Islamic theme. In 2010 the British Museum announced that it will

50 www.brin.ac.uk/news/?m=201008. See www.britishcouncil.org/scotland-society- muslims-integration-in-scotland-report.pdf, accessed 14 March 2011. 51 www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2009, accessed 15 April 2011. 52 http://www.iaw.org.uk/previous/2010, accessed 14 March 2011. united kingdom 615 be holding a major exhibition on the Hajj during 2012 (Guardian, 1 July 2010). And following the overturning of a 2009 ban by the High Court, Dutch politician, Geert Wilders, finally saw his controversial film,Fitna , screened in the House of Lords to a small audience of around 60 people with 200 protestors outside (Telegraph, 6 March 2010).

PART II

ANALYSIS

Edited by Samim Akgönül and Jørgen S. Nielsen

DECONSTRUCTING LUTHER’S ISLAM: THE TURK AS CURSE OR CURE?

Ian Almond

This monk, all the vindictive instincts of a failed priest in him, fulminated in Rome against the Renaissance . . . Instead of grasping with profound gratitude the tremendous event which had taken place, the overcoming of Christianity in its very seat—his hatred grasped only how to nourish itself on this spectacle. The religious man thinks only of himself. The Antichrist, p. 197 To be able to understand Turks and Muslims image in Germany, Luther’s writings are significant. In many ways, his diatribes against the Turk constitute the last non-European voice against Islam in German thought. Unlike Leibniz, Luther will never attempt to draw on the idea of a Europe united in Christianity; in all of Luther’s copious objections against the Turks as “a wild and barbarous people”,1 in all of Luther’s references to their holiness as “the very dregs of abomina- tions and errors”2 and their “stinking Qur’an”, territorial or regional political considerations take a poor second place to doctrine. Luther’s profound and cultivated fundamentalism, a dedication to the letter which leaves little room for any notion of Realpolitik to slip through, suggests a conjunction of the medieval and the modern. On the one hand, a figure whose extensive reliance on Nicholas of Cusa’s Qur’anic commentary and a thirteenth century friar’s polemic will render his view of Islam irreducibly medieval. But his own antagonism towards Catholicism, aversion to allegory, selective mistrust of scholasticism and unwillingness to speak of a single Church will colour Luther’s Islam in a very different way from that of Cusa or Brother Ricardo. “Paradigm shift” is, admittedly, a term which has suffered much abuse of late, and yet it does seem to be a fact of clear significance that

1 “On War Against the Turk”, p. 175—found in Jaroslav Pelikan (ed.), Luther’s Works (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967) vol. 46. All references to Luther, unless otherwise stated, will be from this edition. 2 Ibid., p. 182. 620 ian almond

Luther’s works find themselves on an erratic fault line between the constantly shifting plates of the medieval and the early modern. As early as 1518, Luther had written that “to fight against the Turk is the same as resisting God, who visits our sin upon us with his rod”.3 Luther’s consistent conviction of the instrumental function of Islam as a tool to punish Christians for their transgressions, even to the point of equating the Turks almost unequivocally with the will of God (“It is the Gospel which is the Turk”)4 not only marks Luther’s Islam as indelibly medieval, but also introduces a strange and irresolvable tension into his work. Islam, sometimes our “schoolmaster”, sometimes “Satan’s army”,5 enjoys a status of undecidability in Luther. The term is intentionally Derridean; just as the author of Dissemination discerned an indeterminate play of oppositions in the Greek pharmakon, a term which can mean both ‘poison’ and ‘cure’, Islam itself will perform an equally ambiguous role in Luther’s meditations, both diabolical and divine, cleansing and corrupting, the epitome of blasphemy and— simultaneously—the restorer of the sacred. In the following pages, we are going to riddle Luther’s texts with a variety of different interrogatives, in an attempt to understand not simply how Islam and the Turk are represented in his commentaries, tracts and remarks, but also the subtler mechanisms within Luther’s theological positions which enabled such views of Islam to take place. What were Luther’s sources—and more significantly, what motives guided his selection of the various Islams presented to him? Exactly what internal consistencies and contradictions lay in the compendium of phenomena Luther associated with Islam—from Münzer and the Ninevites to allegory and Catholic Spain? What precise function did Islam have for the Reformer—what kind of identities did it affirm for him, what sort of oppositions did it facilitate? How did Luther deal with the aspects of Islam which ran in close proximity to his own faith—such as predestination or iconoclasticism? What effect did Luther’s Islam have on his own understanding of Christian culture— did it socially or geo-culturally locate his faith? Does Luther’s German- ness ever colour his treatment of Islam? Finally, and perhaps most intractably, what does Luther leave out in his myriad of references to

3 Luther’s Works 31:91–22. 4 Ibid., 46:202. 5 “Appeal for Prayer Against the Turk” in Luther’s Works 43:224, 237. deconstructing luther’s islam 621

Turks and “Mohammedans”? What is absent in his discourse—and what is the significance of such lacunae?

The Choice between Diatribe and Dialogue: Luther’s Sources for Islam

I have read this book of Brother Ricardo’s several times, but couldn’t believe there were reasonable people in the world who could be persuaded by the Devil to believe in such shameful things, and I had always thought it had been made up by the Walachian scribes . . . I would gladly have read the Qur’an myself, and was surprised . . . that no one had translated the Qur’an into Latin for a long time . . . so that even though Mahomet had reigned for over nine hundred years . . . no one felt themselves compelled to find out what Mahomet’s belief was . . . —from Luther’s 1542 preface to his own translation of Brother Ricardo’s Confutatio Alcorani (own translation.)6 As the Luther scholar H. Barge points out, two principal texts formed the general basis for Luther’s knowledge of Islam: the Confutatio Alcorani of Brother Ricardo of Montecroce (first written around 1300 and translated by Luther in 1542) and Nicholas of Cusa’s famous commentary on the Qur’an, the Cribratio Alcorano. Luther’s desire to obtain concrete information about “Mohammedanism”—even if cynically interpreted as more of a manifestation of instrumental reason rather than communicative—is striking, and foreshadows Leib- niz’s own seventeenth century scramble to find a reliable translation of the Qur’an. And yet, we will see how Luther’s indebtedness to the fourteenth century polemicist over the distinguished Christian Neo- platonist indicates a very specific and meditated choice. To a large extent, the pitch and tone of Luther’s diatribes against Islam will draw on Ricardo rather than Cusa, will see Islam as an opposite pole rather than a corrupt (yet partially salvageable) version of Christianity, and ultimately will allow a strategy of abuse and utter alterity to override a search for resemblance and proximity. Although Luther translates into German what can best be described as Ricardo’s ‘summary’ of the Qur’an in 1542, he had been acquainted with the Latin text at least twelve years earlier. Luther’s introduction

6 Verlegung des Alcoran Bruder Richardi, Prediger Ordens, ed. H. Barge. Found in Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar: Hermann Böhlhaus Nach- folger, 1883–1986), vol. 53., pp. 260–385. 622 ian almond to the German version is curious for a number of reasons. From the above passage, one can discern an anxiety concerning the original meaning of the Qur’an—and a very Protestant suspicion that church scribes have exaggerated or corrupted it. As the author of one of the most significant vernacular translations of the Bible, Luther’s anxiety at not obtaining the real Qur’an does implicitly place the infidel’s text in the same position as the Holy Scriptures. Luther’s concern for textual authenticity, be it Biblical or Qur’anic, unwittingly runs along parallel lines. Luther’s amazement that “reasonable people” (vernunftige Men- schen) could actually believe the “shameful” things he had found in the Qur’an is also worth noting, as Luther’s views on the relationship between Islam and reason are often inconsistent. There are frequently moments where he defends Christian practices such as communion against “Turks, Jews and our reason”,7 whilst in the 1529 text “On War Against the Turk” the Judaeo-Islamic rejection of the divinity of Christ is seen as “extraordinarily pleasing to reason”.8 Whenever the word irrationalis comes up to describe Islam in Brother Ricardo’s treatise, however, Luther throws himself into mistranslating the term with remarkable gusto, producing an interesting range of variants— ‘foolish’, ‘ridiculous’, ‘against God and all reason’ and even ‘bestial’ (viehisch).9 A curiously triangular oscillation of uncertainties is set up here between mind, body and faith; because Luther’s fide, being doctrine alone, can have nothing to do with the world, the “Moham- medanism” which Luther forever seems to associate with worldliness and worldly things has to oscillate between a fleshly, animal, insensate creed and a false, pagan, Sophist-icated version of Judaism. Naturally, Luther’s own deep reservations concerning the limitations of Aristote- lian philosophy as a foundation for theology meant he had to be careful in his vilification of Islam as ‘irrational’, trying to ascribe to Islam all the negative aspects of the word (animal-like, bestial, etc.) whilst avoiding any positive, anti-rationalist connotations. As Barge’s critical introduction to the text amply demonstrates, Luther’s translation of Brother Ricardo’s polemic is not merely loose but selectively flexible. Whole passages are missed out, phrases are

7 Luther’s Works 23:99. 8 Ibid., 46:177. 9 “narrisch”, “lecherlich”, “gegen Gott und alle Vernunft”—see Gesamtausgabe, 53:268. deconstructing luther’s islam 623 condensed, ideas Luther found difficult to agree with are simply omit- ted, or replaced with Luther’s own thoughts. Luther’s conviction, for example, that Turks and Saracens were unconvertible (können nicht . . . bekeren) causes him to leave out Ricardo’s Latin expression to the contrary at the end of the second chapter.10 Overtly Catholic phrases such as splendore miraculorum are rendered more palatable for a Protestant tongue (Luther writes “wonderful clarity” instead). All of which suggests a profoundly pragmatic approach towards the tract on Luther’s part; the Reformer’s care and concern to preserve the original in the case of the Bible and the Qur’an are not reflected in his translation of Ricardo—rather than the work of reference it is introduced as, the more immediate function of Luther’s translation appears to be that of ammunition. Ricardo’s medieval tract offers a stark contrast to Nicholas of Cusa’s commentary on the Qur’an. Even if the principal raison d’etre of both texts are the same—to illustrate the deficiencies of Islam vis-a-vis the Christian faith—Cusa’s text distinguishes itself from that of Ricardo’s in its caution, its paucity of abuse, its inclination towards the ignorance rather than the malevolence of Mohammed and, most significantly, its greater degree of philosophical sensitivity towards the difficult epistemological issues of revelation. From the very outset, we find the author of the Cribratio contemplating the question of how one can know a Good which does not belong to “the region of this sensible world”11 (“for example” says Cusa, “a man blind from birth has no knowledge of colour” p. 5). In place of Brother Ricardo’s obsession with the deficiencies of the Qur’an, what we have in Cusa is a delicate attempt (probably of Neoplatonic origin) to pick out some shattered fragments of Christian truth from the general debris of Islam. Of course, this still involves a brutalization of Islam,12 but the difference in tone between the two sources is plain to see. Brother Ricardo’s style does not require a Luther to augment its venom:

10 Quod saraceni debent suscipere evangelica testimonia, similiter et quae sunt vet- eris testamenti. Gesamtausgabe, 53:267. 11 Nicholas of Cusa, Cribratio AlQur’ani, trans. J. Hopkins (Arthur J. Banning Press: Minneapolis, 1994) p. 4. 12 See Norman Daniel, Islam and the West: The Making of an Image (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1960), pp. 276–8. Although acknowledging the sophistication of Cusa’s apologetics as being “polemically, even speculatively superior to anything that had gone before in the West”, he still sees a gesture which is in the end “petty” and “rambling and repetitive” (p. 278). 624 ian almond

At the time of Emperor Heraclius came a man, indeed a Devil, a true, first born child of Satan diabolus( primogenitus sathanae), against the truth and against the Christian church, who was driven by fleshly desires (in libidine proclius) and with black magic and who went by the name of Mahomet . . .13 One only has to compare this with the opening lines of Cusa’s Pro- logue to his Cribratio: As best I could, I made a careful attempt to understand the book of law of the Arabs, a book I obtained at Basel . . . together with a debate among those noble Arabs, wherein one of them, a follower of Mohammed, attempted to win over another of them—who, being eminent among the Arabs and quite learned, showed that the Christian faith ought rather to be accepted.14 Above all else, Cusa’s book begins in dialogue. Where Ricardo’s text tries to cram as many terms of abuse as possible into its opening lines (underlining thereby its exclusively Christian audience), Cusa’s text is on the whole more open and “careful” towards the potential convert, more sensitive in its treatment of the “noble Arabs”—Ricardo, in contrast, refers to them later as thieves and robbers (maxime aliorum Ara- bes, gulam videlicet, rapinam et intemperantiam).15 If Ricardo’s tract ultimately constitutes a defensive reinforcement of the Christian faith, Cusa’s commentary takes on the more subtle (though no less single- minded) aim of showing how the Qur’an itself unwittingly reveals the truth of Christianity.16 The point is not to foolishly proffer Nicholas of Cusa as some kind of late medieval beacon of tolerance and multiculturalism in contrast to Ricardo—Cusa provides enough references to the Qur’an’s “turpitude, flagrant lies and contradictions” (p. 13) in the Cribratio to make this in itself a silly idealization. What should be emphasized, rather, are the two ways in which Luther actively chooses Ricardo’s approach to Islam over that of Cusa’s as a model for his own—firstly, in seeing Mohammed as intentionally perverse and mendacious (in contrast to Cusa’s belief that “ignorance was the cause of Mohammed’s error and malevolence” p. 6) and secondly, by adopting the form of Ricardo’s critique—essentially a rhetorical strategy of derogatory labelling, dark sarcasm (“. . . these wise, yes, wisest

13 Gesamtausgabe, 53:277. 14 Cribratio, p. 2. 15 Gesamtausgabe, 53:283, line 21. 16 See in particular Cribratio, pp. 35–37. deconstructing luther’s islam 625 people the Turks”),17 extensive outrage interspersed with sections of half-informed, explanatory analysis. Standing at the forked path of the Other and the Same, Luther chooses Ricardo’s way of radical polarisation, transforming Islam theologically, culturally, ethnically into the totaliter alter of Christianity—and passes by Cusa’s more moderate route of comparison, reduction and ultimate absorption of the apparently alien into an overwhelmingly Christian framework.

Flesh, Falsity and Philosophia: What Luther Associates with Islam and the Turk

In the profusion of things Luther associates with the faith, figure and followers of Mohammed, three or four basic themes emerge, intercon- nected if not always harmonious, and interdependent, if not always mutually justifying. In order to fully grasp their subtleties, one has to recall Luther’s most basic juxtaposition of doctrine against life: We must be careful to distinguish between doctrine and life. Doctrine is heaven; life is the earth. In life is sin, error, uncleanness and mis- ery . . . But in doctrine, since there is no error, there is no need of pardon; therefore, there is no comparison between doctrine and life. One little point of true doctrine is more valuable than heaven and earth . . . our doctrine, blessed be God, is pure.18 Borges has already written on how every writer creates his predecessors; certainly, without Nietzsche’s version of Luther as a hater of life this passage, tucked away in the middle of a commentary on Gala- tians, would not stand out as it does. The purity of doctrine—kept apart from everything else, to follow the original Hebrew meaning of holy (qadosh or ‘separate’)—renders the world impure; moreover, the reductionism implicit in Luther’s gesture is ontologically comprehensive. All things—good works, luxury, art, greed, ethics, positions of power—stand as naught against the word of God. Scripture, insuper- ably divine, levels everything which does not belong to it to the same base line.

17 Luther’s Works 15:340—cit. in Minou Reeves, Muhammad in Europe (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 2000), p. 131. 18 Taken from Luther’s commentary on Galatians Chapter 5—in Alistair McGrath and J.I. Packer, Galatians (London: Crossway Books, 1998), p. 259. 626 ian almond

So it comes as no surprise that one of the standard attributes which Luther constantly associates with “Mohammedanism” is worldliness, often in the positive sense of worldly wisdom and material success: Observe how the Turks are adorned with power and wisdom. The pope, too, and the cardinals are very wise men. Similarly Plato, Cicero and Socrates are also very great men.19 In “On War Against the Turk”, this synonymy of the Turk with the world is seen as an indirect cause of his military superiority: The Turk has people and money in abundance; he defeated the Sultan twice in succession, and that took people! Why, dear sir, his people are always under arms so that he can quickly muster three or four hundred thousand men.20 It is a calculation Luther is fond of repeatedly making: Scripture hates the world, the Turk hates scripture, and therefore the world loves the Turk. In an almost perfect inverse of the prosperity Gospel, Luther interprets the success of the Muslim armies as indicative of their God- lessness. To be successful in this world is proof that one belongs to it— for, as scripture says, the world loves those who are its own; the “power and wisdom” of the Turks and the Pope stands in inverse proportion to their faith, it belongs to the Godless conviction that “men are to rule and bear the sword and get ahead in the world”;21 the more worldly success and virtues they enjoy, the farther they lie from scripture, which is antithetical to the world. If the Turk and the Pope wanted to join the true church, their high status in the world would first “have to be reduced to nothing before God”.22 Luther uses this argument to facilitate—though not completely to explain—the perceived military and economic superiority of the Turk in his time. This equation of wealth, success and wisdom with worldliness, nevertheless, does not displace the chastising function of the Turk as Luther’s primary explanation for the success of the Ottomans. What is most interesting about this repeated linking of the Turks with the world is that it subsequently makes any qualities one might attribute to them theologically irrelevant. If even good works and wisdom

19 From the commentary on Genesis 21:15, 16—in Luther’s Works 4:54. 20 Luther’s Works 46:200. 21 Ibid., p. 176. 22 Ibid., 4:54. deconstructing luther’s islam 627 are not enough to win God’s grace—only belief in the Gospel can do this—then it doesn’t really matter whether the Turks are good or evil, selfish or generous, black or white, as wise as Socrates or as cruel as Timur. The fundamental, all-deciding fulcrum of faith—to believe that Christ is God—makes Luther’s descriptions of Turks of merely anthropological interest. This may explain why Luther gives us such inconsistent versions of the level of culture of the Turks—sometimes they are linked with “wisdom”, Cicero and Socrates,23 at other points in Luther’s writings they are presented to us as a “wild and barbarous people”,24 are compared to Tartars25 and portrayed as essentially backward and nomadic: Similarly, the Turks, too, boast that they do not build magnificent structures, as do we, who adorn our cities with magnificent buildings and erect castles as though we were going to live forever. The Turks laugh at this ambition of ours, and they regard it as a point of saintliness not to dwell in stately houses. Hence they lay waste to vineyards and demolish stately buildings. The northern peoples whom we call the Tartars follow a similar way of life; for they also dwell in huts . . .26 A teasing ambiguity runs through these lines. Luther seems almost torn between demonizing the Turks as mindless Goths and lauding them for their ascetic indifference to the treasures of this world. His paraphrase of the Turk’s boast becomes so extended (“as do we”) that one begins to doubt who is really speaking, and what the value of those “magnificent buildings” actually is. What begins as a moment of Chris- tian self-congratulation on how civilised and splendid “we” are almost ends on a note of self-admonishing vanitas. The sense is unclear—are stately buildings a good thing or a bad one? The biblical context of the comment—Luther is talking about the offspring of Noah (Genesis 10:2)—offers little help, apart from the lesson of how God rewards pride and unbelief with destruction; Luther sees Magog as an ancestor of the Scythians, whom he later associates with the Turks. Neverthe- less, whether contempt for worldly structures is spiritually healthy or barbaric savagery remains ambiguous. This ambiguity persists in many other associations Luther makes with Islam and the Turks. Although Luther mocks their monadic

23 Ibid. 24 Luther’s Works 46:175. 25 Commentary on Genesis in Luther’s Works 2:189. 26 Luther’s Works 2:188. 628 ian almond asceticism, and in rare moments even acknowledges their “pious” reputation and “abstemious life”,27 the faith and its followers are generally seen as the epitome of carnal desires and excess. Following an already well-established medieval tradition of fleshly “Mohammedanism”,28 Luther tells us repeatedly of “the Turk’s dissolute life”, how the Qur’an is “a bed of harlotry”, how it is “customary among the Turks for one man to have ten or twenty wives”.29 Islam’s worldliness inevitably takes on an abiding association with flesh and carnality, a propensity for appetite which, for Luther, soon brings his references spilling over into Roman Catholicism: Both the pope and the Turk are so blind and senseless that they commit the dumb sins shamelessly . . . I hear one horrible thing after another about what an open and glorious Sodom Turkey is, and everyone who has looked around a little in Rome and Italy knows well how God revenges and punishes the forbidden marriage [homosexuality].30 The association Luther makes of Islam with Catholicism—Luther’s constant refrain “The Jew, the Turk and the Pope” becomes almost formulaic in its repetition—affects the ontological status of both Islam and his own faith in two contradictory ways. On the one hand, the various points on which Luther sees Islam and Catholicism as different heads on the same apocalyptic beast—the ‘inventedness’ of their faiths, their belief in works, their common, dogmatic styles of exegesis31— enacts his critique in an exclusively theological context, draining his words of any cultural colouring, bringing a purely spiritual transparency to his objections. In this sense, Luther’s criticisms of Turk and pope take place on an other-worldly plane, in the silent, apolitical, heavenly realm of theological dispute, far above the noise and mess of mere worldly affairs. At the same time, however, even in the very act of other-worldly, scriptural disputation, Luther’s diatribes against Islam and Catholicism are also words against Italy and Turkey, against

27 Luther’s Works 22:333, cit. in Johnathan C. Naumann, “Luther, Lutherans and Islam”, Concordia Journal (2002) 28:1, p. 66. 28 Precedents for this association of Islam with sexual laxity are too numerous to list—Roger Bacon, for example, was convinced Islam was a continuation of a form of Venus love-worship (lex venerea), whilst Guibert of Nogent insisted the Qur’an taught “a new licence of promiscuous intercourse”. For a medieval survey of these responses, see Daniel, Islam and the West, pp. 144–6. 29 Respectively Luther’s Works 46:176, 15:340, 46:179. 30 Luther’s Works 46:196. 31 Ibid., 4:124, 221. deconstructing luther’s islam 629

Spaniards and Turks, against Suleiman the Magnificent and Pope Clement VII. In other words, Luther’s doctrinal stance against Turk and Pope, however biblical in nature, also implicitly locates Luther’s universal message, colouring it with German Protestantism as a topos, distinct from places such as Spain and Turkey. In geo-culturally locating Islam and Catholicism not merely as false doctrines but also as real places and peoples which have fallen from God (“. . . if we are to die . . . may we be killed in the profession of our faith, and not become Turkish or Spanish!”),32 Luther unwittingly finitises his own true Church as essentially German. Islam’s fate in Luther’s writings is to oscillate between these two versions of a spiritual threat and a military one. Moreover, this repeated linking of Islam with the flesh does suggest that Luther’s anxiety and disgust towards Islam is an anxiety and disgust towards the body. Both of them are perceived to be threats— either military or spiritual; both need to be checked and controlled; neither can be defeated unless we begin by cleansing our own hearts in prayer. That Luther’s most venomous remarks concerning Islam employ sensuality as their main device—the Qur’an always “smells” or “stinks”33—underlines this subtle projection of self-hatred, of a hatred of the flesh and fleshly desires, onto Islam in Luther’s Islamophobia. On a related note of subversion, Luther seems to associate Islam with revolutionary figures such as Thomas Münzer, and more generally with a radical threat of displacement, structural change and loss of control. Münzer, the social revolutionary and contemporary of Luther’s who was executed for his role in the Peasant’s Revolt of 1525, is explicitly compared to Mohammed as one who becomes possessed by the devil to wage war with worldly means for his own worldly goals (“What was Münzer seeking in our own times, but to become a new Turkish Emperor?”).34 Luther’s own ambiguities towards hierarchy and class notwithstanding, “Mohammedanism” finds itself linked with the threat of social unrest and hierarchical disruption; in this sense, not merely an anxiety over the intrusion of the alien (a concern for “our” girls, “our” culture, “our” women which Luther, in his more German moments, certainly reveals) but a much deeper worry about the internal disruption of the familiar. ThisAngst over social stability

32 Ibid., 54:269. 33 Ibid., 15:340, 4:29. 34 Ibid., 46:178. 630 ian almond has largely to do with the egalitarian, or at least non-aristocratic ideas about Ottoman society which Luther had already encountered second hand from sympathetic Christian accounts of the government of the Turk;35 Luther was clearly perturbed by the thought of Christian peasants, already oppressed and long-suffering under the feudal lords of their own faith, electing to side with the Turk out of hope for a better deal. There are several occasions in his work where Luther warns against the folly of such betrayal—and how “preachers must diligently impress upon such people” the sinfulness of siding with the Turk.36 Reinforcing this specific belief of Luther’s is a more general conviction that Muslims, be they Arabs or Turks, are inherently a-structural and somehow nomadic. Commenting on Genesis 16:12’s description of Ishmael as a “wild man”, Luther helpfully informs us: Strictly speaking, this description applies to the Arabs, who do not stay in a definite place, but carry all their possessions with them in carts and live mostly on plunder.37 More a foreshadowing of Renan’s “tent and tribe”38 than a reflection of Cusa’s “noble Arabs”, this aversion to stasis and stability is extended to the Turk by Luther as a warning against those peasants who think life might be better under a different lord: For it is characteristic of the Turk not to let those who are anything or who have anything stay in the place where they live, but to put them far back in another land, where they are sold and must be servants.39 Luther’s subtext beneath this warning to the serfs is fairly clear: “Side with the Turk and he will treat you like Jews, selling you into captivity and sending you into Egypt”. The hierarchy of mind/body, thoughts/

35 In an introduction to one of the early editions of Georg von Ungarn’s Türken- Traktaus, Luther himself had made some positive comments on the merits of the Ottoman system of government. For more on the debate concerning the influence of the Ottomans on European political thought of the period, see Tahsin Görgün, “The Ottoman State as a Factor in the Socio-Political Formation of Europe” inOtto- man Philosophy, Science and Institution, pp. 61–71. In a French context, Clarence Dana Rouillard offers an impressive survey of the widespread admiration of Ottoman social and military order in sixteenth century travel accounts such as those of Nicolas de Nicolay, Busbecq, Belon and Postel. See Rouillard’s The Turk in French History, Thought and Literature 1520–1660 (Paris: Boivin, 1938), pp. 291–306. 36 Luther’s Works 46:192. 37 Ibid., 3:66. 38 Cit. in Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 105. 39 Luther’s Works 46:193. deconstructing luther’s islam 631 feelings, will/appetite which Luther saw Islam threatening to over- turn is replicated on a political level: not merely personal hierarchies but also social ones are threatened by the Turk. Not only control of our bodies, but also control of our societies will be disrupted by their arrival—the Turk will turn everything upside down. This psychologi- cally interesting fear of disruption and displacement which Muslims inspire in Luther does lend Islam an aura of dynamic energy, possibly anarchic but at the same time radically transformative. Slightly problematically, Luther’s Christianity as a consequence becomes associated with stasis, permanence, society and tradition—a preserver of place and stasis, a respecter of position and custom. In other words, Luther finds himself in the strange position of defending the value of something he has been trying to reform, of arguing for the existence of something which, biblically, is nothing more than soil and flag, town and pasture, use and custom. Whenever Luther comes to and realises this—that without scripture, everything in the world , everything that is sacred in German culture and tradition, is not worth “one little point of true doctrine”40—then the theological immediately reasserts its primacy over the merely territorial in his work, and we encounter some of his most surprising statements: If we are not going to make an adequate, honest resistance . . . it would be far better not to begin a war, but to yield lands and people to the Turk in time, without useless bloodshed.41 Of course, part of the motivation behind this remarkable advice is worldly—Luther’s conviction of the Turk’s military superiority, as we have already seen, prompts this reluctance to embark on a campaign one cannot win. However, by far the most significant factor in this contemplation of a German surrender to Turkish forces is Luther’s belief that Christians are not so much militarily but above all spiritually unprepared for the conflict—“our unrepentant life makes us unworthy of any grace, counsel or support, we must put up with it and suffer under the devil” (ibid.). It is impossible to imagine Leib- niz, who would be faced with a similar Turkish advance on Vienna a hundred and fifty years later, advocating the same spiritual advice. In these moments, Luther’s world drains magically of any importance;

40 McGrath and Packer, Galatians, p. 259. 41 Luther’s Works 46:199. 632 ian almond faced with the idea of the Turk not as radically evil, but rather as a consequence of our own greater evil, crowns, kingdoms and pride take second place to scripture.

Luther, Language and Islam

Thus Islam, unruly signifier that it is, threatens to disturb three kinds of Christian order—spiritual, bodily and social, even if Luther appears to shift emphasis from one to the other at different points in his work. However, this pairing of Islam with worldliness does lead to another feature of Luther’s “Mohammedanism”—that of falsity and pure appearance. The semantic emptiness of Islam, the spiritual hollowness of the Turk is what emerges here, a signifier without any real signified to boast of, all zahir with no batin. Luther’s Muslims ‘look’ like Chris- tians—they pay lip service to Jesus and believe in the same prophets— but in substance they are not, for they deny Christ’s divinity. The fact that they “boast” of their “godliness”42 only serves to emphasise how much they belong to the world of Schein and surface. Interestingly, this conviction of the Muslim’s inherent superficiality is extended to their hermeneutics. Luther’s mistrust of allegory as “pernicious” and misleading is already well-known, a mistrust which he displayed even towards the fathers of the early Church (“In all of Origen there is not one word about Christ”).43 Luther, according to his own confession, realised very early on as a monk that “allegories are nothing, that it’s not what Christ signifies but what Christ is that counts” (ibid.). A rejection of the phenomenological Christ in favour of the ontological one is what takes place here; a desire for solidity and substance permeates this frustration with the allegorical, the same desire which no doubt pushed Luther to look for a reliable translation of the Qur’an. Not surprisingly, many of Luther’s more derogatory references to allegory invariably involve the Turk—in his commentaries on Genesis 30:9–11, Luther mocks the way medieval commentators interpreted Rachel to be the contemplative life and Leah that of the active. If Christians persist in reading the Bible in this way

42 Ibid., 4:53, 2:60. 43 Ibid., 47. deconstructing luther’s islam 633

they will become like the Turks and the Tartars, not like Leah or Rachel. For in Turkey there are also many religious who make it their one aim to interpret the Alcoran of Mohammed allegorically in order that they may gain greater admiration. For allegory is like a beautiful harlot who fon- dles men in such a way that it is impossible for her not to be loved . . .44 In this passage, falseness, fleshly pleasure, shallowness, allegory, textual flexibility and Islam are all blended together in an eclectic defence of scriptural fundamentalism. If Turks and their faith are shallow, then certainly their exegesis is going to be equally lacking in substance. The allegorist’s sin is the same as the fornicator’s: to fall in love with the body instead of the soul, to be deceived by the outward instead of paying proper attention to the inward, to employ a fantastic hermeneutics of eros instead of a proper exegesis of agapeia—ultimately, to have foolishly overlooked the fact that the Truth does not signify, it simply is. Scripture (with apologies to the poet Macleish) should not mean, but be. Luther’s description of Islam as “a patchwork of Jewish, Christian and heathen beliefs” and elsewhere, as a work of “self-made spirituality” (eigen Geisterey) coming out of “their own heads and dreams”45 goes hand in hand with this rejection of allegory. Because Islam is empty, because it lacks depth, the Mohammedans do what they want with their texts, just as they have done what they wanted with the Bible. In this sense, Luther’s reference to the Qur’an as “a bed of harlotry”46 is not simply a condemnation of its perceived ‘lewdness’, but also a comment on its multiple interpretability—the harlotry of allegory lies precisely in the fact that the allegorist does not have to remain faithful to just one thing. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to see in Luther’s words against allegory and the scribes of the “Alcoran” a very Derrid- ean fear of the loss of textual control. Luther is already irritated at the monks who, reading Ovid, can turn Apollo or a laurel tree into Jesus and Mary.47 If the signs in God’s universe are not necessarily linked to reality, then we can rearrange them in whatever way we wish, even to the extent (as Cusa did) of finding the Bible in the Qur’an, or the

44 Ibid., 5:347. 45 Luther’s Works 46:177, 13:277. 46 Ibid., 15:340. 47 Ibid., 5:347. 634 ian almond

Gospel in Ovid. Once again, Islam represents a subversive threat, not so much political or spiritual this time but lexical.48 Given the fact that Luther did employ allegorical interpretations from time to time—he certainly follows a long tradition in associating Islam with the apocalypse, and quite explicitly draws on Revelations 13 and Daniel 12 to justify this49—we find a qualification in the same commentary on Genesis. Although Luther admits he “hate[s] allegories”, on the rare occasion one has to use them, first of all a “historical sense may be sought”, one which is “genuine and pure” and which gives us “correct and solid instruction”.50 Once more, solidity and substance is opposed to fantasy and empty speculation. The fact that any allegory which results from this “historical sense” cannot become a “monastic allegory”, one which suggests devilish fancies such as the vita con- templativa, but an allegory which “is in agreement with history . . . and embraces the doctrine of the cross” (ibid.), confirms Luther’s desire to keep scripture as a vehicle, rather than an expression, of God’s holy word. It is important to see how Luther understands of Islamic exegesis lay outside this domain of interpretative stability. Luther’s hatred of Islam, like his hatred of allegory, of the body, of the fanciful imagination of the monks, is ultimately a hatred of that which upsets the natural limits God has laid down for us. In speaking of Luther and language, one final, related point. It is worthwhile noting that both Luther and Leibniz, as we shall see in the next chapter, were at times attracted by the idea of creating a completely new language. Towards the end of his life (as Graham White has pointed out)51 Luther considered the idea of a radically new language to convey more clearly the intricacies of faith:

48 See Susan E. Schreiner’s article on “Appearances and Reality in Luther, Mon- taigne and Shakespeare” in Journal of Religion (2003) 83:3, pp. 345–80. Schreiner presents a Luther who steadily sank into a solipsistic paranoia, surrounded by a world of diabolically-inspired phenomena, difficult to distinguish from the truth: “Because of the tension between the real and the nonreal, faith places the believer outside the realm of the rational, the ordinary, and the visible. Faith, therefore, is a supremely alienating experience. Luther was very adept at describing the loneliness and, at times, nightmare-like qualities of the life now lived by the believer” (355). 49 Luther’s Works 54:46—for more background on this motif, see David Burr’s “Antichrist and Islam in Medieval Franciscan Exegesis” and Philip Krey’s “Nicholas of Lyra and Paul of Burgos on Islam” in. Toran, John V (ed.), Medieval Christian Perceptions of Islam (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 131–174. 50 Luther’s Works 5:347. 51 White, Graham, “Luther’s Views on Language”, Journal of Literature and Theol- ogy 3:2 (July 1989), pp. 188–218. deconstructing luther’s islam 635

We will, then, do better if we leave logic or philosophy in its own sphere, and learn to speak new languages in the kingdom of faith (novis linguis in regno fidei) outside of every sphere.52 This projected, future language, “outside of every sphere”, would be more adept at expressing not merely a Christian reality, but more importantly the (occasionally non-rational) complexities of faith. The verse “The word became flesh” (John 1:14), Luther insisted, was true in theology and false in philosophy. Moreover, the language of theology conveys meanings that philosophia (keeping in mind the original Aristotelian sense of the term, with all its echoes of non-contradiction) cannot discern: “Mother” in philosophy means an impure woman; in theology it means someone who is pure and virgin. And thus the words used in philosophy become new [in theology].53 Given Luther’s repeated linking of philosophy with Turks, Jews and Catholics, his constant emphasis on the fact that all three sects cannot accept certain non-rational facets of the Christian truth, it is not surprising to find Luther’s project for a new language to be a language somehow beyond philosophy, a new language of faith unspeakable to Muslims and Catholics, a lingua nova essentially Protestant in nature.

