The Caucasus Globalization

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Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 1 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES OF THE CAUCASUS

THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013

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Eldar Chairman of the Editorial Council (Baku) ISMAILOV Tel/fax: (994 – 12) 497 12 22 E-mail: [email protected] Kenan Executive Secretary (Baku) ALLAHVERDIEV Tel: (994 – 12) 596 11 73 E-mail: [email protected] Azer represents the journal in Russia (Moscow) SAFAROV Tel: (7 – 495) 937 77 27 E-mail: [email protected] Nodar represents the journal in Georgia (Tbilisi) KHADURI Tel: (995 – 32) 99 59 67 E-mail: [email protected] Ayca represents the journal in Turkey (Ankara) ERGUN Tel: (+90 – 312) 210 59 96 E-mail: [email protected]

Editorial Board

Nazim Editor-in-Chief (Azerbaijan) MUZAFFARLI Tel: (994 – 12) 510 32 52 E-mail: [email protected] (IMANOV) Vladimer Deputy Editor-in-Chief (Georgia) PAPAVA Tel: (995 – 32) 24 35 55 E-mail: [email protected] Akif Deputy Editor-in-Chief (Azerbaijan) ABDULLAEV Tel: (994 – 12) 596 11 73 E-mail: [email protected] Volume 7 IssueMembers 1-2 2013 of Editorial Board: 3 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Zaza D.Sc. (History), Professor, Corresponding member of the Georgian National Academy of ALEKSIDZE Sciences, head of the scientific department of the Korneli Kekelidze Institute of Manu- scripts (Georgia) Mustafa AYDIN Rector of Kadir Has University (Turkey) Irina BABICH D.Sc. (History), Leading research associate of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Douglas Professor, Chair of Political Science Department, Providence College (U.S.A.) W. BLUM Svante Professor, Research Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies E. CORNELL Program, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS (U.S.A.) Parvin D.Sc. (History), Professor, Baku State University (Azerbaijan) DARABADI Murad D.Sc. (Political Science), Editor-in-Chief, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal of ESENOV Social and Political Studies (Sweden) Jannatkhan Deputy Director, Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus (Azerbaijan) EYVAZOV Rauf Ph.D. (Psychology), Leading research associate of the Center for Strategic Studies under GARAGOZOV the President of the Azerbaijan Republic (Azerbaijan) Archil Ph.D. (Geography), Senior fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and GEGESHIDZE International Studies (Georgia) Elmir Director of the Department of Geoculture, Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus GULIEV (Azerbaijan) Shamsaddin D.Sc.(Economy), Professor, Rector of the Azerbaijan State Economic University HAJIEV (Azerbaijan) Jamil HASANLI D.Sc. (History), Professor at Khazar University (Azerbaijan) Stephen Professor, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Mount Holyoke College (U.S.A.) F. JONES Akira Ph.D., History of Central Asia & the Caucasus, Program Officer, The Sasakawa MATSUNAGA Peace Foundation (Japan) Roger Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of MCDERMOTT Kent at Canterbury (U.K.); Senior Research Fellow on Eurasian military affairs within the framework of the Eurasia Program of the Jamestown Foundation, Washington (U.S.A.) Roin D.Sc. (History), Professor, Academician of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences, METREVELI President of the National Committee of Georgian Historians (Georgia) Fuad Ph.D. (Economy), Counselor of the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the International MURSHUDLI Bank of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan) Michael Associate professor, Near Eastern Studies Department, Princeton University (U.S.A.) A. REYNOLDS Alexander Professor, President of Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies RONDELI (Georgia) Mehdi SANAIE Professor, Tehran University, Director, Center for Russian Studies (Iran) Avtandil D.Sc. (Economy), Professor, Tbilisi University of International Relations, Corresponding SILAGADZE member of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences (Georgia) S. Frederick Professor, Chairman, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS STARR (U.S.A.) James Professor, Director of the International and Regional Studies Program, Washington V. WERTSCH University in St. Louis (U.S.A.) Alla D.Sc. (History), Professor, head of the Mediterranean-Black Sea Center, Institute of YAZKOVA Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Stanislav D.Sc. (Economy), Senior Researcher, Institute of World Economy and International ZHUKOV Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

The materials that appear in the journal do not necessarily reflect the Editorial Board and the Editors’ opinion

Editorial Office: THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION © The Caucasus & Globalization, 2013 25 Ajami Nakhchivani, building 2 © CA&CC Press®, 2013 AZ1108, Baku, Azerbaijan © Institute of Strategic Studies of WEB: www.ca-c.org the Caucasus, 2013 4 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013

CONTENTS

GEOPOLITICS

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CONFLICT SETTLEMENT IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS: Leyla NEW PROSPECTS AND LIMITS ALIEVA 7

THE IDEA OF A CAUCASIAN HOME AND THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRATION Khaladdin IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS IBRAHIMLI 16

TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE CAUCASUS: PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION Evgenia IN CONFLICT SETTLEMENT GABER 26

SOME ASPECTS OF APPLYING THE SWEDISH-FINNISH MODEL TO SETTLEMENT OF THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI Taleh NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT ZIYADOV 40 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 5 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION GEO-ECONOMICS

SECTORAL, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL-ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES OF Vakhtang THE GEORGIAN ECONOMY: BURDULI, DEVELOPMENT ISSUES Ramaz IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION ABESADZE 48

THE BAKU-TBILISI-KARS (BTK) RAILROAD PROJECT IN THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE CENTRAL CAUCASIAN COUNTRIES, Alexander TURKEY, AND RUSSIA DUDNIK 65

INFLUENCE OF Zurab THE MIDDLE EAST TENSION GARAKANIDZE, ON THE EU’S SOUTHERN Nata GAS CORRIDOR GARAKANIDZE 74

GEOCULTURE

THE CONFLICT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH: IS IT A “CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS”? How Samuel Huntington’s Theory Explains Oleg Its Culturological Dimension KUZNETSOV 82

REVIVAL OF THE NORTH CAUCASIAN UMMA IN THE LIGHT OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY FLAWS Ruslan IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD KURBANOV 94

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN STATE SCHOOLS IN AZERBAIJAN, GEORGIA, AND ARMENIA. DEMOCRATIC POLITICS OF RELIGION AND THE PLURALITY OF Ansgar RELIGIOUS REPRESENTATIONS JÖDICKE 102

THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR IN THE GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA AND TURKEY Farman IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS KULIEV 110 6 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION GEOHISTORY

ALI MARDAN BEK TOPCHIBASHEV: LIFE, EPOCH, COMRADES-IN-ARMS Jamil (THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS BIRTH) HASANLI 120

ETHNOCULTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FORMATION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN THE CAUCASUS (19TH-BEGINNING OF Sudaba THE 20TH CENTURIES) ZEYNALOVA 147

Contributors please use the following guidelines: — begin articles with a brief abstract of 300-500 words and keywords; — articles should be no less than 3,000 and no more than 6,000 words, including footnotes; — footnotes should be placed at the bottom of each page; if there are references to Internet resources, please give the author’s name, the name of the document, the website address, and the date it was made available, for example, available 2007-04-19; — quotations, names of authors and other information from English-language sources should be duplicated in brackets in the original language, that is, in English; — the article should be divided into sections, including an introduction and conclusion; — the author should include the following personal information: first name, last name, academic degree, place of work, position, city, country.

All articles accepted are published in Russian and English, in the Russian-language and English-language versions of the journal, respectively. The editorial board takes responsibility for translation of the articles. Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 7 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOPOLITICS

Leyla ALIEVA

Director, Center for National and International Studies (Baku, Azerbaijan).

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CONFLICT SETTLEMENT IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS: NEW PROSPECTS AND LIMITS

Abstract

his study attempts to analyze the models Caucasus has been limited. Today, however, and approaches to conflict settlement the EU betrays much more interest in the re- T based on EU programs that rely on the gion, while its new programs for the Central maximum possible use of the Union’s mecha- Caucasus have created new opportunities for nisms, policy tools, and resources. So far, the individualized approaches to conflict settle- EU’s ability to act effectively in the Central ment on the basis of EU programs and tools.

KEYWORDS: the European Union, the Central Caucasus, conflict settlement, European integration, policy tool impact potential.

Introduction

It has been stressed more than once that the emergence of the European Union, set up after World War II, was geared at the idea of peacekeeping as one of the new structure’s foreign policy priorities repeatedly confirmed in its documents and decisions. 8 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Despite the fact that the EU applied its peacekeeping potential far and wide—from the Balkans to the Middle East—the results were not always impressive. Some authors think1 that the EU has created a fairly extensive set of tools of conflict settlement applied, although not always successfully, in neighboring countries for the simple reason that their efficiency depends primarily on the specifics of Brussels’ relations with the sides involved. The international conflict settlement measures launched in 1993 within the OSCE and the U.N. have so far failed to produce impressive results. In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the OSCE framework produced a form of cooperation (the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group) of all major external forces (states) whose interests have been infringed upon because of the conflict; this steered the conflict into a civilized and peaceful channel—the positions of the sides, however, remain as irreconcilable as ever. It should be said that the degree of EU involvement in conflict settlement in the Caucasus varies from country to country. In contrast to the conflicts in Georgia (the Geneva talks in which the EU, OSCE, and U.N. are also involved), the EU has been steering away from conflict settlement in Kara- bakh. The European Neighborhood Policy did nothing to supply the corresponding national plans of Azerbaijan and Armenia with mechanisms of conflict resolution. In view of the closer relations between the EU and the three Central Caucasian republics within the EU’s latest programs (European Neighborhood and Eastern Partnership), these states have been discussing their attitude toward EU integration and the EU’s role in conflict resolution.

Political and Institutional Limits and Possibilities of EU Influence on Conflict Settlement in the Central Caucasus

The EU relies on the Common Foreign and Security Policy—CFSP as its main foreign policy instrument. Since the day it was adopted in Maastricht, the EU has been using it in the international context to express its attitude toward armed conflicts, human rights issues, and any other event related to the principles and values the EU is determined to protect. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 supplied this instrument with another element—the High Representative for CFSP. The CFSP has a military element that allows the EU to be involved in peacekeeping and preventive operations. Despite the fact that the European Parliament’s ability to influence decision-making is fairly limited,2 the decisions reflect the EU’s main trends and priorities. The importance of the Central Caucasus for the EU is shown by the fact that the European Parliament recently passed several resolutions related to this region that outlined the EU’s policy in the Central Caucasian countries. The Resolutions of 15 November, 2007 On Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy3 and of 17 January, 2008 On a More Effective EU Policy for the South Caucasus4 can be described as documents devoted to the situation in the Central Caucasus. On 20 May, 2010, the European Parlia-

1 See: N. Tocchi, The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard, Routledge/ UACES, 2007. 2 See: U. Diedrichs, “The European Parliament in CFSP: More than a Marginal Player?” The International Spectator, No. 2, 2004. 3 See: European Parliament Resolution of 15 November, 2007 on Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) (2007/2008[INI]). 4 See: European Parliament Resolution of 17 January, 2008 on a More Effective EU Policy for the South Caucasus: From Promises to Actions (2007/2076[INI]).

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 9 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ment passed a resolution On the Need for an EU Strategy for the South Caucasus5 that concentrated on the conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Resolution of 20 May, 2010 says, in particular, that “the frozen conflicts are an impediment to the economic and social development and hinder the improvement of the standard of living of the South Caucasus region as well as the full development of the Eastern Partnership of the ENP; whereas a peaceful resolution of the conflicts is essential for stability in the EU Neighborhood.”6 The same resolution went on to say that “further efforts should be made so as to identify common areas of interests that can overcome divergences, facilitate dialog and promote regional cooperation and development opportunities.”7 The document stressed that “the EU’s main objective in the region is to encourage the development of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia toward open, peaceful, stable and democratic countries, ready to establish good neighborly relations and able to transform the South Caucasus into a region of sustainable peace, stability and prosperity.”8 In the documents and statements of the EU Commissioner for Foreign Policy, the European Parliament has called on the European Union to be more actively involved in conflict settlement in the Central Caucasus because “retaining the status quo in the conflicts in the region is unacceptable and unsustainable, since it bears the constant risk of an escalation of tensions and a resumption of armed hostilities.” Instability along the borders of the newly adopted EU members and the involvement of other countries in two of the EU’s new programs (Eastern Partnership and European Neighborhood) have acquired special importance. As early as the 1990s, the European Union became interested in the energy resources in the Caucasus and Central Asia and, therefore, in the region’s stability. In 2003, the EU formulated the Common Security and Defense Policy and appointed its Special Representative for the South Caucasus to create the EU’s political profile in the region.9 Euronest, the parliamentary assembly of Eastern Partnership, which includes a dialog platform for the parliamentary deputies of six countries involved in the Eastern Partnership program, is another mechanism of EU impact on regional security and conflicts, including a potentially closer dialog between Azerbai- jan and Armenia. The Caucasian countries are also involved in the Black Sea Regional Synergy, a multisided EU strategic program. This means that after expanding in 2004 and launching East-related programs, the political documents of the European Union formulated increasingly ambitious plans of conflict settlement. This became even clearer during the 2008 Russian-Georgian war when, thanks to the hectic activities of French President Nicholas Sarkozy, the EU chair, who negotiated agreements with Russia on conflict settlement (only part of them were later fulfilled), a mission of 250 European representatives was placed along the cease-fire line; the EU set up an independent international mission under Swiss Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini to study the facts and present a report on the situation in Georgia. The so-called Geneva Talks began. These initiatives were presented as an escape from the contradictions of the EU’s Caucasian policies caused by the so-called Russian factor when the European Union preferred to act cautiously in the Central Caucasus so as not to estrange Russia. I have already written that the EU’s approach to the conflicts in the Caucasus can be hardly described as uniform: it is affected by relations with Russia, the Armenian diaspora in some of the European countries, Turkish policy, and the EU’s immediate interests at any specific moment. There

5 See: European Parliament Resolution of 20 May, 2010 on the Need for an EU Strategy for the South Caucasus (2009/2216[INI]). 6 Ibidem. 7 Ibidem. 8 Ibidem. 9 See: S. Vasilyan, “The Policy of ‘Regional Cooperation in the South Caucasus’,” Working Paper # 024, Centro Ar- gentino de Estudios Internacionales Area CEI Paises Balticos, 2010, available at [http://www.caei.com.ar/es/programas/cei/ P24.pdf].

10 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION are objective individual descriptions of the conflicts and objective assessments of European security threats that inevitably affect EU interests. There are also political factors behind the differentiated approaches to each of the post-Soviet conflicts. For example, the EU has refused to issue entry visas for the leaders of Transnistria, but allows the leaders of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia to visit the European Union. Moreover, the NKR has opened its offices in the main European countries. So far, the EU has limited itself to prohibiting certain officials of Belarus and Transnistria from entering Europe; for political considerations this measure will be hardly extended; banned entry without corresponding economic sanctions (frozen bank deposits in EU banks) might prove inefficient. In other cases, the EU’s political documents, as well as resolutions of the European Parliament, clearly indicate that the EU supports the principle of Georgia’s territorial integrity; however they say nothing at all about Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Meanwhile, back in the 1990s, Armenia violated (very much like Russia in 2008) the internationally recognized borders of the neighboring country. It is interesting to note that in 2008 the co-chairs of the Minsk Group voted against the draft resolution on Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.10 Since 2008, the EU has been involved in the talks on Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Geneva, but has done nothing so far in relation to the Karabakh conflict. This means that there are certain contradictions that keep the EU away from conflict resolution in some cases. First, the European Parliament is extremely aware of the clash of interests: resolutions and other documents are not only the result of objective and long-term strategic considerations, but also of intensive rivalry of numerous groups of interests and the national interests of individual member countries. For example, the European Parliament recommended Turkey, which had closed its borders with Armenia in response to its occupation of Azeri territories, not to tie together its OSCE membership and the Turkish-Armenian protocols. This weakens, to a certain extent, the Azeri position at the talks. At the same time, the EU prefers to steer clear of the Minsk process. This means that Brussels, aware of the inefficiency of the talks within the OSCE, has reconciled itself to maintaining the status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The European Parliament’s position on the energy-related projects (transportation projects in particular) clearly indicates that it is fully aware of the importance of the three Central Caucasian states in their implementation; it has repeatedly insisted that Armenia should be included in these without specifying “if any tangible progress in conflict settlement is achieved.” This means that its recommen- dation is unrelated to the reason why Armenia was and is excluded from these projects in the first place. The EU has no efficient strategy to apply to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As a rule, the Eu- ropean states explain their unwillingness to stick to the territorial integrity principles (as in the case with the conflicts in Moldova and Georgia) by the principle of non-interference in the settlement process or an attempt at “objectivity.” This and similar declarations are often accompanied by statements that, as distinct from other post-Soviet conflicts, Nagorno-Karabakh is a “disputed” territory. The absence of a regional security structure, an objective and trusted arbiter that can insist on and realize the basic principles and rules of international relations in the region and the local countries’ responsible behavior, is one of the highest stumbling blocks to conflict settlement in the Caucasus. In the absence of such a structure, relations in the region could be regulated by development prospects opened up by cooperation with neighbors, especially with resource-rich and strong economies. In any other region of the world, the prospect of being excluded from the largest energy projects and economic contacts would have driven a country with little or no resources and no sea outlet to establish good relations with its regional neighbors at all costs. At the very least, this country would have kept away from conflicts in the neighboring country, but would have acted as a good neighbor

10 The resolution was passed by the 62nd UN GA (39 for, 7, against, 100 abstained) on 14 March, 2008, available at [http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/ga10693.doc.htm].

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 11 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION trying to quench the separatist sentiments being stirred up in the neighbor’s autonomous regions. Armenia, deprived of all, including economic, relations with its important neighbors (Azerbaijan and Turkey) and left outside the energy and transportation projects, has never tried to normalize relations with these two countries, in the first place, or demonstrate its respect for its neighbor’s internationally recognized borders. The sobering effect of the immediate (particularly economic) repercussions of the conflict was downplayed by considerable economic support from the West (the U.S. and the EU in particular). This created the illusion in Erevan that the country could survive without normalizing its relations with neighbors.11 Armenia, which is obviously interested in the regional energy and transportation projects, is trying to restore its economic relations (so far, with Turkey) without demonstrating responsible behavior toward its other neighbors. It does not need compromises either in “liberal” or “real interests” contexts. The EU’s conflict resolution efforts not only did nothing to settle the conflict, but also encouraged its own patronage attitude toward the region’s countries. This means that at the political level there is a discrepancy between the EU’s ambition to promote regional cooperation among the three Caucasian states, on the one hand, and the degree and nature of its involvement in conflict settlement, on the other. It remains unclear whether, having ratified the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU will act as an independent force in ensuring “hard” (military-political) security or will prefer to remain a NATO ally of the United States in the Caucasian conflicts (“soft” security). A big step forward was made in the summer of 2003 when Brussels set up the institution of EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and appointed Finnish diplomat Heikki Talvitie to this post. In the last few years, this post was filled by Swedish diplomat Peter Semneby, who organized regular consultations and kept conflict resolution in the center of Brussels’ attention, which compensated, to a certain extent, for its inadequate involvement in conflict settlement in the Caucasus. How- ever, it became known that once the Treaty of Lisbon had been ratified the functions of EU Special Representatives for the South Caucasus and for Moldova would be integrated into a new foreign policy institution—the European External Action Service (EEAS)—set up to help the EU High Represen- tative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (EUHR). Meanwhile, an influential publication of Radio Free Europe pointed out: “Any downgrading of the EU’s involvement in either part of the world would inevitably send powerful messages to both local capitals—most of which seek closer integration with the West—as well as Moscow.”12 Several foreign ministers, mainly of the East European countries, protested against this prospect. The civil societies of the Central Caucasian countries were determined to preserve the post and Peter Semneby who filled it.13 As a result, his four-year mandate, which expired in February 2010, was extended to 31 August, 2010, and then to 28 February 2011.

Tools and Mechanisms

I have written above that the EU prefers to concentrate its efforts on liquidating the roots of conflicts—social and political discrimination, not an easy task in the Caucasian regimes. The political documents, as a rule, suggest that EU policy tools (border programs and public dialog) should be used for conflict settlement. This calls for selective and individual approaches because in different conditions these tools produce different effects. In some cases (the Balkans serve as a pertinent example), successful trans-border cooperation was realized in the wake of political

11 See: L. Alieva, “Imperial Legacy: Economics and Conflict,” Security Dialogue, Oslo, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 1996. 12 A. Lobjakas, “EU Envoys in South Caucasus, Moldova Facing End of the Road,” RFE/RL, 14 June, 2010, available at [http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Envoys_In_South_Caucasus_Moldova_Facing_End_Of_The_Road/2071102.html]. 13 Some of the NGOs and citizens of Azerbaijan in their letter to Brussels supported the institute of EU Special Representative for the Caucasus.

12 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION settlement. In the case of occupation (the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict), trans-border cooperation cannot be realized along mine-closed borders. It should be applied either before the active phase to avert a conflict or when a political settlement has been reached. Conflict settlement tools are scattered throughout different departments of the EU’s very complicated bureaucratic structure. The CFSP, for example, has a peacekeeping and crisis management department; on 26 February, 2001, in the wake of formulating the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), a Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) appeared that was to be applied for a short period of time immediately after the crisis; its scope, defined by a long list of other Community tools, includes human rights efforts, election monitoring, institution- building, media support, border management, humanitarian missions, police training and the provision of police equipment, civil emergency assistance, rehabilitation, reconstruction, pacification, resettlement, and mediation. The ESDP relies for its realization on several mechanisms, the permanent Political and Security Committee (PSC) being one of them. It is made up of ambassadorial representatives of the member states and charged with monitoring the international situation, as well as with political control and strategic direction of crisis response operations. There is an extensive Conflict Prevention Associates (CPA) structure, an outgrowth of the Conflict Prevention Network, made up of corresponding EU structures, NGOs, experts, etc. The new EU programs, the European Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, addressed to the Soviet successor states can be described as similar instruments designed to prevent new conflicts, positively affect those underway, and improve the climate of conflict resolution. The vague wording of the EU’s position on conflict settlement also applies to the ENP Action Plans related to the Central Caucasian countries; they clearly indicate that the EU finds it extremely hard to reconcile the opposing positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the different approaches to the conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan. The Plan of Action for Armenia spoke of the principle of self-determination as the key to conflict resolution and did not mention the principle of territorial integrity. The Plan of Action for Azerbaijan spoke about dedication to the principles of territorial integrity and respect for internationally recognized borders, but it remained unsubstantiated in the context of conflict settlement in the way this is done in the Action Plans for Georgia and Moldova.14 The above amply confirms that the European Neighborhood Policy deals with the conflict settlement problem indirectly, by addressing the problems of state governance, inadequate economic development, and the absence of security and stability.15 The EU attaches a lot of importance to human contacts and socialization, confidence-building measures, and regional cooperation. It is absolutely clear that the EU’s policies in regions where it has no, or limited, interests and which it treats as its periphery are less consistent and vaguer with respect to conflict settlement.

The Central Caucasus and the EU: How Do Cooperation and Integration Promote Conflict Settlement?

It should be said that against the background of the increasingly intensive interaction between the EU and the Central Caucasus at the formal level, real integration has been slowing down and caused a lot of skepticism on both sides, which is explained, in turn, by retreats in the sphere of democratic reforms in many EU partner countries, apart from Moldova. Integration, however, is still

14 See: L. Alieva, “EU and the South Caucasus,” Discussion Paper Bertelsmann СAP/Stiftung Berlin, 2006, available at [http://www.cap-lmu.de/aktuell/events/2006/eastern-policy.php]. 15 [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/faq_en.htm#1.2].

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 13 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION high on the list of official foreign policy priorities and the region’s civil society. This means that the process of integration may promote conflict settlement in the Caucasus. Here is a more detailed analysis of successful conflict settlement in Europe, the experience of which can be borrowed. Conflict settlement experts and those who are practically involved in the process frequently refer to the successful conflict settlement around the Åland Islands in Finland and Tyrol in Italy.16 The needs and interests of the border regions contested by two sovereign states were finally reflected in the creative application of different self-administration tools, which relied on an identical principle: the widest possible autonomy (with continued territorial integrity), the elements of which were the product of talks and compromises. The Central Caucasian states could have borrowed this experience had not three factors set this experience and the current situation in the Caucasus apart. First, the relations between the EU and the Caucasus do not lead to EU membership, as was the case of Austria in the South Tyrolean conflict. This means that contract relations between the EU and the sides involved in the conflict were very different: the Caucasus is not strongly encouraged by the reward of EU membership. On the other hand, the international factor in Europe was much more favorable: first, Western Europe was no longer divided as before World War II; it was united for the sake of security and common foreign policy orientations. There was a legal arbiter in the region (a formal structure/organization recognized by both sides in the conflict) that the sides could address and whose decisions were recognized as legitimate. The neighboring countries (in the case of Tyrol) behaved absolutely respon- sibly; they did not try to violate borders with the use of force and were, instead, looking for a mutually acceptable solution. Nothing of the above was observed in the post-Soviet expanse. The EU as an important factor in the region has not yet become an attractive political center for the Caucasian states and autonomies. While the Caucasian countries are seeking European integration and settlement through mediation by European organizations (the OSCE and EU), the former autonomies are seeking the patronage of Russia, another regional power, which is competing with European structures for regional influence. This can be explained by the fact that the security problem remains pending (that is, there is no political solution or security guarantees for the people in the conflict zones) and European integration has not become a real alternative to Russian (even though all the sides in the conflict, the countries and its autonomies, probably prefer Europe).17 There is no regional or international arbiter in the Caucasus able to pass legally valid decisions (the Åland Islands, for example, sought the decision of the League of Nations) acceptable to both sides and treated as a guide to action. The U.N. acts as an arbiter in the Caucasus, but none of its resolutions have been fulfilled so far. The European structures (such as OSCE) are forums and intermediaries, which makes continued occupation, in violation of international principles and laws, legitimate. During the latest open conflict between Russia and Georgia, the EU, for the first time, acted as an “honest broker;” it put its observers on the cease-fire line to ensure that the cease-fire regime and agreements were observed. The domestic factor (the domestic policy factor) is no less important: the absence of liberalism as a state philosophy toward minorities and the minorities’ political elites’ extremely ethnocentric attitude toward citizenship and human rights, likewise, make the European conflicts mentioned above and the conflicts in Central Caucasus very different indeed. This means that democratization, reforms, and institution-building, which encourage participation in a common foreign policy by forming a common political identity, are more ways the EU can have an impact on conflict settlement.

16 See: St. Wolff, “Complex Power Sharing as Conflict Resolution: South Tyrol in Comparative Perspective,” available at [www.stefanwolff.com/working-papers/STCPS.pdf]. 17 See: I. Khintba, “The EU and the Conflicts in the Eastern Neighborhood: The Case of Abkhazia,” Heinrich Boell Foundation, International Politics, 23 September, 2010.

14 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Those in favor of European integration think that “the prospect of membership in European institutions, and in the first place the European Union, is supposed to transform the behavior and attitudes of the political actors involved in the conflict in such a way that a solution becomes more feasible. In principle, these institutions are offering secessionist parties an institutional framework that makes it easier for them to reach a compromise on sovereignty issues. … It seems quite obvious that the difference of impact of the EU upon candidate and non-candidate countries should be rather sharp, as the EU cannot use conditionality linked to membership in its policies toward non-candidate countries.”18 The European Neighborhood and Eastern Partnership programs do not promise EU membership to the countries participating in them, which weakens the EU’s political impact on the social transformations in these countries, although its financial argument—money for reforms through the recently created Governance Facility—remains convincing. However, financial stimulus does not work in the case of oil- and gas-rich Azerbaijan. Worldwide conflict settlement practice has demonstrated that reforms and institutions as the least painful and non-violent tools are necessary and unavoidable. Indeed, the most successful Euro- pean examples are based on various types of self-administration and decentralization combined with consociation; new political identities shaped by gradual European integration will finally iron out different approaches to foreign policy principles and security issues of autonomies and countries. The prospect of European integration and a “European” political identity for all sides in the conflict will make Russia’s patronage unimportant for the people of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh. European integration, institutions related to human rights and the rights of minorities, as well as democratic institutions that presuppose people’s involvement in governance will create an attractive model for all ethnicities to manifest their identity. Integration will make state borders less important; so far the conflicts in the Central Caucasus are mainly territorial, in which the sides want “all or nothing.” This makes a consensus practically unattainable; talks at which irreconcilable positions are encountered should be moved to a different level where formal boundaries are not as categorical, or to the level of EU integration.19 This approach worked well in the Baltic republics where the problem of the Russian minority was resolved by applying the advantages of EU citizenship, including protection of the rights of minorities, to all citizens of the Baltic states without exception.

Conclusion

The above suggests several conclusions on the potential/resource of the EU’s influence on the Central Caucasian conflicts to be used in the region for conflict resolution. The Treaty of Lisbon, which makes it possible for the EU to act on the international arena as a more consolidated political entity, increases its impact worldwide, including on conflict settlement in the Central Caucasus. Civil society and all forces interested in prompt settlement should follow the process and use every opportunity to establish peace in the region. The EU has not yet fully tapped its policy tool potential for settling the conflicts in the region. During the August 2008 conflict and after Russia’s occupation of Georgia’s territories, the EU behaved as a political actor able to guide the crisis (so far in the sphere of “soft security”) as an intermediary, through observers, etc.

18 G. Nodia, “Europeanization and (Not) Resolving the Secessionist Conflicts,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minorities Issues in Europe, No. 1, 2004 (European Center for Minority Issues, Flensburg, Germany), pp. 1-15. 19 In the past, this awareness gave rise to the ideas of a common Caucasian home, a common Central Caucasian parliament, or even a regional confederation. In the process of drawing closer to the European Union, the alternative of European integration became much more attractive than Caucasian integration: it offers much higher standards of living, tested values, sustainable laws, and stimulation of institutional reforms in the Central Caucasian states.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 15 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Compared with its previous involvement in the settlement of regional conflicts, this is a big stride forward supported by programs that include these countries and also by awareness of the great threat to regional and European security. The crisis in which military force was used demonstrated that what the EU had been doing for many years to prevent conflicts and weed out their roots was not enough to prevent conflicts from resuming or to settle them. The armed crisis of 2008 can be described as a failure of the political logic the world community applies to conflict settlement brilliantly described by Ghia Nodia: “There is near-consensus on a scheme so that first the situation in post-violent conflicts should be stabilized and the parties should cool down. Then there should be a period of confidence-building. As a result, there will be ‘conflict transformation,’ attitudes of conflict parties will change, and only after that, under the guidance of the international community, responsible rational actors on both sides will sign a deal, legitimated by transformed communities on both sides.” As a rule, the intermediary and the sides involved stop at the stabilization stage, which means that the conflict may be resumed as an armed conflict. This normally happens to conflicts on the periphery of European interests, which means that during a cease-fire (or stabilization) period, the EU does nothing to settle the conflict either through consistent social transformations or by changing the balance of power to achieve a compromise. So far, the EU’s involvement in the Caucasus has not been either effective or impartial: its decision-making mechanism has remained a blend of “power politics” and liberal approaches, while the region remains on the periphery of its attention. Today, the EU’s increased interest in the Central Caucasus and its new programs for the region have created new opportunities for individualized approaches to conflict settlement on the basis of EU programs and instruments. This is acquiring special importance against the background of the increasingly vehement militarist rhetoric of the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, despite the peace talks that are still going on. The EU and the governments can do the following at the political level: (1) The European Union should clearly express its attitude toward the involvement of third sides (countries) in secessionist conflicts as unacceptable from the viewpoint of international law and international agreements, as well as condemn a violation of internationally recognized borders. This should serve as a fundamental and uncontested basis that cannot and should not be negotiated. This means that Russia and Armenia, which have violated the borders of their neighbors, should become legally responsible rather than “rewarded” for the pull-out of their troops. (2) The EU can emulate its own experience in Moldova to encourage the sides (rather than dis- unite them) with the prospect of EU membership for united Georgia and united Azerbaijan. (3) The EU should promote or even create conditions for the development of civil (rather than ethnically homogeneous) societies in the autonomies; it should give grants and extend its aid not directly to the autonomies but through and with the help of the republic’s civil society and/ or only for projects implemented jointly with the civil societies of the corresponding republics. This will bring the two societies together rather than promote irredentism and secessionism. (4) This means that the civil societies of the republics should first establish contacts and then start cooperating with the civil societies of the autonomies: Tbilisi and Baku should start working with Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh to convince them that their safety and equal rights are guaranteed. (5) Since the OSCE-guided process will probably end in nothing, the European Union should concentrate on: —holding a broad discussion of successful models (Tyrol and the Åland Islands) of conflict settlement; organizing training sessions of all types of coexistence for ethnicities and cultural groups; 16 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION —persuading Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh to quench their radicalism; putting pressure on Baku, Tbilisi, and Erevan to force them to elaborate a new policy for dealing with minorities and mechanisms for its implementation; discussing with minorities all the measures designed to satisfy their most urgent requirements; —putting pressure on third countries (Russia and Armenia) to persuade them to admit that internationally recognized borders should not be violated, telling them in clear terms that only normal relations with neighbors and observation of international principles can lead to full economic prosperity and improve their relations with the EU; —promoting a dialog between the center and the autonomies to decrease post-conflict ani- mosity and help them find common denominators; —applying its policy tools and programs (trans-border cooperation, regional cooperation, etc.) while taking into account the political reality. The civil societies of the three republics should: —put pressure on their governments to convince them to abandon the use of force in conflict settlement (Armenia should be persuaded to pull out its forces without preliminary conditions; Azerbaijan and Georgia should drop their aggressive rhetoric and attempts to restore territorial integrity by force) and start a dialog to convince people in Abkhazia, South Os- setia, and Nagorno-Karabakh that their safety is guaranteed and that they have equal rights and opportunities to develop their cultural identity and be involved on an equal footing in political and economic activities; —promote successful European models and creatively apply them; create new models of coexistence and conflict settlement together with representatives of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh; and —promote active democratization of society jointly with the civil societies of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Khaladdin IBRAHIMLI

D.Sc. (Hist.), Professor at the Azerbaijan Tourism Institute (Baku, Azerbaijan).

THE IDEA OF A CAUCASIAN HOME AND THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRATION IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS

Abstract

his article researches the historical pre- tion over the span of 200 years. The author requisites of the idea of a Caucasian substantiates that the idea is not limited to T Home and its development and evolu- the independence of the states in the region, Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 17 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION but includes their further formation and inte- gressive policy is so alien to the spirit, na- gration into a confederation at a later stage, ture, customs, and traditions of the Cauca- like the EU. The author also implies that two sian peoples, Armenia cannot be in opposi- main factors detain integration in the region: tion and insist on aggression for a long time. the fact that the North Caucasian Republics Based on this consideration, the author as- are constituencies of the Russian Federation sumes that when Armenian aggression is and the aggressive policy of Armenia in the over, the idea of a Caucasian Home can be Central Caucasus. However, since its ag- realized in some way.

KEYWORDS: Caucasian Home, Free Caucasus, confederation, independence, Bolshevism, diaspora.

Introduction

The idea of a “Caucasian Home” or “Caucasian Union” is not new. In its contemporary form it emerged at the beginning of the 20th century and went through a long evolutionary process after the overthrow of the national states in the Caucasus in 1920—during the period of political emigration. The idea of a union of Caucasian peoples is closely related to the policy of occupation implemented in the region by the Russian Empire since the time of Alexander I. The endless Russian- Caucasian wars from the beginning of the 19th century until the 1870s showed that only joint struggle and action against the same very powerful aggressor can lead to freedom. At the end of the 20th century, the Central Caucasian states regained the independence they acquired after World War I but lost two years later. Today, there are three independent states in the Central Caucasus, as well as the republics in the Northern Caucasus that are constituencies of the Russian Federation. The idea of a Caucasian Home, however, has not been realized yet because this idea is not limited to the independence of the states in the region. In actual fact, independence is the first step toward the formation of a union followed by a mutual approach, integration, and the formation of a political confederation. For this reason, some scholars consider the idea to be a myth. Another reality is that there are serious integration problems not only between the Central and Northern Caucasus, but also among the three Central Caucasian states. The formation of national states has not been very stable over the last 100 years. Why does Armenia continue to make territorial claims against its neighbors, systematically threatening security and stability in the region and paving the way to intervention by outside forces? What are the ideas and principles that increase separatism in Armenia’s national interests, hinder interstate integration in the region, and increase cooperation of these states with the West? All of these similar questions require serious research, neat arguments, and valid answers.

Emergence of the Idea of a Caucasian Home

Long ago, in the 1830s, “the Adighe people convened a national congress, at which they declared the independence of four million mountain dwellers and put forward the idea of a union of Caucasian peoples, while the whole of Chechnia and Daghestan were embroiled in bloody battles.”1 This was

1 Kh. İbrahimli, “Kavkazskiy dom: mif ili realnost?” Kavkaz (Baku), No. 1, 1997.

18 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the first glimmer of the “Free Caucasus” and “Caucasian Home” ideas that developed and acquired more definite shape at later stages. At the beginning of the 20th century, the idea of a “Free Caucasus” was substantially put into practice. Émigrés from the Northern Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and Georgia organized a Caucasian Com- mittee in Turkey. In December of 1915, a delegation was formed by the committee and sent to Berlin and Vienna to present a memorandum to the Western states. The delegation included Isa Pasha, Aziz Meker, and Fuad Pasha from the Northern Caucasus, Salimbey Behboudzade from Azerbaijan, and Prince Machabeli and Kamilbey Togiridze from Georgia. The memorandum asked that “the Caucasian Committee be rendered material and spiritual assistance to save the Caucasus from the Russian yoke and establish a confederative state that would include Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and the North- ern Caucasus.”2 The Caucasian Committee struggled for independence of the Caucasus under the chairmanship of Marshal Fuad Pasha, an émigré from the Northern Caucasus, and prepared the theoretical basis for the formation of a confederative state after separation from Russia. Members of the Committee carried out intensive propaganda to form public opinion in Europe. As non-official members of the Committee, two well-known public men from Azerbaijan—Alibey Huseynzade and Ah- madbay Aghaoghlu—settled in neutral Switzerland during World War I and worked intensively on ways to free the Caucasus from the Russian yoke. “They sent notifications to the European states in which they described the real situation of the people living in the region.”3 After the Caucasian states gained their independence in 1918, some important steps were taken to unify the states and peoples living in the region: on 16 April, 1919, an agreement on a military and defense alliance was signed between Azerbaijan and Georgia, which was declared open to Armenia too. At the congress of the Musavat Party in 1919, a resolution was adopted on activities regarding the formation of a Caucasian Confederation. Furthermore, defense of the Northern Caucasus was discussed at the Azerbaijani-Armenian Conference held in Baku in 1920 and at the Tbilisi Conference of the three Central Caucasian states held later, where a decision was made to express solidarity with the mountain dwellers and to render them military and material assistance. At the Tbilisi Conference, an agreement was reached on forming a Council of Caucasian Re- publics on the initiative of the Azerbaijani delegation that included Head of the Delegation Fatali Khan Khoysky, Hasanbay Aghayev, Mustafa Vekilli, and O. Nayman Krichinsky. Later, a draft consisting of 24 articles was prepared by Deputy Minister of Justice of Azerbaijan O. Nayman Mirza Krichinsky on formation of the Council aimed at establishing a real political union of the Caucasian peoples. However, the 11th Red Army occupied Azerbaijan on 27 April, 1920, after which all these steps failed.4

The Idea of a Caucasian Home in Emigration

After the Bolshevik occupation in April 1920, the idea of a Caucasian Home was raised again during the very first years of emigration. The Azerbaijani delegation was intensively working for de jure protection of the Azerbaijan Republic, while independence had already been lost de facto. They made efforts to coordinate their activities with representatives of the other Caucasian Republics. For this purpose, on 8 May, 1921, the Azerbaijani delegation got together at the Diplomatic Representative Office of Azerbaijan in Paris and discussed the formation of a Caucasian Confederation taking into

2 M.A. Rasulzade, “The Idea of the Caucasian Union in Immigration,” Kafkasiya (Munich), No. 11-12, 1952 (in Azeri). 3 Kurtuluş (Berlin), No. 28, 1937 (in Azeri). 4 See: Kurtuluş, No. 5, 1935.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 19 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION consideration the joint efforts to achieve independence of the Caucasian Republics. As early as 10 June, 1921, authorized representatives of the three Central Caucasian Republics held their first meeting under the chairmanship of A.M. Topchubashi, where a decision was made to form a political and economic alliance among the states. They informed the Head of the French Council of Ministers, Mr. Briand, of this decision, who, in turn, gave instructions and authority to his Minister for Liberated Territories, Mr. Lucsher, to conduct negotiations with representatives of the three Caucasian states. The first meeting of the representatives of the Central Caucasian Republics and Russia was held at the Paris Court House on 7 July, 1921, where Azerbaijan was represented by Ali Mardanbay Top- chubashi, Georgia by Gegechkori (ex-minister of foreign affairs) and Sabakhtarashvili (former undersecretary for foreign affairs), Armenia by Avetis Agoranian, Russia by Maklakov (Ambassador to France under the Kerensky Government) and Mandelshtam (ex-ambassador to Turkey), and France by ex-supreme commissar Shevalier and Dean of the Law Faculty of Sorbonne Prof. Vernaut. A.M. Topchubashi was the first to speak at the meeting held under the chairmanship of Vernaut. Mentioning that Azerbaijan was an adherent supporter of the idea of a Caucasian Home, he said that Turkey also advocated this idea. At the end of his speech, A.M. Topchubashi appealed to the Allies (supporters of the idea of splitting Turkey—England, France, and Greece) to recognize Turkey’s rights and render assistance to Turkey—Guarantor of Peace in the East. He tried to convince them that the Turkish-Bolshevik Agreement was temporary because Bolshevik ideas deny Islamic moral and traditions. Shevalier, however, did not accept his criticism and did not emphasize that he defended Turkey. In his speech he mentioned in particular that Georgia and Armenia were more developed and that he himself was surprised at how these republics had been able to survive so close to Turkey—“the ruth- less enemy of the Allies.” He also asked Gegechkori to respond to Topchubashi but the former declined. Agoranian, however, said that Turkey and later, beginning in 1920, Russia had entered the South Caucasian Republics as imperialist states although the latter had been struggling for their independence since 1918. Furious that Russia was being accused of imperialism and annexations, Maklakov reminded the Armenian representatives of “Russia’s historical patronage” of the Armenians and reproached them. At the end of his speech he said that “Russia would rise again!”, creating a hysterical atmosphere at the meeting with these words. Émigrés from the Caucasus “formed a permanent Caucasian Council consisting of the members of four delegations,”5 in which detrimental émigrés from Armenia and Russia were not included. Established after the delegations of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Northern Caucasus signed a common appeal, the Caucasus Union in Emigration paved the way for the formation of more effective organizations at later stages. In 1927, the Caucasus Independence Committee was formed by Azerbaijani, Georgian and North Caucasian representatives. The organization was founded on the basis of the 3+1 principle: the three Caucasian states plus Poland. Poland coordinated the activities of the Caucasian delegations and rendered all kinds of assistance, including material aid. Azerbaijan was represented in the organization by M.A. Rasulzade and M.Y. Mehdiyev, Georgia by N. Jordania, A. Chkhenkeli, A. Asa- tiani, and S. Mdivani, and the mountain dwellers by M. Sunshev and I. Chumshov. The organization also included a Department of the Military, Department of the Press, and a tripartite consisting of N. Mehdiyev, M. Sunshev, and I. Salamoda for carrying out operative activities.6 Inspired by the ideas of “the European Union” and “the Balkan Union,” émigrés from the Cau- casus tried to involve Armenia in the Committee in 1920s. However, the Armenian émigrés preferred Kerensky and Miliukov—the leaders of the Russian émigrés who adherently supported the idea of an “Indivisible Russia” and published articles in their main newspaper Dni.

5 M.A. Rasulzade, op. cit. 6 See: Kh. İbrahimli, The History of Azerbaijani Immigration, Elm ve Tehsil Publishing House, Baku, 2012 (in Azeri).

20 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The Caucasian Confederation Council

Émigrés from the Caucasus took another step forward in 1934 and got together with the support of Marshal Józef Piłsudski in Brussels on 14 July, where they signed a Pact on the Caucasian Con- federation (historians call it a “Treaty”). National centers of Caucasian émigrés from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Northern Caucasus declared the following principles of the Caucasian Confederation: 1. The Caucasian Confederation will act on behalf of the Republics included in it and will have joint customs borders. 2. Foreign policy of the Republics will be conducted by authorized delegations of the Repub- lics involved in the Confederation. 3. The borders of the Confederation will be defended by the Confederation Army consisting of the national armies of the Republics and led by a joint headquarters. 4. Disputed internal matters of the Confederation will be examined by the Supreme Confed- eration Court.7 The pact was signed on behalf of Azerbaijan by M.A. Rasulzade and A. Topchubashi, on behalf of Georgia by N. Jordania and A. Chkhenkeli, and on behalf on the Northern Caucasus by M. Girey Sunj, Ibrahim Chuluk, and Tausultan Shahman. The Declaration of the Caucasus Independence Com- mittee on the Pact of 14 July read: “Soon a new conference will be held to accept resignation of the Caucasus Independence Committee and to establish a new organization.” The mentioned conference was held on 14 February, 1935 and declared establishment of the Caucasian Confederation Council. The document, consisting of 10 articles defined by the Conference, set forth its duties as follows: 1. To prepare the Caucasian nations for eliminating Russian occupation in the Caucasus, establishing national republics, and forming a confederation. 2. To establish contacts with representatives of the nations under Soviet occupation for this purpose. 3. To declare this Council ready for contact with any form of Russian power that recognizes the independence of all the Caucasian nations, including nations of other regions under the Russian yoke. 4. To ensure that the Council relies upon its power on the path to independence, etc.8 The Caucasian Confederation Council was established on the basis of parity and was declared open to the Armenian representatives who broke off with the émigrés from the Caucasus in 1921. They did not join the Council until 1940 after the beginning of World War II.

The Situation after World War II

After World War II, the idea of a Caucasian Union gained importance once more. The old émi- grés met again in Munich in 1952. The Caucasian Independence Committee was established at the Conference of the Caucasus held on 10-11 December. The Committee determined its duties as follows: 1. To represent and lead the national liberty struggle of the Caucasian nations abroad. 2. To coordinate the activities of the Committee with the U.S. and other Western countries.

7 See: Kurtuluş, No. 5, 1935. 8 See: Ibidem.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 21 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION 3. To involve the nations of Eastern Europe, Central Asia (Turkistan), etc. in the national liberty struggle.9 The last article reads that the people of the Caucasus do not hate the Russians and Russians will be saved after the collapse of Bolshevism. The Declaration was signed by Chairman of the Azerbaijan National Center M.A. Rasulzade, Chairman of the Georgian National Political Center N. Jordania, and Chairman of the North Caucasian National Committee Prof. A.N. Magoma. The Committee was the last organized émigré center established abroad around the idea of a Caucasian Union. For many years, émigrés have held discussions on the idea of a Caucasian Union. Despite the formation of two opposite poles on this issue, the absolute majority of the émigrés supported the idea of a union. They acknowledged that the Caucasus is a region where ethnographic diversity is much more complex than in any other region and that every state in the region has its own “Achilles heel.” So the émigrés were determined to establish a state that would look like Switzerland, where internal regional disputes would be solved by confederation institutions in which all the Republics would be represented.

Collapse of the Soviet Union and National Independence Movements in the Caucasus

The idea of a Caucasian Union regained popularity after the collapse of the Soviet Union. On 8 March, 1996, Presidents Heydar Aliev and Eduard Shevardnadze signed the Tbilisi Declaration, in which the two Republics declared their agreement on cooperation in strategic and humanitarian issues, including collaboration in investment and international projects, as well as in the development and security of transport and communication systems. The Declaration led to the establishment of GUAM in 1997, construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan Main Crude Oil Export Pipeline, and implementation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline and TRACECA (the idea of which was put forward in 1992) at later stages. It also paved the way for operation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway line. In the late 1990s, after long negotiations among Georgia, Azerbaijan, Daghestan, Chechnia, and Ingushetia, parliamentary representatives of the mentioned nations declared their intention and initiative to establish a Caucasian Parliament and sent appeals to the Parliaments of the Caucasian nations. The Appeal was signed by V. Guliyev, Z. Garalov, and A. Manafova from Azerbaijan, B. Kakubava and G. Patsatsiya from Georgia, A. Nalshev and M. Yandiev from Ingushetia, and Makhachev, Hajiev, and Ashuraliev from Daghestan.10 The Appeal found support in the Chechen Parliament, however it was not signed for technical reasons. Later an initiative came from the Northern Caucasus: establishment of an OSCE-like structure in the Caucasus. Unfortunately, none of these ideas has been realized.

Armenian National Interests and Opposition to Integration in the Caucasus

Armenia occupies a political position that does not correspond to the interests of the Caucasian nations and states and even opposes them with antagonism in most cases. This antagonism was

9 See: M.A. Rasulzade, “The Caucasian Issue,” Kafkasiya, No. 11-12, 1952 (in Azeri). 10 Kavkaz, No. 2, 1997.

22 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION clearly revealed during the short independent life of the four states established in the region in 1917- 1921: Armenia declared war on Azerbaijan and Georgia. The States in the region faced a new type of state “philosophy” that corresponded neither to the existing regulations, nor to the so-called Regula- tions of the Caucasus. What does this philosophy mean? What does Armenia want? What are Arme- nia’s interests founded on? Armenian nationalism is a type of religious nationalism. It is difficult to find an analogy for this type of nationalism. Some scholars assume that there is a similarity between Persian-led Islamic nationalism and Armenian religious nationalism. However, there are serious differences between them. Islam is a kind of veil for Tehran, from behind which Persian ideologists are trying to assimilate all of the Turkic people in Iran, who are as many as the Persians in Iran. To express it as official, Tehran cites: the main policy is formation of a “United Iran,” a process of “ethnic, religious, and cultural integration.” Armenian religious nationalism, however, is quite different: self-separation from neighbors—other peoples in the Caucasus, and confrontation with them in most cases—isolating nationalism. That is why, despite the fact that Armenians live in almost every part of the world, they do not want representatives of other peoples and ethnic minorities to live in Armenia, including their Chris- tian neighbors—the Georgians. This mentality originates from the continuous conflicts with their neighbors. And what might disturb the Armenians in this situation? Namely the same territorial claims of their neighbors against Armenia. This is the main reason why they do not want other minorities in Armenia. In short, if there is no other ethnic minority or population in Armenia, there cannot be any claims. They do not even have the desire to assimilate with others, while they pretend to be easily assimilated themselves, remaining intact, however, in other nations for a long period. All the changes are formal, superficial, whereby the essence remains the same. There are three factors that give shape to Armenia’s interests and form the state policy of Armenia: 1. The World Armenian Diaspora, 2. The Armenians of Armenia, and 3. The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. All three of them have played their part in forming the Armenian national ideology that emerged in the late 19th century, creating artificial boundaries around this ideology. Armenian national ideology is what the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiun considers as its basis: “The Armenian Issue” or “Haydat.” According to “Haydat,” the Armenian national ideology conception has three fundamental principles: 1. Return of the so-called lost Armenian lands and establishment of a United Armenian State (“Greater Armenia”); 2. Return of the Armenians scattered all over the world to the national state; 3. Social state-building. How do the Armenians think these aims can be reached? What methods and means do they consider possible for achieving this? According to Dashnaktsutiun ideologists, realization of Armenia’s national interests is possible through revolutions and armed struggle. Hrant Markarian (current head of the Armenian Revolution- ary Federation) writes: “As long as power is decisive in the world, not laws, Dashnaktsutiun is obliged to remain legal as a political and ideological movement, conserving its revolutionary power at the same time.”11 Along with showing the illegality of the revolutionary struggle, this citation also considers it possible to act outside the law to restore “justice and truth.” Another Dashnaktsutiun ideologist Edu-

11 M. Sarkisian, Politicheskie problemy Kavkaza i Armenia. Politika Armenii v regione, Erevan, 1995.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 23 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ard Ohanesian lays bare this logic in his considerations: “Justice is above the law as a spiritual value. So this value can be established by circumventing the law, even sometimes repulsing it by force.”12 The matter is clear. The interesting thing is what do the Dashnaktsutiun ideologists mean when they say justice or injustice? They undoubtedly mean return of the “lost Armenian lands”—the main principle of the “Haydat” concept. If the main purpose of Dashnaktsutiun is return of the “lost lands,” those “who have captured the historical Armenian territories” are unjust, and the most convenient way to return these territories is through revolutions and armed struggle. But the international regulations and laws consider forced border changes and territorial occupation to be unacceptable. According to the same regulations and laws, armed revolutions are not met with sympathy. In this case, Armenia’s interests contradict international regulations and laws and, for these interests to be realized, violation of international regulations and laws is inevitable. The principle of “the possibility and necessity of bypassing and violating laws in the case of injustice” originates precisely from this mentality. So it turns out that the Armenians consider the international regulations and laws to be unjust and this is what makes it impossible for them to return “the historical lands.”13 There are many examples in history of how the Armenians have tried to return “the lost lands” only during serious international upheavals, wars, and revolutions. They engaged in unrest, armed confrontations, revolts, massacres, and occupation only during times of disorder and crisis. The Baku massacres of 1914-1915, the armed revolts in Van during the same years, the Karabakh massacres of 1917-1920, the Baku, Shamakhi, Ganja, and Guba massacres in March-April 1918, the slaughters in Borchali and Akhalkalaki (Georgia) in 1919, the reprisals after the 11th Russian Army suppressed the Ganja uprising in May 1920, and the massacres in Nagorno-Karabakh, Nakhchivan, Abkhazia, and Javakhetia since 1989 are obvious examples of the ideology named “preparation” for further territorial claims and occupation. World War I, the independence period of the Caucasian Republics during 1917-1921, their reoc- cupation and the infliction of reprisals on them by Russian-Soviet forces, and finally the period of Soviet collapse, after which large-scale changes, local conflicts, and confrontations occurred in Eur- asia are all examples of serious changes, as well as deep crises, in international relations—the entire 20th century was full of such events. It is precisely these deep crises in international relations that provide the most convenient conditions for realizing Armenia’s national interests. The issue of the “lost lands” riles the Armenians up against their neighbors. Director of the Na- tional and Strategic Research Center of Armenia M. Sarkisian states: “Armenian national consciousness has yielded a strange stereotype of ‘the defender of justice,’ which is related to the fact that Armenians have always been victims of foreign political powers.”14 The citation allows us to assume that Armenians can be satisfied with the establishment of justice only when neighboring nations are oppressed and undergo violation of their rights. It means that preventing Armenians from returning their lost lands is unjust and having to face such obstacles makes the Armenians victims of “external forces.” The most dreadful thing, however, is that the Armenians are educated and brought up in this spirit, convincing themselves that they have been unjustly deprived of their “lost lands” and that they are “victims of foreign aggression,” and imposing this ideology on generation after generation. And “the lost lands” are the Van province of Turkey and the Nakhchivan and Nagorno-Karabakh regions of Azerbaijan, including all the territories to the west of the River Kura and even Borchali (Kvemo- Kartli) and the Javakhetia regions of Georgia. The Armenians’ claims are against all their neighbors, as well as the international relations system and the regulations on the basis of which international organizations work. Armenia has territorial and genocide claims against Turkey and territorial and cultural claims against Azerbaijan and Georgia. Thousands of books have been written about these claims. It explains why the Armenians

12 Ibidem. 13 Ibidem. 14 Quoted from: H. İbrahimli, Deyişen Avrasiyada Kafkasiya, ASAM, Ankara, 2001.

24 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION consider many cultural and culinary traditions of Turkey and various Caucasian peoples to be their own. Even most of the religious monuments and tombstones in South and West Georgia have been catalogued and presented to the world as Armenian cultural artifacts. In general, causing disturbance in the Caucasus, creating headaches for their neighbors, and reflecting on justice for the Armenians originate from the idea of “Greater Armenia” and its carto- graphic image. A map of “Greater Armenia” for the Armenians is the same as the Lenin Mausoleum was for Communist Russia. It perturbs the Armenian soul, preventing it from trusting its neighbors. Armenians were busy with thoughts about “the return of national territories” and worried about “liberation of the territories” (in other words, occupation of territories of neighboring nations) while the Caucasian nations struggled for their national independence. So there is no room in the Armenian mind for national independence that excludes “the return of the lost territories.” The Armenians never considered weapons as a means to be used against the Russian Empire-Soviets that deprived them of their freedom. Actually, it makes no difference to Erevan who is in charge in Kremlin—reds, whites, or democrats. No matter what the shape, content, or character of the government in Moscow, Erevan has always had close mutual relations with and a positive attitude toward Russia. This can only be explained by the fact that national independence for Armenia does not necessarily mean a break with Russia. This is why it would be unimaginable or too naive even to imagine that the So- viet Army would commit the slaughter in Erevan that it committed against the demonstrations in Tbilisi on 9 April, in Baku on 20 January, and in Riga on 21 January, 1989-1990.

Ideological-Political and Geopolitical Considerations

Why has the “Armenian Genocide” ideology become so popular recently with the Armenians? What does it serve? 1. To form a united network of Armenians scattered all over the world and unite them around one idea; 2. To make Armenians stay alert by creating a hostile image of the Turks; 3. To incite the great powers against Turkey, exploiting anti-Turkish inclinations and interests; 4. To commit actual genocide, hiding behind the false one; 5. To isolate Azerbaijan by putting pressure on Turkey and estranging it from the Caucasus. 6. To serve the Armenian Diaspora and even private Armenian businessmen with the funding gathered under the umbrella of “Genocide.” Armenia is a landlocked state with insignificant geostrategic and political importance. Taking this into consideration, Armenian politicians do not think it convenient to consider the Nagorno- Karabakh issue within the scope of Russian-Armenian relations and prefer a doctrine based on ground- less claims, balancing principles, isolation, etc. The main principles of this doctrine can be characterized as following: — Armenia is compensating for its insignificant geopolitical position by making claims against its neighbors with important geopolitical positions (Georgia with its direct access to open waters, Azerbaijan with its rich carbohydrate resources, which are transported to the world market through Georgia) and is trying to fill the vacuum in this sphere; — Armenia is pursuing a policy of isolation and integration in parallel. According to this policy, integration conditions are defined from the viewpoint of Armenian national interests. So if any Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 25 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION parameter of the globalization process does not fit Erevan’s self-isolation course, it cannot be accepted. For instance, there is a parallel between resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and integration into the Euro-Atlantic zone. If the conflict is not resolved in Armenia’s favor, integration into the West cannot be considered acceptable either (here we can add the strong influence of the “foreign aggression” stereotype shaped in the Armenian mind long ago). — Armenia considers itself to be a power that balances the interests of Turkey, Russia, and the West in the Caucasus and prevents “economic and political expansion.” According to Arme- nian analysts, Armenia is the only state in the Caucasus that considers the region’s unambiguous orientation to be harmful and opposes it. According to this consideration, being cautious of Georgia and Azerbaijan’s unambiguous integration course toward the West, Ar- menia is trying to draw other states into the Caucasus. The purpose is to get the superpowers to restrain each other in the region. Armenian strategists think that this is precisely Armenia’s political mission. According to the same analysts, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is important from the viewpoint of Georgian’s interests. This conflict strengthens Georgia’s position in the region and enables it to play a neutral role and sometimes the role of arbiter. According to this logic, Georgia should not oppose Armenia’s interests regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict if it wants to gain strength in the region. The leading principle in Armenian-Iranian relations is similar. Armenia regards Iran not as a power capable of opposing integration into the West, but as a player that stimulates Russia and China against the West, forming at the same time a strong buffer to possible Turkish economic and cultural expansion toward the Caucasus.

Conclusion

At present, we can conclude that there are two main obstacles to realizing the “Caucasian Union” idea. First of all, the Caucasus has not transformed into a single cultural, political, and economic zone with its North and South. Second, Armenia’s aggressive policy and its territorial claims against its neighbors prevent this process. Georgian President Mikael Saakashvili’s appeal to form a Caucasian Confederation was a recall of historical memory, proving that the idea has not turned into a myth, as several politicians thought. It is extremely difficult to predict the political configuration of the Caucasus in the future. There are three independent states in the Central Caucasus, as well as the republics in the Northern Caucasus that are constituencies of the Russian Federation. The integration process between the Northern and Central Caucasus is monotonous and too weak, while relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Central Caucasus are the worst because of Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani territories. However, despite its limited resources and potential for a better infrastructure, it is not beyond the bounds of reality that the Central Caucasus might become a smaller version of the EU (with the Northern Caucasus joining this union later). The theoretical and practical research carried out by outstanding scholars, politicians, and businessmen from the region over the last 200 years, as well as the results of this research and the historical- cultural links between the peoples of the region, lead to positive thoughts about the possible future of a Caucasian Union. 26 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Evgenia GABER

Senior Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Mechnikov Odessa National University (Odessa, Ukraine).

TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE CAUCASUS: PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION IN CONFLICT SETTLEMENT

Abstract

he author poses herself the task of an- sues of regional security and assesses the alyzing the strategic interests of the extent to which they can cooperate for the T United States, as a global actor, and sake of peaceful settlement of regional con- Turkey, as the state that claims the rank of a flicts. regional player, in the Southern Caucasus.1 The author analyzes the regional poli- She compares their positions on the key is- cies of both actors in the Southern Caucasus and compares their positions on two key 1 The editors, in turn, prefer the division of the points—the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict be- geopolitical space of the Caucasian Region into three sub- tween Armenia and Azerbaijan and the con- regions suggested by the Institute of Strategic Studies of the flict in South Ossetia. In both cases, different Caucasus: the Northern Caucasus (the administrative units of regional and extra-regional forces are in- the North Caucasian and Southern Federal Districts of the RF); the Central Caucasus (independent states—Azerbaijan, volved at different stages of peaceful settle- Armenia, and Georgia); and the Southern Caucasus (the ment, which gives us a chance to assess the northeastern ilis of Turkey and the northwestern ostans of prospects for the joint efforts of Ankara and Iran). For more details, see, for example: E. Ismailov, V. Pa- Washington in the far from simple geopoliti- pava, The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical cal situation and identify the main obstacles Economy, CA&CC Press AB, Stockholm, 2006; E. Ismailov, V. Papava, Tsentralny Kavkaz: istoria, politika, ekonomika, and the main factors of their efficient coop- Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 2007. eration.

KEYWORDS: the U.S., Turkey, regional conflicts, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia.

Introduction

For over twenty years now, unsettled regional conflicts have been and remain the main security threat in the Southern Caucasus and beyond it (the Black Sea and Caspian basins and partly the Middle East). Resumed hostilities will echo far and wide both in the South Caucasian republics (Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan) and in the regional heavyweights (Russia, Turkey, and Iran). This will bring Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 27 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION destabilization dangerously close to the sources and main pipelines used to transport Caspian energy resources and threaten the energy security of most of the European countries and the United States. There has been no shortage of conflict settlement projects—from multilateral negotiations under the aegis of international structures to private peace initiatives put forward by state leaders. The United States and Turkey, NATO partners since 1952 and strategic partners since the late 1990s, arrived at a concept document called Shared Vision and Structured Dialog to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership (signed in July 2006 by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister of Turkey Abdullah Gül)2 better described as a cornerstone of partnership of the two states within the regional security system. It described “stability, democracy and prosperity in the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, and Central Asia” as one of the central spheres of shared strategic interests. In fact, the two countries remained riveted on the Middle East and never put forward joint initiatives of conflict settlement in the Southern Caucasus; their ad hoc attempts at concerted efforts were declarative and, therefore, fruitless.

Turkey: A Regional Actor with Global Ambitions

In the early 2000s, Ankara claimed the role of one of the regional leaders and more active involvement in regional developments. The roots of its external (regional) activities are found in the domestic political changes that made it possible to revise the foreign policy priorities and in the changed regional environment that allowed Turkey to become a “regional actor with global ambitions.”3 For many decades, the country perceived its regional context as dangerous; it stirred up fear, suspicion, antagonism, and enmity. Kemal Kirişçi has written in this respect: “The instability and insecurity reigning within Turkey and Turkey’s immediate neighborhood culminated in the ‘national security-centered’ understanding of foreign policy reasserting itself.”4 Prof. Mustafa Aydın has also pointed to this “security paradox:” “Although Turkey possesses the second biggest army in NATO, it lives in a perennial ‘insecurity complex.’ It is a securitized country where ‘security,’ in its wider definition, reigns supreme in societal and political development, and overrides most other considerations.”5 This “perception of being encircled by enemies,” or the so-called Sèvres Syndrome,6 was frequently used to justify the far from simple or even strained relations with neighboring states, concentration on domestic affairs, and the passive, mostly reactive, foreign policy. There is a more or less concerted opinion that around the early 2000s, when the domestic and regional situation had stabilized to a certain extent, the first wave “that prevailed from the end of the Second World War through the end of the Cold War” and pushed the security issues to the fore was replaced by a “second wave,” which was much more liberal and geared at cooperation.7 Ian Lesser

2 See: “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership,” July 2006, available at [http://turkey.usembassy.gov/statement_070508.html]. 3 A. Davutoğlu , Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (32. baskı), Küre Yayınları, Istanbul, 2009, p. 552. 4 K. Kirişçi, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times,” Chaillot Papers, No. 92, 2006, p. 12. 5 M. Aydın, “Securitization of History and Geography: Understanding of Security in Turkey,” Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2003, p. 163. 6 The fear of foreign (mainly Western) aggression and of losing (completely or partially) sovereignty and territorial integrity (named after the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, which destroyed the Ottoman Empire and de facto divided its territory among the U.K., France, Italy, and Greece). 7 See, for example: I. Lesser, “Turkey’s Third Wave — and the Coming Quest for Strategic Reassurance,” GMF, On Turkey Series, 25 October, 2011; S. Özel, “Waves, Ways and Historical Turns: Turkey’s Strategic Quest,” GMF, On Turkey Series, 30 January, 2012.

28 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION has the following to say on this score: “But the real shift was from security to commerce and from distant partners to the immediate neighborhood.”8 The Justice and Development Party, which came to power in 2002, ended the prolonged social, economic, and political crisis. Foreign policy was completely revised with “zero problems with neighbors” becoming its main priority. Whereas in the past its military might and special attention to security issues made Turkey a source of “hard power” in the region, today the country relies on “soft power” instruments: cultural and religious affinity, a shared past, economic cooperation, etc. At the same time, Turkey no longer associates its national security solely with the military component: it has been extended to the economic, energy, social, and other components. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has pointed to “security for all,” “political dialog,” “economic interdependence,” “cultural harmony” and “mutual respect,” and the main elements of the “new foreign policy thinking.”9 Having replaced its previous “zero sum game” neighborhood policy with “zero problems,” Ankara unburdened itself from the load of past problems in bilateral relations with its neighbors to fortify its regional position and improve its image in the eyes of the world community. More intensive relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan can be described as an outstanding example of mutually advantageous relations no longer limited to multisided military exercises. They went far beyond these limits to “the growth of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project;” the BTC oil pipeline and the gas pipeline going from Baku via Tbilisi to Erzurum; liberalization of or no visa regime for practically all regional states; and the steadily rising level of trade and economic relations, tourism, and business contacts with the Caucasian and Black Sea states, particularly Russia, which improves the general atmosphere in the region. There were attempts to normalize relations with Armenia, which, together with the Cyprus issue, were, according to Ahmet Davutoğlu, two missing vectors of the “zero problem policy toward Tur- key’s neighbors.” In April 2009, the talks mediated by Switzerland between the foreign ministers of Armenia and Turkey produced principles for normalizing their bilateral relations, drafting a Roadmap, and holding somewhat premature talks that the state borders would be opened without preliminary conditions on the eve of 24 April, the day that the Armenians all over the world mark as the Genocide Remembrance Day. The plans failed for objective reasons (the vague status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the inability of Turkish and Armenian society to accept the policy of drawing closer together, etc.). The so-called football diplomacy10 and the Zurich Protocols,11 which, according to the Turkish foreign minister, “are an unprecedented step toward eradicating the legal and mental barriers that have been dividing the two neighboring peoples,”12 as well as a much more active political dialog with Erevan show that the Turkish leaders were determined to resolve the old problems marring their relations with neighbors. This was but the first step toward the status of a regional leader, an independent and responsible actor on the international scene with a constructive role to play in the region. Having established relations with most of its regional neighbors, Ankara could have not only offered its model of conflict settlement, but also improved its image. Instead of being an “isolated encircled country,” it could have

8 I. Lesser, op. cit. 9 R. Erdoğan, “Volny sotrudnichestva v Chernom more idut v odnom napravlenii,” 2010, available at [http://www.day. kiev.ua/ru/article/den-planety/volny-sotrudnichestva-v-chernom-more]. 10 In September 2008, for the first time in many years, President of Turkey Abdulla Gül came to Erevan on an invitation of President of Armenia Serzh Sargsian to watch a football match between the national teams of both countries during the 2010 World Cup. 11 The reference is to two protocols Armenia and Turkey signed on 10 October, 2009 in Zurich which related the problem of whether the events of 1915 had been “genocide of the Armenian people” to a commission of experts and historians expected to study the facts to avoid the problem’s excessive politicization. 12 A. Davutoğlu, “Fostering a Culture of Harmony,” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 1, 2010, available at [http://eng. globalaffairs.ru/number/n_14784].

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 29 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION become a “platform of peace talks” and practically the only country in the region whose objectivity raised no questions in any of the conflicting sides. According to Davutoğlu, “in terms of its area of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country.”13 “It may be defined as a central country with multiple regional identities,”14 which allows Turkey to be an active peacekeeper, intermediary, and facilitator in the Middle Eastern peace process and an intermediary in settling the “frozen conflicts” in the Caucasus. The Turkish foreign minister has pointed to another huge advantage of his country: “Turkey’s unique demographic realities also affect its foreign-policy vision. There are more … Chechens than in Chechnia, more Abkhazians than in the Abkhaz region in Geor- gia, and a significant number of Azeris and Georgians, in addition to considerable other ethnicities from neighboring regions.”15 On the one hand, Turkey is a welcome intermediary in the Southern Caucasus and an influential actor in the vast Black Sea region, where it can not only organize peace talks among the governments, but also start a confidence-building dialog between the conflicting ethnic and religious groups. On the other hand, in view of the outspoken demands of the ethnic minorities in Turkey, in order to achieve peace in the region and ensure security of the corresponding national groups in the countries of their origin, Ankara cannot afford the luxury of self-isolation or ad hoc politics because, every time, tension in the region echoes inside the country. By skillfully combining its “soft power” with its considerable military resources, Turkey is trying to build relations with its neighbors at the state level, encourage individual contacts, and maintain social ties with “kindred” societies. This increases its presence in the region and adds to its attraction as an unbiased intermediary in the Southern Caucasus. Its active regional policy is part of an integrated foreign policy approach formulated by the ruling Justice and Development Party in the early 2000s. On the one hand, Ankara realizes its leadership ambitions and is seeking additional instruments in its dialog with the West by being actively involved in peacekeeping and regional energy and transportation projects. While on the other hand, its close cooperation with European countries and the United States, as well as its NATO membership are factors of its special status and a source of dividends in its relations with the regional states.

The U.S.: A Global Actor with Regional Interests

Unlike Turkey which is stepping up its active involvement in regional processes, the U.S. has traditionally been keeping a much lower profile than befitted a global power. The expert community and the U.S. leaders were convinced of the region’s strategic importance for the United States, yet this did nothing to expand America’s presence in this part of the globe beyond the economic presence of American companies and American energy requirements. Robert Art, a prominent American academic, who has formulated the “selective engagement” concept as the most efficient foreign policy line for the global power, identified the U.S. “vital” national interests (“including preventing great power wars and security competition among Eurasian great powers) and “desirable” national interests (“preserving an open international economic order;

13 A. Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008, p. 79. 14 Ibid., p. 78. 15 A. Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Zero Problems Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, 20 May, 2010, available at [http://www. foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy?page=0,2].

30 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION fostering a spread of democracy and respect for human rights as well as preventing mass murder and genocide”).16 He seems to be convinced that while the U.S.’s “vital interests” require military force for their protection, its “desirable interests” can be ensured by other means. This classification suggests that conflict settlement in the Caucasus does not belong to the U.S.’s foreign policy priorities: these interstate and ethnic conflicts do not threaten America’s “vital interests” until they develop into full-scale rivalry of the main regional forces. Despite the traditional rhetoric of consecutive American administrations, which invariably points to “huge strategic importance” of the South Caucasian republics, Washington cannot implement specific projects and increase its presence in the region because of the more than 10,000 km that separate the Southern Caucasus from the U.S.’s East Coast, the relative scarcity of the region’s energy resources (Azerbaijan owns 0.5% and 0.7% of the world oil and gas reserves, respectively), and the absence of America’s “vital interests” in the region, even though it would like to see the regional conflicts resolved.17 For a long time, as viewed from Washington, the Southern Caucasus did not appear to be critically important for America’s national security, however its interest in this part of the world kept America involved. “This interest had three main drivers… sovereignty, energy and security.”18 Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia from 1994 to 1996, has pointed out: “In the wake of the Soviet collapse in 1991, the United States developed working guidelines for dealing with the Soviet successor states. These included recognition of the states as independent and viable entities, support for their transition to market economies and democratic societies, facilitation of their integration into international institutions, and encouragement of regional cooperative arrangements.”19 The United States’ “preoccupation with the four ‘nuclear successor states’ (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) prevented the Caucasus and Central Asian states from getting much serious attention until 1994.” The author added: “The United States lacked a clear understanding of the new ruling parties in each country, for instance, and a number of unpredictable armed conflicts continued to unsettle the region.”20 This explains the fairly passive American policies in the Caucasus limited to “merely watching, listening and learning.”21 By the mid-1990s, the United States had gradually increased its attention to the Southern Caucasus, mainly due to its rich oil and gas reserves in the Caspian; in 1997, Washington announced, for the first time, that the Black Sea and Caspian basins were a zone of its national interests as a promising source of fuel and a real alternative to the Gulf energy resources. The United States became actively involved in developing new oil and gas transportation routes from the Caspian to Western Europe and in vigorous cooperation with the regional states (Azerbaijan, Geor- gia, and Turkey) within the BTC and BTE projects. The energy component gradually moved to the fore in Washington’s regional policies. Thomas Goltz, who spent several years in Azerbaijan in the 1990s, aptly pointed out that the level of America’s economic presence in the country exceeded by far the level of its diplomatic presence, while the oil tankers of Amoco, Unocal, Chevron, and other American companies appeared in the Azerbaijani capital much earlier than the American embassy.22

16 R. Art, “The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” in: Strategic Transformation and Naval Power in the 21st Century, ed. by P. Boyer, R. Wood, IR, Newport, 2000, p. 171. 17 See: J. Zarifian, “Le Sud Caucase vu de Washington, ou pour quoi et comment un territoire devient ‘strategique’,” Dynamiques Internationales, No. 6, 2012, pp. 1-2. 18 S. Cornell, “US Engagement in the Caucasus: Changing Gears,” Helsinki Monitor, No. 2, 2005, pp. 112, 111. 19 E. Sherwood-Randall, “US Policy and the Caucasus,” Contemporary Caucasus Newsletter, Berkley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, No. 5, Spring 1998, p. 3. 20 Ibidem. 21 Ibidem. 22 Quoted from: J. Zarifian, op. cit., p. 4.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 31 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The conventional third stage of America’s Caucasian policy can be described as a much greater attention to security and military-technical cooperation with the local states. It began on 9/11 when, according to Richard Giragosian, “the initial attention paid to the energy transportation corridors and transit pipelines was replaced with the need to organize ‘air corridors’ and to use air space for military purposes”23 in the interests of a global war against terrorism and the U.S.’s later military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. For some time this added vigor to America’s cooperation with the local states in the security sphere still limited to joint counterterrorist military exercises (the Train and Equip Program realized in Georgia) and extended financial and technical support to ensure border security and stem illegal trafficking of weapons and people. These efforts remained superficial; they did nothing to remedy the region’s “deep-seated” problems and merely concentrated on fighting the new global security threats. This means that America’s regional presence is limited to its economic presence, involvement in the regional energy systems, financial assistance to the newly independent states, cooperation in the anti-terrorist struggle, joint military exercises, and encouragement of the democratic processes. On the one hand, it is enough to contain the Russian and Iranian impact; however, on the other, this allows the U.S. to remain an outsider free from the obligation to promptly respond to all crises in the fairly stormy region and avoid direct involvement in a conflict with the Russian Federation if the situation becomes too hot. America is involved in settling regional conflicts for the sake of its image of superpower; it was never one of the “vital interests” and never one of the foreign policy priorities of any of the American administrations.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict as a Threat to U.S. Regional Interests

It was in the wake of 9/11 and the Turkish parliament’s refusal in March 2003 to let the U.S. use Turkey’s airspace for its Iraqi war, which came as a bolt from the blue, that the U.S. finally developed a much greater interest in the region and increased its military presence there. This is confirmed by two visits Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld paid to the region in 2003 and 2004 (that is, within the space of less than twelve months). In 2003, he and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev discussed the possibility of an American airbase on the Absheron Peninsula; the American visitor spoke of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as “a formidable obstacle”24 on the road to promoting the U.S.’s vital interests in the security sphere. It should be said that in the absence of a clear and consistent conflict settlement strategy, U.S. involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement looked especially obvious. A “mandate of the co- chairmanship was set out in March 1995” within the Minsk Group. “This now covers the activities of France, Russia, and the United States, which have been the three co-chairs of the Minsk Group since February 1997.” Officially25 this “commits the co-chairs to more activities than they are currently engaged in, mandating them specifically to carry out confidence-building measures, help develop plans for a peacekeeping force and maintain contacts with other international organizations.”26 In fact, their time

23 R. Giragosian, “Natsionalnye interesy SShA i strategiia deiatelnosti na Iuzhnom Kavkaze,” in: Iuzhny Kavkaz—20 let nezavisimosti, The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2011, p. 273. 24 S. Cornell, op. cit., p. 114. 25 Mandate OSCE DOC 525/95. 26 T. de Waal, “Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process,” Survival, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2010, p. 161.

32 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION was mainly devoted to “secret shuttle diplomacy”27 spread, in the case of the United States, beyond Erevan and Baku to Ankara, another regional capital. In the 1990s, the sore spot of Nagorno-Karabakh largely determined the dynamics of the Turkish-American cooperation in the Black Sea and Caucasian region. More than that, it figured prominently in their bilateral relations outside the region. In most cases, the two countries agreed on methods of conflict settlement (normally limited to cautious appeals to the warring sides to achieve a peaceful settlement and the ever present intention to trim the roles of the regional powers, the RF in particular). In the Armenian-Azeri conflict, Ankara and Washington found themselves on opposite sides. At that time, Azerbaijan, a strategically important state because of its geographic location and vast natural and human resources, remained on the margins of the U.S.’s foreign policy strategy mainly thanks to active lobbying of the American Armenian diaspora. At the height of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict, the Armenian lobby in Congress28 spared no effort to discontinue economic assistance to Azerbaijan. Under Section 907 Restriction on Assistance to Azerbaijan, “the United States assistance under this or any other Act (other than assistance under title V of this Act) may not be provided to the Government of Azerbaijan until the President determines, and so reports to the Con- gress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.”29 Turkey which traditionally followed the “two countries-one nation” formula in its relations with Azerbaijan was openly pro-Azeri on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. This explains why in 1993 the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress invited the Committee on Foreign Affairs to discuss the “Resolution to express dissatisfaction with the Republic of Azerbaijan’s failure to work toward a peaceful and fair settlement to the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh by continuing the devastating blockade and economic boycott of the Republics of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh” which recommended to continue the policy of withdrawal of American aid to Azerbaijan which “failed to terminate the blockade and other uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, as set forth in the Freedom Support Act” and to “encourage the Republic of Turkey, which has provided military, economic and diplomatic support for Azerbaijan, to play a neutral role in helping to promote an equitable resolution to this crisis.”30 Washington repeatedly voiced its concern about the state of Turkish-Armenian relations and called on Ankara to open its borders with Armenia. In 1996, the Senate committee on foreign affairs drafted a bill under which aid to Turkey (as earlier to Azerbaijan) should have been suspended until the blockade of Armenia had been lifted.31 Its first and second more generalized versions demanded that military and economic aid be discontinued to those countries that interfered with the deliveries of humanitarian aid to other nations (a reference to Turkey and Azerbaijan).32 Under

27 T. de Waal, op. cit., p. 175. 28 The following organizations are the most influential members of the U.S. Armenian diaspora: ANCA (Armenian National Committee of America), AAA (Armenian Assembly of America), and ARAMAC (Armenian-American Action Committee) (see: S. Karagül, “20. Yüzyılda Ermeni Diasporası ve Faaliyetleri,” in: Dünden Bugüne Türk-Ermeni İlişkiler, ed. by İ. Bal, M. Çufali, Lalezar Kitabevi, Ankara, 2006. S. 586-587). These interests were lobbied by the AC (Armenian Caucus) group of Republicans and Democrats (see: Ş. Kantarcı, “Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri ve Ermeni Sorunu,” in: Dünden Bugüne Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri, S. 598). 29 Freedom Support Act [Final as Passed Both House and Senate] — S.2532.ENR, 1992/ 102nd Congress (1991-1992), Library of Congress, available at [http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c102:4:./temp/~c102AF9kj3:e119984]. 30 Resolution. To express dissatisfaction with the Republic of Azerbaijan’s failure to work toward a peaceful and fair settlement to the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh by continuing the devastating blockade and economic boycott of the Republics of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. — H.RES.86, 1993 / 103rd Congress (1993-1994), Library of Congress, available at [http:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-103hres86ih/pdf/BILLS-103hres86ih.pdf]. 31 See: Congress and the Nation, ed. by A. O’Connor, J. Preimesberger, D. Tarr, Vol. IX, 1993-1996 (Clinton; 103rd- 104th Cong.), CQ Press, Washington, 1998, p. 230. 32 See: Ibid., p. 233.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 33 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the pressure of the Armenian diaspora and because of the mounting public discontent with Ankara’s Kurdish and Cyprus policies, the Senate agreed on an amendment which, in 1997, cut America’s financial assistance from $46 to $21 million.33 In 1999, America discontinued its military aid to Turkey. The resultant displeasure in Ankara never developed into a serious crisis in the countries’ bilateral relations. In fact, America’s fairly benevolent treatment of Baku released Ankara from the trap of having to choose between the two partners. Even though Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act limited some types of direct aid (military aid in particular) from the U.S. government to Azer- baijan, the law said nothing about humanitarian aid or grants for the development of democratic institutions and the struggle against crime and WMD proliferation. According to the information supplied by the Armenian National Committee of America for 10 years (1992-2002) “while restrict- ing certain types of direct government-to-government aid, including military aid, this law has not prevented over $200 million in humanitarian, democracy-building, anti-crime, and anti-proliferation aid to Azerbaijan.”34 The figures look a bit inflated; what is important in this context is the fact that despite Armenian lobbying, Washington and Baku did not sever their relations; discoveries of rich offshore power resources gave them a fresh impetus. At all times, the United States remained concerned about its energy security and never stopped diversifying the sources of energy resources and their transportation routes. This made Azerbaijan an even more desirable regional partner. In the 1990s, attempts were made to speed up Nagorno-Karabakh settlement by drawing Armenia into a regional pipeline project. Following an idea of the U.S. National Security Council, Unocal pledged in early 1995 to build a “peace pipeline” that would cross Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia into Turkey. The project was also supported by the Foreign Ministry of Turkey as, according to many experts, this “would contribute to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, without contradicting Turkey’s traditional policy of guarding the regional balances.”35 The leaders of both countries, however, were opposed to the idea of mixing oil business with politics. The leading international oil companies (Amoco and BP), likewise, did not like the idea of moving oil and gas across this highly volatile region; they would rather look at the north (Russia) or the west (Georgia).36 Seeking the image of a reliable Western partner and the region’s “energy hub,” Turkey worked hard not to be excluded, because of its unstable neighbors, from the planned transportation routes between the Black and Caspian seas and Europe. This makes the BTC oil pipeline commissioned in 2006 and the BTE gas pipeline commissioned in 2007 (in which Azerbaijan and Turkey were involved with considerable American support) one of the biggest achievements of the Turkish-American relations in the Caucasus of the last few years. The coordinated activities of the trans-Atlantic partners in the region were the exception rather than the rule. Turkey’s special relations with Azerbaijan and its irreconcilable Armenian policy made “Turkey once again the hostage of Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus and prevents it from being the independent regional player that it would like to be.”37 This made decision-making and coordination with Washington much harder. The Armenian factor regularly re-surfaced as an irritant in Turkish-American relations because of the Armenian lobby’s consistent attempts to push a resolution through Congress that would recog-

33 See: Ibid., p. 232. 34 Position of the Armenian National Committee of America on Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, Winter/Spring 2006, available at [http://www.anca.org/hill_staff/position_papers.php?ppid=6]. 35 E. Erşen, “The Impact of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline on Turkey-U.S. Relations,” Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies, Annual 3, 2003, p. 88. 36 S. Lussac, “Will Gas Help Resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict?” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute’s Analyst, 17 September, 2010, available at [http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node%2F5406]. 37 A. Iskandaryan, “Armenian-Turkish Rapprochement: Timing Matters,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2009, p. 39.

34 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION nize the huge number of Armenian lives lost in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 as “genocide of the Armenian people.” The resolution failed; in addition, the top figures in Washington kept on saying that severed diplomatic relations or military cooperation with Turkey would make the price to be paid for the Armenian issue prohibitive.38 Turkish historian Ilhan Üzgel has written that the far from simple Armenian-Turkish relations, the Armenian-Azeri contradictions, and the still painful Nagorno- Karabakh conflict remained a “source of hushed-up confrontation”39 between Ankara and Washington and made it practically impossible to arrive at a concerted position in the peaceful settlement process. Cooperation between the two countries in the Minsk Group (Turkey had been involved since 1992, while the U.S. was one of the three co-chairs) turned out to be a failure. In its present status, Ankara was unable to come up with efficient solutions, while the initiative of Baku to make Turkey the fourth co-chair caused resolute opposition from Erevan and failed to stir up enthusiasm among the other members. In fact, because of Turkey’s “unconditional support of Azerbaijan and the lack of diplomatic ties between Turkey and Armenia” Turkey was involved in this conflict “as a party rather than a mediator.” This limited Turkey’s participation in the peacekeeping process and “jeopardized its efforts to become a regional leader.”40 Ankara hoped that the “zero problems with neighbors” policy would change the situation for the better. In 2008-2009, Turkey made several attempts to improve its relations with Armenia; the United States actively supported the budding “rapprochement”; in 2009 Washington was the driving force behind the drafting and signing of the Zurich Protocols. It was expected that they would open the state border and restore diplomatic and economic relations, irrespective of the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement, and that Ankara would be more actively involved in the peacekeeping process. On the whole, it was hoped that these developments would defuse the “Armenian genocide” issue.41 Both parliaments refused to ratify the protocols despite Washington’s repeated appeals to both countries. Armenia proved unable to drop its demand of recognition of the “genocide of Armenians,” while Turkey could not sacrifice its relations with Azerbaijan (left outside the Protocols) for the sake of closer relations with Armenia. Since 1993, when the Turkish-Armenian border was closed, Baku and Ankara have remained convinced that the two issues are interconnected and should be addressed as such. Restored diplomatic contacts between Ankara and Erevan outside Turkish-Azeri understanding would mean a crisis between Ankara and Baku.42 The December 2011 visit of U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden to Ankara produced no results. The two sides failed to come to an agreement on unconditional opening of the borders. The expert community started saying that the U.S. preferred to maintain the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh: the Zurich Protocols effectively deprived the mediator of “economic instruments” to be used to change Erevan’s position; very much to Washington’s advantage, they removed the conflict between Ankara and Erevan and pushed the talks on Nagorno-Kara- bakh into a dead-end. Turkey as a potential mediator tried to pursue active, dynamic, and multisided diplomacy as befits a regional leader and repeatedly reproached the United States for inertia and lack of viable initiatives.43

38 See, for example: Bill Clinton’s speech in the House of Representatives in October 2000 (see: Armenia Resolution, Congress and the Nation, ed. by Ann O’Connor... Vol. X. 1997-2001. A Review of Government and Politics (Clinton; 105th- 106th Cong.), CQ Press, Washington, 2002- (1206 р.), p. 231. 39 İ. Üzgel, “ABD ve NATO’yla ilişkiler,” in: Türk Dış Politikası. Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, ed. by B. Oran, Cilt II. 6, Baskı, İletişim, İst., 2002, p. 283. 40 A. Görgülü, “Towards a Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement?” Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2009, p. 24. 41 V. Socor, “Zurich Protocols: No Substitute for American Strategy in South Caucasus,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 228, 2011, available at [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38786]. 42 See: F. Ismailzade, “Azerbaijan-Turkey Energy Cooperation,” GMF Analysis, On Turkey Series, 16 November, 2011, p. 1. 43 For example, in February 2010 Prime Minister Erdoğan pointed out: “If Russia, the U.S. and France had worked hard within the past 20 years, none of these problems would have emerged … or would remain” (see: [http://www.todayszaman. com/tz-web/news-200260-100-erdogan-vows-to-abolish-emasya-protocol-revise-security-priorities.html]).

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 35 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION This means that cooperation between Turkey and the United States over Nagorno-Karabakh settlement is complicated by many factors, the central of them being the absence of a clear and consistent Caucasian strategy on the part of the United States, the lack of its desire to promptly settle the frozen conflicts, the continued misunderstandings between Turkey and its neighbors, the special relations of both capitals with regional countries (Washington-Erevan; Ankara-Erevan, and Ankara-Baku), and the negative impact of the Armenian issue on American-Turkish relations as a whole. Much depends on the political will of Ankara and Washington, on the general atmosphere of the relations between the two countries, and on their desire to jointly realize their national interests in the region, in the energy sphere among other things.

The 2008 South Ossetia Conflict: New Opportunities and Trials for Turkey

The Russian-Georgian war of 2008 over the events in South Ossetia is another example of failed cooperation between Turkey and America. Turkey’s refusal to allow American warships carrying humanitarian aid for Georgia to pass through the Straits caused a diplomatic scandal between Ankara and Washington. Officially, the former referred to the 1936 Convention of Montreux, which limited the tonnage of warships of the non-Black Sea states passing through the Straits into the Black Sea (the tonnage of the American warships by far exceeded the maximum permitted limits). There is a more or less widely accepted opinion among the experts that Ankara merely did not want to see foreign naval forces in the Black Sea. The problem was settled several days later, however it became clear that Turkey regarded the Black Sea as an exclusive zone of Turkish- Russian influence. On the whole, the 2008 August crisis demonstrated that the potential scope of Turkey’s regional policy was fairly limited; it became clear that despite Ankara’s consistent efforts to stick to a good neighborhood policy within the region and put relations with the global actors on a mutually complementary rather than mutually exclusive platform, objective factors make it very hard to elaborate and pursue a logical and consistent foreign policy course. At the regional level, Turkey had to choose between Georgia, a strategically important partner, and Russia, an economically advantageous and politically influential partner. Georgia’s territorial integrity fit perfectly into Turkey’s national interests and its image of a conscientious observer of international laws and a fair arbiter in regional contentions. On the other hand, the worsened relations with Russia would have cut down trade turnover and the flow of Russian tourists. At the global level, choosing between Tbilisi and Moscow would have meant making a choice between the Unit- ed States, a military-political ally of long standing, and the Russian Federation, an economic and energy partner. On the one hand, Turkey and Russia agree on many regional policy issues: they both try to keep the U.S. away from regional developments; they do not want the Black Sea to become a potential foothold for military operations against Iraq or Iran. Turkey’s NATO membership does not prevent it from agreeing with Moscow that the Montreux Convention and the regime of the Straits should be consistently observed; neither country wants the Black Sea to become NATO’s “playground.”44 Tur- key and Russia achieved a consensus on the struggle against Chechen and Kurdish terrorists and

44 See: O. Taşpınar, F. Hill, “Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?” Survival, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2006, pp. 86-87.

36 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION opposition to the separatist sentiments of those who planned to set up an independent Ichkeria and Kurdistan. On the other hand, while prepared to seek peace and stability in the Black Sea and the Caucasus together, individually each of them is striving for regional hegemony. Turkey’s inadequate material resources and political weight make America’s support indispensable. This is equally important in dealing with the South Caucasian and Central Asian republics, as well as in realizing new energy projects in the region. This explains why at the first stage of the conflict Ankara looked undecided. Unwilling to complicate its relations with any of its partners—Georgia and the United States, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other—Turkey decided to keep away from both. Here is what Director and Senior Associate of the CSIS Turkey Project Bülent Aliriza had to say on this score: “One of the sides is our closest ally, the United States. The other side is Russia, with which we have an important trade volume. We would act in line with what Turkey’s national interests require.”45 This gave Ankara a chance to demonstrate its new foreign policy course: efficient, rhythmic, and multisided diplomacy of active involvement of all sides within the initiatives under Turkey’s chairmanship. In this way, Ankara addressed several strategically important problems: first, there was no need to make a hard and basically losing geopolitical choice between different partners. Second, Turkey demonstrated that it was ready to become a responsible regional leader which, armed with its “soft power” and “good neighborhood policy,” could change the dynamics of regional processes. Third, the image of peacekeeper and its sincere desire to bring the Caucasian countries together in one organization should have improved Turkey’s relations with Armenia and raise its status for the European Union. On the fourth day of the South Ossetia conflict (11 August, 2008), Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that the region needed a Caucasian Alliance to maintain regional stability. On 13 August, on a visit to Moscow, Erdoğan invited Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to set up the Caucasus Sta- bility and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) of three Caucasian states (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) and Turkey and Russia. Despite the serious contradictions between Russia and Georgia, Turkey and Armenia and Armenia and Azerbaijan, all potential members, accepted the idea of a multisided regional organization. The CSCP was expected to develop a “regional but comprehensive approach” to find a peaceful solution to all the regional conflicts and build more confidence between the warring nations. Accord- ing to the then Foreign Minister of Turkey Ali Babacan, “the Caucasus countries need to develop a functional method of finding solutions to their problems from within,” that is, without outside interference.46 His Russian colleague Sergey Lavrov was of the same opinion: it is “a mechanism for limiting the conflict potential of the region and increasing stability”; he added that “its chief value rests on common sense, because it assumes that the countries of the region should solve their own problems.”47 Turkish expert Dr. Mitat Çelikpala pointed out that in the wake of August 2008 Turkey was guided by the “regional solution for regional issues” concept.48 There was nothing new in the regional stability pact idea: President of Turkey Demirel put it on the table late in 1999; it remained on paper despite Ankara’s frantic efforts and Washington’s consid-

45 B. Alirıza, “Turkey and the Crisis in the Caucasus,” CSIS Commentary, September 2008, available at [http://csis.org/ publication/turkey-and-crisis-caucasus] 46 See: A. Babacan, “Calming the Caucasus,” New York Times, 23 September, 2008, available at [http://www.nytimes. com/2008/09/23/opinion/23iht-edbabacan.1.16407371.html]. 47 B. Punsmann, “The Cauсasus Stability and Cooperation Platform: An Attempt to Foster Regional Accountability,” ICBSS Policy Brief, No. 13, 2009, p. 6. 48 See: M. Çelikpala, “The Application of Turkey’s ‘Zero-Problems-with-Neighbours-Policy’ in the Black-Sea Region and its Surrounding Area,” available at [http://www.suedosteuropa-gesellschaft.com/framescontent/projekte/2010/conference_ berlin_turkey/celikpala_beitrag.pdf].

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 37 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION erable support. The 2008 CSCP looked much more promising at first, but the optimism of the Turkish experts ignited by the first rounds of the talks was later quenched. Turkey improved its image in the Caucasus and reminded the other regional forces that it is an indispensable force behind the peace and integration initiatives. What happened later demonstrated that Turkey, which wanted a higher international status and, therefore, sought wider political influence in the region, was left alone with its project. No other country was prepared to work hard to realize the Turkish design of a new security system in the Caucasus. Russia, which found the September 2008 reality much more acceptable than the prewar situation, preferred the post-war regional context. This explains why its leaders and the state TV chan- nels played down Prime Minister Erdoğan’s calls to set up a comprehensive stability pact designed to achieve a fair solution of the Russian-Georgian conflict. “Perhaps for this reason the Russian press chose to give short shrift to Erdoğan’s call for a stability pact, and instead interpreted his visit as signifying support for Russia in South Ossetia. It was not the finest moment in Turkish diplomacy.”49 Indeed, when the project depends on “geographical base,” Russia will be part of it for sure, which means a tight corner for Tbilisi. “Turkey’s moderate policy is fair. Not provoking Russia and protecting our national interests by not staying against Russia for American’s adventures is reasonable. But we don’t have to forget that Turkey, by itself, does not have the power to stop Russia.”50 This means that Ankara has to maintain its relations with Washington at a certain level that is critically important for the country’s security; it will, therefore, never go lower. At the same time, official visits of top U.S. officials to the region in the wake of the 2008 events (President Obama visited Moscow, while Vice President Biden went to Georgia in July 2009, and Secretary of State Clinton visited the three South Caucasian republics as part of her East European tour in July 2010, later in May 2012 she came to the region once more) showed that the U.S. would like to remain in control. In Washington, however, there was “an undercurrent of alarm that the example of what effectively became a Russian occupation of strategic areas of Georgia, if not repudi- ated in the strongest of terms and reversed, might become a precedent and encourage more uninvited Russian military perambulations around post-Soviet states. It could even prefigure the kind of brink- manship and coercive diplomacy on the borders of new NATO states that would risk triggering a much wider confrontation.”51 Speaking in U.S. Congress on 18 June, 2009, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eur- asian Affairs Philipp Gordon pointed out that the Southern Caucasus should follow the European path and that the United States was resolved to move the frontiers of liberty to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia by helping them settle their regional conflicts and build democratic institutions.52 According to Matthew Bryza, the then deputy assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia, Washington looked at Turkey as “a strategic link between North and South, lying at the center of an extended Black Sea region that connects the European Union, Russia, and Ukraine with the Middle East” and was of “crucial importance” for America’s regional plans.53 Earlier, in June 2005, the then Turkish Deputy Chief of Staff General Başbuğ pointed out that from the military point of view long-

49 M. Reynolds, “Turkey’s Troubles in the Caucasus,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2008, p. 18. 50 S. Laciner, “Is Turkey Getting Away from the US in Caucasus?” 1 September, 2008, available at [http://www. turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=2973]. 51 R. Allison, “Russia Resurgent? Moscow’s Campaign to ‘Coerce Georgia to Peace’”, International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6, 2008, p. 1145. 52 See: N. Gegelashvili, “Osobennosti politiki SShA na Yuzhnom Kavkaze v kontekste novoy paradigmy rossiysko- amerikanskikh otnosheniy,” in: Chenomorye-Kaspiy: poisk novykh formatov bezopasnosty i sotrudnichestva, ed. by A.A. Yazkova, Institute of Europe, RAS, Moscow, 2011, p. 18. 53 M. Bryza, “Invigorating the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership, Ninth Turgut Özal Memorial Lecture,” 24 June, 2008, available at [http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=406].

38 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION term security and stability in the Black Sea-Caucasian region hinged, to a great extent, on the level of Turkish-American relations.54 Regional rivalry and uncoordinated moves by the United States and Turkey at the height of regional conflicts complicate decision-making, however the sides are aware of the vital importance of their partnership. While deepening its economic ties with Russia and entering into ad hoc coalitions with it, Turkey still relies on its long-term strategic relations with the United States even if its regional initiatives have become much more frequent. This means that Turkey is insisting on diversification of partners in the military and energy security spheres as the main principle of its regional policies. By offering the Black Sea and Caucasian states regional projects, as well as its mediation in regional conflicts, Ankara is pursuing several aims: regional security, as well as a chance to confirm its regional leadership and acquire more instruments when dealing with the West. On the one hand, Ankara is preserving the status quo to keep American and NATO troops away from the region. On the other hand, however, this greatly limits the scope of its fruitful cooperation with the United States which, at times, stops being a strategic partner and becomes a strategic rival.

Conclusion

The two regional conflicts described above have revealed several objective factors that affect Turkish-American cooperation in Caucasian peacekeeping: (1) the national interests of the U.S. and Turkey in regional conflicts and the degree of their importance—in the absence of vital interests, the mediators in a conflict will probably be more inclined to be neutral, fair, and objective; this means that they will arrive at a common position based on international law; if any of them wants to achieve specific results or wants to side with one of the conflicting sides, Ankara and Washington will find it hard to arrive at a concerted position; if their national interests clash, no agreement and no harmonized position is possible; (2) the relations between the United States and Turkey with the conflicting states—close partnership relations with the opposite sides (Nagorno-Karabakh) make it much harder to work together in peacekeeping initiatives. Their positions in regional conflicts not only affect settlement and their relations with the regional states, they also leave their imprint on Turk- ish-American partnership as a whole, which might stir up disagreements and short crises between them; (3) the fairly large national diasporas in both countries (Armenian in the United States and Abkhazian, Circassian, Ossetian, and Georgian in Turkey); they have great sway over public opinion and decision-making related to the countries of origin and figure prominently in elections; (4) the changes in foreign policy (including regional) strategies: the multilateral diplomacy of President Obama’s Democratic Administration is much better suited to a dialog with all sides in the conflict and, most importantly, with Turkey than the one-sided diplomacy of the previous Republican Administration of George W. Bush, which repeatedly caused displeasure in Ankara. On the other hand, Turkey’s “new regional activism” causes much more

54 See: İ. Başbuğ, “Luncheon Remarks,” June 2005, available at [http://www.genelkurmay.org/eng/konusma/ gnkurIIncibsk_atckonusmasiogleyemegi_eng_06062006.htm].

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 39 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION disagreement with the United States on regional issues than in the 1990s, the period of the country’s relative passivity; (5) energy security—in the last few years, the United States and Turkey have been guided by energy security and economic advantages when identifying their regional priorities; on the one hand, they would like to eliminate regional instability, which threatens the smooth functioning of the pipelines; while on the other, they will become more closely involved with the energy-rich and transit-promising countries; (6) the general background of Turkish-American relations—the serious crisis in their bilateral relations (in 2003, for example) negatively affected the level of regional cooperation; a much better atmosphere, on the other hand, leads to better coordinated cooperation; (7) external factors—the regional actors (Russia and Iran), as well as the West and international organizations, are contributing to regional development; (8) the international situation—important shifts in the international system, as well as the relations among its key actors, largely affect the shifts in Ankara’s and Washington’s foreign policy priorities and the place of the South Caucasian regional conflicts among them. The above suggests that in the near future the two countries will not step up their peacekeeping efforts in the Southern Caucasus. Washington, with no clear and consistent regional strategy at the best of times, will probably concentrate on its domestic problems and the hot spots in the Middle East (the region of America’s traditional interests), which have pushed the Caucasus’ frozen conflicts from the White House’s immediate agenda. Ankara will probably remain true to the central principle of its regional policy—multisided diplomacy and its status of a regional leader: this will spark off clashes of interests and short-term crises between Turkey and the United States. The still pending problems and the behind-the-scene promises in Turkish-U.S. relations with regional countries will slow down the talks; in the absence of diplomatic relations between Ankara and Erevan, Turkey will lose part of its potential as an efficient moderator. At the same time, a correct cooperation format with Turkey and America acting together could have produced good results: Turkey could have tapped its advantages as an influential regional actor (detailed knowledge of all the regional specifics and historical ties with the main ethnic groups); the United States could have relied on its diplomatic and political consequence, without which Turkey’s peace initiatives might remain mere 3declarations. In the present far from simple regional and international situation, joint projects designed to revive a public dialog and multisided efforts to restore confidence among the conflicting sides stand a much better chance of being implemented. At the same time, narrow agreements that exclude the regional interests and principled positions of any of the concerned sides are better avoided. They will do nothing to resolve the regional conflicts and might even trigger another crisis in the bilateral relations of the trans-Atlantic partners. 40 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Taleh ZIYADOV

Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Cambridge (U.K.), Research Fellow at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy (ADA) (Baku, Azerbaijan).

SOME ASPECTS OF APPLYING THE SWEDISH-FINNISH MODEL TO SETTLEMENT OF THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

Abstract

his article presents an analysis of the local Åland parliament and the central gov- so-called Swedish-Finnish (Åland) ernment in Helsinki. T model that includes the historical back- The author draws several parallels be- ground, the settlement process, the political tween the Åland Islands and Nagorno-Kara- status of the islands, details about the self- bakh and also gives recommendations that administration structure of the Åland Is- can be used during settlement of the Arme- lands, as well as the relations between the nian-Azeri conflict.

KEYWORDS: Åland model, autonomy, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Introduction

For many years now, analysts and political experts have been offering numerous different models for settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. One of the models envisages giving the Nagorno-Karabakh region a status similar to that of Finland’s Åland Islands. This model might be the best alternative for determining the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh, since it permits self-administration, which Armenia wants, while at the same time preserving the country’s territorial integrity within the internationally recognized borders, which is Azerbaijan’s main demand. In July 2005, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Special Representative on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Göran Lennmarker (Sweden) suggested that the Swedish-Finnish model of autonomy enjoyed by the Åland Islands might be useful in determining the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and, in so doing, become a significant stimulus for resolving this long-standing conflict. A few years ago, an Armenian delegation from Nagorno-Karabakh visited Finland, where it was asked if this model might be beneficial for resolving the Armenian-Azeri conflict. While acknowledging all the advantages of this model, one of the delegation members said that “the model would be acceptable for Karabakh if Karabakh had autonomy in Finland rather than in Azerbaijan.” Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 41 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Azerbaijan may not be Finland, but nor is Nagorno-Karabakh the Åland Islands, just as Arme- nia is not Sweden. In this case, it is not the political or economic situation in Armenia or Azerbaijan that is important, but whether the Åland model would be realistic for reaching a compromise resolution of the conflict. Most Armenians and Azeris would certainly support this resolution if the international community proposed and supported this model, in so doing offering both sides corresponding stimuli. Moreover, this model would allow the representatives of both nationalities to coexist peacefully again, gradually reducing the hostility between them. The Åland model continues to draw attention both from the Armenian and the Azeri press. But only a few of the articles have presented an in-depth analysis of the structure of this model, comparing the history of the settlement of the Åland Islands and Nagorno-Karabakh question. This article presents an analysis of the Swedish-Finnish (hereafter Åland) model that includes the historical background, the settlement process, the political status of the islands, details about the self-administration structure of the Åland Islands, as well as the relations between the local Åland parliament and the central government in Helsinki.

Historical Background

The Åland Islands are situated between Sweden and Finland at the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia in the Baltic Sea. The population of the region comprises around 27,000 people, more than 90 percent of whom are Swedes. In his book,1 James Barros divides the history of the islands into three main periods: 1. Swedish control (1157-1809); 2. Russian control (1809-1917); and 3. Finnish control (from 1917). Like the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the strategic position of the Åland Islands made them a target in the geopolitical games of several large nations for many centuries. In 1714, during the rule of Peter the Great, the region was occupied, although not for long, by the Russian Empire. During subsequent years, Russia and Sweden repeatedly fought for control over the region, which was constantly transferred from one to the other. Not until after the military campaign of 1808-1809 did Russia eventually succeed in establishing control over the Åland Islands and the adjacent Finnish regions that were under Swedish control at that time. The arguments of Swedish diplomats about the strategic importance of the islands at the talks with Russia during those years are reminiscent of the current debates at the Karabakh talks. In his book, Barros describes how the Swedish negotiators “vainly insisted upon the fact that the Åland Islands have never been anything other than a Swedish province,” to which Russian diplomats replied that they were “not concerned with old Swedish frontiers, but with new Russian frontiers.”2 Accord- ing to Barros, “having used the Åland Islands as a military base against the Swedes, the Russians were aware of their strategic importance, not only for the defense of Finland, but also for control of the Baltic.”3

1 See: J. Barros, The Åland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968. 2 Ibid., p. 2. 3 Ibid., p. 3.

42 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The Åland Islands were part of the territory, along with other parts of present-day Finland, ceded to Russia by Sweden under the Treaty of Fredrikshamn on 17 September, 1809. The question of militarization or demilitarization of the Åland Islands did not leave the agenda of the Russian- Swedish talks throughout the 19th century. Sweden demanded neutrality of the islands “as an independent state under the protection of France, England and Sweden.”4 This demand was supported by Great Britain, but rejected by Russia. In 1856, Russia, France, and Great Britain signed a convention on demilitarization of the Åland Islands, which put an end to the debates, at least until the collapse of the Swedish-Norwegian alliance in 1905. In 1907, in exchange for recognition of Norway’s independence, Russia demanded annulment of the 1856 convention, which would permit Russia to deploy its troops on the islands. But when Russia publicly voiced the proposal to annul the 1856 convention, it aroused a ruckus in Sweden and Great Britain, and the question was removed from the agenda for some time. During World War I, Germany promised to return the Åland Islands to Sweden, but in exchange demanded Sweden’s allied participation in the war. However, Stockholm was adhering to neutrality and demanded that the Åland Islands be turned into a neutral zone. At the same time, Russia, knowing that Germany was planning to occupy the islands, prepared military forces to oppose it. In a letter to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Sazonov on 1 January, 1915, Naval Minister Vice Admi- ral Ivan Grigorovich emphasized the importance of the islands for Russia. “[T]he whole area was of ‘great strategic importance’ and consequently the navy’s task was to keep the area firmly in Russia’s possession.”5 The turning point for the islands came with the fall of the czarist government in Russia, establishment of the Provisional Government, followed by the Bolsheviks’ advent to power. At that time, Finland demanded independence from Russia, while Sweden insisted more virulently on accession of the Åland Islands. In the end, in December 1917, the Finnish parliament declared independence.

Finland’s Independence

Events similar to those that took place in 1988-1992 in Azerbaijan and its Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region also occurred on the Åland Islands in 1917. In August 1917, the residents of Åland held a secret assembly at which they discussed the question of accession to Sweden. “A four- man delegation was chosen, with instructions to bring to the Swedish government and Parliament the knowledge that for special reasons the ‘population of Åland deeply desired the reincorporation of its islands with the Kingdom of Sweden’,” writes Barros.6 Between 25 and 29 December, the population of the Åland Islands held something like a referendum and signed a petition to King Gustaf of Sweden calling for unification. This message fortified the position of the Swedish political groups that were calling for immediate occupation of the Åland Islands. Taking advantage of Russia’s weakened position, King Gustaf sent a message to Germany, Austria, and Turkey demanding that the question of the Åland Islands “be considered during the peace negotiations with [the] Russians at Brest-Litovsk ‘in order to safeguard [the] vital interests of Sweden in those islands’.”7 Germany offered Sweden its assistance in the talks with the Bolsheviks on accession of the islands to Sweden. At the same time, Germany also put forward several conditions: Swe- den should “allow the islanders to decide the issue in a plebiscite; to construct no fortifications on the

4 J. Barros, op. cit., p. 8. 5 Ibid., p. 21. 6 Ibid., p. 62. 7 Ibid., p. 66.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 43 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION islands; not to hand over the islands to any other power; and, lastly, to begin negotiations for an increase of iron ore exports to Germany after the war.”8 However, on 4 January, 1918, Russia recognized Finland’s independence. It is surprising that, ahead of all of the other European countries, Sweden also recognized Finland’s independence the same day. Helsinki would repeatedly make subsequent use of the argument that “Sweden and the other powers had, by their unconditional recognition, accepted the Åland Islands as part of the sovereign Finnish state.”9 Several weeks after recognition of Finnish independence, a civil war broke out in this country. While King Gustaf tried to act cautiously and avoid direct confrontation with Finland, the Swedish opposition demanded immediate control over the islands. Soon after that, Sweden dispatched its naval ships and occupied the Åland Islands. Later, German troops established control over the whole of Finnish territory, including the Åland Islands.

Status of the Åland Islands

Finland’s independence did not resolve the problem of the Åland Islands, and the talks between Finland and Sweden, like the talks between the victorious powers and Russia, continued. Helsinki accused Stockholm of interfering in its internal affairs by supporting the Ålanders in their striving to unite with Sweden. This intensified the tension in the relations between the two states. The government of Finland informed the Ålanders that it would “guarantee ‘full security’ for the islands and urgently requested them ‘to avoid all acts which would injure Finland’s [territorial] integrity, as this would not be tolerated’.”10 Just as Sweden at one time suggested raising the question of the status of the islands at a referendum during which the people of Åland would determine their future, the outcome being known in advance, so likewise is Armenia insisting today on the monoethnic Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh voting at a referendum, the outcome of which, incidentally, is also a foregone conclusion. Azerbaijan, like Finland in the Åland question, rejects this mechanism for resolving the dispute. “As early as the spring of 1918 [Stockholm advised the Ålanders] that independence could only be acquired by developing their own self-governing institutions, by an act of will of the Ålanders themselves, as well as by organizing public opinion for a union of the islands with Sweden and for a plebiscite at the proper moment which the Swedish government would require from Finland.”11 At some point, speculations appeared that Finland was considering the possibility of territorial exchange by transferring the Åland Islands to Sweden and receiving the territory of Eastern Karelia in exchange. But these speculations were refuted in a special statement by the Finnish government. Instead, Finland offered the island residents a high status of autonomy within Finland. The talks between Stockholm and Helsinki did not yield any results and the sides agreed to transfer examination of the question on the status of the Åland Islands to the League of Nations. The Great Powers tried to mediate, while the situation both in Sweden and in Finland deteriorated. Public opinion in both countries became more stringent and demanded immediate resolution of the islands’ status. As a result, the League of Nations created two special commissions to resolve

8 Ibid., p. 62. 9 Ibid., p. 70. 10 Ibid., p. 90. 11 Ibid., p. 100.

44 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the question of the islands. The first commission was faced with comprehensively studying the political, legal, and historical aspects of the Åland problem and offering possible ways to resolve it. The task of the second commission was to make specific recommendations and draw up a peace agreement. After listening to the arguments of both sides and carrying out its own research, the first commission (the Commission of Jurists) “believed that the primary question at issue was a legal one, namely, Finland’s right to sovereignty over the Åland [Islands]. Here they wished to discuss whether Finland was a sovereign state after its union with Czarist Russia had been resolved and whether [Fin- land’s] sovereignty extended to the [islands] as it did to other parts of Finland.”12 As for the question of Finland’s right to the Åland Islands, the commission concluded that “independent Finland in 1917 had included the island group [and Finland’s] subsequent recognition by other states” meant that “Finnish sovereignty over the Åland Islands was ‘incontestable’ and that legally [the Islands] formed a part of the Finnish state.”13 Armenia has also been repeatedly raising the question of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nago- rno-Karabakh. As in the case of Finland, Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and its right to Nagorno- Karabakh were recognized by the international community in 1992. According to international law, this is a fact that Erevan ultimately has to reconcile itself to. The commission of the League of Nations also examined the question of supremacy of the state’s territorial integrity over a minority’s right to self-determination, which is also pertinent today. The question “Was it possible to acknowledge as an absolute rule that a minority in a state had ‘the right to separate itself from her in order to be incorporated into another State or to declare its independence’” was addressed in the commission’s report. Citing the commission’s report, Bar- ros writes: “To concede to either linguistic or religious minorities or to any fractions of a population the right of withdrawing from the community to which they belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in international life.”14 In the end, the Commission of Jurists came forward with the following recommendations regarding the status of the Åland Islands within Finland:  “In the province of Åland exclusively, primary schools and technical schools should give instruction only in Swedish, to the obligatory exclusion of Finnish, confirmed by law.  “The Ålanders be accorded the right of preemption on every occasion when offers to purchase land are made by outsiders, and newly arrived settlers in the islands be granted the franchise only after a stay of five years.  “The Ålanders be allowed to present a list of three candidates to the government at Hels- ingfors [the modern day Helsinki] for the position of governor, who was to be chosen only from this list.”15 The commission also threatened a referendum on the status of the Åland Islands if the Finnish government rejected these recommendations. These recommendations were added to the already existing guarantees of autonomy of the islands adopted by the government of Finland. The final decision on the question of the islands was made on 24 June, 1921, and the League of Nations again confirmed the sovereignty of Finland over the Åland Islands. Three days later, on 27 June, Sweden and Finland signed the Åland Agreement—a peace treaty on the status of the islands.

12 J. Barros, op. cit., p. 314. 13 Ibid., pp. 314-315. 14 Ibid., p. 316. 15 Ibid., p. 318.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 45 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Structure of Autonomy

An act on the autonomy of the Åland Islands was hastily drawn up and adopted by the parliament of Finland on 6 May, 1920. At first the residents of the islands rejected this act. But after the League of Nations discussed the question of the status of the islands, the proposed recommendations were added to the Act on the Autonomy of Åland of 1920. Lars Ingmar Johannson, who worked as secretary general of the parliament of the Åland Islands in the 1980s, writes that “the first popularly elected body, the Landsting, or Åland Parliament, was appointed through general election and it assembled for its first plenary session on 9 June, 1922.”16 Later the Act on the Autonomy of Åland was revised twice, the first time on 28 December, 1951 and the second in 1993. The current legislation has been fully coordinated with the government of Finland and the population of the Åland Islands. The “fundamental principle” of the Autonomy Act was “to give the Ålanders as great a freedom to manage their internal affairs as possible with regard to the internal and external security of the country (Finland).”17 The Autonomy Act unequivocally and precisely divides legal responsibility between the parliaments of Finland and the Åland Islands. The Parliament of Åland functions in a similar way to the Finish parliament. It consists of 30 deputies elected every four years and functions as an institution that adopts laws and decisions on such issues of island life as the police, medical services, education, communications, economic development of the region, and so on. Johansson argues that “in these spheres Åland functions just about in the same way as an independent state with its own legislation and administrative machinery.”18 “Provisional laws approved by the Åland Parliament apply in Åland, not any equivalent laws that may be passed by the Finnish Parliament. However, in spheres where the Åland Parliament does not possess legislative competence, the laws of Finland apply in Åland too just like in the rest of the country. Such sectors include the postal, customs and monetary services, courts of justice and the penal code, most aspects of civil law such as those concerning family, inheritance and trade, and foreign administration.”19 Ålanders also have a quota in the Finnish parliament and are elected by direct voting of the island residents, just like the other deputies of the country’s parliament. All the legislative acts adopted by the Parliament of Åland are sent to the president of Finland for signing. He has the right to veto only in two cases: if the law adopted by the Åland parliament “has exceeded its legislative competence,” or if the adopted act “threatens the country’s internal or external security.”20 The Åland Parliament also adopts laws regarding its own budget and taxation. Taxes, customs duties, and other fees are levied on the residents of the island in the same way as for all other citizens of Finland. The Åland Islands also receive guaranteed assignations from the Finnish state budget every year. In addition to this, the Parliament of Åland has the right to ask for additional financing from the Finnish state budget. The Ålanders have their own flag and local police subdivisions. Moreover, the islands issue their own postal stamps and are represented (as part of the Finnish delegation) in the Nordic Council of Ministers.21

16 M. Isaksson, L.I. Johansson, The Åland Island: Autonomous Demilitarized Region, Ålands Fredsforening (The Peace Society of Åland), 1984, p. 25. 17 Ibid., p. 26. 18 Ibidem. 19 Ibidem. 20 Ibidem. 21 The Nordic Council is a regional organization that consists of ministers and parliamentary deputies of the Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the autonomous territories of the Faroe Islands (Denmark), Greenland (Denmark), and the Åland Islands (Finland).

46 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 1 Comparing Basic Facts

The Åland Islands NKAO

Territory 1,527 sq. km. 4,400 sq. km.