The Turk and the Jew: Semitic Brothers, Racial Foes

Luther’s remarks on Jews in the context of Islam bring to light, more than anything else, how ambiguous Luther’s own attitude to Judaism was. Given the controversial nature of texts such as On Jews and their Lies, Luther and Judaism is in itself a well-researched area; Amy New- man has already formulated how Judaism’s persistence in eighteenth and nineteenth century German society provided an ongoing problem for the Protestant narrative, which could not accommodate the Jew- ish faith as an actual and still valid phenomenon—on the contrary, German Jews provided “an apparent discrepancy between Protestant

52 WA 39, II. 5:35 ff—cit. in White, p. 212. 53 Cit. in White, p. 203. 636 ian almond discourse and historical reality”.54 Moreover, Newman correctly discerns three versions of the death of Judaism in Luther’s writings—the first as the death of Christ on the Cross (i.e. the cessation of Judaism’s validity with the birth of Christianity); the second as the death of Juda- ism in a contemporary sense, understanding the present Jew as one amongst the many enemies of Christ in our society; finally, the demise of Judaism is also interpreted eschatologically by Luther as a necessary condition of the Final Coming.55 Certainly, this can result in the kind of ‘Good Jew/Bad Jew’ investigations one finds so often in Nietzsche scholarship; Luther follows a standard tradition in Christian anti-Semitic thought of distinguishing between ‘good’ pre-Christian Jews and ‘bad’ post-Christian ones. It comes as no surprise to find Luther, even in the midst of his vitupera- tive invective against Judaism, heaping unambiguous praise upon the Jews for being a “remarkable people”.56 Nor is it surprising to find this ambiguity reflected in the relationship between Judaism and Islam in Luther’s work. Particularly in the commentaries on Genesis, Turks and Arabs are clearly seen as the inherent enemies of the Jew, through a semi-racial/semi-scriptural understanding of their genealogy. If Turks and Tartars are seen as “Scythians”,57 then Arabs are “Ishmaelites” or “sons of Ishmael”.58 Luther consistently refers to Ishmael as being somehow related to the “Hagarenes” or “Saracens”, essentially making use of the Old Testament, of a pre-Islamic text, to foretell the emergence of Islam. The gesture is an interesting one, if not without precedent—tracing Mohammed’s lineage back to Ishmael and the Moabites is a familiar, though by no means standard motif in medieval apologetics.59 Locating the origins of Islam in the figure of Ishmael, however cynically intended, attributes an extraordinary significance to the faith, even if that significance is ultimately adversarial and derogatory. Not

54 Newman, Amy, “The Death of Judaism in German Protestant Thought from Luther to Hegel”, in Journal of the American Academy of Religion 61:3 (1993), p. 455. 55 Ibid., pp. 456–7. 56 Luther’s Works 54:418. 57 Ibid., 1:188–9. 58 Ibid., 3:66, 4:328. 59 Pope Gregory, for example, can call the Saracen colonists of Lucera “the sons of Hagar” in 1236 (see J.P. Lomax, “Frederick II, his Saracens and the Papacy” in Toran, Medieval Christian Perceptions of Islam, p. 185); William of Auvergne, San Pedro and William of Tripoli all make use of this strategy in their polemics—see Daniel, Islam and the West, pp. 127–8. deconstructing luther’s islam 637 only does it replicate the kind of Scholastic typology Luther would often grow impatient with, but associating Islam with Ishmael allots the faith an important position in an essentially tri-polar scheme— Judaism, Christianity and Islam. All of which serves to emphasise how Luther’s Islam is no strange, lunatic sect or minor heresy, but rather a significant and elementary force in the Christian world. In these Old Testament contexts, the Muslim (Scythian/Moabite/ sons of Hagar) emerges as the tribal enemy of the Jew; what is most curious, however, is the sympathetic gloss Luther the commentator offers on Ishmael. Having just connected, somewhat emphatically, Ish- mael and his descendants to Arabs and Mohammedans, immediately in the following lines Luther emphasises both the carnal (worldly) and spiritual blessing of Ishmael, who “lived in the true faith and in godliness”.60 The contiguity of the two descriptions is problematic: one minute Ishmael, Luther’s pre-Islamic Muslim, is said to have received a physical blessing from the Lord, with the Ottoman conquest of Ara- bia being given immediately as a contemporary example of this. The next moment, we learn (contrary to what Luther has said elsewhere about God’s exclusively worldly blessing of the Turk with power and wisdom) that Ishmael also received a spiritual benediction—indeed, his death is redescribed by Luther as being “gathered to the people of the saints” (ibid.). Luther’s overt positivity towards Ishmael does not quite match the Biblical description as “a wild donkey of a man” who “will live in hostility towards all his brothers” (Genesis 16:12). The exact status of Ishmael in Luther’s Christian ontology, like that of Islam in general, remains uncertain. Apart from this slightly ambiguous juxtaposition of Ishmael against the Old Testament Jew, Luther is almost always equally negative towards Jews and Muslims whenever he links them together. As was the case with Catholicism, Luther chooses a number of points on which he finds a common abhorrence of both Islam and Judaism; unlike Luther’s Pope, however, who is occasionally seen to be ‘even worse’ than the Turk (“he has done more harm to the Kingdom of Christ than Mohammed”),61 both Muslim and Jew emerge as equally valid enemies of Christ. Neither profits at the expense of the other

60 Luther’s Works 4:329. 61 Luther’s Works 8:187. 638 ian almond within the general scheme of Luther’s hate. Both (as we have already seen) are blinded by Reason against the crucial doctrine of communion and Christ’s divinity;62 both fast, in vain, believing it to be pleasing to God;63 both smugly and confidently assume that they are the chosen people of God (a remark to be echoed by Kant—even if Luther later qualifies this with the admission that “all men are people of this kind”);64 both refuse to accept any belief which is not in their books (a hermeneutical obstinacy which Kant, once again, will remark upon, choosing to explain such an attitude as “pride” in the case of Moham- medans and “misanthropy” in the case of the Jews).65 On the common feature of treachery, however—both faiths being literal/metaphorical betrayers of Christ—Luther finds himself in the situation not so much of a conflict of sympathies but a conflict of antipathies when writing about the Jew who has to live under Muslim oppression: They are a people scattered here and there, oppressed in various ways, and all but held in captivity wherever they live. They fancy they have great prestige . . . among the Turks. And it is true the Turks favour them because of their traitorous activities. For whatever secret plans the Jews are able to fish out from all the courts of the Christian princes, they immediately bring to the Turk . . . But if you consider the actual situation, the Jews are prey for the Turks themselves . . .66 Although Luther clearly states that “usury is contrary to nature . . . and actually a sin” (ibid.), he significantly omits any mention of this parallel conviction in Islam (even though he would have known about the Islamic prohibition of usury as haram through Cusa),67 nor does he cite it as a reason for the “wealth and prestige” of Jews in Ottoman cities. Moreover, the general section from which the passage is taken is problematic in its position on the Ottoman treatment of the Yahudi: does the Turk oppress the Jew or not? First Luther says no, then he says yes, followed by an elaboration on how relatively better off Jews are under Christian governments than Muslim ones. Luther has to struggle with two contradictory prejudices here (the Turk’s despotism

62 Ibid., 23:99, 46:176; 1:59. 63 Ibid., 5:71. 64 Ibid., 4:52. 65 Ibid., 4:221. Kant’s remarks can be found in his 1793 essay Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason Alone, trans. Allen Wood (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 6:184. 66 Luther’s Works 2:262. 67 See Cribratio I: 6, 42 (p. 23). deconstructing luther’s islam 639 and his own desire to see the Jew’s oppression as deserved), trying to keep one in play without cancelling out the other. The author has to simultaneously preserve the idea of Jews and Mohammedans being traitors to a Christian Europe, without allowing the reader to forget in this Judaeo-Ottoman friendship the despotic merciless nature of the Turkish government, which oppresses the Jews more than Christian governments do. On the other hand, Luther has to be careful not to present the Ottomans as being too despotic to their fellow traitors— whom Luther has no sympathy for and who, after all, are “in error” and oppressed as a consequence of their disbelief (“What sort of a name have the Jews today? Are they not the reproach of all human beings?”). Turkish despotism, in this case, becomes an unknowing tool of God’s anger upon the Jews. The result of all this is a strange passage, marked by a slightly Byzantine logic, where Luther’s anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic sentiments coincide on one point (the Turk favours the Jew because both are traitors, allied against Christ) but conflict with each other in a wider sense. If the Turk favours the Jew, can he still be a despot? And even if we decide that he is, Luther’s contradictory desire to depict such oppression as divine retribution robs any relative tolerance of the Yahudi by Christian governments completely of its value. The kind of ambiguities we find in Luther concerning the precise image and function of the Turk—friendly to the Jews or despotic? A dissolute life or a pious one? Civilized or barbaric? Rational or raving? Sensuously attached to this world or fanatically obsessed with the next one?—reflect, in part, the most fundamental and problematic association Luther makes with Islam: that of the divine will of God, a moral lesson for fallen Christendom engineered by a ruthlessly educative deity. One could argue there is little problematic with Luther’s interpretation of the Ottoman military successes as divinely assisted: the gesture has many medieval precedents—the idea of God using the armies of his enemies to spiritually correct a people clearly has a plethora of examples in the Old Testament—and was supported by a considerable number of Luther’s contemporaries (including Melancthon and Calvin).68 And yet, Luther’s theological position on the Turkish

68 Calvin, in his On the Reformation of the Church, wrote: “The fuel of the Turk- ish war is within us, shut up in our bowels, and must first be removed, if we should 640 ian almond advance towards Vienna causes a number of interesting fault-lines in his work to tremble: his own ambiguous relationship to German language and German culture, the strangely personal way in which Luther will even see the Turks as fighting for him, not to mention the difficult theological question of the status of an evil which is used to correct the sinner . . . all of these complications are introduced into Luther’s theology by his own persistent association of the Turk with the Word of God. Although Luther had been asserting God’s approval of the Turk- ish advance as early as 1518, his position became increasingly controversial with the successes of Suleiman’s campaigns—culminating in 1540, when the Sultan finally occupied Hungary, taking advantage of a convenient power vacuum to bring his armies to the banks of the Danube. Criticisms of Luther and his perceived encouragement of passivity against the Turkish foe were already numerous, and Luther responded to them with only slight modifications, basically arguing that the only soldier who can fight the Turk successfully is one who fights with a clean and prepared heart. Although some commentators interpret the late 1541 text “Appeal For Prayer Against the Turk” as an attempt to more sensitively rectify Luther’s politically uncomfortable position, what we find is an essentially unrepentant text, one which gives some nominal attention to the need to fight outside foes, but really focuses on the (for Luther) larger spiritual issues of why “God has sent the Turk to thrash us”.69 The scholastic theme implicit in this expression is one Luther often made use of: The Turk, you see, is our schoolmaster. He has to discipline and teach us to fear God and pray. Otherwise we will do what we have been doing— rotting in sin and complacency. . . . if we do not accept God’s counsel, there is no help for us. It will be all in vain to scream that the Turks are terrible tyrants. It does not help a naughty child to scream when he feels the rod. If the child were obedient, the rod would not be used.70

successfully drive back the war itself.” (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1958) 1:233. For more on Protestant punitive/ apocalyptic interpretations of the Turkish advance, see W. Schmidt-Biggemann section on Melancthon in his Philosophia Perennis, pp. 635–645. Indeed, the entire notion of a ‘Calvinoturkish’ alliance would persist well after Luther—see Schmidt-Biggemann’s “Salvation Through Philology” in P. Schäfer and M. Cohen, Toward the Millenium: Messianic Expectations from the Bible to Waco (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1998), especially pp. 267–8. 69 Luther’s Works 43:240. 70 Ibid., 43:224. deconstructing luther’s islam 641

The Turk is a rod, a cane, a stick; embodying pure symbol, bereft of any humanitas or possibility for conversion (Luther will never really doubt the inconvertibility of the Turks),71 the Turk is reified into a monstrous yet somehow awesomely divine punishment. Their inhumanity helps us to explain why they do not disappoint God as much as we do—for Luther, Christians who fail to follow God’s law are “worse than Turks”.72 That which has no soul cannot be accused of sin—in this sense the functionality of the Turk does not simply replace his humanity, it becomes a cause of its removal. The abstract, faceless image of the Turk as schoolmaster lies a world away from the moments in Luther where the preacher will dwell upon the carnal qualities of the Turk, his dissolute life, his faith in predestination, his superficial praise of the Gospels. When reminding us of how superior Christianity is to Islam, the Turk becomes flesh and blood, so that we may see how filthy, lewd, cruel and despotic Mohammedans are; when Luther wishes to chastise Christians, however, he employs a hollow Turk, faceless, attributeless, whose only quality is that of divine retribution, a Turk stripped of any semantic depth. The implicit contradiction here only emerges when, as we saw in the remarks on Ottomans and Jews, Luther tries to use both vocabularies at the same time—defaming the Turk for his cruelty, yet simultaneously justifying his tyranny of the Jew. The implicit approval of the Turk’s advance lurks beneath Luther’s “schoolmaster” metaphors—an unspoken, incomplete endorsement which angered his critics.73 Certainly, it is not uncharitable to see an element of self-justification at work here—in “On War Against the Turk” we read: Although . . . I could keep quiet and look on while the Turk avenged me upon tyrants (who persecute the Gospel and blame me for all kinds of misfortune) and paid them back for it, nevertheless, I shall not do so . . .74 The Turkavenges Luther; the righteous injustices Luther and his followers have suffered because of their devotion to the Gospel are directly related here to the success of an Islamic army. The juxtaposition is a

71 In the preface to his translation of Ricardo’s Confutatio, Luther goes into some detail describing how Turks stop their ears and close their eyes whenever Christians try to reason with them. Gesamtausgabe 53:276. 72 Luther’s Works 46:172. 73 Luther defends himself against these charges in “Instructions for the Visitors of Parish Pastors” in Luther’s Works 40:305–6. 74 Ibid., 46:168. 642 ian almond curious one, unwittingly bringing Islam in as an ally of Luther in a strange, unintentional alliance of interests. Luther will never take this farther—unlike Nietzsche, Luther’s enemy’s enemy is not necessarily his friend—but the language is striking, particularly when Luther argues that the Turk will teach the Germans what his articles mean (ibid.). In this sense, the two functions of Luther’s Turk combine— the Turks supply not only a providential justification of Luther on a purely individual level, vindicating him against his enemies, but also emerge in the guise of an external correction to the Church, a divinely- administered reprove and re-adjustment of the Church’s mortal errancy. Not just a rod, then, but also a salve, a brace, an instrument of correction and healing. In this sense, Luther’s notion of the public and the private spill over into one another—because “Germany is ripe and bursting with sin”75 (elsewhere we read, in an ironic repetition of Luther’s description of the Jews, “There is no nation so despised as the German”),76 a national self-improvement is implicit in the Turk’s defeat. This also counts on an individual level—until the Christian cleanses his heart, no salvation from the Turk can be expected. In both cases, the presence of the Turk brings spiritual self-correction. It is also interesting to see how Luther employs the Turk as a vehicle of social criticism. In the middle of “Appeal for Prayer”, we find him bitterly lamenting the price of eggs (“. . . in times past . . . you could get fifteen eggs for three groschen”),77 a resentment of inflation which Luther clearly sees as part of Germany’s sinful state. Although Luther sees this as an essentially spiritual problem—“that great god Mammon or avarice”78—the objects of his criticism are socially specific: not just the humble peasant, but the nobility, lawyers, small farmers and bankers are all responsible for the adverse conditions, “stealing from the poor and needy” and thereby provoking the wrath of God.79 Luther’s words against bankers (“cursed money-lenders”), it should be said, mask a stifled anti-Semitism, even though the principle concern is the dominance of their avarice: “I almost forgot to mention the banker. Oh, how complacent he is, as if he were God and master of the country . . . either the Turk or some other instrument of God’s wrath will

75 Ibid., 43:221. 76 Ibid., 54:151. 77 Ibid., 43:222. 78 Ibid., 43:220. 79 Ibid., p. 223. deconstructing luther’s islam 643 teach you that Luther understood well enough what the money lend- ing business is about”.80 In describing Münzer as a Turkish emperor, Luther employed the Turk as a threat to social stability; in his own social criticism, however, the threat of the Turk is actually a means to better social cohesion. Far from destroying society, the Turkish threat in these moments reforms it, redressing its worst abuses, amending its most visible excesses. Even if this oscillation between the two images of the Turk—an imminent menace to social order, and a vehicle of social reform within that order—is not wholly contradictory, it does illustrate not only how quickly Luther’s Turk can change his identity to fit the required mould, but also how plastic and shifting Luther’s own relationship to Germany is, at times something to be defended and preserved, at others something to be despised, forcefully corrected and, failing that, destroyed or handed over “bloodlessly” to the Turk. These two aspects of Islam—curse and cure—pervade Luther’s work. They manifest themselves, at different times, to answer different needs—a need to defend ‘our’ culture and faith against the outside, or a need on the contrary to criticise and reform the familiar. In other words, although Islam was always “wholly other” for Luther, it represented an alterity he made use of in different and sometimes contradictory ways. We see how the faith and followers of Moham- med threaten to subvert Christian order—the order of the body, the order of society, the order of the text; we also see how precisely their un-Christian qualities—their worldliness, their despotism, their zeal— serves implicitly to reinforce and reaffirm this order. Ultimately, it is in this desire to reform that Luther finds himself unwittingly drawn into a relationship of problematic intimacy with his own enemy’s enemy: What do our dear lords do? They treat it as a joke. It is a fact that the Turk is at our throat . . . Meanwhile, our princes consult us about how they can harass Luther and the gospel: It is the gospel which is the Turk! Force must be used against it! The gospel must be put to rout!81 In many ways, Luther illustrates one of the classic dangers of ironic paraphrase: that in the moment of repetitive mimicry, the shifting of register and perspective to imitate the voice of the mocked, we may end up speaking the words of truth in somebody else’s mouth. Cer- tainly, Luther’s sarcastic paraphrase is mocking the lords and their

80 Ibid., p. 221. 81 Ibid., 46:202. 644 ian almond paranoid attitude towards him. There is even something subversively self-deprecating about the way Luther imagines himself vilified as the Turk, one of the many moments of odd solidarity we find with her- etics in the Werke. And yet, even if the subtext of Luther’s mockery is clear—‘Instead of fighting those who would reform the Church, the Empire should busy itself with the infidels who lie outside it’—there is an ulterior sense in which Luther’s mimicry also rings quite true. The gospelis the Turk, insofar as the Turk will cause the gospel to be read; the Turk represents the gospel, insofar as he is an (unwitting) tool of its restoration. The curious echo of this secondary meaning lingers on in the passage: the lords should forget Luther and fight the cursed Turk, who nevertheless will play a key role in their necessary spiritual renewal. In short the Turk, to use Luther’s own paradoxical description, is both “God’s rod and the devil’s servant”, both poison and antidote, both curse and cure.82

‘Othering’ Islam: Overcoming Resemblances, Sustaining Alterity

Having gone to some lengths to show the variety of associations Luther makes with Mohammed and ‘Mohammedan’ cultures, two points of significance remain which need to be dealt with, if we are to understand at all the intricate mechanisms within Luther’s ‘Othering’ of Islam: the kinds of strategies Luther will resort to in order to disqualify those aspects of Islam which problematically resemble his own beliefs, and secondly the omissions and circumventions Luther makes in his hundreds of references and remarks on Islam. Unlike Nicholas of Cusa, Luther was no Neoplatonist. Despite the profound influence of Augustine and Luther’s own fascination with a number of Eckhartian ideas (as mediated through his reading of Tauler), the idea of Truth as a long-shattered vase, amongst whose fragments we now live here in the fallen, transient world of the multiple, never really makes itself felt in his attitude towards difference. If Cusa’s strategy towards Islam follows a theological policy of recovery and absorption—following the standard Neoplatonic motif of a return to the One through the Many—Luther’s approach is rather one of

82 Ibid., 46:170. deconstructing luther’s islam 645 clear and distinctive delineation, a polarisation of Islam which pushes the faith outside the boundaries of any holistic henology. This makes interesting reading when Luther encounters ideas similar to his own in the very ideology he is trying to ‘other’. Three common features in particular stand out between what Luther perceives to be “Moham- medanism” and his own understanding of the Christian faith: a belief in predestination, an aversion to images and, most obviously, a historical recognition in Islam of Jesus, Mary and most of the prophets from the Old Testament. Luther deals with these obstacles in different ways. On the question of free will and predestination, one which recalls Luther’s own famous debate with Erasmus, the Reformer has to deal with the familiar stereotype of Mohammedan fatalism—and the fact that Luther’s own theology placed a strong emphasis on predestination and the sovereign will of God: Beware of the Turkish, Epicurean philosophy [hüte dich fur dem Turckis- chen, Epikurische Glauben] which says “What can I do? What is the use of praying? What does it help to worry? If it is predestined, it will happen.” It is the belief of the Turks that no-one may die until their fated hour has come. This is the reason for their fanatical courage and their assurance that what they are doing is right. Yes, of course it is true: if it is predestined, it will happen. But it has not been given to us to know what is predestined.83 It would be too much of a digression to examine how this passage prefigures both Nietzsche and Benjamin’s remarks on the relationship between fate and nihilism.84 Scripturally, at least, Luther’s ironic paraphrase of “Turkish philosophy” is half-true once again—“What does it help to worry?” (Was hilft viel Sorgen?) comes straight out of Mat- thew 6:24–35. Faced with this superficial resemblance, Luther distinguishes Christian predestination from its flawed Muslim equivalent by drawing on two familiar features of Luther’s Islam—pride and fanaticism. Even though everything is preordained, the ‘good’ fatalist acts

83 Ibid., 43:235–6 (Werke 51:614–5). 84 Benjamin’s assertion that the Protestant claim to salvation through grace alone emptied the sixteenth century world of meaning and provided, in many ways, the first modern basis for European nihilism, was theGrundthese of his work The Ori- gin Of German Tragic Drama (trans. John Osborne, London: Verso, 1998). In his Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche speculated on the essential nihilism of the Assassins (the Islamic warrior-sect mythologised throughout European for their daring, ruthless murders) whose secret maxim, Nietzsche claimed, was “Nothing is true. Everything is allowed”—see Genealogie der Moral, III.24, p. 152. 646 ian almond as if he still possessed free will; significantly, Luther does not trouble himself to wonder whether the Qur’an or its commentators have also made this logically inevitable reservation. Mohammedan pride pushes the Muslim to assume he already knows the will of God (the Muslim arrogance of claiming to be the last religion, of replacing Christ with their Mohammed as the last prophet, etc.). Thus Luther circumvents the problematic resemblance by distinguishing between an authentic belief in fate (God has preordained everything but we don’t know how, we still act as if we had free will) and the Turk’s inauthentic belief (God has preordained everything and we know he will give us vic- tory). Instead of citing the Qur’an or providing a textual source, he justifies this difference by appealing empirically to the behaviour of its adherents—their “fanatical courage”, how they “rush furiously at the foe at great risk” in battle, is supplied by Luther as a proof of this distinction.85 The proof is slightly problematic not simply because of its positivity—adding intense devotion to their God as a factor in Turkish military success—but also because the other-worldly fanaticism which underlies it does not square well with the worldliness of the Moham- medan (their sensuality, their power, wealth and wisdom) Luther has seen fit to emphasise elsewhere. The question of the image—and how Luther treats a prohibition in Islam of representation as shirk—also creates a difficulty, as one would imagine Luther actually having something positive to say about Islamic proscription of the icon, given his own belief in images as “worthless and despised”.86 To some extent, Luther grudgingly acknowledges the validity of this position, before going on to develop his argument in a very different direction: It is also a part of the Turk’s holiness to tolerate no images or pictures, and they are even holier than our iconoclasts. For our iconoclasts tolerate and are glad to have images on gulden, groschen, rings and ornaments; but the Turk tolerates none of them and stamps nothing but letters on his coins. He is entirely Münzerian, too, for he exterminates all rulers and tolerates no gradations of government such as princes, counts . . .87 “The Turk’s holiness” . . . in attempting to cordon off the more Chris- tian aspects of Islam from any conciliatory comparison, Luther tries

85 Luther’s Works 6:102. 86 “Against the Heavenly Prophets” in Luther’s Works 40:85. 87 Ibid., 46:181. deconstructing luther’s islam 647 to show how “their” holiness and “their” iconoclasts are different from “ours”, just as he had with “their” belief in predestination. This strategy this time does not involve locating the devil as the source of the practice concerned (as Luther does with the Turks’ eagerness for martyrdom and devotion to their scriptures),88 nor showing how the apparently similar belief is actually based on wrong or incomplete foundations (as was the case with Mohammedan fatalism); rather, the Turk’s problem this time is excess. The Islamic distaste towards images in not ‘really’ holy because it is taken to extremes—a point Luther emphasizes by bringing in Münzer once more. What in Christianity is essentially a sound and thoroughly biblical gesture becomes, in Islam, an anarchic and destructive feature, a ‘false’ holiness of force and excessive fanaticism, rather than a ‘genuine’ spiritual distaste for the graven image. In both cases, a valid belief found in Islam is disqualified and rendered ‘Other’ by an appeal to the character of the Moham- medan. Since Turks are fanatical and cruel, their aversion to images becomes obliterative and chaotic—just as the pride and arrogance of the Turk renders their belief in predestination invalid, turning it into complacent self-congratulation. In all of these maneuvers, Luther never allows the circles of Christianity and Islam to overlap. Whenever a problematic proximity occurs, some wholly external information—a racial characteristic or a traveler’s observation—is brought in to keep the two spheres righteously separate. In dealing with Islam’s acceptance of many figures within the Judaeo-Christian tradition (“I cannot deny that the Turk esteems the four gospels”),89 not to mention moreover the common-sense proposi- tion that no religion or race can be wholly bad—even the Turks must have some qualities akin to Christian virtues—Luther adopts a tactic which implicitly contradicts his previous two strategies, that of ascrib- ing such similarity to diabolical inspiration: It is said that among themselves the Turks are faithful, friendly, and careful to tell the truth. I believe that and I think that they probably have more fine virtues in them than that. No man is so bad that there is not something good in him. Now and then a woman of the streets has more good qualities than do ten honourable matrons. The devil would have a cloak and be a handsome angel of light, so he hides behind certain works that are works of light. Murderers and robbers are more faithful

88 Ibid., 46:181, 4:221. 89 Ibid., 46:194. 648 ian almond

and friendly to each other than neighbours are, even more so than many Christians. For if the devil keeps the three things—lies, murder and disregard of marriage—as the real foundation of hell, he can easily tolerate, even help, carnal love and faithfulness being built upon it . . .90 What Luther supplies here is an early, pre-modern, diabolical hermeneutics of suspicion. The more ‘Christian’ the Turk looks, the more suspicious we should become; the closeness of the resemblance only counts as an act of inverse interpretation to show how far apart the two faiths really lie. The superficiality of Islam, as we had already seen in its relation to allegory, facilitates this deception, even if here Luther develops the idea by attributing not merely emptiness to Islam, but Satanic mendacity. Islam pretends to signify Christ, but actually represents the devil. Instead of trying to convince us how an initial impression of resemblance is, upon closer inspection, actually false (or valid but misapplied), Luther’s strategy this time is to epistemologically call the entire act of signification into question. Of course, the suspicion that the manifestly holy may conceal a diabolical reality is as old as 2 Corinthians 11:14 (“For even Satan disguises himself as an angel of light”)—what is interesting is that Luther employs this to rebut a contiguity he would otherwise have to accept. Whereas Cusa would Neo- platonically attribute such similarities to the work of God, Who moves even amongst the most pagan religions, Luther’s inverse hermeneutics and theology of polarity has to see the Islamic sign, no matter what it signifies, as coming from the opposite direction. When the phenomena are negative—cruelty, lechery, fanaticism— then no problem arises for Luther, and the observer may trust the signs they perceive. When the phenomena are positive—faithfulness, friendliness, truthfulness—then a potentially nihilistic situation emerges, where any reliable link between signifier and signified is necessarily severed, and human reality loses all hope of contact with the divine realm of truth. As a result, an implicitly contradictory picture emerges in Luther’s determination to keep Islam ‘other’: first of all, for Luther most resemblances between Christianity and Islam are actually illusory, when one examines them closely. Secondly, those resemblances which are genuine do not count, for they acquire within Islam a different and ultimately unsound character. Thirdly, even those few resemblances of belief and character which are incontestably

90 Ibid., 46:180. deconstructing luther’s islam 649 identical cannot be trusted, for they have been created as snares to seduce the gullible. In striving to keep Christianity qadosh (holy, separate) with regards to Islam, Luther is driven into a valueless, epistemological vacuum, one where (to use Luther’s own words) “all that God speaks and does, the devil has to speak and do first”.91 Given that we already have a God who can use evil to do well, alongside a devil who can disguise darkness as light, the arbitrariness of Luther’s gnoseology is surprising but not completely unexpected. For our own study, at least, the most significant point is that Luther’s sceptical epistemology plays an essential part in keeping a Semitic, book-based, monotheistic faith with a Judaeo-Christian morality safely away from the unsullied truth of Christianity. In concluding, some note should also be made concerning the kinds of absences we find in Luther’s texts, the various lacunae which emerge in his treatment of Islam—particularly when one considers the sources he had to draw on. Although this gesture may seem excessively apo- phatic—the idea that what Luther doesn’t say about Islam is somehow more significant than what he does—it does give us some useful information on the selective ‘othering’ of Islam, of how the alterity of the Muslim Other was shaped and located just as much by the unsaid as well as the said. Certainly one of the first things that Luther says strikingly little about is the Christian Orient. Luther was definitely aware of the Christian (Armenian/Syrian Orthodox/Nestorian/Maronite) tradition in the Middle East; as we have already seen, Cusa begins his Cribratio with a discussion amongst “wise and noble” Christian Arabs, whilst Ricardo’s own treatise draws on the various groups of Nestorians and Syrian Monophysites (Jacobites) in some detail to argue against Mohammed’s claims concerning the falsification of the Holy Scrip- tures.92 Given Luther’s frequently racial understanding of Islam—his conviction of the Arab’s descent as being traceable to Ishmael, his description of Turks as “a wild and barbarous people”93—it is not too surprising that Luther has little to say concerning Christian Arabs. A racial understanding of Islam inevitably becomes a geographical understanding of Islam: Islam as topos, as a region or boundary, a

91 Ibid., 14:31–2 cit. in Schreiner, “Appearances and Reality”, p. 355. 92 Gesamtausgabe, 53:286. 93 Luther’s Works 3:167, 46:175. 650 ian almond place where Islam ‘lives’. The absence of any Protestant Christianity in the Middle East, moreover, most Arab Christians being either Catho- lics or Monophysites, would hardly encourage Luther to discover an empathy with a creed he at times considered to be worse than Islam. A third and final reason for Luther’s paucity of references to Christian Arabs may well be a belief that Christians cannot live under Turkish (Ottoman) rule without becoming ‘polluted’. In “On War Against the Turk”, Luther makes a brief reference to the praise which came from some quarters for the Ottomans’ tolerance of minorities, before dis- missing it as false: on the contrary, the Turk “does not allow Christians to come together in public, and no-one can openly teach . . . against Mohammed”.94 Luther’s words are to some extent true—our critique of the European reification of the Muslim should not lead us into ide- alizing the darker aspects of Ottoman rule and their infamous ‘gavur’ tax; what is interesting, however, is how Luther goes on to argue a rather different point: Since faith must be . . . held in secret among this wild and barbarous people . . . how can it exist in the long run?. . . . Therefore it happens that those Christians who are captured or otherwise get into Turkey fall away and become altogether Turkish, and it is very seldom that one remains true to his faith, for they lack the living bread of the soul and see the abandoned carnal life of the Turks and are obliged to adapt themselves to it.95 For Luther, Christians who live under Turkish rule “become Turk- ish” for three reasons. Firstly, because of the Turk’s own despotic restrictions; secondly, because they have no access to the living word (because they no longer live within a Christian society); thirdly, because they are won over by the seductive carnality of the Turks’ practices. Although Luther is probably talking not just about Turkey but also the conquered Balkan territories here, and not the Christian traditions of Palestine and Aleppo, it does give us an idea of how essentially Muslim Luther’s East is. Islam is no separate faith but, foreshadowing Leibniz’s own description of la peste de mahometanisme,96 a contagious disease, one which sooner or later affects all who dwell near it. Luther makes

94 Ibid., 46:175. 95 Ibid. 96 See Leibniz’s Reflexions sur la guerre (1687) in Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1923), vol. 4:3, p. 776. deconstructing luther’s islam 651 comparatively little mention of Arab Christianity not just because his own understanding of Christianity was so unconsciously German, but also because his understanding of the Orient—and the Ottoman’s occupation of it97—was an intrinsically Islamic one, a place where genuine Christianity was simply impossible. Other omissions are, perhaps, more obvious. Luther seldom speaks of love or forgiveness concerning the Turk. Christ’s injunction to love one’s enemies (Matthew 5:43–7) Luther cites on several occasions, but only once makes the briefest mention of the Turk: “The Christian ought to . . . include all men in his prayer . . . ‘all men’ includes Turks and Tartars. For these we must also pray”.98 Although the Christian is scripturally obliged to love his/her enemy, Luther seems unwilling to consider this verse very often in a Turkish context. Luther’s conviction that the Turk was no normal, human enemy but rather a supernatural foe is certainly of consequence here (“What you are fighting against is not flesh and blood, or just human beings . . . The Turk’s army is really Satan’s army”).99 We have already seen how Luther’s Turk, in its primary chastising/apocalyptic function, is nothing more than a shallow caricature of humanity, paradoxically a tool of both diabolical and ultimately divine will. The inhumanity of the Turk, in this sense, would have rendered the question of forgiveness, let alone love, quite irrelevant. With regards to the subsequent history of representations of Islam after Luther, another significant absence in the Reformer’s treatment of “Mohammedanism” is the omission of any real dismissal of Islam as a ‘fossilised’, ‘obsolete’ or ‘insignificant’ faith. In contrast to the categorisation of later centuries—where Islam shrinks to the status of a rather strange footnote of Western progress, an idealised, ontologically frozen topos whose growth stopped somewhere around 1400—Luther sees Islam as a living, dynamic and vibrant faith. Of course, the proximity of the Ottoman threat is the clearest factor in this—100,000 Turkish soldiers across the Danube would make it difficult to dismiss “Mohammedanism” as a minor, antiquated heresy; this acknowledgment of Islam’s contemporaneity, however, does offer an interesting

97 Luther was well aware of the Ottoman occupation of the Saudi peninsula—see Luther’s Works 4:329. 98 Commentary on 1 Timothy in Luther’s Works 28:258. 99 Ibid., 43:237. 652 ian almond contrast with the way Luther talks about Judaism—his references, in particular, to “the destruction of Judaism”, and his description of the faith as “withered and decayed in all the world”.100 Luther’s Islam, on the contrary, appears to evoke a faint but definite sense of inferior- ity in his writings—evidenced not simply by his constant complaints that Islam “mocks” and “humiliates” us, but also by an uncannily sensitive awareness of the way in which Islam metaphysically ‘boxes’ Christianity: We Christians acknowledge the Old Testament as divine scripture, but now that it is fulfilled and is, as St Peter says, too hard without God’s grace, it is abolished and no longer binding upon us. Mohammed treats the Gospel the same way. He declares that the Gospel is indeed correct, but that it has long since served its purpose and that it is too hard to keep . . .101 The passage is remarkable for a number of reasons. First of all, Luther says, somewhat explicitly: ‘Islam treats Christianity as we treat the Jews; Mohammed does to Christ what Christ does to Moses’. The remark, for all its intended hostility, is implicitly empathetic. Although Luther is trying to make Islam’s attitude towards Christianity clearer, he inadvertently justifies their gesture as a replica of the Christian one. Secondly, the intellectual flexibility here is also worth comment, as Luther decentres his viewpoint not once but twice—first to imagine how Jews feel redescribed by Christians, and then to reflect on how Muslims view Christians. The observation is epistemologically subtle and light years away from Luther’s diatribes against the “stinking” Qur’an. Thirdly, Luther’s analogy is problematic, as it ultimately rein- forces Islam’s incorporation of Christianity as a second stage. The two reported (and for Luther presumably false) reasons we are given for the redundancy of the Gospels in Islam—that they have been rendered obsolete by a subsequent revelation, and were in any case too difficult to follow—are structurally identical to the (true, sound) reasons Juda- ism is no longer necessary for Christians. Read in isolation, one might be forgiven for thinking Luther was trying to justify Islam, rather than condemn it.

100 Luther’s Works 26:101 (cit. in Amy, p. 457); 19:104 (cit. in Amy, 471). 101 Luther’s Works 46:195. deconstructing luther’s islam 653

Conclusion

The subtleties and inner mechanisms of Luther’s general attitude towards Islam—with all its repressed sympathies, omissions and circumventions—leave us with a number of reflections. Luther’s sincere desire to obtain a reliable knowledge of Islam, not to mention his frequently stated awareness of the fact that it was unjustly defamed to some extent,102 certainly emphasise the limitations of a critical will to truth. Moreover, in the manifold spray of different characteristics Luther projects onto the vacuous “Mohammedanism” he constructs— irrational animals and slaves of reason, well-disciplined governments and ruthless despots, pious-living ascetics and carnal hedonists—the Protean flexibility of Islam appears to be less of a consequence of Luther’s strategies and more a condition for them. Perhaps his conviction of the superficial hollowness of Islam, to some extent, was able to facilitate these multiple, often conflicting characteristics. A study of Luther’s approach to Islam also shows how a loyalty to scripture—in the case of a fundamentalist such as Luther, the ontological primacy of a particular text over all over facets of socio-political reality—does not conform to but rather complicates more ‘worldly’ agendas of cultural identity, regional allegiance and political economy. Luther’s understanding of the Turk as divinely assisted always threatens, but never quite overturns, the regional rootedness of his own religious context, in particular an implicit belief, always present in the Werke but never quite expressed, in the essential Germanness of Christianity (his satisfaction, for example, that “we Germans should call God by the ancient name (finer and more appropriate than any other), ‘Good’ . . .”).103 In this sense, what the fundamental ambiguity of Luther’s destructive/restorative Turk reveals, more than anything else, is the ambiguity of hatred itself; the fact that hatred, like love, is a relationship of intimacy, an act of negative devotion. Hatred, like love, requires attention and energy; it brings the object of hatred into the world of the hater, accords it a privileged place, and imbues it with an incontestable (if unenviable) significance. In reading Luther’s response to Islam, one

102 See, for example, 46:176 on Luther’s awareness of the “outrageous lies” which have been invented about the Turks “to incite us Germans against them”. 103 Cit. in Van A. Harvey, “Feuerbach on Luther’s Doctrine of Revelation”, in Jour- nal of Religion (1998) 78:1, p. 12. 654 ian almond can’t help feeling the rather Nietzschean lesson implicit in Derrida’s pharmakon—that what can kill us may also cure us—finds a structurally similar counterpoint in Luther’s Turcken and the Teuffelsdreck of Islam; the paradox that our ultimate salvation may lie in the obstacle, the enemy, the curse (and implicitly, our corresponding damnation may come in the form of our comforts, our allies, our aid) belongs to the mysterious ways of a hidden, unpredictable, enigmatic God. INTERPRETING ISLAMIC LAW FOR EUROPEAN MUSLIMS: THE ROLE AND THE WORK OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL FOR FATWA AND RESEARCH

Karen-Lise Johansen Karman1

Introduction

The debate on Muslim minorities’ application of Islamic legal and normative tradition has gained immediacy as Muslim communities outside the Muslim majority world grow.2 The ‘ulama’ guiding Muslims living as religious minorities in Western Europe are confronted with the issue of adapting the content of the Islamic law to meet West- ern European circumstances and have started to engage in normative debates about the extent to which local practices can be taken into account when interpreting Shari’a. Not only established institutions of ifta’ (fatwa-issuing) in the Muslim majority world, but also Muslim scholars residing in Western Europe and newly established Western fiqh councils give theological responses to Muslim minorities’ religious concerns. This paper studies the politics and the legal consultation of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), one of the most renowned and the only “supranational” fiqh council in Europe. The general topic is how a Western fiqh council’s legal guidance concerning the practice of Islam’s religious, social and legal norms in non- Muslim societies is shaped to meet West European Muslims’ needs. The paper examines the European fatwa council’s institutional structures, membership, and international scholarly relatedness attempting to answer whether the council succeeds in its aim of being the main— and an independent—body of jurisconsultancy for Muslims in West- ern Europe. The paper examines the legal rulings of the council and

1 Karen-Lise Johansen Karman PhD (Comparative Religion, University of Aarhus) is a researcher and advisor at the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, Denmark. 2 The article builds on my PhD thesis,Rethinking Islamic Jurisprudence for Muslim Minorities: The Politics and the Work of Contemporary Fatwa Councils (Aarhus: Uni- versity of Aarhus, 2008). 656 karen-lise johansen karman addresses the question of whether the council’s legal reasoning may lead to the establishment of jurisprudence of Muslim minorities.

The Organisational Circumstances of the European Council for Fatwa and Research

The process of fatwa-giving is rooted in the legal heritage of Islamic thought. The varied production of legal texts responding to Muslim minorities’ situation in Western Europe and the diverse articulations of a normative Islam for Muslims living in non-Muslim countries indicate, however, that the content and function of the legal texts are given different meanings depending on the setting, period, persons and institutions doing the readings. The dynamic process of diversity, transformation and ambiguity illustrates that despite the religious tradition’s inherent limitations, the legal utterances are subject to various conditions that may constrain or facilitate and influence the legal products. The influential mechanisms that shape the legal guidance may be human and structural factors, such as the educational background and ideological positions of the ‘ulama’, or the environment and institutions within which they operate. Having these reflections in mind, the institutional framework and social practices of the ECFR—i.e. the structures within which the legal announcements are produced—will be described in the following.

1 The European Fatwa Council’s Raison d’être On the initiative of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE), the European Council for Fatwa and Research was established in 1997.3 According to one of the founding-members of the ECFR, Ahmad al-Rawi (an Iraqi-born structural engineer and former president of the FIOE), the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe

3 For studies on the ECFR see, Caeiro, Alexandre, “Transnational ‘Ulama, Euro- pean Fatwas and Islamic Authority: A Case Study of the European Council for Fatwa and Research”, in: Martin van Bruinessen and Stefano Allievi eds., Producing Islamic Knowledge: Transmission and Dissemination in Western Europe (London: Routledge, 2010); Rohe, Mathias, “The Formation of a European Shari‘a” in: Jamal Malik ed.,Mus- lims in Europe: From the Margin to the Centre (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004); Larsen, Lena Islamisk rettstenking i mote med dagliglivets utfordringer. Fatwaer som løsnings- forslag for muslimske kvinner i Vest-Europa, (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2011), Karman, Rethinking Islamic Jurisprudence for Muslim Minorities. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 657 had various motives for founding the fatwa council.4 First of all, the FIOE identified a growing need for improving and facilitating the possibilities for European Muslims to receive guidance from qualified ‘ulama’ living in Europe instead of accepting religious legal advice given by ‘ulama’ living outside Europe with ”limited understanding of the living conditions of Muslim minorities in the West”.5 In the ECFR’s constitution, it is thus stated that the Muslims in Europe are urgently in need of an authority that can fulfil their requirements in the form of suitable fatwas, judgments, studies and research, and then subsequently to resolve their problems.6 This motive is in line with the FIOE’s efforts to develop a body of European-educated ‘ulama’, which in 1990 led to its establishment of the European Institute for Human Sciences. One of the main reasons for creating this educational institution was, according to FIOE, to address and deal with the challenge posed by a lack of ‘ulama’ with a full comprehension of European conditions.7 The FIOE aims, al-Rawi explains, at cultivating a new generation of European ‘ulama’ with a profound understanding of the local context which would be consequently better qualified to deal with the problems of these Muslim minorities in Europe.8 Ahmad al-Rawi further notes that the FIOE acknowledged that it would be some time until these students graduate and become trusted ‘ulama’. Meanwhile it would be necessary to assemble a group of trustworthy ‘ulama’ who could take on the task of guiding the Muslim minorities in Europe. The European Council for Fatwa and Research was thus perceived as a provisional body of reputed ‘ulama’ with knowledge of European society, entrusted with the responsibility of temporarily fulfilling the need for authorities in Europe until local ‘ulama’ were graduated. Following Ahmad al-Rawi, another motive for establishing the ECFR was to counter the lack of unity among the Muslim ‘ulama’ living in Europe. It is argued that divisions partition the European Muslim community and lead to contradictory understandings of how to comply with Islam in the West. Al-Rawi says that there is a “flood

4 Ahmad al-Rawi is now the head of the umbrella organisation, the Muslim Asso- ciation of Britain (MAB). 5 Interview with Ahmad al-Rawi, Leicester, 14 February 2006. 6 Qararat wa fatawa, Al-majlis al-aurubbi li al-ifta’ wa al-buhuth (Fatwas of the European Council for Fatwa and Research), pp. 1–2. 7 http://www.iesh.fr, assessed 30 March 2011. 8 Interview with Ahmad al-Rawi, Leicester, 14 February 2006. 658 karen-lise johansen karman of fatwas” guiding the Muslim community in diverse directions and it is necessary to develop a uniform body of guidance. In other words, the intention was to establish an organ that in a unified way could direct Muslims to live as Muslims in Western Europe without vio- lating either the demands of Shari’a or European laws. Such an idea is furthermore echoed in the introduction of the council’s published collection of fatwas, in which it is described how the need to establish the council was made clear by the presence of some self-acclaimed scholars who misguided the Muslim community by issuing fatwas. The introductory text continues, “[I]t is imperative that the ECFR fulfils its role [. . .] to silence those ignorant and vile voices [. . .]”.9 The council aimed at becoming an influential voice taking an active role in discursive disputes with other Islamic approaches, and the project seems first and foremost to have been to form an authoritative Islamic say that can influence the European Muslims and become the dominant, normative Islamic discourse in Europe.

2 The Council Members—Local, Famous or Scholarly? FIOE selected the first 25 members of the council striving to choose qualified ulama‘ ’ representing different European countries with a significant Muslim presence, different schools of law and different groups of Muslim communities.10 Today the ECFR comprises 34 members— some fourteen members live outside Europe.11 Although the council has succeeded in representing various nationalities, including ‘ulama’ of subcontinental and Turkish background, the majority of the members is of Arab origin. The council does not include any members who represent a state-controlled Islam by their home countries, which is the case for the Diyanet imams and some of the ‘ulama’ related to the grand mosque in Paris, which is run by the Algerian government, and the FNMF (Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France) controlled by Morocco.12 The council does not count any Muslim authorities

9 Qararat wa fatawa, Al-majlis al-aurubbi li al-ifta’ wa al-buhuth (Fatwas of the European Council for Fatwa and Research), xiii. 10 Interview with Ahmad al-Rawi, Leicester, 14 February 2006. 11 www.e-cfr.org, accessed 30 March 2011. 12 John Bowen describes the network of mosques under the control of the Paris Mosque as UOIF’s main rivals. Bowen, John R. “Beyond Migration: Islam as a Trans- national Public Space”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30, 5, (2004): pp. 879–94, (883). interpreting islamic law for european muslims 659 related to Sufi Brotherhoods tariqa( ). If they were invited to join the ECFR they may have chosen not to be associated with the council, as was the case of the quietest movement Tabligh (jama‘at al-tabligh).13 The ECFR also excludes female members as well as Shi’i Muslim authorities. The actual membership thus calls into question the sincer- ity of the ECFR’s proclaimed aim of embracing the Muslim community in Europe. It shows that the council is not that inclusive and only partially succeeds in representing the European Muslim community across ethical and ideological backgrounds. At the time of the ECFR’s launch, the membership criteria were not completely ratified, and the lack of definite criteria led to the inclusion of what some members call “less qualified ulama‘ ’”.14 According to al- Rawi, apart from looking at the ‘ulama’s qualifications, knowledge and experience, attention was also paid to members’ location and position within the different Muslim minority communities. It was believed that the chances of transmitting the council’s rulings and achieving greater influence would increase by selecting ulama‘ ’ representing large groups of Muslim communities. Abdullah al-Judai (a founding member of the council and known as one of the more pragmatic scholars of the council when it comes to legal interpretation) adds that having a dominant community position has never been a condition for membership, but he admits that if the council’s voice is supposed to reach a wide and diverse group of Muslims, it is decisive that members are known within the communities.15 In the text of the constitution, the membership criteria are outlined. It is stated that the member must have a university degree in Shari’a science or have been trained by esteemed ‘ulama’. He must be proficient in Arabic and personally comply with the principles and manners of Islam. It is furthermore a condition that he have wide knowledge of Islamic legal jurisprudence and be capable of issuing fatwas in accordance with the European environment, and finally that he be a European resident.16 The inclusion of Rachid al-Ghannouchi as a member illustrates how the membership criteria are occasionally compromised for the sake of other qualifications. The Tunisian political activist does not have any educational background in Islamic

13 Interview with Ahmad al-Rawi, Leicester, 14 February 2006. 14 Interview with Ahmad al-Rawi, Leicester, 14 February 2006. 15 Interview with Abdullah al-Judai, Leeds, 15 February 2006. 16 Interview with Abdullah al-Judai, Leeds, 15 February 2006. 660 karen-lise johansen karman jurisprudence—he studied philosophy in Damascus and at the Sor- bonne in Paris—and is according to the ECFR byelaws not qualified to act as a mufti. He is, however, an established Muslim thinker with international recognition and these qualities have outweighed the official membership standards. It is argued that the intention of establishing a council composed mainly of members residing in Europe was hindered by the apparent lack of proficient ulama‘ ’ in Europe.17 ‘Ulama’ from abroad were included and in the constitution it was added that the council may select members residing outside Europe provided they have full comprehension of the European Muslim communities’ situation and that their number does not exceed one quarter of the members.18 The international aspect of the European Council was further emphasised by the founding members’ appointment of Yusuf al-Qaradawi as the president and Faysal Mawlawi as vice-president. When the council was established it had five members living outside Europe. In the last decade, the number of members living outside Europe has gradually increased and now exceeds a quarter of the total. Consequently, the council modified its byelaws in the mid-2000s, now permitting one third of its members to reside outside Europe.19 Apparently, the election of Yusuf al-Qaradawi to the council’s presidency took the initiators by surprise. They had expected that the invited members had been more committed to the vision of creating a European fiqh council and would have appointed a president residing in Europe.20 The members may have chosen Yusuf al-Qaradawi because he was the most respected and prominent ‘alim present at the meeting and therefore it was unavoidable that he be proposed as the most likely candidate for the position. They may have expected that by appointing one of the most popular and influential contemporary ‘ulama’ as president, the influence of the council and Muslims’ trust in its work would be guaranteed. Al-Qaradawi himself was keen to take on the role as president. On several occasions al-Qaradawi has elaborated on the necessity of

17 Interview with Ahmad al-Rawi, Leicester, 14 February 2006. 18 Qararat wa fatawa, Al-majlis al-aurubbi li al-ifta’ wa al-buhuth (Fatwas of the European Council for Fatwa and Research), p. 5. 19 Interview with Abdullah al-Judai, Leeds, 15 February 2006. 20 Interview with Ahmad al-Rawi, Leicester, 14 February 2006. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 661

providing the Muslim minorities with a centralised leadership.21 He had long shown interest in an international opportunity for public expression of Islamic opinions without interference from religious institutions of Islamic teaching or governments and perhaps he envisaged the ECFR as offering such an independent platform with the potential of becoming a global Islamic authority. In addition to the ECFR, Yusuf al-Qaradawi has also been the driving force behind the establishment of another Dublin-based international organisation, the IUMS, The International Union of Muslim Scholars, al-ittihad( al-‘alami li-‘ulama’ al-muslimun). It held its founding conference in July 2004 and its declared aim is fully in line with Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s vision about a united Muslim umma: to become a global representative for Muslims across the world.22 Some members, among them Ahmad al-Rawi, regret the increasing number of foreign members. It contradicts the FIOE’s vision of establishing a body of scholars with significant knowledge and familiarity with the local practices of the Muslim minorities in Western Europe. Furthermore al-Rawi points out that in contrast to the first selected members living outside Europe, not all the current foreign members are familiar with the minorities’ circumstances. Others argue that it is necessary to include foreign ‘ulama’ who may support the European ‘ulama’ with their experience in ifta’ and contribute in a positive way to the council’s work.23 It is denied that the foreign members’ presence primarily is commendable due to the authority they may bring to the council, but rather emphasised that they are an asset for the council due to their scholarly capabilities.24

3 Ideological Diversity within the Council President Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s strong ideological position may be the reason why several of the members interviewed find it necessary to emphasise, when describing the profile of the council, that it by no means tries to conform to any ideology represented by Yusuf al- Qaradawi and that the council is by no means al-Qaradawi’s project.

21 Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase, (Swansea: Awakening Publication, 2000). 22 Gräf, Bettina, “The Search of a Global Islamic Authority”,ISIM Review 15, (2005): p. 47. 23 Interview with Suhayb Hassan, London, 16 February, 2006. 24 Interview with council member Ismail Kachholvi, Bradford, 15 February 2006. 662 karen-lise johansen karman

In his younger days, al-Qaradawi was an active member of the Muslim Brotherhood and some still call him the unofficial theological authority of the organisation and consequently the ECFR is often automatically linked with the Muslim Brotherhood.25 Despite al-Qaradawi’s relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, despite the fact that Muslim Brothers were involved in establishing the council and despite that many of the ECFR members feel affiliated to the heritage of the Muslim Brother- hood, I argue that the council, as a collective body, cannot be defined as merely a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood. The members represent many varied positions, far from all having any affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood’s past ideology and some are even antagonistic toward its way of thinking. If the ECFR is exclusively identified with the Muslim Brotherhood, the differences within the council are ignored and many important nuances in its legal guidance are lost. Based on interviews with members living in the United Kingdom (and from my knowledge of the other council members), three main positions within the ECFR can be identified. The first position and probably the less influential one may be described as a traditional, conservative position that preserves and reveres ethnic traditions as legitimate expression of Islamic practice. The members belonging to this stream are more isolated from the mainstream majority society than the other members are. They mainly deal with their local Mus- lim community’s concerns about how to preserve the practice of local customs and rituals within a non-Muslim society. The second position can be identified as a Saudi-inspired approach. Some of the members following this line have studied in Saudi Arabia, and are actively engaged in the discourse on how to ensure a further Islamisation of the Muslim community. Members belonging to this position are very critical of some of the council’s collective rulings, arguing that these occasionally compromise unchanging elements of the Islamic jurisprudence in the endeavour to adapt Islamic practice to local circumstances. For example, they are against exemptions in cases such as that of riba and hijab. The final position, which is the most widespread in the council, can be identified as a pragmatic and flexible position when it comes to

25 Vidino, Lorenzo, The new Muslim Brotherhood in the West (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 72. Maréchal, Birgitte, The Muslim Brothers in Europe. Root and Discourses (Leiden: Brill, 2008), p. 151. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 663

Islamic practice. They find it generally necessary to develop forms of Islamic life compatible with Western norms and laws. The representatives of this position recommend the principle of taysir and accept the dispensation of some Islamic rules if they are found too difficult to apply in non-Muslim societies. The position can be divided into two groups. One is mostly concerned with identifying ways of facilitating Islamic practice for the Muslim minorities on a micro level, e.g., in their daily life. The other group, having much in common with the contemporary Islamic revivalist/awakening trend, is also preoccupied with the Islamic practice on a macro level, e.g. the persons belonging to this group seek influence by developing liaisons with European governmental bodies. They are often involved in European Muslim organisations, such as the FIOE and some of them identify themselves as affiliated with the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood.26

4 The Social Setting: Opportunities and Constraints Many of the members praise the council’s institutional and financial independence and claim that a juridical body’s reliability depends on its level of governmental affiliation. Less dependence is proportional with increasing credibility. As a council member Abdullah al-Judai asserts that the council’s institutional independence has not affected his opinions, but has facilitated possibilities of his proclaiming views that contradict mainstream scholarly consensus. This freedom may have been circumscribed had he belonged to a state-controlled Islamic learning institution, he argues. Some of the members belonging to the pragmatic and politically oriented position in the council, such as the former president of the FIOE, Ahmad al-Rawi and the Tuni- sian political activist, Rachid al-Ghannouchi claim that the scholarly freedom that exists within the council is related to the political climate in Europe. According to al-Rawi, the council experiences no political pressure from the European governments and it is free to do what it wants. This viewpoint is echoed by al-Ghannouchi who argues that today free Islamic thinking can only be developed outside classical Islamic institutions such as those typical of the Arab world. Al- Ghannouchi’s perception of Western political and religious freedom is (needless to say) shaped by his personal experience and is profoundly

26 See Larsen, Islamisk rettstenkning i møte med dagliglivets utfordringer, pp. 104– 105 for examples of ideological differences within the council. 664 karen-lise johansen karman opposed by the Saudi-inspired member and general secretary of the Shari’a Council in London, Suhayb Hassan. He claims that European countries have started to persecute Muslims because of their ideas. According to him, many ‘ulama’ residing in Europe feel constrained and are reluctant to discuss matters that are considered controversial among non-Muslim Europeans. He continues that after 9/11, imams have started to censor their khutbas and no longer openly criticise any European government out of fear of losing their residence permits. Suhayb Hassan makes a distinction between what he calls a “real Islam” and a “liberal Islam” and argues that the ones who represent the real Islam can only discuss their beliefs within circumspection, while the proponents of liberal Islam have every possible opportunity to freely voice their opinion.27 It is interesting to note that members representing a political position affiliated with the ideological heritage of the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Rachid al-Ghannouchi and the former president of the FIOE, Ahmad al-Rawi, describe the European environment as free, while the Saudi-inspired ‘alim, Suhaib Hassan, finds it constraining. It is a fact that an association such as the FIOE—along with other European Muslim Brotherhood-inspired groups—have more freedom and are not monitored and watched to the same extent as the group has been in the Middle East. The Brotherhood-inspired groups are involved in organs trying to represent diverse groups of European Muslims (such as the Muslim Council of Britain MCB, Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM) and the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE)) and are already playing a dynamic role in interacting and liaising with the European government. The Saudi-inspired general secretary of the Shari’a Council in London, Suhayb Hassan, who defines himself as a “Salafist”, feels that his freedom as a Muslim Salafi scholar has been restricted, which would explain why he sees hostility where the others see freedom.