Population 25,000 (est. 1990) 189,000 (1989)

Demographics 90% Swedish-speaking; 76% Armenians; 5% Finnish-speaking 24% Azerbaijanis (est. 2011) (1989 census)

Autonomy status Within Finland Within Azerbaijan SSR 1920(1921)-present 1923-1991

Secession claims Yes. Wanted to unify with Yes. Initially wanted to unify with Sweden Armenian SSR, then started to demand independence

Conflict/War Mostly between regional War between Armenia and powers (No serious fighting Azerbaijan; Ethnic clashes between between Sweden & Finland) Armenians and Azerbaijanis

Occupation Brief occupation by Swedish Current occupation of NKAO and forces in 1918 adjacent seven regions by Armenian troops

Lessons Learned: Achievable and Unachievable Objectives (In Lieu of a Conclusion)

As we see, the model of autonomy of the Åland Islands has not only given the residents of the islands self-administration opportunities and cultural, economic, and political freedoms, but has also allowed two neighboring countries, Sweden and Finland, to peacefully coexist and cooperate after signing a peace treaty in 1921. This model meets the demands of the national minority for self-administration without violating the internationally recognized borders of the country. In actual fact, however, like any other autonomy in the world, the Åland Islands have their own specific traits that may differ from the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Nevertheless, the model of Åland autonomy is the most optimal solution for resolution of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, the question of whether the Azeri and Armenian sides will come to this conclusion in one year or five years’ time is still up in the air. If Armenia and Azerbaijan (or the Armenians and Azeris) want to live in peace and prosperity, cooperate in regional projects and make progress toward Euro-Atlantic integration, settlement of the conflict with guarantee of the minority’s right to self- administration while preserving the principle of inviolability of the borders is the only possible alternative. Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 47 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION It is no secret that the separatists in Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia expected the decisions on Kosovo’s ultimate status to somehow legitimize their separatist endeavors. However, as already happened with the Åland Islands at the beginning of the 20th century, there are achievable and unachievable goals in this issue. All conflicts in the world, including the question of Kosovo’s status (Resolution 1244 of the U.N. Security Council), are settled on the basis of international law. Erevan has never tried to disguise its discontent over Baku’s attempts to discuss the Karabakh conflict in the U.N., mainly due to the already adopted resolutions of the Security Council (No. 822, No. 853, No. 874, and No. 884), which criticize occupation of Azerbaijan’s territory and unequivocally call for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. But sooner or later all three Central Caucasian conflicts in the post-Soviet expanse will attract closer attention from the international community, the verdict of which will most likely displease the separatists. There can be no doubt that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh will be higher in terms of autonomy and self-administration than the one that existed in Soviet Azerbaijan. But it also goes without saying that Karabakh will not acquire independence and will not become unified with Armenia. So while the Azeri side should recognize the right of the Armenians of Karabakh to self-administration and cultural and economic freedoms, the Armenian side should understand that Azerbaijan will never agree to a solution to the conflict that undermines the country’s territorial integrity and changes the map of its borders. The price of the issue and its possible consequences should also always be kept in mind. A delay in settlement of the Armenian-Azeri Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will not only divide the future generations of Armenians and Azeris, but also make them more recalcitrant and unwilling to compromise, while today a compromise is still achievable. However, Azerbaijan’s growing international legal, economic, and military capabilities are prompting it to dig in its heels. And any compromise between the two governments on the conflict will require public approval in both countries, which is also fraught with certain difficulties.

48 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEO-ECONOMICS

Vakhtang BURDULI

D.Sc. (Econ.), department head at the Paata Gugushvili Institute of Economics, Tbilisi State University (Tbilisi, Georgia).

Ramaz ABESADZE

D.Sc. (Econ.), professor, director of the Paata Gugushvili Institute of Economics, Tbilisi State University (Tbilisi, Georgia).

SECTORAL, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL-ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES OF THE GEORGIAN ECONOMY: DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION

Abstract

his article explores the methodological ment and business) in Georgia in the context and practical aspects of the develop- of globalization. It contains proposals for creat- T ment of sectoral, technological, and ing a national sectoral structure that would institutional-organizational structures (govern- meet neo-industrial development standards.

KEYWORDS: Georgia’s economy, globalization, sectoral structure, neo-industrial development standards. Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 49 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Introduction

After the post-Soviet collapse of the economy in the early 1990s, the economic structure in Georgia, as in most other post-Soviet countries, changed drastically due to the loss of many branches of production. Although most of them were based on obsolete technologies, the national economic complex in Soviet times was diversified and to some extent self-sufficient (given the relative equilib- rium between the volumes of inbound and outbound products).1 In the past two decades, Georgia has achieved relative economic stability; production is being equipped with information technologies (IT), and construction and transportation are developing rapidly. But the sectoral structure of the country’s economy still does not meet current neo-industrial development standards. As a result, Georgia cannot achieve a satisfactory export-import balance, “reanimate” many important industrial sectors on the basis of new technology or utilize idle production capacity in agriculture. The main reason for this “lag” is slowness in tapping the potential of technological progress and integrating into global and regional international economic systems. This article is devoted to an analysis of current processes in the development of sectoral, technological, and institutional-organizational structures in individual countries in the context of globalization.

Modern Interpretations of Sectoral and Technological Structure of the Economy

The sectoral (industrial) structure of the economy is one of the main parameters that determine the level of a country’s development indicators. That is why it is very important to study the state, dynamics and ways of rationalization of this structure and to improve the economic mechanisms for coordinating its transformation. The operation of each particular economic sector is based on gradually developing technologies (both specific to this sector and used in many sectors) which enhance labor productivity growth. The parameters of material, energy and asset intensity of production change as well. New sectors emerge based on the use of new technologies; they produce qualitatively new products both for production purposes and for mass consumption. It is known that economic sectors (classified in terms of activities or types of goods and services produced) develop through the diffusion of innovations into these sectors, i.e. based on new technologies. In this process, there is a renewal (modernization) not only of physical, but also of socio- institutional technologies (management or business technologies, i.e. technologies concerned with

1 An analysis of the post-communist economy and the ways of its development in a globalizing world will be found, for example, in: R. Abesadze, “Some Theoretical Aspects of Economic Development,” The Caucasus & Globalization, Volume 5, Issue 1-2, 2011; V. Burduli, “The Role of Globalization in Reviving the Economy of Countries in Transition (A Case Study of Georgia),” The Caucasus & Globalization, Volume 1, Issue 3, 2007; R. Abesadze, “High Technologies and Economic Development” (in Georgian), in: Actual Economic Problems under Globalization, Tbilisi, 2011; R. Abesadze, V. Burduli, “Regionalnye aspekty uskorenia tempov ekonomicheskogo razvitia Gruzii,” Obshchestvo i ekonomika, No. 7, 2011; V. Burduli, “The Potential of Higher Investment Activity in Georgia,” The Caucasus & Globalization, Volume 2, Issue 4, 2008; V. Burduli, “Voprosy strukturnoi perestroiki ekonomiki Gruzii i rosta urovnia zaniatosti,” Ekonomisti, No. 5, 2009, and others. A fundamental study of these processes is presented in: V. Papava, Necroeconomics: Political Economy of Post-Communist Capitalism (Lesson from Georgia), iUniverse, Inc., New York, 2005; T. Beridze, E. Ismailov, V. Papava, Tsentralnyi Kavkaz i ekonomika Gruzii, Nurlan, Baku, 2004; V. Papava, T. Beridze, Ocherki politicheskoi ekonomii postkommunisticheskogo kapitalizma (opyt Gruzii), Delo i Servis, Moscow, 2005.

50 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION market or other production relations, and also technologies for government coordination of structural-sector development), which is in large part related to the rapid development of IT and current globalization processes (largely driven by technological progress). Present and future sectoral structures should be viewed, first and foremost, from a broad, general perspective; in this case, it is appropriate to use the terms “post-industrial” (Daniel Bell) and “super-industrial” or “third wave” (Alvin Toffler) structures, which are mainly applied to developed countries. To characterize developing countries (including newly industrialized and post-Soviet ones), a more suitable term is “neo-industrial structure,” which more accurately reflects the economic development trends observed in the world (including developed countries) and is increasingly used by researchers and journalists. For example, concepts such as “neo-industrial technological structure”, “the structure of neo- industrial economy (economies),” “neo-industrial phase of development,” “neo-industrial type of development” “European … services of neo-industrial economy,” “neo-industrial systems … in national industrial structures,” etc., which are increasingly common in the Internet (in the scientific literature, in presentations made by big corporations, etc.), are rarely used in conjunction with the term “post-industrial,” which, in our opinion, does not exactly reflect the structural economic changes taking place in the countries of the world (developed and developing). Industry is not contracting but is acquiring new features, “spawning” new sectors and modernizing, although its overall material intensity (per unit of value of produced goods and services) may have somewhat declined. The formation of a neo-industrial type of national economic structure implies the following: — the emergence of new sectors, primarily the production of IT equipment and some other sectors that are gaining considerable importance in the structure of the economy; — sustainable development of innovation activity both in individual economic sectors and in various entities within a particular sector; — an increase in the share of knowledge-intensive products and services (in the total amount of products and services); — an increase in the share of the service sector (service industry); — sustainable development of the key sectors with the use of high technologies, and the production of corresponding goods and services; — the timely diffusion of new and advanced technologies in a number of traditional sectors; — a revival, based on advanced technologies, traditional sectors that have temporarily lost their importance (in the case of Georgia, in light industry, high technology industries, furniture industry, etc.); — an orientation toward the development of the agro-industrial complex in the context of ensuring national food security in the long term; — the development of technologies for the production of individually customized goods and services (tailoring, housing construction, furniture making, some types of medical services, etc.). Another option discussed in the economic literature is mass customization of vehicles, IT and some other products which may be in demand only among the very rich (this is an opposite trend and implies standardization). Along with a study of economic structure (from the perspective of economic sectors), it is increasingly important to differentiate sectors (activities) in terms of the technologies they use (new, traditional, key, high, etc.) and in terms of other criteria (export orientation, import substitution and current demand for produced goods). Such evaluative characteristics promote more effective decision Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 51 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION making in coordinating the development of production (including decisions on its institutional organization) by both government authorities and businesses. There are various options for differentiating sectors (or individual production units and corporations) in terms of technological levels (technology intensity). Based on this criterion, sectors are classified into low, medium and high-technology categories.2 According to the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW),3 some of them can be described as industries based on high-level and key (cutting-edge) technologies. Technology intensity in any of the above options is measured by the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales. To determine this intensity, some researchers are guided by fixed R&D to sales ratios. But in many corporations and, consequently, in the respective industries, these indicators change from year to year, which is why many research centers (like the U.S. National Science Foundation) determine their range arbitrarily, without formulating any specific criteria.4 In the theory of long-term technical and economic development5 and “technological orders,” both technologies and sectors are structured. A distinction is made between so-called technologies of the key factor and the core of the technological order, and also between backbone and other sectors. In the process of their development, there is a diffusion of the necessary technologies of the dominant technological order. Technologies (technological structure) and sectors (some technologies are simul- taneously seen as sectors) make up a kind of aggregate. They are regarded (together with technological and institutional linkages) as a technological order, which keeps developing in any country. The development of existing economic sectors can also take place through the modernization of old technologies specific to these sectors. An examination of the real and financial sectors of the economy is ever more important.  First, this is necessary for the development of proactive measures to prevent undesirable phenomena in the process of interaction between different segments of the real and financial sectors of the economy that could provoke negative effects.  Second, theorists should try to understand the institutional contradictions of the global system for the reproduction of fictitious capital. Due to these contradictions, stock prices to some extent lose their objectivity, thus complicating the process of reasonable capital flow between sectors and countries.6 Our research in this area is based on modern methods of classifying sectors according to the above and other criteria (for example, as industries of the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors). These methods, together with a strategy for the development of the sectoral structure in Georgia based on these methods, are examined in the works of G. Tsereteli.7 Sector/industry classification systems can also be based on other criteria. For example, 20 or 30 years ago industries in South Korea and some other countries were already classified by the criterion of “priority.”

2 See: S. Liubimtseva, “Innovatsionnaia transformatsia economicheskoi sistemy,” Ekonomist, No. 9, 2008, p. 31. 3 See: Ye. Semionova, “Vozmozhnosti innovatsionnogo tipa razvitia,” Ekonomist, No. 6, 2006, p. 14. 4 Ibid., p. 15. 5 See: S. Glazyev, “Mirovoi ekonomicheski krizis kak protsess smeny tekhnologicheskikh ukladov,” Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 3, 2009; idem, “Vozmozhnosti i ogranichenia tekhniko-ekonomicheskogo razvitia Rossii v usloviiakh strukturnykh izmenenii v mirovoi ekonomike,” available at [www.spkurdyumov.narod.ru/glaziev/htm]. 6 See: V. Burduli, “Voprosy strukturnoi perestroiki ekonomiki Gruzii i rosta urovnia zaniatosti,” p. 30; D. Frolov, “Teoria krizisov posle krizisa: tekhnologii versus instituty,” Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 7, 2011, p. 31. 7 See: G. Tsereteli, “Strategic Goals for the Development of the Productive Forces and Ways of Achieving Them,” in: Problems in the Development of a Market Economy in Georgia, Vol. I, Tbilisi, 2000 (in Georgian); idem, “On Assessing the Effectiveness of Government Regulation in a Post-Communist Country,” in: Problems in the Development of a Market Economy in Georgia, Vol. III, Tbilisi, 2003; and others.

52 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The main priority criteria were as follows: 1. The export potential of the industry concerned. 2. The projected demand for the industry’s products in the domestic market. 3. The country’s development prospects in the case of accelerated development of the industry (or attainment by the country of a “high industrial stage”). 4. Minimization of the country’s trade deficit. 5. Minimization of resource and import dependence, reduction in the resource intensity of industry as a whole (this criterion, like all others, is of importance not only for industrial, but also for all other sectors of the economy). 6. A positive spillover effect (improvement in the efficiency of other industries; today this effect is more often referred to as the industry’s “multiplier effect”).8 It should be noted that at present some sectors/industries meet several priority criteria at once, to which can be added the following: — high level of competitiveness of the sector in the world market; — high knowledge intensity of the sector; — sufficiently high labor and knowledge intensity of products due to a reduction in material and energy intensity; — minimum or zero level of environmental pollution, opportunities for comprehensive utiliza- tion of industrial waste, etc. In current statistical reporting, in contrast to previous systems, the sectoral structure of the economy is seen in terms of types of activity (activities). Highly aggregated activities are often called sectors (industrial sector, agricultural sector, construction sector) or spheres of activity (service sphere). In most economic studies, more detailed, narrowly defined economic activities (for example, in industry) are called industries or sectors. In the literal sense, activity may also mean a particular occupation such as manager, marketing specialist, etc. Depending on the position held, statistical reports include some of these workers in various economic sectors, and others, in industries/sectors reflecting their occupation. For example, marketing specialists can work in an industrial company or in a specialized marketing company. In the first case, they will be reported as belonging to the industrial sector, and in the second, to the aggregate service sector. To avoid misunderstandings, let us note that in this study the term “economic activity” means a narrowly defined “industry” or “sector” of the economy, as is customary in the economic literature. Let us also note that production in any sector is based on a set of technologies characteristic of this sector. But a simple study of statistical facts does not provide sufficient grounds for reasoned decisions in matters of rationalizing the sectoral structure either by government regulatory agencies (for example, in improving the investment climate) or by businesses (for example, in making investments in a particular sector). They should be studied using modern theoretical approaches and the generalized practical experience of different countries gained in recent years, as well as direct quantitative indicators, normal- ized indicators and qualitative parameters.9

8 V. Khrutskiy, “Rynochnye sistemy i varianty strukturnoi perestroiki promyshlennosti,” Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii zhurnal, No. 3, 1992, pp. 97-98. 9 See, for example: R. Abesadze, “Some Theoretical Aspects of Economic Development”; G. Kolodko, “Velikaia transformatsia. Moglo li byt luchshe? Budet li luchshe?” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia (MEiMO), No. 4, 2010.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 53 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Development of Technologies and Their Diffusion in Economic Sectors

In the system of national accounts, production efficiency is measured based on economic sectors. At the same time, progress occurs and is observed from the perspective of technologies. Thus, in order to assess the effectiveness of the implementation of certain new or advanced production technologies in various economic sectors, it is important to trace their diffusion. In this process, it is necessary to take into consideration the accepted sectoral classification used in national accounts (while disaggregating branches of industry and agriculture into more detailed levels). The principles of systematizing sectors and technologies are reflected in the theory of long-term technical and economic development.10 It helps to assess the effectiveness of the diffusion of new and modernized traditional technologies in economic sectors. One should bear in mind that the development of technological orders and the transition from one (dominant) order to another are similar to the processes described by Alvin Toffler, who spoke of successive “waves”: from the pre-industrial stage to the industrial stage and then on to the “super-industrial” stage. By “wave” he meant rapid progress in science and technology. The first wave was the development of agriculture (the agricultural revolution), and the second wave, the industrial revolution. The third, “super-industrial” wave brought with it new technologies (IT and others), and this process is still at work today.11 Similarly, the transition from one “industrial” order to another is based on the emergence of new “key factor technologies” and “core”. This transition is also gradual: the key technologies of both previous and currently dominant orders are implemented alongside existing elements. It is noteworthy that such an approach makes it possible to present the technological development process and assess its effectiveness at a sufficiently detailed level (which is important for making effective management decisions in the business community and government institutions) both from the perspective of individual economic sectors and as a whole (with an assessment of the quality of the sectoral structure in individual countries). The spread of technologies (diffusion) in the sectoral structure of the national economy as a whole and its individual sectors includes the following processes: — new sectors producing technologies (production and consumption) of the “key factor” oriented toward neo-industrial development (within the framework of the modern technological order) are taking shape; — in post-Soviet countries, some lost technologies (sectors or industries) are being revived, on the basis of modernization, as a necessary component of the neo-industrial economic structure; — in varying degrees (depending on the technological nature of the sectors), there is a diffusion of key factor technologies into the other sectors and a corresponding modernization of their production technologies. For example, the share of technologies, especially in agriculture, classified as technologies of the key factor of the fourth technological order (internal combus- tion engine) is still increasing in some developing countries; in the modern, sixth techno-

10 See: S. Glazyev, “Mirovoi ekonomicheskiy krizis kak protsess smeny tekhnologicheskikh ukladov”; idem, “Vozmozhnosti i ogranichenia tekhniko-ekonomicheskogo razvitia Rossii v usloviyakh strukturnykh izmeneni v mirovoi ekonomike.” 11 See: A. Toffler, The Third Wave, Part I, Ch. 1, Bandam Books, U.S., 1980.

54 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION logical order, which ensures neo-industrial development, there is a diffusion of IT, computer- aided manufacturing technologies, etc., into various economic sectors; — traditional industries are modernized not only by implementing key factor technologies in these sectors, but also by “upgrading” existing technologies without their participation (for example, in agriculture this can be done by modernizing traditional crop rotation schemes, land improvement systems and measures to prevent soil erosion; in traditional sectors of industry, mechanical technologies are upgraded either with or without the inclusion of elements of key factor technologies). On the whole, new and high technologies whose development is of paramount importance for the formation of the modern technological order and a corresponding sectoral structure of the neo- industrial type can be classified as follows12: cognitive technologies in most IT sectors, computer- aided manufacturing technologies, microelectronics, biotechnologies (microbiology, molecular and cellular biology, biochemistry, embryology, etc.), nanotechnologies, photonics and others, atomic physics, aerospace technologies, clean (renewable) energy sources, possibly electric motors (if scientists are able to create sufficiently compact and high-capacity storage batteries), new and sufficiently clean technologies for industrial waste treatment and recycling, etc. Of course, most of the key technologies of previous technological orders do not lose their importance, just as modernized technologies of the basic sectors (agriculture, food and light industry, etc.) that meet basic human needs and are essential components of the modern neo-industrial economic structure. In order to improve the assessment of the quality of economic growth and development and to help government and business make the most rational decisions in sectoral investment-structure policy, it is necessary to be guided by a system of indicators that reflect the effectiveness of the sectoral structure (and individual sectors) and the need to stimulate it. The system of indicators also helps to improve the performance of government and business institutions (including organizations) so as to enhance their effectiveness in the process of neo-industrial development. The integrated indicators currently used in statistical reporting give some idea of the effectiveness of the sectoral structure. But today it is also very important to have indicators that would make it possible to assess the qualitative and quantitative aspects of technology diffusion from the perspective of activities (sectors) and the development of appropriate coordinating institutions. In this context, let us consider the possibility of the practical use of the methods for assessing the development of the sectoral structure employed in some modern and traditional approaches. For an assessment of the “spillovers” of “labor productivity” growth as a result of the diffusion of new technologies into sectors of material production, and also for an indirect assessment of the effectiveness of globalization processes involving cross-border capital flows through a comparison of labor productivity growth in different countries, one can use the approaches systematized by I. Stre- lets.13 In particular, the author discusses research on measuring the “spillover effects” from the information economy to labor productivity growth in other sectors.14 In this work, I. Strelets presents a table (compiled using data from a number of sources) which shows labor productivity growth in various sectors (industries) based on the standard statistical no- menclature for 1989-1999. Sectors in this table are divided into two groups: “IT-intensive” and “less IT-intensive.” The table shows that labor productivity growth in the first group was much higher than

12 See, for example: R. Abesadze, “High Technologies and Economic Development,” pp. 3-4; V. Burduli, “Vzaimosviaz razvitia tekhnologicheskikh ukladov i transformatsii ekonomicheskikh system,” in: Actual Economic Problems under Globalization, p. 24. 13 See: I. Strelets, “Novaia ekonomika: gipoteza ili realnost,” MEiMO, No. 3, 2008. 14 See: W. Nordhaus, Productivity Growth and the New Economy, National Bureau of Economic Research, Washington, 2001.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 55 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION in the second group. Thus, it clearly demonstrates that labor productivity growth spillover does in fact take place. Improvement and use of this method in a developing country (with simultaneous consideration of the overall effect of the diffusion of all new technologies) can be one of the ways to assess the quality of the neo-industrial transformation taking place in its economy as a result of the diffusion of new technologies. It should be noted that methods for measuring the increase in labor productivity and return on assets (reduction in asset intensity) and the reduction in material and energy intensity through the implementation of new and advanced technologies have been widely used and continue to be used in large corporations and enterprises in order to formulate an effective development strategy; they are also used for entire sectors.15 In our opinion, it would make sense to resume the development of appropriate sector-specific statistical reporting, especially since with currently available IT equipment this will not require significant expenditure of time or labor and will be very useful in management decision making. An increase in the range and diversity of assessments of the effectiveness of the sectoral structure and the quality of its regulation (market and government) is necessary to improve a number of mechanisms. These include the following: the mechanism for determining the achieved level of compliance with neo-industrial development principles; the mechanism for making decisions to promote the course for neo-industrial development; the mechanism for strengthening proactive regulation; and the coordination mechanism and its institutional component (let us emphasize once again that this includes both market coordination and the government regulation system).

The Influence of Globalization Factors on the Sectoral and Technological Structures in Individual Countries

The current development of the sectoral and technological structures of the economy in individual countries cannot be considered in isolation from globalization processes, as confirmed by the above analysis. In this subsection, we attempt to systematize the main aspects of the impact made by globalization factors on the formation of the sectoral and technological structures of the economy in individual, primarily developing, countries. Technological development, which is the main generator of current globalization processes, influ- ences the forms and methods of their organization. And one of the characteristic (if not key) features of the ongoing globalization in many countries is the spread of technological progress and, accord- ingly, the formation of progressive sectoral structures characteristic of neo-industrial development. That is why special attention should be paid to a scientific investigation of this particular process. Among the current globalization factors that determine the creation and development of sectoral and technological structures in individual countries (especially developed and developing ones) one should include the following: 1. A significant increase in the possibilities for accelerated diffusion of new production technologies from the leading countries to developed and developing recipient countries (given a favorable economic climate in the latter). In this process, the implementation of new

15 A sectoral analysis based on statistical data was performed by one of the authors. See: V. Burduli, Problemy territorialnogo upravlenia proizvodstvenno-khoziaistvennymi kompleksami, Tbilisi, Metsniereba, 1989, pp. 148-180.

56 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION technologies takes place both through the attraction of real foreign capital (primarily in the form of multinational enterprises) and through the purchase and implementation of modernized traditional technologies (in small and medium-sized countries, the development of domestic production technologies is only possible in some selected areas). 2. The emergence of new opportunities for accelerated adaptation of the organizational and institutional structures of business and government institutional systems supporting it to the acceptance of new technologies and neo-industrial transformation of the sectoral structure of the economy within the framework of the emerging global and regional economic orders. This fact is clearly demonstrated by a number of developed and developing countries which have established a favorable, enabling institutional and economic environment for business and have created modern organizational and institutional business structures.16 3. The increasing role of international technological cooperation. National economies, their industries and businesses are integrating into the respective global and regional international networks. This is an extremely important process which ensures the maximum possible sectoral and technological diversification of production, especially in small countries with a transforming economy. For business in these countries, it is very important to take part not so much in global as in regional technological cooperation networks. 4. Wide regulation of globalization processes by global economic organizations. Liberaliza- tion of trade (tariff reduction), which is regulated by the WTO, increases export opportunities for countries, on the one hand, and puts some pressure on national producers, on the other. Both factors have a certain effect on the development of the sectoral and technological structure in individual countries. 5. IMF and World Bank loans available on certain conditions regarding their use. It should be noted that reasonable agreements on the use of loans have a positive influence on the effective development of sectoral and technological structures in the recipient countries.17 6. Some advantages gained by countries from participation in regional international organizations. Agreements concluded within their framework (on customs tariffs, on the use of regional development funds, etc.) enable them to rationalize the sectoral and technological structure in individual countries. But even as they participate in regional unions, national governments should control the situation so as to prevent a decline in the development of some sectors. 7. Trade liberalization in a globalizing world increases competition at the international level. This induces national governments and businesses to take active measures to enhance the competitiveness of national enterprises. 8. Development of national sectoral structures as modern-technology multinational corporations (MNCs) enter national production systems. But a favorable economic climate for doing business helps to integrate more and more countries into global processes, which intensifies competition for the attraction of MNCs. 9. Globalization processes (low trade barriers, access to information on available technologies, etc.) facilitating the purchase of new licensed technologies by domestic companies. For their

16 See: J.-P. Blandinières, “Change of the Fundamental Productive and Social Paradigms and Transformation of the Public Sphere in Europe,” available at [http://www.recep.ru/files/documents/04_10_10_Blandinieres_paradigms_En.pdf]; N. Ivanov, “Globalizatsia i obshchestvo: problemy upravlenia,” MEiMO, No. 4, 2008; and others. 17 See: V. Papava, “On the Role of the International Monetary Fund in the Post-Communist Transformation of Georgia,” Emerging Markets Finance & Trade, Vol. 39, No. 5, 2003; idem, Splendours and Miseries of the IMF in Post-Communist Georgia, Laredo, we-publish.com, 2003; idem, “The ‘Rosy’ Mistakes of the IMF and World Bank in Georgia,” Problems of Economic Transition, Vol. 52, No. 7, 2009.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 57 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION implementation and the production of competitive products, the states and their business circles should make an effort to train highly qualified specialists and workers. 10. The rules and regulations of the WTO and international credit organizations, which to some extent reduce the opportunities of national producers due to pressure from competing imports and some impediments to exports caused by limitations on the use of export subsidies. Nevertheless, it is still possible to support and protect national business: subsidies and countervailing duties may be applied in accordance with the appropriate article of the GATT (the predecessor of the WTO), the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. As temporary measures, countries may impose antidumping and countervailing duties (against individual countries or trading partners), and also tariffs and quotas on imports of fairly traded goods causing injury to a domestic industry (non-discriminatory measures applied to all partners). Countries also use non-tariff methods of regulation which are not provided for by WTO agreements but are not inconsistent with them. Permanent measures (waivers of obligations) are also practiced; waivers are granted in rare cases and must be formally approved by the WTO General Council.18 11. Change in the functions of public administration as individual countries adapt to globalization processes. In successfully developing countries, national systems for supporting neo- industrial development and thus business are modernized and refined. The use of economic methods based on the principles of neoliberalism in regulatory practice does not always or immediately lead to sustainable success. For example, the Washington Consensus, described by its main author John Williamson as a combination of the Austrian School, monetarism, neoclassical economics and public choice theory (critics called this Consensus “neoliberal doctrine”),19 after the first encouraging results achieved in Latin American countries, led to a series of crises (in 1994 in Mexico, and in 1997-2002, a number of crises which started in Asia and ended in Argentina).20 But countries which took a sensible approach to the Washington Consensus (as Joseph Stiglitz put it, “countries that have not closely followed the Washington Consensus prescriptions”21) achieved certain successes—and in some cases significant successes—in neo-industrial development. A weak institutional base for coordinating and ensuring economic growth came to be seen as one of the main reasons for unsustainable development; another reason lay in the excessive constraints imposed on states by the Washington Consensus in matters of timely adjustment of regulatory mechanisms, especially where it was necessary to increase the social orientation of the state and encourage business to invest in sectors of particular importance (obviously, these two problems are interconnected and interdependent). After that, John Williamson and his co-authors gave a new interpretation of issues relating to institution building, particularly regarding the role of the state in creating and supporting market economy institutions, providing public goods, internalizing externalities, and adjusting income distribution.22 The study of issues relating to the adjustment of the principles of coordination of current economic development received even wider coverage in the works of other researchers.23 As we know, in the 1990s government support for sectoral (industrial) policy began to be limited by the prescriptions of global economic organizations. But in 2003, the range of economic poli-

18 See: G.V. Turban, “Razvitie mezhdunarodnoi torgovli i rost protektsionizma,” Visnik Donetskogo natsionalnogo universitetu, Series B: Ekonomika i pravo, Issue 2, Vol. 2, 2010, p. 431. 19 O. Ananyin, R. Khaitkulov, D. Shestakov, “Vashingtonski konsensus: peizazh posle bitv,” MEiMO, No. 12, 2010, pp. 17, 19. 20 See: Ibid., pp. 19-20. 21 J. Stiglitz, More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus, The World Bank Group Helsinki, Finland, 7 January, 1998. 22 See: Ibid., p. 23. 23 See, for example: “The Barcelona Development Agenda,” The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance, ed. by N. Serra, J.E. Stiglitz. Oxford, 2008; J. Stiglitz, op. cit.

58 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION cy objectives was extended to include the creation of national innovation systems. They were designed to perform some of the functions traditionally associated with industrial policy.24 We also know that government incentives for innovation are supported by global economic organizations and are intensively used in many countries.25 Certainly, industrial policy26 has not lost its importance today (a more precise term for industrial policy is sectoral policy because one of its purposes is to coordinate the development not only of industries, but also of agriculture, construction, etc. It can be divided into separate areas such as food security policy; policy designed to coordinate the development of agricultural sectors providing raw materials for light industry and its various sectors such as textiles, leather and footwear manufacturing; policy of support for export-oriented and import-substitution industries, etc.). But the role and importance of some tools of sectoral (industrial) policy have changed. For example, direct export subsidies for industrial and agricultural products have been reduced (due to an increase in agricultural output). For its part, this has affected the export of food products as a whole (i.e. processed and unprocessed agricultural products). Support not associated with innovation activities has significantly shifted toward indirect methods of regulation (tax and financial). But in some developed and developing countries there are various funds for the support of sectoral development. In agriculture, support is regulated by the terms of the WTO’s so-called amber, blue and green boxes.27 Generally speaking, under the current guidelines of global economic organizations, individual countries are free to experiment, within designated limits, with economic policies suited to their specific circumstances because “there is no single set of policies that can be guaranteed to ignite sustained growth… International lending organizations and aid agencies should encourage such experimenta- tion…The priority is to identify the most binding constraints to growth and to address them through microeconomic and macroeconomic policies.”28 Such an approach also underpins modern updated options of neoliberal economic policy being implemented, in principle, by most developed and developing countries. Given economic regulatory mechanisms that ensure such a policy, most developing countries have higher rates of GDP growth than developed countries. Rapid diffusion of technologies from developed to developing countries helps to modernize the latter’s technological order, diversify their sectoral structure and increase the competitiveness of their economies on a global scale. It is obvious, however, that these mechanisms have flaws associated, for example, with the weakness of the proactive29 response (in both developed and developing countries) to crisis situations, with excessive deregulation of the labor market (which reduces the socially oriented opportunities for government and trade union coordination), etc. It should also be noted that in many developing and even in some developed countries government and market systems of institutional mechanisms designed to ensure sustainable neo-industrial growth require serious improvement. Some of the modern principles of neoliberal policy,30 formulated in a number of scientific works, have already found their reflection in the guidelines and prescriptions of global international

24 See: O. Ananyin, R. Khaitkulov, D. Shestakov, op. cit., p. 23. 25 See: R. Abesadze, V. Burduli, “Innovative Activities and Their Coordination under Advancing Globalization,” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 3, Issue 4, 2009. 26 See: V. Burduli, “Industrial Policy: Institutional Framework and Implementation Mechanism”, Proceedings of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, Economic Series, Nos. 1-2, 1996 (in Georgian); D. Kuzin, “Promyshlennaia politika razvitykh stran: tseli, instrumenty, otsenki,” Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 9, 1993; V. Khrutskiy, op. cit. 27 See: R. Abesadze, V. Burduli, L. Datunashvili, “Problems of Regulation of National Food Security”, Proceedings of Scientific Works of Paata Gugushvili Institute of Economics of TSU, Tbilisi, 2011 (in Georgian). 28 O. Ananyin, R. Khaitkulov, D. Shestakov, op. cit., p. 26. “The Barcelona Development Agenda,” p. 60. 29 See: D. Kuzin, op. cit., p. 134. 30 See, for example: “The Barcelona Development Agenda”; J. Stiglitz, op. cit.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 59 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION organizations. They enable states to respond to the given short and long-term circumstances and somewhat modernize their economic policy, particularly to improve support for neo-industrial sectoral development.

Development of Organizational and Institutional Structures in a Globalizing World

The economic forms of the ongoing globalization are the result of the development of technological orders (the interrelated development of technological, sectoral, institutional and organizational structures). They are associated with the specific features of the spread and distribution of new and traditional technologies in economic sectors of various countries; international diffusion of innovations; rapid development of trade, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation; deepening management relations (in government and business); the emergence of institutions (global and regional international) for regulation and coordination; the peculiarities of cross-border capital flows and labor productivity growth in individual countries (on an international, regional and global scale); the growing importance of MNC activities; a rethinking of the purpose of medium, small and individual enterprises; the growing role of network methods of organization and management; and the development of vertically and horizontally (regionally) organized clusters. The term “globalization” appeared after the 1970s. But current economic globalization has deeper roots that can be traced back to much earlier times. In the process of globalization, the development of technologies is accompanied by changes in the forms of capital flow within and between countries, significant transformations in the system of commodity exchange (for example, export and import volumes in world trade have steadily increased, reaching 60% of world GDP31), improvements in the forms of property management, and an increase in the role of resource-saving and knowledge- intensive technologies. The innovation component of technological orders has long gone beyond the borders of individual countries; the world’s steadily increasing population requires constant growth in the traditional sectors of material production coupled with their modernization. Accelerating technological development leads, on the one hand, to redundancies in the traditional sectors, and on the other, to the emergence of new activities; this has an increasing influence on the development and change of the employment structure and sets the direction for additional efforts to resolve problems associated with the sectoral, technological and regional restructuring of the economy and reduction of unemploy- ment. At the same time, the coordination of sectoral development is now connected with the process of regionalization (both at the international level and at the level of individual countries and their regions). For example, the process of sub-national regionalization (an increase in the role of sub-national regions in coordinating economic development) is determined by the objective development of modern technological orders in a globalizing world; its earliest manifestations were observed quite a long time ago, in the 1970s.32

31 See: Iu. Shishkov, “Gosudarstvo v epokhu globalizatsii,” MEiMO, No. 1, 2010, p. 8. 32 See: R. Abesadze, V. Burduli, “Regionalnye aspekty uskorenia tempov ekonomicheskogo razvitia Gruzii”; D.L. Lo- patnikov, Ekonomicheskaia geografia i regionalistika, Gardariki, Moscow, 2006; Regionalnaia politika stran ES, Moscow, IMEMO RAS, 2009; P. Didier, “Le Nord – Pas-de-Calais face aux nouvelles dynamiques économiques: practiques et ejeux de l’aménagement régional,” Hommes et terres Nord, No. 4, 1989; P. Martin, H. Nonn, “Stratégies des acteurs publics en Alsace en matière de dévelopment économique et d’aménagement: 1982-1989,” Hommes et terres nord, No. 4, 1989.

60 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Globalization processes are inseparably connected with an increase in the number of credit and regulatory institutions (global and international) and the gradual evolution of their activities. In addition, there are changes in the functions of state and regional coordination agencies and their adaptation to the new conditions. A spontaneous reaction of local social communities to objective processes caused by the development of technological orders and globalization is the trend toward institutional and organizational restructuring observed “at all levels of social life: from firms and communities to integration blocs of states. One of the paradoxes of globalization is that it goes hand in hand with localization processes. The economic and political role of local communities is increasing, and they are drawn into a complex system of relations and dependencies. This provides them with new opportunities and, at the same time, creates new threats, compelling them to look for their own ways of adapting to the new conditions.”33 For successful development in the new conditions, local communities should look for adequate ways to coordinate their functioning and integrate into international and national cooperation systems, which will ensure the competitiveness of their firms both within the country (in a globalizing world, the domestic market is open to competing goods) and in the international market. It should be noted that at the local level (national and sub-national regional), the response to the challenges of globalization and adjustment to them are often delayed. This is characteristic, in varying degrees, of all post-Soviet countries undergoing transformation, since the technological structure of their economies does not meet the principles of neo-industrial development (due to the backwardness of many sectors of the economy). In particular, the share of high value added production systems (i.e. with a high degree of processing from raw materials to finished products) is small, and there are delays in the spread of modern forms of industrial cooperation (including in the field of innovation) and in the development of modern export-oriented and import-substitution enterprises. That is why it is necessary to make a theoretical study of the challenges posed by globalization and to develop the prerequisites for the creation of a modern economy at the national and sub-national regional levels through sustainable neo-industrial development and improvement of the mechanism of its regulation. According to rating agencies, the institutional prudential mechanism in Georgia is much more business-friendly than in many other countries. Nevertheless, it needs to be further improved so as to accelerate sustainable neo-industrial development. This applies, in the first place, to the development of production systems ensuring a high degree of processing (in industry, for example, it is necessary not only to set up assembly plants, but also to create production complexes ensuring the maximum possible degree of processing from raw to finished products). As the world globalizes, increased competition, expanding markets of goods and services, the need to reduce production costs by using cheaper labor, etc., enhance the role of cross-border capital flows (primarily in the form of technologies). This accelerates technology transfer to developing countries, and not only the transfer of traditional technologies, but also IT, computer-aided manufacturing systems, flexible and other high technologies. This particularly applies to countries with a large consumer market or having preferential opportunities for the export of products (for example, due to participation in interstate regional associations). Countries with a friendly regulatory environment for the adoption of modern technologies have an opportunity to reach the highest level of development. The transformation of systems of redistribution (of capital, technologies, diffusion of innovations and labor productivity growth, as well as income and budget expenditures within countries) is primarily determined by the conditions in emerging international and domestic markets. Changes

33 N. Ivanov, op. cit., p. 4.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 61 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION occur through the development of technologies, demand conditions and market coordination. Systems of global, regional international, national and sub-national coordination and regulation are also transformed under the impact of the current exogenous and endogenous realities, but for a number of reasons (special interests, the need to reconcile the interests of different countries and different population groups within them, etc.) the necessary decisions are often made with delay. The development of network forms of production organization and management in the context of globalization has resulted in a profound reorganization of the mode of production.34 It has found its expression in a change in the structure and scale of MNC production, in the forms of interaction between large corporations, medium and small firms forming their own networks, and also within the framework of certain activities at the national and international levels (especially in the area of IT and some other new technologies). Such methods ensure close cooperation between economic actors within the framework of common information, scientific and technological, financial and marketing networks, thus reducing production costs. This kind of cooperation does not exclude rivalry within networks and increases competition among them in the world market.35 For developing and post-Soviet countries, whose economy is at a stage of transformation, sectoral and technological diversification of production (at the level of the country as a whole and its regions) is an increasingly relevant problem. Due to globalization, new and modernized traditional technologies (especially IT and flexible technologies), computer-aided manufacturing systems, out- sourcing and franchising are rapidly spreading across the world. With the development of network structures and corresponding forms of production cooperation, they help to increase the role of small and medium enterprises, and at the local level (small and medium-sized countries and their regions), the role of divisions of high-tech multinationals. These local structures also provide a framework for the development of production cooperation of local enterprises with both MNCs as a whole and their enterprises located at local levels. International trade liberalization and the capabilities of MNCs facilitate the export of their products. Diversification of production based on these mechanisms ensures a high degree of processing; it is an important factor of globalization implying effective neo-industrial development (particularly in small countries and their regions) and opportunities for the adoption and use of modern technologies. To address the problems of diversifying production, local communities (small and medium-sized countries and their regions) create a favorable investment climate in their territory. This includes, in particular: convenient tax systems for investment and production; the necessary financial systems (created with the participation of business); training of specialists and workers based on advanced training methods; and modern transportation and product distribution systems. A major role is also played by other elements of the production infrastructure, including public utilities, and by the development of national and regional growth centers.36 As for special economic zones (industrial and industrial-innovation), they are an extreme form which makes it possible to diversify production at the level of local communities. Thus, to resolve the problems of achieving sustainable and accelerated neo-industrial development in the context of globalization (such as the creation of modern sectoral and technological structures, accelerated development of industry, agriculture, innovation and agribusiness, development of centers of attraction, improvement of business structures in various economic sectors, diversification

34 See: J.-P. Blandinières, op. cit., p. 3. 35 See: N. Ivanov, op. cit., p. 5. 36 See: V. Burduli, “Ways of Development of Regional Centers of Social and Economic Attraction in Georgia,” Sakartvelos Ekonomika, No. 1, 2006 (in Georgian); V. Burduli, N. Arevadze, “Regional Factors of Employment Growth and Their Influence on Economic Development (Georgian Case Study),” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 4, Issue 1-2, 2010, p. 91.

62 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of the economy in the country and its regions, development of regional auxiliary production systems) it is necessary to continue improving organizational and institutional systems in the country as a whole and its regions. In the first place, this implies the development of an appropriate strategy setting out the following: — the ways to improve the system of division of powers between the central, regional and local authorities; — the ways to improve the institutional structure at all levels of government; — the tasks of creating a modern technological order, which include the selection of priority sectors (for the country as a whole and with due regard for regional peculiarities), the development and implementation of a policy to stimulate growth centers (main industrial hubs, innovation centers, etc.) and the selection of ways to develop export-oriented, import-substitution and other relevant industries (through the creation of auxiliary production facilities required for their operation); — the ways to diversify production in the country and its regions; — the ways to develop small and medium-sized growth centers (along with big cities); — the methods of promoting the development of auxiliary services and firms (and farms in rural areas) characteristic of the market economy and required for real sector production; — the ways to establish an effective balance between large, medium and small enterprises, and also between foreign enterprises operating in the country and the development of national business. In order to pursue a neo-industrial development strategy and ensure the implementation of sectoral policy, the appropriate coordination and regulation mechanisms should be further improved. This is particularly important for countries that have taken the path of post-communist transformation; they should take proper care to coordinate the development of market institutions (at both the national and local levels), organizations (financial and industrial) and state regulatory instruments. It should be taken into account that neo-industrial development implies the development not only of new and traditional high-tech industries, but also of those which satisfy people’s basic material needs (manufacture of textiles, clothing footwear, furniture and other goods). Meanwhile, after the post-communist collapse of the economy, production in these sectors sharply declined, dealing a blow to agriculture as well. When there is no market for raw products (wool, leather, silkworm cocoons, etc.), many agricultural enterprises operate at a loss and are obliged to reduce production. That is why the neo-industrial development strategy, while ensuring favorable conditions for the development of high-tech sectors, should also provide incentives for businesses to revive production in these areas on the basis of new technology. An improvement of the fiscal mechanism designed to ensure neo-industrial development implies an improvement of the system of tax rates (in particular, the introduction of a progressive tax scale). It is also necessary to introduce a system of tax incentives to stimulate accelerated development, and also to create an enabling environment for priority sectors as is practiced in different forms in all developed and many developing countries. In the budgets of some countries, there are special lines (on a permanent or temporary basis) for the support of priority private sector industries. Their use, underpinned by appropriate legislation (such as Japan’s 1983 Law on Temporary Measures for the Structural Improvement of Specified Industries37), takes place either directly (at present, in accordance with WTO rules) or through orga-

37 See: V. Khrutskiy, op. cit., p. 100.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 63 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION nizations set up for this purpose (e.g. development banks). In some countries, there are special organizations for coordination of the food market and promotion of agricultural exports.38 The Georgian fiscal mechanism is also in need of improvement, taking into account that Geor- gia has no budget and tax system at the regional (territorial) level. At the same time, in a globalizing world the functions of regional coordination in developed countries are expanding, especially in the area of business support and the creation of regional production structures. Today, competition between developing countries for real foreign capital equipped with modern technologies, primarily for multinational enterprises, has sharply increased. This is because “MNC subsidiaries bring new production technologies, give access to the desired capital resources and, most importantly, provide an opportunity to use well-known brands and distribution networks that make it possible to enter the markets of large countries.”39 In view of this and considering that no country, let alone a small one, can on its own create a full-scale industrial (sectoral) complex, it is necessary to provide for fiscal and other institutional preferences for the operation of multinational enterprises and other production facilities equipped with modern technologies (suitable for deployment in the country) concentrated in the real sector of the economy (this does not apply to agriculture because massive attraction of foreigners to this sector will lead to the displacement of domestic producers from rural areas). Such preferences can be granted as the result of separate negotiations with companies intending to locate their enterprises in the country (if their location is advisable), as is customary in international practice (“in the sphere of international direct investment flows, sovereign states are obliged to negotiate with quasi-sovereign entities: MNCs”40). Naturally, it is also necessary to encourage the purchase and implementation of modern real sector technologies by domestic businesses. To accelerate the development of the sectoral structure of the economy in a neo-industrial country, financial policy should be more clearly targeted to stimulate (in accordance with WTO rules) the creation of enterprises based on technologies characteristic of modern technological orders. The country’s sufficiently developed system of private banks should be more explicitly oriented (by means of banking instruments of government regulation) toward an increase in the amount of long-term loans for the development of priority sectors. This can be achieved through proper use of the central bank’s regulatory mechanisms. It would also make sense to set up development funds (or investment funds) in the country and its regions to provide additional financing in the form of subsidies to priority industrial and agricultural enterprises in accordance with WTO rules and the recommendations of international credit organizations. For targeted concessional financing of private sector enterprises based on share capital contributions from both the state budget and private investors, it might be possible to set up a development (or investment) bank. Farm subsidies today are subject to special WTO regulations. In some of our works, we suggest rational ways of subsidizing the development of agriculture within the framework of these WTO regulations.41 At the level of the whole country, and also of its regions and local communities, we need further development of the institutional structure of the economy (in public and private enterprises, between them, and between the state and private enterprises).

38 See: V. Dobrosotskiy, “Gosudarstvennoie regulirovanie prodovolstvennogo rynka,” MEiMO, No. 9, 2000. 39 Iu. Shishkov, op. cit. 40 Ibid., p. 9. 41 See: R. Abesadze, V. Burduli, L. Datunashvili, op. cit.; V. Burduli, L. Datunashvili, “National Food Security as an Object of Regulation,” in: Priorities of Sustainable Development of Agriculture (Proceedings of International Workshop), TSU Publishers, Tbilisi, 2012 (in Georgian).

64 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Following the example of developed countries, we should diversify the mechanisms for the economic management of public enterprises. It is also necessary to expand the range of contracts between the state and private enterprises (for works ordered by national, regional and local authorities). It is also very important to develop institutional relations based on dialog and conclusion of contracts (on government preferences and business obligations) between national and regional authorities, on the one hand, and businesses, on the other. Of particular relevance today is the question of the development of modern institutional relations in rural areas, which should take place through the creation of sectoral owners’ associations, the establishment of public, mixed and private specialized auxiliary plants, organizations, firms and farms, and the granting of subsidies for core production activities.

Conclusion

Technological development and improvement of economic mechanisms in a globalizing world are interconnected and interdependent processes. They influence the formation of sectoral structures in individual countries. These processes also determine the corresponding development of institutional and organizational structures of business (both at the global level and at the level of individual countries). Under the impact of technological progress, global, regional international and national coordination and regulation mechanisms improve and adapt to the new conditions. Countries that have been able to adapt to globalization processes in due time and are prepared for the sustainable adoption of the achievements of technological progress are successfully transition- ing to the modern neo-industrial stage of development. In order to create an effective sectoral structure characteristic of neo-industrial development, it is important to assimilate the experience of successfully developing countries. This experience consists in the systematization and assessment of the effectiveness of sectoral and technological structures (considering the priority of various sectors and technologies), their institutional and organizational support, and market coordination of the formation of business structures. The tasks of neo-industrial modernization of countries, including Georgia, which is going through a period of post-communist transformation, imply further improvements in the methods for assessing sectoral and technological systems (with corresponding development of statistical reporting and analysis methods), increased effectiveness of business processes and, of course, more effective coordination of government economic policy (with a critical assessment and assimilation of the said experience). This will ensure a deeper integration of the country’s economy into the system of global and regional international cooperation ties (including through the attraction of multinational enterprises) and trade relations, helping to create a neo-industrial sectoral structure and to achieve high and rational employment and sustainable socio-economic development. Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 65 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Alexander DUDNIK

Ph.D. (Hist.), Senior Researcher for the Foundation of Ukrainian Presidents at the Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine (Kiev, Ukraine).

THE BAKU-TBILISI-KARS (BTK) RAILROAD PROJECT IN THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE CENTRAL CAUCASIAN COUNTRIES, TURKEY, AND RUSSIA

Abstract

his article reveals the positions of the the Republic of Georgia and the Turkish Re- Central Caucasian countries,1 neigh- public in the railroad. The author highlights T boring countries—Russia and Turkey, the problems of Georgia’s participation in the as well as the U.S. and EU regarding imple- project and the reasons for the opposition to mentation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars, BTK the construction of the BTK trunk line, pri- (Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku, KATB) trans- marily from Russia and Armenia, as well as portation project.2 the Armenian diaspora of the Javakheti re- In particular, the research study deter- gion in Georgia. It shows the attempts by mines the geostrategic interests (national, Moscow and Erevan to prevent implementa- regional, and global) of the country that initi- tion of the project. ated building the BTK, as well as Baku’s di- Moreover, it reveals the relation be- rect aspirations concerning the project. It tween building the trunk line and the unset- also analyzes the economic and political fac- tled Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Kara- tors of the interest of such member states as bakh conflict, as well as the world community’s recognition of the Armenian genocide 1 The author takes the original principle of dividing of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire. To this end, the political space of the Caucasian region into three it highlights the reasons why such leading subregions as his basis: the Northern Caucasus (the countries of the world as the U.S., as well as administrative units of the North Caucasian and South Federal Districts of the Russian Federation); the Central the EU countries, which are directly inter- Caucasus (the independent states of Azerbaijan, Armenia, ested in the railroad, are refusing to partici- and Georgia); and the Southern Caucasus (the northeastern pate in funding the project. It also draws at- ils of Turkey and the northwestern ostans of Iran) (for more tention to how their refusal has dissuaded on this, see, for example: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical Economy, CA&CC Press other European and Asian states from in- AB, Stockholm, 2006; E. Ismailov, V. Papava, Tsentralny vesting in the construction. Kavkaz: istoria, politika, ekonomika, Mysl Publishers, It reveals the geopolitical and econom- Moscow, 2007). ic significance of the BTK project for both the 2 In 2007, a framework agreement was signed by Central Caucasian countries and the states Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia, according to which the initial name of the project—the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi- of neighboring regions, as well as the Euro- Baku (KATB) trunk railroad was renamed Baku-Tbilisi-Kars pean Union and the U.S. It sets forth the ap- (BTK) keeping in mind the current reality. proaches toward the project of the initiator 66 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION countries and its opponents. The article also objective hurdles preventing implementation sheds light on both the subjective and the of the BTK project.

KEYWORDS: BTK project, KATB, Central Caucasus, transportation corridors, Euro-integration, regional ethnic conflicts, investments, Javakheti.

Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict led to Armenia’s transport and energy isolation from Azerbaijan and Turkey. But Baku and An- kara have equally suffered, since they have also been deprived of direct land links to each other through Armenia. Since Soviet times, this transport link was provided by the Kars (Turkey)-Gum- ri (Armenia) railroad. However, the route has not been in operation at all since the mid-1990s. It was in need of major repairs and its rails had to be replaced to meet the European gauge standards.3 Erevan failed to carry out repair of the trunk line, but has repeatedly announced its willingness to restitute rail traffic with Turkey if that diplomatic relations are restored between the two countries and the Turkish-Armenian border is opened. Ankara was in favor of normalizing relations with Erevan but in turn demanded that Armenia cease its efforts to gain international recognition of the historical events of 1915 as “genocide of the Armenians”4 and withdraw its troops from Nagorno- Karabakh. The absence of direct land routes has caused trade and economic and even political difficulties for Azerbaijan and Turkey, which are strategic partners. By maintaining good-neighborly relations with Tbilisi, Erevan has access to the Black Sea and its ports, as well as land links with Russia. Ad- mittedly, in turn, transportation between Armenia and Russia through Georgia depends on Georgian- Russian relations, which, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, are governed by the ethnic conflicts— South Ossetian and Abkhazian—in Georgian territory. In particular, the hostilities in these regions of Georgia at the beginning of the 1990s, as well as in 2008, caused a breakdown in transport links between Russia and Armenia. In 2005, Azerbaijan asked Turkey and Georgia to assist in building the Kars-Akhalkalaki- Tbilisi-Baku (KATB) railroad. This project was developed by the Georgian-Turkish Transportation Commission in Ankara in 1993 as one of the most important sections of the Silk Road—Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA)—elaborated by the European Union. However, the KATB route was not included in the international TRACECA program, since, according to the people in Brussels, it infringed on the interests and position of Armenia. The EU demanded that the Kars- Gumri railroad be launched within the TRACECA framework.5 Implementation of the KATB project will make it possible to establish a direct land link between Azerbaijan and Turkey bypassing Armenia. The new railroad through the Georgian city of Akhalka- laki will bypass Armenia from the north. In this way, Georgia will become a transportation artery not

3 A ready terminal for preparing trains for transferring to a different rail gauge has been built on the Armenian-Turkish border. 4 During World War I in 1915, thousands of Armenians were brutally killed in the Ottoman Empire. Today, Armenia is trying to get the world community to recognize those events as genocide of the Armenian people by the Turks. 5 See: G. Hovhannesian, “Zheleznodorozhny proekt Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku v kontekste turetsko-gruzinskikh interesov,” available at [http://www. noravank.am/upload/.../4.Gor_Hovhannesyan_21_VEK_03_2012].

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 67 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION only for Russia and Armenia, but also for Azerbaijan and Turkey, that is, two pairs of states that are trying to dominate in the Central Caucasus.

Interests of the Azerbaijan Republic in Implementation of the Project

President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev, who is aspiring to turn the republic from an oil-producing country into a transportation bridge joining Europe and Asia, was the direct initiator of the KATB project. Azerbaijan is actively making use of the resources of the State Oil Fund accumulated in the past in order to develop and modernize the country’s infrastructure and that of the region as a whole. Azerbaijan has associated three areas of geostrategic interests (national, regional, and global) with implementation of the KATB project. The national aspect consists in restoring the current Baku-Tbilisi railroad and bringing the internal Baku-Ganja-Gazakh transportation artery into harmony with world standards. The regional aspect focuses on reinforcing its economic and political position in the region by independently funding the national and regional project and incorporating its own traditional partners, Georgia and Turkey, into it, but leaving out Armenia. However, Baku notes that the KATB transportation corridor is not directed against the interests of any particular country or group of states, and thinks that any possible infringement of Armenia’s interests to be insufficiently justified since Azerbaijan and Armenia are de facto in a state of confrontation. There is no agreement between the two countries on border recognition. The leadership of the Azerbaijan Republic recognizes the economic expediency of Armenia participating in KATB as a regional state, but thinks that Erevan should itself, without outside assistance, make its geo-economic choice in the Central Caucasus.6 Russian researchers believe that Baku, which is supported by the West, is putting political and economic pressure on Erevan. Therefore Armenia can only realistically participate in the KATB project after it returns Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azerbaijani territories occupied by Erevan to the jurisdiction of the Azerbaijan Republic.7 Baku contends that the project will aggravate Armenia’s transportation isolation, which is why Erevan is trying to prevent its implementation as it did with other regional economic projects in the past. This is why it has been hindering the negotiation process for settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.8 However, as the experience of implementing previous energy projects shows, Armenia’s position can only have an effect on the rate at which KATB is implemented. At the same time, it will automatically lead Erevan into further self-isolation and create additional problems in the Central Caucasian region. The global aspect of the KATB project lies in the fact that official Baku is building its regional policy in keeping with global geopolitical trends and is actively involved in the world processes. Baku regards the KATB trunk line as a link that will make it possible to join the transport terminals and ports of the Black Sea and Caspian basin countries, as well as the geostrategic North-South (Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and India) and East-West (Russia, Georgia, and Armenia) corridors. As of today,

6 See: “Renaming the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku Project BTK is Significant,” available in Russian at [http://www. nregion.com/news.php?i=9212#.TzT5zXqDF0I], 2 February, 2007. 7 See: N. Fedulova, “‘Zamorozhennye’ konflikty v SNG i pozitsiia Rossii,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 1, 2008, p. 59. 8 In 2005, Robert Kocharian predicted a drop in negotiation activity with respect to settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

68 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Azerbaijan is already an important component of the South-North9 rail and road corridor from Asia to Europe initiated by Russia and Iran. Since there was no hope of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict being settled any time soon, the EU approved the signing of a framework agreement in 2007 among Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia on building the KATB railroad. According to the agreement, the route was renamed Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK), thus bringing the name into compliance with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Er- zurum oil and gas pipelines, which was significant.10 Brussels and Washington, which compete with Russia in the Central Caucasus, believe that Azerbaijan will become a hub that draws the trans-Caspian export routes to it. This will open direct access, particularly for the EU, to the raw material resources of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and at the same time significantly weaken Russia’s economic and political position not only in the Central Caucasus, but also in Central Asia.11 Implementation of the project fits into the framework of the West-East energy transportation corridor being promoted by the EU, in which Azerbaijan is being given one of the leading roles. The BTK will strengthen Azerbaijan’s transportation-transit position in this corridor, in which Georgia dominates and Armenia and Russia participate, while Baku still only plays an important role in the transportation of energy resources. The BTK route will increase cargo turnover several-fold on the reverse Europe-Asia routes and to neighboring regions. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan objectively need it since it will promote the development of their economic relations with Azerbaijan, currently realized through the ports of the cities of Baku, Turkmenbashi (Turkmenistan), and Aktau (Kazakhstan). The route will raise the importance of maritime transport in the Caspian Sea. Baku is already preparing for this by setting up a ship-building factory and ordering ferries for transporting train carriages across the Caspian.12 KATB will eventually link China and India.13 Moreover, the railroad is to become one of the links in America’s Greater Central Asia project called upon to join Central and Southern Asia with the help of a common energy and transport infrastructure. While the international peacekeeping operation was unfolding in Afghanistan, Washington examined the possibility of transporting cargo by means of the so-called Caspian route through Geor- gia, Azerbaijan, the Kazakh port of Aktau, and on through Uzbek territory to Afghanistan.14 Baku believes that the economic interests of the BTK project participants will be quickly paid off by the increased activity of the hundreds of transport operators who will be working in the Euro- pean and Asian directions within the framework of the European Union’s TRACECA project.15

Position of the Turkish Republic in Implementation of the Project KATB will help Ankara to realize several main vectors in the country’s foreign political strategy—integration into the EU and establishment of a direct transport link with the Turkic states of

9 See: R. Mamaraev, “Rol Iuga Rossii v Kaspiiskom regione,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 1, 2009, p. 72. 10 See: “Renaming the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku Project BTK is Significant.” 11 See: N. Fedulova, op. cit., p. 61. 12 See: S. Mamedov, “Baku forsiruet stroitelstvo zheleznoi dorogi v obkhod Armenii,” available at [http: //www. ng. ru/cis/2011-05-24/6_baku.html], 24 May, 2011. 13 See: “Renaming the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku Project BTK is Significant.” 14 See: N. Gegelashvili, “Kaspysky region v kontekste rossiysko-amerikanskikh otonosheny,” SShA. Kanada. Ekonomika-politika-kultura, No. 12, 2009, p. 43. 15 See: “A Presentation of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku Railroad Construction Project is to be Given in Georgia,” available in Russian at [http://www. news.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=223639], 21 November, 2007.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 69 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Central Asia, which is still controlled by Russia and Iran. This route will also raise Turkey’s significance as an important transit-transportation hub throughout the entire Eurasian region and allow it to become an indispensable element in both regional and global policy.16 Official Ankara has been actively supporting the project. In the spring of 2006, President of the Turkish Republic Ahmet Necdet Sezer said in Tbilisi: “Turkey is interested in establishing a railroad link with Georgia and Azerbaijan within the framework of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku project.” While Head of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül said, “If the route is joined in the east with the proposed rail and sea routes between Baku and Aktau (Kazakhstan) and further with China, and in the west with the Turkish Marmarai project (the rail branch near the Bosporus), it will become an important part of the shortest route to Europe. Moreover, construction of the railroad will open up new opportunities in the context of cargo shipments between Asia and Europe and strengthen the transport positions of Azerbaijan and Georgia in the region, particularly by redirecting some of the cargo flows from the North-South transportation corridor to the West-East corridor,”17 which is not in the interests of Russia and Armenia in particular. According to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, after implementation of the Baku- Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum energy projects, building the KATB route will ensure a direct transportation link between the Caspian Region and Europe and accelerate integration of the Central Caucasian states into Europe. This will be a route on which trains can travel at up to 120 km an hour. The project will make it possible to carry out cargo and passenger movement and will become a new Silk Road on rails.18

Position of the Republic of Georgia Regarding the BTK Project

Official Tbilisi has also been supporting BTK railroad as a strategically important project that will allow the country to gain access through Turkey to the world, particularly European, market. Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gela Bezhuashvili noted that it is important for Georgia to have as many transport links with neighboring countries as possible for joining the regions with the country’s center. He also assured Erevan that the project would not lead to Armenia’s further isolation, but, on the contrary, would help to expand regional cooperation and European integration of all three countries of the region. Furthermore, operation of the Kars-Gumri line would not eliminate the need for the KATB route.19 After all, in 2009 alone the trade volume between Europe and Asia reached $600 billion. According to the forecasts of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- ment (OECD), in the next 10-15 years, development of the world economy will be sustainable thanks to the high development rates, primarily of China and the East Asian countries. This will result in a 1.5-2-fold rise in the foreign trade circulation between the counties of Europe and Asia.20 It stands to reason that this requires acceleration of the region’s economic development, particularly of its transport infrastructure, which will produce profit for the Central Caucasian countries and raise their role and significance in trade between Europe and Asia.