5 Transnational Relations and Hegemonic Struggles It is stressed both in the council’s constitution and by the members interviewed that the role of the ECFR is to serve the European Mus- lims. Nevertheless, it appears from discussions with the members that

27 Interview with Suhayb Hassan, London, 16 February 2006. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 665 some keep open the option of a broader influence beyond the Mus- lim minority population. The sharp distinction between the Muslim majority world and the Muslim minority societies is certainly at times an artificial separation. Similarities exist between the two types of societies and inevitably, advice directed at minorities may now and then be suitable for Muslim majorities. Caeiro suggests that this geographical distinction places the members of the ECFR in an ethical dilemma.28 It may be difficult to justify certain privileges to Muslims in the West, such as permitting mortgages when purchasing houses, while refusing to legitimise them in Muslim countries where people also may be in need of acquiring a private accommodation. Al-Ghannouchi is a member who envisages a significant influence of the council. In his view, some of the issued fatwas are beneficial for Muslims living as majorities. He emphasises that the purpose of the council is not to make some sort of “revolution against the recognised Islamic bodies”, but to develop solutions to Muslim minorities’ contemporary problems, some of which are shared by Muslims living in Muslim majority countries.29 Several others of the members interviewed, across different ideological positions, touch upon the prospects of influencing ulama‘ ’ in the Muslim majority world. A widely held opinion is that the council’s distribution of its research papers and fatwa collection to ‘ulama’ residing outside Europe as well as including them as members provide means of exercising influence on ulama‘ ’ around the world. Abdullah al-Judai, points at the benefit of having ulama‘ ’ from abroad sitting in the council when he reflects upon the chances of having dialogue with and being influential in the Muslim majority world.30 The members from the Muslim majority world may act as a voice for the ‘ulama’ residing in Europe. They have the opportunity to clarify the rationale and methodology of the ECFR’s ruling in their academic circles, and this side benefit of transnational communication seemed to be used by the council to justify the increasing number of foreign members.31

28 Caeiro, Alexandre, “The Social Construction of Shari’a: Bank Interest, Home Purchase, and Islamic Norms in the West”, Die Welt des Islams, 44, 3 (2004): pp. 351–75, (373). 29 Interview with Rachid al-Gannouchi, London, 16 February 2006. 30 Interview with Abdullah al-Judai, Leeds, 15 February 2006. 31 On exchange on ideas between religious authorities in the West and in the Mus- lim world see Karman, Karen, Intellectual Influences between the West and the Muslim 666 karen-lise johansen karman

Apart from including reputed ‘ulama’ living outside Europe, the council also attempts to strengthen its transnational dialogue by emphasising its relations with respected Islamic institutions such as the Islamic Research Academy of al-Azhar, the Fiqh Council of the Muslim World League and the Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organi- sation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). In the introduction of the ECFR’s first compilation of fatwas, Yusuf al-Qaradawi presents the council as a complementary body, specialising in issues related to the fiqh of minorities, and not as a competitor to other councils. He mentions that the ECFR actively pursues and examines rulings, resolutions and studies of respectable fiqh councils from which the ECFR will gain great benefit. It is crucial for the ECFR to present its discursive practice as in continuity with the thinking of recognised fiqh councils and the traditional practices of issuing legal advice. This strategy may be seen as a means of achieving legitimacy among the Muslim minority communities. By locating itself within the Islamic jurisprudential tradition, it attempts to demonstrate that although some of its rulings may deviate from traditional fiqh, the council is conducting reliable jurisconsultancy. The council’s participation in hegemonic authority struggles is not only reflected in its intention to pursue international recognition and influence, but also in its somehow ambiguous effort to achieve independence from the Muslim majority world; an effort that is paradoxically countered by some powers within the council, who agitate for the inclusion of foreign members. The former president of the FIOE, al-Rawi, is as mentioned above, a strong advocate for strengthening the role of Western European Muslim authorities by means of Islamic teaching institutions in Europe. Other members, who agree with al-Rawi’s vision of attaining independence from authorities in the Muslim majority world, have more realistic assumptions regarding the time horizon of educating European Muslim scholars. Rachid al-Ghannouchi, argues that the establishment of teaching institutes is paramount for the institutionalisation of Islam in Europe. He believes that these institutes are the only means by which European Muslims can participate in the development of Islamic thought and avoid per- petual import of Islamic culture. He reckons though that it might take

world. Religious Authority in Transnational Interaction. (Kvinder: 2007, Køn & For- skning), pp. 16, 2–3, 76–89. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 667 more than a hundred years to produce European Muslim authorities that are recognised both in Europe and in the Muslim majority countries.32 Abdullah al-Judai also views the FIOE’s mission of educating Euro- pean ‘ulama’ with some scepticism. He explains that the majority of the students at the Islamic Institute of Human Sciences in Wales come from Malaysia and Eastern Europe and that they are naturally not going be the future ‘ulama’ of Western Europe. The establishment of the teaching institutes can be considered as a step in the right direction, but the level of the institutes’ education is too low. Al-Judai suggests that graduates with four years studies might be recognised as imams, but not as ‘ulama’ having a dominant influence on Muslims.33 Al-Judai is still a proponent of the idea of reaching independence from the Muslim majority world. In contrast to the other members quoted above, his idea of independence does not entail struggle against existing authority hegemonies. Rather, al-Judai refers to a discursive independence that involves independence from the political discourses in the Muslim majority world. He says, “We need to be focused on the living conditions in Europe and refrain from being affected by political issues in the Middle East in our rulings and guidance of Muslim minorities.”34 Due to the low level of the European Islamic teaching institutes’ educations, al-Judai realises that it is premature to pursue a complete independence from ‘ulama’ in the Muslim majority world. He hopes however that council members, and in particular the foreign members, remain focused on the daily concerns of the Mus- lim minorities and do not let foreign policy issues and controversies between some Western countries and the Muslim world impinge upon their rulings. Al-Judai fears that if the ‘ulama’ in Europe and Mus- lim minority population alike continue to allow themselves to be too deeply affected by the political conflicts in their places of origin, it may inflame an antagonism and impede their loyalty and commitment to their home in the West.35

32 Interview with Rachid al-Ghannouchi, London, 16 February 2006. 33 Interview with Abdullah al-Judai, Leeds, 15 February 2006. 34 Interview with Abdullah al-Judai, Leeds, 15 February 2006. 35 On discussions about how diaspora communities continue to foster transnational relations and to live with a sense of displacement and of loyalty to other places and groups beyond the place of settlement, see Werbner, Pnina, “Introduction: The materiality of Diaspora—between aesthetic and “real” Politics”, Diaspora 9,1 (2000): 5–20. 668 karen-lise johansen karman

6 Summary At the time of the ECFR’s establishment, some ten years ago, the ambition among the initiators was that in a matter of years, the council would consist exclusively of ‘ulama’ residing in Europe. It has until now not succeeded in realising this objective. One of the reasons for this failure was the unrealistic expectations about the possibilities of educating Muslim authorities within Europe. The Muslim educational institutes have not been capable of attracting students with the potential of becoming the future Muslim authorities of Europe, and the teaching they offer is not compatible with the education provided by teaching centres and universities in the Muslim world. Secondly, the assignment of powerful positions to non-European ‘ulama’ turned out to become an impediment to reaching full Euro- pean membership. The focus has among some members shifted from the idea of creating an independent judicial European body to promoting and reinforcing cooperation and exchange between Muslim authorities in Europe and in the Muslim majority world. It may be argued that some of the foreign members have overridden the original idea of acting as interim authorities for European Muslims. Instead, they turned the council into a platform from which they could freely promote their ideas about contemporary Islamic jurisprudence and thinking without interference and restrictions from any government or religious institutions. Presumably, the council as a name or brand is widely known among Muslim minorities, but their intended target audience has not been completely obvious. When seeking legal advice the older generation of Muslims in Europe may still feel more comfortable contacting a local imam who is familiar with the questioner’s cultural background and language. To a greater extent, the younger generation probably does identify themselves with the council’s universal profile and is probably likewise attracted to the council’s attempts of transgressing cultural and national group affiliations. They might, nevertheless, tend to contact an online mufti and get an immediate answer, instead of addressing a question to the council and risk waiting a longer time before receiving an answer. Some of the members take an optimistic view about the council’s future influence and expect the coming generation of European Mus- lims to be more engaged with the identification of Islamic answers to the European way of life than the older generation of Muslims and consequently be more oriented towards the council’s work. According interpreting islamic law for european muslims 669 to the former president of the FIOE, al-Rawi, an increasing number of people are contacting the council for advice, which might indicate that the Muslim European community is gradually starting to respect the council and beginning to pay attention to its rulings. It is likely that the coming generations of Western European Muslims will become more concerned with finding practical Islamic solutions than the first generations of Muslims in Europe. If the expected growing demand among European Muslims to receive responses related to their lives brings further queries to the council, its level of authority and influence will depend on how it manages to fulfil the demand of the minorities and meets their expectations.

The Legal Counselling of the European Fatwa Council

1 The Mustaftis and Their Questions The questions the ECFR responses to vary significantly in style and content. Some of the questions are lengthy with detailed description of the questioners’ conditions and motivations for posing the questions. Others are very short with one or two paragraphs without any additional information about the petitioners’ (mustafti) background. The style of some questions is professional and formal, while others are personal. One asks, for instance, for forgiveness for a sin committed and another seeks answer to how to make amends for an abortion. Thus, several questions are asked due to personal experience, requesting answers that respond to a particular individual situation. In contrast to these a number of questions are of a more general character, demanding rulings that apply to all Muslims in similar circumstances. Some questioners tend to influence the answers in a certain direction by pointing out certain difficulties they face or seek to legalise an existing way of acting by stressing the advantages of an already widespread practice. From the way the questions are formulated and their content, it seems that both individuals, groups of people, Muslim communities and charity organisations approach the council for answers. Accord- ing to the findings of Lena Larsen, 70% of the questions are posed by female petitioners.36 In most cases, nothing detailed can be said about

36 Larsen, Islamisk rettstenkning i møte med dagliglivets utfordringer, p. 109. 670 karen-lise johansen karman the identity of the petitioner, the mustafti is anonymised, and most details that may reveal aspects of gender, age or place of residence are excluded. However, in some cases, not all personal traits are omit- ted. We are for example presented with questions with wordings like: “I am a young Muslim who arrived in Germany”, “Two years ago I was a student in Britain”, and “I work as a doctor in a British hospital”. A number of the resolutions and fatwas from the ECFR’s fatwa collection is reproduced at the website IslamOnline.net. The questions undergo a certain transition when they are republished online. The identity and place of residence is mostly mentioned. Based on these details, it is seemingly Muslims around the world that request answers from the ECFR with a majority of European petitioners.37 Most of the questions gathered in the council’s fatwa collection deal with Muslim minorities’ situation in the West viz.: the identification of the qibla in buildings used for congregational prayers but not originally built as mosques; the participation in European elections; and the legality of consuming meat slaughtered by non-Muslims. Other questions evidently result from experiences encountered by Muslims living in non-Muslim societies, but are of a general nature that may concern a wider audience of Muslims regardless of location. A significant group of questions, mainly with reference to Islamic family law (inheritance, economic obligations in the families, men’s duty to participate in child rearing etc.), has no references whatsoever to minority issues, although Muslims living in the West might have asked them. A minority of the questions bears references to legal technicalities and presumably most of the petitioners are ordinary Muslims without an Islamic educational background. Only a few questioners put forward their own interpretation of Islamic law or ask to be furnished with a detailed answer including for Shari‘atic evidence of the ruling (dalil).

2 The Answers—A Medium of Communication and Influence The European Council for Fatwa and Research issues two types of legal opinions: fatwas and resolutions (qararat). The fatwas are responses to

37 This information must, however, be treated with a considerable measure of reserve. Nothing proves that the listed locations are the true places of the questioners’ origin. One questioner is introduced in the title of the question as Murad—the United States, although it is mentioned in the questions that the man lives and works in Switzerland. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 671 received questions and the resolutions are collective opinions developed on the basis of research presentations and legal discussions at the council’s annual assemblies. Nico Kaptein points out that the qarar is in theory not regarded as having the same authority as a fatwa, because qararat are not formally subject, like the fatwas, to strict procedural constraints in order to guarantee the quality of the advice.38 The traditional fatwa is, however, no longer necessarily the most authoritative statement. Many of the council’s fatwas are issued by individual members or a smaller group of the members and subsequently authorised by the council, whereas the resolutions are well-researched and far better grounded in scholarly work with occasionally involvement of external experts.39 The fatwa genre is by definition intended for the ordinary Muslim and the ECFR’s fatwas are clearly aimed at ordinary literate Muslims. They generally avoid specialised technical terminology and some opinions are advanced without any proof (dalil). The resolutions are generally more technical, including detailed exposi- tions of the underlying evidence. The resolutions concern topics of a more general legal character, which may be studied and commented on by other fuqaha’, and are therefore advanced in terms that are more scholarly. The legal responsa of the ECFR are published in the council’s Arabic language review, al-majalla al-‘ilmiyya.40 It is written in the council’s mission statement that it aims at translating fatwas, studies and research into various European languages, but for the present its publications in languages other than Arabic is limited. For the sake of con- venience, the council may have chosen Arabic as its working language since a majority of its members is more fluent in Arabic than they are in English. The choice can also suggest an effort to demonstrate scholarly religious authority. To claim and demonstrate scholarly expertise, one must master Arabic, and maybe the ECFR seeks to demonstrate its authenticity of its understanding of the Islamic heritage by communicating in Arabic.

38 Kaptein, Nico J.G., “Theme Issue: Fatwas in Indonesia”,Islamic Law and Society, 12, 1 (2005): pp. 1–8. 39 The council’s work and its various fatwa committees have been described elsewhere, for example Karman, Rethinking Islamic Jurisprudence for Muslim Minorities, pp. 73–79, and Larsen, Islamisk rettstenkning i møte med dagliglivets utfordringer, pp. 100–109. 40 See Caeiro, “The Power of European Fatwas” for further details on the council’s publication and distribution of its legal guidance. 672 karen-lise johansen karman

The fatwas function as a medium of communication used by the council members to communicate their expression of religious meanings to the Muslim community. The purpose of the legal response is not only to convey a message to the percipients, but also modify their consciousness and if possible influence their behaviour.41 The fatwas guide the petitioner on how to act but the readers of the fatwas are recognised as “actors in processes”, as the rulings appeal to the petitioners’ common sense and appreciation of proper Islamic conduct. They are encouraged to do as recommended in the rulings, but are believed to have an instinctive knowledge about what is right and wrong and are allowed room for manoeuvre. After all, the fatwas are not binding but only advisory, and it is up to the petitioners’ conscience to comply with the opinions of the ‘ulama’. The muftis also represent different styles when issuing fatwas. First of all, they are the legal experts who possess Islamic knowledge and play the active role in interpretation of the Shari’a. They are the authorities who in a scholarly way explain the principles of Islamic law. But the relations between the muftis and the mustaftis are not always characterised by distance and instructions given in authoritative and sermo- nising language. Occasionally the mufti undertakes other roles, as a mediator between spouses or as a therapist who gives general advice on marriage, relations and child rearing, based on empathy and sympathy rather than on religious doctrines. Although the majority of the questions seem to be triggered by Muslim minorities’ experiences in the West, the answers are in most cases couched in general terms not personally or territorially limited and bear no references to the Western context.42 Although questions may contain specific details regarding minority circumstances or be obviously caused by difficulties encountered by Muslim minorities, the particular minority aspect is sometimes disregarded in the rulings gathered in the ECFR’s fatwa collection. The council chooses to make their answers generally valid and generally applicable instead of elaborating on topics that are of minorities’ particular interest. For example, a questioner asks whether it is acceptable to be led in prayer by

41 Salvatore, Armando, Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity, (Berkshire: Ithaca Press, 1997), p. 5. 42 Layish, Aharon, Shari’a and Customs in Libyan Tribal Society. An Annotated Translation of Decisions from the Shari’a Courts of Adjabiya and Kufra, (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 276. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 673 somebody who does not fully comply with the Shari’a. The question is probably caused by the fact that many Muslim minority communities face difficulties in finding qualified religious leaders. In its answer, the council decided not to expand on that issue—by guiding communities in selecting religious leaders—but gave a ruling that accounts for the general qualifications of imams. The council’s rulings’ scholarly content varies from simple answers, which do not provide underlying reasons, to those that refer to specific sources and provide the reader with elaborate evidence. This indicates that different members were being given the task of formulating the answers, as their individual styles of writing the opinion are reflected in the final fatwas. Some opinions bear the stamp of a careful preparation and an exhaustive discussion and examination of the textual sources. Others are brief and do not seem to have preoccupied the ‘ulama’ much. By and large, the ECFR’s shorter rulings contain a confirmative answer to the practice described in the question and begin with the phrase “na‘am yajuz”—yes, it is permissible. Others cannot justly be answered by a simple “yes” or “no” and are consequently furnished with a detailed account of recommended behaviour or an extensive explanation of a certain topic. Generally, the fatwas accommodate the questioners’ conviction or way of acting and include sentences like “yes, it is legitimate (mashru‘),” “it is allowed,” etc. The rulings usually do not impose a heavy burden on the petitioners. The ruling might initially be presented in an unambiguous manner, but subsequently holds open the possibility that the petitioner may choose not to comply with the ruling if he finds it too difficult. For example, the council forbids Muslims to sell alcohol and pork and encourages a mustafti working at McDonalds to find another job. The ruling says that if he cannot be excused from selling pork, he should find alternative means of making a living that do not involve sales of ḥaram products. The ruling concludes, however, that he may continue if alternative adequate income is not available.43 In a few cases, the council dismisses a suggested action or makes it unmistakably clear that the petitioner’s described behaviour is Islamically unacceptable, as in the case of contracting pro forma marriages in the West in order to receive social benefits.44

43 Fatwa 14. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 44 Fatwa 17. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 674 karen-lise johansen karman

In those rulings, the ‘ulama’ do not refrain from using strong wordings such as “the act is totally haram” and that the person may “incur sin” if doing as proposed in the question.

3 Sources of Legal Ruling and Internal Disagreement The ECFR—as other producers of the fatwas—legitimises its statements in relation to the authoritative body of Islamic law. The council members are trained in different schools of law madhhab( s) and, as with other contemporary fiqh councils, the ECFR does not solely adhere to a particular school, but draws upon the four recognised madhhabs. Beyond that, the council does not restrict itself to the views of the four main law schools, but also accredits madhhahib ahl al- ‘ilm, which refers to different earlier schools, such as the ones in Kufa, Basra, Mecca, Medina etc. It draws on madhhab al-sahabi, which refers to the hadith of the differentsahaba and shar‘u man qabla-na, which refers to earlier generation, not exclusively the sahaba, but also succeeding generations. Conventional sources of legislation like the Qur’an, Sunna, ijma‘ and qiyas are applied alongside secondary principles such as, istihsan, ‘urf and darura.45 While strictly legislative verses are relatively rare in the Qur’an, the council can often produce a quote which is relevant in some way to the subject at hand.46 Fundamentally, the Qur’an is quoted to illustrate that it retains its validity over time and is relevant for guidance regardless of location, and thus the ‘ulama’ buttress their rulings with references to a Qur’anic text. However, on several counts, one can argue that the Qur’anic quotation is not exactly relevant to the submitted question. The Qur’an is used as a source of inspiration for general human relations and behaviour rather than as a source for explicit rulings. For example, on the question of whether or not it is permissible to sell alcohol,47 the council declares that it is totally forbidden to sell alcohol, but the only source cited is verses 65:2–3 from Sura

45 In the constitution, other alternative sources such as sadd al- dhara’i‘ (closing off the means that can lead to evil) and istishab (presumption of continuity) are listed. The practical function ofsadd al-dhara’i‘ is to prevent improper usage of a legal means to achieve an illegal end. According to the principle of istishab, a legal state of affairs is presumed to continue to be valid until there is reason to change this presumption. 46 Cf. Zeberi, Kate, Mahmud Shaltût and Islamic Modernism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 111. 47 Fatwa 15. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 675 al-Talaq. These verses touch upon how God will provide for those who are pious, and do not deal with any legislation regarding sales of alcoholic drinks. Everyone knows it is not permissible to sell alcohol and the question is really about whether the petitioner may ignore this in order to keep a job. The ECFR, then, chooses to use these verses to counter possible arguments about darura (unavoidable necessity) and to emphasise that you should rely on God. The ‘ulama’ often refer to the fiqh“ of balance” ( fiqh al-muwazanat) in their rulings, which bears similarities to the repeatedly cited principle of ease (taysir). The fiqh“ of balance” is often called upon when the council members seek legitimacy for rulings that allow compromises in the practice of religious duties. This principle is in line with the principle of taysir, which the ECFR is known for employing in order to issue rulings that facilitate Islamic life. The principle is generally employed when ‘ulama’ reason about God’s imposition of duties on men and is reached from the Qur’anic verse 2:185 saying that “God intends for you ease, and He does not want to make things difficult for you”. The council members, however, expand the traditional usage of the principle. It is put forward, for example, as evidence in a ruling arguing that men ought not to overburden their wives with heavy duties. Other principles referred to include the principle of “averting harm is more important than bringing good” (dar’ al-mafsada muqd- dam ‘ala jalb al maslaha)48 and the principle of “good taste and proper conduct” (al-dauq al-salim wa al-adab al-rafi‘).49 Not all the arguments presented in the rulings are of a religious character. Occasionally, the ‘ulama’ discuss what effect a ruling may have and sometimes the expected positive or negative consequences of a certain way of behaving is used as a reason for ruling in a particular way. An instance of such reasoning is found in the ruling stating that a woman should consult her husband before cutting her hair, since a radical change in her appearance may surprise the husband and affect their relationship. Similar logic is behind the fatwa encouraging a husband to attend his wife’s delivery of their baby, which argues that facing the pain she suffers may increase his appreciation for her. The reasoning of the fatwas, then, is not always purely religious in the

48 Fatwa 32. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 49 Fatwa 41. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 676 karen-lise johansen karman sense of being based on Islamic evidence, but also relies on common human relations and a generally didactic approach. Another common way of reasoning is referring to the existence of prevalent customs among contemporary Muslims. A fatwa on credit cards argues, for instance, that the usage is acceptable “due to the great need and overwhelming advantages of using them”, and it continues, “this is the habit of the majority of Muslims living in the West.”50 It is argued that as long as there is nothing un-Islamic about a widespread but new mode of action, it is permissible. Not only customs among the minorities are emphasised; if a practice in the Muslim world is considered useful in the West it may also be advanced as an argument in the council’s guidance. Customs in “Muslim countries” are, for example, referred to when ruling on how to treat women after giving birth.51 The applied methodology,usul al-fiqh, has often been the cause of disagreement among the members. Some of the members have accused the council of ruling in a fashion inconsistent with Islamic jurisprudential consensus and a few have resigned following methodological disputes. When it comes to the principle of taysir and sources such as ‘urf and darura there are marked differences between the various positions in the council. The Saudi-educated general secretary of the Islamic Shari’a Council in London, Suhayb Hassan, criticises the ECFR for occasionally ignoring the saying of the Sunna in favour of older opinions from the past. He is a vocal opponent of drifting away from the clear text of the Qur’an and the hadith and blames the council for basing its rulings on weak narrations of the sahaba and ancient fiqh opinions that are not accepted in the recognised fiqh collections.52 Although accepting the principle of necessity, Suhayb Hassan con- cedes that within the council there is confusion about how to define a case of extreme hardship. He criticises some of the members for not distinguishing properly between darura (understood as indispensable necessity) and haja (need that causes inconvenience, but not hardship). He agrees with the claim that there is a tendency within the council to overuse the principle of darura.53 Suhayb Hassan is also critical of

50 Fatwa 13. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 51 Fatwa 23. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 52 Interview with Suhayb Hassan, London, 16 February 2006. 53 In the wake of the disagreement caused by this ruling, Suhayb Hassan resigned from the council along with the Syrian ‘alim Muhammad Fu‘ad al-Barazi. Suhayb Hassan was later encouraged by al-Qaradawi to return to the council, and he agreed, interpreting islamic law for european muslims 677 how the principle of taysir permeates the rulings of the ECFR. Suhayb Hassan argues that this principle was applied when the council issued the ruling in 2001 allowing female Muslim converts to remain married to their non-Muslim husbands. Suhayb Hassan says: “You cannot make halal haram. We cannot say that we can adopt haram because it is easier for people, just as we did in the case of the female convert [. . .] But I say, the Sunna says, “they are not halal for you and you are not halal for them”, it says it very clearly and there are no choices. In some cases, the majlis (council) wants to take the easiest way based upon some old opinion and weak narrations.”54 The ECFR’s pragmatic groups find it legitimate to employ the opinion of the sahaba if it may facilitate the life of Muslim minorities and they deny that the council exaggerates the use of darura. One of the representatives of this position, the general secretary of the fatwa committee in the UK, Salim al-Shayki, explains that as a jurist in Europe, he takes the legitimate evidence from the Shari’a and applies it to the reality with a correct understanding of what suits or may not suit Muslim minorities. Al-Judai, who also represents the pragmatic position, likewise refutes any allegation of improper use of legal methodology. He acknowledges that the ECFR’s rulings may deviate from those of other councils, but maintains that it is attributable to the fact that the subjects and issues it deals with are of a specifically minority character.55

4 Orientation towards Differences—Room for Heterogeneous Interpretations Legal rulings, as is true of any other body of texts, vary in their orientation towards differences.56 The relation of a legal utterance to others may be a matter of building on them, polemicising with them or ignoring them by suppressing differences and alternative interpretations. Some of the council’s rulings—or certain elements in the rulings—are open to dialogued and differing readings, and others are not. Often the fatwas are introduced with categorical assertions and authoritative

on the condition that the council included a member from Saudi Arabia in order to ensure that different trends were represented in the council. 54 Interview with Suhayb Hassan, London, 16 February 2006. 55 Interview with Abdullah al-Judai, Leeds, 15 February 2006. 56 Fairclough, Norman, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992). 678 karen-lise johansen karman statements, but when it comes to the further elaboration of the rulings, the language tends to be open towards differences. The ECFR employs several techniques to bracket and reduce scholarly heterogeneity. Sometimes it refers to an Islamic principle as already “known to every reader” or it presents a certain way of Islamic thinking as an unchallenged “taken-for-granted” background. Secondly, it presents occasional rulings as indisputable facts without reference to legal evidence. Not referring to any legal proof is a strong way of demonstrating that this is an incontestable ruling; alleging that it is superfluous to substantiate further theresponsa . Finally, the council attempts to reduce divergence of opinions by employing the classic usul technique of ijma‘ focusing on commonality among the ‘ulama’. It writes, for instance, “[. . .] agreed in consensus by the entire umma”57 and “There is no disagreement among scholars la( khilaf bayna ahl al-‘ilm).”58 In other cases, the ECFR accentuates differences, but does not let the legal uncertainty or diversity of interpretation go unchallenged. Polemically, the council members enter a struggle over meaning and over which sources to draw upon and how to interpret them. In fatwa 20 in its first collection of fatwas, for example, they disapprove of the use of certain hadiths that states it is makruh to see the private part of one’s spouse. They acknowledge the existence of those traditions but maintain that they are not proper to use as evidence since they are not authentic. Sometimes the ‘ulama’ refute certain ways of reading and interpreting the Sunna. They may argue that a certain reading is wrong or that a particular understanding of a Sunna is based on a too hasty or simplified reading mujazafa( ).59 In a lengthy discussion about the correct construction of a hadith on division between Muslims, the ‘ulama’ assert that a certain interpretation of the content is not permissible (la yajuz) and the use of it to create problems among Muslims is not permitted (la yahillu).60 In a non-dialogical mode, the alternative interpretation is refuted. In other rulings, the ECFR uses less conclusive language and tends to show an acceptance of difference. When referring to the sources upon which fatwa 4 draws, for example, it is stated that “A considerable

57 Fatwa 5. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 58 Fatwa 9. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 59 Cf. fatwa 36. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 60 Fatwa 2. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 679 number of our predecessors agreed”. Writing “considerable” demonstrates openness to the existence of alternative opinions. In fatwa 2, it is emphasised that diversity also can be identified in the legal sources. It describes how the Prophet’s companions narrated hadiths carrying the same meaning but varying in the use of certain terms. Illustrat- ing how the classical fuqaha’ disagreed with each other contributes to the legitimisation of disagreement among contemporary ‘ulama’. In fatwa 2, it is explicitly stressed that discord (ikhtilaf) among hadith experts occurs, and the council embarks on a dialogue with that divergence by directing their response to those who are of a different opinion. Other fatwas, for instance fatwa 9, do not only recognise diversity, but actually accentuate and normalise heterogeneity of interpretative perspectives. In fatwa 9, the ‘ulama’ remind the petitioner that the matter discussed is a controversial issue and that Muslims should refrain from criticising anyone that wishes to choose one view or another. In another ruling, the petitioner is reminded that what some might see as wrongdoing may simply be a matter of difference in views and opinions caused by the fact that people follow different form of legal guidance (fatwa 8). Difference of opinion is not always seen in a negative light, for it illustrates the potential of the Shari’a to adapt to changing circumstances61 and also why the content of fatwas varies depending on time and circumstances. When elaborating on their rulings, the ‘ulama’ in the council often use sentences like, “We prefer and it is our view”,62 “The opinion which we find to be most reassuring” (natma’inn),63 “we feel that it is preferable (nastahsin),64 “We find no objection to” najidu( harajan),65 “We do not see anything wrong”.66 These types of statement express a certain degree of doubt and vagueness, and show acceptance of alternative interpretations. There are several reasons for the use of such less assertive language in the rulings. The ulama‘ ’ sometimes face questions without precedent. They cannot cite a similar case or rely on common practices and choose therefore to show an orientation

61 Zeberi, Mahmud Shaltût and Islamic Modernism, 101. 62 Fatwa 5. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 63 Fatwa 24. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 64 Fatwa 27. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 65 Fatwa 35. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 66 Fatwa 43. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 680 karen-lise johansen karman to differences. In cases where they cannot refer to any incontrovert- ible textual sources, but must base their opinion on other types of usul al-fiqh, such as istihsan, they are vaguer in their guidance. If the question dealt with is a controversial issue over which opinions differ, they seem hesitant to articulate an explicit view. In this fashion, they both acknowledge alternative opinions and anticipate criticism from other ‘ulama’ who might have an interpretation differing from that of the council. Other rulings are the work of a single member, but the final statement is made on behalf of the ECFR as a collective body with a diversity of opinions, and therefore a tentative language is required to make all of the members accept and vouch for the opinion. Finally, the fatwa is a negotiated text. Some rulings are the outcome of an extensive debate and collective ijtihad. The ulama‘ ’ negotiated amongst themselves about which voices to include in the text, and the acceptance of difference may be evidence of a scholarly disagreement within the council. From the very outset, the council aimed at achieving unified and collective scholarly rulings. Member of the council, Abdullah al-Judai, explains that occasionally it is impossible to reach a decision because the disagreement among members is too fundamental and the question has to be left unanswered or to be considered anew at coming assemblies. In other cases, a personal answer from the president or older respected elderly ‘ulama’ is recorded as the collective opinion of the council.67 The byelaws state that the ECFR’s resolutions are issued by virtue of consensus where possible or by absolute majority. It is, however, added that if a member has reservations about the decision he has the right to record the objection. The European Council for Fatwa and Research accords disagreement in the internal memorandum, and although it is agreed that members’ objections are unpublished, objections do figure twice in the published fatwa compilation. The mention- ing of the objections in the publication is somewhat arbitrary. It is publicly known and confirmed by the Saudi-educated ‘alim, Suhayb Hassan, that he and the Syrian ‘alim living in Denmark, al-Barazi, vehemently opposed the council’s ruling permitting real estate pur- chases with usurious loans. This objection is elided in the publication;

67 Interview with Abdullah al-Judai, Leeds, 15 Feburary 2006. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 681 instead, two other objections raised by al-Barazi, on two other rulings, are included. It is noteworthy that the disagreement that caused a major division in the council is excluded and instead reservations on two less controversial rulings are included, namely on the burial of Muslims in non-Muslim cemeteries and on insurance, respectively.

Discourse on Muslim Minorities

1 Fiqh al-aqalliyyat—An Indispensable Legal Theory for Minorities or a Superfluous Project? An overview of the ECFR’s fatwas and resolutions, in their entirety, shows that Muslim minority issues have always been a matter of concern for the ECFR. However, for years it has also dealt with general jurisprudential topics, only gradually moving towards an increased focus on minority questions. In its first years, it was crucial for the council to take a formal stance on general fiqh topics, which were widely discussed among other established fiqh councils. For example, in 2000 and 2001 the ECFR developed resolutions on cloning and organ donations, computer software copyright and on sales of land in Jerusalem.68 Developing resolutions on those topics was a way of demonstrating that the ECFR consisted of competent fuqaha’ capable of tackling contemporary fiqh topics on equal terms with other councils. The majority of the resolutions developed from 1997 to the beginning of 2000 showed only limited interest in minority issues, and some—particularly those on marital relations—completely ignored Western legislation. The first years of low priority given to minority issues suggests that the council members initially lacked a clear understanding of—or disagreed about—the primary role and profile of the council and furthermore had difficulties in reaching collective rulings when dealing with minority issues. A change of approach can be identified after the council’s Twelfth Ordinary Session, held from 31 December 2003 to 4 January 2004. During this session, special attention was paid to the topic of fiqh al- aqalliyyat. Since then the ECFR has dealt with research topics such as “Fiqh of the Muslim Family in West”, “Political fiqh for Muslims in

68 Sixth Ordinary Session in 2000 and Eighth Ordinary Session in 2001. 682 karen-lise johansen karman

Europe” and “Muslims living in Europe: Citizenship and Integration”.69 In recent years, most of the resolutions have treated minority-related affairs, and other resolutions of a general character have demonstrated a particular concern for minority matters by including comments on either minorities’ circumstances or calling for further studies to analyse the possibilities of applying Islamic legal practices in the West. Although the council as a result of debates on jurisprudence of fiqh al-aqalliyyat formulated a resolution stating that the ECFR ultimately agrees that the use of the term “fiqh of minorities” is correct, the individual members still disagree whether it is reasonable to use the terminology and various conflicting positions can identified within the council. A group of the council members disapprove of calling its legal rulings fiqh al-aqalliyyat. They consider fatwas to be an instrument to respond to changing circumstances and to adapt Islamic practice to new situations faced by the Muslim community. Fatwas embody an interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence, minorities’ questions can be addressed within the framework of Islamic fiqh and in view of that it is argued that there is no need of developing a specificfiqh dealing with minority issues. Members representing this position fear that the terminology fiqh al-aqalliyyatwrongly gives the impression that Muslim minorities are obligated to a different set of Shari‘atic duties than other Muslims. This group of members points to the differences between Shari’a and fiqh. Shari’a is defined as the revealed divine law of Islam derived from the Qur’an and Sunna, while fiqh signifies the effort and activities of legal experts to discover and give expression of the many facets of the Shari’a. Fiqh is bounded by temporality in contrast to the absolute universality of the Qur’anic message.70 It is stressed that the Islamic obligations remain the same for all Muslims, but the practice of Islamic obligations may differ depending on circumstances. Certain duties may be temporarily abrogated and the implementation of some rules might be suspended. This does not mean that some duties are permanently abolished and that Islamic rules for minorities need to be redefined in new Islamic jurisprudence. As an example, it is pointed out that the obligation of wearing the hijab is effective regardless of

69 The Fourteenth Ordinary Session, February 2005, the Sixteenth Ordinary Ses- sion, July 2006 and Seventeenth Ordinary Session, July 2007. 70 Masud, Muhammad Khalid, “Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities”, ISIM Review 11 (2002): p. 17. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 683 residence. Abdullah al-Judai, representing this position, explains that he may advise a British female convert not to wear the head scarf if it is causing too much distress in her life since Muslims are only required to practice according to their ability and not forced to comply with commands that in certain circumstances are hard to fulfil.71 In general, this position accepts fatwas for “aqalliyyat” and agrees that it is necessary to issue fatwas that are affected by the circumstances of minorities; but warns against juxtaposing the elaboration of fatwas for minorities with a specialised form of jurisprudence termed fiqh al-aqalliyyat. Other members, including the president Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have no reservation about the concept and define it as a “new branch of fiqh that is mandatory to develop in the milieu of the Muslim minorities”.72 The purpose of thefiqh al-aqalliyyat is according to this position two- fold. First of all, it aims at identifying Islamic solutions, to ensure that the Muslims living as minorities fulfil their Islamic obligations. Sec- ondly, it aims at preventing that Muslim minorities become isolated communities in Western Europe but rather be active citizens as religious Muslims. Salim al-Shaykhi, representing this position, stresses that the fiqh al-aqalliyyatis needed in order to assist the minorities in living in a positive way in society as Muslims. He says: “The council [. . .] is trying to give Muslims in Europe a clear guide for them to govern their lives Islamic without affecting the relationship (with non-Muslims) negatively [. . .] to be productive in their own societies without causing any clashes, encouraging them to be pro-active”.73 The minorityfiqh can be understood as a project striving to balance the tensions between Islamic piousness and integration in Western Europe—a balance between maintaining a religious identity and living according to Islam without being isolated from the surrounding society.74 A third position in the council also accepts the terminology fiqh al- aqalliyyat but draws on a different definition of the concept and defines its goals differently. The Saudi-inspired member Suhayb Hassan, representing this position argues that a fiqh al-aqalliyyat is required in

71 Interview with Abdullah al-Judai, Leeds, 15 February, 2006. 72 Interview with Rachid al-Gannouchi, London, 16 February 2006. 73 Interview with Salim al-Shaykhi, Manchester, 15 February 2006. 74 Caiero, “The Power of European Fatwas”, 435, and Karman,Rethinking Islamic Jurisprudence for Muslim Minorities, p. 46. 684 karen-lise johansen karman order to assist Muslims in Western Europe to identify spaces—socially as well as legally—for Islamic practices in Europe. Fiqh al-aqalliyyat is, according to this position, not a legal theory composed of rulings adapted to the non-Muslim society, but rather a collection of general guidelines elucidating how Islamic practices can be implemented in a non-Muslim society. He regrets, for example, how Hizb al-Tahrir argues that as long as the Islamic caliphate is not established, Mus- lim minorities should not attempt to create a system of zakat in the West, although there are many Muslim relief organisations in Europe, which can collect money. He uses this example to illustrate how Mus- lim minorities occasionally refrain from practising Islamic obligations because they lack knowledge about possible ways of implementing Islam, which Suhayb Hassan imagines that a fiqh al-aqalliyyatcan remedy.75 The heterogeneous understand of the concept indicates that despite the council’s shared declaration in 2004 on jurisprudence of minorities, the ECFR did not really solve the dispute regarding the concept, but only managed to come up with a resolution that the majority of the members supported. Various positions regarding the idea of a minority jurisprudence can be identified and the precise meaning of the term is still a matter of contention among the members. The ambiguity surrounding the concept seems mainly to be a problem of semantics. Some of the council members who strongly repudiate the idea of a minority fiqh are nevertheless in favour of examining the legal heritage to accommodate it to non-Muslim circumstances. Others who are against shaping the rulings—a least too extensively— according to the Western context support the concept, believing it will clarify how Islam can be fully practised in a non-Muslim society.

2 Discourse on Muslim Minority Affairs—Institutionalisation of Legal Norms in Western Europe In an attempt to clarify characteristics of the ECFR’s minority discourse, two themes that play a significant role in constituting the discourse will in the following be addressed, namely 1) implementation of Islamic legal norms (aspects relating to mu‘amalat) and 2) changes in ritual practices (aspects relating to ‘ibadat).

75 Interview with Suhayḅ Ḥassan, London, 16 February 2006. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 685

Most of the questions addressed to the ECFR that deal with Islamic legal norms concern Muslim personal status issues. Time and again, the council elaborates extensively on the principle of the Islamic legal norms regarding these matters without paying attention to the West- ern legal system. Occasionally, it concludes its rulings by stating that further studies about their applications in the West are needed. This is, for instance, the case in a resolution on child custody. The ruling states that Islamic centres are obliged to provide suitable custody, subsequently the council gives in the ruling a full description of the Shari‘atic rules on this topic and finally recommends further studies on possibilities of implementing these norms in the West. Some of the questions are answered as if the petitioner was living in countries where the state laws agreed with the Shari’a, and as if the authority behind the legal opinion has only limited acquaintance with Western societies. In a legal opinion about the guardianship powers of male legal representatives of the bride, the required approval of the guardian of an underage girl is commented upon, but no attention is paid to the problems relating to the marriage of minors in many Western countries.76 A decision to ignore completely Western legal norms is also found in a ruling on polygamous marriages. It describes in detail the Islamic permission of a man marrying up to four women. It strongly defends this Islamic principle and takes no notice of the Western legislation that prohibits polygamy.77 The same appears in a decision on women’s rights to divorce. It summarises the Islamic legal principles of divorce, but pays no heed to European laws.78 In these rulings the council may be addressing Muslims minorities who are ignoring the national legal systems and continuing to live by the Shari’a in Western Europe. In a few rulings, it is acknowledged that some matters lie in the hands of the Western legal systems. In answering a question regarding a divorce issued by a non-Muslim judge, the ECFR rules that the principle is that a Muslim resorts only to a Muslim judge, but due to the absence of an Islamic judicial system in non-Muslim countries, it is imperative to comply with the rulings of the non-Muslim judge.79 The same is the case in a ruling from 2005 about the Islamic divorce

76 Fatwa 12. First Collection of Fatwas, second part. 77 Fatwa 13. First Collection of Fatwas, second part. 78 Fatwa 16. First Collection of Fatwas, second part. 79 Fatwa 17. First Collection of Fatwas, second part. 686 karen-lise johansen karman principle khul‘, permitting the wife to pay compensation to her husband in return for a divorce. The council states in its legal decision that the couple should pursue the official divorce procedures in non- Muslim countries where khul‘ is not recognised.80 The rulings’ contradictory trends, paying heed to respectively religious piousness and integration may be caused by the ECFR’s heterogeneous membership. Some—mainly the European-based—are primarily concerned with the accommodation of Islam to the West- ern circumstances and integration of the Muslims, while others—some residing outside Europe and some belonging to the Saudi-inspired position in the council—attach more importance to Muslim minorities’ accommodation of religious observances and religious identity than adherence to European legal regulation.81 Since its first set of recommendation, the ECFR has been giving advice on how to promote and ensure the establishment of Islam in Europe. The council has advised Muslims to raise their children in an Islamic environment by establishing Islamic schools, educational and recreational centres and encouraged Muslims to establish legal councils (Shari’a councils) to preside over their personal status and religious affairs with respect for European law and regulations. A study of the council’s rulings as well as modifications and additions to its general recommendations over the years indicates a tendency towards an increased level of recommending Islamic institutionalisation. For example, at the ECFR’s Eighth Ordinary Session in 2001, the recommendations that the Muslims living in Europe should “seriously and actively” pursue the establishment of firms and financial institutions in various fields were added in. They should also communicate with insurance and investment companies and other financial institutions in the West to agree with them on removing illegal practices, such as usury.82 In 2002, the council presented a resolution calling upon Muslims in Europe to refer to arbitration according to Islamic law, particularly in their personal affairs and financial dealings.83

80 Resolution 3/15, the Fifteenth Ordinary Session, 29 June to 3 July 2005. 81 Caeiro distinguishes between members striving to place the council within the revivalist movement and member preoccupied with national discourses about integration and fear of Islamic radicalization, The Power of European Fatwas, p. 437. 82 Al-majallat al-‘almiyya. Al-majlis al-aurubbi li al- ifta’ wa al-buhuth, no. 2, 2003. 83 Ibid. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 687

At the council’s Fifteenth Ordinary Session in 2005, several additional initiatives to facilitate the implementation of Islamic practice in Europe were introduced. The council proceeded with the discussion on arbitration and concluded that Islamic centres should use every possible means to attain a decision from official European authorities to make decisions issued by the committees of arbitrations legally binding. Besides, the council encouraged Islamic centres to obtain permission to issue official marriage contracts and finally it called upon mosque officials to assume a greater role in Islamic education.84 By the ECFR members’ common consent, the establishment of Islamic arbitration tribunals is an important means of easing Muslims’ religious lives in Europe. The philosophy of the council is that the Muslim minority has no possibilities of struggling for the implementation of a general Islamic legislation on national level in Europe: they must find other ways of living as Muslims within the secular state. However, it is legitimate to strive for an implementation of the Shari’a in personal affairs, and thus for the establishment of Islamic arbitration tribunals. The council states that the fundamental principle must be that a Muslim chooses arbitrators or an arbitration establishment committed to the rulings of Islamic law. It adds that it will be permissible to resort to non-Muslim arbitration bodies for the sake of achieving what is required according to the Shari’a, i.e., it is permissible to include Islamic conditions in contracts, and have them confirmed by a non- Muslim attorney or other official authorities.85 The several steps towards a stronger Islamic institutionalisation taken by the ECFR over the years may be interpreted as a natural consequence of the council becoming more conscious of the role it is supposed to play as the Muslim community in Europe becomes more numerous. It may, however, also be an indication of an increased tendency to Islamism within the council—an increased insistence on that Islamic Shari’a must be followed for all areas of life, public and private.86 The council’s approach is that Islam within the minority community should not be confined to personal religious practice, but should also

84 Final Statement of the Fifteenth Ordinary Session, 29 June to 3 July 2005. 85 See resolution 9/1 in Final Statement of the Ninth Ordinary Session, held in France 13–17 July 2002 and Second Recommendation, Final Statement of the Fif- teenth Ordinary Session, held in Ireland, 29 June–3 July 2005. 86 Shepard, William, “The Diversity of Islamic Thought: Towards a Typology”, in: Suha Taji-Farouki and Basheer M. Nafi, eds.,Islamic Thought in the Twentieth Century (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 70. 688 karen-lise johansen karman guide, for example, economic transactions and be a standard set of terms for the conduct of arbitration among Muslims in Europe.

3 Discourse on Muslim Minority Affairs—Adjustment of Religious Practice Several petitioners have shown interested in hearing the ECFR’s view on Muslims’ permanent residence in non-Muslim societies. The council argues that it is not permitted to live amongst non-Muslim if doing so compromises your Islamic identity, but it is lawful to migrate outside the Muslim majority world provided the right to practice Islam.87 The area of ‘ibadat is traditionally presented as a restricted area excluded from interpretation (ijtihad). However, new developments raise questions regarding religious practice, and the ‘ulama’ do not refrain from dealing with the area that constitutes the “rituals of Islamic law”. They do not change religious obligations, but make allowances for changes in the rules that describe the performance of the obligations. The council has issued a ruling permitting the combination ofzuhr and ‘asr prayer during the winter in Europe, when the days are short, as well as a combination of maghrib and ‘isha’ prayer during the Euro- pean summers.88 It also finds it legally permissible to hire churches for the purpose of prayer, and argues that Christian symbols in churches have no effect on “the soundness of the prayer”.89 The ECFR has issued several fatwas on the requirements for burial and prayers over the dead. It encourages Muslim minorities in the West to establish their own cemeteries, but adds that it does not cause any harm to be buried in a non-Muslim cemetery if other alternatives are not available.90 The council has repeatedly received questions about the permissibility of collecting zakat in a non-Muslim country. Here, the ECFR permits donations to charitable organisations in the West, with the money distributed among poor Muslims in the West.91 The council permits female converts living in the West to refrain from wearing the head scarf (hijab), since this obligation is not one of Islam’s pillars, but a

87 Fatwa 1. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 88 Fatwa 4. First Fatwa Collection, second part. 89 Resolution 9/3, Ninth Ordinary Session, July 2002. 90 Fatwa 21. First Fatwa Collection, second part. 91 Cf. Fatwa 5. First Fatwa Collection, second part, which states that some claim that due to the absence of khilafa, charitable organisations are not allowed to collect zakat, as this is the sole responsibility of the Caliph. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 689 secondary duty. Nevertheless, the Muslim community is obliged to support the Muslim woman and to encourage her to cover her head, since it is regarded as a sinful act not to wear the head scarf.92 At the Twelfth Ordinary Session, in January 2004, the ECFR issued a ruling to the question: “Is it permissible to deliver the sermon of Friday in the language of the audience even if it is other than Arabic? “The council responded that the “ideal solution is to deliver the sermon in Arabic and then translate as much as possible of it for those who do not understand. [. . .] But if those who know Arabic among the audience are just a few or non-existent, it is permissible to deliver it in their language [. . .].” The council argues that the aim of the sermon is to “teach and instruct” and draws the logical conclusion that the language of the audience addressed must be taken into consideration. It thereby puts emphasis of the maqasid of certain obligations and makes allowances for adapting the regulations that prescribe the performance of the duty. The ruling discusses how the sermon is primarily supposed to be in Arabic if most of the audience can understand it, for the sermon usually requires citing evidence from the Qur’an or the hadith attributed to the Prophet. The ECFR permits, however, not only to translate as much as possible into the language of the listener, but allows the sermon to be delivered in other languages. This position implies that the council not only allows commenting on the Qur’an in a language other than Arabic, but also accepts that the Qur’an can be quoted in another language. To some jurists, this opinion may be regarded as an infringe- ment of the rule of the Sunna,93 but demonstrates how areas within ‘ibadat may also be adjusted according to local circumstances. The discourse on the ruling related to issues of ibadat‘ is one of adaptation and pragmatism. It is maintained that the Islamic message is relevant regardless of time and place. The content of the Islamic message is consistent and invariable, but the means by which this eter- nal message is spread is changeable and adaptable according to the local circumstances of the Muslim societies. The ruling distinguishes between the ideal solution and the practical conditions, and this distinction allows for transformation when it comes to details regarding the

92 Fatwa 6. First Collection of Fatwas, first part. 93 Koningsveld, P.S. van and G.A. Wiegers, “The Islamic Statute of the Mudejars in the Light of a New Source”, Al-Qantara. Revista de Estudios Arabes, 17 (1996): pp. 19–58, (47). 690 karen-lise johansen karman performance of religious rituals. Regarding the Friday sermon ideally it should be delivered in Arabic, but if audience does not understand that language, it is, according to the ECFR’s way of reasoning, illogi- cal and irrational to insist on preserving such a tradition. The crucial thing is that the Islamic message still guides and disciplines Muslim societies and in order to reach this goal the council allows compromising the traditional sunna of how to perform religious practice.

4 Summary A comparison of the ECFR’s research topics, resolutions and fatwas over the last ten years shows that it has gradually started to concentrate more on minority issues and develop fatwas that little by little start to form a specific minority discourse. It has dealt with many different fiqh issues, but more recently, it has begun to concentrate on fiqh matters of particular relevance for minorities. Thus it works towards identifying a common ground for its legal approach to Mus- lim minorities as a unified council which may standardise its future guidance to Muslim minorities. The council not only guides minorities on how to accommodate Islamic ritual practices in a non-Muslim society, but also strives to create space for other legal, social and economic practices by, for example, encouraging the establishment of Muslim arbitration tribunals and Islamic financial institutions. It runs through all the council’s ruling that it intends to support the building of a Muslim community in Europe. The ECFR issues occasional rulings which totally ignore Western legislation, and at other times insists that Muslims must abide by the laws and regulations of the European countries. Hence, it has not yet developed a clear cut discourse when it comes to the discussion of how to reconcile Islamic legal principles, religious obligations and Western legislation. On the other hand, it is apparent that the council tends not making it too difficult for the individual Muslim to practice Islam and therefore often develops rulings that accommodate the Western conditions by allowing accommodation and compromises of religious practice when it for example comes to prayer and dressing. It is repeatedly stated that a Muslim should only practice Islam according to one’s capabilities. The council’s task is to steer a path mid-way between preserving generally accepted conclusions and adapting them to European realities. Sometimes it does the former, sometimes the latter, and sometimes is does actually compromise. Occasionally, the rulings are contradictory and some go in opposite directions. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 691

Conclusion

The recognition that the realities of life in the Western Europe differ significantly to those of Muslim majority societies, nurtured the idea that it was no longer sufficient to importulama ‘ ’ and interpretations from the Muslim world, but required to establish fiqh councils in the West. The study of the European fatwa council’s social and discursive practice shows that formally the council operates independently of the Muslim world and many members aspire to reach further independence by building up a Western Islamic scholarship. They are, however, manoeuvring in a social practice where religious authorities in the Muslim majority world play a significant role for contemporary Islamic thinking and and it is difficult for the European fatwa council to disengage itselves from acknowledged persons of Islamic thinking situated in the Middle East. The council challenges traditional authority structures, but simultaneously it confirms the traditional authorities. Senior ‘ulama’ from the Muslim world fill many of the seats in the ECFR, and in terms of membership, it cannot be described as a purely Western council. The relocation to the West makes the councils independent of any government, and it is not structurally linked to tradition-bound religious teaching institutions and other bodies of legal counselling in the Muslim world. Nor is the ECFR dominated by a controlling donor and have seemingly full institutional freedom in its scholarly undertakings. The multicultural setting of the European fatwa council involves diverse minority communities lacking the consensus on religious matters inherent in more homogenous societies. This opens up the opportunity of discussing matters not traditionally touched upon in the Muslim world, as for instance, the need to distinguish between faith and cultural practice in matters of gender relations, and dress codes. So far, the council has not become the body of jurisconsultancy to which Muslims living in Western Europe automatically turn when a problematic issue of Islamic normative character arises. The dominance of Arabic-speaking members may constrain its impact on the wider European Muslim community, and since majority of its discursive products are published in Arabic, the council is less known among Urdu and Turkish speaking communities. The council members interviewed acknowledge that the influence of the ECFR is still limited and that it will take time before it achieves broader recognition. The 692 karen-lise johansen karman council expected that the inclusion of members with a high media profile would give widespread publicity, but it seems that the council’s shortcomings in advertising and making itself visible among Muslim minorities with a non-Arabic background has impeded its impact. The legal opinions addressing minority issues demonstrate that the ECFR is against an isolationist attitude and encourages Muslims to engage themselves in the Western non-Muslim society’s political and civic life. The council encourages the institutionalisation of Islamic legal norms by recommending the establishment of Muslim schools, Islamic arbitration tribunals, Islamic financial institutes, etc. While the rules regulating Islamic practice may be transformed, the fundamental view and philosophy of the reasoning is consistent with the Shari’a. Some elements of Islamic orthodoxy may be deliberately ignored in the ECFR’s rulings, but the essentials of Islam and the traditional perception of the canonical sources remains unchallenged. It expresses, however, flexibility in its interpretation of rules describing the performance of ritual practice. The ECFR seems to reason according to the perception that Muslim identity is not always compatible with a West European identity. It therefore allows for modifications in the rules regarding, e.g., the wearing of the hijab. The rulings are adapted to the requirements of life in the West but are not leading to any reform in theology or law. The ECFR does not represent a particular, different manner of legal reasoning, nor a new Western Islamic scholarship that might change mainstream traditional Islamic jurisprudence. The failure to call for a reform does not preclude changes of varying significance. In the process of performingifta ’, the ‘ulama’ share the conception of the flexibility of the Shari’a.94 In fact, the contemporary ‘ulama’ are basically repeating the legal practice of jurists throughout Islam’s history. The jurists are balancing between the variable and permanent and ruling according to the dictum that the content of fatwas changes according to time and circumstances. The discussion of transformation of legal thinking and Islamic practice goes back to the study’s initial question regarding the jurisprudence of minority. Basically, fiqh al-aqalliyyat is about performing legal reasoning consistent with the Shari’a and in compliance with the minority setting. The dispute about the concept among the council

94 Zaman, Muhammad Qasim, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 188. interpreting islamic law for european muslims 693 members is, as discussed, a problem of semantic but also caused by disagreement about to which extent the Islamic legal norms shall be shaped by the non-Muslim circumstances. Although the members disagree about the idea of developing a minority jurisprudence, and although the council’s rulings occasionally go in opposite directions and do not always deal with religious minority issues, it may be argued that, in the future, its work may contribute to a new legal theory of Muslim minorities. The ECFR must continue to respond to the needs of the Muslims in the West by reaching rulings adapted to the context, while continuing to develop resolutions dealing with the basic principles of Islam’s position in a non-Muslim society. Furthermore, it must continue to conduct research on matters related to Islamic practice in the non-Muslim world. If it pursues this, its legal reasoning may lay ground for a new branch of jurisprudence or at least a systematic formulation of the status and ethical standards for Muslim minorities. This will, however, only occur if the European Council for Fatwa and Research become more active and engaged far more open in their dialogue with the Muslim communities in the West and if the members come to terms with which legal topics are relevant to discuss, which rules may be accommodated and altered, and which methods shall be applied to adopt Islamic rulings to a non-Muslim society.

MEASURING THE MUSLIM: ABOUT STATISTICAL OBSESSIONS, CATEGORISATIONS AND THE QUANTIFICATION OF RELIGION

Riem Spielhaus1

For a decade and more now, scholars dedicated to research on Muslims in European countries have been struggling to establish the number of Muslims living in the respective countries. Apart from ambiguities of religious and cultural affiliations, the reason for the difficulty lies in the historically grounded reservation in several European countries to gather data about religious affiliation.2 This reservation is a consequence of past violent conflicts about religions; it is seen as part of religious freedom and expresses a notion of religion as a private affair. However, with a growing awareness of and interest in Muslim populations and resulting from that lack of official statistical data on Muslims, researchers and bureaucrats were compelled to find ways to establish reliable quantifications. A matter that had come to be regarded as private, affiliation to and practice of religion, particularly of Islam, became an issue of public debates and concerns. The question of how many Muslims lived in Western European countries arose in the mid-1990ies i.e. in Sweden, the UK and Germany.3 The basis of

1 The author is a post.doc researcher at the Centre for European Islamic Thought, Faculty of Theology, University of Copenhagen. She wishes to thank her colleagues Jørgen Nielsen, Birgitte Schepelern Johansen, Nadia Jeldtoft, Niels Valdemar Vind- ing and Safet Bektovic for their comments and inspiring discussions about the issues being addressed in this article. The stimulating atmosphere and numerous conversations on methodological questions of research on Muslims in Europe at the Centre for European Islamic Thought has animated the writing of this paper. 2 Nielsen, Jørgen, Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), pp. 175–6. 3 See for example Sander, Åke, “To What Extent is the Swedish Muslim Religious?” in Vertovec, Steven and Peach, Ceri (eds.) Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community, (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), pp. 269–289; Brown, Mark, “Quantifying the Muslim population in Europe: conceptual and data issues,” Inter- national Journal of Social Research Methodology, vol. 3, no. 2, (2000), pp. 87–101, Deutscher Bundestag, Islam in Deutschland. Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine Große Anfrage, (Berlin: Drucksache 14/4530, 2000), Deutscher Bundestag, Stand der rechtlichen Gleichstellung des Islam in Deutschland. Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine Große Anfrage, (Berlin Drucksache 16/5033, 2007); Peach, Ceri, “Muslims in the 696 riem spielhaus the first quantifications of Muslims was formed by available census- data4 and existing statistical data on other characteristics like nationality, country of origin or the parent’s place of birth, that were seen in correlation with religious affiliation. At later points in time censuses, polls and surveys have been conducted in order to verify the estimates and produce detailed knowledge about subgroups, attitudes and other aspects relevant to dominant Islam-debates. A rapidly growing number of quantitative surveys based on polling among Muslims have been carried out during the last decade in order to satisfy a need for knowledge and statistical data on Mus- lims, especially in Western Europe. However, a rising interest in both autochthonous Muslim minorities and new immigrants from Muslim majority countries can be observed in Eastern Europe. These surveys cover issues ranging from religiosity and religious practice through attitudes towards democracy, plurality of religions or homosexuality, to surveys measuring the living situation, levels of integration and education or discrimination Muslims have experienced. These surveys can tell us a lot about how academics are imagining Muslims; how they feed these imaginations back into political debates and thereby into the realities of Muslim individuals and communities. This paper takes a close look at quantitative surveys and how they are embedded in debates on Islam with reference to the specific case of Germany as an example of a trend in academic knowledge production that can be observed throughout Western Europe. It thereby seeks to identify and exemplify theoretical and methodological predicaments in quantitative research on Muslims.

Statistical Visibility, Representation and Claims-Making

The precise number of Muslims living in a respective country is by far not only an academic concern. Various socio-political actors are interested in reliable data, Muslim representatives included. Due to the lack of a recent census or official data on religious affiliation, the number of

2001 Census of England and Wales: Gender and economic disadvantage,” in Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 29, no. 4, (2006), pp. 629–655. 4 In Germany, the last census in 1987 on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, still without the eastern part, included a voluntary question on religious affiliation. measuring the muslim 697

Muslims in Germany has so far been an issue of fierce debates, fuelled by the claims of Islamic organisations to speak for all Muslims in the country or in some cases even for all immigrants from Turkey or from other Muslim majority countries. These claims were meant to emphasise the organization’s importance and point out the relevance of the issues put forward by them. In turn, the legitimacy for these claims has been questioned by other Muslims, non-Muslim immigrants and government representatives. Subsequently, a representative survey was commissioned by the first German Islam Conference (DIK), a forum for long-term dialogue set up by the German Federal Interior Ministry in 2006. The struggle for recognition as religious community by German administrations has led to a special attention not only for the proportion of Muslims in the general population but also for the proportion of individuals that are members of Islamic associations or feel at least represented by them. In this context it has been frequently noticed that the majority of Muslims in Germany—as in many other European countries—are not members in any Islamic organisation.5 Erik Jentges6 puts this common remark into perspective by pointing out that it is advanced in a context where the ‘power of numbers’ as the major argument of civil organisations for participation in political processes in general is subject to revision. The number of members and supporters, used to be a crucial attribute of social might, a powerful indicator of an organisation’s or movement‘s potential to mobilise. Jentges maintains that in the light of generally decreasing membership figures of political parties or trade unions for instance this argument becomes less important. Besides, civil society organisations usually cannot explain or prove whom they are speaking for. Those acting as spokesmen for the environment or consumers, claim to represent far beyond the scope of their members.7 Nevertheless, Islamic organisations throughout Western Europe frequently employ the size of ‘their community’ to substantiate claims to governments and administrations. Some of these Islamic associations,

5 Azzaoui, Mounir, “Muslimische Gemeinschaften in Deutschland zwischen Reli- gionspolitik und Religionsverfassungsrecht—Schieflagen und Perspektiven,” in Hen- drik Meyer and Klaus Schubert (eds.), Politik und Islam (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2011), pp. 247–76, (256–257). 6 Jentges, Erik, Die soziale Magie politischer Repräsentation. Charisma und Anerken- nung in der Zivilgesellschaft (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010). 7 Jentges, Die soziale Magie, p. 12. 698 riem spielhaus

Yasemin Soysal says,8 “function as ethnic interest groups, claiming for their members not only religious, but also political, social, and economic rights. Like their secular counterparts, they take stands on such migrant issues as racism, discrimination, and integration.”9 This led to a competitive situation turning claims-making into a highly contested field. Some Islamic organisations therefore are particularly interested to establish high numbers in order to describe their constituencies. Not uncommonly this included exaggerations which in turn are being questioned by means of quantitative research. Referring to the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), Konrad Pędzi- wiatr10 demonstrates the engagement of a specific Islamic association for reliable numbers of Muslims in Great Britain. The association strongly and successfully lobbied for the introduction of a question on religion into the census and celebrated it as a “landmark event”. “The members of the MCB were also aware of the fact that implementation of the religion question into the Census meant that religions and religious groups had gained a new space in the public sphere.”11 The establishment of authoritative data on the size and regional distribution of British Muslims, Pędziwiatr concludes, does not only put an end to quarrels about the size of the Muslim population but marks also the beginning of their statistical visibility as the second largest religious group in the country. Islamic organisations understand and use this visibility as a valuable tool when they lobby the government,12 thus, revealing a nexus between statistical visibility and recognition.