16 See: G. Hovhannesian, op. cit. 17 “The Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku Railroad: For and Against,” available in Russian at [http://www.apsny.ge/ analytics/1150822399.php], 20 June 2006. 18 See: Ibidem. 19 See: S. Markedonov, “Zheleznodorozhny Baku-Dzheikhan,” available at [http://www.politcom.ru/5484.html], 14 December, 2007. 20 See: R. Mamaraev, op. cit.

70 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION In this respect, Co-Director of the Institute for Policy Studies in Tbilisi George Tarkhan-Moura- vi wrote that the Central Caucasus is becoming a transport hub between Central Asia and the West and could acquire the same significance for the North-South route.21 However, there were also doubts about how economically expedient the route would be for Georgia. In particular, Minister for Economic Reforms Kakha Bendukidze did not see indices in the project that would guarantee the country large amounts of profit. Moreover, the project might deprive the Georgian ports in Batumi and Poti, through which Azerbaijani and Turkish cargo is currently transported, of income. So, of all the project’s member countries, it is least advantageous for Georgia. For example, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines currently in operation have brought only $50 million into the country’s treasury, whereas $300 million were expected.22 According to Georgian economists, the route could become an additional source of income for the country only if Turkey or Azerbaijan assumes responsibility for total funding of its construction and operation. That is, Tbilisi supported the project at the political level, but was unable to participate in its construction financially, so it held talks with Kazakhstan and China as potential investors in the project.23

Russia and the BTK Route

Russia and Armenia have been actively opposed to building the KATB (BTK) route from the very beginning. Moscow could not allow strategic transportation routes to bypass it through the territory of neighboring states. The Kremlin also thought that the BTK would compete with the Russian Trans-Siberian route, which is essentially the only railroad currently joining Europe and Asia. Despite the fact that the throughput capacity of KATB will be small compared to the Trans-Siberian route (Transsib), the flows of cargo delivered from the Central Asian countries to Europe might change direction. The route will make Georgia and Azerbaijan less politically and economically dependent on Russia, which will ease their integration into the European structures. In the 1990s, during the first Chechen war, Moscow lost its influence on the Central Caucasian countries, tacitly supporting the separatist movements in Azerbaijan and Georgia and closing the borders with these countries, which aggravated their economic position. Therefore Baku and Tbilisi strove to reduce their dependence on Russia.24 According to Russian experts, spending on the route will not be paid off for another few decades, while there will be nothing to guarantee the volumes of cargo flow. They are also convinced that the interest of Turkey and Azerbaijan in establishing a direct land link bypassing Armenia is in no way economic, but military-political in nature. After all, relations between Baku and Ankara are gradually acquiring signs of a strategic alliance and could reach a qualitatively new level, which the Krem- lin wants to avoid. Moscow also thinks that politicized and economically unpromising transport projects will never become a foundation for peace and stability in the Caucasus. So the Kremlin suggested reopening the rail link between Armenia and Turkey. Moscow believed that this would make it possible to establish communication among Russia, Turkey, and Iran and give a boost to trade

21 See: I. Pashkovskaia, “Deiatelnost Evropeiskogo soiuza na Iuzhnom Kavkaze,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, No. 5, 2009, p. 59. 22 “A Presentation of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku Railroad Construction Project is to be Given in Georgia.” 23 See: Ibidem. 24 See: “Kars-Akhalkalaki-Baku is in No Way an Economic, but a Military-Political Project,” available in Russian at [http://www. atc.az/forum/showthread.php?t=5451&page=9/], 26 November, 2007.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 71 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and economic development of all the states of the region without exception within the framework of the North-South transportation corridor.25 But the Kars-Gumri route cannot operate without settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. That is, Moscow is leery of a project that, in addition to weakening its political influence in the region, will also be of economic detriment, but it is not rushing to resolve the indicated conflict. Russian researchers also believe that Russia ranks lower than the West in the hierarchy of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy priorities. Today, Western capital, technology, pipelines, and the raw hydrocarbon sales market tie Azerbaijan to Europe. Baku associates it with hopes of accelerated modernization of its economy and a civilizational breakthrough. It is also important that the share of West European countries in Azerbaijan’s foreign trade turnover is higher than similar indices with Russia. In particular, in 2006 this index for the EU countries reached 60%, while for Russia it was 15%.26

Armenia’s Position Regarding the BTK Project

Official Erevan thought that building the BTK (KATB) railroad had a political objective from the very beginning, i.e. Armenia’s complete isolation. However, keeping in mind the difficult terrain through which it will pass and the existence of the Kars-Gumri-Tbilisi route and terminal for transferring trains to the European gauge standard, the project has been deemed economically unsubstantiated, expensive, and inexpedient both for Armenia and for the entire region. In the summer of 2005, Armenian Prime Minister Andranik Margarian said during a visit to Georgia that Erevan considers Georgia’s participation in the KATB project to be Tbilisi’s internal affair.27 However, some Armenian researchers believe that the project will show again that Georgia is turning from a subject of international policy into its object.28 At the same time, the Armenian opposition asserted that the BTK would either not influence Armenia’s economic development at all, or would have a positive impact. On the whole, Armenia will not find itself in complete isolation and will not become an island-state. The opposition discerned the relation between constantly postponing settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and building the railroad, since other states are unable to wait until Armenia resolves its issues and begins operating as a transit country.29

Georgia’s Armenian Diaspora and the BTK Route

The Armenian diaspora of the Javakheti region of Georgia in the form of the leaders of the Armenian Union of the Intelligentsia of Javakheti and the Armenian Javakhk movement thought that implementation of the project would help the Turks, their language, and their culture to penetrate the

25 See: “Kars-Akhalkalaki: A Delayed Time Bomb in Armenian-Georgian Relations,” available in Russian at [http:// www.azg.am/palm/?lang=RU&num=2007031306azg daily/], 13 March, 2007. 26 See: N. Fedulova, op. cit., p. 60. 27 See: S. Markenonov, op. cit. 28 See: G. Hovhannesian, op. cit. 29 “A Presentation of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku Railroad Construction Project is to be Given in Georgia.”

72 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION region. Furthermore, the local Armenians would lose land, settlements, communication means, and their culture, and they would not be hired to fill the new jobs, if only from the standpoint of security. They could not allow this, since Turkey does not want to open the border with Armenia or recognize genocide of the Armenians. So only the Turkish government is interested in building KATB. Repre- sentatives of the Armenian Union of the Intelligentsia of Javakheti also claimed that implementing the project would aggravate Armenian-Georgian relations.30 Such severe statements by representatives of Georgia’s Armenian diaspora show that there is a real threat to this project, the implementation of which requires certain security guarantees.

Feasibility Report of the Project, Its Initial Cost, and Leading Investors

The feasibility report of the BTK railroad project was drawn up by Turkey’s Yuksel Domonik Company, which spent $1 million on it. According to the feasibility report, the final budget of the project amounts to $360 million. The railroad is 104 km long. Seventy-five kilometers pass through Turkey, and 29 km through Georgia. According to the project, a terminal will be built in Akhalkalaki for transferring trains with a Soviet rail gauge of 1,520 mm to the European standard of 1,435 mm,31 and 183 km of the Akhalkalaki-Marabda-Tbilisi railroad have been reconstructed. The cost of the project, keeping in mind the infrastructure, is estimated at between $400 and $800 million, and even as high as $1 billion, according to different data.32 The route will make it possible to transport 10-15 million tons of cargo every year. The throughput capacity of the project in different sections will amount to between 15 and 30 million tons of cargo a year. Since implementation of the project was indeed economically expensive and, more important, was politically charged, this caused an unambiguous reaction among international investors. For example, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Japanese financial institutions announced their willingness to finance construction of the route. At the same time, the EU European Commission at first refused to fund the project, explaining this by the fact that it was not included in the TRACECA program, although the route itself is not on the approved program map. But later, at the beginning of 2008, the EU said it was willing to financially support the BTK (KATB) project, but only if it was of regional importance, that is, if all the countries of the region, including Armenia, were incorporated into it.33 The American establishment was unable to reach a consensus on this issue. Congressmen were against further intensification of Armenia’s isolation by means of new large-scale regional transport projects and forbid American companies from participating in funding the project in order to thus promote stability, or to be more exact maintain the status quo in the Central Cau- casus. However, in contrast to the congressmen, the U.S. presidential administration was essentially not against building the route. Therefore, some researchers assessed the statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza about Washington’s negative attitude toward the

30 See: “Building the Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars railroad is Being Revived,” available in Russian at [http://www. trans-port.com.ua/index.php?newsid=12830], 12 May, 2010. 31 See: R. Grdzelian, “Po kakim soobrazheniiam Azerbaidzhan sokratil finansirovanie zh/d Kars-Akhalkalaki?” available at [http://www.analitika.at.ua/news/po_kakim_soobrazhenijam_azerbajdzhan_sokratil_finansirovanie_zhd_kars_ akhalkalaki/2009-10-17-15771], 17 October, 2009. 32 See: “Kars-Akhalkalaki: A Delayed Time Bomb in Armenian-Georgian Relations.” 33 See: “The EC is Still Refusing to Finance Construction of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku Railroad,” available in Russian at [http://www. regnum.ru/news/953042.html/], 6 February, 2008.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 73 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION BTK (KATB) project on the eve of signing the agreement on its implementation as the U.S.’s political flirt with Russia.34 The decisions of the U.S. Congress and the EU did nothing to help finance the BTK (KATB) by the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and China interested in it. This led to Azerbaijan and Turkey drawing up and financing the project using their own funds. Since Tbilisi was unable to participate in implementing the project for financial reasons, Baku issued Georgia the first loan for $200 million for 25 years at a 1% interest rate. Furthermore, Tbilisi can extend the loan payback time by means of income obtained from operating the route in its own territory.35

Conclusion

The revitalization of trade and economic relations between the Central Caucasian states and the European and Asian countries was the main reason for building the BTK (KATB) route. One of the regional factors promoting construction of the BTK was the unsettled Armenian-Azeri Nagorno- Karabakh conflict. The route will reduce both Georgia and Azerbaijan’s transport dependence on Moscow and the latter’s position in the region as a whole. It goes without saying that Russia and Armenia stand to lose somewhat from this project, while Azerbaijan and Georgia, which will become important strategic transport hubs in the Central Caucasus, will gain a certain amount of economic profit. It stands to reason that this factor will promote the European integration of the project’s member countries. The route will significantly reinforce Turkey’s transportation-transit position both in the region and on a global scale. It will help to establish a direct link between Ankara and the Turkic states of Central Asia. The project, in which many states of Europe and Asia are interested, will be implemented keeping in mind common and objective world economic factors and complies in particular with the Euro- pean transport energy East-West corridor project. Thanks to the BTK (KATB), shipments of goods will also increase in the Caspian Sea basin. The project is being carried out by Azerbaijan and Turkey without the financial and political support of large Western countries, which indicates an increase in the political and economic significance of these states as important and independent regional players. The route will not lead to an increase in Armenia’s transportation isolation, but nor will it promote either an improvement in Armenian-Turkish relations or settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. One of the main threats to implementation of the project is the position of Georgia’s Arme- nian diaspora in the Javakheti region, through which the route will pass. The transportation and economic significance of the BTK project is obvious. But in the future, even in conjunction with the Kars-Gumri route, it will not be able to provide for the constantly growing need for cargo transportation both from Asia to Europe and in the opposite direction. Both railroads will continue to be in demand.

34 See: G. Inandzh, “Doroga Kars-Akhalkalaki-Baku mozhet pereiti pod control Rossii,” available at [http://www. abhazia.com/snews.php?action=news&id_cat=3&id_mess=5938], 3 February, 2007. 35 See: S. Markedonov, op. cit.

74 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Zurab GARAKANIDZE

Ph.D. (Econ.), Turkish CESRAN’s English language magazine Political Reflection, British e-magazine NewsBase, commentator (Georgia, Tbilisi).

Nata GARAKANIDZE

MA (International Relations and Policy), Sr. Specialist, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of Georgia (Georgia, Tbilisi).

INFLUENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST TENSION ON THE EU’S SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR

Abstract

ussia and Iran are looking at strength- gas pipeline to the EU in late 2012. As major ening their presence in the EU gas members of the GECF, Qatar and Iran are R market. For this purpose, they are go- trying to export their own gas to the EU mar- ing to approve the charter of the GECF— ket. Syrian territory has already become the Gas Exporting Countries Forum—at the main obstacle to this endeavor, which, in summit in Tehran scheduled in November turn, could cause tension among the GECF 2013. This will allow the GECF member members. countries to control (like OPEC) the pricing Russia, as an active member of the and quotas of gas production in the world GECF, could support Damascus and Tehran markets, transforming GECF into the Orga- in their plans, on the one hand, but it is clear nization of Gas Exporting Countries (OGEC). that any new gas pipeline built to carry gas The appearance of this new cartel will to the coast of the Mediterranean and further promote the building of new gas pipelines to the EU contradicts the South Stream—a from Qatar through Syria to the Mediterra- personal project of RF President Vladimir nean coast and from Iran (the South Pars Putin, on the other. Given these develop- giant gas field) via Syria to the same destina- ments, the best option for Moscow would be tion. At the same time, Russia started build- the continuation of the recent clashes in the ing its new subsea (Black Sea) South Stream Middle East.

KEYWORDS: the Middle East, Southern Gas Corridor, gas deposits, GECF, OGEC, the Mediterranean, Syrian clashes, South Stream. Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 75 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Introduction

According to some media sources, a secret protocol was signed between the leaders of the Syr- ian opposition fighters and the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar during a meeting in Doha in early February 2013: if the Syrian opposition wins, Qatar will lay a gas pipeline to Europe.1 This will mean the appearance of a new competitor to the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor projects bypassing the Central Caucasus routes.

Transit and Sale of Natural Gas— Specific Types of Economic Relations

Problems related to transit pipeline control, access to pipeline routes, and the availability of cheap energy resources, such as coal and oil, have reduced consumption of environmentally friendly natural gas worldwide. Historically and logically, the first type of fuel—wood—has always been fully accessible, while coal is generally found in most European and American countries. Another source—oil—was discov- ered in the territories of dozens of countries, whereas gas was found only in a limited area… Accord- ing to economic theory, monopoly occurs when specific individuals or enterprises have sufficient control over the supply of a particular product or service. In this regard, concentration of oil production in the hands of approximately 20 states led to the creation of the simplest form of monopoly—an oil cartel (i.e. OPEC).2 The narrower concentration of gas production and its special transportation facilities—pipelines— in the hands of only a few nations leads to a higher degree of monopolization.3 This situation is quite new in the world’s energy supply-demand mechanism because natural gas has only recently become one of the main types of fuel. Natural gas has come into considerable use in the last 30 years. It is being brought from the supplier to the consumer directly (approximately 88-90%) by gas pipelines, passing free market pricing. Problems related to the influence of gas trade on the global and regional processes are less studied than those relating to other types of fuel. For this reason, we would like to introduce some of our considerations regarding the geo-economic contradictions between (a) the ongoing processes of gas market monopolization and the new pipeline projects developed by one supplier and (b) the free pricing trend and the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) spot market.

1 See: P. Escobar, “Why Qatar Wants to Invade Syria,” Asia Times, 27 September, 2012. 2 See: The Effect of OPEC Oil Pricing On Output, Prices and Exchange Rates in the US and Other Industrialized Countries. Congressional Budget Office, February 1981, available at [http://www.intellectualtakeout.org/library/primary- sources/effect-opec-oil-pricing-output-prices-and-exchange-rates-united-states-and-other-industrialized-coun]. 3 See: K.P. Green, “What Drives Gas Prices: Cartels, Speculators, or Supply and Demand?” Energy and Environment Outlook, No. 3, 26 August, 2011, available at [http://www.aei.org/outlook/energy-and-the-environment/conventional-energy/ natural-gas/what-drives-gas-prices-cartels-speculators-or-supply-and-demand/].

76 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION New OPEC (OGEC) against Europe

In the 21st century Russia’s Gazprom became the largest gas producer and exporter in the world. It should hereby be noted that natural gas is the predominant energy source within the Russian Fed- eration as well, accounting for nearly half of the country’s domestic consumption. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian officials realized that they had spent all their money on the arms race and that they did not have enough resources either (which, in turn, any industrialized country needs). On the contrary, the U.S. achieved sustainable economic growth—Wash- ington managed its foreign policy without much effort using the rich oil fields. For this reason, Rus- sia, in turn, decided to gain access to energy resources—both oil and gas. Considering the fact that the oil sector has no big prospects in Russia, Moscow focused on gas, its production, transportation, and export. The starting point was 1995 when the Russian leadership posed a new challenge for Gazprom: to move from its own gas fields to the fields of Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Iran, Europe, and the Middle East. The reserves of natural gas in Europe are limited, accounting for less than 5% of global resources. At present, the European gas market is under structural changes resulting from the liberalization of the spot market trade. The main EU gas-producing countries are the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. The aim of Putin’s new initiatives—the North Stream and South Stream projects—is to increase Russia’s role on the international arena and put more monopolistic pressure on the EU, which will depend on Russian gas for the next decades. Russia and the Middle Eastern countries are likely to play a major role in the high gas production growth of the non-OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. As a result, GECF—the first international gas organization—was created in Tehran in 2001. Until the seventh ministerial meeting of the GECF in Moscow (2011), the Forum operated without a charter or fixed membership structure. A secretariat was created in Moscow, which declared the start-up of work on the GECF charter (Secretary General—Leonid Bokhanovsky from Russian Stroitransgaz Com- pany). The GECF is still officially known as the Gas Forum, but the main producers and exporters, Iran and Russia, have started taking steps to change the body into an OPEC-like organization—the Orga- nization of Gas Exporting Countries (OGEC). They are planning to draw up a charter, including common decisions on world gas prices and production quotas. Iran, Russia, Qatar, Venezuela, and Algeria are among the GECF’s member states possessing 42% of the world’s gas reserves. These countries will do their best to elaborate the above mentioned OGEC instruments at the next (15th) ministerial meeting in Tehran in the fall of 2013. In response to Moscow’s plans, Washington and the EU had to create a rival Nabucco initiative. This project later became part of the wider cross-Caspian EU Southern Gas Corridor program, including alternative sources of gas and number of transit countries, among which Turkey and the Central Caucasian states are of crucial importance. As for Turkey, Ankara paved the way for Russia’s South Stream by allowing the gas pipeline to run through a Turkish section of the Black Sea. Turkey is also the main transit country in the cross-Caspian corridor Europe is planning, which will play a part either in the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) or the Nabucco-West projects. In this context, An- kara and Moscow are clear rivals, but they have bilateral interests too. While Putin wants to keep relations with Turkey warm, Turkey responded equally to the Krem- lin. More than half of Turkish natural gas imports come from Russia. Moreover, bilateral trade between the countries could reach $100 billion over the next years. However, Moscow and Ankara have different views on the situation in Syria. After a meeting with Erdoğan, the Russian president claimed that Turkey and Russia had similar opinions about what they would “...like the situation in Syria to Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 77 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION be,” but differed on the methods to reach those goals. In other words, they successfully downplayed their differences during Putin’s visit.4 Despite the differences about the Syrian developments, it is expected that Russia and Turkey will put mutually beneficial interests first and continue to work on energy. It is true that the riots in Syria are playing the role of an obstacle for the EU Southern Corridor projects passing through Turk- ish territory. In addition, this tension can help to speed up the AGRI—the only project planned to bring Caspian LNG to Rumania via the Black Sea, bypassing Turkey.

Alternatives of EU Gas Supply

Recent development of liquefied natural gas (LNG) international trade has allowed producers to bypass pipelines. However, LNG requires an expensive infrastructure, which is a problem for producers and importers. Therefore, LNG is unlikely to reach the levels of dry gas shipments. Some energy analysts see potential in shale gas and other unconventional sources as a way to boost domestic resources of countries once thought to have limited gas resources, lessening the possibility of import dependence. However, it cannot be concluded that the U.S.’s success with shale gas can be reproduced elsewhere. So-called technique twins—horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, also called “fracking” (injecting a chemical liquid and sand into rock formations under high pressure to push out natural gas)—have the potential to access large swaths of shale gas, tight gas, and coal-bed methane (CBM) once thought too expensive to extract. When assessing gas reserves in 32 countries, the EIA report for 2011 clearly estimates that shale gas could increase recoverable gas globally by as much as 40 percent.5 As mentioned above, Russia plays a leading role in gas production. However, it is very possible that its dominant position will be soon replaced by a competitor rich in so-called alternatives. For example, Poland or Ukraine with their rich shale gas resources could become relevant players in the global market. Most analysts believe shale gas will change the global gas market. Energy specialists note that it is shale that will make it impossible for a natural gas cartel to form along the lines of OPEC and break the stranglehold on gas trade for some big players such as Russia or other GECF member countries. According to the EIA, shale gas could reduce the imports of China and South Africa and provide export opportunities for other countries. Despite the shale successes, the European Commission has decided to stick with natural gas as the most environmentally friendly of all hydrocarbons. In the future, the share of gas in the European energy balance (18.8% at the beginning of 2010) will continue to grow. And given the limited ability to increase production from fields in the North Sea and the shale gas ban in the EU (for environmental reasons), the short and medium term increase in gas consumption will be met by pipeline gas import, i.e. the EU is negatively affected by monopoly. Whereas the price of oil and coal are actually determined by usual exchange quotations, gas is largely subject to extended contractual agreements between the seller and the buyer. The price of long-term contracts for gas delivered by Russia’s Gazprom and Norway’s Statoil is not favorable for Brussels, but there is no other choice for Europe yet. The average gas price in Europe indexed in relation to oil is about $12 per 1 million British thermal units, while in the U.S., it is $2.5. In the case of

4 See: L. Witschge, “Putin and Erdoğan Put Syria in the Backseat, Pipeline Politics First,” The Global Y, 10 December, 2012, available at [http://theglobaly.wordpress.com/2012/12/10/putin-and-erdogan-put-syria-in-the-backseat-pipeline- politics-first/]. 5 See: M. Katusa, “New EIA Report Says Shale Gas Boom Could Go Global,” Casey Energy Report, available at [http:// www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2011/06/27/new-eia-report-says-shale-gas-boom-could-go-global/].

78 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the EU’s gas market, we are talking about a system in which 90% of the gas is supplied via pipeline. The other 10% is supplied in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG), only a quarter of which is sold on the spot exchange at gas hubs. As a result, Brussels has designated two priorities in the EU’s gas policy: (1) Putting pressure on existing suppliers to reduce prices, and, at the same time, focusing on spot gas prices in long-term contracts linking the price of natural gas to that of oil. In this regard, in September 2012, the EU began a so-called antitrust investigation against Gazprom; (2) Diversifying supply sources. The EU is looking forward to the Southern Gas Corridor. This program would increase energy security in the event of supply disruptions (winter of 2006 and 2008/09), on the one hand, and help to increase competition among suppliers, on the other. However, the project was never implemented because of the lack of necessary political and economic support. In response to the problems that have arisen in the context of Nabucco, the Azeri-Turkish alternative—the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline—was projected. British BP, the operator of Shah Deniz, joined TANAP with a 12% stake. However, the TANAP pipeline is designed to pump only 16 billion cubic meters of gas from Azeri’s Shah Deniz II, which is to become the main source for the EU corridor. The situation with diversification of the EU’s supplies became easier after the so-called shale revolution in the U.S., which has redirected large amounts of LNG from the U.S. market to the Eu- ropean. However, Brussels has not given up the hope of obtaining new amounts of pipeline gas. The Arab Spring provided this opportunity. Be that as it may, the gas discoveries in Israel, Qatar, and Syria, along with the emergence of the EU as the world’s potentially largest natural gas consumer, combined to create the grassroots of a geopolitical clash over the Al-Assad regime in Syria. Almost all the Middle Eastern countries support the insurgents in Syria. GECF member Qatar is among them.

The New EU’s Gas Supply Diversification

In the early 21st century, Qatar became the third largest country in terms of the world’s proven natural gas reserves. Doha has the world’s largest undeveloped gas field, the North Field (South Pars—located in Iran, which also has access to it). Qatar started to increase its LNG supply, and the number of liquefaction plants is constantly growing in this small country. Special LNG tankers make Qatar more independent in terms of diversification of markets, i.e. geo-economically. However, given the geographical location of the country, the sources of its income are largely dependent on the security of the Persian Gulf. During the conflict between Iran and the West, Tehran threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz, through which JSC Qatargas moves all its gas tankers. In this regard, Qatar is trying to develop pipelines bypassing the Strait and the Gulf. A similar tactic was chosen by Saudi Arabia. For the past two years, Riyadh has been actively working on building bypass pipelines. Thus, the new Qatar pipeline was built via the UAE to Oman, which if needed, can be brought to the Gulf of Oman. However, the pipeline does not allow Qatar to compensate losses if the Strait of Hormuz is closed. Since early 2008, Qatar has been considering another project—building an onshore pipeline to Europe. The resource base of the new pipeline would be the North field, and laying it would strengthen the rights of the emirate for development of the whole deposit. At a time when Tehran is under the pressure of anti-nuclear sanctions, the country has been forced to suspend the development of this deposit, meaning that Qatar can beat its opponent. As a result of the ongoing changes in the Middle East, the prospect of building a new gas pipeline from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 79 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION coast is far less fantastic. In this case, Qatar only needs an agreement with three countries—Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. Saudi Arabia could be persuaded to build the gas pipeline through its territory, in spite of its territorial claims against Qatar. The Western world can play an important role in this process. The social situation in the country is very tense, despite large investments in social programs. The majority of the Saudi population is young people, many of whom have never worked and do not have any prospects. Moreover, the growing tension within the ruling family and the ongoing conflict with the local Shi‘ite population living in the oil-and-gas-rich Eastern Province (located near Qatar) could bring the additional benefits to the new pipeline construction project. Earlier Riyadh entirely relied on an alliance with Washington, but U.S. policy is now causing serious concern in the Saudi elite. The country is particularly worried by the fact that the Obama administration not only wants to withdraw from the hot spots (evacuation from Iraq ended in 2011, while withdrawal from Afghanistan is planned in 2014), but is actively demonstrating its unwillingness to intervene in new conflicts. It has become clear to Riyadh that the likelihood of U.S. military action against Iran is low. In addition, the U.S. did not provide direct support of the Saudi intervention in Bahrain. This means that the Saudi regime is not certain that Washington will support it in the event of a serious crisis. Although it is against a cooling of relations with Washington, Riyadh is also against making friends with a stronger Europe. It is significant that today the EU ranks first (€ 3.3 billion in 2010) as a supplier of military-industrial complex products to Saudi Arabia. Europe, in turn, is willing to collaborate with the Saudi regime. For the first time, Berlin has approved the sale of Leopard II tanks to Saudi Arabia, despite its “non-democratic regime.”6 These tanks can be used to suppress protests in Bahrain. The situation in Jordan in terms of gas supply is tense. A new supply route will be welcomed. This is in the interest of Qatar and particularly of the EU. The government and ruling dynasty of Jordan receives substantial subsidies from Qatar. In addition, Doha has a serious impact on the Jor- danian opposition from the Muslim Brotherhood. So, despite the instability in the country, the pipeline project will not be affected even if the government in Amman is replaced. The only problematic section of the proposed gas pipeline remains in Syria, which is ruled by Bashar al-Assad.

How Syrian Tension Can Affect the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor

It is true that the wars in the last century were fought for oil, while now a new era is beginning, the era of wars over gas and its transportation routes. Nowadays, when the EU is under the threat of destruction because of the economic crisis and its influence is waning in the face of the emerging BRICS powers, the key to economic prosperity is to gain control over the main energy resource of the 21st century—natural gas. That is why Syria, located in the center of the largest gas field in the Middle East, has become a target. Once Cyprus and Israel began producing oil and gas in 2009, it became clear that the whole Mediterranean would be pulled into the game; either Syria would become the main target of attack, or the entire region would live in peace. According to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy—the think tank of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the Mediterranean basin has the largest reserves of natural gas, the major part of which are located in Syria. The same institute suggested that the struggle between Tur-

6 H. Kundnani, “More Money, More Problems. Germany’s Foreign Policy is Increasingly Driven by Economic Interests,” 31 October, 2011, available at [https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/article/19288/print].

80 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION key and Cyprus could be exacerbated by the fact that Turkey cannot accept the loss of the Nabucco project (despite the agreement signed between Moscow and Ankara on transit of the South Stream pipeline gas through the Turkish exclusive economic zone). Disclosure of the Syrian gas sector allows realizing the importance of Syria. Controlling Syria means controlling the entire Middle East and its natural gas flows. By controlling Damascus, Mos- cow controls not only its last Middle Eastern ally, but also prevents implementation of the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor projects through Turkish territory. This is the real reason for Russian support of Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad… Syria is important not only for the transportation of gas from Qatar, but also for the transit of Egyptian gas via Jordan and Syria to the coast of Mediterranean, and further to the EU. Cairo has revealed a clear interest in the supply of gas to Europe for economic reasons. First of all, the new government needs the vital sources of income. Furthermore, the gas deal between Israel and Egypt has been unpopular because of claims that Israel buys gas at below-market, monopoly rates. The pipeline that carries gas to Israel across the Sinai desert has been sabotaged at least 14 times since the start of the Egyptian uprising last year, seriously disrupting supplies. A strategic alliance has developed between Doha and Cairo on the Syrian issue—the two countries are working together in the framework of the U.N., the Arab League, and the Group of Friends of Syria. Syria has a chance to become one of the most important gas producers along with Lebanon given the discovery of a huge new gas field in Qara near the border with Lebanon. Now it is a whole new geographic, strategic, and energy space, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The signatories of the Damascus 2011 agreement allowing Iranian gas to pass through Iraq and gain access to the Mediterranean coast (which opens a new geopolitical space and cuts the lifeline of the EU Corridor’s Nabucco and other projects) emphasized that “Syria is the key step to a new era.” The obstacle that the project is experiencing gives an idea of the intensity of the fight that broke out over control of Syria and Lebanon. Not surprisingly Qatar has become one of the main instigators of the fight against the Syrian regime. In addition to active and public diplomacy of the Qatar government, according to unofficial sources, Doha has been providing substantial humanitarian assistance to the Syrian armed opposition. Indeed, if it wins the civil war, the last obstacle to the gas pipeline from Qatar to the Mediterranean will fall. Similar logic can in many ways also be used to explain the actions of the EU. However, the Syrian regime has a powerful ally—Iran. Iran’s ultimate plan is to build a pipeline from Syria to Lebanon’s Mediterranean port in order to further transport gas to the EU. Syria and Iraq would both buy Iranian gas from Iran’s part of South Pars field.7 For a long time, the implementation of these plans was prevented by the Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein. However, after the American military invasion against Hussein, the way was opened for Iranian gas to go to Syria. In July 2011, Iran signed several agreements on transporting its gas through Iraq and Syria. The ten-billion-dollar pipeline, which will take 3 years to complete, will run from Iran’s Assalouyeh near the South Pars gas field located in the Persian Gulf to Damascus in Syria via Iraqi territory. The pipeline will carry 40 billion cubic meters per year,8 while the expected annual transport capacities of the TAP, Nabucco West, and TANAP gas pipelines are about 20 billion cubic meters each. Based on those numbers, Iran (all crude oil and gas imports from this country have been banned by the EU) is going to export twice as much gas to Syria and the Islamic world as the Caspian countries do to Europe. To achieve this objective, Iran, Iraq, and Syria are ready to invest as much money as their Western counterparts do.

7 See: H. Hafidh, B. Faucon, “Iraq, Iran, Syria Sign $10 Billion Gas-Pipeline Deal,” The WSJ, 25 July, 2011. 8 See: “Some Reasons to Materialize Iran, Iraq, and Syria’s Gas Pipeline,” 13 February, 2013, available at [http://www. naturalgaseurope.com/iran-iraq-and-syria-gas-pipeline].

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 81 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Construction of a pipeline via Syrian territory would allow Tehran to solve the problem of transporting its natural gas to the world markets. Even if Western energy companies refuse to buy Iranian crude at the final destination, Tehran will always be able to sell its gas to Europe through a second or third party. These arguments make Iran support the regime of Bashar al-Assad, sending him money and volunteers. If the Alawite regime is defeated, the plans for the new pipeline will remain unfulfilled. It should also be noted that other major countries also play a role in the scenario related to Syria. If the Al-Assad regime wins, Russia, as “a savior,” will play a decisive role in developing and exploiting Syrian gas. Israel (Russia has some leverage over Israel too) could theoretically shift to back a Russian-Syrian-Iraqi-Iran gas consortium were Israel and Iran to reach some consensus on the nuclear and other issues. Turkey is likely to play a far more constructive role in the region as a transit country for Syrian and Iranian gas, and this new alternative to the EU’s corridor, the transit option, will become a new bargaining chip for Ankara in its long negotiations with Brussels for EU accession. As for the U.S., after starting the Shale Revolution, Washington’s big game around Damascus is not related to energy issues; the U.S.’s main target is to arrange the Greater Middle East in this region.

Some Conclusions

It can be concluded that, given the above-mentioned developments, the likelihood of any serious military conflict is out of the question, especially now that the U.S. does not actually depend on external supplies of oil and gas. Further development of shale production can transform the U.S. into an exporter of hydrocarbons. This is why the Obama administration has conceded its key role in the Middle East to European Union member states. Washington has its own vision of the possible developments in the region. This includes the formation of a new system of balance that will be oriented toward the U.S. by supporting Qatar and Europe in the struggle over Syria. However, Washington is not willing to directly take part and thus escalate the military situation against Bashar Assad. It is clear to the U.S. that only Russia can benefit from the unrest in the Middle East. Moscow is quite happy with the current situation in Syria, where none of the parties is close to winning. The ongoing events in Syria hinder Russia’s opponent Southern Gas Corridor prospects, because Turkey—the main transit chain of this corridor—is fully involved in the conflict. In addition, building a Russia’s competitive pipeline from Qatar, Egyptian or Iranian Gas Pipelines to the Mediter- ranean via the Syrian territory seems to be an unrealistic plan so far. Therefore, Russia’s position on the Syrian conflict is clear—“the worse, the better.” This might be why Russia’s support of its last ally in the region is expressed only by the Moscow’s irreconcilable position on Western intervention in the U.N. Security Council. While Qatar, Iran, and the EU are discussing the Syrian issue with each other, Gazprom continues with plans for its megaprojects—North Stream (building the third and fourth lines is under discussion) and South Stream (the underwater section is yet to start). These projects represent the competi- tors of the Caspian (via Turkey and Caucasus, bypassing Russian territory) pipeline routes. Thus, if Russia manages to complete its megaprojects before the end of the Syrian conflict and the implementation of Southern Gas Corridor projects, it is expected that Moscow will maintain its monopoly in the European energy market, which, in turn, is crucially important for the country’s budget itself. In addition, the above-mentioned gas pipeline projects of Qatar and Iran—active GECF members—contradict not only the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor plans, but also Russia’s South Stream project. 82 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOCULTURE

Oleg KUZNETSOV

Ph.D. (Hist.), Deputy Rector for Research, Higher School of Social and Managerial Consulting (Institute) (Moscow, the Russian Federation)

THE CONFLICT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH: IS IT A “CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS”? How Samuel Huntington’s Theory Explains Its Culturological Dimension

Abstract

he author discusses various ideological offers his own culturological approach to the and ethnopsychological aspects of the causes, motives, and driving forces behind the T Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the light of Armenian-Azeri confrontation and the ways they Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory. He affect the prospects for peaceful settlement.

KEYWORDS: Nagorno-Karabakh, Samuel Huntington, the clash of civilizations theory, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Artsakh, diaspora, peaceful settlement.

Introduction

Samuel Phillips Huntington (1927-2008) is one the outstanding political and social thinkers of recent times, whose theoretical contribution to our understanding of geopolitical processes is beyond Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 83 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION comparison. His theory of the clash of civilizations presented to the public in the form of an article “The Clash of Civilizations?”, which appeared in 1993 in Foreign Affairs, an American journal of political science,1 and later extended to a historical-philosophical monograph The Clash of Civiliza- tions and the Remaking of World Order published in 1996,2 was an ideal model and real pattern of comprehensive and unbiased understanding of the sources, the driving forces behind and development prospects for the absolute majority of regional (local) wars and conflicts of the last quarter of the 20th century, including the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Strange as it may seem, during the twenty-five years of open confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas, the political scientists in both countries have made no attempt to analyze the sources, nature, and possible repercussions of the conflict from the point of view of a civilizational-culturological approach within the framework of Huntington’s theory. They have had every opportunity to do this, but in the last two decades there have been no political scientific works (to say nothing of Ph.D. and doctoral theses) in Russian carrying an analysis of the Armenian and Azeri positions in the Karabakh war of 1991-1994 and its follow-up in the region in the context of the clash of civilizations theory. I can offer two explanations: either no one in Ar- menia and Azerbaijan was able to undertake this analysis, or the conclusions of such efforts proved to be too “unpalatable” for either side to be published. It is my turn to fill in the gap.

Nagorno-Karabakh: A Fault Line War

It is commonly believed that the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is a conflict between two an- tagonistic civilizations—Armenian and Azeri—even though the nationalist-minded Armenian intelligentsia refuses to accept this. They consistently deny that the Azeri ethnicity has the right to national self-identity as a very specific social organism and dismiss its members as “Caucasian Turks.” There is nothing new in this; it is an echo of the official position of the Russian Empire which, at the turn of the 20th century (that is, a century ago) refused to treat the Azeris as an ethnicity in their own right and insisted on the term Transcaucasian Tatars. The fact that some Armenians deny the right of the Azeris to ethnicity is the best proof that the confrontation between these two nations is civilizational (cultural-ideological) rather than socioeconomic and political. Samuel Huntington used the term “fault line war” to describe conflicts similar to that around Nagorno-Karabakh and discussed them in Chapters 10 and 11 of his book. It should be said that the variety of causes and multitude of reasons behind this conflict are much greater than behind any other local conflict or sluggish regional war of our time (this is true of the confrontation between the Christians of the south and the Muslims of the north of Sudan, which has been going on for a long time; the same applies to the Israeli-Arab confrontation in the Middle East). The fault line between the sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is much deeper than in any typical conflict between states or peoples represented by the Afghan war the Soviet Union waged in 1979-1989, the Falkland War between the U.K. and Argentina in 1982, or even the 1991 Storm in the Desert operation of the multinational coalition in the Gulf against Iraq. The gap is much deeper than it looks to a superficial observer, the fire being maintained by a much larger number of factors, more on which will be discussed below.

1 See: S.P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49. 2 See: S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996.

84 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Huntington proceeded from the thesis that in the near future religion will become the main driving force behind civilizational clashes. This is true—to a certain extent. He compared the present “clashes of religions” with the previous epochs of “clashes of ideologies” of the second-fourth quarters of the 20th century and did not go further. In the past, religious wars occurred on the fault line between Christianity and Islam (the Crusades of the 11th-15th centuries, the Reconquista in Spain in the 8th-15th centuries; and the wars the Ottoman Turks waged in Southern and Eastern Europe in the 14th-17th centuries). This does not mean, however, that the wars inside the Christian or Muslim worlds were free from religious overtones: in the 13th century the Baltic peoples were baptized in the course of what looked very much like another crusade; the military inroads of Swedish and Teutonic knights into northwestern Russia in 1240-1242 were, in part, confrontations between Orthodox Chris- tians and Catholics over domination in the eastern Baltic lands. The Reformation wars in Europe between the Catholics and Protestants went on and on for over a century with short respites, while the Persians and Ottoman Turks fought for several decades over the rights of the Caliphate. Religious hues were added to play down the economic reasons invariably present in all wars; this means that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, likewise, cannot be reduced to a religious war of Armenian Christians against their eternal foe, the Muslim Turks. This is how ideologists from among the activists of ARF Dashnaktsutiun (who speak of all Azeris as Muslim Turks) describe the conflict. For two reasons, however, this conflict defies this description. Correctly grasped and correctly interpreted they point to the deepest sources of this civilizational confrontation.

 First, from the very first days of its independence proclaimed in 1918, the Azerbaijan Re- public has been a secular state; it outstripped in this respect not only the Turkish Republic, but also all countries of the Islamic ecumene. Throughout the 20th century the Muslim factor was present in the life of the country and the nation as a culturological rather than political factor and could not, therefore, affect state life. The contemporary Azeri variant of secular (non-political) Islam demonstrates loyalty, tolerance, and non-conflict relations with other religions and cultures. In this respect it differs greatly from the Arab-Maghreb variant of political Islam (in the last few decades it ignited wars and fed violence and hatred in the Middle East and North Africa; recently it moved to Western Europe).  Second, over the last century, the Armenians have been building their country as we see it now without relying on Monophysite Christianity, the official religion, but by delving deeper into the past, to the pagan roots of their national mentality. In the mid-19th century, the cults of pagan deities Vahagn, Mihr, Anahid, and Hayk, the legendary forefather of the Armenians who entered a contract with supreme deity Ara (from whom he received the staff of power and strength), coexisted in the nation’s spiritual and public life with Christian Gregorian religious rites, the attributes of which were very close to pagan. In their time, Russian historians of the Caucasus and ethnographers pointed to this similarity.3 This is explained by the fact that throughout the entire period when Armenians were scattered across the Muslim ecumene, the Armenian Apostolic Church was an administrative instrument on which the Armenians relied in their dealings with the powers of the corresponding titular nations. The Church was part of the unshakeable world order and de facto part of the system in which the Armenians depended on the Muslim peoples. This explains why it was not and could not be either a revolutionary, or even an evolutionary force behind the Arme- nians’ national-self-identification process. For obvious reasons this identity should be placed on a cornerstone very different from the religious ideology of the Armenian Grego- rian Church.

3 See, for example: N.F. Dubrovin, Istoria vioyny i vladychestva russkikh na Kavkaze, in 8 volumes, Vol. 2, St. Petersburg, 1871, pp. 409-410.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 85 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Late in the 19th and throughout the 20th centuries, political self-identification of the Arme- nians proceeded from paganism or neo-paganism rather than from Christian morals and ethics. This process gained momentum under Soviet power. It was instigated by the leaders of the Armenian S.S.R., who used legends about Greater Armenia, the Old Armenian Kingdom, the Armenian State of Urartu, and other myths as trump cards in the ideological struggle against the ideologues of the Armenian diaspora in the bourgeois and Third World countries. They looked at Soviet Armenia as a reincarnation of Greater Armenia and the center of attraction for all Armenians. In view of the anticlerical nature of Soviet ideology and, therefore, of the ideology of the Armenian S.S.R., the Armenian Gregorian Church could not serve as an ideological center for the Armenian ethnicity. This explains why pagan legends and myths of the Armenian forefathers (proto-Armenians) and the points of view of social evolution that corresponded to the archetypes of the ideology of the clan and tribal period were permitted (and used) as an archetypical foundation of the ideology “Armenians of all countries, unite!” under the red banner of the U.S.S.R.4 This explains why the religious fault line between the Armenians and Azeris in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is much deeper and much harder to negotiate than it might seem because it divides not a religious or confessional but a mental-ideological space. This means that the intellectual foundations of the ideological component of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict do not belong to the level of contradictions between Islam and Christianity, but go much deeper, to the level of comprehension of the world beyond the canonical traditions of the world religions. The political identity of the contemporary Armenian ethnicity extends beyond the moral laws and canons of the Armenian Gregorian confession; it is rooted in the legends and myths of pre- Christian times, which is amply confirmed by the materials and designs of the Internet resources of the Armenian International or Hay Dat; they operate under the ideological impact of extremist slogans of the Armenian Revolutionary Faction Dashnaktsutiun. The site www.k4500.com in the Russian sector of the Internet is a typical example of these resources. It functions under the slogan “Know! Know How! Dare!” that Dashnaktsutiun brought into political practice. Nothing is said about Christ and His death on the cross to redeem mankind; there is not a word about the Gospels or Christianity in general, while the main accent in visualization is on Ara, the world creator, Vahagn, the Armenian deity of fire and war, Hayk, the forefather of Armenians who received the staff of power from Ara, and the battle between Hayk and Bel, king of Babylon, which took place on 11 August, 2492 B.C. on the eastern shore of Lake Van (Hayots Dzor). This removes all doubts: political self-awareness of the contemporary Armenian ethnicity is far removed from the publicly declared common Christian or Armenian Gregorian religious self-awareness. This means that either the Armenians were never Christians throughout their history in the canonical sense of this definition and the Armenian Apostolic Church served as a screen behind which Armenian paganism was concealed from the Muslims and the Orthodox Christians (since the 19th century), or that the politically active and extremist minded part of the Armenians, disappointed with the ability of their Church to fully express their spiritual needs and hopes, turned to neo-paganism. These people were appealing to pagan archetypes of national self-awareness to build their political ideology. The truth of this is not guaranteed since both theses rely on argumentation of their own. If the second argument is true, the fact that the nation turned to the ideology of neo-paganism shows

4 In view of a possible negative response from the Armenian academic community, let me explain. The world of antiquity of Southeastern Europe and Hither Asia as well as the Hellenic world of the Mediterranean were pagan and yet the first empires (from the Macedonian Kingdom of Alexander the Great to the Roman Empire of Caesar Augustus and Octavianus Augustus) were built on the social foundations of paganism. At the early stages of human civilization, paganism was a state-forming ideology, the role which later belonged to Christianity and Islam. Before he baptized Rus in 988, Grand Prince St. Vladimir, Equal-to-the-Apostles (Grand Prince of Kiev Vladimir Svyatoslavovich), tried to build a united Old Russian state on the pagan ideas and even created, in 980, a pantheon of pagan deities common to all the Eastern Slavs, starting with Perun and ending with Simargl.

86 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION that the political establishment of the Armenian ethnicity is highly aggressive. The degree of its psychological aggressiveness can be compared with the degree exhibited by the leaders of the Third Reich in the 1930s, with the only difference that the Nazis geared their aggression against the Jews, while the Armenians geared theirs against the Turks (the ideologists of contemporary Armenian nationalism call Azeris “Caucasian Turks”). This means that the exaltation with which the Armenians do this and which has already manifested itself in recent history (the Khojaly massacre) and may cause new geopolitical upheavals is much more lamentable than the fact that the Armenians are sliding back toward paganism (a trend typical of many nations today). Vahagn, the Armenian god of fire and war, who is actively cultivated by the ideologists of ARF Dashnaktsutiun and Hay Dat, the worldwide Armenian International, is identical in written form and pronunciation to the name of Baal, the god of all Semites, who in the Christian tradition is Satan’s brother and broke away with him from God the Father. Placed in this context, Armenian neo-paganism makes the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (from the culturological viewpoint) eschatologically tinged, or a precursor of Doomsday. In this conflict, the Azeri side (both in the light of Christian and Islamic metaphysics) represents Light, while the Armenians represent Evil. An opposite interpretation of the metaphysical roots of the Armenian-Azeri confrontation is also possible from the position of Armenian paganism, in the context of which the Muslims are associated with Babylon tyrant Bel killed by Hayk, the forefather of Armenians (on the whole, this story is very close to the Old Testa- ment story of the Towel of Babel). This brings us to the limits of metaphysics where it borders on eschatology with opposite signs: the Armenians represent Light, while the Turks and Azeris represent Darkness. Irrespective of the eschatological signs, this aspect moves the civilizational conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh far beyond the framework of Huntington’s “fault line war” between two world religions and adds the pathos of the universal struggle between Good and Evil. Each of the sides involved sees itself as an instrument of Good; in this case the Armenians’ archetypical mentality plays a much more important role than the religious mentality of the Azeris. Traditionally secular, they tend to look at the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a conflict between states or nations, but not eschatological as it appears to or, at least, is publicly declared to be by the radical Armenian political neo-pagans. In the context of our discussion of deeply-rooted archetypical stereotypes of national self-awareness of ethnicities, we should pay attention to a fundamentally important circumstance, i.e. the Na- gorno-Karabakh conflict bears imprints of the millennia-old confrontation between the Semites and Aryans. It appeared in the Old Testament times when the Babylonians and then the Romans conquered the Middle East and North Africa and has been present in world history ever since. As distinct from the events that took place four thousand years ago, today it is the descendants of the Semites, not of the Aryans, who are the aggressors. Seen from this position, contemporary geopolitics shows that at the turn of the 21st century the Semitic peoples exhibited much more passion and aggression, amply confirmed by the never-ending troubles people from Arab countries stir up in Europe and the never- ending wars in the Middle East. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is an inalienable part of these geopolitical processes and is, in fact, a “war of retribution” of the Armenian Semites against the Azeri Aryans. The interest of the Armenians in this war is encouraged (deliberately or not) by the radically minded national intelligentsia; it relies on the religious-eschatological ideas of neo-paganism cultivated among co-tribesmen scattered all over the world. This is how it looks to an Orthodox Christian. The above can be summed up by saying that the smoldering Armenian-Azeri confrontation around Nagorno-Karabakh is a vivid and classical example of a clash of civilizations. The fault line is much deeper and, therefore, much harder to negotiate than a religious fault line. It runs across five spheres: state, national, religious, cultural, and racial; this makes the Karabakh conflict very different from any other war known to mankind. Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 87 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The Dominants of the Conflict

The active phase of the Karabakh war (1991-1994) and its “smoldering” continuation was not a war between states since in Nagorno-Karabakh the army and the police of Azerbaijan fought not the army of the Republic of Armenia but organized forces of local separatists and international terrorists, among whom were Armenian servicemen from the regular forces of the United Armed Forc- es of the CIS and mercenaries from the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. This was an intervention of the coalition forces of the Armenian International, or Hay Dat, organized by ARF Dashnaktsutiun, which assumed all sorts of hypostases and reincarnations, the most prominent among them being the notorious ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) which moved to the fore in the last quarter of the 20th century. Aggression of the international Armenian forces against the Azeris of Nagorno-Karabakh was not a colonial war either in its classical or contemporary interpretation, that is, a war for natural resources or living space. After winning, the Armenians acquired neither new sources of raw materials nor new consumer markets; this victory did not change the vector or balance of trade and economic relations. This is especially true of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, which still exhibit many features of a feudal natural economy. In the last two decades, occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and its military, administrative, and economic infrastructure has cost the Armenians dearly; the investors gained nothing—neither money nor even minimal dividends. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is not a civil war, nor is it a traditional war for self-identification (an anti-colonial war). The Armenian separatists of Artsakh show no desire to isolate the territory (liberated or conquered) they control. They are actively invading the political and economic space of Armenia and the neighboring countries with deeply rooted Armenian diasporas (Russia, Ukraine, and Abkhazia in particular). For this reason the Armenian side treats the conflict as part of military and economic expansion, a colonial cold war of sorts, to spread its geopolitical domination and economic dominance across the Transcaucasus, the Caucasus, and even Hither Asia as a whole. Neither Armenia nor Artsakh profited from the victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict either in the foreign policy and military-strategic or economic spheres. The international community, as represented by U.N. institutions, looks at the Armenians as aggressors, occupants, and intervention- ists; this hypothetically may produce sanctions against Artsakh, non-existent twenty years ago when the war was still going on (no-flight zone over Armenia and Artsakh or arms and dual technologies embargo). In any case, any rational-minded observer can say that the war cost Armenia and the Ar- menians dearly, while the gains were minimal; and it will cost even more in future. This means that as seen from Erevan the conflict is of political and ideological, rather than of military and economic importance. This also means that the term “identity war” (Huntington) is fully applicable. In plain words, the Armenians started the war to preserve their national identity.

Armenian Identity

The Armenians are one of the few peoples, the majority of whom live beyond the borders of their state (that is, beyond the borders of the Republic of Armenia). In other words, the numerical strength of the Armenian diaspora, the members of which have no citizenship in what is called “the historical homeland,” is much larger than the population of this state. Some ethnographers think that it is impossible to arrive at an exact number of Armenians because they are scattered all over the world, however approximate assessments (up to a hundred of thousands) are possible. I think that a 88 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION figure of about 11.5 million is more or less correct; today, the population of Armenia is under three million, a quarter of the total number of Armenians in the world. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a unifying factor indispensable for consolidating the ethnicity scattered all over the world. We should bear in mind the historical conditions in which it was started: in the Soviet Union the citizens of Soviet Armenia and Armenians from other countries were divided by an iron curtain that created an ideological abyss between two communities of the same ethnicity. For a long time, the Armenians in the Soviet Union were guided by moral values and social landmarks very different from those that guided the Armenians in Lebanon, Syria, the U.S., and France. Disintegration of the Soviet Union and the national statehood of the former Soviet Armenians made their prompt integration into the worldwide Armenian community a priority, since the numerical strength of the diaspora has exceeded and exceeds the size of the Armenian population living in the Republic of Armenia. Armenia and the diaspora had to unite. The war over Artsakh (called the Karabakh war of 1991-1994 in recent history) was the main driving force. Indeed, post-Soviet Arme- nia with its weak economic and social infrastructure (in many places there is no running water) stood little chance without Artsakh of attracting money from the Armenian diaspora in the volumes that arrive today. In fact, the Karabakh war became the ticket for the former Soviet Armenians (in Arme- nia and Karabakh) to the world Armenian community. Today, Artsakh is Armenia’s main instrument for extracting investments or subventions from the diaspora in order to maintain relative financial stability and wellbeing. This means that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will be preserved, in its present smoldering state, for as long as possible. Armenia is a recipient country that lives on financial aid from abroad. The main source of its financial wellbeing, besides its own GDP, is regular donations from international Armenian NGOs which, in turn, collect donations from the Armenian diaspora to keep their “historical homeland” afloat. This brings Armenia up to $10 billion every year. In other words, Armenia is not self-sufficient and, therefore, not a completely sovereign state; to go on living it needs outside help from the Arme- nian lobbies in other countries, the members of which are citizens of these countries. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia around Nagorno-Karabakh would have been settled long ago in full conformity with international law if the Armenian diaspora or its financial elite needed this. A settlement could have been achieved by suspending financial aid for several months. Nothing of the sort was done and nothing is being done; this means that there are extra-economic reasons behind the seemingly unjustified spending. An answer to the question of why the sluggish Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is vitally important for the top crust of the Armenian diaspora would have explained why this seat of international tension in the Caucasus is seemingly irrationally preserved in its present state. It seems that these people regard Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) as an Ark of sorts, which in the near future will serve as a heaven amid the upcoming global geopolitical transformations and metamorphoses. Active Islamization of Europe and radicalization of political Islam in Hither Asia and the Balkans, which we have been watching for two decades now, are narrowing down the range of political impacts and related financial possibilities of the Armenian diaspora in the traditional countries—Syria, Lebanon, France, and the Balkan states. The dwindling numerical strength of the titular population groups in the main European countries and the growing share of Muslim immigrants from Africa and Asia (mainly from the Maghreb), together with the aggressive promotion of so-called liberal values there (unconditionally rejected by the Christian traditionalists and Islamic fundamentalists), will very soon exacerbate all social contradictions and add vigor to the social and political activity of the followers of fundamentalist religions, Christian Orthodoxy, and Islam in particular. In twenty years’ time, that is, one generation later, Western Europe will become completely Islamized. If events unfold according to the Bosnian, radical, scenario, the decline of the West (which Spengler predicted in 1918 in his book of the same title) will cause irreversible and relatively prompt removal of two ethnic and religious minorities (Armenians and Jews) traditionally hostile toward Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 89 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Muslims from the continent. This may happen to the European Christians too; they, however, will have Russia as a safe place (probably if and when they publicly declare their devotion to the traditional Christian values). The Jews can count on Israel and the United States; while the European Armenians will be sheltered in the United States, Russia, and Ukraine with their strong Armenian diasporas, or in Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) as the second Ark. This explains the lavish, and strategically important, funding by the Armenian diaspora of the continued Armenian presence in Karabakh via the Republic of Armenia, the building of an international airport in Khankendi that will receive large airliners, the unyielding position of Erevan at the talks on the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement at all levels, and the provocations of all sorts connected in one way or another with Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian presence there. Resettlement of Armenians from Syria has already begun to test the exodus mechanism.

Armenians and Artsakh

Huntington wrote that “fault line wars go through processes of intensification, expansion, con- tainment, interruption, and, rarely, resolution. These processes usually begin sequentially, but they also often overlap and may be repeated. Once started, fault line wars, like other communal conflicts, tend to take on a life of their own and to develop in an action-reaction pattern. Identities which had previously been multiple and casual become focused and hardened; communal conflicts are appro- priately termed ‘identity wars’.”5 He hinted that fault line wars (the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict be- longs to this category) never reach resolution all by themselves since each of the sides (or one of them) interprets continued awareness of a war (even if not the war itself) as an expression of its national identity. In Armenians, the demonstration of national identity in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is most open and most impulsive: no Armenian is recognized as such by other Armenians if he admits that Nagorno-Karabakh (the second Ark of the Armenians) is legally Azeri, not Armenian, territory. This is easily explained by geopolitical reality: in the mid-term perspective the Armenians have no choice but to regard Artsakh as the Promised Land. This calls for a profound psychological analysis of the Armenians’ attitude toward the conflict; in other words, we must turn to ethnopsychology. Many Russian ethnographers and memoir writers pointed to the practically pathological greed- iness of the Transcaucasian Armenians as one of their most prominent immanent features; their striving for material wealth, however, never conflicted with religious ethics. They are not merely close- fisted—they are misers; for the smallest profit they are ready to go far, to what borders on, but does not violate, ethnic and religious prohibitions.6 Translated into academic parlance this means that Armenians at all times and in all circumstances have been guided and are guided by their private or selfish interests both in their relations with individuals and with society; they, however, keep within their traditional norms of religious ethics. I have already written that throughout the centuries the Armenians have been inspired and kept together by the eschatological dream of national statehood (either in the form of a revived theocratic Old Armenian Kingdom or a bourgeois Greater Armenia republic). Disintegration of the Soviet Union, which gave the Armenians a chance to set up the Republic of Armenia, deprived them, by the same token, of the irrational meaning of their collective national-religious existence. In the late 1980s, amid the turmoil of perestroika, Armenian fighters from the Middle East, Europe, and the United States

5 S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, p. 432. 6 See, for example: N.F. Dubrovin, op. cit., pp. 405-406.