Shifting Paradigms and the Persistence of Ethnic Categories

Currently, media and politics are revealing an obsession with statistical data and quantifications of Muslims and Muslim groups that is dominated by a fixation on estimates that could grasp the proportions

8 Soysal, Yasemin N., “Changing parameters of citizenship and claims-making: Organized Islam in European public spheres,” Theory and Society, vol. 26, no. 4 (1997), pp. 509–527. 9 Soysal, “Citizenship and Claims-making”, p. 509. 10 Pędziwiatr, Konrad, “Creating New Discursive Arenas and Influencing the Poli- cies of the State: The case of the Muslim Council of Britain,”Social Compass, vol. 54, no. 2 (2007), pp. 267–280. 11 Pędziwiatr, Influencing the Policies of the State, p. 275. 12 Pędziwiatr, Influencing the Policies of the State, p. 275. measuring the muslim 699 of dangerous versus integrated pockets. This passion for numbers is not self-sufficient. Attempts to categorise and quantify Muslim populations are embedded in governmental policies and identity politics of organisations. A closer look at surveys and opinion polls reveals how academia emulates the paradigm shift from an ethnic terminology of integration debates to a religious terminology. In his rigorous evaluation of sociological studies of Islam, Sefano Allievi13 notes that through a semantic shift and a selective perception, categories once used to describe migrants have been transformed. While “everywhere in Europe classification, perception and also study were limited to ethnic and national variables” now religious categories became salient to migration studies.14 Beyond the academic realm researchers have been attesting an “Islamisation of the integration debate”15 that corresponds with the “creation of subjects for dialogue”16 in interreligious activities and governmental initiatives for dialogue with representatives of the Muslim population in Germany.17 In fact, the new focus on religious aspects of immigrants’ lives does not merely mean the attention for another dimension of a group of people. This shift triggered the construction of a new group. Initially, Thijl Sunier resumes, people from around the Mediterranean, Muslim and non-Muslim, were lumped together under the heading ‘Medi- terranean culture’, until in the course of the 1980s ‘Muslim culture’ emerged as separate explanatory category.18 Scholars of Islam and social scientists found each other in minute descriptions of organisational patterns, habits and duties, confessional outlooks and attitudes towards their new cultural environment. This approach contributed to

13 Allievi, Stefano, “How the Immigrant has become Muslim. Public Debates on Islam in Europe,” in Revue européenne des migrations internationales, vol. 21, no. 2 (2005), pp. 1–23. 14 Allievi, “How the Immigrant has become Muslim”, p. 3. 15 Halm, Dirk, Der Islam als Diskursfeld. Bilder des Islams in Deutschland. (Wies- baden: VS Verlag, 2008); Rommelspacher, Birgit, “Emanzipation als Konversion. Das Bild von der Muslima im christlich-säkularen Diskurs”, in Ethik und Gesellschaft. Öku- menische Zeitschrift für Sozialethik, vol. 4, no. 2 (2010), (www.ethik-und-gesellschaft .de/mm/EuG-2-2010_Rom-melspacher.pdf, 2010). 16 Tezcan, Levent, “Interreligiöser Dialog und politische Religionen”, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. 28/29, (2006), pp. 26–32. 17 Amir-Moazami, Schirin, “Dialogue as a governmental technique. Managing gen- dered Islam in Germany,” Feminist Review, vol. 98 no. 1 (2011), pp. 9–27. 18 Sunier, Thijl, “Beyond the Domestication of Islam: A Reflection on Research on Islam in European Societies,” unpublished inaugural lecture, Free University of Amsterdam, 27 November 2009, p. 4. 700 riem spielhaus the perception of fundamental cultural differences between Muslims and the rest of society. ‘Muslim culture’ was rendered an almost timeless character and turned from a ‘category of practice’ into a ‘category of analysis’, Sunier so aptly puts it. There are serious indications that research on Islam in Europe is gradually narrowing down to issues of security, deviant behaviour and culture clash as an effect of the spread of domestication policies across Europe. One of the major consequences of the one- sided emphasis on governance, national identity politics, integration and security in the study of Islam in Europe is that it conceals and disregards certain issues and trends that might be relevant. This has produced a paradoxical situation: “Whereas Islam in particular has become the common denominator for a wide range of phenomena, attitudes and developments, as fields of research religious practices and the production of religious knowledge among Muslims have suffered from programmatic concealment and downright neglect.”19 The political discourse has been inscribed into the academic research, through the agenda-setting of public debates and the direct influence on academic approaches to Islam and Muslims in Europe through research funding. This is particularly decisive in the field of resource- intensive quantitative surveys and opinion polls. In the case of surveys on Muslims in Germany, as in many other Western European countries, the category Muslim as a basic frame for samples and analysis appears around the year 2000. In that year the German government delivered a 93-page answer to a set of questions by the Christian-Democratic party of the German parliament, one of the main questions asking for the quantity of Muslim residents in the country. The enquiry had been launched in 1999 during the debate on the changes in German citizenship law. Since the year 2000 foreigners living in the country are able to become full-fledged citizen under certain conditions and the principle of jus soli applies for children of foreigners born since then. The same year, Mark Brown points out in a contribution to the methodology of social research on Muslims that naturalisations are a cause for Muslims to disappear from the statistics, since it means that a direct measurement of religious affiliation will be required.20

19 Sunier, p. 4. 20 Brown, “Quantifying the Muslim population”, p. 87. Another point to mention here is that the growing focus on Muslim identities of immigrants and their measuring the muslim 701

However one might want to mention that relevant groups of Muslims had never been captured by these indirect measurements, namely those without a recent migration history from a Muslim majority country.21 Like estimates, surveys on Muslims are entrenched in political debates. The biggest surveys—including the only representative poll among immigrants from Muslim majority countries and their descendants—have been commissioned directly by the Federal Interior Ministry,22 indirectly with a detour over the German Islam Confer- ence23 or non-partisan think tanks like the Bertelsmann foundation.24 Furthermore, international players have conducted multinational comparative surveys.25

descendants in Germany coincided with the falling numbers of foreigners living in the country because they increasingly were German nationals. 21 Often Muslims without a recent migration history from a Muslim majority country are referred to as ‘converts’ ignoring that migration does not stand in direct relation to conversion or the other way round. Some converts are immigrants though not from Muslim majority countries and the descendants of those who became Muslims in the 1970ies have meanwhile founded their own families; hence Muslims are born into families without ‘migration background’ as well. Last but not least this approach is another example of a discursive framing of Muslim presence in Europe that disregards pre-migration Muslim life. See Özyürek, Esra, “Convert Alert: German Mus- lims and Turkish Christians as threat to security in the new Europe,” in Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 51, no. 1, (2009), pp. 91–116, and Larsson, Göran and Egdunas Račius, “A Different Approach to the History of Islam and Muslims in Europe: A North-Eastern Angle, or the Need to Reconsider the Research Field,” Journal of Religion in Europe, vol. 3, no. 3, (2010), pp. 350–373. 22 Brettfeld, Katrin and Peter Wetzels, Muslime in Deutschland. Integration, Integrationsbarrieren, Religion und Einstellungen zu Demokratie, Rechtsstaat und politisch-religiös motivierter Gewalt. Ergebnisse von Befragungen im Rahmen einer multizentrischen Studie in städtischen Lebensräumen. (Berlin: Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2007). 23 Sonja Haug, Anja Stichs, Stephanie Müssig and Katy Otto, Muslim Life in Germany. A study conducted on behalf of the German Conference on Islam. (Nürn- berg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2009). A similar survey has been comissioned by the state North Rhine-Westphalia: Muslimisches Leben in Nordrhein- Westfalen, (Düsseldorf: Ministerium für Arbeit, Integration und Soziales des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2010). 24 Bertelsmann, Stiftung (ed.), Religion Monitor 2008. Muslim Religiosity in Ger- many (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2008). 25 Pew Research Centre, Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries top concerns about religious and cultural Identity, 13-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey (Washington: Pew Research Centre, 2006), Zsolt, Nyiri, “Religious and National Identities,” Gallup World Poll Special Report: Muslims in Europe (Washington: www.gallup.com, 2007), Open Society Institute, Muslims in Berlin (New York, London, Budapest: OSI, 2010); Open Society Institute, Muslims in Hamburg (New York, London, Budapest: OSI 2010). 702 riem spielhaus

Quantifications of Muslims are not only funded and commissioned by political players and governments but also drawn on in political debates to strengthen the arguments of various interest groups. As previously mentioned, one of the main issues in the German Islam debate during the last few years has been the question of the total number of Muslims in the country in the context of their representation and, hence, the legitimacy of Islamic organisations to speak for Muslims in Germany. ‘Representativity’ thereby is aspired commonly to both quantitative surveys and Islamic organisations. It is not a coin- cidence that representation of Muslims and Islam is fought about with remarkable determination. If Islamic organisations claim to speak on behalf of all Muslims,26 some surveys express an ambition that is not so dissimilar from this, namely to tell their readers what Muslims really think.27 Different from the notion of representativeness as legitimating advocacy is the idea to give a most adequate image. According to this concept, a survey does not need to include all the individuals classified under the respective category, a sample is considered of high quality when it represents “a reduced image of the population with regard to the heterogeneity of the elements and the representativeness of the variables responsible for testing the hypotheses.”28

The Ambiguity of Classifications

Benedict Anderson29 draws our attention to three institutions of power, census, map and museum, which “profoundly shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion—the nature of the human beings it rules, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry.”30 The census, a measure of quantification, here, is characterised as one of the main tools of governing right at the nexus between culture, community and territory. Even though the colonial time is the focus for Anderson’s observations, the quantification of groups of population is not only confined to the colonial state. On

26 See Pędziwiatr, “Influencing the Policies of the State”, 270. 27 Esposito, John L. and Mogahed, Dalia, Who Speaks For Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think (New York: Gallup Press, 2007). 28 Haug et al., Muslim Life in Germany, p. 34. 29 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities, (London: Verso, 1991). 30 Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 163–164. measuring the muslim 703 the contrary, it seems to be one of the obsessions of democracies as well. Even though developed in light of a different time frame, Ander- son provides us with a critical approach to the function of censuses and other means of quantification for administrative purposes. “It is extremely unlikely,” he argues, that in 1911, more than “a tiny fraction of those categorised and subcategorised” would have recognised themselves under the labels designated to them by the authorities. Anderson notices the census-makers’ passion for completeness, dis- like for ambiguity and their intolerance of multiple, politically “trans- vestite,” blurred, or changing identifications. “The fiction of the census is that everyone is in it, and that everyone has one—and only one— extremely clear place. No fractions.”31 The innovation by census-makers according to Anderson was not the complete invention or construction of ethnic-racial classifications but their fixation and systematic quantification. A look at the history of population related statistics demonstrates that colonial subjects and Muslim immigrants are far from being the only targets of numerical data collection. An obsession with quantifications of deviance, according to Ian Hacking, builds already the core of official statistics in the European context of the nineteenth century. “I study the dullest of subjects, the official statistics of the nineteenth century. They range, of course, over agriculture, education, trade, births, and military might, but there is one especially striking feature of the avalanche of numbers that begins around 1820. It is obsessed with analyse morale, namely, the statistics of deviance.”32 One could thus conclude that statistics are a mirror for what our societies perceive as the biggest deviance from the norm and thereby construct both the norm and the anomaly. Hence, while after the naturalisation of a large proportion of immigrants’ nationality can no longer be drawn upon as a marker of difference; other characteristics come to the fore, religion being one of them. By maintaining that classification, whether created in order to control or to dominate people, to help them or to organise them, does not only describe reality in numeric terms but is a creative process that actually makes up “kinds of people” and has effects on the people

31 Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 165–166. 32 Hacking, Ian, “Making Up People,” in Mario Biagioli (ed.), The Science Studies reader (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 161–172 (161). 704 riem spielhaus classified who in turn might take influence on the classification afterwards, Hacking goes further than Anderson. Many “kinds of people”, Hacking explains, are thought of as objects of scientific inquiry. “We think of these kinds of people as definite classes defined by definite properties. As we get to know more about these properties, we will be able to control, help, change, or emulate them better. But it’s not quite like that. They are moving targets because our investigations interact with them, and change them. And since they are changed, they are not quite the same kind of people as before. The target has moved. [. . .] Sometimes, our sciences create kinds of people that in a certain sense did not exist before. I call this ‘making up people’.”33 During the last decade, people who previously neither thought nor spoke of themselves in terms of religion increasingly imagined and presented themselves as Muslims.34 A longitudinal study by the Centre for Studies on Turkey attests a rising importance of religion between 2000 and 2009 among immigrants from Turkey35 in North Rhine- Westphalia. While in 2000 a little more than half of the respondents (57%) described themselves as very or somewhat religious, the number rose to 83% in 2005. After a slight decrease in 2006 the rate was back to three quarters (75%) in 2009.36 In view of the debate on Islam and Muslims in Germany, the interpretation of these polls remains ambivalent: do these changes reflect an increase in religiosity in terms of practice and belief? Or do they indicate an increasing relevance of religious identity resulting from ascription and internalisation of the ethno-religious markers as other? Interactions between the dominant

33 Hacking, Ian, “Kinds of People: Moving Targets,” in Proceedings of the British Academy, no. 151, (2007), pp. 285–318 (293). 34 Spielhaus, Riem, “Media making Muslims: the construction of a Muslim community in Germany through media debate,” Contemporary Islam, vol. 4, no. 1 (2010), pp. 11–27. 35 In contradiction to its title “Participation and Attitudes of Migrants from Tur- key in North Rhine-Westphalia” the research included “persons with familial roots in Turkey” as respondents of the survey. That means, here, children and grandchildren of those who came to Germany are categorised as migrants. A unique characteristic is the survey’s awareness and inclusions of different ethnic affiliations from Turkey (Turks, Kurds, Armenians, etc.) regardless of their nationality (Sauer 2009: 45–46). Martina Sauer, Teilhabe und Orientierungen türkeistämmiger Migrantinnen und Migranten in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Ergebnisse der zehnten Mehrthemenbefragung (Essen: Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien, 2009). 36 Sauer, Teilhabe und Orientierungen türkeistämmiger Migrantinnen und Migranten in Nordrhein-Westfalen, pp. 57–58. measuring the muslim 705 discourse in politics, media and academia on the one hand, and Muslim self-perception and religiosity on the other remain unclear. Ambiguities and uncertainties connected to classifications and categorisations can not only be blamed on Muslim’s rejection to clarify membership, affiliation and belonging to their faith group but are, as Zygmunt Bauman maintains, a by-product of any attempt “to give the world a structure.”37 While claiming cohesion within a certain category, classifying means most of all to set apart, to segregate. It consists in the acts of inclusion and exclusion.38 Once started, the process of quantification can hardly be stopped but only improved by the introduction of refined categories. “Ambivalence is a side-product of the labour of classification; and it calls for yet more classifying effort. Though born of the naming/classifying urge, ambivalence may be fought only with a naming that is yet more exact, and classes that are yet more precisely defined: that is, with such operations as will set still tougher (counter- factual) demands on the discreteness and transparency of the world and thus give yet more occasion for ambiguity.”39

Unfitting Categories

One outcome of such a refinement is the recent specification of the categories in the Mikrozensus, a yearly representative poll in the population of Germany that can demonstrate the involvement of those classified as described by Hacking. With the introduction of the item Migrationshintergrund (migration background), the statisticians of the federal government reacted to requests by immigrant organisations for a method that would allow to monitor successes of and barriers to integration in order to combat structural discrimination and support claims of ethnic groups with statistical data.40 Furthermore, the term foreigner, that until then was used in the official’s language to designate immigrants and their descendants, had been criticised for being imprecise, exclusivist and leaving out growing parts of those discussed

37 Bauman, Zygmunt, Modernity and Ambivalence (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991), p. 1. 38 Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, p. 2. 39 Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, p. 3. 40 Castro Varela, Maria do Mar and Paul Mecheril, “Grenze und Bewegung. Migra- tionswissenschaftliche Klärungen,” in Mecheril, Paul et al. (ed.), Migrationspädagogik, (Weinheim and Basel: Beltz, 2010), pp. 23–53. 706 riem spielhaus in integration debates.41 Since 2005, the Mikrozensus includes questions on the respondent’s place of birth, as well as the parent’s and grandparent’s place of birth and nationality. Maria do Mar Castro Varela and Paul Mecheril, both researchers on migration, explain that the meanings of the term ‘Migrant’ span from experiences of migration, personal or familial origin in a non-German state, cultural or ethnic difference to individuals without a German passport. Contrary to the term Ausländer it captures ethnic Germans who were born outside Germany with a different nationality but could prove their Ger- man ethnicity (formerly Spätaussiedler). Migrationshintergrund then broadens the category to the descendants of those who migrated or acquired the German citizenship. Interestingly though, not all kinds of migration are considered. Migration of ethnic and national Germans is neglected by the survey while foreigners—individuals without Ger- man citizenship—are considered migrants regardless of where they or their grandparents might have been born.42 In their reflection on the refined categories, Castro Varela and Mecheril conclude that the term Migrant/in paradoxically does not articulate the experience of migration but rather assumes and ascribes “deviances from notions of normality in view of biography, identity and habitus.” This perception of normality is not descriptive but affirms the order between those who self-evidently belong and those who do not self-evidently belong or self-evidently do not belong.43 For the study of Muslims, this is relevant insofar as the discursive practice of many quantitative and qualitative studies merges the categories of the Muslim and the immigrant. We can observe a discursive construction that denies attention to non-immigrant Muslims as well as non- Muslim immigrants in socio-political debates and scientific research. In 2009, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BaMF) for the first time published a representative survey, commissioned by the German Islam Conference to present refined projections of the general Muslim population in Germany. Unfortunately, the survey has one significant limitation. Only immigrants and their descendants were considered. Muslims who did not qualify for the category Migrant or Migrationshintergrund, i.e. purely ‘ethnic German Muslims’, were not

41 Castro Varela and Mecheril, “Grenze und Bewegung”, p. 38. 42 Castro Varela and Mecheril, “Grenze und Bewegung”, p. 38. 43 Castro Varela and Mecheril, “Grenze und Bewegung”, p. 38. measuring the muslim 707 chosen for the sample.44 The restriction on migrants is explained with “the fact that the focus of this study is on determining the number of Muslims with a migrant background”. Anyhow, according to the team around Sonja Haug, “the number of ethnic Germans who have converted to Islam is unknown.” The authors assume, nevertheless, that they are relatively few in comparison with the number of immigrant Muslims and therefore could be neglected. In turn they warn the readers, that “the aspects covered by this study should not be impaired on a statistical level.” Finally, the incompatibility of the survey method is given as another reason for the exclusion of ‘ethnic German’ Muslims, different survey methods would be required if they should be included. “A name-based procedure such as that used in this study concerning Muslims from other countries of origin could not be used for Ger- man converts to Islam.”45 However, this limitation does not lead to the conclusion, that the method could be inefficient for the purpose of the research. In her analysis of the anxiety about converts to Christianity in Tur- key and to Islam in Germany, Esra Özyürek46 detects a notion of secularity in Germany that is tied to the idea of religious as well as ethnic homogeneity in the country. “The condition of homogeneity creates a specific kind of secularism”, Özyürek argues, “where the religious majority is equated with the national majority and keeps the religious minority outside the national imagination, no matter how well integrated or assimilated the members of the minority are.”47 Finally Özyürek reasons “converted German Muslims—as well as German citizens born Muslims—who have perfect accents, German passports, and German names, evoke anxieties about not being able to tell who is, and is not, a true German.”48 One could thus argue, that for a quantitative survey not only quantity but also importance of groups of origin— in this case of German origin—are playing a considerable role. On the

44 Bi-nationals were included in the survey as well, since one immigrant parent or grandparent qualifies for the classification as ‘Migrant’ or ‘person with Migration background’ and the name-based procedure method would be inclusive for some of them. 45 Haug et al., Muslim Life in Germany, p. 54. 46 Özyürek, Esra, “Convert Alert: German Muslims and Turkish Christians as threat to security in the new Europe,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 51, no. 1 (2009), pp. 91–116. 47 Özyürek, “Convert Alert”, p. 108. 48 Özyürek, “Convert Alert”, p. 111. 708 riem spielhaus basis of the survey by the BaMF, with a sample of 6000 respondents acquiring data on 17.000 household members, the number of Muslims in Germany has been estimated at 3.8 to 4.3 million. An assessment of the Muslim population in Germany regardless of migration background, today still does not exist. It is to be expected though that the census 2011 will provide comprehensive data as it contains a voluntary question on religious affiliation. A basic finding of the BaMF -survey is that a substantial proportion of persons originating from Muslim majority countries are not Mus- lims according to their self-assessment.49 Like previous studies have shown, emigration does not necessarily mirror the total population of the countries of origin. Specific parts of population grab opportunities to emigrate.50 Thus, religious minorities seem to have been more likely to emigrate and take the chance to leave when foreign workers were recruited. A closer look at migrants from Iran shows that this applies even more to cases of politically motivated emigration. Almost 40% of the respondents from Iran in the BaMF-survey claim to have no religious affiliation.51 Similar disproportions can be found regarding denominational minorities. As the Religion Monitor 2008 reveals, a remarkably high proportion of 29% of the interviewees with an Iranian background classified themselves as Sunnis. Accord- ing to official figures, less than 10% of the population in Iran is Sunni. However, the differences might not only be connected with politically tainted quantifications in the country of origin. It is also likely that Iranians who belong to a religious minority had a higher interest in going abroad. The quest for more religious freedom, either to pursue a different religious practice than the dominant, or no religion at all, as a motivation for emigration, thus connects the two items religious affiliation and migration.52 This sustains the conclusion of the team around Sonja Haug that the religion of migrants as such “cannot be automatically inferred from the religious composition of the population of their respective countries of origin.”53

49 Haug et al., Muslim Life in Germany, p. 12. 50 Heine, Peter und Riem Spielhaus, “Sunnis and Shiites in Germany: A Brief Anal- ysis of the Results of the Study by the Bertelsmann Stiftung,” in Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.), Religion Monitor 2008. Muslim Religiosity in Germany, (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2008), pp. 24–31, Brown, “Quantifying the Muslim population”. 51 Haug et al., Muslim Life in Germany, p. 12, p. 87, pp. 302–320. 52 Heine and Spielhaus, “Sunnis and Shiites in Germany”. 53 Haug et al., Muslim Life in Germany, p. 12. measuring the muslim 709

The item ‘Islamic denomination’—mostly giving the options Sunni, Shi’i or Alevi Islam—is another frequent feature of quantifications of Muslims. Among the Muslims interviewed in the Religion Monitor in Germany, 9% classified themselves as Shi’i, 65% as Sunni and 8% as Alevi. A remarkable percentage (19%) of all interviewees did not classify themselves with any of the denominations listed, but answered “other denomination” (11%) or “don’t know/no answer” (8%). More than a third (36%) of the Bosnian respondents, but only 13% of the Muslims of Iranian origin did not classify themselves as part of any of the given denominations. Although—or perhaps because—the concept of a duality between Shi’i and Sunni Islam dominates the academic and political discourse on Islam, the debate is thwarted by a polarisation of counteracting movements within Islam. The answers of Muslims reveal a different degree of awareness as well as regional relevance of denominational affiliation. The high number of those who say they belong to other denominations than the choices given in the questionnaires points to further connections on a religious level; that might be mystic movements, Islamic schools of jurisprudence, or transnational networks and religious groups that have acquired global significance over the past decades.54 As for Germany, it can therefore be ascertained that the significance of the polarisation between Sunnis and Shi’ites or the affiliation with Islamic denominations is either far smaller or much more complex than mostly assumed.55

Giving a Voice—Representative of What Exactly?

And until we know what we are going to count or measure, it is obviously impossible to get any accurate measure.56 Åke Sander Research on Muslims in Europe has been recently criticised for a number of preoccupations and blind spots: The dominant focus on Western Europe and new Muslim presence caused by migration after

54 Heine and Spielhaus, “Sunnis and Shiites in Germany,” pp. 24–25. 55 Unfortunately the Census 2011 allows Muslims only to claim affiliation to Islam if they decide between the three ‘denominations’ Sunni, Shi’i or Alevi Islam. It remains uncertain how Muslims will answer who do not care about or oppose subdivisions of Islam. 56 Sander, “To What Extent is the Swedish Muslim Religious?” p. 184. 710 riem spielhaus

World War II,57 the neglect of long-standing Muslim population and the focus on visible, active Muslims and those affiliated in one way or the other to Islamic organisations.58 The concentration on religious practice and Muslim communities, according to Safet Bektovic, left ‘unorganised’ Muslims unexplored and absent from public discourse.59 Even though I agree with the observation of a methodological challenge in studies on Muslims who are not actively engaged and therefore simply less accessible for researchers which leads to a limited picture, that is dominated by the formal, political and visual elements, I would still question the notion that Muslims who are not part of Islamic organisations are necessarily absent from public discourse.60 In any case, political and academic debates in Germany are characterised almost by an obsession with the “silent masses”, recurring to those Muslims that are not represented by those Islamic organisations that are striving for recognition by German governments and administrations as spokespersons for Muslims in the country. An example on the discursive level of the dialogue between Muslims and the state is the German Islam Conference (DIK). In both phases of the structured dialogue that was initiated by the Federal Interior Ministry in 2006, and continued in a second phase with a new thematic and personnel composition in 2010, inviting representatives of non-organised Mus- lims was an explicit dialogue policy. The Interior Ministry Wolfgang Schäuble explained the selection of the Muslim representatives for the first Islam Conference in the following way: “Five of these 15 Muslim

57 Larsson and Račius, “A Different Approach to the History of Islam and Muslims in Europe”. 58 Bektovic, Safet, “Studying Muslims and constructing Islamic identity,” in Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 34 (2011), pp. 1–14, Jensen, Tina Gudrun, “Context, focus and new perspectives in the study of Muslim religiosity,” in Ethnic and Racial Studies, (2010), pp. 1–16; Kühle, Lene, “Excuse me, which radical organization are you a member of? Reflections on methods to study highly religious but non-organized Muslims,” in Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 34, no. 7 (2010), Schmidt, Garbi, “Understanding and Approaching Muslim Visibilities: Lessons Learned from a Fieldwork-based Study of Muslims in Copenhagen,” in Ethnic and Racial Studies, (2011), pp. 1–14; Jeldtoft, Nadia, “On Defining Muslims,” in Jørgen Nielsen, Samim Akgönül, Ahmet Alibašić, Brigitte Maréchal and Christian Moe (eds.), Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 9–14. 59 Bektovic, “Studying Muslims and constructing Islamic identity,” p. 3. 60 See also Amiraux, Valérie, “Speaking as a Muslim: Avoiding Religion in French Public Space,” in Gerdien Jonker and Valérie Amiraux (eds.), Politics of Visibility. Young Muslims in European Public Spaces (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2006), pp. 21–52, (48–49). measuring the muslim 711 participants represent the largest Islamic organisations in terms of numbers. Since the five Muslim umbrella organisations represent at most only one-fifth of all Muslims living in Germany, unaffiliated Muslims are included in the dialogue: Ten Muslim representatives were chosen from various spheres of Muslim life and traditions in order to represent the diversity of Muslim life in Germany.”61 Since several of the “unaffiliated Muslims” represented positions critical of Islamic organisations or Islam in general, this selection has been described as a strategy to indirectly critique Islamic organisations in order to antagonise the declared objective of recognising Islam as a religious community.62 On the other hand in its ambivalence the Islam Conference also bears the features of a genuine attempt to include non-organised, ‘silent’ Muslim’s voices. As has been pointed out by Garbi Schmidt,63 qualitative studies face the challenge to include those who are not visible or organised as Muslims in the setting and the frame of research. Crucial for most empirical studies is where and how Muslims can be recognised as such. Because of their accessibility, visible and active Muslims have been at the focus of (qualitative) research.64 Yet, where the research focus is set on a prayer room, a Muslim women’s organisation, a neighbourhood initiative or a political parties for instance, directly influences the outcome. Most quantitative surveys are circumventing this pitfall by employing random samples. But even this way, the category Muslim has to be defined despite this being a highly contested issue. Most surveys therefore leave the question to their respondents and include whoever embraces the Muslim identity. Employing self-definition by individuals, allows an understanding of being Muslim that regards affiliation to Islam as “sense of belonging and believing”. The Religion Monitor, a quantitative global survey on religion inclusive of all faiths and confessions conducted by the Bertelsmann

61 Bundesministerium des Inneren, “Work programme of the German Islam Conference,” www.bmi.bund.de/EN/Themen/PolitikGesellschaft/DtIslamKonferenz/ ArbeitsprogrammZusammensetzung/ArbeitsprogrammZusammensetzung_node .html (accessed 15 March 2011). 62 Peter, Frank, “Welcoming Muslims into the Nation. Tolerance Politics and Inte- gration Germany,” in Jocelyne Cesari (ed.), Muslims in Europe and the United States since 9/11 (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 119–144. 63 Schmidt, “Understanding and Approaching Muslim Visibilities”, pp. 1–14. 64 Schmidt, “Understanding and Approaching Muslim Visibilities”, p. 2. 712 riem spielhaus foundation, is based on Glock‘s multidimensional definition of religiosity, an approach that measures “centrality of religion” in the six core dimensions: intellect, ideology (belief), public practice, private practice, experience, general relevance of religion to everyday life.65 Every- body who states his or her belonging to Islam is classified as a Muslim in this survey. Based on multivariate items centrality of religion is assessed in the subsequent analysis. However, as Jytte Klausen reminds us, even surveys on the basis of self-identification have to leave open a decisive question: What do respondents understand as being Mus- lim? The concept is constantly changing its meaning. More and more, people accept that being a Muslim is not just a matter of faith, but also a sociological reality. Muslim identity became a significant source of political mobilisation, organisation, and counter-mobilisation for both xenophobic voters and those who feel discriminated against.66 Finally, the sampling process raises questions about access to respondents and response rates. Different methods of approach (like telephone, door to door, online, snowball) have different drawback and affect the participation rates of different target groups. The role of academic contributions in legitimising state policies has repercussions on the commitment of respondents. Certain (Muslims) populations have a highly critical view of surveys and show reluctance to participate in general but especially in quantitative polls. The fact that results of polls are often used to support political arguments seems to feed into this scepticism. Particular populations are developing ‘survey fatigue’ after having been exposed to polling and surveys on repeated occasions and are therefore hesitant to take part.

Conclusion: What Is Particularly ‘Muslim’ about Muslims?

This paper has discussed quantifications and classifications as a governmental praxis to control, manage, and represent populations, raising questions like: How are Muslim’s constructed in polls and surveys?

65 Huber, Stefan, “Aufbau und strukturierende Prinzipien des Religionsmonitors” in Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.), Religionsmonitor (2008), pp. 21–31. Gütersloh: Güter- sloher Verlagshaus, Martin Rieger, “The Religion Monitor,” in Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.), Religion Monitor 2008. Muslim Religiousness in Germany: Overview of Religious Attitudes and Practices, (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2008), pp. 9–12 (9). 66 Klausen, Jytte, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). measuring the muslim 713

How is being Muslim framed? These questions refer to the sampling, the sets of questions as well as the control groups. In some cases the control group would be characterised as the general population thereby rendering the sampled population separately, comparing it to the “general public”, representing the national majority.67 While other surveys contrast Muslims with immigrants of other faiths68 or with affiliates of the majority religion.69 In this way the Muslim is contextualised within a set of categories that are perceived as equivalent and that is due to financial and methodical constraints unavoidably limited. Remark- ably, religion is not always the focal point of analysis. Even though this paper starts from the German context, quantification of Muslims is not limited to any nation-state in Europe. Therefore the aim here is to stimulate comparisons of quantitative mappings of Muslims. The replacement of debates on foreigners by debates on Islam, and the merging of studies on migration and Islam have an impact on studies of population that are now marked and classified as Muslim. While in Germany, former ‘foreigners’ were increasingly categorised and discussed as Muslims, the patterns of argument largely remained the same. Quantifications of Muslims are effectively embedded in political agendas and discourses of governance, national identity politics, integration and security. Accordingly the turn to quantitative arguments appears to be a substantial aspect of replies to claims for recognition by Islamic organisations in Germany. The ‘discovery’ of Muslims in Western Europe through public discourse has led to an academic trend of focusing on Muslims. Academ- ics are confronted with a tremendous demand for information about Muslims and at the same time financial resources have opened for research in this field. The past decade has witnessed a growing interest and need for expert knowledge and statistical data on Islam and Mus- lims in the Middle East as well as in Europe. This opened opportunities

67 See for example Zsolt, Nyiri, “The Clash of Perceptions: Views on National Loyalty, Respect for Women, Religious Tolerance, and Preference to Coexist among Muslims in Paris, London and Berlin in Comparison to the General Public,” in Man- aging Ethnic Diversity after 9–11: Internal Security and Civil Liberties in Transatlantic Perspective, Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia and Simon Reich (ed.), Managing Diversity after 9/11. Integration, Security, and Civil Liberties in Transatlantic Perspective (New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press, 2010), Pew Research Centre, Muslims in Europe. 68 Brettfeld and Wetzels, Muslime in Deutschland. 69 Brettfeld and Wetzels, Muslime in Deutschland, Bertelsmann, Religion Monitor. 714 riem spielhaus for funding and involvement of researchers from a multiplicity of disciplines and numerous analytical approaches for studying Muslims. The sense of what it means to be a Muslim has been broadened in the fields of Migration Studies, World History, European or Ameri- can Studies to name just a few examples. In this ambivalent situation categories like religiosity, ethnicity and migration background tend to be conflated. Simultaneously, migration and other developments often referred to under the heading of globalisation put holistic notions of culture as territorial traits into question. In this process religion, especially in case of religious minorities, is becoming a key characteristic and feature of classification and quantification embedded in practices of administration and control. ‘Muslim’ increasingly seems to become a floating signifier that is invested with meaning by debates in media and politics as well as by the academic production of knowledge. Even though claiming that they are just measuring what is already there, scholarly activities involved in these practices of governmentality are taking part both in producing the categories which are subject to quantifications and in constructing the content of those categories. Here, in this special case people are imagined and constructed as Muslims and (seemingly inseparably, as) immigrants. Muslim communities in Germany, however, are not always immigrant communities; though most people with a Muslim affiliation do have roots outside this country. Muslim individuals might not live in one but in several communities and subgroups of society simultaneously.70 Moreover, they might share identities as well as characteristics and problems in everyday life with other groups, be it because of similarities in their social, economic, or educational status, because of sharing living space in the urban quarters they live in or the political vision they have in common. The focus on one faith group bears the risk of constructing Muslims as a coherent group while ignoring the characteristics that some of them share with other individuals and groups. Every survey, every poll among Muslims has to answer why this term, this category is used and not another one. And why a survey would choose exactly this frame leaving out the Muslim’s Christian, Buddhist or Hindu neighbours, persons with a similar migration

70 See Baumann, Gerd, “Collective identity as a Dual Discursive Construction. Dominant v. Demotic of Culture and the Negotiation of Historical Memory,” in Heidrun Friese (ed.), Identities: Time, Difference and Boundaries (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2002), pp. 189–200. measuring the muslim 715

history or common contemporary political ambitions. How is this category associated or dissociated with other categories like nationality, ethnicity, religion or the like? Therefore it seems crucial to reflect on how dominant research designs, e.g. the operationalization of research questions and frames, define academic understandings of what it means to be a Muslim. This question furthermore leads to face the methodological challenge to develop adequate approaches to study Muslims that are capable of grasping the multiplicity of identifications and circumstances that shape lives and actions of Muslims, such as gender, ethnic, economic, social, religious diversity or the fluidity and contextuality of identities, affiliations and loyalties that have been substantiated by qualitative research. Which research designs enable us to tackle specificities of Muslims, if there are any? Under which circumstances can research produce knowledge on what is specifically ‘Muslim’? How, working on Muslims, could the traps of methodological nationalisms as well as the conflation of objects and units of analysis—that among others Nina Glick Schiller cautions us against71—be avoided? Coming from that research tradition I would deem it useful to ask what the contributions and strengths of Islamic Studies are that it has to offer to researchers from the diverse disciplines or in multidisciplinary teams currently turning to work on Muslims in Europe. The methodological challenges call for a debate that brings together research perspectives from multiple disciplinary fields researching Muslims in different regional and social spheres as well as time frames, and enables a conversation to share experiences from across disciplinary boundaries.

71 Glick-Schiller, Nina, “Beyond methodological Ethnicity: local and transnational Pathwazs of Immigrant Incorporation,” Willi Brandt Series of working papers in Inter- national Migration and Ethnic Relations, vol. 2, no. 8 (2008), pp. 1–44.

PART III

BOOK REVIEWS

Edited by Hugh Goddard and Samim Akgönül

THE LAST SHALL BE THE FIRST—OR HOW THE STUDY OF ISLAM AND MUSLIMS IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES COULD BE MORE DEVELOPED

Göran Larsson1

Bibliographical information and academic databases clearly indicate that the study of Islam and Muslims is a maturing research area within the broader field of religious and social studies in the West. This observation is also true for the Nordic countries.2 However, even though the quantity of publications has grown over the years, it is evident that most academics working on Islam in the Nordic countries seem to have limited possibilities to do fieldwork or thorough comparative and longitudinal studies covering more than one country. This review article is therefore written with two aims. The first is to present some recent publications written in the Nordic languages or in English that deal with Islam and Muslims in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. How- ever, and more importantly, the second aim is to argue that we should pay more attention to BA and MA theses published in the respective countries, and also that new research questions need to be formulated. While most academic articles and books are focused on the history and institutionalisation of Muslim groups in the Nordic countries, the research theses published by undergraduate, graduate and PhD students are more often based on field work and participant observation. However, before I give some examples from the latest publications dealing with Islam and Muslims in Denmark, Norway and Sweden,

I must stress that there are important exceptions regarding my general conclusion (e.g. the research carried out by Garbi Schmidt, Jonas Otterbeck and Kari Vogt discussed below), and that this short overview is mainly the outcome of eclectic reading. In addition to presenting some recent publications, I believe it is also vital to discuss certain topics that have been neglected in the study of Islam and Muslims in the Nordic countries.

Some Recent Publications

In the last five years, most academic studies on Islam and Muslims in the Nordic countries have been produced by PhD candidates. In Swe- den, the thesis Muslima: Islamisk väckelse och unga kvinnors förhan- dlingar om genus i det samtida Sverige (Muslima: Islamic Revival and Young Women’s Negotiations over Gender in Contemporary Sweden) by Pia Karlsson Minganti could serve as an example.3 The aim of this study is to highlight how young Muslim women who are organised in the largest Sunni youth organization in Sweden (SUM) negotiate gender and how this negotiation is informed by discussions concerning race, ethnicity, age and generational difference. With the help of interviews and participant observation, the study analyses how the women selected might use Islam as a method for empowerment, but it also discusses how the women can be hindered by religious norms, values and expectations. The thesis engages with and struggles to understand contemporary debates on multiculturalism and globalisation processes and how these processes have an influence on young Muslim women. Resembling Pia Karlsson Minganti’s work, the Norwegian social anthropologist Christine M. Jacobsen’s thesis is also focused on participants in one of Norway’s largest Muslim youth organisations. Her thesis, Staying on the straight path: religious identities and practices among young Muslims in Norway, is based on a long field study.4 Without

3 Karlsson Minganti, K., Muslima. Islamisk väckelse och unga kvinnors förhandlin- gar om genus i det samtida Sverige (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2007). 4 Jacobsen, C.M., Staying on the straight path: religious identities and practices among young Muslims in Norway (Bergen: Bergen University, 2006). A revised edition of her thesis has been published by Brill: see Jacobsen, C.M., Islamic Traditions and Muslim Youth in Norway (Leiden: Brill, 2010). reviews: the last shall be the first 721 going into detail, the topics of identity, negotiation and belonging are central to both Karlsson Minganti’s and Jacobsen’s theses. However, senior researchers, such as Garbi Schmidt, Jonas Otterbeck and others, have also produced academic publications on Islam and Muslims in the Nordic countries. For example, Garbi Schmidt’s report Muslim i Danmark—muslim i verden: En analyse af muslimske ung- domsforeninger og muslimsk identitet i årene op til Muhammad-krisen (Muslim in Denmark—Muslim in the world: an analysis of Muslim youth organizations and Muslim identities prior to the Muhammad crisis) is informed by similar methods and research questions as is the case for Karlson Minganti and Jacobsen. Like the two earlier researchers, Schmidt is interested in how young Muslims negotiate and formu- late their identity and how the non-Muslim community in Denmark views Islam and Muslims.5 Jonas Otterbeck’s book Samtidsislam: unga muslimer i Malmö och Köpenhamn (Contemporary Islam: Young Muslims in Malmö and Copenhagen) is another example of a study that focuses on identity production among young Muslims, but unlike Karlsson Minganti, Jacobsen and Schmidt, Otterbeck is mainly interested in young individuals who have a so-called weak connection with Islam and Muslim activities.6 The nine young individuals included in this study live in the city of Malmö, Sweden, and in the Danish capital, Copenhagen. They are only associated with Islam because they have a Muslim cultural background. Unlike the individuals in the earlier discussed studies by Karlsson Minganti, Jacobsen and Schmidt, they seldom if ever present themselves as pious Muslims, and some of them are also very critical of Islam and their so-called Muslim cultural background. Otterbeck’s study is of great importance because it is focused on so-called secular or cultural Muslims, and his book provides a fresh and unique insight into how the great majority of ‘Muslims’ most likely see Islam. Instead of presenting Muslims as extremely religious and pious, this work has the potential to correct stereotypes and gen- eralisations about Islam and Muslims in the Nordic countries.

5 Schmidt, G., Muslim i Danmark—muslim i verden: En analyse af muslimske ung- domsforeninger og muslimsk identitet i årene op til Muhammad-krisen (Uppsala: Swed- ish Science Press, 2007). 6 Otterbeck, J., Samtidsislam: unga muslimer i Malmö och Köpenhamn (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2010). 722 reviews

Even if we have a fairly good understanding and picture of the institutionalisation of Islam in the Nordic countries, it is hard to find a more systematic study than Lena Kühle’s Moskeer i Danmark: islam og muslimske bedesteder (Mosques in Denmark: Islam and Muslim prayer houses).7 This study, which mapped approximately 115 mosques and Muslim prayer houses, was published in 2006 as part of a larger project on religiosity in Denmark. A similar ambition is also found in the online publication Islam—guide till föreningar (Islam—A Guide to Congregations), which deals with fewer than twenty mosques and prayer houses in the city of Gothenburg, Sweden.8 For Norway it is possible to find similar data in Saphinaz-Amal Naguib’s beautifully illustrated book Mosques in Norway: the creation and iconography of sacred space.9 Even though these studies provide invaluable insights into the institutionalisation and creation of Muslim space in the Nor- dic countries, they quickly become obsolete and inaccurate since the religious landscape is subject to constant and rapid change (as demonstrated by the statistical data presented in the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe). New mosques are built and old basements abandoned, and even though we have the studies named above, we still lack interviews with religious leaders and documents that can be used to reconstruct how the first Muslim congregations were started and how these leaders or entrepreneurs established Islamic institutions. One important exception that deserves to be mentioned is Kari Vogt’s wonderful study Islam på Norsk: Moskeer och islamiske organisasjoner i Norge (Islam in Norwegian: Mosques and Islamic Organizations in Norway).10 Unlike most studies of Islam and Muslims in Europe, this book is based on interview data and field observations that have been collected over a long period of time, and the ethnographic data provided by Vogt is in my view unique in its richness. Before I provide some examples of undergraduate and graduate student essays and theses, I wish to point out that Islamic jurisprudence and Islam in schools seem to becoming two topics that are increasingly

7 Kühle, L., Moskeer i Danmark: islam og muslimske bedesteder (Højbjerg: Forlaget univers, 2006). 8 Retrieved from www.islamguiden.com/ovrigt/islam_guide.pdf. 9 Naguib, S.-A., Mosques in Norway: the creation and iconography of sacred space (Oslo: Novus, 2001). 10 Vogt, K., Islam på Norsk: Moskeer och islamiske organisasjoner i Norge (Oslo: Cappelen Damm AS, 2008, revised second edition). reviews: the last shall be the first 723 being researched. Besides Jørgen S. Nielsen and Lisbet Christoffersen’s Shari‘a As Discourse: Legal Traditions and the Encounter with Europe (see my review in this volume), Mosa Sayed defended his thesis Islam och arvsrätt i det mångkulturella Sverige: En internationellt privaträtt- slig och jämförande studie (Islam and Inheritance Law in Multicultural Sweden: A Study in Private International and Comparative Law) in 2009 at the University of Uppsala.11 This thesis caused a critical public debate about shari‘a and the study of Islamic law at Swedish universities, and the debate was partly coloured by strong anti-Muslim tendencies. Another research topic that has lately attracted some attention is the study of Islam in schools (both in municipality schools and so- called independent confessional Muslim, Islamic or Arabic schools). While the earlier studies in this field were focused on the analysis and presentation of Islam and Muslims in textbooks, the ‘next generation’ of researchers have paid closer attention to classroom observations, Islamic pedagogies and how pupils talk about religion.12

The Last Shall Be the First

Although having no ambition to be complete or comprehensive, this short review illustrates clearly that the study of Islam and Muslims in Denmark, Norway and Sweden is thriving. But this does not mean that the field should not become more developed. One way to expand our knowledge is to include another kind of research material, namely the academic theses written by undergraduate and graduate students. For example, with the help of search engines such as www.uppsats.se (a database that currently contains more than 84,000 theses written at Swedish universities and colleges by undergraduate and graduate students), it is possible to find a large number of texts that are relevant for the study of Islam and Muslims in the Nordic countries.

11 Sayed, M., Islam och arvsrätt i det mångkulturella Sverige: en internationellt privaträttslig och jämförande studie (Uppsala: Iustus Förlag AB, 2009). 12 See, for example, Andersen, P.B. et al., Religion, skole og kulturel integration i Danmark och Sverige (Copenhagen: Museeum Tusculanums forlag, 2006); Carlson, M. et al., Education in ‘Multicultural’ Societies: Turkish and Swedish Perspectives (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007); Berglund, J., Teaching Islam: Islamic Religious Education in Sweden (Münster: Waxmann, 2010). 724 reviews

When I inserted the key words ‘Sweden’ and ‘Islam’, I received 39 hits (5 December 2010). Even though the quality of these texts might vary, it is evident that this material has been left unexplored and is often neglected in other academic publications. The theses in this database are often written over several months and are generally based on interviews and participant observation. For example, three recent undergraduate theses from my own university have dealt with Friday sermons at the University mosque at Chalmers, open lectures organised by a local Muslim organisation in Gothenburg and prevailing political attitudes among participants at a Muslim youth conference in Stock- holm.13 Without bending the argument too much, it is no exaggeration to say that the three examples above have all made important contributions to the study of Islam and Muslims in Sweden in general, and in Gothenburg in particular. Like all academic works, the theses discussed above can best be described as building bricks in a larger wall, without which it is hard to obtain a full picture of Islam and Muslims in Swe- den. Since the financial situation seldom provides enough money for full-scale research projects, it has become even more important to take into account the work done by undergraduate and graduate students. Instead of repeating old findings and accepted facts, it is clear that PhD students and other advanced students are generally more willing to undertake hard fieldwork and tiresome participant observation than more senior researchers. To maintain, and even more importantly to revitalise the study of Islam and Muslims in the Nordic countries, it is therefore essential to focus on both old and new research topics. Without pointing a finger at anyone, I believe that Jonas Otterbeck is right when he stress how vital it is to focus on individuals of Muslim cultural background that might have weak attachments or even negative opinions about Islam, but it is also important to acquire a better understanding of what Muslims actually think about Islam and how

13 See, Emanuelson, J., Islam på universitet. En innehållsanalys av islamisk predikan på Chalmers (Göteborg: Göteborgs universitet, Institutionen för Litteratur, idéhistoria, religion, 2010, retrieved from http://gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/2077/22662); Näckdal, T., Islamism, da‘wa eller det sanna islam? En studie av Islamiska informationsföreningen i Göteborg (Göteborg: Göteborgs universitet, Institutionen för Litteratur, idéhistoria, religion, 2010, retrieved from http://gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/2077/22661) and Bäck- elie, J., I vilken utsträckning relaterar unga muslimer till vänster-högerskalan i svensk politik?: En fallstudie från SUMs ungdomskonferens 2009 (Göteborg: Göteborgs universitet, Institutionen för Litteratur, idéhistoria, religion, 2010, retrieved from http:// gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/2077/22096). reviews: the last shall be the first 725

Islam is preached in mosques and Islamic institutions. Consequently, instead of focusing on organisational history, it is now time to focus on lectures, Qur’anic classes, Friday sermons, the distribution and use of transnational fatwas and other Muslim activities. For example, what kinds of Islamic texts and opinions are disseminated among Muslims in Sweden, and to what extent are Muslims influenced by preachers who use the latest information and communication technologies in spreading their interpretations of Islam? How are Muslim organisations and individuals from a Muslim cultural background affected by the anti-Muslim attitudes that are growing in the Nordic countries? 726 reviews

Two Faiths, One Banner: When Muslims Marched With Christians Across Europe’s Battlegrounds. By Ian Almond. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009. Pp. 256. ISBN-10: 0674033973 ISBN-13: 978-0674033979. $29.95 and £22.95.

History is very often a narrative of the winner. The tendency to monop- olise the winning experience, setting up a sharp dividing line between “Us” and “Them”, has been interwoven into many official historical narratives. The merging, non-defined and negotiable space between the two (created) divides has not been a matter of deeper historical research, at least up to recent times. Ian Almond, a professor of postcolonial lit- eratures and a historian, tries to reverse this established position and present the reader with a new insight into the tumultuous history of the bordering zones of Europe, Middle East and North Africa. The book, which tries to subvert the established stereotypes and narratives about Islam and Europe, carries the title Two Faiths, One Banner: When Muslims Marched With Christians Across Europe’s Battlegrounds and, apart from the Introduction, Conclusion and other additional parts, it is divided into five chapters: The Eleventh-Century Spain of Alfonso VI: Emperor of the Two Religions; Frederick II and the Saracens of Southern Italy; Turkish-Christian Alliances in Asia Minor 1300–1402; Muslims, Protestants and Peasants: Ottoman Hun- gary 1526–1683, and The Crimean War (1853–6): Muslims on all Sides. The author proclaims his aim to be to present the emptiness and falsity of the sharp contradiction between “Islam” and “Europe” right at the start in the introduction to the book. What Almond wants is to present how the purity of such categories is non-existent, and that insistence on that purity brings about the need for fantasy, and, as the author says at the beginning of his book, “the fantasy of Europe relies on an idea of non-Europe to exist” (p. 6). The basic subject of the book is various Muslim-Christian alliances. Almond lists various different types of such alliances, some caused by political and economic needs and dependencies, but some also caused by more private, personal and close bonds which existed between members of different nations and religions. What emerges here is the question of identity and the question of authority. In a very skilful manner, Almond deconstructs the notion of stable, unitarian, Euro- pean identity that has its roots solely in the Judeo-Christian tradition; in its place he sets up an alternative view of the history of Middle Ages where identity was carved by various factors differing from those which come to the fore in the present-day context. Such was also the reviews 727 issue of authority: allegiances and alliances could shift in a more mun- dane manner than our contemporary historians are willing to admit. Both these aspects indicate, firstly, how there is a constant need for redefinition of the notions “identity” and “authority”; and, secondly, how that makes it necessary that the solid categories of “West” and “non-West” which are placed as binary oppositions must be questioned and reshaped. This book richly presents the great narrative style of Ian Almond and his ability to combine the official history with lesser known or very often neglected facts in order to present the modern-day reader with a picture, if not more complete, than at least more conducive to ques- tioning the imposed stereotypes. The wish to show the history from the other side (although not without any flaws: there is a place in the book where Ian Almond fails to present the Islamic view on the authenticity of the holy book in a remark about the Qur’anic surah al-Rum) is certainly an encouraging impetus, and especially for researchers who are interested in hybridity and symbiosis of experiences of different (but not always diverging) religions, nations, traditions and cultures.

Dženita Karić Oriental Institute in Sarajevo

History of Islam in German Thought: From Leibniz to Nietzsche. By Ian Almond. London: Routledge, 2009. Pp. 216. Hbk. ISBN 978-0- 415-99519-1. $103.00

Writing any kind of history of a certain school of thought is a task which implies recognition of the variety of responses, and also the dynamic nature of responses that is resistant to categorisation. Ian Almond is aware of this need to rethink even the making of the history of thought and brings to the readership a carefully written book under the title History of Islam in German Thought: From Leibniz to Nietzsche. This genealogy of thought examines the diverse answers to the idea of Islam in the works of eight German philosophers and thinkers. It is important to point out how this diversity can be traced back in the works of an individual thinker as well—how he differently responded to this idea. The book is divided into eight chapters, apart from Introduction: The Historical Context, Europe and the Ottoman Empire 1683–1856 and Conclusion. The chapters are titled: Leibniz, Historicism and 728 reviews the Plague of Islam; Kant, Islam and the Preservation of Boundaries; Herder’s Arab Fantasies; Keeping the Turks Out of Islam: Goethe’s Ottoman Plan; Friedrich Schlegel and the Emptying of Islam; Hegel and the Disappearance of Islam; Marx the Moor; and Nietzsche’s Peace with Islam. What Almond shows is how the idea of Islam is being used as a useful textual and contextual tool for expressing an author’s more general aim. For example, Almond discerns three different moments in Leibniz’s thought: Muslims as enemies, Muslims as barbarians and, sometimes, as possessors of a natural theology. However, this differ- entiation in the thought of a thinker must not be regarded as a set of decisive breaks; it is more of a constant shifting between several ideas in a moment. What Almond tries to present is the often very pragmatic nature of these several thinkers when it comes to their relationship to the phenomenon of Islam. This preoccupation with the perceived non-European—in this case Islam—in a manner which diverges from the medieval view of Islam as the pure enemy, had its roots in the emerging need to return to the sources (scriptures, documents, travelogues) and, especially, in the rising importance of oriental studies in Europe. However, contrary to our contemporary view of orientalists and oriental studies in the Saidian light, Almond traces and finds examples where orientalists actually promoted the search for better understanding of this phenomenon. Decades after Said’s ground-breaking study Orientalism, literary critics, historians and thinkers have generally tended to observe the role of classical orientalists (to a large degree rightly) as submissive to the urge of creating the Orient. Almond does not deny this fact, but also finds examples which seem to contradict this standard view (as in the case of Heinrich von Diez, who had some influence on Goethe). Every thinker whose relation to Islam has been evaluated in this book had his particular subject of preoccupation and reason for treating Islam in some way. Kant’s obsession with the preservation of boundaries, Herder’s diverse references, Goethe’s creation of the Ori- ent and contempt for Turks, Schlegel’s appreciation of Islam for its aesthetics, Hegel’s multiplicity of identities in relation to Islam, and Marx’s “Orientalist defence of the Oriental” all testify to the tendency towards selectivity and a certain penchant on the part of these authors for creating the entity that would suit their own textual needs. In this context, Almond brilliantly highlights how dealing with the “closer Other”, such as Catholicism, Protestantism or modernism (depending reviews 729 on the author), often brought Islam to the scene as a friend or a foe. In this book, Almond continues the critical approach he used in the book The New Orientalists: Postmodern Representations of Islam from Baudrillard to Foucault (I. B. Tauris, 2007), also reviewed in this volume. In this way, History of Islam in German Thought traces the roots and history of certain ideas that have found their way in the works of more modern thinkers as well.

Dženita Karić Oriental Institute in Sarajevo

Islam in Victorian Britain: The Life and Times of Abdullah Quilliam. By Ron Geaves. Pbk. Markfield: Kube, 2010. Pp. viii + 344. ISBN 978-1-84774-010-6. £14.99.

This first biography of an important figure in the history of Islam in Britain tells a story which deserves to be far more widely-known, particularly in the light of the role currently being played in Britain by a foundation which bears his name (cf. p. 306), and does so very effectively. (It is very important to distinguish between the London-based Quilliam Foundation, which with its motto ‘Challenging Extremism, Promoting Pluralism, Inspiring Change’, is primarily concerned with different aspects of counter-terrorism, and the Liverpool-based Quil- liam Society, which is seeking to restore the property set up by Quil- liam as the first mosque in Liverpool, at 8 Brougham Terrace in the West Derby area of the city.) William Quilliam, born in Liverpool in 1856 to a Wesleyan Meth- odist family with strong connections to the Isle of Man, trained as a solicitor, qualifying in 1878. In 1888, however, he formally converted to Islam, following a visit to Morocco in the previous year, and changed his name to Abdullah (Servant of God). The author outlines very effectively the various factors which contributed to this decision, including the theological (unease with the Christian doctrine of the atonement, the difficulties which the Christian churches seemed to be encountering with the discoveries of science, the problems of biblical criticism, and, in particular, issues with Trinitarianism, which led to a flirtation with Unitarianism (through the influence of Pastor Charles Beard) before converting to Islam); the political (Quilliam’s work as a liberal politician campaigning against capital punishment, and slavery in the 730 reviews

USA, and his later work campaigning on issues relating to British colo- nialism, especially in the Islamic world, on which his views were often close to a figure such as Wilfred Scawen Blunt); the legal (as seen in Quilliam’s role as the defender, in 1895, of Burton and Cunningham, two supporters of the Irish cause who were tried for setting off bombs in England and Scotland, indicating his work as a kind of campaigning lawyer); the social (especially his concern about the lack of Christian unity in his city, which would today be called sectarianism, and for the high rate of violent crime); the moral (evidenced by his involvement in the Temperance Movement as a young man—‘Nonconformist crusading zeal against alcohol’ (p. 27)—and campaigns against prosti- tution); and the personal (where the author chronicles sensitively but probingly Quilliam’s own sexual and family life, with his first child born three months after his first wedding (1879), his apparently running a second household with a former chorus girl, Mary Lyons, to whom he was married by Islamic law, with whom he had five children, and whom he married according to English law after the death of his first wife in 1909, and then his also at a later stage living with and possibly marrying Edith Miriam Spray, the widow of his close friend and fellow convert to Islam Henri de Leon. Geaves makes it quite clear that Quilliam broke no British law by these arrangements, and that his first wife must surely have agreed to the arrangement with Mary Lyons, but he also includes a telling comment from his grandson, who described Quilliam’s views of women as ‘a mixture of Muhammedanism and Victorianism’ (p. 52)). Quilliam clearly ‘pushed the limits of both the moral codes of Victorian society and the licence of Islam to permit more than one wife’ (p. 57). As the story unfolds after Quilliam’s conversion to Islam it is a very Liverpool story, will illustrated by some of the cartoons of Quilliam in The Porcupine, a Liverpool satirical magazine (pp. 137 and 233). Liver- pool was at that time the second city of the British Empire, with strong links with America, Ireland and North Wales, and these links had a considerable impact on the city in terms of both its intra-Christian diversity and the arrival of Muslims from different parts of the empire. Quilliam’s role in the life of the city is compared by the author to that of Charles Dickens in London, combining the roles of public speaker and philanthropist (p. 36). One significant difference between the two, however, is that Quilliam was responsible for the conversion of possibly as many as 500 British men and women to Islam (p. 6). reviews 731

Things all seem to have gone wrong for Quilliam around 1908, however, with a slightly mysterious summons coming to him and his son to head to Istanbul being followed by his being struck off the Rolls (i.e. disqualified from practising as a lawyer) in 1909, and being badly let down by his son Billal with reference to the sale of the property which had been used as a mosque in Liverpool. His last years are therefore rather opaque, to say the least. The story of his life is well told by the author, though more might have been made of the wisdom or otherwise of Quilliam’s close association with the Ottoman Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II, whose overthrow by the Young Turks in 1908 must surely have been a major factor in Quilliam’s uncertain position in the last years of his life. Too close an association by British Muslims with any foreign government has its hazards. And not all readers will be persuaded by the author’s suggestion that Quilliam can be seen as ‘the first multiculturalist’, as argued in Chapter 5. His ‘Hymns Suitable for English-speaking Muslim congregations’ (p. 84), and his establishment of the Osmanli Regiment, a kind of Muslim equivalent of the Boys’ Brigade (p. 89), perhaps suggest that Quilliam was rather too tied to some of the norms of British culture for that description to be fully valid, but it is of course easy to be wise with hindsight. The revived interest in Quilliam, however, in both Liverpool and the wider UK, is both timely and deserved, and this biography is a valuable resource which will do much to make the enigmatic figure of Wil- liam/Abdullah Quilliam both better-known and better-understood.

Hugh Goddard University of Edinburgh

Muslims in Britain, An Introduction. By Sophie Gilliat-Ray. Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. 316. Pbk. ISBN 978052153688. £19.99.

Muslims in Britain: Race, Place and Identities. Ed. Peter Hopkins and Richard Gale. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. Pp. 236. Pbk. ISBN 978 07486 2588 8. £19.99.

These two volumes indicate both the strengths and weaknesses of much academic study of Muslims in Britain. First, a growing awareness 732 reviews that such study has to be interdisciplinary. Hopkins and Gale have sought to highlight the contribution of geographers but the volume also includes socials scientists and religious studies specialists. Another welcome feature is that a new generation of young British Muslim academics are beginning to make their distinctive contributions—such as Gilliat-Ray or Jonathan Birt. Both volumes wisely eschew any focus on Muslim extremism. Gil- liat-Ray focuses on ordinary lived experience and marries insights from religious studies and the social sciences. There is a plethora of young Muslim social scientists in Britain but very few have the level of religious literacy which Gilliat-Ray exhibits. Her impressive work of synthesis is informed by her primary research on Muslim chaplaincy in Britain. In Part I, four chapters provide insight into the historical and religious roots of the Muslim communities in Britain. These include an historical sketch of intermittent interactions between Brit- ain and the world of Islam reaching back to Bede, as well as focused analyses of Middle Eastern and South Asian reform movements which Muslim migrants brought with them into Britain. She also shows the variable extent to which different and conflicting expressions of Islam have been acculturated in a new environment. The most original parts of the book are in Part II where alongside a chapter profiling the socio-economic, demographic and geographical spread and diversity of Muslim communities, there is much original and insightful material organised around the topics of ‘religious nurture and education’; ‘religious leadership’; ‘mosques’; ‘gender, religious identity and youth’ and ‘engagement and enterprise’. Gilliat-Ray’s focus on religious dimensions of Muslim experience complements the topics covered in the Hopkins and Gale volume structured around three sections bookended by an introduction and afterword by the two editors. The first section—‘gender, place and culture’—includes three essays devoted to local studies of British Muslim women most of whom are of Pakistani ethnicity; one focuses on how they conceptualise ‘home’; a second looks at the barriers, internal and external, to their inclusion in the job market; the third reflects on their educational experiences and aspirations. A fourth, as a counterpoint, offers a localised reflection on identity formation and masculinities of young British adolescents of Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds. The second section—‘landscapes, communities and networks’— includes two essays which foreground non-South Asian Muslims. One explores how the more well-to-do British Arab communities reflect on reviews 733 religion and politics; the other explores how another successful Muslim minority, the Ismailis, made the transition from East Africa to Brit- ain. This section also has a perceptive article which traces the growing sophistication in relations between Muslims and the local state in Bir- mingham as the former sought planning permission for three purpose- built mosques. The final chapter offers a nuanced exploration of how British Pakistanis experience the pilgrimage to Makah and Medina. The final section—‘religion, race and difference’—includes three disparate chapters: one an overview of strengths and weaknesses of the recent focus on ‘Muslim geographies’; a second on ‘Muslims and the politics of difference’; and a final chapter on ‘Islamophobia in the construction of British Muslim identity politics’. Both volumes are tracking the ‘normalisation’ of new generations of British Muslims as they engage with an ever widening range of Brit- ish institutional and social life. Both indicate a refusal of many young Muslims to play the victim. While aware that it is not easy to be a Muslim post-9/11 and post-7/7, Gilliat-Ray is concerned to flag up the creativity and agency of young Muslims, male and female, as they embed themselves in politics, the arts, sport and business. This is complemented by Birt’s contribution in the Hopkins and Gale volume. His chapter might have been better titled, ‘Beyond Islamophobia’, since he shows how young British Muslims, especially women, have been busy developing political alliances with non- Muslims. He instances their involvement in the Stop the War Coali- tion (STWC) and rightly insists that ‘the idea of creative agency’ needs to be factored into identity formation. Both volumes also emphasise the heterogeneity—ethnically and Islamically—of Muslim communities in Britain. Both works more than justify their inclusion on graduate and undergraduate reading lists. Gilliat-Ray’s exhaustive and up-to-date bibliography and excellent appendix, ‘source notes for researchers’, will prove especially helpful for those new to the study of Muslims in Britain. However, in both works there are weaknesses and the occasional surprising omission. Neither study includes material on Christian- Muslim relations. This is an odd omission, since the churches were one of the few institutions which have consistently used their institutional influence to enable Muslim voices to be heard by policy makers, locally and nationally. Moreover, one indicator of constructive, local inter-community relations is the extent to which mosque and church, often spatially situated in close proximity, actually relate. 734 reviews

Neither study locates Muslim minorities within a wider context of how other religious minorities, past and present, have fared in the UK. One essayist in the Hopkins and Gale volume points to the skewed nature of much British ‘religious’ geographical research which focuses almost exclusively on Islam and Muslims. In Britain, Mus- lims of Pakistani ancestry are occasionally spoken of as the ‘new Irish’, yet possible suggestive commonalities across communities remains under-explored. Finally, unlike the USA and France, there are very few social scientists or religious studies specialists who have the languages and background knowledge to make sense of the world of ‘normative Islam’—however differentiated and contested that world is. This is clear in Gilliat-Ray’s occasional forays into making sense of empirical realities which she considers depart from such norms. Thus, in the section on gender, she talks about a number of women’s rights which she considers integral to normative Islam: including ‘her right to participate in public life’ (p. 207) and the fact that Islam ‘accords equal status to men and women’ (p. 227). The whole complex of issues around what counts as normative Islam as it impacts the area of gender, human rights and public life requires a much more nuanced treatment. There is no hint in either volume that there might be ‘a crisis of epistemology in Islamic sciences . . . the result of a self-cultivated dislocation between theology, ethics and law in the Islamic tradition’ to which Abdulaziz Sachedina draws attention in his theologically incisive Islam & The Challenge of Human Rights (Oxford, 2009, p. 88).

Philip Lewis Bradford University

Muslims in Europe: A Report on 11 EU Cities. Open Society Insti- tute. New York, London, Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2010. Pp. 346. Pbk. ISBN: 978-1-936133-01-7. Available from http://www .soros.org/initiatives/home/.

The present volume is an overview and synthesis of the results of a major survey which has been taking place since 2006. On the basis of a literature survey concluded that year, the project organisers selected eleven cities in the European Union for in-depth study. The results for the various cities are being published in separate volumes progressively through 2010 and 2011 in connection with seminars being held in reviews 735 each of the cities. At the time of writing (March 2011) the following reports have been published:

Amsterdam—ISBN 978-1-936133-03-1 Berlin—ISBN 978-1-936133-07-9 Hamburg—ISBN 978-1-936133-11-6 Rotterdam—ISBN 978-1-936133-19-2 Leicester—ISBN 978-1-936133-13-0 Copenhagen—ISBN 978-1-936133-09-3

During 2011 the remaining reports are expected to be published, dealing with Antwerp, London, Marseille, Paris and Stockholm. The basis for each report is a combination of quantitative and qualitative material, including a total of 66 focus groups, interviews with leaders and opinion makers, and reviews of academic publications and government policy documents. The quantitative material consists of the data collected from a total of 2200 survey questionnaires. This is made up of questionnaires from 200 interviewees in each of the eleven cities, evenly distributed between self-identified Muslims and non-Muslims. The focus in each of the cities has been on narrowly defined districts, all identified as districts with high proportions of Muslims resident. The project team is explicit about the limitations of the research. They have deliberately avoided entering the contested field of trying to define ‘Muslim’, leaving it to interviewees to self-define and accepting that this will implicitly reflect local and national variations due to the different contexts. The distinction between religious and ethnic/racial characteristics can often not be clearly made, especially when reporting experiences of discrimination or harassment. Finally, it is accepted that the sampling method means that the quantitative data can only be indicative. In recent years a number of opinion polls have appeared seeking to uncover what European Mus- lims think about various matters. An analysis of the data in this project exposes the nature of the often too generalised conclusions drawn from such surveys. Merely on the basis of the sample size, if one were to present the views of Muslims in, say, Hamburg and then state that the sample size was only one hundred, the normal polling analyst would say that the sample is not large enough to give a reliable result. But a poll conducted among 1100 Muslims Europe-wide might carry more credibility, even though it is made up of eleven such batches of one hundred. 736 reviews

The merged data also hide some substantial differences. Let me take as an example the responses to the question of whether interviewees identify ‘fairly strongly’ or ‘very strongly’ with the country and the city respectively. The overall figures suggest that 61.3% of Muslims feel they belong to the country while three quarters feel the same about their city. But this hides a range from only two-fifths of Berlin Muslims identifying with the country to four fifths of Amsterdam Muslims doing so. A comparison with non-Muslims shows a similar range with a figure of only 37% in Hamburg and as high as 88% in Amsterdam. It is often suggested that Muslims feel a stronger affiliation to their city or town of residence than they do to their country. These surveys suggest that this is indeed so—but that it is also the case with the non-Muslim majority, so Muslims are not, after all, that different from anyone else. One can engage a long list of similar comparative analysis across the various topics that the surveys cover: national and local policy, education, employment, neighbourhoods and housing, health, policing and media. Again, there are significant variations among the eleven localities in the survey. But at the inevitable risk of pushing generalisation too far, the impression which emerges is of communities which are disadvantaged materially—racist harassment and employment deficit due to what used to be called a working class origin—and politically, at least in those countries where there has been a low take-up on citizenship and therefore low political participation. But in many other ways the Muslims and the localities surveyed indicate high levels of integration and shared values and expectations. Where the major dissonances seem to appear is between the local and the national: local media are regarded as fairer and more discerning and objective than national media, and the political discourse at local level is seen as more ‘real’ than national political debates. Segregation in housing and schooling as well as social isolation are only to a very limited degree the result of Muslim attitudes and expectations. The great majority of Muslims approached want interaction and mixing, not the parallel communities so feared by the political right. Their continued segregation on the ground appears to be the result more of majority than of minority rejection of the other. But it is also clear that the older generation, the immigrants who are now in ever larger numbers the grandparents, are isolated and often the ultimate losers in this whole process of immigration and settlement.