90 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION moved to Armenia in great numbers to fight for the national idea against the Soviet troops. Later, when there were no longer Soviet troops in the Transcaucasus, they became the main striking force of the Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh. I do not mean to say that the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was an accidental war. The Karabakh war of 1991-1994 was the logical outcome of the natural death of the ethnoreligious eschatological ideological dominant of Greater Armenia reincarnated. It died as the result of its practical implementation. If you like, this war was a product of the Armenians’ collective idea of reinstating Greater Armenia. Strange as it may seem, the newly acquired national statehood deprived the Armenians and the thinkers among them—the nationalist-minded intelligentsia—of the meaning of social existence. The dream disappeared together with the meaning of life. The fate of Paruyr Hayrikyan, dissident No. 1 in Soviet Armenia in the 1970s, may serve as a good example. He fought energetically and sincerely against the Soviet Union, then in post-Soviet times became a political outcast (in fact, he was an outcast in Soviet times) for most of his compatriots. This was the tragedy of a man who, inspired by an idea, proved in real life not to be the man he imagined himself to be, and found this hard to accept. The Republic of Armenia, which in the twinkling of an eye stopped being a dream and became harsh reality, left an intellectual and emotional vacuum in the minds of those who for many years had been inspired by it. The loss, to use a psychological term, of a dominant constellation or motivation for action caused frustration which, to be cured, required a fundamentally new eschatological idea. The war over Nagorno-Karabakh, which the Armenians anticipated as a triumph after the triumph, became this idea. Despite the obvious military-technical success in the war, the Armenians suffered a crushing psychological defeat, which was very obvious to the nation’s more rationally minded members. The creative and therefore fundamentally collectivist idea of Greater Armenia was replaced with a negative and therefore hopeless idea of a defensive war on the Karabakh front. In fact, this is an even gloomier and even more hopeless idea of survival in extreme conditions that people created for themselves; this is a situation in which man is left alone to come to grips with no matter what might happen. So far, the idea has meant something to its creators—the middle and older generations of Armenians; it says nothing to their children and grandchildren; this much is amply shown by the contacts of young Armenians in the social networking services. Very much like their fathers and grandfathers, young Armenians are enthusiastic nationalists; they are more determined than their ancestors to divide the world into “us” and “them.” They are intoxicated by the fact that Armenians live not only in Hither Asia, Europe, and North America, but have reached Australia, Oceania, Central Africa, and even Japan and China with their alien mentalities. This means that the younger generation of Armenians is no longer interested in its “historical homeland”: today, the diaspora has become a center of attraction for the subjective interests of the younger generation and a dream reincarnated. They no longer associate their personal future with Armenia, its ideal has lost its former luster; young minds are concerned about the alternatives and possibilities of joining the diaspora; young souls have been conquered by the Wandering Jew. The pendulum of history has started moving in the opposite direction—Armenians have begun scattering all over the world, away from the ideal of Greater Armenia; they have started moving; this means that fairly soon the Republic of Armenia will weaken. I am not talking about next year or in two years’ time; this will happen in the mid-term perspective, in the next decade. Armenia’s economy and politics will slide down into stagflation—permanent stagnation, plummeting standards of living, and a gradual loss of all former values. Armenia and Karabakh, to an even greater degree, will remain a distant moral ideal for the younger generation, which they are light-heartedly and remorselessly prepared to exchange for material wellbeing in the Armenian quarters of Glendale and Hollywood, Montebello or Burbank in the United States, Toronto or Montreal in Canada, to say nothing about Russia’s South, Moscow, or St. Petersburg. The Armenian diaspora will collect money to help the Armenians in Armenia and Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 91 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Nagorno-Karabakh, using, on numerous occasions, the state or local budgets of the countries and regions where they live (for example, since 2008, the Haut-de-Seine department, the General Council of which is headed by ethnic Armenian Patrick Devedjian, has been sponsoring the development of the communal infrastructure in agricultural areas of Armenia at the expense of French taxpayers). This money will be a compensation of sorts; it will buy the right to call oneself an Armenian and enjoy the related benefits without being a citizen of the Republic of Armenia and not living in it or Nagorno-Karabakh. Current globalization has deprived the religious mystical idea of Greater Armenia of its ideological consequence of the continued existence of the Armenian ethnicity as a whole; it has become the ideology of a closed elite club of those who have power and money and who are ready to earn more doing business with their ilk, holding forth on the subjects commonly discussed in these circles and paying membership dues. Similar structures of social and business communication organized by the ethnoreligious principle need the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. We all know that people are brought closer together by their awareness of social belonging and collective responsibility. Among the Armenians this awareness was cultivated for centuries through the payment of the poll tax (jizyah). There are no longer Islamic, Russian imperial, or Soviet rulers in Armenia and Karabakh, but the practice of money gathering and money distribution for national needs has survived. Over the centuries this practice has become a rational and viable tradition which will not and cannot be abandoned. Allocations for common national needs are like ballast that adds very much needed stability to the Armenian ship in a sea of troubles, calamities, and wars. It remains to be seen how this money will be spent. Donations of the Armenian diaspora cannot be used to feed the Armenians in Armenia lest they become its spongers. The diaspora cannot afford this because of their members’ inborn stinginess and selfishness. Giving money to those who suffer because of a war is a horse of another color: for Armenians the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is a sort of psychological compromise between private and public interests; they need it to keep the centuries-old rules and forms of public relations alive in their ethnoreligious environment. This conflict allows the Armenians scattered across the world to retain their feeling of belonging while changing nothing in their habitual life style and habitual way of thinking. The Middle Eastern conflict plays a similar role for the world Jewry. Both conflicts allow the predominantly scattered peoples—Armenians and Jews—to preserve their national and religious unity and feeling of belonging, without which their ethnoreligious awareness would have collapsed. When talking about the future of the Karabakh Armenians, who comprise a meager 2 percent of the total number of Armenians, we should bear in mind that we are talking about the mode of existence of the Armenian nation in its present form. We also need to keep in mind that the Republic of Armenia today is not the center, not even a tiny point of attraction for the Armenians of the diaspora. Armenia is ballast that makes the diaspora’s ship more stable; Karabakh (Artsakh) is a Kingston valve that connects the ship to the sea. In other words, a man or an organization, who/which means Artsakh when talking about Karabakh, is a “friend of the Armenians” and can count on their support. If the man or organization publicly expresses a different opinion, he/it becomes subject to obstruction and is persecuted in the same way as the Armenians were persecuted in the Islamic world.

Azeri Identity

I have written a lot about the Armenians’ position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, discussed the sources and motives of their actions, and tried to forecast the future. To complete the picture I will turn to the Azeri side and its position. 92 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The Karabakh war of 1991-1994 greatly affected the self-identification or forming of identity (Huntington) of the contemporary Azeri ethnicity, which transformed the Azeris into a state-forming nation in the true sense of the word. It should be said that in Azerbaijan the process followed a vector very different from that of the ideology of the Armenians and most other peoples who acquired national and state independence in the 1990s (I have in mind the peoples of former Yugoslavia, Slova- kia, Eritrea, the Central Asian countries, and partly Sudan). In most of these countries (former Yugo- slavia, Eritrea, and Sudan) and on the Armenian side of the Karabakh conflict, fault line wars were the consequence and frequently the main result of national and religious polarization of the ethnicities involved. In Azerbaijan, on the other hand, the war produced a different effect: the country and the people acquired their national and state identity; they started looking at themselves not as Transcau- casian Muslims (something which the Armenians would like very much) but as a nation deliberately and consistently building its united polyethnic state. It stands to reason that choice of the Azeris, as an ethnicity, of this vector of identification was not caused by external factors (the war). The choice was predetermined by the content and the course of ethnogenesis of the Azeri nation within the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as a secular nation. Secularism strongly affected the historical destinies of the Azeri nation during the (civilization- ally) short life of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic of 1918-1920, the first ever secular state in the Islamic ecumene. Islam was a factor of political identity in the relations between the Azeri ethnicity (in its contemporary state and political interpretation localized in the triangle formed by the Caspian, the Arax, and the Great Caucasian Range) and its northern and eastern neighbors. In the country itself Islam served as a background rather than an ideological (system-forming) factor; this explains why the process of self-identification among the Azeris was of a secular (national-state) rather than ethnoreligious nature. Samuel Huntington never grasped the secular specifics of the Azeri ethnic identity of recent times or, probably preferred to ignore it because it did not fit his clash of civilizations concept in the form of “fault line wars” caused among other things by the religious factor. It should be said, however, that he correctly pointed to this factor as the driving force behind Armenian separatism in Na- gorno-Karabakh when he said that the “local groups” of Armenians there were “at best, embryonic states.”7 This, deliberately or not, answers the question of why neo-paganism serves as the cornerstone of national and religious identity for the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh: any society at the stage of clan-tribal relations cannot objectively appreciate the moral values of any of the world monotheist religions, be it Christianity, Islam, or Judaism. No matter what Baku thinks about the Karabakh war, it was this war that transformed the Azeri ethnicity into a nation. In the early 1990s, Armenian separatism in Nagorno-Karabakh stirred up centrifugal trends in other regions of Azerbaijan. This revived separatist sentiments in the compact settlements of Lezghians and Avars. In the south, a self-proclaimed Talysh-Mugan autonomy appeared; local separatism was partly fed by the contradictions between the Shi‘a and Sunnis, very typical of Islam. At that time, in the specific historical conditions, no single national-religious identity could have appeared in polyethnic Azerbaijan. Guided by its collective instinct of national and state self-preservation, society opted for civil-political identify and unity: the local people demonstrated that they were first adherents of statism, and only then secular nationalists, and, finally, Mus- lims. This explains why the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict does not completely fit the Huntington concept of the clash of civilizations as a confrontation between communities and religions. In this conflict, the fault line ran between the desire of the citizens of Azerbaijan to preserve their sovereign statehood and the Armenian desire to destroy it. The fault line divided ideas of statehood and ideas of anarchy, ideas of civilization and ideas of barbarity. Barbarity wins tactically, while civilization carries the

7 S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, p. 272.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 93 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION final victory; this means that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an exception that proves the rule (Huntington’s theory). It was the Armenian International (Hay Dat) that drew Azerbaijan into the conflict. From the very beginning it was “catching up with the developments” or defending itself against Armenian attacks. Azerbaijan never held the strategic initiative either during the war or after its active phase ended. It seems that this happened because Baku demonstrated a very rational approach to the forms and methods of settlement based on the principles and norms of international law and diplomatic practice. Its traditional instruments and its legal demands to observe Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity were not sufficiently supported by the instruments of force and coercion: the international community did not dare to use them against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Statism and secularism as two dominants of the Azeri national identity suggest that once returned to Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh would not be impulsively rejected by the country’s social organism after decades of occupation. The nation, which managed to overcome an internal social and political split in wartime, is able to cope with the repercussions of a territorial split imposed from the outside. As distinct from those who rule Artsakh and Armenia and the establishment of the Armenian diaspora, official Baku has clear-cut plans for the reinstated territories of Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent, so far occupied, territories. This is confirmed by the clear and fully substantiated reintegration plans. They are absolutely realistic provided there is political will and enough material resources.8 It seems that there is enough of both. An analysis of these plans shows that reintegration of the conflict zone into the country’s state and public life will be based not on the political principles Baku declares from time to time to create a liberal, that is, positive image outside the national borders. The economic, social, administrative, and humanitarian re-adjustment of the returned region will proceed according to the principles of statism and secularism, which will exclude any possibility of any type of autonomy (even national- cultural autonomy) for the Armenian minority in the future. This is not an anti-Armenian model; it fully corresponds to the present nature of the political regime of Azerbaijan that took shape in the conditions of and under the impact of the Karabakh war of 1991-1994 today tolerantly called the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Prospects for Settlement

Samuel Huntington wrote in his time that “as violence increases, the initial issues at stake tend to get redefined more exclusively as ‘us’ against ‘them’ and group cohesion and commitment are enhanced. Political leaders expand and deepen their appeals to ethnic and religious loyalties, and civilization consciousness strengthens in relation to other identities. A ‘hate dynamic’ emerges, comparable to the ‘security dilemma’ in international relations, in which mutual fears, distrust, and hatred feed on each other. Each side dramatizes and magnifies the distinction between the forces of virtue and the forces of evil and eventually attempts to transform this distinction into the ultimate distinction between the quick and the dead.”9 I can add that in the final analysis the frontline of any protracted war becomes a border which later appears on the political map of the world (the Korean Peninsula divided along the 38th parallel into the South and the North is one of the examples. The process began back in 1895). By way of conclusion, I can say that Armenia alone needs the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. As distinct from the Azeris, the Armenians do not need Karabakh as a living space (they do not live

8 See: N. Muzaffarly, E. Ismailov, Basic Principles for the Rehabilitation of Azerbaijan Post-Conflict Territories, CA&CC Press, Stockholm, 2010. 9 S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, p. 266.

94 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION there) or as a source of material boons (the money poured into the region will be never returned). For the Armenians, Karabakh or, to be more exact, Artsakh is another reincarnation of the metaphysical myth of Greater Armenia, a copy of the original that never existed; it is a simulacrum, a new semiotic sign that divides the world into allies and enemies of Artsakh, not Armenia. If there is no Artsakh, there will be no Armenia; if there is no Armenia, there will be no Armenian diaspora as we know it. We should register the fact and derive the only possible conclusion: no matter how hard Azerbaijan tries, no matter what new steps the international intermediaries of the Minsk Group of OSCE suggest, it is impossible in principle to return the region to status ante bellum. In both capitals, the solution to this territorial and military-political problem is seen as “all or nothing”; the Romans would have said tertium non datur. As the Armenian occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh goes on, Baku’s chances of reinstating its jurisdiction (actual and formal) by peaceful means are gradually disappearing. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh the “relatively soft” methods of settlement of similar geopolitical problems (such as mandates of the League of Nations or Anschluss) will be neither efficient nor legal. I have written above that the fault line between the sides in this local conflict on a contemporary planetary scale is the deepest and has the sharpest edges. This may be precisely where humanitarian development is pushing mankind.

Ruslan KURBANOV

Ph.D. (Political Science), Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, the Russian Federation).

REVIVAL OF THE NORTH CAUCASIAN UMMA IN THE LIGHT OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY FLAWS IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Abstract

he author looks at the extremely com- sance, in the Northern Caucasus and offers plicated, numerous, and contradictory his opinion of how the North Caucasian T aspects of the upsurge in Islamic Muslims perceive the factor of Islamic glo- awakening, the so-called Islamic renais- balism.

KEYWORDS: Islamic renaissance, Islamic globalism, Islam in the Northern Caucasus, Islamic community of Russia. Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 95 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Introduction

Today, most experts dealing with North Caucasian religious and political reality and looking at the invigorating role of the international factor limit themselves to the narrow problem of the money the “terrorist international” is pouring into the Caucasus to destabilize the situation. The problem caused by the emergence of the North Caucasian Islamic renaissance at the international level is much more complicated and multi-dimensional. Throughout many centuries, Islam and its local Caucasian interpretations and practices have been unfolding according to their own scenarios, different and sometimes very different from those practiced elsewhere in the Caliphate.

 First, the Caucasian Muslims were isolated from the rest of the Muslim world: everything going on in the Caliphate in the social, political, military, cultural, and other spheres sound- ed like a distant echo in this isolated and hard to access region.  Second, in the Caucasus the interpretations and practices of Islam were greatly affected by the local spiritual and legal traditions and rites of amazing inner force and viability. Through- out many centuries, Islam had to accept as inevitable the tenacious traces of paganism in everyday life, customs, the norms of customary law (adats), and the mountain dwellers’ behavior and mindset. This meant that religious customs and rites were warped, while the Caucasian legal expanse was divided between traditional adat and the Shari‘a, something that classical Islam could not accept. This factor played a huge role in the victory of the Russian Empire and, later, Soviet Russia in the Caucasian theater of war. Czarist and Soviet power made skilful use of the far from homogenous, far from monolith, and very patchy Islamic consciousness, the divided legal expanse, and the fact that Islamic power was unevenly spread in the mountains to split Caucasian society and impose their own political and legal projects on the region.

The Community’s Heterogeneity

It should be said that the multinational Muslim community of Russia can be divided into two large national groups, which Alexey Malashenko calls the Tatar-Bashkirian and the North Cauca- sian.1 Dr. Malashenko himself admits that the terms are conventional or even “inadequate:” “besides Tatars, there are millions of Muslims of other ethnicities in Moscow, the Volga Area, the Urals, and Siberia,” and can be used merely as working terms.2 This can be accepted on the whole, but we should bear in mind that the first (Tatar-Bashkirian) group also includes the Muslim Turkic peoples of the Volga Area, South Urals, and Siberia (Tatars, Bashkirs and their ethnic subgroups—Siberian Tatars, Nizhny Novgorod Tatars (Mishars), etc. The second (North Caucasian) group consists of the Muslims of the North Caucasian peoples who live in the region’s seven republics: Daghestan, Chechnia, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino- Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and Adigey. Although Muslims of both groups are scattered across the country and kindred ethnic groups live side by side in many places and pray in the same mosques, their representatives preserve their

1 See: A.V. Malashenko, Islam dlia Rossii, Moscow, 2007, p. 11. 2 A. Malashenko, “Dva neskhozhikh renessansa,” Otechestvennye zapiski, No. 5 (13), 2003, available at [http://www. strana-oz.ru/?numid=14&article=644].

96 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION own patterns of social behavior, mentality, degree of religiosity, and attitude toward religious injunctions, the country’s non-Muslim majority, and the Russian state. On the whole, as distinct from North Caucasian Islam, Tatar-Bashkirian Islam is much more integrated into Russian society; it is much more receptive to the idea of a dialog and cooperation with the government, while its traditional social structure is much less cohesive. On the other hand, North Caucasian Islam is much more determined, with cruelty or even fanaticism, to follow the religious authorities which belong to their own peoples; they are much less tolerant of the non-Muslim majority of Russia and even of co-religionists of other nationalities. Both groups are highly heterogeneous: there are regional or sub-ethnic types, groups, and communities inside them with different religious and social specifics. Alexey Malashenko has pointed to other features shared by both areas: cultural and religious self-sufficiency; a bias toward internal cohesion; and preoccupation with their own problems, particularly their relations with the authorities. “Despite the sporadic attempts at demonstrating the desire to integrate, both areas are living as two separate worlds. The Muslim leaders from the capital or Tatarstan are received in Makhachkala or Nalchik as honored guests but treated as Muscovites or people from Kazan.”3 Without going into detailed descriptions of theses sub-groups and types, I will limit myself to one example to clarify the degree of inner differentiation and diversity of the conventional Muslim groups in Russia. This is important since this diversity and the different nature of these groups affect the relations among the spiritual structures of Islam in Russia. While at the first level the Russian Islamic community is divided into two groups (Tatar-Bash- kirian and North Caucasian), at the second level a careful observer of extremely diverse North Cau- casian Islam will find the following. Today the Caucasian Muslim community is an extremely diverse and multisided phenomenon with numerous internal specifics and hues. First, the Caucasus is ethnically the most diverse of Rus- sia’s regions; each of the North Caucasian peoples follows its own model of social and religious behavior. All experts agree that the region’s eastern part (Daghestan, Ingushetia, and Chechnia) is more religious than its western part (Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and Adigey), even though in recent years Islam has been conquering the western part as well.4 Experts on the Caucasus divide the Northern Caucasus either in two or four sub-regions (depending on the parameters they are guided by). Enver Kisriev, for example, describes Daghestan as the first sub-region; Chechnia and Ingushetia as the second; Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and Adigey as the third; and North Ossetia as the fourth.5 Second, the region’s Islamic space is highly diverse; it is better described as a patchwork of religious communities each with Islamic trends and traditions of its own. Conventionally they can be divided into three sub-groups. The first sub-group of the Caucasian Muslims consists of the followers of Islam, which, in the course of history, became a blend of Orthodox Islamic, local ethnocultural, and Sufi traditions. Most of the expert community calls this version traditional Islam. It, with certain variations, dominated in the Caucasus before the onslaught of the Russian Empire and later Soviet Russia on the Islamic culture. In the Eastern Caucasus (Daghestan, Chechnia, and Ingushetia), the Sufi component dominates over the other two (Orthodox Islamic and ethnic) components.

3 A. Malashenko, “Dva neskhozhikh renessansa.” 4 See: A.V. Malashenko, Islam dlia Rossii, p. 13. 5 See: E. Kisriev, “Islam i natsionalnye otnoshenia na Severnom Kavkaze,” in: Islam v rossiiskikh regionakh, Moscow, 2007.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 97 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION In the Western Caucasus, where Islamic spiritual, political and legal components are much weaker, everyday interpretations and shortened versions of rites were responsible for the local ethnocultural tradition. Sufism, which has the strongest position in Daghestan, Chechnia, and Ingushetia, is represented by three Tareqats (orders): Qadiriya, Naqshbandiya, and Shaziliya (spiritual schools of sorts which combine the means and methods of mystical cognition of truth, a code of moral and ethical prescriptions, and forms of inner organization). The second sub-group of the Caucasian Muslims is represented by the Daghestan Shafi‘i school of Islamic law (maddhab) rooted in the pre-Russian past and created by the self-governing Muslim communities of Darghinians, in which the position of Muslim lawyers and judges were strong enough to contest the local elected rulers. There was de facto dual power in the Akusha-Dargo community with two political leaders—an elected ruler and a Shari‘a judge (qadi). The third sub-group of the Caucasian Muslims is represented by the rapidly expanding community of fundamentalists—Wahhabis for public and propaganda purposes and Salafis for the academic community. This is a fundamentalist type of Islam of the Salafi variant that harks back to the roots of the Islamic faith and the way of life of the Prophet Muhammad and the “Pious Predecessors” (as-Salaf as-Saleh), as well as purification of Islam from later distortions. Contrary to what the federal media have to say about the alien and non-traditional nature of Salafism in the Caucasus, it has been present in the region for over 300 years. At an even lower (third) level of classification of the Islamic communities, each of the larger groups (the Sufi, Shafi‘i lawyers, and Salafi) consists of smaller national or even district groups. For example, in Daghestan Sufism differs in many respects among the Kumyks and among the Avars. The Sufism of the Avars has clearly pronounced district specifics: the Sufism of the Shamil district of Daghestan differs greatly from the Sufism of the Tsumada district of the same republic. This is true of Salafiya: the degree of acceptance of certain religious injunctions, social behavior patterns, and the attitude toward society and the government is very different among the Salafis of Southern Daghestan, the Salafis of Gimry, Tsumada, Kadar, Gunib, etc. This is still preserved despite the recent consistent efforts of the Salafi ideology to overcome the “frames of ethnic isolation” and “to act as a single ideological and political force”6 in the Northern Caucasus. The situation is further complicated by the desire of members of traditional religious communities in all Caucasian republics to keep away socially from the members of other religious communities even if they all belong to the same nationality. For example, not so long ago, the followers of Daghestan Sufi sheikhs Said Afandi al- Chirawi, now deceased (an Avar), Muhammad-Mukhtar Kyakhulaysky (Kumyk), and the late Sirajuddin Hurikski (Tabasaran) limited their association to greetings, handshakes, and small talk. Communication between Daghestanis and Chechens devoted to traditional Islam is mainly official; the geographically distant ethnicities—the peoples of the Northwest and Northeast—also com- municate at the official level. In social matters, the followers of traditional Islam prefer to stay as far away as possible from the followers of fundamentalist and reformist Islam.

Revival of Old Islamic Schools and Trends

When seen in the context of the dynamics and trends of the so-called Islamic renaissance, the diversity of the Caucasian Islamic community reveals the following sub-groups.

6 A. Malashenko, “Dva neskhozhikh renessansa”.

98 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The first: representatives of the “traditional” Islam formed throughout centuries as a blend of Orthodox Islamic, local ethnocultural, and Sufi traditions. The expert community calls this version of Islam traditional. It should be said that it was distinguished by strict observance of the division of Islam into mad- dhabs, a product of Islam’s long history. Therefore the followers only recognize scholars of their school and practice the asceticism, meditation, and humility offered by Sufism; their Islam exists in a niche limited to philosophical and ritual issues; it has nothing to do with the social and political transformations of the world. Alexey Malashenko has put Caucasian Islamic traditionalism, a product of partly natural and partly artificial cultural and political isolation, into bolder relief by comparing it with the religious schools and trends abroad, which can still develop and change. He has referred to the official Soviet ideology, which divided Islam into “foreign” (active, politically involved, frequently anti-Communist, and used by the national-liberation movements) and “Soviet,” professed by “backward old men” and “weak women” and immersed in the religious issues proper and rejecting its political bias.7 The fact is, however, that in the Caucasus Islam, due to its deep penetration into society (albeit in a syncretic version), remained, in many places, a regulator of social relations. This version and practices of Islam lost their inner energy and mobilization potential long ago; today, it is nothing more than the remnants of the first Islamization wave in the region. After travelling across the world during slavery and feudalism, the first wave of Islamization started losing its impact during the initial period of capitalism and at its peak. The Muslims of the first Islamic wave spread Islam far and wide across the Caucasus; they proved unable to respond to the new challenges of history and lost the initiative very much needed to arrive at viable social-economic and social-political models. The Caucasian War of 1817-1864 and the Imamate can be described as the peak of mobilization and reformist efforts of the Caucasian Muslims of the first wave. (The Imamate was an Islamic state which imitated the Caliphate; Imam Shamil assumed the title of “Commander of the Faithful” earlier used by the caliphs.) When the wave subsided, Islamic tradition in the Caucasus was consistently suppressed, which finally undermined its inner stamina. The present revival of what was left of this version of Islam in the Caucasus should not be mis- taken for the beginning of the Islamic renaissance. Islam of the first wave, which flourished in the works of Daghestani murshids and ustazas and was completely realized in Shamil’s Imamate, is in a spiritual and creative crisis. It has nothing to offer the Caucasian Muslims except for backsliding to the pre-revolutionary intellectual, scholarly, and cognitive level. What looks like an upsurge is not an impetus for further development (even though it is often described as such), but a return to the spiritual and social position from which Islam was dislodged by Soviet power. This illusion proved to be a trap for many politicians and students of Islam. The Islamic renaissance has not yet begun in the region. In fact we should say that the Islam of the first wave, which, on the whole, has regained its lost position and returned the pre-revolutionary ideas about the world and Islam to the old pedestal, cannot satisfy the spiritual quest of the Caucasian Muslims in the 21st century. We have to admit that “fossilized” interpretations of Islam are in a deep crisis. They have no viable answers to the social, economic, national, political, or even cultural and moral problems of today. The Spiritual Administrations of the Muslims of the Western Caucasus proved unable to mobilize the Muslim youth; this defeat led to an armed uprising of the Kabardinian-Balkar Muslims against the power system in the republic and the Spiritual Administrations. In the last twelve months, sev-

7 See: A.V. Malashenko, Islam dlia Rossii, p. 52.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 99 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION eral imams and officials of the Spiritual Administrations of the Western and Eastern Caucasus lost their lives in assassination attempts. Disenchanted with the official clergy and their interpretation of Islam, young people are joining protest movements and groups in search for fresh ideas and fresh causes to which they can dedicate their lives. They are looking for flexibility and purity; they want to go beyond the limits of their mosques and auls and raise the scope of their own Islamic consciousness to the international level. For these reasons, young people no longer treat the local imams and spiritual leaders as an authority; they listen to the people with worldwide authority and aspire to reach the international level.

Russia and the Muslim World: Relations and Problems

The flaws of Russia’s policy in the Islamic world constitute another factor that seriously af- fects the trends of the Islamic renaissance in the Caucasus. Rinat Mukhametov, an expert from Russia, has written: “Russia’s foreign policy is largely bureaucratic. Moscow maintains contacts only with ruling regimes, but not with counter-elites and societies—and this is especially fatal in the Middle East.”8 In the revolutionary turmoil in the Middle East, Moscow supports “to the uttermost” (the lack of other alternatives is Russia’s fault) the doomed regimes as its only door open into the region. Even if and when the situation goes from bad to worse from Russia’s viewpoint, it takes Moscow a lot of time to adjust to the new reality; it does not respond, but complains, and looks for enemies. By the way, the Muslim Brotherhood that assumed power in Egypt and some other Arab countries is still listed, by sheer misunderstanding, as a terrorist organization, contacts with which are banned. There are no business structures in Russia to deal with the Muslim world. The Russian-Arab Business Council set up by Evgeny Primakov has so far scored no victories: in the economic sphere it is still geared at military-technical cooperation. Shamil Sultanov, President of the Center of Strategic Research Russia-Islamic World, has voiced his concern: “There is no subject empowered with the development of partner relations between Moscow and the Islamic world. This is very important. The Kremlin needs a corresponding strategy. Putin has said more than once: we have a Muslim community so get down to work. There was no response. Then he said: give me ideas and suggestions. No response.”9 The International Theological Conference “The Islamic Doctrine against Radicalism” held on 25-26 May, 2012 in Moscow was the only step in the right direction; it filled the strategic dialog between Russia and the Muslims with meaningful content. This was the first time that the Islamic world represented by luminaries of Islamic theology was invited to Russia. The ulemas invited by the Russian and Kuwaiti Al-Wasatiya centers and the Fund of Support for Islamic Science, Culture, and Education approved what Russia had been doing to oppose extremism. The world famous Islamic theologians adopted the Moscow Theological Declaration of Muslim Scholars on Jihad, the Application of Shari‘a and the Caliphate, which can be ranked with such historical documents as the Mecca and Amman declarations. The scholars preferred to avoid foreign policy issues, but the Arab media regarded the very fact of the visit of prominent and influential people (in the Islamic world a theologian is much more than merely a learned man) as a step toward Moscow, even though Russia’s position on Syria found little support in the Arab Muslim world.

8 R.M. Mukhametov, “Russian Muslims and Foreign Policy,” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 3, 2012. 9 Sh.Z. Sultanov, “Sblizhenie Rossii i islamskogo mira: strategicheskoe partnerstvo ili koniunktura?” available at [http:// www.islamnews.ru/news-7543.html].

100 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The complications and political instability in the Arab world and Russia’s relevant position apart, the top crust of Islamic theologians demonstrated that they were prepared to work with Russia as a strategic partner of the reviving Islamic world. The Russian Muslims who made the dialog possible became, for essentially the first time in their history, a bridge between Russia and Islam. Al-Wasatiya is the only Arab structure officially operating in Russia; in the early 2000s all the Arab funds and centers were closed down on suspicions of funding Chechen separatists. Tiny oil-rich Kuwait, which promoted the concept of moderate Islam, became an open window to the Arab world, the Gulf countries in particular, relations with which had never been smooth, and the Muslim world in general. In 2010, President Medvedev awarded the Order of Friendship to Dr. Adel al-Falah, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs of Kuwait. He was the first Arab religious leader to receive this order.

Response of the Muslim World: By Way of a Conclusion

The response of the Muslim community in Russia and, in particular, in the Northern Caucasus to Russia’s foreign policy oversights in the Islamic world can be described as highly interesting. As soon as perestroika began and the Iron Curtain was lifted, the Northern Caucasus demonstrated a lot of interest in the Islamic world. The interest was mutual. The rapidly developing Arab countries were extremely enthusiastic about the Islamic revival in the region. The Middle East started large-scale funding programs for the religious sphere of the Russian part of the Caucasus. According to Egyptian television preacher Amr Khaled, the entire Islamic world from Indonesia to the remotest part of Africa should be helping the Muslims in Russia, but only the closest and richest neighbors did this. It was only the richest states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Iran) that could afford to give money away to the Northern Caucasus and did this; Daghestan was selected as a springboard for the future revival and proliferation of Islam in the South of Russia. According to ethnologist Vladimir Bobrovnikov, between 1985 and 1990, the number of mosques in Daghestan increased tenfold—from 44 to 431; there were no more than a several dozen mosques in the other republics altogether. At the same time, previously clandestine Islamic movements began stepping up their activities in the Caucasian republics, in Daghestan in particular. It was in these republics that religious parties became a real and influential force which, supported by a solid material base and having the popular masses behind it, confronted the authorities. Local businessmen and politicians, likewise, helped Muslim organizations in their republics. For a while, the local governments were unconcerned about the Arab-driven Islamic revival and the restored pre-Soviet Islamic traditions, so remained passive. Never simple, Russia’s relations with the Arab and Islamic world became even more complicated when federal troops were moved into Chechnia in 1994 to pacify the mutinous republic. All the Muslim centers run by Middle Eastern countries in Russia were closed down. The Arab countries were very negative about the developments in Chechnia and made no secret of this. Colonel Qaddafi was the first among the heads of the Islamic states to respond to the hostilities in the South of Russia. In his letter to President Yeltsin, he outlined two problems that, he asserted, bothered the Islamic world the most: first, possible worsening of Russia’s relations with the Middle East caused by the former’s war against Muslims in the Caucasus and, second, Russia’s territorial integrity. Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 101 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The position of the Islamic states was somewhat ambiguous. A new contradiction emerged between solidarity with the co-religionists and their own geopolitical interests. Solidarity with the Caucasian Muslims was set off by the fact that the East did not want a unipolar America-led world and a system of international relations in which the geopolitical leader would be left without a counterbalance of any sort, including a strong Russia. During the second Chechen campaign, Russian diplomacy in the Middle Eastern countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen, Jordan, Libya, Syria, Kuwait, Iraq, Sudan, and Egypt) demonstrated much more cohesion and much more efficiency. When talking to high officials who still remembered the Soviet Union and its support, Russian diplomats insisted that Russia’s territorial integrity was in the interests of the Islamic world. Russia promised to remedy all “infringements on peaceful Muslims” and improve the overall situation; this saved its relatively good relations with the Middle East. Very soon Moscow acquired a chance to start talking about fighting “terrorism” (rather than separatism during the first Chechen war) in Chechnia. The Muslim world, fighting against those who called themselves “radical Islamists,” found this argument much more palatable. When talking to one of the muftis of Russia, the then Speaker of the Sudan National Congress Party Hassan al-Turabi said that today you (the Muslims) should strive not for national self-determination but pursue another strategic aim, that is, the continued existence of a strong and effective Russia as a guarantee of security for all Muslims in the multipolar world.10 On the whole, the heads of practically all the Arab states were of the same opinion, while actively helping the Chechen refugees. Mass demonstrations and rallies took place in many Arab countries to draw the attention of the world community to the plight of the peaceful population in the areas of fierce fighting. The popular rallies were reflected in what was said at the 27th OIC Foreign Ministerial Confer- ence in Kuala Lumpur, which expressed “its grave concern over the tragic crisis in the Republic of Chechnia of the Russian Federation and the loss of lives and properties”. The two military campaigns made Chechnia the centerpiece of the Caucasian region; it figured prominently in Russia’s domestic and foreign policies, particularly in its relations with the Arab world. Today, the republic “arising from the ashes,” which is no longer an irritant in Russia’s relations with the Middle East, can be described as Russia’s foreign policy trump card. In the course of several years, the completely ruined republic has become not only an effective foreign policy instrument of the Foreign Ministry of Russia. It has become the shop window of Russia’s Caucasian community: all Arab sheikhs and Turkish technocrats are taken to Chechnia, the best exhibit of successful administration and successful development. I should say that today the foreign policy interests of Chechnia in the East and the ambitions of its head perfectly fit Russia’s strategy in the Arab world. To some extent, Ramzan Kadyrov can be called another Russian foreign minister whose task is to normalize relations with the Arab and Mus- lim world. He supports propaganda of moderate Islam; the head of Chechnia said to a UAE delegation: “I would like to stress that, in the first place, we are tied together with the United Arab Emirates by brotherly relations; the economy, sports, and culture come second.” Famous reader of the Koran Mishaari Raashid from Kuwait came to Chechnia on an invitation of the Al-Wasatiya Center of Moderate Islam; he led the collective prayer meeting in the Akhmad Kadyrov Mosque. Recently well-known Shari‘a Egyptian scholar Osman Abdurrahim came to Chech- nia to preach moderate Islam. President of Ingushetia Yunus-Bek Evkurov headed the Russian delegation at the fifth session of the Russia-Islamic World Strategic Vision Group held in Kuwait on 21-24 December, 2009. In- gushetia was chosen as the place of the Group’s next session.

10 Quoted from: [http://pda.islamrf.ru/news/culture/islam-world/2672/].

102 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The end of the acute crisis in Chechnia and Russia’s gradual return to the international scene as a strong and independent player with great and increasing authority have its relations with the Arab world a fresh boost. The business community followed suit to consistently increase trade turnover with the Middle East. According to Vladimir Evtushenkov, Chairman of the AFK Sistema Board of Directors, the Middle East is one of the best regions for investments; this is especially true of the Gulf countries and Lebanon. Russia stands a good chance of widening the scope of its economic cooperation with the Arab countries to the high-tech sphere and the banking sector; it can sell the products of its metallurgical industry and materials for industrial use and transfer its technologies, especially those used in the oil and gas industry. Cooperation in the sphere of weapon trade is a field of special importance; many of the Middle Eastern countries spend billions of U.S. dollars on Russia-produced weapons and armaments. Strate- gic cooperation within all sorts of international structures, OPEC in particular, is going ahead. Russia wants to attract Middle Eastern investments (especially money from the rich Arab countries) to the Northern Caucasus. Head of Chechnia Ramzan Kadyrov proved to be a valuable addition to President Medvedev’s Middle Eastern tour. In Syria, Kadyrov, as a member of the Russian delegation, took part in the talks and the signing of important intergovernmental agreements; in Damascus he met the leading Syrian politicians, members of the business community, and the mufti of Syria. In other words, the Northern Caucasus is gradually regaining its central role in many spheres of Russia’s relations with the Arab world. The future of these relations and their efficiency depend not so much on Moscow, the Caucasus, and the Muslim world: the interests of third forces can be clearly seen in the revolutionary wave that has engulfed the region.

Ansgar JÖDICKE

Senior Lecturer at the Department of Social Sciences, University of Fribourg (Fribourg, Switzerland).

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN STATE SCHOOLS IN AZERBAIJAN, GEORGIA, AND ARMENIA. DEMOCRATIC POLITICS OF RELIGION AND THE PLURALITY OF RELIGIOUS REPRESENTATIONS

Abstract

olitical institutions determine specific religion should be part of the state school education policies, although it is high- curriculum. All three Central Caucasian P ly contested whether, or in what way, states tried to establish a religious education Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 103 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION course under the auspices of the state and the role of religion in society. In conclusion, all three countries failed. the author argues that the existence of dif- This article analyses the historical ferent ways in which religion is represented background and interprets these develop- in society fosters the democratic civilization ments as part of the negotiation process on of religion.

KEYWORDS: religious education, politics of religion, religion in the public sphere, state school, education policy, politics and religion, religion and governance.

Introduction

Many sociologists of religion accept that religion is a social power that can establish strong and long-lasting commitments. Boundary-setting in religious traditions can be as strong as the boundaries of ethnic and national identities. The religious factor should be taken into account when religious identities are associated with national or ethnic boundaries, which is the case in all three Central Caucasian states. Academic studies should not overestimate religion or address it as an ex- plicit or hidden factor in all conflicts, nor should religion be neglected, because it is a powerful force in society. The most intriguing issue regarding religion in society is the democratic regulation of religious pluralism. The contemporary armed conflicts are not religious conflicts, even if the religious factor has sometimes been mobilized during these conflicts. Therefore, the politics of religion has to cope with social tension, minority-majority relations, and ways of negotiating in the public sphere. Some- times religious “the politics of religion” may succeed in civilizing religious actors; sometimes they themselves may be the origin of the conflicts. The relationship between political and religious institutions in society is in permanent negotiation. Working on conflict resolution requires balanced politics of religion. The position of religion in society is influenced, but not completely determined, by the politics of religion. Religion and politics may be understood as two fields of power that are to be civilized in a peaceful society. In this respect, one of the most controversial questions is the presence of religion in the public sphere.1 This article draws attention to a small part of the public significance of religion by analyzing the politics of religion. The case-studies deal with religious education in state schools2 in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.3 Comparable attempts to introduce a course about religion in state schools have been undertaken in all three countries. However, these attempts have either never been realized (Azerbaijan) or been abolished or revised a couple of years later (Georgia and Armenia). A short description of the general situation of religion in post-Soviet Central Caucasian countries provides the framework for understanding state-organized religious education. An analysis of these findings gives evidence of the existence of different forms fostering the democratic civilization of religion in society.

1 The academic discussion started with J. Casanova, Religion in the Public Sphere, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1994; today, he analyzes this sort of problems in the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs in Washington. 2 In the following, I will use the term “state school” to designate schools that represent the main part of the state’s education system and whose curricula and teachers are under state supervision. The term “public school” may lead to misunderstanding because of its different use in British and American English. 3 Many thanks to Satenik Mkrtchyan, Tatia Kekelia, and Elnur Ismayilov for their help, though I take full responsibility for the content and interpretations presented here.

104 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Religion in the Post-Soviet Central Caucasus

After years of adherence to an anti-religious policy during the Soviet period, the situation pertaining to religion in the Central Caucasus began to change in the years before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The policy of Glasnost and the structural weakness of the state facilitated a slightly friendlier attitude toward religions. With the declarations of independence in 1991, the possibilities for religious communities rose dramatically in the three Central Caucasian countries. The two mainstream Churches in Armenia and Georgia profited the most from the change in regimes and the years of political instability. They (re-)established powerful institutions strongly related to politics. The religious situation in Azerbaijan is less centralized. However, the Islamic communities began to flour- ish under the new law of freedom of religion. In general, the situation pertaining to religion was more convenient than in Soviet times. Today, all three countries refer to a national heritage of either Geor- gian Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic, or the Islamic tradition, and sometimes religion also contributes to identity formation, as well as to nationalism. As quantitative research points out, the support of religion is—to some extent—a political declaration of trust. The trust in religious institutions is much higher than in political institutions.4 In contrast, public religious activity in all three countries is as low as it is in the West European countries; however, most people declare themselves to be religious. The increase in public interest in religion does not contradict the broad consensus in favor of a secular state, at least in the cities and centers of civil society. The political principles in all three countries are mainly oriented toward Western Europe and a secular separation policy. However, what does this mean in practice? Even countries like France and the U.S., which promote the separation scheme in a strong way, are forced to make more specific decisions about their special type of politics of religion. And even in those countries that have written the same principle of separation in their constitutions, the reality of the separation policy may include close cooperation with at least the dominant religious institutions.5 In all three Central Caucasian states, there has been a considerable shift from a strong secular attitude right after independence toward religion-friendly (however still secular) politics. Whilst remaining, without doubt, a secular state, all three governments require markers that would distinguish them from their Soviet past. Religion played this role right after the instability of the new states became visible in the 1990s. Thanks to a slight religious revival at the end of the So- viet period, the groundwork was prepared for a positive evaluation of religion as part of national history. However, this did not automatically include a cooperative attitude to the existing mainstream religions and their institutional leaders. So the public reference to religion became an arena for power struggles and negotiation.

Religion in State Schools

State schools are an important part of the public sphere, and religion in state schools is at the crossroads between religion and politics. If the state or a religious community is active in this field,

4 See: R. Charles, “Religiosity and Trust in Religious Institutions. Tales from the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia),” Politics and Religion, Vol. 3 (2), 2010, pp. 228-261. 5 See also the analysis of J. Fox, “Separation of Religion and State and Secularism in Theory and in Practice,” Religion, State & Society, Vol. 39, 2011, pp. 384-401.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 105 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION it will be closely observed reciprocally. Therefore, religious education concepts in state schools may serve as case-studies concerning the general relationship between religion and society.6 In some European countries such as Great Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, and Switzerland, the influence of the state on religious education in state schools steadily increased during the 20th century. These countries developed forms of teaching about religion that were completely under the control of the state authorities.7 Some of those courses also dealt with life skills, ethics, and civic education. Curricula development, teacher formation, and supervision were part of the state’s education system and were clearly linked to general and civic values. At the beginning of the 21st century, even at the European level, there were attempts to foster such pedagogically legitimate religious education courses.8 Similarly, all three Caucasian states have undergone a phase of debate about such courses. They have used analogous arguments to legitimize the state’s activity by referring to cultural, moral, in any case, pedagogical reasons. In the following discussion, I will take a closer look at these debates and developments.

Azerbaijan

The Azerbaijani government started debates regarding the introduction of a special discipline on religious issues in secondary schools during the first years of the 21st century. The idea was first proposed by Head of the Muslim Spiritual Administration of the Caucasus Sheikh-ul-Islam Haji Al- lahshukur Pashazade. Pashazade is the official representative of all Muslims in the Caucasus; however, he was chosen by the Azerbaijani government and performs only a limited representational function while being very active in interreligious activities. Pashazade’s initiative was also supported by Rafiq Aliev, the former head of the State Commit- tee for Work with Religious Organizations (SCWRO). According to the SCWRO, it was necessary to introduce a special discipline on religious subjects that would not permit either the Shi‘a or Sunni interpretation of Islam to predominate. SCWRO even prepared a special textbook on the basics of religion, which was also supported by several well-known Islamic thinkers and some secular public figures. In the end, this project was stopped by its main opponent, Minister of Education Misir Mar- danov. According to him, the educational system—without any religious teaching in state schools— is based on the Constitution “with a rather well-founded legislative base.”9 He stressed the peaceful relations between different departments (education and religion) and the secular character of Azer- baijan’s educational system. Later, SCWRO Spokesman Allakhverdiev backed out, stating that secondary schools would not teach the subject of religion the following year. Committee Head Aliev explained that religion would not be a subject in its own right in secondary schools, but topics relating to religion would be taught within the context of history, social science, and literature. The discourse on this matter started with a reference to value education and moral education; later on, it shifted to the politics of religion, assuming that knowledge about religion could prevent the youth from falling under the negative influence of internal or external radical religious circles. Last but not least, the idea was to strengthen religious tolerance in Azerbaijan. Some analysts thought

6 See: A. Jödicke, “Introduction,” in: Religious Education Politics, the State, and Society, ed. by A. Jödicke, Ergon, Würzburg, 2013, pp. 7-22. 7 See the overview: Religious Education in Public Schools. Study of Comparative Law, ed. by J. López-Muñiz et al., Springer, Dordrecht, 2006. Close cooperation between the state and the main Christian churches can still be found, for example in Germany. 8 See: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools: Prepared by the ODIHR Advisory Council of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief, 2007, available at [http://www.osce.org/odihr/29154]. 9 [http://www.religioscope.com/notes/2002/066_azerb_edu.htm].

106 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION that the final decision against the new school subject was motivated by protection of the secular character of the education system. Especially when protecting Azerbaijan’s image versus European institutions, the “pollution” of the secular character of the state could have dangerous consequences in international relations. Another attempt occurred in September 2011 in the same direction and from the same origin. Haji Sabir Hasanli, the deputy chairman of the Caucasus Muslims Department, proposed introducing religious studies in secondary schools in Azerbaijan. He suggested that a pilot study be carried out in one of Baku’s schools and the effect monitored. His idea was to offer general courses in Islam and other religions, and not to introduce prayer in schools. Students at Baku Islamic University “do not learn to be mullahs, but to be teachers.”10 Discussions on the issue of religious education in school are still in progress.

Georgia

A new school subject “The History of Christianity” was introduced in Georgia during the last years of the Soviet Union. The purpose was cultural rather than religious. Pupils should complete their knowledge of history, art, and literature. After the declaration of independence in 1991, “the Patriarch- ate became increasingly active; especially in relation to the training of teachers... Moreover, the contents of ‘The History of Religion’ became the subject of disputes between some representatives of academic circles and the Patriarchate.”11 In addition, the Patriarchate succeeded in influencing the Law on Education adopted in 1997, which states in Art 18.2 that the “Ministry of Education and Sci- ence of Georgia (MES) had to cooperate with the Georgian Patriarchate while working on the elabo- ration of the school curricula.”12 The Georgian Orthodox Church especially concentrated on pushing back every attempt to implement teachings about other religions. The subject “Religion and Culture” had been taught in state schools for only a short period of time. It had to be removed from the curriculum in April 1999 as a result of the successful action of the Orthodox movement “Union of Orthodox Parents” to stick to a Christian Orthodox curriculum. Their position was that “the textbook dedicated a large section to the teaching of other religions, which, according to confessors, might confuse the child’s mind.”13 Public debates on religious education at state schools were held during the first decade of the 21st century. “Secular” or “human rights” activists complained about the religious character of the teachings. The Report on Conditions of Human Rights in Georgia in 2004 stated that the “nature of religious education at certain schools also causes concern.” “A subject called ‘The History of Religion and Culture’ is taught at schools, which very often is understood by the teachers as teaching the ‘Law of God.’ The level of education of religion teachers at schools is very low. Praying before any classes start, as well as holding different types of religious-patriotic events at the initiative of the school administration… is a common practice… Many of the teachers admit that their goal is making the children religious or ‘church-goers,’ i.e. indoctrination.”14

10 First statements from 2010: [http://en.trend.az/news/society/1689204.html]. 11 S. Papuashvili, State of freedom of religion in Georgia since the Adoption of Constitutional Agreement between Government and the Orthodox Church of Georgia, Human Rights Center, Tbilisi, 2008, especially pp. 7-10. 12 Translated by Satenik Mkrtchyan. 13 “‘რელიგიას და კულტურას’ სკოლებში აღარ ისწავლიან (“Religion and Culture” Will Not Be Taught in Schools Anymore),” კვირის პალიტრა (Weekly Times), No. 15 (207), 12-18 აპრილი 1999 (12-18 April, 1999), p. 2. 14 Published by the Office of the Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia, Tbilisi, 2005, p. 41, available at [http:// www.ombudsman.ge/files/downloads/en/szounjmrncjpwcvdgasn.pdf]. Refer to the outcomes of the qualitative interviews in Assessment of Reform in Education System. Sociology Research Paper, The Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Tbilisi, 2009, pp. 54-56, available at [http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/24875/1/ Assessment%20of%20reform%20in%20Education%20System.pdf?1].

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 107 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION A fierce debate in November 2004 over the role of religion in school curricula illustrated the stakes involved. In an attempt to remove religious instruction altogether from state schools, some 70,000 Georgians signed a petition for the resignation of Minister of Education and Science Alexan- der Lomaia. As a compromise, the ministry settled on information about religion as a social sciences course. In the meantime, Georgia’s religious policy tried to curtail the influence of the Georgian Ortho- dox Church. The new Law on General Education (adopted on 8 April, 2005), as stated in Art 13.2, prohibited religious sermons and the teaching of any specific religion in state schools. The law identified several activities as illegitimate “indoctrination,” “proselytism,” or “measures of forced assimilation,” such as exposing one religion as the only true religion to pupils in order to convert them, praying during lessons, and displaying religious symbols (icons, crosses) in the precincts of state schools. However, some exceptions are mentioned, such as religious symbols used for education, celebration of state holidays, and “universal values.” So the Georgian Parliament left the possibility open for religion as a resource of cultural capital and did not completely ban religion from schools. On the contrary, the law states that “pupils of state schools can study religion or conduct religious rituals during their free time if the purpose is to receive religious education” (Art 18.4). School textbooks were published in 2007 for some grades, and another textbook on the history of world religions followed in 2010, which is not yet widespread.15 An analysis of recently published history textbooks attests that the depiction of world religion is balanced.16 However, older textbooks are still in use, and some teachers claim the authority of the Georgian Orthodox Church.17

Armenia

Although there were attempts to establish regular courses about the history of religion right after the declaration of independence in 1991, the situation with regard to religion in the first ten years of the new Armenian state was confusing. There is empirical evidence of organized group baptism, as well as academic-like history of religion courses during these years.18 The story of religion in state schools in Armenia has its parallels in the reestablishment of the Armenian Apostolic Church as the national church which has been vested with enormous power. After an agreement between the Government and the Armenian Apostolic Church was signed in 2002, a course on “The History of the Armenian Apostolic Church” was introduced gradually in secondary and high schools. The Church also successfully affected the legal bases of the education system. According to Art 4 of Section 3 of the Law on Education, “The Republic of Armenia’s educational system is aimed at strengthening the spiritual and intellectual potential of the Armenian nation, as well as maintaining and promoting universal human values. The Armenian Church contributes greatly to this work.” Art 8 entitles the Armenian Apostolic Church to curricula and textbook development, as well as other possibilities of influence. It is obvious that the Armenian Church takes

15 This is one of the major outcomes of the project “Improving Environment for Minority Integration in Georgia through Supporting Reforms in the School Education System,” funded by Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst / EED (Germany). The project has also been supported by the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (refer to the annual report 2010, especially footnote 15). 16 See: L. Gigineishvili, “Post-reform History Textbooks in Georgia: Changing Patterns and the Issue of Minorities in Georgian History,” in: History Teaching in Georgia: Representation of Minorities in Georgian History Textbooks, ed. by CIMERA, Geneva, 2007, available at [www.cimera.org], pp. 7-22 (especially footnote 17). 17 See: D. Tinikashvili, “Religious Lessons in Public Schools, 20 February 2012,” Humanrights.ge, available at [http:// www.humanrights.ge/index.php?a=main&pid=14476&lang=eng]. 18 I follow the detailed depiction of S. Mkrtchyan, “State and Church in Armenian State Schools,” in: Religious Education Politics, the State, and Society, pp. 149-161.

108 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION part in the organization, financing, control, and evaluation of the religious education lessons in Ar- menia. On 22 February, 2007, the government adopted the Law Regarding Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church. This permits the Church to initiate activities in state schools. Compared with Georgia, the public debates on this structural cooperation are weak. Several authors have pointed out the incompatibility between compulsory courses and human rights, e.g. the report on religious tolerance in 2009/2010.19 Nevertheless, the political and Church authorities present themselves in great harmony. They argue that the courses are only courses in history and knowledge of religion. The participation of the Armenian Apostolic Church has to be understood because of its special significance for the people of Armenia (as written in the Constitution).

Discussion

All three states dealt with the topic of religion in state schools during the period of nation- building and identity formation in the early years of the post-Soviet era. The political arguments given by those promoting the state’s activity in this field refer to a positive evaluation of religion in society, its significance for the nation’s cultural tradition, and its support of social values. Principle ambivalence is sometimes visible, for example, when the state legitimizes its activity by giving a negative evaluation of religion, making courses in religion part of a prevention policy. Positive and negative judgments highlight that the presentation of religion in schools by state authorities is not identical to the religion presented by religious communities. The presentation of several world views under the headline “religion” makes them in principle comparable and to some extent equal. This is what democratic politics of religion requires as a precondition for any policy of religious tolerance. However, the mainstream religious communities will disagree radically when they feel their claims to truth and tradition are weakened. We found two contradictory strategies of politics of religion, although both referred to the interpretation of the separation of state and religion. In Azerbaijan, politics refers to the separation of state and religion hoping that abstinence in this field will both convince the EU that Azerbaijan is a modern country and encourage religious communities to keep out of politics. Nevertheless, religion is not only represented in religious education courses, but also in history, the arts, and literature. The state’s politics of religion in Armenia welcomed the Church as a strong partner in identity and value formation. The influence of the Church on state schools has been increasing during the last decade as supported by parliament. Yet politics tries to substantiate the general difference between religion and politics although this is clearly not what happens in the field of religious education policy. There are similar tendencies found in Georgia. However, the state remains more distant from the Church and the protests are far more elaborate. Even the policy of the state authorities is more skeptical about their collaboration with the church. The activities of the religious communities were dependent on their sociopolitical situation. The two main Churches in Georgia and Armenia were far more centralized than Islam in Azerbaijan. They represented not only a tradition that was worth recovering after the atheistic period of the Soviet Union, but also provided the new societies with a stable institution during the years of instability. The Georgian Orthodox Church, as well as the Armenian Apostolic Church, stepped into the power vacuum. This has especially been the case in Armenia where the government did not really counter the

19 See a number of interview examples in: S. Danielyan & V. Vardanyan & A. Avtandilyan, “Religious Tolerance in Armenia,” pp. 22-31, available at [http://www.osce.org/yerevan/74894].

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 109 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Church’s ambitions. In Georgia, the Church had to fight for its presence in schools and had to accept some compromises. In Azerbaijan, communication between political groups and religious communities was deeply impaired; political ambitions could not be negotiated in the public sphere like participation in schools, but seethed under the surface in some regions. The reasons why the governments did not introduce a course on religious topics were two-fold. In Azerbaijan, it was a political decision. In Georgia and Armenia, the Church had too much power. In Armenia, the Church could capture the field; in Georgia, the Church was able to prevent the most radical form of state influence. However, the jury is still out. The failures might therefore be interpreted as an ongoing clarification process of the role of religion in society. In any case, there are doors open where religion remains part of the curriculum in state schools.

Conclusion

The findings show that religious education policy in state schools can obviously be interpreted as a crucial point of politics of religion. In all three Caucasian countries, the state authorities used the field of religious education in state schools as a means for their politics of religion. They all used the religion/politics separation scheme as an interpretative pattern to legitimize their politics. Further- more, they found solutions to cope with the power of religion, though it is not yet clear how sustainable these solutions are. The change in political regime and the transformation of society may deepen the separation between religion-friendly and secular forces. The separation paradigm may help to structure the politics of religion, however, it is not itself a solution in school, because there are many specific places where religion appears.20 Religion does not function within society in terms of a yes/no distinction. There are different forms of representing religion. There is a plurality of representations and people might react “religiously” in one context and “non-religiously” in another. There may be pupils and parents who would support a cultural representation of religion in school while refusing a strictly religious identity in their life. The presentation of religion to pupils turns into a social factor itself and a specific form of representing religion in society. The use of “religion” as a universal term becomes obvious when the state insists on dealing with a plurality of religions in “its” schools. However, the question of plurality and the representation of a variety of religions is only the surface of the problem. What is the role of religion in a democratic society? Which institutions and persons speak about which religion(s)? How are these religions presented? Who represents religion and in what form? The public debate about these matters itself is a sign for negotiations about religion in society. The case of religion represented in school textbooks and lessons may be seen as a minor debate that takes place instead of a major battle for religious truth. In pluralistic societies, when the state does not need to win religious-truth battles, there are many ways to deal with religion. In consequence, it is a misleading analysis when Dimitri K. Burlaka21 attempts to define the fields stating that “education localizes specialized information coming from such units within its various institutions and programs (e.g. political information is localized as the academic discipline of political science; religious information is localized as theology, etc.).”22 In con-

20 This is not only the case in history, literature and arts. It also happens to be a question of religious symbols with clothing, which has been left out in this article. 21 He is professor in St. Petersburg and Rector of Private educational establishment of higher professional education “Russian Christian Academy for Humanities.” In this context, I just criticize his precondition saying nothing about his pedagogical proposition. 22 D.K. Burlaka, “Value-Cultural Pedagogy as a Method of Education for Tolerance in the Conditions of the Post-Secular Society,” in: World Religions in the Context of Contemporary Culture: New Perspectives of Dialogue and Mutual Understanding, ed. by UNESCO, St. Petersburg Branch of the Russian Institute for Cultural Research, St. Petersburg, 2011, p. 193.

110 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION trast, there are far more academic disciplines that deal with religion, such as sociology/anthropology of religion, history of religion, and the scientific study of religion. Social sciences, history, and arts can manifest a different approach to religion, and this is an observable fact itself. However, it is not only within the academic community that there are different ways to represent religion. Religion is represented in societies in other forms and not only by praying and religious hierarchy. Grace Davie emphasizes that church visiting in Europe may itself be regarded as an important factor for religion in a society.23 Even if we do not follow her interpretation that this is an example of “vicarious religion,” we will certainly observe the significance of touristic or museum- related forms of religious representation. Besides religious rituals, religion is represented in museums, within the arts, and in school. The acceptance of pedagogical forms of representation within these contexts may foster a democratic culture. Despite different configurations of churches and Muslim communities, the three Central Cau- casian countries face similar challenges to their politics of religion. The politics of religion is linked with questions of stability, democratic structures, and negotiations on norms of society. The policy of separation of state and religious institutions is only a partial solution. In this situation, the politics of religion in state schools offers an enormous potential for dialog with religious communities as to the formats in which religion can be represented.24 The democratic process could benefit from keeping this debate open.

23 See: G. Davie, Religion in Modern Europe. A Memory Mutates, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 156-160. 24 An example of a successful intervention in religious education in state schools very close to the Caucasus has been Tajikistan (see: From Confidence Building Towards Co-operative Co-existence. The Tajik Experiment of Islamic-Secular Dialog, ed. by J.-N. Bitter et al., Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2005).

Farman KULIEV

Ph.D. (Hist.), Associate Professor, Head of the Chair of Social and Political Disciplines of the North Caucasian Institute— Branch of the Russian Academy of the National Economy and Civil Service under the President of the Russian Federation (Piatigorsk, the Russian Federation).

THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR IN THE GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA AND TURKEY IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS

Abstract

his article examines the evolution of the region from the 18th century to the present role of the religious factor and the dynam- day. It formulates several urgent tasks of Rus- T ics of Russia’s and Turkey’s influence on sia’s foreign policy in light of the need to stabi- the domestic problems of the North Caucasian lize the situation in the Northern Caucasus. Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 111 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

KEYWORDS: religious factor, geostrategy, Russian Empire, Ottoman Empire, Northern Caucasus, Islamization, muridism, pan-Turkism, New Ottomanism.

Introduction

The unique geographic location of the Northern Caucasus has been a blessing and a curse from time immemorial. Situated in a temperate continental climate zone and known for its balanced combination of mountainous and forest areas, fertile lowlands, and steppes, the region has always been an almost ideal place for all kinds of traditional farming. As a coveted prize in itself, as well as a trade, settlement, and cultural hub, the Caucasus became a bone of contention among its powerful neighbors—Russia, Turkey, and Persia—as early as the 16th century. The Northern Caucasus has always been and is still considered today to be one of the most important geostrategic regions separating Eastern Europe from the Asian steppes and Orthodoxy from Islam, as well as an arena of imperial struggle and ethnic conflicts. Positional warfare went on in the Northern Caucasus for influence on the local peoples, during which now one side, now the other took the upper hand. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the world socialist system, Turkey’s position in the region drastically changed. It acquired unique opportunities to raise its geopolitical status by means of pan-Turkic expansion into the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union and to increase its influence on the Russian regions of the Volga Area, the Northern Caucasus, and even Siberia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. The U.S. and its allies welcomed Turkey’s advance, particularly into the Muslim countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia, as a counterbalance to possible Iranian influence. At present, based on its stable economic growth and consolidation of power, Turkey is persis- tently returning to the idea of forming a political union of Turkic-speaking peoples, creating a powerful mechanism for coordinating its foreign policy, and increasing its national might. The situation in present-day Turkey is having a direct effect on the Russian Islamic regions.

The Religious Factor in the Geopolitics of Russia and Turkey in the Northern Caucasus in the 18th-Beginnning of the 20th Centuries

The Caucasus occupies a special place in the history of the Russian nation. It became a military- political problem for Muscovia as early as the 16th-17th centuries. This was followed by the era of the Russian Empire. The Russian nation laid its geopolitical route to the East and the South through the Caucasus, entering there into contacts with Islamic world, which were rather difficult for it. It can be said that the Caucasus, the Northern Caucasus in particular, was also attractive prey for southern neighbors, Iran and the empire of the Ottoman Turks, at the beginning of the 16th century. Before the 16th century, periodical clashes had occurred between Shi‘ite Iran and Sunni Turkey, which ended in compromise agreements, as a result of which Iranian dominance spread to the Eastern Transcaucasus and Daghestan and Turkish influence to the Western Transcaucasus and the North- 112 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION western and partially Central Caucasus. At the beginning of the 16th century, Turkey achieved the greatest success in the Northern Caucasus and the region became a strategically important vector in the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire. The presence of a Turkic-speaking population and the predominance of Islam over other religions in the Caucasian-Transcaucasian region opened the way to gradual and relatively peaceful penetration of the Ottoman Empire into these territories. At the end of the 1760s, the Russian Empire entered into open confrontation with Turkey. As a result of two Russo-Turkish wars, Russia acquired several territories in the Northern Caucasus and so reinforced its position in this region. Under the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca signed in 1774, the sides also assumed religious obligations: Russia was recognized as having the right to defend the interests of the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, while the treaty also envisaged patronage of the sultan, “the supreme caliph of Mohammedan law,” over the Muslims of the Russian Empire. It was proposed “to appoint a supreme official-mufti or khan, spiritually subordinate to the caliph, from the indigenous Russian Muslims who had the relevant religious education and squireship.”1 After the wars, czarist Russia sent people en masse to settle in the new places. Initially a political move, Muslims were also incorporated into the mass resettlement policy of the czarist regime. In so doing, much depended not only on the domestic political situation, but also on the often very complicated and not always peaceful relations with neighboring Muslim states—Persia and, in particular, the Ottoman Empire. The czarist authorities had to reckon with the effect the propaganda coming from these neighboring states had on the Muslims under their control, which was Islamic in form and anti-Russian in content. Therefore, “the government was faced with the task of nipping in the bud the foreign political orientation of the Russian Muslims (Volga Tatars, mountain-dwellers of the Northern Caucasus) toward Turkey as a bastion of Islam in the world.”2 At the end of the 18th century, the Northern Caucasus was engulfed by a new wave of Islamiza- tion, which also had clear signs of radicalism. The efforts of the Russian authorities to Christianize the population, which had been quite successful in Ossetia, Ingushetia, and to some extent Balkaria, were largely reduced to zero. Essentially all the influential political forces of the region striving to retain their political independence began applying Islamic ideology in almost every sphere of their activity. Preaching Christianity was frowned upon, whereby feudal circles actively enforced such views among the population, offering certain privileges to those strata of the dependent population that adopted Islam. For example, Ossetian elder Mirzabek Tulatov (a nobleman) reported: “Anyone who supports the Muslim faith is given an advantage and considered to be on a par with the elders, while those that support the Christian faith are subordinate to them.”3 Changes began occurring in the way the mountain people dressed and behaved. Delpozzo, superintendant of Kabarda, noted these changes at the beginning of the 19th century, saying that “now many uzdeni [noblemen], who are almost 40 years old, are learning how to read and write in Tatar in order to understand the Koran … they all have changed the way they dress: instead of the previous short caftans [long-wasted collarless outer garment], they have begun wearing long ones, they wrap turbans around their heads over their hats, they are growing beards, they have stopped drinking hot wine or smoking and sniffing tobacco, and they do not eat any meat that has not been killed by a Muslim, and consider this their salvation.”4 Russia, in turn, was also hatching just as sweeping modernization plans, but so-called Western attributes predominated in them: imperial state power, introduction of unified laws, development of

1 See: M. Kandur, Muridism. Istoria kavkazskikh voin, 1819-1859, Nalchik, 1996, pp. 234, 240; E.Iu. Barkovskaia, Islam i gosudarstvennoe stroitelstvo Rossii (vtoraia polovina XVI v.-fevral 1917), Moscow, 2006, p. 44; V.V. Degoev, Bolshaia igra na Kavkaze: istoria i sovremennost. Statyi, ocherki, esse, Second Edition, Moscow, 2003, p. 18. 2 A. Iunusova, Islam v Bashkortostane, Ufa, 1999, p. 42 (see also: A. Maremkulov, Iuridicheskie formy politiki Rossiiskoi imperii na Severnom Kavkaze v XVIII-XIX vv.: istoriko-pravovoi aspekt, Rostov-on-Don, 2005, pp. 17, 292). 3 N. Kiniapina, M. Bliev, V. Degoev, Kavkaz i Sredniaia Azia vo vneshnei politike Rossii (vtoraia polovina XVIII-80-e gody XIX v.), Moscow, 1984, p. 113. 4 Russian State Military-Historical Archive, rec. gr. MSA, inv. 16, Vol. 3, f. 18491, sheets 8-9.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 113 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the economy and social sphere, cultural Westernization, including missionary work, and so on. Of course, these transformations also presumed interference in the customary way of mountain life, which the preachers of Sufism-muridism did not like. The geopolitics of Russia and Turkey in this region always had room for people who were inclined both toward Islamic and Russian modernization projects. In this sense, the mountain communities became an arena where the ideas presented by the supporters of Islam, on the one hand, and by Russian imperial civilization, on the other, vied with each other. The rapid advance of the Russian Empire in the 19th century could not help but make Persia and Turkey, as well as Great Britain and France, nervous. Despite their influence in this region, Per- sia and Turkey soon understood that a war with Russia was inevitable. The Ottoman Empire openly regarded the Transcaucasus and Northern Caucasus as its time-honored domains or, to use the phrase popular today, “spheres of its vital interests.” It should be noted that all the states participating in the Great Game in the Caucasus pursued their own goals, striving in this way to take maximum advantage of the political situation. Of course, Russia, Iran, and Turkey remained the main players. Each of the three rivals tried to draw as many of the local rulers as possible to their side, on the one hand, while prevent the other two from forming an alliance against them, on the other. In addition to regional nations, Turkey and Iran, which had territorial possessions in the Cauca- sus, the European nations were also Russia’s strategic adversaries. The strivings of the latter in the Caucasus were spurred on by political calculations and economic interests related to the expansion of the sales market of European goods in the Sublime Porte and Persia, including in their Caucasian domains, and sources of raw materials that were provided by the Eastern nations for the growing European industry. Turkey and Iran, which at one time dominated in the Caucasus but now did not have the power to win a war with Russia, carried out propaganda among the Caucasians in an effort to destabilize the situation in the region. However, they were unable to form a united front against the Russian Empire: confessional disagreements and mutual territorial claims barred their way to cooperation, extra proof of which was the Ottoman-Persian war of 1821-1823. By 1830, the wars with Turkey and Iran resulted in the entire Northern Caucasus being formally transferred to the possession of the Russian Empire, while accession of Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe isolated Chechnia, Daghestan, and Kabarda even more from Ottoman influence. What is more, accession of the Porte’s Transcaucasian pashaliks made it possible for St. Petersburg to create a safety belt between Georgia and the Porte. The Russian Empire had learned how to move with skill and patience on the Transcaucasian chessboard, conquering and disuniting its allies. By competently playing on the contradictions of its “enemies” and maneuvering among the interests of its “friends,” Russia simply outwitted the first and the second. Turkey’s and Iran’s understanding of this fact found expression in the vengeful wars of the first third of the 19th century that led to their complete ousting from the Transcaucasus. In the mid-19th century, during the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire and its allies placed the stakes on the murid movement in the Northern Caucasus. But the murid movement suffered defeat. Both Turkey and Persia reacted passively to the murids’ pleas for help, since Sunni Turkey and Shi‘ite Persia were constantly at loggerheads with each other. It was essentially impossible for these two rivaling nations to cooperate in assisting the murids. On the other hand, Russia took skillful advantage of the religious differences between these two Muslim states and methodically sowed dissent between them. Turkish emissaries placed the stakes on the religious factor, calling for emigration that promised a better life in the same land with people of the same faith. The extensive propaganda activity carried out by the Porte even encouraged the conversion of Ossetian Christians to Islam so that they could join the migrants on religious grounds. In the 1860s, the Russian leadership in the Caucasus—general adjutants Alexander Kartsev and Dmitri Svyatopolk-Mirsky, who were assistants to the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, general 114 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION adjutant Prince Levan Melikov and general adjutant Mikhail Loris-Melikov, who were district heads of Daghestan, general adjutant Sergey Sumarokov-Elston, head of the Kuban region, and head of the Caucasian Mountain Administration General Major Staroselsky— suggested spreading Christianity in the region, particularly in the districts where it had already put down strong roots: Ossetia, the Zakataly District, and the Sukhumi District. “There are around 850,000 Muslims in the Caucasus, 32,000 Christians in Ossetia with a total population of 47,000, 3,500 in Zakatalia with a total population of 52,000, and 46,000 in Sukhumi with a population of 66,500. In 1867, the stronger, among the Muslims, part of the population was moved from the Sukhumi District to Turkey. By 1865, of the 500,000 mountain dwellers of the Western Caucasus, only 90,000 remained who had not been sent to Turkey. They were also exiled from northern and southern Daghestan, as well as from Kabarda and Chechnia. After the end of the war, the mountain dwellers were in a state of transition, but the old customs are being too hastily replaced with the new. No one trusts Russia, there is only mistrust, albeit less than there was before. It is the Muslim clergy, who are fanatical and have always been hostile toward us, that are keeping this mistrust alive.”5 In the mid-1870s, before the beginning of the next Russo-Turkish war, Turkey stepped up its efforts to hold sway over the Russian Muslims. With this goal in mind, campaigning was carried out among the local population, which Istanbul allured to its side with promises of material and military assistance, as well as calls to build Islamic solidarity and fight the infidels. As the war drew closer, contacts became more frequent and more active. The mountain dwellers traveling to pray in Arabia participated in meetings of Muslims in the towns of Medina, Mecca, and Istanbul, and when they returned to their Homeland, they convened unofficial meetings where they expounded on Turkey’s position and the need to liberate themselves from the control of the Russian empire. The haji returning from Turkey in the fall of 1876 and the spring of 1877 equipped with the inculcating ideas of the Turkish authorities, as well as spiritual people reputed to be academics, were particularly zealous in their efforts to incite the people.6 This campaigning was carried out not only in areas where resistance to Russia was customary—Daghestan, Chechnia, Abkhazia, and among the Circassians strongly influenced by Turkey, but in other densely populated regions too. One of these areas was the Karanogai steppes, where mullahs, campaigners, and people collecting money to fight the Christians found support and were hidden from the authorities by the local residents.7 Turkish agents in Abkhazia, which maintained enduring trade and political contacts with Turkey, were the most active. They often appeared in Sukhumi, where they gathered political information and also spread proclamations in the sultan’s name and influenced the local population in different ways, calling for assisting Turkey if a war should break out with Russia.8 A whole group of agents functioned in Abkhazia: Haji Husein, Mamad-bei, Bandikam Bekat, and others.9 Several months before the beginning of the Russo-Turkish war, muhajirs, particularly Chechens Usman-Hajiev and Alibek-Haji, appeared in the mountains of Chechnia from Turkey.10 On the eve of the war, other representatives from Turkey arrived in Sogratl with a letter from the son of Imam Shamil Ghazi Muhammad, general of the Turkish army. This letter told of Turkey’s certain victory in the war with Russia and the imminent arrival of the Ottoman troops “with money and weapons,” and said that the Daghestanis should immediately rise up against Russia.11

5 All-Loyal Report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Army regarding military-national administration for 1863-1869, St. Petersburg, 1870, pp. 86, 87, 109, 115, 117. 6 See: Materials for describing the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 in the Caucasian-Asia Minor Theater, Comp. by V. Tomkeev, Vol. 6, Part 2, Tiflis, 1910, p. 38. 7 State Archive of the Republic of Daghestan (hereafter SA RD), rec. gr. 126, inv. 2, f. 2, sheet 1. 8 See: Sh.V. Megrelidze, Voprosy Zakavkazia v istorii russko-turetskoi voiny 1877-1878 gg., Tbilisi, 1969, p. 9. 9 Ibid., p. 6. 10 See: R.M. Magomedov, Vosstanie gortsev Daghestana in 1877 godu, Makhachkala, 1940, pp. 32-33. 11 See: Istoria narodov Severnogo Kavkaza (end of the 18th century-1917), Moscow, 1988, p. 289.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 115 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION In order to counteract such phenomena, Russian-Tatar and Russian-Arabic newspapers began telling the truth about life in the Ottoman Empire. The czarist government also undertook other measures. General Rostislav Fadeev was sent to Istanbul in 1874 where he met with former general of the czarist army Musa Kundukhov and Shamil’s son, Ghazi Muhammad. During the meeting, General Fadeev presented his interlocutors with the following project: “creation of a state on the border with Afghanistan to which all the mountain dwellers in the Ottoman Empire and those wishing to leave the Northern Caucasus would move. Russia would assume all the expenses, providing the state of Caucasians on the border with Afghanistan recognized Russia’s protectorate as an autonomous state and would be subordinate to the czar. This project pursued the goal of preventing the mountain dwellers who emigrated from being used in Turkey’s interests during the war that czarism was about to wage.” This offer was rejected since, apart from everything else, it “opposed the policy of the Turkish government aimed at using the Caucasians who had found shelter in Turkey and were filled with hate and revenge toward czarism.”12 During the second half of the 19th century, after the failure of the idea of muridism, the Ottoman Empire offered the Caucasian peoples a new ideology that could unite them against Russia. This ideology initially became known as pan-Turkism, as well as pan-Islam. This term implies the trend that set itself the task of somehow recreating a single Islamic state in the form of a caliphate. The old idea of gazawat could no longer attract a sufficient number of mountain dwellers, but the new idea of religious and national unification was more progressive and long-term. During the Crimean War, the idea emerged of establishing a Caucasian Home, which envisioned economic and political unification of the Caucasian peoples. At the beginning of the 1880s, Tatar public figure and enlightener Ismail Gasprinski developed a concept for unifying the Turkic-Tatar peoples of the Ottoman and Russian empires into a single federation. The ideological concepts of pan-Turkism were spread by means of Tercümān, a newspaper coordinated by Ismail Gasprinski that was published in the Caucasus, as well as in Central Asia, including in its Russian part at that time— the Turkestan Governorate General. Ismail Gasprinski drew parallels between the Muslim society of Russia and the Porte and explained the principles of pan-Turkism.13 His journalistic pursuits and the awareness campaigns he carried out were absolutely legal, on the one hand, while his newspaper Tercümān openly promulgated the political, religious, and cultural values of the Ottoman Empire, on the other, rallying around itself reactionary groups of Russian Muslims in the Caucasus and the Crimea. The ideologists of the Ottoman Empire gave equal attention to both unifying the Turkic peoples and to the idea of a universal religious renaissance under the sultan, who was the religious leader of the Muslims at that time.14 Thus playing on national and religious consciousness at the same time, the Ottoman Empire was able to strengthen its position in the Caucasian region, reducing the spatial gap with the Turkic world. In order to disseminate the new ideological trends, the Porte took advantage of old methods tested as far back as the times of the Caucasian war: special agents spread the ideas of pan-Turkism and pan-Islam. So-called ideological preachers disguised as merchants, pilgrims returning from Mecca, and instructors visited places with a large Muslim and Turkic-speaking population. At the beginning of the 20th century, the revolution gave a boost to the development of national ideas in the Russian Empire, which opened up broad opportunities for promulgating pan-Islam. The mountain peoples were very drawn by the prospect of all the Muslim people being united under Caliph Abdulhamid II and the ensuing liberation from Russia that might follow. Despite the fact that Turkic peoples—Balkarians, Kumyks, and Karakalpaks—were living in the Northern Caucasus, it was risky to place the stakes exclusively on the idea of pan-Turkism in the region.

12 A.M. Magomeddadaev, Emigratsiia Daghestantsev v Osmanskuiu imperiiu, Book 2, Makhachkala, 2001, pp. 81-82. 13 See, for example: I. Gasprinsky, Turetsko-russkoe obshchestvo, Terjuman (Istanbul), 1914, No. 61. 14 See: I. Malkhazouny, Le Panslavisme et la question d’ Orient, Paris, 1898, p. 45.

116 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The ideas of pan-Turkism and pan-Islam were able to form reliable bonds between the Ottoman Empire, and then Turkey, and the Northern Caucasus. Combining nationalism and religious influence made it possible for Istanbul to reinforce its position in the region. Thanks to the support of the local population, Turkey, which was already a republic, continued to develop its political vector in the region and throughout the 20th century. Spending on the Northern Caucasus was included as a separate item in the budget of the Ottoman Empire. For example, the Chancellery of Sheikh-ul-Islam in Istanbul issued 5,000 lira in 1907 to support Turkish agents in Russia.15 In 1907, the Caucasus and Turkestan was secretly visited by sultan Abdul Hamid’s personal adjutant, Colonel Ismail Hakim-bei. During the three months of his stay in Russia, he campaigned among the Turkic and Islamic population and gave instructions on how to establish relations between the Russian Muslims and representatives of the Ottoman Empire. On the eve of the world war, the idea of creating a unified ethnic and religious state predominated in the foreign policy of the Ottoman government. Turkish consular institutions were subordinate to the Founding Committee of Pan-Islam and, just as during the Caucasian war, the Porte’s trade and diplomatic representation offices in other countries (primarily in Russia) became the centers of agents’ activity. In the Northern Caucasus, the Circassians, Daghestani, and Chechens who emigrated after the Caucasian war of 1878 often acted as agents and disseminators of the ideology of the Ottoman Empire. Most of them occupied high-ranking posts in the civil or military service by that time. Rus- sian governmental circles were aware of the activity various Ottoman trade and consular representative offices were carrying out in Russia, particularly in the Crimea and the Caucasus, but officially did not have the right to prohibit the Porte from opening such offices. So, at the turn of the 20th century, as the entire Caucasus became more integrated into the world economy, its geopolitical significance grew. However, the unprecedented aggravation of social, ethnic, and religious conflicts prompted Turkey and several other states to interfere in the domestic political processes going on in Russia.

Geopolitical Reality of Present-Day Relations between Russia and Turkey

Beginning in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the systemic weakening of the Russian state and its expulsion from the economic, energy, and transportation-communication projects, prompted Turkey to fill the vacuum that arose in the Central Caucasian region, as well as attempt to become a regional leader for the newly independent states in the post-Soviet expanse with a Turkic population. This complied with the West’s interest in weakening Russia, on the one hand, while Turkey wanted to build its own policy, which differed from the West’s, on the other. First, Turkey exported so-called Kemalism to these regions, that is, a Western-oriented ideology that called for building society and the state on secularism (in recent years, propaganda of Islamic solidarity has been paradoxically, although quite successfully, combined with the export of Kemalism). And today we see that the newly formed Turkic-Islamic post-Soviet states are choosing the Turkish rather than the Iranian alternative for themselves. Second, Turkey is taking a very pragmatic approach to relations with the newly formed Turkic states in economic and energy matters. Turkey is offering itself as a transit state for the new energy flows, while oil and gas are paving the way to the creation of a new sales market. Turkish industrial goods are not very competitive in the European markets for well-

15 See: J.M. Landay, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization, Oxford, 1990, p. 11.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 117 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION known technological reasons, but they are in demand in the post-Soviet expanse. Third, Turkey and the newly formed post-Soviet countries that have a Turkic population share ethnic roots, common cultural processes, as well as mentality and spirituality. So Turkey is pursuing cultural cooperation with Azerbaijan and the Russian federal constituencies in the Caucasus, and also with the Central Asian states, which is also creating prerequisites for integration. The Turkish media, nongovernmental organizations, funds, religious organizations, and foreign political state institutions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agency for Developing Relations with Turkic CIS States, and so on) are aimed at carrying out this integration. For example, all the new Turkic states and Turkey itself take turns to hold Turkic kurultai (congresses). The national program of Turkish radio and television (TRT) announced that words from the languages of other Turkic peoples would be gradually included in their broadcasts in order to bring them closer together. It was then that former Turkish president Turgut Özal even predicted that “the 21st century will be the century of Turkey, which has wonderful prospects for promoting new historical unification of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus under the Turkish aegis.”16 After Turgut Özal’s death, the new Turkish president, Süleyman Demirel, talked about “the Turkish world stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China.”17 It should be noted that in addition to establishing official contacts along government lines, nongovernmental structures have also been playing a noticeable role in Turkish expansion. The matter largely concerns the business and educational initiatives coming from the religious network structure of Fethullah Gülen (so-called Nurcular).18 The post-Soviet space is incorporated to a significant extent into the sphere where Neo-Ottomanism is being applied. Particular groups of the population of post-Soviet countries were also exposed to Turkish influence on the economy and politics earlier. In the new conditions, Turkey’s role in the Eurasian space could significantly change with a change in its foreign policy strategy. The Central Caucasus, and of course the Northern Caucasus, comprises the main strategic vector in Turkey’s policy. Neo-Ottomanism (yeni osmanlıcılık in Turkish) has been a topic of extensive discussion among experts since 2008. On 1 May, 2009, Ahmet Davutoğlu, the chief architect of Ankara’s new foreign policy, was appointed as Turkey’s minister of foreign affairs. His numerous vibrant Ottoman speech- es soon became the source of frequent quotes. Some analysts, particularly in countries that used to belong to the Ottoman Empire, became nervous and began talking about the “Ottoman threat” and the “revival of bloody traditions.”19 Neo-Ottomanism poses Turkey exclusively as a regional superpower, the geographical and cultural heir of the Ottoman and Byzantine empires. However, the Ottoman idea has found its way into the Russian Northern Caucasus, although in a somewhat unexpected form. The Ottoman language turned out to be one of the alternatives being considered in the virtual expanse as the official language of the Caucasus Emirate. Furthermore, it is obvious that advocates of the Shari‘a system in the Caucasus have no command of the Ottoman language, which nowadays is only used in manuscripts and old printed books and heard exclusively in rare university auditoriums. The Caucasian separatists need a symbol, an “imperial” language for the multinational state they are planning, that does not give priority to any of the local ethnic groups.

16 K. Panarokis, “Turetskie metamorfozy,” in: Pantiurkizm i natsionalnaia bezopasnost Rossii: Tez. Dokl. Mezhdun. Nauch. Konf., Moscow, 1994. 17 R. Zargarian, “Turetskaia model “novogo mirovogo poriadka,” Observer, No. 6, 1996, p. 45. 18 Mullah Said Nursi who preached extremely radical views was the founder. Later, in the 1970s, Said Nursi’s ideas on establishing Shari‘a were actively preached by Imam Fethullah Gülen Haji effendi. Some of the main trends of its activity are the introduction and advancement of its adepts into the power and administration bodies both in Turkey and in Russia and other CIS countries. 19 L. Melik Shakhnazarian, “Turetsky neoosmanizm. Vozrozhdenie krovavykh traditsii?” available at [http://www. golosarmenii.am/ru/19922/world/520/].

118 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION There is no need to prove how remote this project is from reality. However, it cannot be denied that Ottoman ideas are circulating in one form or another in the radicalized Muslim environment.20 The Turkish government officially adheres to the policy of non-interference in the situation in the North- ern Caucasus, but there are numerous testimonies to the activity of official Turkish emissaries in Chechnia. For example, on 13 May, 2012, an International Caucasian Conference was held in Istanbul organized by the Caucasian diaspora of Turkey and the nongovernmental Imkander organization. Like their Russian colleagues, many Turkish officials adhere to traditional geopolitics. Turkey was cate- gorically against re-examining the flank limits under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. This treaty strictly limited the levels of weapons that Russia had the right to deploy in the Northern Caucasus. In turn, Turkey is now strengthening military cooperation with Azerbaijan, which has essentially come right up to the level of a military-political alliance. In this respect, Baku’s initiative on creating a NATO military base in its territory, although it shows no signs of being implemented in the foreseeable future, was probably coordinated in advance with Ankara. Some supporters of Turkey’s active policy in the Caucasus would be willing to deploy a Turkish military base near Baku. There is clearly some duality in Turkey’s position. Geopoliticians and geo-economists often follow intercepting courses. While the military are taking a hard line about the prospect of a stronger Russian military presence in the region and the enthusiasts of pan-Turkism are elaborating new gran- diose projects, Turkish construction companies are building towns in Vladikavkaz for Russian servicemen to live. Revival of the traditional image of an enemy is not preventing the business circles of both countries from carrying out large-scale projects like Blue Stream (transportation of Russian gas to Turkey along the bottom of the Black Sea). These facts confirm that Turkey, as Russia, has not determined the vector of the country’s future development, and is forming its future foreign policy model not so much during national debates as in the aftermath of a struggle among different trends. The Russian foreign political departments, other state, sociopolitical, and business organizations and forces should pay particular attention to reinforcing the economic and humanitarian ties of both countries with active participation of North Caucasian government and business structures. Only this policy can ensure a more favorable Turkish foreign policy course for Russia. The vast benefits that Turkey has been acquiring in recent years from the activity of construction and other companies in the Russian Federation and from the economic and recreational tourism of Russians in Turkey are an argument that has still not been used to support Russia’s position. On the whole, Turkey’s entire policy in the 1990s and 2000s shows that Turkey has essentially reanimated the new foreign political and geopolitical doctrine and concept of pan-Turkism, we will call it neo-pan-Turkism, and is trying to have a strong influence in this area. Turkey is primarily implementing the so-called Turan project supported by the U.S. using the ideology and practice of pan-Turkism. This policy is stoking separatism, nationalism, and religious fanaticism, while also preserving hotbeds of tension, and so on. In the current situation there are many reasons why it is counterproductive for Russia to oppose the Islamic world with which it has historic ties. The Muslim population within the country is the second largest religious group after the Orthodox Christian. What is more, Islam are closer to Russian Orthodoxy in spiritual values than to Western Christianity, which gives reason to talk about inter- civilizational contact and dialog, as well as cultural interpenetration, and not about confrontation and hostility in the spirit of the Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations.” “The phenomenon of the Russian civilization,” emphasized L. Bashirov, “lies not only in relatively peaceful coexistence within a single state of autochthonous peoples of the Christian and Muslim faiths. The matter concerns a

20 For example, the Sheikh Abdusalam organization is carrying out this kind of work in Daghestan. The leader of terrorist formation, known as Sheikh Abdusalam, Turkish citizen Mukhanned, was killed in the Northern Caucasus during a special operation.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 119 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION deeper foundation of unity of these peoples—spiritual affinity and coincidence of national mentalities formed on common doctrinal principles and the practice of Russian Orthodoxy and ‘Russian’ Islam, interdependence, and interpenetration of national cultures.”21

Conclusion

The Northern Caucasus is situated in the mountainous area of the Caucasus that borders on Atlantic Turkey, which, in turn, strategically controls the border zone with Russia. The main world religions—Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism—have a strong influence here. So it stands to reason that the U.S., Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and several other countries are interested in this multiethnic region. The task of Russian foreign policy and diplomacy is to create favorable external prerequisites for achieving its main objectives of preserving state integrity and reinforcing unity during the development of a law-based democratic state. In order to reach this goal, a coordinated strategy must be elaborated and implemented that expresses the geopolitical interests of Russia, the main vectors of which should be the following: (a) explaining the goals and methods of Russian policy in the Northern Caucasus to Russian society and the outside world in order to attain understanding and support; (b) institutionalizing the political dialog with Turkey in favor of strategic understanding with Russia; introducing the practice of consultations at the level of the Chiefs-of-Staff of the Russian and Turkish Armed Forces; (c) defining normalization and development of relations with direct neighbors in all the main vectors as a vital priority; (d) carrying out measures aimed at historical reconciliation of Russia with the Islamic world in order to turn traditional Islam in the Northern Caucasus into an ally in the fight against extremism; (e) isolating extremist forces in the Northern Caucasus by means of an engaged dialog with the leaders of Turkey, Egypt, other Middle Eastern states, CIS countries, the European Union, and the U.S.; strengthening interaction with the corresponding services of these states in order to pool efforts to combat international terrorism.

21 L.A. Bashirov, Islam i etnopoliticheskie protsessy v sovremennoi Rossii, Moscow, 2000, p. 49. 120 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOHISTORY

Jamil HASANLI

D.Sc. (Hist.), Professor, Khazar University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

ALI MARDAN BEK TOPCHIBASHEV: LIFE, EPOCH, COMRADES-IN-ARMS (THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS BIRTH)

Abstract

his is the life story and an overview of lims of Russia “from a community to a nation” the 50-year-long history of the public and the role of his hero in setting up the Azer- T and political activities of Ali Mardan bek baijan Republic and its first steps on the in- Topchibashev. The author relies on a vast ternational arena. body of archival materials to recreate the Prof. Hasanli introduces materials from problems of the national movement of Azer- the Topchibashev family archives kept in baijan and analyze the evolution of the Mus- France into scientific circulation.

KEYWORDS: Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev, national movement of Azerbaijan, movement of the Muslims of the Russian Empire, Azerbaijan Democratic Republic.

Introduction

Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev is one of the most prominent figures in the history of Azerbaijan and the national-liberation movement of the Muslims of Russia. He graduated from a grammar school Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 121 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION in Tiflis in the 1880s and enrolled at St. Petersburg Imperial University, the best in the Russian Empire. (In the first half of the 19th century, his grandfather, Mirza Jafar Topchibashev, founder of the Russian school of Oriental studies, was a professor at this university.) His excellent university education promised him a brilliant future. He justified the promise by becoming one of the foremost political figures of the Russian Empire. He served at different times as the leader of the Turkic peoples and the Muslims of Russia, as well as of the Caucasian emigration community, and even started historic processes. It would be no exaggeration to say that he was part of history and was among those select political figures who made history. Mamed Emin Rasulzade offered the following opinion about this extraordinary man: “For no less than fifty years, Topchibashev served his people and his nation.”1

Childhood in Tiflis and St. Petersburg

On 6 April, 1870, Transcaucasian Sheikhulislam Akhund Molla Akhmed Huseynzade Salyani (the grandfather of great enlightener Ali bek Huseynzade) issued a document which testified that on 4 May, 1863, Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev was born into the family of Shi‘a Muslim Alekper bek Topchibashev officially married to Sever Khanum, daughter of Muhammed Hasan bek Vekilov.2 The boy was named after his great grandfather Ali Mardan Topchioglu. The Topchiogullars came to Tiflis (where they settled close to the royal palace) from Ganja; the great grandfather served at the courts of two Georgian kings—Irakly II and Georgi XII.3 Mirza Jafar Topchibashev, his grandfather, born in 1790 in Ganja, received an excellent education at home and spent his youth in Tiflis, where his father served at the royal court. He wrote in his memoirs that they lived close to the royal palace.4 Alekper bek Topchibashev, father of Ali Mardan bek, preferred military service; he rose to the rank of a lieutenant in the czarist army.5 The documents from the historical archives of St. Petersburg show that Alekper was born in 1820 and joined the Transcaucasian Muslim Cavalry Regiment in 1843; two years later he became commander of one of the regiment’s subunits. In 1853-1856, he fought in the Crimean War, received numerous awards, and was promoted to second lieutenant.6 In his memoirs, Ali Mardan bek wrote that his father had served in the Russian units stationed in Warsaw. Ali Mardan bek started his schooling in a Muslim madrasah; later he was enrolled in the Tiflis First Classical Grammar School, where lessons were taught in Russian.7 In the summer of 1884, he arrived in St. Petersburg where he enrolled in the historical-philological department of St. Petersburg University. On 25 January, 1885, after the first semester, he requested to be transferred to the depart-

1 Kurtuluş, No. 2, 1934, p. 35 (in Azeri). 2 See: Birth certificate of Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. 06.04.1870, Central Historical Archive of St. Petersburg (TsGIASPb), rec. gr. 14, inv. 3, f. 24308, sheet 4 (in Russian). Akhund Molla Akhmed Huseynzade Salyani (1812-1887) headed the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Caucasus in 1862-1885. 3 See: S.O. Kishmishev, Pokhody Nadir shakha v Herat, Kandahar, Indiyu i sobytia v Persii posle ego smerti, Tiflis, 1889, p. 303. 4 See: Ibid., p. 304. 5 See: Certificate of the rector’s office of St. Petersburg Imperial University issued to A.M. Topchibashev. 22.12.1887, TsGIASPb, rec. gr. 14, inv. 3, f. 24308, sheet 46. 6 For more details, see: TsGIASPb, rec. gr. 14, inv. 3, f. 24308, sheets 8-9. 7 See: Toptchibachi Ali Mardan bek. 16.12.1951, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 6/2, CERCEC, EHESS, Paris, p. 1.

122 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ment of law.8 After receiving the rector’s permission, he passed additional tests and became a law student. When Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev started his university course, his family was well known in academic and political circles. His grandfather Mirza Jafar, who died in 1869, left behind a large group of pupils who worked at the university and government offices in the 1880s. Most world-famous Russian Orientalists were graduates of St. Petersburg University, where, under Mirza Jafar, they learned Arabic, Farsi, and the Turkic languages and became acquainted with the best works of Oriental literature. On 13 January, 1889, Ali Mardan graduated from the university with a diploma that said: “The Council of Imperial St. Petersburg University issued this document to confirm that Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev, a 25-year-old Muslim, enrolled as a student of this University in August 1884, took the full course in the Department of Law, demonstrated excellent knowledge at the exams, and, after presenting his dissertation, was deemed worthy of the academic rank of Ph.D. candidate. On the strength of Point 4 Para 42 of the General Rules of the Russian Universities of 1863, the Council of Imperial St. Petersburg University confirmed his academic rank on 28 November, 1888. On the strength of this, Topchibashev received all rights and advantages envisaged by the laws of the Russian Empire for Ph.D. candidates.” The diploma was signed by Rector of the University, Ph.D., Professor in Ordinary, Councilor of State Mikhail Vladislavlev, and Dean of the Faculty of Law Professor Vladimir Ivanovich Sergeevich.9 Upon graduation Ali Mardan bek returned to Tiflis; on 9 February, 1889, he started working at the District Court. Several months later, on 2 September, the Tiflis District Court moved him to the second city sector as assistant to the justice of the peace for petty administrative offences and criminal cases. He remained in the post until 11 May, 1890; on 8 May, he was appointed, and on 16 May, started working as secretary of the Tiflis District Court. On 20 December, 1891, the Heraldry Department of the Senate conferred on him the civilian title of Collegiate Secretary.10 On 22 June, 1893, the same department promoted him to titular councilor (the ninth rank in the Table of Ranks of the Russian Empire).11 In 1893, when he turned 30, he married Peri Khanum, the elder daughter of Hasan bek Zardabi (Melikov), a prominent Azeri enlightener who founded Ekinci, the first secular newspaper in the Muslim world, in 1875. On 19 April, 1895, by a decision of the Senate’s Heraldry Department, his excellent record at the Tiflis District Court was rewarded with the rank of collegiate assessor. Two days later he left the District Court “for family reasons.”12 After resigning from the district court, Topchibashev applied to the Tiflis Judicial Chamber for the license of a defense lawyer, issued to people with five years of impeccable service in the judi- ciary system. On 8 May, 1895, by a decision of its general meeting, he became a district attorney for the Tiflis Judicial Chamber.13 On 19 June of the same year, the Chamber entered his name on the list of its attorneys at the Tiflis District Court.14 By that time, Topchibashev had already gained prominence as a member of the Tiflis Muslim community.

8 See: A.M. Topchibashev’s written request to the Rector of St. Petersburg Imperial University. 25.01.1885, TsGIASPb, rec. gr. 14, inv. 3, f. 24308, sheet 13. 9 See: Diploma issued to A.M. Topchibashev by St. Petersburg Imperial University. 13.01.1889, TsGIASPb, rec. gr. 14, inv. 3, f. 24308, sheet 57. 10 See: Certificate issued to Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev by Chairman of the Tiflis District Court Bykov. 21.05.1896, The State Historical Archives of Azerbaijan Republic (GIAAR), rec. gr. 50, inv. 1, f. 194, sheet 93 (in Russian). 11 See: Ibid., sheet 93rev. 12 Document of Attestation issued by Chairman of the Tiflis District Court Bykov to Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev, 21.05.1896, GIAAR, rec. gr. 50, inv. 1, f. 194, sheet 93rev. 13 See: Certificate issued by Chairman of the Tiflis District Court Bykov to Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. 09.06.1895, GIAAR, rec. gr. 50, inv. 1, f. 194, sheet 95. 14 See: Document of Attestation issued by Chairman of the Tiflis District Court Bykov to Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. 22.05.1896, GIAAR, rec. gr. 50, inv. 1, f. 194, sheet 95.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 123 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION In the Capital of the “Oil Kingdom”

In 1896, Ali Mardan moved with his family to Baku, where he became caught in the whirlpool of political, national, and cultural processes. By that time the capital of Azerbaijan had become a hub of the world oil industry; the city, however, lacked attorneys with a good command of the local language, good knowledge of the Muslim lifestyle, and the willingness to pour their souls into their mission. The rapidly developing and affluent class of industrialists and merchants acquired in Ali Mardan a diligent defender of the Muslim business circles. The fame of the young and experienced lawyer spread far and wide. This coincided with the peak of oil production, trade in drilling equipment, buy-sell of oil-rich deposits, and all other forms of oil-related operations.15 This was when Azerbaijan reached its historical U-turn, when the cultural and enlightenment ideas of Mirza Fatali Akhundov and Hasan bek Zardabi acquired national tinges and political undertones. Having grasped the values of the epoch of nationalism, the Azeri enlighteners realized that the time had come to move away from the centuries- old idea of umma (community) to the concept of nation, which was much better suited to the spirit of the new century. They justified the need to move away from Eastern madrasahs to modern schools of the usuli-jali type. This pointed the nation in the direction of its salvation. It was in the light of the ideas of these great enlighteners that their followers Ali bek Huseynzade, Akhmed bek Agaev, and Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev steered the Azeris from a community to a nation. His decision to move to Baku proved to be all-important: in October 1897, Topchibashev was elected to the Baku City Duma. On 14 October, he, a newcomer, gained an impressive majority of 271 votes “for” and 117 “against” in the first round—a convincing result; a majority of 154 votes put him at the top of the Muslim election list.16 In December 1896, well-known Azeri millionaire Gaji Zeynalabdin Tagiev bought the Russian language daily Kaspiy (The Caspian) published in Baku and its print shop. In 1898, Ali Mardan became its editor-in-chief; later the print shop was also moved under his command. At the same time, he was re-elected chairman of the Nijat enlightenment society, which broadened the scope of his public and political activities: late in the 19th century, he went beyond the limits of the Azeri capital to become involved in Muslim charities and cultural organizations in other Caucasian cities.17 In 1900, Ali Mardan travelled far and wide in Europe: he visited Sofia, Belgrade, Budapest, Vienna, Paris and the Exposition Universelle (world fair), London, and Liverpool and returned home via Belgium and Germany. He never failed to find out what people in these countries knew about the East and about the Russian Muslims in particular.18 The impressions of his travels and meetings with progressive-minded people of Europe left an indelible imprint on his mind. He cautiously shared his thoughts with his readers. The revolution of 1905 in Baku started against the background of a “national slaughter,” which was not surprising: in the first days of 1905, the city was brimming with rumors about an “Arme- nian-Muslim war.” Very soon the rumors became reality. On 6 February, the Armenians launched their first attack, which lasted for four days and left 400 wounded and 300 dead (130 Muslims and 170 Armenians).19 On 1 March, 1905, the City Duma gathered to discuss the bloodshed. It was de-

15 See: Toptchibachi Ali Mardan bek. 16.12.1951, p. 4. 16 See: List of members of the Baku City Duma, elected by the election meetings on 14 and 25 October 1897, GIAAR, rec. gr. 50, inv. 1, f. 60, sheet 88 (in Russian). 17 See: Toptchibachi Ali Mardan bek Ali Akbar bek oglou, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 6/2, CERCEC, EHESS, Paris, p. 1. 18 See: Toptchibachi Ali Mardan bek. 16.12.1951, p. 6. 19 See: Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti, 22 April, 1905.

124 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION cided that a Committee of six Muslim and six Armenian deputies, two neutral people, and two journalists should be set up together with the Union of Oil Industrialists and under the supervision of the mayor to prevent further escalation. Ali Mardan bek was elected to represent the press. The Arme- nians, however, exploited the Baku events to spread rumors that the “bloodthirsty Azeris” had mur- dered 10 to 15 thousand Armenians in Baku. In his newspaper Kaspiy, Ali Mardan consistently exposed these lies. During the crisis, his office became a sort of headquarters of the national movement; later some of the Armenians apologized for their lies. The newspaper could no longer limit itself to social and cultural subjects; Ali Mardan bek wrote that they had plunged into a whirlpool of political processes, a new phenomenon in Russia. It was not by chance that the bloodshed happened at the time when the Muslims could finally reap the fruits of the processes unfolding across the country.20 The slaughter in the Caucasus did not play down the revolution’s national-liberation vigor: early in 1905 the czar retreated under its pressure. On 18 February, 1905, he signed a decree under which Minister of the Interior Alexander Bulygin was instructed to draft a project for a State Duma; the minister planned to convene his cabinet meeting on 15 March to discuss the rights and duties of the future representative body. In his newspaper, Ali Mardan bek highly assessed the plans of a representative structure and pointed out that the interests of the Muslims should be taken into account, while “the Caucasus should receive a new lease on life”. A Special Meeting under the minister started working on 12 March, that is, much earlier than expected; the very first session, however, made it clear that the discussions of the draft law on the State Duma would take a lot of time. This forced Ali Mardan bek to go to the capital with a special mission. On 15 March, progressive-minded intellectuals gathered at Tagiev’s house to discuss a State- ment on the Needs of the Muslims of 17 points drafted by Topchibashev. It was decided to submit it to the Cabinet for its consideration. The document described the national needs of the Caucasian Muslims as follows: a new lease on life for urban life and more rights for the Muslims in urban administrations; better living conditions for the people and better education, and several other issues. Put in a nutshell, the document demanded an end to discrimination against the Muslims: they should be admitted to civil service; receive full rights to be elected to self-administration; Azeris should acquire equal rights with other peoples in courts; the courts should start using the languages of the local peoples; and Muslims should acquire the freedom of assembly, conscience, speech, and the press, the right to be educated in the national tongue and other national and civil rights, including the right to perform religious and cultural rites. The meeting entrusted Topchibashev, Agaev, Huseynzade, and Vezirov with the task of informing the government about the demands of the Muslim intelligentsia and about the true conditions of life of the Muslims in the Caucasus. At their meetings, the self-administration structures of Baku decided to ask those who drafted the State Duma project to allocate three seats to the representatives of the peoples of the Baku Gubernia.21 In April 1905, Ali Mardan bek and the other members of the Baku delegation arrived in St. Petersburg. There he had a chance to meet Alexander Bulygin, Minister of Internal Affairs, who drafted the project and chaired the Special Meeting, to hand him a list of the main demands of the Caucasian Muslims Topchibashev had written himself and which had been approved by the intellectuals, national bourgeoisie, and big landowners of Baku and Ganja.22 This was when A. Agaev published his articles about the Baku events in St. Petersburg newspapers; Ali Mardan bek gained an audience with Count Vorontsov-Dashkov, the newly appointed Vicegerent of the Caucasus, an achievement of great importance at that time.23 Speaking in the name

20 See: Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), Archives d’Ali Mardan- bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 6/2, CERCEC, EHESS, Paris, p. 7 (in Russian). 21 See: Toptchibachi Ali Mardan bek Ali Akbar bek oglou, p. 2. 22 See: D.B. Seidzade, Azerbaidzhanskie deputaty v Gosudarstvennoy Dume Rossii, Baku, 1991, p. 12 23 See: Toptchibachi Ali Mardan bek. 16.12.1951, p. 8.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 125 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of the entire delegation, Topchibashev convinced the Vicegerent that the region needed administrative, judicial, land, tax, and other reforms. On 22 April, that is, after the audience, he received permission to publish the daily newspaper Hayat (Life) in Azeri.24 After returning to Baku as the owner of the new newspaper, Ali Mardan entrusted it to A. Huseynzade and A. Agaev who had accompanied him to St. Petersburg. Asef bek Atamalybekov, who was secretary of the Baku governor at the beginning of the 20th century, was appointed to Hayat as state censor.25 The first issue appeared on 7 June, 1905 and, in full conformity with its title, gave the Azeris’ public sentiments and national self- awareness a new lease on life.

In the Whirlpool of History

The St. Petersburg visit of the Azeri enlighteners headed by Ali Mardan bek laid the cornerstone of Turkic unity. On 8 April, 1905, Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev, Ali bek Huseynzade, Akhmed bek Agaev, Farrukh bek Vezirov, Bunyamin Akhmed, and Sadri Maksudov met in the St. Petersburg apartment of Abdurashid Ibragimov, where they agreed that the Russian Muslims needed a political party.26 Ismail bek Gasprinski, who arrived in the Russian capital, later specified the practical side. Those present at the discussion called the new structure Ittifaq al-Muslimin (The Union of Muslims); in some documents it is called the Union of Muslims of Russia or The Union for short.27 After discussing the project in detail, the gathering decided to send an address worded by Ali Mardan bek to all well-known intellectuals in the Muslim regions of Russia. The author stressed that Muslims should close ranks around a common program in order to fight together for equal rights with the other peoples of the Russian Empire.28 On 10 June, 1905, Ali Mardan bek left Baku for Tiflis to meet Count Vorontsov-Dashkov, who had started his service as the Caucasian Vicegerent. He described to him, in great detail, how Muslims lived in the Caucasus, clarified the meaning of the appeal presented to him and, in general, supplied him with background information about the Armenian-Muslim confrontation that had ignited the region. He wrote in his report that the authorities were treating the Caucasian Muslims as unwanted children, that they were kept away from civil service, and that they were discriminated against and had no say in what was going on in their own cities. In conclusion he touched upon the events in Irevan triggered by the national conflict and stressed that the press was piling the guilt on the Muslims, while keeping mum about the bodies of Muslims killed in Nakhchivan during the evening namaz and left in the streets and about the Muslims in Irevan who had spent five days under attacks. In short, Ali Mardan bek concluded, the Muslims were defending themselves. The Vicegerent had to admit that reforms were overripe; he promised to pay attention to schooling in the native languages; educational establishments for girls, Muslim spiritual educational centers, etc. He agreed that newspapers and books should be published in the Azeri language and that censorship should become more lib-

24 See: Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), p. 7. 25 V. İmanov, who has written a monograph about Topchibashev published in Turkey, wrongly believes that A. Atamalybe- kov, appointed state censor of Hayat, was Abbas bek Atamalybekov, who in 1919-1920 was secretary of the Azeri delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (see: V. İmanov, Ali Merdan Topçubaşı (1865-1934). Lider Bir Aydın ve Bağımsız Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti’nin Temsili. Boğazici Universitesi Yayınevi-İstanbul, 2003, p. 33). In fact, Abbas bek Atamalybekov was born in 1895 and was, therefore, 10 years old when Hayat was started, while Asef bek Atamalybekov had been secretary of the Baku governor since 1901; as a trusted official he was appointed censor of the Turkic-language newspaper. 26 National Archives of the Republic of Tatarstan (NART), rec. gr. 199, inv. 1, f. 722, sheet 13 (in Russian). 27 See: D. Usmanova, Musulmanskie predstaviteli v Rossiyskom parlamente. 1906-1916, Moscow, 2005, p. 134. 28 See: A.M. Topchibashev, Congresses of the Muslims of Russia, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 7. CERCEC, EHESS, Paris, p. 7 (in Russian).

126 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION eral, but specified that these and other changes petitioned by Muslim representatives could not be realized before law and order in the Caucasus had been restored.29 In June 1905, twelve prominent representatives of Baku (Ali Mardan bek was one of them) met Senator Alexander Kuzminskiy dispatched to investigate the conflict between Armenians and Azeris. The delegates supplied the details about what was going on in the city and the gubernia; Topchibashev handed the senator a copy of the petition intended for the Vicegerent that clarified many of the vague points. In the summer of 1905, he travelled to Ganja and Tiflis to let people know the truth about the events in Baku and to mobilize the most active of the local Muslims. During one of the trips, he visited Hajikent, where he attended a public meeting to speak about the political, social, and economic needs of the Caucasian Muslims and encourage the audience to set up local self-administrations. At the same time, he arranged for the statements and applications of the Muslims of Ganja and the Za- kataly, Sheki, and Javad districts about their situation and hopes to be sent to St. Petersburg.30 In August 1905, Topchibashev went from Tiflis to Nizhny Novgorod to take part in a Muslim congress. The First Congress of the Muslims of Russia, which brought together people from all corners of the vast empire, was opened on 15 August at 1 p.m. on the Oka River. Discussions went on until 11 p.m.31 Ismail bek Gasprinski, editor of the Tercüman newspaper, greeted the delegates of the “Es- teemed Meeting” with a short introductory speech; he suggested that Topchibashev and Akchurin be elected to the presidium32 and invited Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev to be the first speaker. Topchi- bashev delivered a vast report on the political, economic, cultural, national, and religious problems of the Russian Muslims; he opened his speech with: “My faithful brothers, my joy and my satisfaction are beyond words; I am happy and grateful beyond expression; I will never forget this day. It will become an annual holiday for all the Muslims of Russia. We are all Turks united by our origin, our clan, and our religion. Our ancestors ruled the vast areas that stretched from the West to the East. Our ancestors were a heroic people, but today in the mountains of the Caucasus, the orchards of the Crimea, the fields of Kazan, in the domains of our ancestors, in our Motherland, on our native land, we cannot freely discuss our needs and requirements. Alhamdulillah... Today, on the water, we have the joy of opening our hearts to each other, seeing each other face-to-face, and embracing, despite the perfidy and betrayal of the past. I am convinced that if in the future we are denied the time to meet on the water, we will reach the skies and find a place in the stars to celebrate this day.”33 The audience was touched. Musa Jarullakhi Bigiev later wrote: “Most were weeping. The speech was long; there were no secretaries, so I can remember only its main message.” Ali Mardan bek was followed by Abu-s-Suud effendi Akhtyam, Ismail bek Gasprinski, and several other people.34 The Congress ruled that 15 August should become a holiday for all the Muslims of Russia.35 Topchibashev was entrusted with the task of convening the Second Congress.36

29 See: Petition de musulmans du Caucase au gouverneur general Vorontsov-Dashkov. Juin 1905, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 8, CERCEC, EHESS, Paris. 30 See: D.B. Seizade, op. cit., p. 14. 31 See: G. Ibragimov, Tatary v revolutsii 1905 goda, Transl. from the Tatar by G. Mukhamedova, ed. by G.F. Linstser, Kazan, 1926, pp. 149-150; A.M. Topchibashev, Congresses of the Muslims of Russia, p. 8. Ali Mardan bek was very active at the first and later congresses; Musa Bigiev, who had served secretary at many of the meetings chaired by Topchibashev, left a highly interesting account of this in his Osnovy reformy published in Petrograd in 1917. 32 See: Forumy rossiiskikh musulman na poroge novogo tysiachelitia, ed. by D.V. Mukhetdinov, Islamic Madrasa Mahinur Press, Nizhny Novgorod, 2006, p. 121. 33 The First Congress of the Union of the Muslims of Russia. 15.08.1905, NART, rec. gr. 199, inv. 1, f. 722, sheet 14 (in Russian); N. Devlet, Rusiya Türklerinin Milli Mücadile Tarihi: 1905-1917, 2.baskı. Ankara. S. 103; Forumy rossiiskikh musulman na poroge novogo tysyachelitia, p. 122. 34 See: M.J. Bigiev, Osnovy reformy, Petrograd, 1917, p. 176. 35 See: Resolution of the First Congress of the Union of the Muslims of Russia. 15.08.1905, NART, rec. gr. 199, inv. 1, f. 722, sheet 15. 36 See: A.M. Topchibashi: dokumenty iz lichnykh arkhivov. 1903-1934, Compiled, introduced and annotated by S.M. Iskhakov, Moscow, 2012, p. 11.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 127 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION On 17 August, Ali Mardan bek, acting in the name of 30 Caucasian delegates from Baku, Ganja, Shemakha, Salyan, and other cities, organized a ceremonial dinner for the congress delegates so they could express their satisfaction with the congress in suitable circumstances to the sounds of music.37 A day later, the Russian Tatar deputies organized a banquet in honor of the Caucasian delegates. On 20 August, the encouraged and inspired guests left Nizhny Novgorod. The congress brought the Russian Turks together and made them an independent and closely knit political force. Ali Mardan bek returned to Baku to find it enveloped in fire; this time the fires ignited by the Baku events spread beyond the city; the fires at the oil wells across the Absheron Peninsula and close to Baku settlements assumed mass proportions. The clashes between the Armenians and Azeris destroyed at least half the oil derricks.38 Nearly all of them belonged to Armenians; pogroms were organized and carried out by labor migrants from Iran. General Semen Fadeed, Baku governor appointed to his post on 7 July, did not beat about the bush, as befits a military, when answering a question posed by a correspondent of The Times about the culprits of the August events in Baku: “Armenian intellectuals are the main culprits of these ‘events’.”39 Caucasian Vicegerent Vorontsov-Dashkov responded to the Baku disaster. On 7 September, 1905, he arrived in Baku, where a Muslim delegation led by Topchibashev met him at the railway station. Ali Mardan bek promised to submit a detailed report about those involved in the Baku events, those who incited people and who organized the bloodshed. He also assured the Vicegerent that the invariably composed and loyal Baku Muslims wanted peace.40 Despite the frantic efforts of the Muslim intelligentsia headed by Ali Mardan bek, on 20 October, 1905, the clashes between the Armenians and Azeris resumed. The third round was especially vehement and destructive; it went on and on with short intervals until 30 October. The Slavic population who witnessed the destructive zeal of the Armenians demanded that they be disarmed and driven out of the city. The Petersburg Telegraph Agency reported: “Baku. The city looks like a battlefield. The Russians demand that the Armenians be disarmed and removed. According to the police, in each burnt-down house there were 20, 30 or even 50 bomb blasts.” The Armenians calculated that 800 bombs were enough to destroy the city altogether.41 An address of the members of the Baku City Duma to Prime Minister Sergey Witte drew an answer: “I am helpless. This is happening everywhere in Russia. I can do nothing.”42 In August 1905, after the destructive fires at the oilfields, Armenian oil industrialists asked the authorities to move all the Azeris out of the villages close to their oil wells, allegedly to protect and stabilize oil production. They managed to bring the issue, which was rapidly acquiring national hues, to St. Petersburg and the Cabinet. The ministers decided to set up a Special Meeting headed by Finance Minister Count Vladimir Kokovtsev. In September 1905, Topchibashev and Akhmed Agaev arrived in the capital to avert the threat of resettlement for the Muslims employed in the oil industry and the peasants of the Baku villages. They explained the problem to Minister Kokovtsev and warned him that since the people to be resettled were all Muslims, this step would be regarded as an act of national strife. Topchibashev was ready with a written report about the Muslims employed at the oilfields and the settlements in the areas of oil production, which he submitted to the minister. This coincided with the Manifesto of 17 October, which promised a Constitution; in this situation, the Cabinet preferred to halt the fairly ambiguous plan of resettling the Azeri peasants.43

37 See: A.M. Topchibashev, Congresses of the Muslims of Russia, p. 10. 38 See: Y. Baberovskiy, Vrag est vezde. Stalinizm na Kavkaze, Moscow, 2010, p. 76. 39 Syn otechestva, 7 September, 1905. 40 See: Tiflisskiy listok, 10 September, 1905. 41 See: Ibid., 4 November, 1905. 42 Ibid., 2 November, 1905. 43 See: Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), pp. 8-9; İmanov has written that Ali Mardan bek went to St. Petersburg in October 1905 (see: V. İmanov, op. cit., p. 34). According to archival materials, however, the visit took place in September 1905.

128 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The Leader of the Muslims of Russia

On 11 December, 1905, Emperor Nicholas II announced convocation of the State Duma. Sev- eral days later, Ali Mardan bek and Akhmed bek went to St. Petersburg to start preparations for the Second Congress of the Union of Muslims of Russia. Its first sitting took place in the house of Hasan Habibulla, one the richest Muslims in the Russian capital. The delegates discussed the Union’s Pro- gram and Charter written personally by Topchibashev and first discussed by Ibragimov and Agaev. The unofficial Congress of the Union of the Muslims of Russia was an important event for organizing the Turkic and Muslim peoples; it also brought Topchibashev to the all-Russia political arena. The results of the Second Congress testified to his greater political clout among the Muslims and his rapidly increasing role country-wide. About a month later, on 20 February, 1906 to be more exact, the Caucasian Vicegerent initiated a congress of Armenian and Muslim representatives, which was held in the Palace of the Sardar in Tiflis and allegedly convened to remove contradictions. Ali Mardan bek wrote that, contrary to the officially stated purpose, this was a provocation of an obviously destructive nature. Objectively the congress in Tiflis added to the tension between the Armenians and the Azeris.44 In one of his public addresses, Topchibashev pointed out that enlightenment alone could put an end to what was going on; therefore, he argued it was necessary to set up educational establishments to train school teachers able to teach in the native languages. He was convinced that the transfer to education for all in an independent society was related to rejection of the police order that still dominated school education and made progress impossible.45 He also pointed out that a fair judicial system and the rule of law were as important as education and deemed it necessary to specify that lawyers who did not know the local languages, traditions, everyday life, and other specifics of the local people could hardly be fair and impartial. He believed that the City Duma should liquidate all encroachments on the rights of Muslims; they should receive the same rights as all the other Caucasian peoples. Between the end of the Tiflis mission and the Third Congress of the Union of Muslims of Russia held in mid-August 1906, Topchibashev was actively preparing for the elections to the First State Duma and was very busy as head of the Muslim faction. On 31 May, 1906, at noon, Baku elected deputies to the First State Duma. Topchibashev defeated the Social-Democratic candidate Irakly Mamulashvili: out of 81 electors from the population of Baku, 74 turned up at the polling stations. Ali Mardan bek was supported by 51; 21 voted against him; two abstained; his rival received 20 votes “for” and 52 “against.”46 By the latter half of May, Baku, Elisavetpol (Ganja), and the Irevan Gubernia had elected their deputies: Azerbaijan sent A.M. Topchibashev, I. Ziyadkhanov, A. Muradkhanov, A. Akhverdiev, M. Aliev, and A. Irevansky to the First State Duma. Early in June they headed for St. Petersburg.47 On 21 June, 1906, the deputies from the Muslim provinces met in the capital. Twenty-two deputies elected Topchibashev leader of the Muslim faction in the First State Duma. There had been several failed attempts to set up a Muslim faction before Topchibashev arrived in St. Petersburg. The faction consisted of 36 deputies; seven of them, S. Alkin, I. Ziyadkhanov, A. Akhtyamov, S. Janturin (Secretary), Sh. Sul- tanov, and M. Rameev (Treasurer), were elected to the Bureau chaired by Topchibashev. On 9 July, after functioning for 18 days, the Muslim faction was disbanded together with the First State Duma.48

44 See: Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), p. 9. 45 See: D.B. Seidzade, op. cit., pp. 23-26. 46 Kaspiy, 1 June, 1906. 47 For the list of deputies elected from Baku, Elisavetpol and Irevan Gubernia, see: A.M. Topchibashev, Musulmanskaya parlamentskaya fraktsia, Baku, 1907, pp. 25-26. 48 See: Ibid., p. 3. The cover of the copy of this book kept in the Russian National Library in St. Petersburg carries the following inscription by Ali Mardan bek dedicated to Pavel Milyukov: “The indefatigable fighter of the Russian liberation movement, leader of the Party of People’s Freedom highly respected Pavel Nikolaevich Milyukov from chairman of the former Muslim parliamentary faction. A.M. Topchibashev. Baku, 1907 (see: Ibid., p. 1).