Jørgen S. Nielsen University of Copenhagen reviews 737

Anti-Muslim Prejudice: Past and Present. Ed. Maleiha Malik. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010. Pp. viii + 222. Hbk. ISBN 978-0-415- 54987-5. £85.00.

It is not clear whether this volume is the product of a seminar or conference, or rather a specially compiled collection of papers, but either way it represents a significant contribution to the study of anti- Muslim prejudice, which overlaps with but is nevertheless significantly different from Islamophobia. It does so through ten chapters, some more historical and some more contemporary, and some more social scientific and some more humanities-oriented, focusing on a number of geographical contexts. Two chapters are jointly-authored. There are also five very telling illustrations from recent European political campaigns, from Denmark (p. 114), Switzerland and Germany (p. 117), Austria (p. 119), and the United Kingdom (p. 161), and Chapter 9 contains 14 graphs. The first chapter, by Nabil Matar, surveys British attitudes towards Muslims, from roughly 1500 to 1750 CE, a period in which many of those who had had no personal encounter with Muslims preserved some of the older medieval negative portrayals of Islam, while some of those who did have some first-hand experience of encounter, primarily diplomats and merchants, formulated a sometimes rather more positive image. There is an interesting reminder that late eighteenth century astrologers in Britain confidently predicted the destruction of Islam and the conversion of all Muslims to Christianity in the year 1701 (p. 19). The second chapter moves to South-Eastern Europe to investigate anti-Muslim prejudice among the Slavs and some of its consequences, both in the latter years of the Ottoman Empire and in the past two decades. The transition from anti-Turkish to anti-Muslim prejudice is tellingly chronicled by Slobodan Drakulic. Chapters 3 and 4 are more theoretical, Gil Andijar outlining the whole concept of the metaphorical wall as it has developed in Western European history with reference to Jews and others as well as Muslims; and Sonya Fer- nandez then discussing ‘the crusade over the bodies of women’, suggesting that a false dichotomy has been established between a West that is aspiring to gender equality and an Islam which persists in practising traditions of patriarchy and gender inequality. Western attitudes towards such questions as the hijab, ‘honour killings’, and forced marriages are, she suggests, a kind of continuation of the Crusades by other means, which needs to be challenged by means of the subjection of all religions, societies and cultures to an equal critique. 738 reviews

The remaining six chapters move to some more detailed contemporary case studies. Chapter 5, by Leora Bilsky, is a fascinating comparative case study of French attitudes towards the hijab, as seen in legislation to ban its being worn in public places, and an incident from Israel when a Palestinian Israeli, Professor Nizar Hassan, asked a student of his who came to a class wearing his Israeli army uniform, not to do so. Dress has different levels of meaning and significance everywhere. In Chapter 6 Hans-Georg Betz and Susi Meret investigate right-wing mobilisation against Islam in different continental European contexts, under the title ‘Revisiting Lepanto’, and including some of the interesting examples of campaign posters referred to above. Chapter 7, by Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, includes the British context as well as the wider European one in discussing the relationship between racism and anti-Muslim prejudice, suggesting that a significant part of the problem is a general western suspicion of religion per se, what Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury calls the tendency whereby secularism becomes the intellectual default position for many people in the West. The British newspapers in particular are then subjected to a rigorous examination by John E Richardson in Chapter 8, under the title ‘ “Get shot of the lot of them”: election reporting of Muslims in British newspapers’. The results are not encouraging, particularly as seen in some of the comments in the Forum section of The Daily Star following a front-page article in April 2005 entitled ‘Muslim loonies hijack election’. Chapter 9 is then another comparative study, by Erik Bleich, this time of where Muslims stand in the ethno-racial hierarchies of Britain and France, as seen in public opinion surveys between 1988 and 2008. The suggestion is that asethnic groups, Muslims are not faring too badly, but that as a religious group, ‘Muslims have become the primary religious outsiders by a wide margin in both countries’ (p. 181). Black people and asylum-seekers in particular appear lower in the ethnic hierarchy than Muslims in some British reports, but the author’s conclusion is that if Muslims are slipping fast this is a serious cause for concern, leading to the suggestion that the term ‘Islamopho- bia’ should indeed be deployed in both countries. The Rushdie affair in Britain, and head scarf debate in France, both of which began in 1989, have clearly have had a legacy. Chapter 10 then moves to the United States and a consideration by Erik Love of how to confront what he definitely calls Islamophobia in the American context. The relationship between traditional racism and anti-Muslim prejudice is discussed, with a particular focus on the reviews 739 racial categories widely used in the United States, whereby Middle Eastern Muslims are categorised as ‘white’, Afro-American Muslims as ‘black’, and South Asian Muslims as ‘Asian’. Given this diversity within Muslim communities in the United States, Islam is almost the only factor which is held in common. Attitudes towards Muslims in popular culture are examined, together with Islamophobia in government policy, and the final eight pages of the paper focus on various programmes to confront Islamophobia in the American context. Put together, the chapters certainly illustrate the extent of the difficulties which Muslims face in many Western contexts, on both sides of the Atlantic. One aspect of anti-Muslim prejudice which is not really discussed at all is the way in which the phenomenon has now spread to many non-Western contexts, particularly in Africa, as a result of its diffusion through the networks of some evangelical Christian organisations. No single volume can do everything, however, and the book certainly makes very clear the historical longevity of anti-Muslim prejudice, as well its different manifestations today. At certain points the reader might therefore feel rather overwhelmed by feelings of hopelessness, but if this is the case an antidote is provided by the final pages of the book, which might helpfully serve as a call to (metaphorical) arms.

Hugh Goddard University of Edinburgh

Shari‘a as Discourse: Legal Traditions and the Encounter with Europe. Ed. Jørgen S. Nielsen and Lisbet Christoffersen. Farnham/ Burlington: Ashgate, 2010. Pp. ix+267. Hbk. ISBN 9780754679554. £65.00.

Shari‘a as Discourse: Legal Traditions and the Encounter with Europe provides the reader with an excellent introduction to, and overview of, the debate about Islamic jurisprudence and Western legal philosophy and traditions. Even though it would be wrong to argue that current European legal systems are opening themselves up to ideas rooted in Islamic and Muslim cultures—an opinion often voiced by anti-Muslim forces arguing that the shari‘a is a threat and that Islamic law will soon govern Europe if we don’t abandon our allegedly destructive multicultural experiment—it is evident that national 740 reviews legislations have lately become more influenced by and entwined with regional and global processes. For example, the European Union and international human rights discourses have all exposed and questioned laws rooted in national history and forced them, willingly or unwillingly, to adjust to external guidelines set up by the European Union and other regional or global actors (i.e. the United Nations). Although this change has occurred, it is also important to stress that most European legal systems have always put great stress on individual rights and freedoms. With the growth in migration, this guiding principle has, among other things, made it possible for the individual to choose to follow legal systems influenced by Islamic traditions. For example, when it comes to issues such as marriage and inheritance, it is today possible to apply certain interpretations that have been influenced by Islamic juridical traditions. However, contrary to the popular discourse on shari‘a in the West, it is wrong to see shari‘a as a unified and coherent legal system. Consequently, all fifteen contributors in this edited volume struggle with how to define the complex traditions and legal systems that go under the name of shari‘a. Hence, like the European legal traditions, Islamic jurisprudence is complex, flexible and rooted in local and national histories. It is therefore evident that different understandings ofshari‘a give and have always given rise to contradictory opinions among Muslim scholars. Furthermore, as the researchers in this book clearly demonstrate, Islamic scholars are still working out how to understand and apply the law in order to make it fit the prevailing context. Sometimes this process gives rise to conflict and tensions, but it is also possible to find examples when there are few if any tensions between so-called Western and Islamic norms. Following Nielsen’s introduction, the book is divided into three parts. The first part, “An encounter of legal theories”, contains six chapters that deal with the encounter between Islamic jurisprudence, Western and Nordic legal history and traditions, and Muslim positions when it comes to the shari‘a, gender theories and Islamic law. The second part, “Local experiences”, contains six chapters. This part of the book gives the reader insights into European court cases that relate to Islamic jurisprudence, the development of Islamic minority jurisprudence ( fiqh), legal debates in the UK, constitutional debates in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and the construction of Islamic legal practices in satellite television shows. “Shari‘a and discourse”, the final part of the book, contains one comparative text on the rule and function of reviews 741 interpretations in Christian theology and Islam, and a second text on Islamic law, civil rights debates and penal law in Spain. This is a very strong academic publication, which in my view has the potential to become a reference book for the study of shari‘a in West- ern contexts. Especially part two of the book is of great importance for students of Islam in Europe, but also for students and practitioners (i.e. lawyers and court staff ) in that it provides concrete examples of how Islamic thinking encounters Western legal traditions. Like all edited volumes, this book contains some chapters that are better than others and some that are hard to fit into the framework of the volume. For example, even though Saudi Arabia and Egypt could have an influence on contemporary debates about shari‘a in Europe, the authors of these two chapters have not made any clear references to the topic of the book, i.e. the encounter between Europe and Islamic traditions. This criticism is not directed to the content of the chapters or its authors— on the contrary—but it is nonetheless clear that the two contributions do not fit well with the aim of the book. Even though it is a strength that the book brings in scholars from different academic disciplines, it is also clear that scholars of religious studies and law have different traditions and different ways of writing texts. This is not a major problem, but sometimes I have to admit that it is hard for me as a scholar of history of religions to follow fully the legal arguments employed by legal scholars, and it is likely that similar problems might arise when legal scholars read texts produced by scholars of Islamic studies. How- ever, this is an unavoidable problem and a reminder of how important it is to cooperate and develop projects that include many different academic traditions if we want to understand the discussion over Islamic jurisprudence in its entirety. All in all, it is evident that shari‘a in the West will continue to be a much discussed and hotly contested topic in popular and media discourses, a field of studies that it is essential for scholars of Islam and Muslims in Europe to develop. From this point of view, Shari‘a As Discourse: Legal Traditions and the Encounter with Europe by Jørgen S. Nielsen and Lisbet Christoffersen is a welcome contribution, as well as a call for more research in the future.

Göran Larsson University of Gothenburg 742 reviews

Nach dem Islamismus: Eine Ethnographie der Islamischen Gemein- schaft Milli Görüş. By Werner Schiffauer. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010. Pp 394. ISBN 978 3 518 12570 0. €15.00.

Barely any work on Islam in western European countries omits to mention the Turkish transnational movement Milli Görüş. As one of the biggest and most influential organisations, in terms of members, organisational structure and concerning the diversity of associated prayer rooms and Islamic institutions Milli Görüş is rightly getting a lot of attention. So far research approaches Islamic communities in Europe with a strong focus on organisational frames rather than on the internal perspective of individuals engaged in them. Ethnographic accounts with such an approach remain the exception in German scholarship on Islam in Europe (Gerdien Jonker, Eine Wellenlänge zu Gott, 2002; Werner Schiffauer,Die Gottesmänner, 2000; Bekim Agai, Zwischen Netzwerk und Diskurs. Das Bildungsnetzwerk um Fethullah Gülen, 2004). With his ethnographic account of the Islamic Community Milli Görüş, the German cultural anthropologist Werner Schiffauer provides his readers with an inside perspective on the emergence of post- Islamist thought in Europe. According to his main argument, the Milli Görüş movement in Western Europe comprises an array of mind-sets; one of them being the post-Islamist one which currently sets the tone among the movement’s leadership. In the European context, ‘What comes after Islamism’ appears to be strongly connected to the success of the guest workers’ sons and daughters who enjoyed the support of both their parents and their communities to thrive in the German, Bel- gian, Dutch or Austrian educational system and in return contribute the acquired knowledge about the society they live in to their communities. Milli Görüş stands out among Islamic organisations in the way it provided youth work, opportunities for a career in the movement, and attached promising members to the movement. In various ways the migration context fostered the involvement of the next generation and provided a fertile ground for post-Islamist thinking. The carriers of this trend are shaped by their pious families and western Euro- pean education, both part and product of the two worlds that classical Islamism so vigorously presents as enemies. They became experts in translating and defending religious concepts vis-à-vis the non-Muslim environment and concepts like democracy and religious freedom in their communities. reviews 743

Werner Schiffauer holds a chair for Cultural and Social Anthropol- ogy at the European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder). A look on his ethnographic work provides a striking continuity. His first monograph presents life in an Anatolian village (“Die Bauern von Subay” in 1987). In his second book he follows some of the villagers on their labour migration to Germany, (“Die Migranten aus Subay” in 1991), and subsequently into the religious-ideological encapsulation of the Kaplan movement, a splinter of the Milli Görüş, (“Die Gottesmänner” in 2000). In his recent publication the reader meets the German-born offspring of Turkish guest workers in an account of their engagement with, as Schiffauer presents it, gaps and inconsistencies in the movement’s radical rhetoric and its realistic pragmatism. Drawn from a decade of field work on the Milli Görüş in Germany and other West- ern European countries, the analysis of this rather recent development is presented in the historical context of its emergence. In eight chapters Schiffauer addresses three main issues. After introducing his readers into the history of Milli Görüş among labour migrants in West Europe from the 1970’s until 2009, thereby ground- ing his portrayal of the emerging post-Islamist intellectuals in a reflection of the organisation’s as well as the now-leading generation’s past, he narrates a skilful collective biography of the carriers of post-Islamist attitudes. Furthermore, throughout the publication he presents internal narratives of those coming from a Turkish Islamist spectrum in Europe who approach Islamism through criticizing it for being determined by its fixation on the other instead of drawing on religious meaning. Schiffauer is far from painting a rosy picture. Post-Islamists hold a volatile position within the movement contested by purist Isla- mists, nationalist and chauvinist attitudes. In his definition of the emerging trend Schiffauer draws on Asef Bayat’s concept of Post-Islamism and applies it to the minority situation. Not being the opposite of Islamism, it appears to be the answer to the criticism and the failure of a number of Islamist projects around the world. In the context of migration, Post-Islamism “stands for the effort to connect religion with the rights of the individual, with plurality and multivoicedness, with openness instead of closedness and with the future instead of the past.” One of the strengths of this account is the way it presents developments of Milli Görüş in Western Europe in comparison to developments in Turkey thus disclosing correlations but also the slow separation embodied in the differences between running mosques in a 744 reviews minority context and the constraints of a political party in a Muslim majority situation. Portraits of Islamist movements including the Turkish Milli Görüş are not rare. In a time when security is the dominant lens through which political Islam is viewed, a critical approach is often presented as the only appropriate one. Schiffauer chooses not to inform the reader about the suspicions and accusations of security services and investigative journalists. However, in his account they are present in the manifold ways in which they affect the development of the movement. Lengthy sequences from interviews, public speeches and publications present the narratives of the protagonists. Through those lenses the reader learns about the suspicions Milli Görus and its members are confronted with, especially in Germany, and how they react to the allegations. The author found intellectual partners in his informants who took his academic work seriously, held him accountable for the texts he published during the field research and insisted on discussing his findings. Schiffauer stresses their openness to discuss their situation on an abstract level, calling it an active engagement with social sciences. This brings up old questions of ethnographical methods. The politicised field of studying Islam is revealing the academic dilemma that any research can be instrumentalised, which the author tackles with utmost transparency. One of the most significant implications of Schiffauer’s analysis for policy makers is that Milli Görüş unites several competing trends. While Post-Islamists, who lead debates in favour of democratic integration, pluralism, rejecting terrorism and anti-Semitism, are currently guarding the leading positions, the power constellations might well shift. The environment’s reactions to the current leadership’s engagement will, as Schiffauer argues, affect its future position in the movement. He does not give any policy advice, his approach however is a plea to take the movement’s spokespersons at their word and consider competing trends within Islamist movements. With this publication Schiffauer once more provides his readers with a vivid description and succeeds in shedding light on particularly complex developments that span several national borders. Unfor- tunately chances are that inconsistencies in the given translations of Turkish parties will increase the confusion among those who aren’t familiar with the troubling political landscape of Turkey. Hopefully a careful translation into English will make Schiffauer’s account accessible for a broader public in Europe and beyond, as its reviews 745 relevance, like that of Milli Görüş and Post-Islamism, goes beyond the German national interest.

R. Spielhaus Copenhagen University

The New Orientalists: Postmodern Representations of Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard. By Ian Almond. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007. Pp. 256. Pbk. ISBN: 978-1-84511-398-8. £17.99

Proponents of literary theories which are partially a product of the new political and social atmosphere of the last half of the 20th century have tried to set up a new relationship to modernism and modernity. That relationship included deconstruction of the hermetic systems of thought and turning to the “marginal” and “alternative”, and also the subversion of logocentrism(s). The effects of these theories in the modern world are very often positive in the general social context. How- ever, it is often overlooked that an attempt to deconstruct a certain system can itself become a system which will try to impose its own rules and to apply them in different and often unsuitable contexts. The example of “writing-in” the supposed values into the fluid experience of “the Other” is a key theme of Ian Almond in his book with an intriguing title. The book is divided into three parts: Islam and the critique of modernity, containing three chapters: Nietzsche’s peace with Islam, Foucault’s Iran and the madness of Islam, and Derrida’s Islam and the peoples of the book. The second part carries the title Islam and postmodern fiction, with chapters titled Borges and the finitude of Islam, The many Islams of Salman Rushdie, and Islam and melan- choly in Orhan Pamuk’s The Black Book. And the third part is titled Islam, ‘theory’ and Europe, divided into chapters entitled Kristeva and Islam’s time, Islam and Baudrillard’s last hope against the New World order, and Iraq and Hegelian legacy of Žižek’s Islam. Ian Almond primarily questions the compatibility of the postmodern terminology and the demanding vocabulary of Islam, and, in this context, he observes the reactions of some Muslim intellectuals to this pending problem. He points out how a key idea in this book was a way of treating Islam in the critique of modernity—the critique of modernity has historicized modernity itself, and, in that process, post- modernity inherited many orientalist stereotypes. 746 reviews

Almond very skilfully presents the genealogy of this (also heterogeneous) thought, and, in a way which is similar to his work Islam in German Thought: From Leibniz to Nietzsche (also reviewed in this volume), emphasises how Islam was used as a tool for criticising the “closer Other”, always depending on the need of a certain author and his own interest in promoting a particular idea. For example, Islam in Nietzsche’s thought is treated as a pool of signs used for destroying the epistemological frame of the West, which had its implications in the works of Foucault and Derrida. The idea which is constantly lurking in the shadow is that Islam becomes a source for giving identity, but it cannot obtain nor have one itself ! The same problem is observed in the second part of the book, however, with certain modifications. The author introduces two novelists, Salman Rushdie and Orhan Pamuk, each of whom originally came from Muslim societies, and studies their shaping of the idea of Islam. And, just as in the case of Borges, Almond finds out how this shaping is adjusted to the needs of a particular author. The third part of the book brings to light a great disparity between the critics of the alterity and their essentialising (or standardising) critique when it comes to the question of Islam. In this sense, either multiple stereotypes come to the front (as in the case of Julia Kristeva), or Islam is being used for the promotion of a certain ideological stream (as in the case of Žižek). Baudrillard and Žižek adopt interestingly opposed analyses: Baudril- lard notices the emergence of Islam as a sign of the coming global change, but without a wish to “use” that phenomenon, and Žižek, on the other hand, notices the same but tries to make a connection between socialism and Islam. Considering all the mentioned observations, this is an exquisite work for scholars studying the history and culture of the Middle East, but also the Balkans and other parts of the Muslim world. This is extremely refreshing and important work for Muslim scholars especially, since they are the ones who should be aware of the double-sided nature of postmodernism, which, on the one hand, helps in deconstructing the canons but can also turn against the recently neglected, alternative or marginal religions, cultures, streams and phenomena. The final conclusion would be that orientalism, in the negative sense of the word, has not disappeared, but continues to live in new and vital forms.

Dženita Karić Oriental Institute in Sarajevo reviews 747

The New Imagined Community: Global Media and the Construction of National and Muslim Identities of Migrants. By Uriya Shavit. Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2009. Pp. vii + 209. Hbk. ISBN 978-1-84519-328-7, $74.95 or £49.95.

This book by an Israeli scholar based at Tel Aviv University is based on interviews with a number of primarily Arab Muslims based in mosques in Frankfurt, but with reflections on the situation in other European cities both within and beyond Germany. Particular gratitude is expressed to the many German Muslims who agreed to speak to the author about sensitive issues at a very sensitive time, fully aware of his Israeli nationality, and for the lessons which their willingness to do this provided in terms of trust and tolerance (p. vii). The main thesis of the book is that while the processes of globalisation on the one hand result in what could be described as standardi- sation and homogenisation, the technological vehicles of the process, particularly its communication technologies, can also result in the creation of what might be called ‘enclave cultures’, whereby human beings physically situated in one geographical part of the world are ‘virtually’, in the sense of linguistically, culturally and intellectually, in another part of the world, their ancestral homeland. In the case of the United Kingdom this is well illustrated by the debates among Muslims of South Asian origin about where they would prefer deceased relatives to be buried—in the UK or in Pakistan—and the author illustrates effectively how the same issue works out for Muslims of Arab origin in Germany. What he calls ‘territorial affiliations’, in other words traditional national allegiances, far from being challenged or weakened by migration, are actually being reinforced and perpetuated by media instruments such as the internet and satellite TV. Alongside this process, migrants in Muslim-minority situations also find themselves as players in the construction of a truly global, or transnational, umma (community). The argument is developed in two parts, with the titles of both parts, interestingly, beginning with the phrase ‘Imagination from afar’, the first concentrating on theories of the nation state, and the second then focusing on the umma, somewhat misleadingly described as ‘the Mus- lim nation’ (though it is of course difficult to find any effective single word translation of a term with so rich and complex a meaning as umma). Both parts make good use, particularly in Chapters 4 and 8, of the author’s series of interviews with a wide variety of migrants from 748 reviews many different pats of the world, including some Turks, for Part I, and then with a number of Arab Muslims for Part II, in Frankfurt and the surrounding state of Hesse, conducted between December 2006 and November 2007. Frankfurt is described as ‘a migration scholar’s paradise’ on p. 61, because of its claim to be world’s smallest metropolis, and good use is made by the author in his interviews of this helpful combination of wide diversity and manageable size. It is some of the individual biographies discussed in the book which provide some of the most interesting material. Chapter 4 contains the story of Robin, originally from Northern Ireland, who while a student in Edinburgh met and married Helena, from northern Germany. They spent some time in London and then moved together to Frankfurt, where he spends his time increasingly focused on North- ern Ireland, through daily internet visits. There is an interesting discussion of why his focus on his ancestral homeland is increasing rather than decreasing (pp. 90–91). ‘Sojourners can now create individual national bubbles in their living rooms and offices without any connection to other sojourners, to ethnic establishments or to relatives and friends at home.’ (p. 95). Part II focuses on Muslim thinking in particular, including a discussion of the ideas of Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Muhammad al-Ghazali and others about the role and purpose of Mus- lims in the West. Is it to affirm Muslim identity and actively spread message of Islam through the establishment of a kind of parallel society? Or is there a viable alternative view, of Muslims as active participants in Western societies, not necessarily assimilating but adapting suffi- ciently to no longer be perceived as alien, as outlined in the argument of Tariq Ramadan that Muslims in Europe should seek independence, intellectually, economically and politically, from religious scholars in Arab countries and Arab governments (p. 115)? The contributions to the debate of Amr Khaled (pp. 116–120 + pp. 131–135), IslamOnline (pp. 130–132), Islamway.com (pp. 135–138), ‘Sheikh Google’ (p. 164), and German-language Muslim websites such as that of Abu Hamza/ Pierre Vogel, a German-born boxer who converted to Islam (p. 168), are also discussed, and there is a valuable discussion about the role of other converts (those born into other faith communities) and reverts (those from culturally Muslim backgrounds discovering or rediscover- ing Islam later in life) on pp. 172–177. The summary of Part Two, on pp. 186–190, outlines the five generally-agreed duties of Muslims living in the West, according to Muslim reviews 749

Arab religious scholars, contrasted with the more recent alternative view of Muslims as constructive participants in the societies in which they now live. Will the vision of al-Qaradawi or the vision of Amr Khaled come to dominate? In seeking to answer the question the author points to the limitations of the vision of global umma, particularly that there is no single vision of what this means, so that the Mus- lim nation is virtual rather than even imagined (p. 188). The absence of entertainment, sport or gossip (p. 189) limits its appeal to media consumers, and language problems, the fact of the second generation not knowing Arabic or English, are also important. The author’s conclusion is that marginalisation favours those encouraging the establishment of ‘the Muslim nation’. Where European states incorporate, cultivate, and supervise Islam radical elements will fail. Where Euro- pean nation-states close their eyes and hearts, however, the imagined Muslim nation will thrive (pp. 189–90). The book as a whole is thus a significant contribution to the debate about belonging and identity which is central to the agendas of several political parties in Western Europe today. ‘Can the (Western Euro- pean) body politic . . . survive . . . a plurality of identities?’ (p. 5). This is of course not only a dilemma for Western European (receiving) nations, as it is also a challenge for Middle Eastern (receiving) nations, whose citizens, even if no longer resident within their borders, expect to be able continue to continue to contribute to internal debates, with potentially extremely significant consequences, as ex-President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt has recently discovered to his cost. This is not a new process. The Protestant Reformation in England was, at certain stages, sustained by exiles who found themselves driven to take refuge in the Netherlands, while those aspiring to bring about either its Catholic equivalent or the re-assertion of traditional Catholi- cism were sustained by exiles in France. At a later stage, when their position became untenable in France groups such as the Jesuits found refuge among other places in England, and so the process of seeking to disseminate religious ideas has gone on. In the case of Mus- lim communities since 1945, the geographical distances involved are greater and now, with satellite TV and the internet, the speed with which the debates unfold is much greater, but this does not mean that the debates are new. One could push the debate very much further back historically too, by considering the debates between exiled and Jerusalem-based communities within Judaism in the biblical period. 750 reviews

The author makes very clear at the end of his introduction the importance of his own biography for the development of his interest in the subject, which was stimulated by his reading an interview with an Israeli football player who moved to Britain and lived there for a decade or so. While there as a player he never watched any match from the Israeli premier league, but all this changed once satellite television became available, as it then became possible to watch every match. This experience was mirrored by the author’s own experience when he moved as a ten-year old boy to a suburb of Bonn, when he clung to accounts of Israeli football as much as possible, as a ritual ‘that was essential in organizing my rhythm of life and in attaching my identity to the community I was born into’ (p. 8) ‘I longed for the Israeli football ritual not so much for love of the art of football . . . but because its well engraved structure and its familiarity gave me a sense of order, belonging and familiar pleasure’ (p. 8). The importance of family as well as academic connections in the research for the book is also acknowledged, for example to his brother, who works for Israel’s ‘Yes’ satellite TV company, for his help with the workings of satellite TV, and to his sister who provided advice on the use of the Internet as an educational tool. Consuming images from the homeland in a manner that obliterates the geographical gap between home and away, for example via Skype (which is discussed on pp. 55–58), is thus clearly demonstrated to be ‘a development of transformative potential (p. 9), and particularly through some of its comparative illustrations this book is a valuable contribution to the study of this process.

Hugh Goddard University of Edinburgh

Islam in the Eyes of the West: Images and Realities in an Age of Terror. Ed. Tareq Y. Ismael and Andrew Rippin. Abingdon: Rout- ledge, 2010. Pp. ix + 290. Hbk. ISBN 978-0-415-56414-4, £85.00.

This book, one of the outcomes of a conference at the University of Victoria in 2008, is a valuable Canadian contribution to the discussion of a significant contemporary issue. Of its fifteen contributors, including the two editors, seven are based in Canada, five in the United States (one with an additional association with Cairo), and one each in reviews 751

Denmark, Syria, and Japan. And of its thirteen chapters, six investigate different aspects of the relationship between the World of Islam and the West in terms of its origins, concepts and contemporary realities; three focus on media presentations, including in Japan (Chapter 7), with an interesting examination of the extent to which Islam is considered as ‘distant’ (i.e. Middle Eastern) or ‘local’ (i.e. Japan’s regional neighbours in Central or South-East Asia); and four look ahead, aspiring to be ‘enlightening, instructive and forward-thinking’ (p. 10). As the editors make clear in the preface, and as the title of the original conference on which the book is based (‘The Muslim World and the West: emerging avenues for convergence’), suggests, there is plenty of contemporary discussion which focuses on confrontation. What about the other side of the coin, however, in other words an emphasis on interaction and synergies? The fact that the title of the book is so different, however, particularly through the seemingly mandatory inclusion of a reference to ‘an age of terror’, illustrates the problem quite powerfully, as do references to ‘competing chauvinisms’ and ‘the infusion of theology into politics’ in Chapter 2, and the discussion of the influence of evangelical Christian Zionists (by Norton Mezvinsky) in Chapter 3. The description on the ‘War on Terror’ as ‘vigilante masculinity’ in Chapter 4 also gives an interesting gender dimension to the discussion, illustrated (fortunately not visually) by some fairly terrifying YouTube material. Chapter 1 lays a foundation for the discussion through surveying the thought of Edward Said and Michel Foucault, together with their critique by Aijaz Ahmad and Sadik al-Azm. Chapter 5 surveys current attitudes towards Islam in the United States, including some of the comments which were made about Barak Obama’s religious identity during the 2008 presidential election campaign, and Chapter 9 surveys some of the same ground but with a particular focus on the media and its treatment of the relationship between Islam and violence. Chapter 6, a discussion of ‘Jihadiology’, includes the puzzling statement that the thesis of David Cook’s book Understanding Jihad is ‘basically similar if not identical to that of Pipes et al.’ (p. 109). This is surely a considerable exaggeration. There is a more nuanced discussion in Chapter 8, which includes reference to some of the problems within academe in the USA where distinguished professors of Middle Eastern or Islamic Studies find themselves being disbarred from taking up appointments at universities such as Yale (p. 154). On the basis of all these problems, the reader who aspires to 752 reviews promote better mutual understanding between the World of Islam and the West may well find him or herself feeling thoroughly depressed by the end of Chapter 9. The final four chapters, however, may provide some solace, if not hope. In Chapter 10 Raymond W. Baker and Alexander Henry argue that in seeking to understand the Muslim World ‘we’ (though it is never quite defined who ‘we’ are)can do better. The authors plead for the importance of the traditional academic skills of translating and interpreting carefully. Chapter 11 provides a forensic analysis of Canadian and US security legislation, drawing out some of the lessons for both countries of any tendency towards McCarthyism. Chapter 12 subjects Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis to careful analysis, arguing that Huntington’s book suffers considerably through sometimes being discussed rather than read, with the result that it is widely but inaccurately reported as arguing that Islam is inherently hostile or bloody. Huntington is ‘not a Western chauvinist’ (p. 237). And then in Chapter 13 Raymond W. Baker (this time on his own, though acknowledging the help of his co-author in Chapter 10) helpfully discusses ‘Getting it wrong yet again: America and the Islamic mainstream’, including some telling reflections on his own time as a graduate student at Harvard and his initial encounter with the realities of the Islamic World: ‘my encounter with Cairo was a major shock. The Islamic world laid out so completely and so transparently in Cam- bridge . . . simply did not exist.’ (p. 251). The devastating consequences of this issue, in terms of the alienation of potential partners within the World of Islam, are made very clear. The more recent events in the Arab world in the spring of 2011, however, perhaps provide some hope that this situation is not irredeemable, at least until Pastor Terry Jones re-appeared in media headlines in April. Overall, then, the book contains a lot of very worthwhile material, and provides a valuable perspective which comes from North Amer- ica but not the United States, and the conference organisers and editors are to be commended for securing the wider distribution of its insights.

Hugh Goddard University of Edinburgh