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 129 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION On 9 July, 1906, Nicholas II signed a decree that dissolved the State Duma; having learned about this, six members of the Bureau of the Muslim faction headed by Topchibashev signed the Vyborg Declaration. Prime Minister Stolypin, meanwhile, was plotting against 196 former Duma deputies (one of whom was Topchibashev) who had signed the Vyborg Declaration to keep them away from the Sec- ond State Duma. In the absence of corpus delicti they could not be arrested, therefore, judicial structures opened cases on the basis of two articles (129 and 132) of the Criminal Code and started investigation carried out by the investigatory authorities of Finland, in the territory of which (Vyborg) the Declaration had been signed. Topchibashev, Ziyadkhanov, and other deputies were accused of calling the population to disobedience and inciting the people against the government in written form.49 While the investigation was going on, Ali Mardan bek plunged into a politically much more important cause: he was one of the organizers of the Third Congress of the Muslims of Russia. It was officially allowed and was opened on 16 August, 1906 in Nizhny Novgorod in the city’s central club. Local Mullah Khalil read a Surah from the Koran and the Congress began. Five hundred of the 800 deputies had the right to vote.50 Topchibashev was elected Chairman of the Congress. The Congress concentrated on the program of the Union of Muslims of Russia drafted by Ali Mardan bek—not the only, but surely the best—and approved it.51 Topchibashev addressed the Congress with a comment that the disagreements between the Sun- nis and Shi‘a were the highest stumbling block on the road toward unity and progress: “Every Muslim who wishes his people well should say that there are no and should not be different sects; there is neither Sunni, nor Shi‘a, nor Azami, nor Hanafi, etc., therefore, there are no religious obstacles preventing us from setting up common structures to supervise the spiritual affairs of the Muslims of Russia.”52 The Congress unanimously voted for Ali Mardan bek’s proposal. His convincing and touching speech raised a wave of enthusiasm: the Sunni delegates rose from their places with tears to kiss the Shi‘a delegates from Azerbaijan.53 This was one of the brightest pages in the history of Islam and a memorable moment in the historic transfer from the Islamic community to Turkic nationalism. It was decided to convene the next, Fourth, Congress of the Muslims of Russia on 10 August, 1907 in Nizhny Novgorod. The Third Congress was closed; Topchibashev, who had been elected as Chairman of the Muslim faction in the First State Duma and Head of the Union of the Muslims of Russia, became officially recognized as leader of the Russian Turks. Musa Bigiev, who had taken part in the congress and later studied Top- chibashev’s political activity, was quite right when he wrote that Ali Mardan bek was a knowledgeable lawyer with vast political experience who could control himself and was a true intellectual.54 At the Third Congress, Ali Mardan bek was not only elected chairman of the Union of Muslims of Russia, but was also appointed chairman of the political commission set up by the Congress.55

49 See: P.N. Milyukov, Vospominaniia, Moscow, 1991, pp. 272-273. 50 Ali Mardan bek wrote that there were up to 1,000 delegates from the Caucasus, the Crimea, the Volga Area, Siberia, Turkestan, and Kirghizia (see: A.M. Topchibashev, Congresses of the Muslims of Russia, p. 15). 51 See: III Congres des musulmans de Russie, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 7, CERCEC, EHESS, Paris. 52 A.M. Topchibashev, Congresses of the Muslims of Russia, p. 17. 53 See: A. Ayda, Sadri Maksudi Arsal, Transl. from the Turkish by V.V. Feonova, Scientific editing, notes and afterword by S.M. Iskhakov, Moscow, 1996, p. 56. 54 See: M.J. Bigiev, op. cit., p. 172. 55 See: A.M. Topchibashev, Congresses of the Muslims of Russia, pp. 17-18; V. İmanov, author of the book about Topchibashev published in Turkey, writes that Ali Mardan bek did not take part in any commission of the Third Congress. The author asserted that the Congress set up two commissions: for madrasahs and for religious issues (see: V. İmanov, op. cit., pp. 47-48). This is hardly justified. The Congress set up a commission for political issues that functioned under Topchibashev. He mentioned this in his manuscript Congresses of the Muslims of Russia (see: A.M. Topchibashev, Congresses of the Muslims of Russia, pp. 17-18).

130 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION On 6 February, 1907, Baku and the Baku Gubernia elected deputies to the Second State Duma. The same day, Kaspiy carried an article by Ali Mardan bek, which said in part: “Today, our land and all the peoples of the Caucasus should answer an important question posed on the fateful day of 9 July, 1906. Today, the Caucasus should demonstrate what sort of Duma it wants and how the present public and state order, which the government itself has denounced, should be changed.”56 In addition to I. Tagiev, who was elected from Baku, the following people were also elected to the Second State Duma: 29-year-old Cadet (Constitutional Democrat) Mustafa Makhmudov from Kyur- damir and 30-year-old Social-Democrat Zeynal Zeynalov from Amirjan from the Baku Gubernia; Fatali Khan Khoyski and Khalil bek Khasmammedov from the Elisavetpol Gubernia; and Mu- khammed agha Shakhtakhtinsky from the Irevan Gubernia. Topchibashev highly assessed the choice of the Elisavetpol Gubernia: two lawyers with higher education.57 The Second State Duma was opened on 20 February, 1907; a month later, on 17 March, the Muslims set up their faction, the foundations of which had been laid by Ali Mardan bek. It united 22 Muslim deputies, including deputies from Azerbaijan. Two of them (Fatali Khan Khoyski and Khalil bek Khasmammedov) were elected to the faction Bureau.58 The faction set up economic, ju- ridical, and religious commissions. Ali Mardan bek was recalled from Baku to head the religious commission.59 His arrival stirred up the Muslim faction. On several occasions he chaired its meetings; together with the members of the CC of the Union of Muslims of Russia, he drafted the faction’s political platform and compiled deputy interpellations.60 The Second State Duma, likewise, proved to be short-lived. On 3 June, 1907, Nicholas II disbanded it with a manifesto saying that most of the deputies were determined to shake the state’s foundations. The First State Duma worked for 72 days; the Second Duma survived for 103 days. Its disbandment buried the hopes of changing Russia through liberal ideas. A time of hardship was in store for all, including Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. The recognized and respected liberal politician was arrested.

Between 1907 and 1917

Topchibashev’s biographers have written practically next to nothing about the decade between 1907 and 1917; they preferred to keep away from that period. After ending their narrative of the events of 1907, they skimmed over the next ten years to smoothly move on to 1917,61 although those years were the brightest pages in Topchibashev’s biography. It was during that time that he communicated with those who created the history of the Muslim peoples; he was at the epicenter of historic events and, deprived of political rights, was, nevertheless, exposed to the cruelty of the social and political processes. On 12-18 December, 1907, the special administration of the St. Petersburg Judicial Cham- ber summed up the Vyborg case. After familiarizing itself with the cases of 167 former deputies of the First State Duma listed by Stolypin, it sentenced them under Art 129 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Empire to three months in prison; they were deprived of the right to be elected to the Duma

56 Kaspiy, 6 February, 1907. 57 See: Kaspiy, 8 February, 1907. 58 See: D.B. Seidzade, op. cit., p. 56. 59 See: D. Usmanova, Musulmanskie predstaviteli v Rossiiskom parlamente. 1906-1916 gg., Moscow, 2005, p. 171. 60 See: Toptchibachi Ali Mardan bek Ali Akbar bek oglou, p. 3; A.M. Topchibashi: dokumenty iz lichnykh arkhivov. 1903-1934, p. 14. 61 See: V. İmanov, op. cit., pp. 55-57; Böyük diplomat və görkəmli siyasi xadim. Ə.b.Topçubaşovun anadan olmasının 135 illiyinə həsr olunmuş elmi-nəzəri konfransın materialları, Bakı, 1998; V. Fourniau, “Deux langues, trois pays, pour quelle société plurielle?” Journal of Azerbaijan Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1998; A. Safarova, Politiko-diplomaticheskaia deiatelnost Ali Mardan beka Topchibasheva, Ph.D. Candidate (Political Thesis) Thesis, Baku, 2007.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 131 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and other representative structures. Six of them were members of the Muslim faction: A.M. Topchi- bashev, A. Akhtyamov, S.G. Alkin, S.G. Janturin, A. Bukeykhanov, and I. Ziyadkhanov. By that time the country had elected the Third State Duma, in which the number of Muslim deputies had been reduced to the minimum. It was opened on 1 November, 1907; ten days later, the Muslim deputies formed a faction of 8 members (there were 36 Muslim deputies in the First Duma and 38 in the Second). The new Election Law drastically cut down the number of deputies elected from the empire’s national fringes. By that time Ali Mardan bek had gained prominence as a Muslim political figure whose opinion on all important issues in the political and spiritual life of the Muslims of Russia carried a lot of weight. On 2 May, 1908, Muslims of the Crimea and other regions came to Bakhchisaray to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Tercüman newspaper. The local imam invited the gathering to pray for the health and success of prominent publicist writers Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev and Akhmed bek Agaev. He concluded with wishing them “long lives;” the thousand-strong audience responded with “Long Live!”62 Topchibashev was arrested on 8 May, 1908 and sent to the Kresty prison in the Russian capital for three months according to a decision of the St. Petersburg Judicial Chamber. He took his preliminary notes on four issues with him to prison; they included, education for all Muslims; spiritual administrations of Muslims; zemstvos in the Caucasus; and regulation of the land problems in the Transcaucasia. From the very first days of the First Russian Revolution (1905-1907), these four issues had remained important landmarks of his political and public activities; no wonder he was determined to use his prison term to complete his work.63 He was placed in solitary confinement; it was there, in July, that he learned the “joyous news” (as he later wrote in his memoirs) of the Young Turks’ revolution in the Ottoman Empire. He highly appreciated the fact that Turkey had acquired a Constitution and was very positive about the Young Turks’ movement.64 While in prison he spent a lot of time on his manuscripts; he drafted several laws and caught up with reading what had been recently published on history, literature, and philosophy.65 On 6 August, after his release from prison, he moved to the Metropolitan Hotel. Between 9 June and 2 August, 1909, Topchibashev and Chairman of the Muslim faction in the Third Duma Kutlug Magommed Mirza Tevkelov visited the Muslim centers of the Volga Area, the Orenburg Territory, Siberia, and other regions to promote, among the Muslims, the ideas of civil, religious, and political equality for all minorities and to rally their co-religionists around the Union of Muslims and the program adopted at its Third Congress.66 Throughout the trip, Ali Mardan bek kept a diary in which he registered its entire course and described all the meetings. Today, it is an extremely rare personal document that sheds light on the most important period in the movement of the Russian Muslims and on the activities of its prominent figures.67

62 I.A. Kerimov, “Zhivaia” istoria Gasprinskogo. Po materialam gazety ‘Tercüman’ 1883-1914, Simferopol, 1999, p. 180. 63 See: Topchibashi Ali Mardan bek. Autobiography. 16.12.1951, p. 10. 64 See: Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), p. 13. 65 See: The list of book A.M. Topchibashev read between 8 May and 8 August 1908, May-August 1908, GAAR, rec. gr. 3172, inv. 1, f. 7, pp. 1-2 (in Russian). 66 See: Toptchibachi Ali Mardan bek Ali Akbar bek oglou, p. 3; Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), p. 14; Topchibashi Ali Mardan bek. Autobiography. 16.12.1951, p. 10. 67 See: A.M. Topchibashev’s Diary of his trip in the Volga Area, Orenburg, and Siberia. 09.06.1909-01.08.1909, GAAR, rec. gr. 3172, inv. 1, f. 9, sheets 1-8rev. (in Russian); A.M. Topchibashi: dokumenty iz lichnykh arkhivov. 1903-1934, pp. 117- 132. It was prominent historian Dr. Salavat Iskhakov who introduced Topchibashev’s Diary into scientific circulation. His notes and comments and additional information about the people mentioned in the Diary are very valuable from the scientific point of view. His information made it possible to identify many of the Muslim figures mentioned in the Diary.

132 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION In the fall of 1909, after two years of absence, Topchibashev returned to Baku. At first he had to live under close police supervision. In June 1911, one of the “strictly confidential” police reports said: “According to an agent, attorney Topchibashev, who lives in Kyazimov’s house at the intersec- tion of Persidskaya68 and Tserkovnaya69 streets, is one of the prominent pan-Islamists in Baku. He is much better educated than the local Muslims, was editor of the Kaspiy newspaper, maintains close relations with Gaji Zeynalabdin Tagiev and continues to extend considerable financial support to pan-Islamists. He is still close to Tagiev. His past as a deputy of the First State Duma, his trip to Vyborg, and his participation in drafting the well-known declaration for which he served three months in prison deserve special mention… Today, he is still engaged in the pan-Islamist movement and maintains contacts with member of the State Duma Maksudov (Sadri Maksudov.—J.H.). He is very cautious. His vast experience has taught him to carry on party work through personal contacts and eye-to-eye conversations. The Muslims have mastered this method: they leave no written evidence and do not keep documents or banned literature at home. All contacts are realized through members of small (from 3 to 5 people) groups, the representatives of which elect their representatives, etc. This is done secretly and leaves no written documents. By the way, the word of a person trusted by all representatives is treated as law for all members. Signed: Colonel Pastryulin.” 70 Persecution did not stop Topchibashev; after returning to Baku, he resumed his law practice, was the main initiator of setting up zemstvos in the Caucasus, and was actively involved in enlightenment activities as Chairman of the Nidjat Society and Honorable Chairman of the Saadet Madrasah. The police closely followed his efforts to open madrasahs in Caucasian cities; in 1913, the Police Department of Baku informed that his name was on the list of those invited to attend the opening of a madrasah in Baku scheduled for 30 November, 1912.71 The Fourth Congress of the Union of Muslims of Russia convened on the initiative of the Mus- lim faction of the Fourth State Duma (which had been functioning since 1912) was held in St. Peters- burg from 15 to 25 June, 1914. Ali Mardan bek was the key figure at the congress, which attracted about 40 prominent Muslims. The Congress drafted a liberal law on religious organizations to be submitted to a corresponding commission of the State Duma. After ten days, the delegates realized that a decade was not enough to discuss all the problems the Muslims of Russia had accumulated over the years of neglect by the authorities.72 They asked the Ministry of Internal Affairs for permission to extend the Congress for two more days and got a negative response. Pressed for time, the congress leaders had to ask Topchibashev to bring the Congress to a close. On 25 June, he closed the Congress with a speech in which he explained why the authorities did not trust the Muslims73: “We have been, are, and will remain Muslims (these words invited stormy applause.—J.H.). At the same time, we believe and will always believe that our religion, Islam as a world religion, poses no threat to statehood.”74 World War I, which started about a month later, changed the Transcaucasian context beyond recognition. The pressure on the Muslims of Russia, especially on the Turkic-speaking Caucasian

68 Now Murtuza Mukhtarov Street in Baku. 69 Now Vidadi Street in Baku. 70 Information of Colonel Pastryulin to Head of the Gendarme Administration of the Kutaisi Gubernia. Strictly Confidential. 22.06.1911, Archive of Political Documents at the Administration of the President of Azerbaijan Republic (APD UDP AR), rec. gr. 276, inv. 8, f. 394, sheets 24-25 (in Russian). 71 See: Information Supplied by the Police Department of Baku about A.M. Topchibashev. 1913, State Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF), rec. gr. 102, inv. 276, f. 609, sheet 48 (in Russian). 72 See: Topchibashi Ali Mardan bek. Autobiography. 16.12.1951, p. 11; Toptchibachi Ali Mardan bek Ali Akbar bek oglou, p. 3. 73 See: Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), pp. 17-18. 74 Concluding speech of A.M. Topchibashev at the Fourth Congress of the Muslims of Russia. 25.06.1914, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 8/23, pp. 1-5 (in Russian); for more details, see: O.N. Senyutkina, Tyurkizm kak istoricheskoe yavlenie (na materailakh istorii Rossiyskoy imperii 1905-1916 gg., Nizhny Novgorod, 2007, p. 457.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 133 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION peoples, increased because the Ottoman Empire, one of the central powers, was at war with the En- tente. During the war, Ali Mardan bek wrote that the Azeris were growing more and more hostile toward the Russian Empire and more and more eager to gain independence. Outwardly they remained composed, but their indignation and determination to get rid of the shackles of the Russian Empire were steadily mounting. He even wrote that future historians would have to be subtle psychologists to detect the hopes and anxiety the war had brought to the lives of the Caucasian Muslims.75 In this exceptionally difficult situation, Ali Mardan bek, who always attached special importance to Georgian-Azeri friendship, became its main initiator. He represented the Caucasian Muslims at the funeral of Akaky Tseretely, a great Georgian poet and ideologist of the national-liberation movement of the Georgian people, who died on 26 January, 1915. His touching speech about the poet, whom he described as the “valor of the Georgian nation,” and about his outstanding role in the fate of his nation and the peoples of the Caucasus moved all of those present. He pointed out that the “sympathies of the Caucasian Muslims have always been with the people, who remained loyal to the principle ‘live and let live’.”76

On the Political Arena of Russia

The revolution of February 1917 ended autocracy in Russia; the revolutionary wave put an end to the 300-year-long history of the Romanovs and opened a new page in Topchibashev’s life. Throughout March 1917 he was actively involved in all sorts of political street demonstrations in Baku; as if this were not enough for his energetic nature, he also worked hard to draw more Muslims into political activities. The revolutionary events were gradually pushing him into the limelight and, at the same time, testing him for strength: at the early stage of the Russian revolution, the Muslims found it hard to choose between one of the two alternatives: either cultural autonomy or a constitu- ency within a federal state. On 20 March, 1917, the Provisional Government removed all religious and national limitations, something which Ali Mardan bek had wanted to achieve and for which he had been fighting for a long time. From that time on, the national and religious minorities were not limited in their electoral rights; they could serve in the army and be employed by the state as civil servants, judges, and teachers. On 27 March, the Provisional Executive Committee of the National Council of the Muslims of Baku was set up with Magommedhasan Gajinsky as its elected head. The most prominent Muslim figures, such as Topchibashev, Khoyski, Tagiev, Asadullaev, Javanshir, Narimanov, and Amirjanov, were elected to the Committee’s governing structures. They were absolutely open about their final aim—the wellbeing of the Muslims rather than the fate of Russian democracy. The National Committee of the Muslims saw dissemination of national- political ideas as its main duty.77 In April of the same year, Ali Mardan bek went to Ganja and then to Tiflis to consolidate the national forces; he organized large congresses of Muslims there, which supported the new order and the newly established bodies of power.78 While in Tiflis, he was invited to the meeting of a Special Conference on the Problems of the Caucasian Area held at the Palace of the Sardar79 to

75 See: Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), p. 18; Topçubaşı Əlimərdan bəy. Tərcümeyi-hal. 16.12.1951, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 3, p. 11. 76 Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), pp. 18-19. 77 See: Y. Baberovskiy, op. cit., p. 100. 78 See: Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), p. 19. 79 See: An invitation of A.M. Topchibashev to a meeting of the Special Conference in Tiflis. 11.04.1917, GAAR, rec. gr. 3172, inv. 1, f. 10, page 7rev. (in Russian).

134 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION discuss, in particular, how to set up local administrations. The Transcaucasian Committee decided that N. Jordania and G. Gvazava would represent Georgia; S. Arutyunov and A. Jamalyan Armenia, and A.M. Topchibashev and Kh. Sultanov Azerbaijan.80 In mid-April 1917, when he returned from Ganja and Tiflis, Ali Mardan bek chaired the Baku Congress of the Muslims. Convened between 15 and 20 April in the Ismailiyya Palace, the Congress demonstrated that the Musavat Party, which operated in Baku, and the Turk Adam-i Markaziyyat Firqasi (The Turkic Party of Decentralization) set up by Nasib bek Usubbekov (Yusifbeyli) in Ganja after the February Revolution played the leading role in the national-democratic processes. At the very first sitting of the Congress, Ali Mardan bek was elected chairman and steered it throughout its work. He opened the Congress with a brief outline of the agenda and warned the delegates that the peoples of the Caucasus should maintain peace in the region despite the traditional Russian “divide and rule” policy: “This congress of the Caucasian Muslims is the first in the last one hundred years at which the Muslims of the Caucasus will speak freely. It should restore the Caucasus to its historical grandeur. The former Russian authorities pursued the policy of discrimination against the non-Russian peoples of Russia and incited them against each other. The recent confrontation of the Azeris and Armenians could be only explained by this inhuman and hostile policy. If the Muslims and all the other peoples of the Caucasus who follow them want to take the road of freedom and renovation they should do this with common desires and common ideas.”81 Mamed Emin Rasulzade delivered the main report; Ibrahim bek Heydarov82 was another speaker. On 17 April, at the Congress sitting chaired by Ali Mardan bek, Mirmagommed Kerim Mirjafarov, and Akhund Molla Farajullazade, the mufti and sheikhulislam embraced to demonstrate that there were no religious disagreements and enmity among the Azeris. This evidence of friendship between the Sunni and Shi‘a impressed all those present.83 On 20 April, Ali Mardan bek closed the Baku Congress of the Muslims of the Caucasus with a speech on behalf of its leaders. He said that the Congress of the Muslims of Russia would open in Moscow on 1 May, 1917 and asked for permission to read a greeting of the Muslims of the Caucasus to the Moscow Congress and to inform the delegates about the decisions of the Baku Congress. The Moscow Congress of the Muslims of Russia opened on 1 May, 1917; its first sitting elected the Congress’ leaders, secretariat, and commissions. The elected leaders belonged to all the political trends present at the Congress, including those who represented women: Salima Yagubova, Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev, Akhmed bek Salikov, Ayaz Iskhakov, Fatikh Kerimov, Ubeydulla Kho- jaev, Ilyas Alkin, Ibnyamin Akhtyamov, Musa effendi Bigiev, Seid Akhmed Jafarov, Khalil Dost- mukhamedov, Gabdulla Khazrat Apanaev, and Hasan Gabyashov. Deputies of State Dumas of different convocations—Tevkelov, Topchibashev, Alkin, Janturin, Tukaev, Akhtyamov, Enikeev, and others—took part in the Congress.84 Professor Sergey Kotlyarevskiy, who filled the post of Commissar of the Administration of Non-Slavic Citizens and Citizens of Other Religions, greeted the Congress on behalf of the Provi- sional Government. Ali Mardan bek, speaking on behalf of the leaders of the Congress of the Muslims, answered the questions the professor had outlined in his speech. He expressed gratitude for the greeting and pointed out that the Muslims expected that the Provisional Government would free their

80 See: On Organizing Local Administrations. 1917, GAAR, rec. gr. 3172, inv. 1, f. 21, p. 5 (in Russian). 81 Kaspiy, 18 April, 1917. 82 For more details about Ibrahim bek Heydarov, see: A. Tahirzade, “Oğuztoğrul Tahirli. Azerbaycanlı Siyaset Adamı İbrahim Bey Heyderov (Haydaroğlu) (1879, Derbent-1949, Ankara),” Türk Yurdu, Ekim 2011, Cilt 31, Sayı 290, pp. 326-338. 83 See: Kaspiy, 21 April, 1917. 84 See: Bulletin No. 1 of the editorial collegiums of the Congress of the Muslims of Russia in Moscow. May 1917, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 6/2, p. 2; A.M. Topchibashev, Congresses of the Muslims of Russia, p. 28; Açıq söz, 23 May 1917.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 135 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION countries.85 On 3 May, Rasulzade delivered the main report, in which he pointed out that the Muslims should demand territorial autonomy. On 6 and 7 May, Ali Mardan bek chaired the fifth and sixth sit- tings. Akhmed Zaki Validov informed the deputies about the numerical strength and places of settlement of the Muslim peoples of Russia; Seid Girey Alkin outlined the religious and spiritual questions of the Russian Muslims, while Keshshav khazrat Tarjumanov spoke about religious and spiritual organizations. The sitting chaired by Topchibashev enthusiastically supported Rasulzade’s idea about a people’s republic based on “district autonomy.” At 04:00 a.m., Ali Mardan bek announced that his project had won with 446 votes “for” (271 delegates were against and 21 abstained); the rival project of Salikov’s gathered 291 votes “for” (422 delegates voted against). This meant that a federative democratic republic was chosen.86 The Congress adjourned on 10 May. On 7 May, Ali Mardan bek went to Petrograd to discuss with the Cabinet the disturbing news coming from the Caucasus. After completing consultations in the capital, he went to Baku and several days later moved to Tiflis to resume his work at the conference on national issues. Late in June 1917, he returned to Baku to head the National Committee of Muslims of the Transcaucasia and the Baku Committee of Public Organizations of Muslims. In June 1917, a Na- tional Committee of Muslims headed by Topchibashev (elected by secret vote) was set up in Baku to draw Muslims into politics. This post made him the central figure of all the national processes unfolding in the region. Until the end of 1917 he remained head of the committee that steered the political movement of the Caucasian Muslims.87 By the summer of 1917, the crisis in Russia had become even more evident; on 12 August, the Provisional Government headed by Kerensky convened a conference in Moscow to stabilize the situation; the Baku Committee of Public Organizations of Muslims (which functioned as the National Com- mittee of the Transcaucasia) dispatched Ali Mardan bek as its representative.88 The conference was opened on 12 August, 1917 at 03:00 p.m. in the Bolshoi; the Muslims were represented by 34 delegates from the Caucasus, the Crimea, the Volga Area, and Turkestan. On 13 August, they discussed Topchi- bashev’s report, which was delivered the next day on behalf of all the Muslim organizations represented at the Conference (the All-Russia Council of Muslims, the All-Russia Military Council of Muslims; the Baku Committee of Public Organizations of Muslims; the Central Committee of the Union of Mountaineers of Daghestan and the Northern Caucasus, the Council of the Turkestan Area, the Committee of the Crimean Gubernia, and the Council of the Kirghiz and Bashkir Gubernias).89 On 14 August, Ali Mardan bek, speaking as the leader of the Muslims of Russia, pointed out that amid the revolutionary turmoil, the 30-million strong Muslim population of Russia deemed it necessary to address their concerns to the Provisional Government and to all the peoples of free and democratic Russia. When talking about the national question, Russia’s sore spot, he said that he hoped that very soon free and democratic Russia, like European countries, would realize the ideas of equality and fraternity of all peoples. He concluded his speech with an address to the foreign representatives, French and British in particular, sitting in a box together; he called on them to recognize the right of their Muslims to free political activities and self-identification. “Only then,” said he, “will we be able to triumph: Ex oriente lux! (Light comes from the East).”90

85 See: Açıq söz, 23 May, 1917. 86 See: A.M. Topchibashev, Congresses of the Muslims of Russia, p. 35 (for more details, see: S.M. Iskhakov, Rossiyskie musulmane i revolyutsia (vesna 1917g.-leto 1918 g.), Moscow, 2004, p. 176). 87 See: Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), p. 20. 88 See: Toptchibachi Ali Mardan bek Ali Akbar bek oglou, p. 4. 89 See: Kaspiy, 24 August, 1917; Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), p. 20. 90 Gosudarstvennoe soveshchanie (Stenografichekiy otchet) s predisloviem Ya.A. Yakovleva, Moscow-Leningrad, 1930, pp. 185-188; Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), pp. 20-21.

136 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION On 21 August, Ali Mardan bek arrived in Baku; a day later he attended a sitting of the Commit- tee of the Muslims to inform its members of the Moscow Conference.91

Shocks on the Eve of Independence

The October 1917 Bolshevik coup ended the period of liberal transformations in Russia. On 15 November, several days after the coup, which deposed the Provisional Government, all the political organizations of the Transcaucasia met in Tiflis to set up a Transcaucasian Commissariat. On 19 November, the Georgian National Council convened a congress attended by the Central Commit- tee of the Muslims of Transcaucasia headed by Topchibashev. On 23 November, he addressed the congress to outline his ideas about the new power’s political course in Transcaucasia and explained what the Muslims expected from it. He called on the Georgians to act together with the other Caucasian peoples for the sake of their common prosperity.92 In the fall of 1917, preparations for the elections to the Constituent Assembly were in full swing under the guidance of Ali Mardan bek. From Tiflis, the Azeri representatives moved to Ganja, where they convened a congress (chaired by Topchibashev) to draw up the list of delegates for the Commit- tee of Muslims and Musavat, which had formed an election bloc, and compiled list No. 10 that included the names of Magommedyusif Jafarov, Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev, Mamed Emin Rasul- zade, Nasib bek Usubbekov, Fatali Khan Khoyski, Hasan bek Agaev, Khosrov bek Sultanov, Gazi- akhmed bek Magommedbekov, Mustafa Makhmudov, Mirgidayat Seidov, Aslan bek Gardashov, Safi bek Rustambekov, and others.93 Topchibashev was also nominated by the Syr Darya Region, Rasul- zade by the Ferghana Region, and Usubbekov by the Amu Darya Region.94 The Azeri political figures had obviously moved to the fore and gained authority among the Muslims of Russia. On 26-28 November, that is two weeks after the Commissariat had been set up, Transcaucasia elected delegates to the Constituent Assembly; the candidates of the National Committee and the Musavat party won. In December 1917, Ali Mardan bek, elected to the Constituent Assembly, resigned from the post of head of the Committee of the Muslims of Transcaucasia; after 1917, its Baku branch became an interparty structure. The Constituent Assembly proved absolutely impotent and was disbanded by a Bolshevik decree on 6 January, 1918; this buried the hopes that the national question would be settled in Russia any time soon; the national fringes (including Transcaucasia) became even more disillusioned with Rus- sia’s policies. On 22 January, 1918, the Transcaucasian delegates met in Tiflis; after two days of discussions, they decided to set up a regional legislature, the Transcaucasian Sejm, with twice as many seats as the number the parties had gained at the elections to the Constituent Assembly. On 23 February, 1918, the first meeting of the Sejm was held and Transcaucasia acquired its own parliament, but Ali Mardan bek was kept away from the Committee and the Sejm by acute heart troubles.95 The slaughter of Muslims in Baku in March 1918 organized by the Baku Soviet and the Dash- nak Party determined to seize power took Ali Mardan bek by surprise. It became abundantly clear

91 See: Kaspiy, 24 August, 1917. 92 See: Kaspiy, 28 November, 1917; Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), p. 21; Topchibashi Ali Mardan bek. Autobiography. 16.12.1951, p. 13. 93 See: Kaspiy, 28 November, 1917; Kurtuluş, 2 sayı 1934, p. 49. 94 See: Açıq söz, 1 November, 1917. 95 See: Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), pp. 21-22.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 137 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION what the Bolsheviks, who had declared the right of nations to self-determination, had in store for Azerbaijan. On 29 March, on the eve of the bloodshed, the Armenian National Party of the Dashnaks invited prominent Muslims to discuss the joint struggle against the Bolsheviks, only to perform a U-turn and become “Bolshevik” itself during the small hours of the next day. Ali Mardan bek was shattered.96 The perfidy of the Dashnaks triggered bloodshed: it started on 30 March under the slogan of “struggle against counterrevolution” in Baku and went on unabated for three days, causing massive loss of life among the Muslims (12 thousand killed).97 The editorial offices of Kaspiy (associated with many years of Topchibashev’s life); the Ismailiyya Palace; the print shop of Açıq söz, the newspaper which carried the banner of national struggle; Muslim charity centers; the Taza Pir Mosque; and other monuments of culture, enlightenment, and religion were burned down. Everything associated with Turkism and Islam was destroyed. Ali Mardan bek, who saw everything with his own eyes, wrote that the armed Armenians “attacked the homes of Muslims and spared neither old people, nor women, nor children… They killed Muslims, even those who belonged to leftist parties: this happened to several doctors and teachers…”98 On 1 April, the Bolshevik Revolutionary Defense Committee set up on the eve of the March events issued an ultimatum to the Muslim population of Baku: by 03:00 p.m. they should recognize Bolshevist power and disarm their armed units under the threat of continued bloodshed. Fully aware of the implications, still ailing Ali Mardan bek together with Aga Ashurov, Molla Haji Mirmovsum, Hajihuseyn Tagiev, and Abbasgulu Kazimzade (who had stayed at Topchibashev’s house during the March events) went to the Hotel Astoria, the headquarters of the Revolutionary Defense Committee. An hour later, the talks between them in the presence of Consul of Iran Habibulla Khan and the Bol- sheviks who sided with the Armenian National Soviet began. After four hours they signed a document under which they recognized Bolshevist power and agreed to disarm the Muslim armed units.99 The Armenians also demanded that Ali Mardan bek and Haji Zeynalabdin Tagiev go to the Khyrdalan railway station on 3 April to persuade the Lezghian regiment from Daghestan moving to Baku to help the co-religionists to turn back. On 2 April, when the hostilities ceased, Topchibashev’s house was searched; the next day he was arrested by the Armenian military. Much later, on 13 November, 1918, Yakov Smirnov, an attorney at law, testified in front of the Extraordinary Investigatory Commission set up by the Azeri authorities to establish the truth about the March events: “After the March pogroms, I learned that Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev had been arrested. He was kept in a small room in one of the schools along with Colonel Baron Osten-Saken; their Armenian guard occupied an adjacent larger room. The guards, who drank day and night, incessantly clicked their rifle locks, and in general were very noisy, were absolutely disgusting. I saw this when I visited Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev; I went to a lot of trouble to release him on bail; I finally managed this through Japaridze (A. Japaridze, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Deputies.— J.H.) and Kozhemyak (D. Kozhemyak, Chairman of the Executive Commission set up by Bolsheviks.—J.H.).”100

96 See: Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), p. 22; Topchibashi Ali Mardan bek. Autobiography. 16.12.1951, p. 14. 97 See: Report of member of Extraordinary Investigatory Commission A.E. Klyuge to Commission Chairman A.B. Khasmagommedov about the violence against the Turkic-Muslim population of the city, July 1919, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 277, inv. 2, f. 27, sheet 18 (in Russian); for more details about the slaughter of the Turkic-Muslim population of Baku in March 1918, see: S. Rustamova-Tokhidi, Mart 1918. Baku. Azerbaidzhanskie pogromy v dokumentakh, Baku, 2009. 98 Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), p. 22. 99 See: Byulleten KRO g. Baku i ego rayonov, 4 April, 1918. 100 Record of interrogation of witness Yakov Nikolaevich Smirnov by the Extraordinary Investigatory Commission. 13.11.1918, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 277, inv. 2, f. 13, sheets 154-155; S. Rustamova-Takhidi, op. cit., p. 435.

138 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION After a month under arrest, the Extraordinary Military Investigatory Commission of the Bolshe- viks released Ali Mardan bek on bail under the surety of the Gummet Muslim Social-Democratic Party of the Muslims. Several days later, the Armenians insisted on his arrest; this time he was placed in Bayilovo prison.101 Attorney at law Smirnov testified: “In prison he was discouraged and ailing; he complained that he had received no food in the first 24 hours, that he and other prisoners (there were 30 of them) were hungry, that the conditions in Bayilovo were appalling: he shared a tiny cell with Ibrahim bek Heydarov, locked from 6 p.m. to 7 a.m. they had to use a leaking and stinking bucket. It took me and attorney Leontovich (A. Leontovich, one of the leaders of the Russian national Council in Baku.—J.H.) a lot of time to insist, through the same Japaridze, on a medical examination of Top- chibashev and Heydarov; both were found to be ill. At my request, they were moved to the clinic of Doctor Larionov (the clinic, which belonged to my wife, occupied one of the corners of Bazarnaya and Gubernskaya streets). Their Armenian guards in the clinic misbehaved to such an extent that I had to ask for a replacement. They sent Georgians for one day, then after that only Armenians were sent again.”102 Later Topchibashev was released from the clinic on bail. During the March bloodshed he, a prominent political figure, had been in mortal danger; after two and a half months under arrest he, still regarded as a political adversary, was released on bail. On 28 May, 1918, while Topchibashev was still in Armenian-Bolshevist imprisonment, the Azerbaijan Republic was set up; the announcement was made in Tiflis, after which the national government moved to Ganja. Depressed by everything that had happened to him, Ali Mardan bek wrote: “I could please neither the government of Nicholas II, nor the government of Bolsheviks that put me in prison. Let us see what the new government will do.”103 Despondent and persecuted, he tried to escape from Baku, which was temporarily occupied by alien forces.

The Istanbul Mission of the Minister with Emergency Powers

The second Cabinet of the Azerbaijan Republic was formed in Ganja on 17 June, 1918; Ali Mardan bek, who was still under Bolshevist arrest in Baku and so could not be contacted on a regular basis, was temporarily appointed minister without portfolio, with no specific responsibilities in the government of the Azerbaijan Republic.104 The summer victory of the Islamic Army on the Baku front complicated the situation in the city still further; afraid of continued persecution, Ali Mardan bek finally escaped from the city to hide in one of the Absheron country houses. He knew very well that, enraged by the defeats, the Armenian- Bolshevist coalition would give him no chance; even released on bail he had been constantly threatened; he had no choice but to wait for the Islamic Army in hiding.105 On 31 July, 1918, the Soviet of the Baku People’s Commissars, no longer able to stand opposed to the Islamic Army, was overthrown. The next day, the Central Caspian government was set up in Baku. The Islamic Army captured the environs, making it possible for Ali Mardan bek to finally leave his hiding place and go to the army headquarters at the Hyrdalan railway station.

101 See: Topchibashi Ali Mardan bek. Autobiography. 16.12.1951, p. 14. 102 Record of interrogation of witness Yakov Nikolaevich Smirnov by the Extraordinary Investigatory Commission. 13.11.1918, sheets 155-156; S. Rustamova-Takhidi, op. cit., pp. 434-435. 103 Biographical information about Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. Part I (in concise form), p. 22. 104 See: Ibid., p. 22. 105 See: Ibidem.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 139 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The Islamic Army and the Cabinet were moving toward Baku; Ali Mardan bek, on the other hand, finally reached Ganja early in August where, at the request of Prime Minister Fatali Khan Hoyski, he acted as prime minister and foreign minister. Prime Minister Fatali Khan Hoyski and Foreign Minister Magommedhasan Gajinsky, meanwhile, were going to Baku by rail in the footsteps of the advancing Islamic Army.106 On 13 August, the prime minister instructed Topchibashev, who remained in Ganja, to act instead of him as prime minister and temporarily perform the functions of foreign minister.107 Later his family joined him in Ganja; however, after their long and painful separation, this reunion proved short.108 On 18 August, 1918, while fierce fighting for Baku was still going on, the government of the Azerbaijan Republic dispatched Topchibashev, one of its most prominent members, as minister with extraordinary powers to Istanbul to negotiate diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. After leaving Ganja on 23 August, he arrived in Istanbul late in September; on 2 October, he was received by Prime Minister Talaat Pasha, who had just returned from Berlin. Talaat Pasha informed Ali Mardan bek about the Berlin talks and assured him that he had done everything possible to promote the interests of Azerbaijan. The same day, he was received by Foreign Minister of the Ottoman Empire Akhmed Nasimi bek and the next day by Defense Minister Enver Pasha. Further contacts were limited by the changing fortunes of World War I and the deepening government crisis in the Ottoman Empire. Early in October, the government reshuffling in Germany triggered similar changes in the Ot- toman Empire. On 8 October, the Talaat Pasha Cabinet resigned; it was replaced with the Izzet Pasha Cabinet. On 21 October, the new Grand Vizier Izzet Pasha received the Azeri minister with extraordinary powers; on 27 October, Ali Mardan bek met with new Foreign Minister Nabi bek; on 28 Oc- tober, he was received at the Ministry of Education; later the same day, he met the newly elected sheikhulislam. Two days later, on 30 October, Turkey signed the crippling Armistice of Mudros. The defeat of Turkey crippled the Azerbaijan Republic; on 3 November, the conditions of the Armistice of Mudros were made public; on 14 November, Ali Mardan bek wrote: “I spent the evening of the same day (3 November.—Ed.) at Rauf bek’s house.”109 On 4 November, he handed a note to Deputy Foreign Minister of Turkey Rishad Ikmed bek, in which Azerbaijan objected to the clauses of the Armistice of Mudros related to it. On 17 November, in conformity with the armistice, British troops entered Baku. During this very troubled time for the Azerbaijan Republic, the National Crisis Council showed good results; to maintain consistent contacts with European democracies Azerbaijan should become a parliamentary republic. Ali Mardan bek initiated discussions on this issue. On 16 November, the day before the British troops entered the city, the National Council discussed the possibility and several days later, on 19 November, passed an election law. The parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic started functioning on 7 December; 96 deputies of the elected 120 attended the opening ceremony. Chairman Rasulzade addressed the first sitting with a short congratulatory speech; at the end of the meeting, he declared that electing a speaker was one of the key issues. After discussing all the possible alternatives, the parliament voted for Topchibashev; Hasan bek Agaev was elected his first deputy and Rakhim bek Vekilov the parliament secretary. Ali Mardan bek never belonged to a political party; his broad world outlook and profound understanding of democratic values made him an outstanding political figure and diplomat of his time.

106 See: Ibidem. 107 See: Letter of Fatali Khan Hoyski to Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev. 13.08.1918. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 9. p. 1. 108 See: Topchibashi Ali Mardan bek. Autobiography. 16.12.1951, p. 15. 109 See: Letter of Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Azerbaijan Republic A.b. Topchibashev to Chairman of the Council of Ministers F.Kh. Khoyski. 14.11.1918. GAAP. rec. gr. 894, inv. 10. f. 34, p. 18 (in Russian).

140 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION American historian Firuz Kazemzadeh wrote about him: “Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev, who was elected President of the Parliament, was a well-educated lawyer, tolerant in his views, not a narrow nationalist.”110 Elected chairman of the parliament of Azerbaijan, Topchibashev could not return to Baku by the time of the election. In November and December 1918, he met several important Turkish officials and representatives of the Entente who had arrived in Istanbul. On 3 November, he talked to Rauf bek, who had signed the Armistice on behalf of Turkey; on 4 November, he spoke to Deputy Foreign Minister Reshad Ikmet bek, on 5 November to Foreign Minister Nabi bek, on 8 November to Finance Minister Huseyn Jahid bek, on 15 November to representative of Ukraine Sukovchin, on 16 and 18 November to newly appointed Turkish Minister of Internal Affairs Mustafa Reshad Pasha, the new Grand Vizier Tevfik Pasha and diplomatic representative of the U.K. in Istanbul Temple, on 25 November to Defense Minister of Turkey Abdullah Pasha, on 7 December to Russian representative Pavel Milyukov, on 23 December to American representative Brown, and on 31 December to High Commissioner of Italy in Istanbul Count Sforza.111 He discussed the postwar situation in Azerbaijan and the world.

Representative of Azerbaijan at the Paris Peace Conference

On 28 December, the new Cabinet with Fatali Khan Hoyski as its chairman approved the list of Azeri deputies at the Paris Peace Conference. Parliament Chairman Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev was appointed the delegation head; Magommedhasan Gajinsky was his deputy; members of the parliament Akhmed bek Agaev and Akbar agha Sheikhulislamov were members; and two other parlia- mentarians (Miryagub Mekhtiev and Magommed Magerramov) and editor of the Azerbaijan newspaper Jeykhun bek Hajibeyli were sent as advisors. These people represented different parties and different factions in the parliament of Azerbaijan.112 On 20 January, 1919, the delegation arrived in Istanbul where it remained until late April; it reached Paris on 9 May. On 28 May, it was received by U.S. President Wilson. Ali Mardan bek left the following comment: “Woodrow Wilson received our delegation, which was a great event because, like all other heads of the Entente countries, he did not receive delegations.”113 Topchibashev, who headed the delegation of Azerbaijan, deemed it necessary to say to the American president: “It is a great honor to be received by the president of great America, the author of the supreme principles of peaceful coexistence of nations and the right of nations, including numerically small peoples, to decide their fate themselves, and to greet him on behalf of the delegation of Azerbaijan. We, who have come from the far-away Caucasus, from Azerbaijan, separated by several thousands of miles from Paris, want to express our gratitude for the free and independent life of our people. We address you, representative of a great country, with a request to hear what we have to say about our country, our people, and us.”114 President Wilson received a memorandum outlining what was

110 F. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917-1921), New York, 1951, p. 167. 111 See: Diplomaticheskie besedy A.M. Topchibasheva v Stambule (zapisi chrezvychaynogo poslannika i polnomochnogo ministra Azerbaidzhanskoy respubliki). 1918-1919 gg., Baku, 1994, pp. 33-38. 112 See: Report of Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Azerbaijan Republic A.b. Topchibashev. 1919, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 6/1, sheet 3 (in Russian). 113 Information for the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan N.b. Yusifbeyli about the reception of A.b. Topchibashev by U.S. President W. Wilson. 28.05.191, GAAP , rec. gr. 970, inv. 1, f. 143, sheet 7 (in Russian). 114 Conversation of A.M. Topchibashov, Head of Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic at Paris Peace Conference with W. Wilson, President of the USA. 28.05.1919, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 4/ I. CERCEC, EHESS, Paris, pp. 29-30.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 141 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION going on in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan and the claims of the Azeri delegation addressed to President Wilson as one of the heads of the Paris Peace Conference. The president expressed his pleasure with the meeting and detailed information, but said nothing about recognizing the independence of Azerbaijan.115 President Wilson suggested that Ali Mardan bek submit the claims to the Secretariat of the Peace Conference; the documents were in English and French, in June they appeared as a 50-page-long brochure.116 The delegation of Azerbaijan and Ali Mardan bek as its head had been working hard to finally achieve an excellent result. On 11 January, 1920, the Supreme Allied Council de facto recognized the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia.117 On 16 January, Prime Minister Nasib bek Usubbekov congratulated Ali Mardan bek. In his letter he said: “Esteemed Ali Mardan bek! Let me congratulate you and all the members of our delegation on the Entente’s recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence. Please accept my sincere gratitude for your work, which has played an important role in achieving this long-awaited success.” The prime minister further wrote that he had spoken to Topchibashev’s wife and realized that his family was not yet ready to join Ali Mardan bek in Paris and assured him that the issue would be settled as soon as he received a clear answer from them.118 General Ibrahim agha Usubov, engaged in the talks about military deliveries to Azerbaijan, wrote in his telegram from Rome: “Your presence at the Conference opened a new era in the political life of our beloved Azerbaijan. This was a historic event—from that time on Azerbaijan acquired the rights of an independent state. The country owes this gigantic achievement to you. Your crystal-clear name has entered eternity: it has been written in golden letters and will always be the first in the annals of Azerbaijan.”119

Fighting for Independence

On 27 April, 1920, the Azerbaijan Republic, the independence of which had been de facto recognized by the Supreme Allied Council, was occupied by Soviet Russia. During the two years that predated this occupation, Ali Mardan bek, separated by long distances from his motherland, had been consistently working for its independence. The occupation had made him an émigré and condemned him to a life of hardship and loss. He sent notes to all the European hierarchies of power (the Supreme Allied Council, the Great Powers representatives in Paris, the newborn League of Nations, and many other international structures) to complain about the Soviet occupation. On 6 July, 1920, he submitted a document to the Chairman of the Conference in Spa that said in part: “The delegation of Azerbaijan at the Peace Conference would like to draw the Peace Conference’s attention to the occupation of Azerbaijan by Soviet Russia. The de facto recognition of independence of Azerbaijan by the Supreme Allied Coun-

115 See: A.M. Topchibashev, Pisma iz Parizha, Baku, 1998, p. 38. 116 See: La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, Imprimeur P. Harambat. Paris, 1919, 52 pp.; Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, Imp. Robinet-Houtain, Paris, 1919, 52 pp.; Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 2/ I. CERCEC, EHESS, Paris, pp. 1-54. 117 See: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference. 1919, Vol. IX, 1946, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946. p. 959; Bulletin d’Information de l’Azerbaidjan, Paris, No. 7, 17 janvier 1920, p. 1. 118 See: Letter of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers N. Usubbekov to Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic at the Paris Peace Conference A.M. Topchibashov. 16.01.1920, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 6/I. CERCEC, EHESS, Paris, pp. 852-853. 119 Telegram of General I. Usubov from Italy to A.M. Topchibasheff. 03.02.1920, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 6/ I. CERCEC, EHESS, Paris, pp. 854-855.

142 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION cil in Versailles inspired our people and kindled the hope that the young state they created would receive a new lease on life… Shortly after this recognition, the Bolsheviks occupied our country… Today, the Allies, the Peace Conference, and the League of Nations hold the key to the problem.”120 However, his frantic and consistent efforts did not change the West’s position on the occupation. In the wake of the Bolshevist occupation of Azerbaijan in November 1920 and of Georgia in February 1921, Ali Mardan bek invited the representatives of the Caucasus at the Peace Conference to set up a Caucasian Union. On 10 June, 1921, in Paris, the plenipotentiary representatives of the four Caucasian republics (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and the Mountaineers Republic) adopted a declaration: they pushed aside all contradictions to announce that they would work closely together to ensure independence for the peoples of the Caucasus, restore the democratic forms of government in these countries, and work for the region’s prosperity.121 To promote the idea of Azerbaijan’s independence, Ali Mardan bek initiated a conference organized on 9 May, 1923 in Paris by the Sociological Society. Between 9 May and 13 June, the conference discussed the history, culture, ethnography, natural riches, and economic situation of Azerbaijan; it looked into the origins of the Azeris, their history as a nation, their willingness to live as an independent state, their independence recognized de facto by the world community, and the country’s occupation by Soviet Russia.122 From the very first days of 1922, the Azeri émigrés in Europe and émigrés from other Caucasian states actively demonstrated their position at the Cannes Conference of the Allies and even more actively at the conferences in Genoa and The Hague, which discussed, among other things, access to Baku oil. The firm position of the Caucasian governments in exile (particularly of Azerbaijan) res- trained the West inclined toward economic cooperation with Soviet Russia. In Genoa, for example, Ali Mardan bek announced on behalf of the representatives of the Azerbaijan Republic who had arrived at the conference that Soviet Russia had no rights to grant concessions on Baku oil. On the second day of the conference, M. Magerramov, another member of the Azeri delegation, stated in the Italian press that the Bolsheviks had no rights to sell oil fields because they belonged to the people of Azer- baijan. He was convinced that the role of the capital of Russian industrialists in developing the oil industry of his country had not been great and that the oil-rich Absheron Peninsula should belong to the Azeri people and foreign companies that had poured their money into it.123 The Caucasian governments in exile (including that of Azerbaijan) tried to procure an invitation with the help of France to the Lausanne Conference scheduled for 20 November, 1922. The U.K., however, was determined to keep them away. The Georgian representatives spoke of their country as one of the Black Sea states, while representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan pointed out that they were connected to Western Europe across the Black Sea and the Straits. Prime Minister of Great Britain Lloyd George and Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon insisted that governments with no control over their territories had nothing to do at the conference. Despite the firm, or even stubborn, resistance of the British, Ali Mardan bek obtained a Swiss visa on 27 November and on 24 December arrived in Lausanne to find out about everything that was being discussed and to inform the conference about Azerbaijan. After 13 months in Lausanne, where he monitored the developments at the conference, he returned to Paris on 24 February, 1924.124 The consistent efforts of the representatives of the gov-

120 Monsieur le Président de la Conférence de la Paix à Spa. Le 6 juillet 1920, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France, Archives Diplomatique, Vol. 639, folio 124-132. 121 See: Déclaration Représentants des Républiques d’Arménie, d’Azerbaïdjan, du Caucase du Nord et de Géorgie. Classé le 15 juin 1921, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France, Archives Diplomatique, Vol. 639, folio 205-206. 122 See: Conference on Azerbaijan conducted by the Sociological Society. 09.05.1923, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 9/13. CERCEC, EHESS, Paris, pp. 1-2 (in Russian). 123 See: Corriere d’ İtalia, 12 aprile, 1922. 124 See: Visa document attached to the diplomatic passport of A.M. Topchibashev. 27.11.1922, Archives d’Ali Mardan- bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 3. CERCEC, EHESS, Paris, p. 3.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 143 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ernments of the Caucasian republics in exile and their significant arguments convinced the Allies that, contrary to the efforts of Soviet Russia, the Soviet republics it controlled should not be allowed to sign the Treaty of Lausanne. In 1924, when the Socialists came to power in France and the Labor Party led by Ramsey MacDonald won the general elections in the U.K. in January 1924, these two countries softened their position on recognition of the Soviet Union. On 31 January, 1924, two days before the scheduled recognition of the Soviet Union, Topchibashev, as head of the delegation of Azerbaijan, sent a detailed memorandum to British Ambassador to France Marquise de Crewe, in which he outlined the history of the Azerbaijan Republic, informed the ambassador that his country’s independence had been recognized de facto by His Majesty Government and other Allied Powers on 12 January, 1920, and pointed out that Azerbaijan, the state recognized by the Supreme Allied Council at the Peace Conference, was occupied by Soviet Russia.125 In view of the fact that the international community had been displaying a lot of interest in recognizing the Soviet state, Ali Mardan bek sent copies of the document to the official representative of the French government, as well as to 29 diplomatic missions in Paris, including the United States, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain. Edouard Herriot, appointed prime minister of France on 14 June, 1924, immediately initiated a public discussion of the problem of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Ali Mardan bek was one of the first to address the newly appointed prime minister: on 17 June, he sent a letter to him as head of government, as well as to the foreign minister, to draw their attention to several important issues related to Azerbaijan.126 In 1924, the general mood in Europe shifted in favor of recognition of the Soviet Union; this negatively affected the situation of the political émigrés from Azerbaijan and other national parts of the former empire. For want of money, Ali Mardan bek had to move to the suburb of Saint-Cloud. In mid-April 1924, he shared his impressions with M.E. Rasulzade, who established the second center of Azeri emigration in Turkey: “During the Peace Conference (the Paris Peace Conference.— J.H.), everyone was favorably disposed toward us; later we were tolerated, while after Lausanne toleration became a charged silence.” He pointed out that “first Italy and then the U.K. removed us from the list of diplomatic visas. The French Foreign Ministry tried to do the same, but we managed to preserve the old rules. If France recognizes the Soviets tomorrow, everything might change for the worst.”127 Diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. decreased the interest of the French official circles in the Azeri delegation. The French recognized that trade and economic relations with the Soviet republics depended on Moscow. The correspondence between the Cabinet of Ministers of France and the Foreign Ministry of France shows that French officialdom regarded the delegation of Azerbaijan in France as a charity and responded to its enquiries out of diplomatic etiquette. It was recommended that Topchibashev be shown respect as an influential figure.128 Ali Mardan bek did his best to maintain contacts with Baku and Azerbaijan; he had his own source of information about what was going on there. On 16 August, 1927, he wrote to Jeykhun bek

125 See: A Son Excellence Monsieur Marquis de Crewe Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande Paris—A.M. Top- tchibachef Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan, le 31.01.1924, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 9/19. CERCEC, EHESS, Paris, pp. 1-5. 126 See: Son Excellence Monsieur Edouard Herriot Président du Conseil de la République Française Quai d’Orsay Paris—A.M. Toptchibacheff Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan, le 17 juin 1924, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France, Archives Diplomatique, Vol. 639, folio 291-295. 127 Letter of Topchibashev to M.E. Rasulzade. 14-15.04.1924, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 4/3. CERCEC, EHESS, Paris (in Russian). 128 See: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères République Française. Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales. Note pour le Cabinet du Ministre. Paris, le 3 mai 1927, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France, Archives Diplomatique, Vol. 639, folio 304.

144 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Hajibeyli about the massive repressions against the national forces in Azerbaijan and particularly in its capital: “I just received a long letter from Baku written in Aesopian language; it, however, supplies a good picture of what is going on there. Even though it was mailed, it reached me in a roundabout way on 27 July. The situation there is distressing… Everyone is tired and everyone is frightened. Kalinin arrived in Baku in person to conduct some sort of a meeting there; very soon he left, while the repressions intensified and acquired the hitherto unknown form of arrests, searches, and exiles. According to widespread information, many of the Azeris suffered because of their contacts with the Caucasian, including Azeri, organizations, operating abroad.”129

Hardships of Emigration

In the fall of 1920, Topchibashev’s family finally moved to Paris. His elder daughter Sara was married to Aliashraf bek Sultanov, deputy Minister of Trade and Industry in the last Cabinet of the Azerbaijan Republic; he emigrated to France when the Cabinet had fallen. On 24 November, 1921 and 27 March, 1923, his daughter gave birth to Zarifa and Gulnar ;130 judging by what he wrote to his friends these two granddaughters filled his life in exile with new meaning. In the 1920s, his health declined; in a letter to Ali bek Huseynzade he complained of headaches and heart troubles, while his ailing liver caused the first signs of rheumatism of his extremities; because of the painful joints of his right hand he had to use a chemical pen. The problems tumbling down on him forced him to move to Istanbul. On 26 June, 1922, he underwent surgery and had to retire from political activities for a while; however, he promptly reco- vered from his health problems to return to the ranks of the active politicians of his time. He wrote that “no matter how extraordinary and hard, circumstances will never remove me from the road of faithfully serving my people. On this road I can expect moral support from those who know me and my friends.”131 This was when he dropped the Russified ending “ev” in his family name and started using Topchibashi in letters, in the press, and in official statements. He belonged to the most influential societies and public organizations of France, where he was invariably respected for his outstanding intellectual potential, broad world outlook, vast experience of over four decades of political struggle, and firm political convictions. He was a member of the academic societies France-the Caucasus, France-Asia, and France-the Orient, which in the 1920s operated within the Paris International Academy of Diplomacy, the alma mater of many outstanding French diplomats; he was also involved in many other influential organizations.132 Starting in the late 1920s, Ali Mardan bek became engrossed in the past to a much greater extent than before; his letter to Anushiravan bek Zulkadarov, son of his old friend and comrade-in-arms Allakhyar bek, written on 24 July, 1929 in answer to Anushirvan bek’s letter of 18 July is the best evidence of this. He highly praised his correspondent for the respect he demonstrated toward the older generation in his letter of 18 July and wrote that this was rooted in the culture of the Azeris and should be preserved as a value of special importance for the Azeri youth. He wrote further: “I am very glad to find these qualities in you, son of my friend Allakhyar bek, the memory of whom will always remain with me. I was joined by bonds of friendship with the late Allakhyar bek and also by our loyalty and

129 Letter of A.M. Topchibashev to J. Hajibeyli. 16.08.1927, The Mumtaz State Archives of Literature and Art of Azerbaijan (AGALI), rec. gr. 649, inv. 3, f. 52, sheet 1. 130 See: Notes by A. Topchibashev on the birth dates of the members of his family, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 9/17. CERCEC, EHESS, Paris, p. 2 (in Russian). 131 A.M. Topchibashi: dokumenty iz lichnykh arkhivov. 1903-1934, p. 188. 132 See: Topchibashi Ali Mardan bek. Autobiography. 16.12.1951, p. 17; Toptchibachi Ali Mardan bek Ali Akbar bek oglou, p. 5.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 145 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION service to our people. He knew my father and called me ‘my cousin.’ The late Hamid bek always called me ‘our leader.’ As a relative I derive great joy from your friendship with Alekper bek. This strengthens the sincerity and friendship between our families.”133 Late in the 1920s, the Topchibachevs lived in Saint-Cloud, at that time a distant Paris banlieue, where they had moved from the center because of financial problems. Not infrequently, they had no money to pay the rent. On 6 August, 1929, Ali Mardan bek wrote to J. Hajibeyli: “I did not want to write you about the appalling conditions in which we have found ourselves. This will probably lead us to our end and will give you some breathing space. When you left I went to a doctor who insistent- ly recommended that I go to the Royat Spa not far from Vichy and La Bourboule famous for its mine- ral waters to treat my atherosclerosis and other health problems. Alas, I can’t go anywhere right now in order to avoid the trap I fell into three years ago. Since May I have been living in expectation of a bailiff: we are far behind with our rent. I have written to you about other spending. Aliashraf was wrong with his calculations—today, we are penniless. We have become accustomed to misfortunes and poverty. In any case, I gather my strength to survive, mobilize myself and keep my head.”134 Despite his advanced age he followed everything that was going on in the national émigré movement and did his best to keep in contact with the press of émigré groups. His contacts with Yeni Turan (New Turan), a newspaper published in Finland, reminded him of the distant past when he was leader of the Muslims of Russia. His letter of 23 June, 1933 mailed to Magommedsadyg Akhundzade, one of the newspaper contributors, was filled with sadness about the past: “Dear Magommedsadyg bek! As a member of the editorial board I have been receiving Yeni Turan for some time now at my old address. I distribute the copies among the necessary citizens. Unfortunately, I lack several of the latest copies and I ask you to send me all the issues. If possible, in future send them to me personally to the address at which I have been living for over a year now (28 rue Ernest Tissot, Saint-Cloud). In any case, I read Yeni Turan with pleasure and am grateful to you and its owner Ibrahim Arifulla bek effendi. This is an unforgettable effort to fight for the liberation of the Turkic countries in the far north of Europe. Long live those who are working hard on friendly Finnish soil for the benefit of their Motherland. I know a bit about the culture of this country; in the past I had friends among Finnish enlighteners whom I met in Petersburg, in the First Duma. Are any of them still living? With whom are you fighting together in that blessed country? With the eternally dear brothers from the Itil-Ural countries? This gladdens me infinitely because I spent the hardest stages of my political struggle both with the Azeris, and in the Itil-Ural countries (1903-1917): Kazan-Samara-Orenburg-Kargali-Ufa- Ekaterinburg-Tyumen-Semirechie-Petropavlosvk and others. In the same way, I met our brothers in Baku, Lenkoran, Salyan, Quba, Shemakha, Ganja, Sheki, Arash, Gazakh and elsewhere I travelled across Turkic countries and organized political consultations. Are there people from Kazan, Orenburg, Ufa, and other places in Helsinki? Probably they are children or grandchildren of my friends. Do they remember me? No matter what, give them my regards. You know, my friend, it is very hard to be an old man in my situation. I have been ailing for over a year now; the state of affairs of our organization is far from perfect. I still live in the hope that I can serve my people, be it in Azerbaijan, Itil-Ural, Turkestan, or other Turkic countries.”135 This sincere letter brimming with reminiscences is probably the best evidence of the spiritual makeup and political values of a prominent Muslim and Turkic figure who dedicated his life to struggle. On 14 July, 1934, representatives of the Caucasian republics in emigration signed the Pact of Caucasian Confederation; Ali Mardan Topchibashev and Mamed Emin Rasulzade signed it on behalf

133 Letter of A.M. Topchibashev to Anushiravan bek Zulkadarov. 24.07.1929, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 6/1. CERCEC, EHESS, Paris, pp. 1-2. 134 Letter of A.M. Topchibasev to J. Hajibeyli. 06.08.1919, AGALI, rec. gr. 649, inv. 3, f. 71, sheet 1. 135 Letter of A.M. Topchibashev to Magommedsadyg bek Akhundzade. 23.06.1933, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 9/19. CERCEC, EHESS, Paris, pp. 1-2.

146 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of the Azerbaijan National Center. Ali Mardan bek looked at the Pact as a triumph of Caucasian solidarity. At that time he felt much better than before; he looked to the future with the hope of uniting the Azeris and neighboring peoples under the flag of the Caucasian Confederation. He believed that he had enough strength to achieve this; his doctor encouraged him, yet fate decided differently. He was paralyzed on 5 November, 1934 and died.136 On 8 November, after the religious ritual performed by the imam of the Paris Muslim majilis, his coffin was carried under the Arc de Triomphe to demonstrate respect for the outstanding political and state figure of the Azerbaijan Republic. His funeral became a meeting of solidarity of the Cauca- sian, Central Asian, and Russian emigration.

Conclusion

Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev is one of the outstanding figures in the history of Azerbaijan; his lofty personal qualities and rich experience, his role in the history of the national-liberation movement, and his fifty-year-long political activities largely contributed to the struggle of the Azeris, Russian Muslims, and Turkic-speaking peoples of the Russian Empire for national and state development. Ali Mardan bek regarded the freedom of the Muslims of Russia and their civil rights as a triumph of democratic values. It was for this purpose that he brought the Muslim faction in the State Duma, which he headed, closer to the Cadets (Constitutional Democrats of the Party of People’s Freedom). The reactionary policies of 1907 buried the political careers of many outstanding people. Most of the political figures who came to the fore during the first Russian revolution succumbed under tyranny: some of them emigrated; others preferred cooperation with the authorities; some committed suicide, while many moved away to lead private lives. In 1907-1917, a relatively peaceful period in Russia, Ali Mardan bek enriched history with an example of bright political struggle and selfless dedication to the people. Throughout his life he remained devoted to the idea of unity and solidarity of the Caucasian peoples; he was convinced that the Muslims of different Islamic trends should unite; he was one of the first Muslim leaders of Russia to declare that Muslims should turn to the basic principles of their religion. As the first speaker of the parliament of the independent Azerbaijan Republic and as head of its delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, he finally achieved recognition by the Allied Powers of his country’s independence. In April 1920, it was occupied by Soviet Russia; until his last day, Ali Mardan bek was in the vanguard of those who fought for Azerbaijan’s independence. Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev will be always remembered as a prominent political leader and a figure of historic dimensions; he did much to promote the development of the statehood of Azer- baijan.

136 See: Topchibashi Ali Mardan bek. Autobiography. 16.12.1951, p. 19.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 147 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Sudaba ZEYNALOVA

Ph.D. (Hist.) (Baku, Azerbaijan).

ETHNOCULTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FORMATION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN THE CAUCASUS (19TH-BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURIES)

Abstract

his article examines several issues re- of the European communities in the region. lated to the reasons for and ways in The author focuses attention on the ethno- T which czarism pursued its migration cultural aspects of the formation of European policy, as a result of which significant chang- ethnic communities in the region—German, es took place in the ethnodemographic Greek, Polish, Czech, Estonian, and other structure of the Caucasus in the 19th-begin- communities—and on issues regarding their ning of the 20th centuries, particularly with social activity, education, and material and respect to the migration and increase in size spiritual culture.

KEYWORDS: the Caucasus, European ethnic communities, migration, ethnodemographic indices, ethnocultural values, ethnographic aspects.

Introduction

The Caucasus is a region of the world that combines cultural diversity with a rich historical past and variegated ethnic map. Over the centuries, the Caucasus, as a region with plentiful natural resources, a magnificent historical and cultural heritage, and ethnographic diversity, drew the keen attention of the Europeans. At the end of the 18th-19th centuries, representatives of the European peoples emigrated to the Caucasus en masse. Since the region proved favorable for tempestuous socioeconomic development and the preservation of ethnocultural identity, ethnocultural values, and ethnographic characteristics, European ethnic communities continued to form in the Caucasus throughout the 19th-beginning of the 20th centuries.

Ethnodemographic Changes in the Caucasus: Migration and the Formation of European Ethnic Communities

When the Russian Empire conquered the Caucasus, the path was paved for new ethnosocial processes and changes in the ethnodemographic structure of the region. Throughout the 19th-begin- 148 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ning of the 20th centuries, mass migration and resettlement of the non-indigenous population occurred in the Caucasus both from the outside and from the internal gubernias of the Russian Empire. Re- settlement in the Caucasus in the 19th century occurred under the czarist migration policy in both a forced and voluntary way. The czarist migration policy can be provisionally divided into several stages. At the end of the 18th-first half of the 19th centuries, czarism orchestrated mass and targeted migration and settlement of the Russian and Ukrainian population, German colonists, Greek immigrants, and Polish servicemen and exiles in the Caucasus. During the second half of the 19th century, after the abolition of serfdom, the resettlement of various ethnic communities became partially spontaneous and voluntary, supported and encouraged by czarism. During these years, economic and industrial development of the region led to mass migration of the land-poor Russian peasants from the central gubernias of Russia, as well as of German colonists, Estonian, Moldavian, Czech, and Bulgarian peasants, and so on. Also during this period, the industrial boom prompted an increase in the inflow of European migrants to the Caucasian cities, among whom were quite a large number of white- collar workers, specialists in various branches, businessmen, and so on. As a result, the end of the 19th-beginning of the 20th centuries was characterized by the development of capitalism and industrial-economic growth, which largely promoted an increase in migration to and resettlement in the Caucasus of foreign population. By the beginning of the 20th century, in addition to the indigenous peoples, the representatives of more than 20 nationalities, whose historical homeland was outside the Caucasus, lived in the region. These peoples appeared in the Caucasus at different times, for different reasons, and under different circumstances. The nature of the migration was also different, which can be largely divided into two groups: (1) migration directed and orchestrated by the state; (2) spontaneous migration, during which primarily small groups and families moved.1 Migration and the changes it caused on the ethnodemographic map of the Caucasus had a direct impact on the size of both the local and the new ethnic communities. New European ethnic communities, in particular, appeared in a short time on the ethnodemographic map of the region, the size of which gradually grew due to the constant flow of migrants that did not cease throughout the 19th-beginning of the 20th centuries. This is graphically demonstrated by the data of censuses and statistical sources. The quantitative indices of the European ethnic communities in the Caucasus at the end of the 19th century can be examined on the basis of the data of the first general population census of the Russian Empire held in 1897. As early as the beginning of the 20th century, the formation of European ethnic communities in the Caucasus was essentially complete. Representatives of the European peoples who moved to and lived in the Caucasus formed relatively compact and large ethnic communities and well-established diasporas in the cities and villages. In the 1920s, the quantitative indices of the European ethnic communities also stabilized. The ethnic composition of the Caucasus was shown most comprehensively in the documents of the 1926 All-Union Census. The migration policy pursued by Russian czarism brought new ethnic groups to the region with its historically developed ethnic diversity and prompted the emergence, formation, and increase in size of the new ethnic communities, while the area of historical settlement of most of them extended far beyond the boundaries of the Caucasus. Between the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, new European ethnic groups appeared in the Caucasus—Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians, Germans, Swedes, Moldavians, Rumanians, Finns, Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and others, most of whom founded

1 See: N.G. Volkova, Etnichesky sostav naseleniia Severnogo Kavkaza v XVIII-nachale XX vekov, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1974, pp. 193-197.

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Table 1 Quantitative Distribution of European Ethnic Communities in the Caucasus by Native Language according to the 1897 Census

Roman, incl. Finnish, Administrative- French, Polish German Greek incl. territorial units Rumanian, Latvian Estonian

Lithuanian- Moldavian

Baku Gubernia 1,439 371 158 3,430 — 622

Elisavetpol 616 148 143 3,194 558 16 Gubernia

Zakataly District 115 — — 11 2 —

Daghestan 1,630 537 78 261 — 50 Region

Kars Region 3,243 956 51 430 32,593 484

Tiflis Gubernia 6,167 1,420 814 8,329 27,116 199

Kutaisi 793 242 184 290 4,372 8 Gubernia

Batumi Region 911 191 160 369 4,717 31

Sukhumi 234 123 138 406 5,393 607 District

Black Sea 731 88 1,091 748 5,969 821 Gubernia

Erivan 1,385 485 363 210 1,323 403 Gubernia

Stavropol 961 199 110 8,601 1,715 1,532 Gubernia

Kuban 2,719 1,086 5,444 20,778 20,137 2,446 Gubernia

Terek Region 4,173 841 221 9,672 958 203

S o u r c e: Kavkazsky kalendar na 1908 god, Tiflis, 1907, pp. 108-124. monoethnic settlements, settled in mixed villages, or lived in the cities. These diaspora groups went through a long process of social adaptation and, preserving their cultural values and features of national identity, were able, for the most part, to become incorporated into the polyethnic and subcul- tural space of the region, leaving their mark on the history of the Caucasus. 150 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 2 European Population of the Transcaucasus according to the 1926 Census

Transcaucasian Azerbaijan Armenian Nationality Georgian S.S.R. A.S.S.R. (total) S.S.R. S.S.R.

Germans 25,327 13,149 12,074 104

Poles 6,324 2,460 3,159 705

Greeks 57,935 904 54,051 2,980

Estonians 1,043 168 871 4

Latvians 944 569 363 12

Lithuanians 572 285 283 4

Moldavians 316 156 142 18

French 347 58 282 7

Italians 257 77 172 8

Czechs and 237 87 143 7 Slovakians

Bulgarians 203 40 160 3

S o u r c e: Naselenie Zakavkazia. Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1926 g. Kratkie itogi, Transcaucasian Central Statistics Board, Tiflis, 1928, p. 8.

Formation of the European ethnic communities was a long process and had its own special features, similarities, and differences during resettlement and social adaptation. It is worth noting that, on the whole, diasporas are based primarily on cultural identity that ensures the viability of the ethnic organism. Separation from the historical homeland is compensated for by an accentuated desire to preserve the national culture. It stands to reason that not every ethnic group can act as a diaspora, which is distinguished by the following main criteria: quantitative indices, precise definition of ethnocultural interests, high level of consolidation, and active economic, social, and cultural self-organization. Most of the ethnic groups that resettled in and migrated to the Caucasus in the 19th-beginning of the 20th centuries took the evolutionary path of ethnic community formation. The German, Greek, and Polish communities, which finished forming at the beginning of the 20th century, were the largest European diasporas in the Caucasus. The German and Greek communities have their own large compact and mainly monoethnic settlements in the Caucasus, and also lived en masse in the large cities of the region. At the beginning of the 20th century, the German and Greek diasporas had their own national public organizations and press organs, while in Soviet times they also had national-administrative districts—the Grechesky and Vannovsky districts in the Krasnodar Territory. They had quite a developed economic structure and contributed to the industrial development of the territory. The Poles formed a large community that lived in the major cities and was represented by different social strata of the urban population, mainly the intelligentsia and white- collar workers. The Czech, Bulgarian, Estonian, Moldavian, and other European communities of the Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 151 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 3 European Population of the North Caucasian Territory and Daghestani A.S.S.R. according to the 1926 Census

North Caucasian Territory Daghestani A.S.S.R. Nationality Total Urban Rural Total Population Population Population Population

Poles 18,425 12,588 5,837 460

Czechs and 3,780 12,86 2,494 20 Slovakians

Serbs 277 133 144 1

Bulgarians 2,798 762 2,036 44

Latvians 4,573 2,582 1,991 73

Lithuanians 2,292 1,718 574 69

Estonians 5,201 962 4,239 33

Germans 93,915 12,734 81,181 2,551

English 59 40 19 —

Swedes 82 70 12 1

Dutch 10 8 2 13

Italians 308 242 66 1

French 164 135 29 10

Rumanians 562 201 361 58

Moldavians 9546 446 9,100 491

Greeks 32,178 11,125 21,053 82

Finns 322 128 194 9

S o u r c e: Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1926 goda, Vol. V, Crimean A.S.S.R., North Caucasian Territory, Daghestani A.S.S.R., Moscow, 1928, pp. 52-56, 342.

Caucasus were represented by relatively small groups, had their own settlements in the Northern Caucasus and on the Black Sea coast, and were largely engaged in agriculture. The French, Italians, English, Swedes, Dutch, and other representatives of West European peoples lived in small numbers in the large cities—the administrative, industrial, and commercial centers of the Caucasus: Baku, Tiflis, Ekaterinodar, Stavropol, and Vladikavkaz—and were mainly engaged in industrial and commercial activity. 152 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION As a result, diaspora groups of European peoples—Germans, Greeks, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Moldavians, and others—formed in the ethnic structure of the Cau- casus throughout the 19th-beginning of the 20th centuries. They differed in size, social composition, and level of incorporation into economic life and the sociocultural environment. The diaspora groups created cultural-enlightenment institutions, religious and charity societies, and national schools ensuring preservation of their identity in their communities. It was this that allowed them, while actively participating in the economic and sociocultural development of the region, to preserve their unique cultural portrait throughout the long period of their existence in the Caucasus. However, the sociopolitical and socioeconomic processes that occurred during the Soviet period had an influence on the ethnodemographic structure of the Caucasus. In the 1920s-1940s, after Soviet power was established in the Caucasus, there was mass emigration of the population abroad. Dekulakization, repressions, coercive deportation of the indigenous Caucasian peoples, as well as of the new ethnic groups living in the region, and the combat action in the Caucasus during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 had a direct effect on some ethnic composition and demographic development of the Caucasus. In particular, representatives of the European ethnic communities—the German population in its entirety and part of the Greek and Polish population—were deported from the Cau- casus. After rehabilitation, only a small number of them returned to the Caucasus.2

Social Activity and Education

The formation of European ethnic communities was related not only to the resettlement processes, rise in their quantitative and demographic indices, economic activity, and incorporation into the economic infrastructure of the territory, but also to the sociocultural adaptation and social activity of the representatives of the European communities, development of common goals, and preservation of ethnocultural features far from their historical homeland. One of the significant ethnocultural features in the formation of the European ethnic communities in the Caucasus was their social activity, expressed in the establishment of charity and cultural societies, participation in local administration bodies, and publication of printed matter in the national language. In particular, at the end of the 19th-beginning of the 20th centuries, the German communities functioning in Baku, Tbilisi, and other large cities of the Caucasus began to engage in social activity expressed in the establishment of public organizations and charity societies. At the beginning of the 20th century, several German charities were established and functioned in Baku. One of the first was the Women’s Evangelical Lutheran Charity Society registered with the city authorities on 20 July, 1907. The society has its own charter, according to which its main purpose was to “assist needy people of the Evangelical Lutheran faith living in Baku.” Approximately at the same time, a Women’s Evangelical Lutheran Charity Society was set up in Tbilisi (Tiflis), at which an almshouse functioned.3 After the February Revolution, social activity became more vigorous in different regions of the former Russian Empire, including in the Caucasus, the difficult military situation and milestone events prompting new public organizations to spring up. During these years, the social activity of the German migrants in the Caucasus also became much more vigorous. On 14 May, 1917, a meeting of the Ter- ritorial Congress of Delegates of German Russian Citizens of the Transcaucasus opened in Tiflis attended by representatives of almost all the German colonies. Various socioeconomic problems of the

2 See: S.M. Zeynalova, Formirovanie evropeiskikh etnicheskikh obshchin na Kavkaze (XIX—pervaia polovina XX vv.), Mutarjim, Baku, 2010, pp. 33-56. 3 State Historical Archives of the Azerbaijan Republic (GIAAR), rec. gr. 46, inv. 2, f. 76, sheet 26; Kavkazsky kalendar na 1914 god, Tiflis, 1913, p. 828; Heimatbuch der Deutschen aus Rußland, Stuttgard, 1961, p. 120.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 153 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION German population—colonists and city-dwellers—were discussed at the meetings of the German Council held regularly in Tiflis, as well as issues relating to the activity of German schools, which helped them to consolidate.4 On 28 May, 1918, the independent Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was formed, which existed until April 1920. The sociopolitical, economic, and cultural transformations that occurred in Azerbai- jan in 1918-1920 also affected the German population of the republic. Deputy Lorenz Jakob Kun (1884-1942), who came from the colony of Helenendorf, represented the German population in the Azerbaijan Parliament that began functioning on 7 December, 1918. Speaking on behalf of the Na- tional Minorities faction, Mr. Kun represented the interests of the entire German population of Azer- baijan in the Parliament.5 During the years of Soviet power, changes that took place in the country also occurred in the public life of the German population of the region. At this time, party structures among the German population organized a widespread ideological campaign, the primary aim of which was to draw the Germans into Soviet-building projects and encourage participation in the public life of Soviet society, for which party bodies and communist cells were organized and a staff of instructors assigned. After the October coup in Russia, a People’s Commissariat for Nationalities was founded, at one of the first collegiate meetings of which the need was justified for creating a German Department at the People’s Commissariat for Nationalities. In 1920, the Central Bureau of German Sectors under the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was created at the People’s Commissariat for Nationalities. In the Northern Caucasus, the Central Bureau initially had German sectors in the local party committees in Stavropol and Piatigorsk, which carried out social and ideological work among the German population. In 1921, a German sector was created at the Kuban-Black Sea Regional Committee.6 In the Transcaucasus, there were German sectors functioning in Baku and Tiflis, and communist cells were set up in the German settlements. A German sector was set up at the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Azerbaijan in January 1921 in Baku. The activity of the German sector was to extend to the German population of Baku and the rural districts, particularly the German settlements. According to the annual reports of the German sector for 1923- 1926, a German Workers’ Club was organized in Baku and club organizations opened in many Ger- man settlements, while party and communist cells, etc. formed in the colonies.7 In the 1920s-1930s, the Soviet leadership laid great store by the participation of the German population in the work of the local administrative bodies—the rural Soviets. For example, the report for 1927 by E. Beck, the chairman of the rural Soviet of Helenendorf, the largest German settlement in Azerbaijan, as well as investigatory act of the work of the rural Soviet for 1928, said that the He- lenendorf rural Soviet had 40 members, 34 of which were Germans by nationality, and under which four sectors functioned: (1) the redevelopment and public health sector; (2) the agricultural sector; (3) the cultural and enlightenment sector; and (4) the cooperative sector.

4 GIAAR, rec. gr. 508, inv. 1, f. 388, s. 1, 16-31; A. Aisfeld, “Rossiiskie nemtsy i samoupravlenie: plany i deistvitelnost,” in: Nemtsy Rossii: sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe i dukhovnoe razvitie (1871-1941). Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii, Moscow, 2002, pp. 43-44; Nemtsy v Rossii i v SNG 1763-1993, Stuttgart, 1993, p. 15. 5 State Archives of the Azerbaijan Republic (GAAR), rec. gr. 894, inv. 10, f. 53, sheet 5. 6 See: V.G. Chebotareva, Narkomnats RSFSR: svet i teni natsionalnoi politiki 1917-1924 gg., Moscow, 2003, pp. 549- 552, 561. 7 Archives of Political Documents of the General Managemet Department of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic (APDUDPAR), rec. gr. 1, inv. 235, f. 99, sheets 48—49; rec. gr. 1, inv. 235, f. 171, sheets 10-11, 18—19; rec. gr. 1, inv. 235, f. 175, sheets 10-11.

154 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION On the whole, as of 1 July, 1928, five German rural Soviets functioned in the Azerbaijan S.S.R.8 In 1924-1925, 25 German rural Soviets were established in the North Caucasian Territory. Due to the high numbers and large size of the German community in the Northern Caucasus, the German population was offered a national administrative-territorial unit. After the presidium of the North Caucasian territory executive committee adopted a resolution in 1927 “On the Possibility of Forming a National Minority Administrative Unit in the Territory to Unite the German Population,” the Van- novsky National District was formed in the territory of the Kuban and Armavir districts that united five German colonies with its center in Vannovsky (Eigenfeld) with a mostly German population. A German was appointed as head of the district organization, and the rural Soviets of this district were mainly staffed with Germans. The Vannovsky District was agricultural. German learning institutions also functioned there.9 In the mid-1930s, changes began in the national policy of the Soviet state that marked revision of and departure from the former national minority policy for both domestic and foreign political reasons. In April 1938, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a resolution On Reorganization of Artificially Created National Districts and Rural Soviets in the Krasnodar Territory, as a result of which the Vannovsky German National District was renamed the North Kuban District, and the Vannovsky settlement became known as the North Kuban settlement. The German rural Soviets of the Vannovsky District were also renamed. In 1940, the Vannovsky District entirely ceased its existence, and along with it publications and study in the German language also ceased.10 The publication of German periodicals was an important vehicle for expressing the social activity of the German population. From the beginning of the 20th century to the 1920s, a German newspaper called Kaukasische Post (Caucasian Post) was published in Tiflis that became the first printed matter of the German population of the Caucasus. In the 1920s-1930s, the German newspapers Bau- er und Arbeiter (Farmer and Worker) and Lenins Weg (Lenin’s Way) were published in German. In the 1930s in the Caucasus, a newspaper called Kollektivfahne (Collective Banner) was published in German in the Vannovsky District.11 The German press occupied an important place in the sociopolitical and cultural life of the German population and was one of the factors promoting the integrity of the German community of the Caucasus. In contrast to the representatives of other European ethnic groups that settled in the Caucasus and established compact settlements there, Germans, Greeks, Czechs, Estonians, and others, Poles mainly took up residence in the large cities and did not have national settlements. Only a small per- centage of the Polish population lived in rural areas, mainly in mixed settlements. Most people from Poland were able to quickly adapt to the new living conditions and occupy a specific socioeconomic niche. In addition to engaging in private business activity, Poles could also be found in government and military service. There was quite a number of high-ranking military officials, prominent scientists and professors, figures of art, physicians, and well-known architects among the Polish population living in the Caucasus.

8 APDUDPAR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 235, f. 330, sheet 187; GAAR, rec. gr. 2448, inv. 3, f. 94, sheet 125; Z.B. Şıxlinski, Azərbaycan kəndində sovet quruculuğu (1926-1932-ci illər), Elm, Bakı, 1975, sheet 19. 9 See: Nemetskoe naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza: sotsialno-ekonomicheskaia, politicheskaia i religioznaia zhizn (posledniaia chetvert XVIII-seredina XX v.), Collected Documents, Compiled by T. N. Plokhotniuk, SGU Publishers, Stavropol, 2002, pp. 13, 138-139. 10 See: N.F. Bugai, “Deportatsiia nemtsev s iuga Rossii v 40-e gody: prichiny, khod, posledstviia,” in: Rossiiskie nemtsy na Donu, Kavkaze i Volge, Russian-German Scientific Conference Papers, Moscow, 1995, p. 41; I.I. Alekseenko, “Istroria i problemy rossiiskikh nemtsev na Kubani,” in: Rossiiskie nemtsy na Donu, Kavkaze i Volge, pp. 58-60. 11 See: S. Zeynalova, Nemtsy na Kavkaze, Mutarjim, Baku, 2008, pp. 165-176.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 155 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION By the beginning of the 20th century, Polish communities with a high level of ethnocultural consolidation formed in large Caucasian cities. In some cities (for example, in Vladikavkaz), the Pol- ish community lived quite compactly in districts, where its members opened several private establishments—stores and medical and educational institutions. At the beginning of the 20th century, a Roman Catholic school and a Catholic church, rebuilt in the 1930s, functioned in Vladikavkaz.12 The Polish community in Kuban was the largest. Many nobles, servicemen, physicians, professors, and businessmen had a significant influence on the development of the Kuban Region. They included Prosecutor General of the Ekaterinodar District Court Viktor Rakovski, Chief Physician of the Ekaterinodar Military Hospital and founder of the Goriachie kliuchi resort Mieczysław Rymashevski, third-generation nobles and Kuban industrialists Petr-Pavel Bukovski and Henryk Kozlovski, founder of the Anapa resort Vladimir Budzinski, and others. The Polish population of Kuban was distinguished by a high level of social activity. The sociocultural activity of the Polish population was particularly vigorous in Ekaterinodar. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Ognisko Polish Club functioned in Ekaterinodar.13 The Polish community in the cities of the Central Caucasus—Baku, Tbilisi (Tiflis), and Batu- mi—was distinguished by outstanding public figures. The names of talented poets, scientists, and engineers, such as Tadeusz Łada Zabłocki, Władysław Strzelnicki, Ludwik Młokosiewicz, Witold Zglenicki, Paweł Potocki, Józef Chodźko, Boleslaw Statkowski, Władysław Kalusowski, and others14 can be noted among the Polish settlers in the Central Caucasus. Polish architects, Józef Gosławski, Kazimir Skurevic, Józef Plośko, Eugeniusz Skibiński, Konstantin Borisoglebski, and others, who designed several of the most beautiful architectural buildings in Baku and other cities, were prominent representatives of the Polish population in Azerbaijan.15 Poles occupied several executive posts in military service, state administration, and industry in the national mosaic of Baku. In particular, at the end of the 19th century, Stanisław Despot-Zenovic of Polish origin was chairman of the Baku City Duma. Some Polish officers occupied posts in the military administration in Azerbaijan, in particular, physician Seropski (head of the military infirmary in Baku in 1931), Major Kanonenski (military commandant of Baku in 1839), and Colonel Miklaszewski (military head of the Muslim provinces of the Caucasus). In 1847, nine high-ranking Polish white-collar workers served in Azerbaijan, in particular, head of the district military headquarters Major General M. Gurski, Major F. Dobrzanski, and others.16 The Polish population was distinguished by its vigor in social activity. At the beginning of the 20th century, Polish public organizations—the Polish House, charity societies, libraries, etc.—functioned in the large cities of the Northern and Central Caucasus. In particular, at the beginning of the 20th century, Polish public and charity organizations, such as the Polish House, a Catholic charity society, and a Polish library, existed in Baku, in which representatives of the Polish intelligentsia participated. The first union of Poles, called the Roman Catholic Society, was created in Baku in 1903 to engage in charity. In 1909, an association called the Polish House was registered, the charter of which named assisting the cultural development of the Polish population of Baku as its main objective. At the beginning of World War I, the Polish House helped refugees from Poland.17 Deputy Stanisław

12 See: V. Kanukova, Stary Vladikavkaz, Iriston, Vladikavkaz, 2002, 310 pages, available at [http://nocss.ru/projects/24/ gl1_p2.php]. 13 See: “Poliaki na Kubani: istoria i sovremennost,” available at [http://poloniakub an.by.ru/polish_kub.htm]; V.B. Vi- nogradov, Sredniaia Kuban: zemliaki i sosedi, Armavir, 1995, pp. 128-132. 14 See: G.G. Abdullabekova, Temy i inspiratsii Azerbaidzhana v polskoi literature XIX veka, Ozan, Baku, 1999, pp. 46- 48, 67; “Puteshestvyia po stranitsam proshlovo,” Kavkazskaia Poloniia, No. 8, 2002, pp. 5-12. 15 See: Sh. Fatullaev-Figarov, Tvorchestvo polskikh arkhitektorov v Baku, 2004; Sh.S. Fatullaev, Gradostroitelstvo i arkhitektura Azerbaidzhana XIX-nachala XX veka, Stroiizdat, Leningrad, 1986, pp. 65-66, 82, 158-162, 218, 276, 405. 16 See: R. Badirbeili, “Poliaki v Azerbaidzhane v XIX i nachale XX veka,” Kavkazskaia Polonia, No. 2, 1999, pp. 2-4. 17 Ibidem.

156 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Vonsovic represented the Polish National Council in the parliament of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920) in the faction of deputies from the national minorities.18 At the beginning of the 20th century, the Polish House, a Polish theater, and a library functioned in Tiflis.19 By the beginning of the 20th century, the Greek community of the Caucasus was playing an active part in social life. In May 1917, the first National Assembly of Greeks of the Transcaucasus was held in Tiflis, in which the representatives of 73 Greek communities of the region took part. In June 1917, the first All-Russia Congress of Greeks was convened in Taganrog, at which the representatives of 40 Greek communities gathered. The congress decided to establish a Union of Greek Communities with its central council in Rostov.20 During the Soviet period, in the 1920s, Greek sectors were created in the regional committees of the Communist Party of several union republics, as well as in the executive committees. In particular, in 1920, a Greek sector was formed by the Black Sea District Committee. In Baku, in Oc- tober 1925, a subdivision of the national minorities of the Baku Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was set up, under which a national minority commission was created out of representatives of the relevant institutions and organizations working among the representatives of different nationalities—Latvians, Germans, Jews (mountain and European), Greeks, and others.21 In 1921, a print organ of the Greek population—the Kommunistis newspaper published in Batumi—was founded in the Ajaria Regional Committee of the Georgian Communist Party. In 1924, a print organ of the Greek population—the Alitia newspaper published in Krasnodar—was founded in the political department of national minorities of the Kuban-Black Sea Regional Com- mittee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). In 1925, a decision was made to create a Bureau of Greek Sectors in Rostov-on-Don, as well as to join the Kommunistis and Alitia newspapers into a single newspaper called Kommunistis, which was to be the main print organ of the Greek population.22 During the years of Soviet power, the Greek community had an administrative-territorial unit. In the 1920s, national Greek rural Soviets were formed in the Georgian S.S.R. belonging to the Tsalka (Tsalkinsky) municipal district with its center in Tsalka. A Greek administrative-territorial unit existed in the Krasnodar Territory for several years; it was the Grechesky municipal district created on 7 February, 1930 by a resolution of the Presidium of the Azov-Black Sea Territory Executive Committee confirmed by a resolution of the U.S.S.R. All-Russia Central Executive Committee of 10 January, 1930. The Grechesky municipal district included 7 rural Soviets of the Krymsky municipal district (Black Sea District) and two rural Soviets of the Abinsk municipal district (Kuban District) with an overwhelming majority of Greeks in its population (more than 11 thousand). The Krymskaia stanitsa was also the center of the Krymsky and Grechesky municipal districts, and in 1934, the center of the Grechesky District was transferred to the Nizhne-Bakanskaia stanitsa, where the editorial office of the Greek newspaper Kommunistis was transferred from Rostov and the Greek Teacher Training College from Krasnodar. In the 1930s, there were a total of 16 Greek national rural Soviets in the Kuban District. In May 1938, the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet adopted a Resolution on Elimination of Nineteen Rural Districts of the Krasnodar Territory, among which were

18 See: Azerbaidzhanskaia Demokraticheskaia Respublika (1918-1920). Parlament, Azerbaijan Publishers, Baku, 1998, pp. 23-26; Azerbaidzhanskaia Respublika. Dokumenty i materialy 1918-1920 gg., ed. by J.B. Guliev, Elm, Baku, 1998, p. 215. 19 See: A. Kozbelevsky, “Iz istorii poliakov Gruzii,” Kavkazskaia Polonia, No. 9, 2002, pp. 13-14; M. Komakhia, “Georgia’s Slavic Population,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (46), 2007, pp. 132-143. 20 See: P.D. Tsatsanidi, Grecheskaia tserkov na Ravkaze v XIX-nachale XX v. Author’s thesis for a Ph.D. in History, Krasnodar, 2004, p. 21; Gretsia-Rossia. Tysiacheletie sviazei, Athens, 1995, pp. 123-135. 21 APDUDPAR, rec. gr. 12, inv. 2, f. 94, sheet 29. 22 See: A.R. Aklaev, “Iz istorii formirovaniia sovremennoi etnoiazykovoi situatsii u grekov Gruzii,” in: Etnografiia, antropologiia i smezhnye distsipliny: sootnoshenie predmeta i metodov, Moscow, 1989, pp. 123-124; Gretsia-Rossia. Tysiacheletie sviazei, pp. 139-148.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 157 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION districts where Greeks resided compactly: Belorechensky, Vitiazevsky, Krymsky, and others. Greek schools were abolished and lessons began to be taught in Russian. In March 1939, the Krasnodar Territory Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) made a decision to transform the national districts into ordinary districts.23 During Soviet times, the Estonian population began participating in party bodies. In 1921, Es- tonian national party cells were created, one of which functioned in the Stavropol Gubernia and two in the Kuban-Black Sea Region. In 1921, an Estonian department began functioning at the People’s Commissariat for Nationalities. By the beginning of 1926, four Estonian rural Soviets had been created in the North Caucasian District: Khussy-Kardoniksky, Livonsky, Novo-Estonsky, and Podgorn- sky. In 1926, the Salminsky rural Soviet was formed in the Black Sea District. At the end of the 1920s, the village of Estonia had become the center of the Estonian national rural Soviets in Abkhazia. By 1926, Komsomol cells had been created in all the Estonian settlements of the Caucasus.24 So, by the beginning of the 20th century, the social activity of the European ethnic communities had also increased under the impact of the sociopolitical processes in the region. Whereas at the beginning of the 20th century the social activity of the German, Polish, Greek, and other European communities of the Caucasus was expressed in establishing national public organizations, mainly charitable in nature, and after the February Revolution it took the form of organizing territory congresses of the German and Greek population, during the years of Soviet power, it was placed under the supervision of the national minority sectors and national minority commissions, expressed in the publication of periodicals in the national language, and aimed at drawing the representatives of the European communities into the new ideology of Soviet-building, joining the Communist Party, and participating in sociopolitical processes. On the whole, the social activity of the European communities was instrumental in developing common goals, identifying problems, and finding ways to resolve them and had a direct impact on the formation of diaspora groups and communities of representatives of the European peoples living in the Caucasus. Education was a vital component of the cultural development of the European communities in the Caucasus. Most of the German colonists, Poles, Greeks, Czechs, Estonians, and other European migrants had a command of their own and the Russian language, and some also studied the languages of the autochthonic peoples. National schools functioned in essentially all the German colonies and in the Greek, Czech, and Estonian settlements, as well in the large cities of the Caucasus. In particular, the colonists laid the foundation of the first school at the very beginning of the existence of the first German colony in Azerbaijan—Helenendorf. German children took lessons in the home of pastor Johann Jacob Kraus, who taught them how to read and write, as well as giving them lessons in religion. In 1842, the first school house was built in the colony of Helenendorf. The school was attended by both boys and girls. Teaching was carried out in German. According to the reports, by 1906, 396 pupils had been taught at the two-year school in Helenendorf.25 Schools were founded in the German settlements of the Northern Caucasus: in 1835 in Karras, in 1836 in Nikolaevka, and in 1838 in Konstantinovka. As of 1 January, 1898, the following church schools in the German settlements of the Northern Caucasus were on the list of educational establishments of the Caucasian school district: in Johannesdorf (founded in 1884, 52 pupils), Martinfeld (founded in 1867, 85 pupils), Friedrichsfeld (founded in 1893, 36 pupils), Germansburg (founded in

23 See: M.E. Ignatova, Grechesky i Nemetsky (Vannovsky) natsionalnye raiony Krasnodarskogo kraia v 20—40-e gg. XX veka, Author’s thesis for a Ph.D. in History, Maikop, 2005, pp. 18-24; D. Chitlov, Moi narod, Kombinat pechati Publishers, Tbilisi, 2000, pp. 92-128. 24 See: L.A. Vyime, Estonskie poseleniia na Chernomorskom poberezhie Kavkaza (vtoraia polovina XIX-1929 g.), Author’s thesis for a Ph.D. in History, Tallinn, 1975, pp. 30-37; Ia.Sh. Sharapov, Natsionalnye sektsii RKP(b), Kazan University Publishers, Kazan, 1967, p. 211. 25 GIAAR, rec. gr. 508, inv. 1, f. 436, sheet 26; rec. gr. 830, inv. 1, f. 7, sheet 8; N. A. Ibragimov, Nemetskie stranitsy istorii Azerbaidzhana, Azerbaijan Publishers, Baku,1995, pp. 165-166.

158 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION 1882, 62 pupils), and Johannesheim (founded in 1887, 40 pupils) in the Stavropol Gubernia; Karras (founded in 1805, 131 pupils) and Tempelgolf (founded in 1890, 62 pupils) in the Terek Region; and the Baron Steingel estate (founded in 1887, 49 pupils) in the Kuban Region, and so on.26 The school at the Khutorok estate was established for the children of white- and blue-collar workers. Particu- larly gifted pupils received a grant from Baron Steingel in order to continue their education. At the end of the 19th-beginning of 20th centuries, in addition to general education schools, specialized schools were opened in the large German settlements, in the colonies of Semenovka and Helenendorf, for example. German schools were also opened in the large cities of the Caucasus where Germans lived en masse, particularly in Baku and Tiflis. In the 1920s, first- and second-level schools functioned in German settlements. In particular, in the 1920s, kindergartens and primary schools functioned in all the German settlements of Azerbaijan, and there was a secondary school in the colony of Helenendorf. The report of the Commission of the Azerbaijan Central Executive Committee on the cultural and economic state of the German peas- antry of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. in 1930 noted that in eight German settlements, there were 8 schools, 10 kindergartens, 4 clubs, and 2 reading huts.27 At the end of the 1920s, an engineering school was established and functioned in Helenendorf, at which, according to the curriculum, in addition to general education subjects, students studied mechanics, engineering, and other technical subjects. And in the 1930s, a winegrowing and winemaking school functioned in Helenendorf.28 By 1927, more than 30 German schools functioned in the Northern Caucasus in the Terek Dis- trict, while 14 German schools functioned in the Stavropol District.29 In the 1930s, the clampdown of the Soviet regime and the beginning of repressions led to changes in the education situation of the German population. In March 1938, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bol- sheviks) and U.S.S.R. Council of People’s Commissars adopted a resolution on the mandatory study of the Russian language in non-Russian schools. By the beginning of 1939, German schools had been reorganized, which resulted in all classes in German schools being transferred to Russian. The Greek migrants, who settled primarily in rural areas, strove to establish monoethnic settlements. The cultural and spiritual life of the Greek community in the Caucasus largely promoted the preservation of national values. Greek schools and cultural charity societies functioned in many of the large Greek villages where Greeks lived en masse. In particular, in 1879, a church-parochial school that taught in Greek was founded in a Greek village in Georgia called Bashkov. A unified language was instituted for Greek schools functioning in the U.S.S.R. by a decision of the R.S.F.S.R. People’s Commissariat of Enlightenment—a literary form of Demotic, which helped to consolidate the Greek community, where there were many different dialects. Greek teachers trained in teacher training col- leges and specialized schools in Akhaltsikhe, Batumi, Sukhumi, Tsalka, and the village of Santa. In the 1880s, a Greek public academy was opened in Batumi, and in 1892 a women’s church-parochial school. A Greek teacher training college was opened in the village of Santa in 1934. In 1928, there were 106 Greek schools in Georgia. In order to train Greek teaching staff, a Greek department was formed at the teacher training college in Krasnodar in 1925.30 According to the statistics of 1922, two Greek schools functioned in Azerbaijan—one in Baku and the other in the Jevanshir Uezd. At the beginning of the 20th century, a Greek Philanthropic (Charity) Society and the Greek Euripides Drama Club functioned in Baku. The Greek community

26 See: M.V. Kornilova, Nemetskie poseleniia na Severnom Kavkaze v XIX-nachale XX vv., Author’s thesis for a Ph.D in History, Vladikavkaz, 2006, pp. 11-14, 19-21; Otchet popechitelia Kavkazskogo uchebnogo okruga o sostoianii uchebnykh zavedenii za 1897 g., Tiflis, 1898, pp. 8, 32, 37. 27 GAAR, rec. gr. 379, inv. 7, f. 100, sheet 5. 28 GAAR, rec. gr. 2368, inv. 1, f. 38, sheet 157; rec. gr. 2368, inv. 1, f. 12, sheet 11; APDUDPAR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 235, f. 171, sheet 97. 29 See: T.N. Plokhotniuk, Rossiiskie nemtsy na Severnom Kavkaze, Moscow, 2001, p. 141. 30 See: L. Chitlov, op. cit., pp. 282-292, 298; Gretsiia-Rossiia. Tysiacheletie sviazei, pp. 139-148.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 159 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of Baku had its own school, the director of which was E. Anastadiadi (1885-1937), who was one of the initiators of the establishment of a Greek cultural center. During the repressions at the end of the 1930s, Greek schools, churches, and societies gradually stopped functioning.31 The Polish community in the Caucasus was characterized by a high level of literacy. For example, according to the statistics, in the mid-1920s, Poles and Germans ranked first in literacy level per 1,000 people of the European ethnic population in the Transcaucasus (which amounted to at least 3,000 people): 831 Poles per 1,000 people and 755 Germans per 1,000 people.32 In the 19th-beginning of the 20th centuries, Polish schools, which mainly functioned at Catholic churches, were established in the large cities of the Caucasus where groups of Poles lived compactly. In particular, in 1920, three Polish schools functioned in the Kuban-Black Sea Region in Armavir, Novorossiysk, and Ekaterino- dar. A Polish school functioned in Georgia in the 1920s.33 There were national schools in the large Estonian settlements. In particular, a secondary school functioned in the village of Esto-Khagin, at which Estonians, Russians, and Germans studied. In the 1920s, political clubs were opened in Sulewi and a wall newspaper was put out. In 1923-1925, drama clubs and sports and music clubs were organized in other Estonian settlements. In the 1920s, schools that taught in Estonian functioned in the Estonian settlements of Esto-Sakok, Salme, Sulewi, Alam- Linda, and Iulem-Linda.34 On the whole, most of the German, Polish, Greek, Czech, and Estonian population could read and write and boasted some level of education. Education had a direct impact on the formation and development of European communities in the Caucasus. On the one hand, teaching in the native language helped to preserve national ethnocultural characteristics, language, and culture among the young generation who had never seen their historical homeland. On the other hand, it raised the level of literacy and professional training of both the rural and urban European population.

Spiritual Culture and Ethnocultural Aspects of the European Communities in the Caucasus

The spiritual culture was a fundamental and indelible part of the life of the European ethnic communities in the Caucasus. Religion, which served as a bond and a symbol of the national culture and uniqueness of the representatives of the European population of the Caucasus preserved far from the historical homeland, occupied a noteworthy place in the formation of the European communities in the Caucasus. Most of the European migrants were Russian Orthodox, Lutheran, Catholic, as well as the followers of various Christian and sectarian teachings—separatism, Shtundism, Mennonism, and so on. The first German evangelist parish in the Northern Caucasus was the Piatigorsk-Karras Evan- gelical Lutheran Parish created in 1835. In 1859, the Stavropol and in 1881 the Ekaterinodar-Novo- rossiysk, then the Vladikavkaz and Taganrog parishes appeared, while in 1900 the Rostov parish emerged. By 1917, the following Evangelical Lutheran parishes functioned in the Northern Caucasus:

31 See: Izvestiia AzTsSU, No. 1 (8), 1924, pp. 20-29; I. Pilijev, “Greki v Azerbaidzhane,” Azerbaidzhan i azerbaidzhantsy v mire, No. 2, 2009, pp. 100-104; “Zdes vitaet dukh Ellady,” Bakinsky rabochy, 15 July, 2004. 32 See: “Gramotnost naseleniia ZSFSR,” Ekonomichesky Vestnik Zakavkazia, No. 9, 1928, p. 5. 33 See: “Poliaki na Kubani: istoria i sovremennost”; V.B. Vinogradov, op. cit., pp. 128-132; M. Komakhia, op. cit. 34 See: Collection of Information on the Northern Caucasus. Lists of Population Sites of the Stavropol Gubernia (according to the data for 1909), Stavropol, 1911, p. 112 (in Russian); V.A. Maamiagi, Estontsy v SSSR 1917-1940 gg., Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1990, p. 132.

160 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION in Stavropol (there were 7,760 parishioners in 1904/1906), Piatigorsk-Karras (5,659 parishioners in 1904/1906), Ekaterinodar-Novorossiysk (3,500 people in 1904/1906), and Vladikavkaz (6,800 parishioners in 1904/1906), belonging to the Moscow Consistorial District.35 Lutheran churches were built in the large German colonies in the Central Caucasus, as well as in the cities of Baku and Tiflis. On 24 April, 1854, the first stone of the St. John Church in Helenen- dorf was laid, while on 10 March, 1857, solemn consecration of the church took place.36 In 1909, the foundation of a church was laid in the colony of Annenfeld. The churches in Helenendorf and An- nenfeld were built in the Roman Gothic style and were distinguished by their simplicity and expres- siveness. In 1885, the Baku City Duma granted the Lutheran community a plot of land of 1,400 sq. sazhens on Telefonny Street for building a Lutheran parish. A Lutheran church was built on this plot, designed by architect A. Eichler and solemnly consecrated in 1899. A parish school functioned at the church.37 One of the most monumental buildings of the German population in Georgia was the Ger- man Lutheran St. Peter and Paul Church in Tbilisi built under the supervision of German architect Leopold Bilfeld in 1897. In the 1930s, churches began to be closed down, including the Lutheran ones. By the mid-1930s, all of the Lutheran churches, both in the cities and in the German settlements, had essentially been closed, and by 1937, the Lutheran churches, like most of the mosques, churches, and temples functioning in the Caucasus, ultimately ceased their activity. Greek churches were built in almost all of the Greek settlements. The Greek Orthodox community had its own churches in Tiflis as early as the last quarter of the 18th century. Two Greek churches were designated on the urban plan of Tiflis for 1782, which were also marked on the urban plans of 1828 and 1843. But the needs of the Greek community made it necessary to build a larger church, which was consecrated in 1858. By the beginning of the 20th century, there were 26 Greek church parishes in the Tiflis Gubernia, 3 in the Erivan Gubernia, 35 in the Kars Region, 11 in the Sukhumi District, and 5 in the Batumi District, which were under the jurisdiction of the Georgian exarchate.38 In the 1840s, the Polish community built a Catholic church in Stavropol at which a primary school and charity society functioned.39 In 1893, a Roman Catholic church was built and consecrated in Ekaterinodar, at which a church-parochial school was opened. A Roman Catholic church also functioned in Armavir, at which there was a Roman Catholic academy for Poles and a library.40 In 1909-1911, a Catholic church was built in Baku designed by Józef Plośko. The Rylski family of Pol- ish industrialists, as well as scientist-geologist Witold Zglenicki, took active part in financing the activity of the Polish House and building the Catholic church. The Catholic church, most of the parishioners of which were Poles, was destroyed during the time of so-called militant atheism in the 1930s. The dean of the parish, Roman Catholic priest Stefan Demurov was arrested during the years of repression, as were many other members of the clergy.41 Spiritual culture was an integral part of the life of the European communities in the Caucasus. By preserving their national diversity, traditions, and various elements of their spiritual culture, the

35 See: M.V. Kornilova, op. cit; O.A. Litsenberger, Evangelichesko-liuteranskaia tserkov v rossiiskoi istorii (XVI-XX vv.), Moscow, 2003, available at [http://svitlo.net /istoria/lut_z_ros/_ftn1#_ftn1]. 36 GIAAR, rec. gr. 508, inv. 1, f. 436, sheet 26. 37 GIAAR, rec. gr. 389, inv. 2, f. 149, sheets 1, 25. 38 See: P.D. Tsatsanidi, op. cit., p. 15; Iu.D. Anchabadze, N.G. Volkova, Stary Tbilisi. Goroda i gorozhane v XIX veke, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1990, p. 44. 39 See: I.V. Tsifanova, Polskie pereselentsy na Severnom Kavkaze v XIX veke: osobennosti protsessa adaptatsii, Author’s thesis for a Ph.D. in History, Stavropol, 2005, pp. 21-27. 40 See: “Poliaki na Kubani: istoria i sovremennost”; V.B. Vinogradov, op. cit., pp. 128-132. 41 See: A. Khodubski, “Polsko-azerbaidzhanskie sviazi i istoriko-memuarnaia literatura (do nachala XX v.),” in: Azerbaidzhansko-evropeiskie literaturnye vzaimosviazi, Elm, Baku, 1983, pp. 202-209; Ia. Chapla, “Katolicheskaia tserkov,” Azerbaidzhan i azerbaidzhantsy v mire, No. 1, 2007, pp. 72-75; Iu. Guretsky, “Katolicheskaia tserkov v Azerbaidzhane,” Kavkazskaia Polonia, No. 12, 2003, pp. 5-9.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 161 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION settlers were able to pass them on from generation to generation. Tolerance, religious tolerance in particular, in the Caucasus was highly conducive to preserving the spiritual culture, since it gave the migrant communities the freedom to confess their faith and the opportunity to build churches and temples in the cities and rural settlements and observe their religious and national customs and rituals. It was the spiritual culture that played a constructive role in forming the European ethnic communities in the region and in maintaining their solidarity. On the whole, during the entire period of their residence in the Caucasus, the European migrants retained their traditional national and ethnocultural features. These features were vividly expressed both in the material and spiritual culture of groups of the European population—the appearance of their settlements, style of housing, clothing and cuisine, language, family, religious and calendar rituals and customs. There was contact between the Europeans and local population, along with interdependence of cultures, which was expressed in mutual enrichment of experience, knowledge, and techniques in different spheres of vital activity, particularly in economic and domestic affairs. In particular, as mentioned above, the Germans mainly retained and did not lose the traditional national features they brought with them from the historical homeland—Germany—throughout their long residence in the Caucasus. Despite the fact that the German community in the Caucasus formed in stages throughout the 19th century, being replenished by several groups of German settlers who came from different parts of Germany with different dialects and religious confessions, it largely composed a unified sociocultural whole. The national uniqueness and ethnographic characteristics of the German community were more evident in the German colonies than among the urban German population. The material culture of the German colonists of the Caucasus was rich and diverse. Architectur- ally, the German colonies followed the German standards of settlement-building. Each German settlement had its own specific and precise planning. The colonies usually had a central square, around which public buildings were arranged: rural administration office, church, hospital, stores, and so on.42 Most German colonies used the Gothic style, which was particularly vividly expressed in the building of German churches. The colonists lived in Allemande-type houses, as they are called in ethnography, distinguished by their uniformity and with their fronts facing the street. There were both similarities and differences in the construction of housing in the German settlements of the Northern and Central Caucasus, which were expressed in the use of different building materials and interior design of the houses and estates depending on the natural and climatic conditions and the occupations the residents were engaged in. In particular, the houses of the colonists in the German colonies of Azerbaijan were small but complex structures combining both residential and household buildings: a living area, a small yard with household facilities, and a wine cellar, which was related to the main economic spe- cialization of the colonists—winegrowing and winemaking.43 The German colonists also used most of the skills they brought with them from their historical homeland in their economic and household affairs. When engaging in different types of economic activity—winegrowing and winemaking, farming, cattle breeding, dairy farming, and handicrafts— the colonists used both their own skills, which expressed the special characteristics of their national uniqueness, as well as gradually borrowing techniques and ways of carrying out different economic occupations from the local population. The German colonists borrowed some methods of working and irrigating the land from the Azeris, in particular, irrigation systems for pumping ground water known as kahrez, which had existed in Azerbaijan since antiquity, local types of grapes, local winegrowing techniques, means of transportation (local wagons [arba]), and so on. In turn, the Azeris also

42 See: Narody zarubezhnoi Evropy, in two parts, Part I, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p. 788. 43 See: E. Kerimov, “O nekotorykh istoriko-etnograficheskikh osobennostiakh nemetskikh kolonistov Azerbaidzhana,” in: Papers from the First Scientific Conference “Kavkazskie nemtsy—nemtsy na Kavkaze do pervoi mirovoi voiny” (Caucasian Germans—Germans in the Caucasus before World War I), Elm, Berlin, 2001, p. 287.

162 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION borrowed traditions used in winemaking from the colonists—European types of grapes, technical innovations, European trucks, and so on. The same mutual exchange of economic skills was seen among the German population of Geor- gia. Some economic innovations widespread in the German settlements of Georgia were also borrowed by the local population, for instance light German trucks, which replaced the arba in some cases, wine barrels, which were sometimes used instead of large vats, and European ploughs (the so-called colonist plough).44 The German population borrowed some farming accessories, local types of grapes—rkatseteli, takveri, etc.—and methods for cultivating them in keeping with the local climate from the local population. The spiritual culture of the German colonists of the Caucasus was interesting and diverse. The German colonists solicitously preserved the customs and traditions that expressed their national character and were passed on from generation to generations, including family, calendar, and religious customs and rituals. The main celebrations of the German community were Christmas and Easter, as well as harvesting. The colonists preserved their national folklore—songs, music, dances, games, and so on used in rituals and celebrations. The preservation and use of the native language was a particular manifestation of ethnic self- preservation and self-awareness of the German community in the Caucasus. The Plattdeutsch, Swa- bian, and other German dialects were the most widespread. In particular, the German colonists living in the Central Caucasus who came from South Germany—Württemberg were Swabian in origin and preserved their characteristic ethnographic features, which were vividly expressed in everyday, economic, and cultural life. Germany toponyms with their characteristic endings were used in the names of the German settlements—“feld,” German for “field” (Annenfeld) and “dorf,” German for “village” (Helenendorf).45 The German settlers spoke in the dialect their ancestors brought with them from the historical homeland and wrote in the traditional German Gothic print. The language of the German colonists living in a foreign language environment away from the national homeland retained many archaicisms and was sometimes replenished with borrowings from the languages of the indigenous peoples of the Caucasus and the Russian language. The Azerbaijani language was one of the subjects studied in the German schools that functioned in Azerbaijan. As distinct from the rural colonists, the German urban population used Russian more in their everyday communication. Since, in contrast to the German and Greek communities, most of the Polish population lived in the Caucasian cities and did not have national settlements, the ethnocultural features of the Polish community were correspondingly expressed by the conditions of urban life. The Polish community solicitously preserved elements of the national and spiritual culture, language, customs, and traditions passed on from generation to generation. On the whole, the lifestyle of the Poles adhered to and followed the European and Christian values and dogmas. By retaining its national identity, the Polish community, successful in its sociocultural adaptation, was able to integrate harmoniously into the socioeconomic and sociocultural life of the Caucasian cities. The Czechs living in the Caucasus for almost more than a century retained their cultural and ethnographic characteristics expressed in the domestic, material, and spiritual culture of the settlers. In particular, the Czech villages were reminiscent of the European settlements with their public institutions—church, rural Soviet office, and school—being arranged around a central square. The houses usually faced the street and were arranged inside a spacious estate that included a farmyard and vegetable garden. The Czech population of the Caucasus was known for its farming and cattle- breeding way of life. Beer-brewing was the most developed occupation in the Mamatsev khutor, while

44 See: A.D. Eritsov, “Ekonomichesky byt gosudarstvennykh krestian Borchalinskogo uezda Tiflisskoi gubernii,” in: Materialy dlia izucheniia ekonomicheskogo byta gosudarstvennykh krestian Zakavkazskogo kraia, in 7 volumes, Vol. 7, Tiflis, 1887, p. 388. 45 See: J. Hummel, Heimat-Büchlein der Deutchen in Traskaukasien, Nemgosizdat, Pokrowsk, 1928, S. 49.

Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 163 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION meat and dairy farming was popular in the Czech settlements of the Black Sea Gubernia. The absolute majority of the Caucasian Czechs were Catholics. Catholic churches and prayer houses were built in some of the Czech villages—Varvarovka, Pavlovka, and Teshebs.46 The Greek community in the Caucasus retained its national uniqueness, language, and culture. Two main groups can be distinguished in the Greek population of the Caucasus—Ellinophones (Ro- meos and Pontians who speak the Greek Pontic dialect) and Urums (who speak Turkish dialects). Most of the Greek community of the Northern Caucasus was made up of Greek Ellinophones—Pon- tic Greeks. Urums mainly settled in Georgia in the region of Trialeti (Tsalka). The Greeks in the Caucasus were frequently called Berdzens or Ions.47 The national specifics were retained in economic activity, lifestyle, family life, and material and spiritual culture. There were different types of economic occupations and settlements of the Greek population in different regions of the Caucasus, which were influenced by the geographic, economic, and ethnographic peculiarities. In particular, the development of mining and stonework among some of the Greek population had an influence not only on the specifics of their economic life, but also on the type of residential buildings of some of the Greek settlements in Georgia. The Greek settlements of the Northern Caucasus were distinguished by their street planning; wooden estate-like homes included living and household facilities, as well as an orchard and vegetable garden enclosed by a fence. Sociocultural adaptation and interdependence trends resulted in the Greek community borrowing some elements of the culture of the indigenous peoples of the Caucasus, which was largely expressed in their economic activity and material culture. The spiritual life of the Greek community of the Caucasus was diverse. Handicrafts, folklore, and calendar rituals were well-developed in the Greek settlements. Religion was one of the unifying bonds of the Greek population of the Caucasus. The absolute majority of the Greeks confessed Orthodoxy. The Greek Ellinophones and Urums, mostly being quite religious, performed weddings, baptisms, funerals, and wakes in keeping with the Orthodox customs.48 The Greek population, which retained its language and culture, was bi- or trilingual. In particular, the Greeks usually had command of one of the languages of the indigenous peoples of the Caucasus, for example, Azerbaijani, Georgian, and also Russian. The Estonian population of the Caucasus retained its national-cultural and ethnographic features, which were expressed particularly vibrantly in their lifestyle, everyday life, and economic management, as well as in the material and spiritual culture of the Estonian settlements. It is worth noting that before the beginning of collectivization, the Estonian migrants mainly lived in khutor, estate-type settlements with street planning; public buildings—church, school, and so on—were arranged around a central square. Multi-room houses with hipped roofs were popular in the Estonian settlements of the Caucasus. Usually each landlord had his own plot of land. Wealthy peasants grouped their living quarters around a yard in which different estate and household facilities were arranged and places were set aside for cattle with orchards and vegetable gardens close by. The houses also retained traditional elements of interior design—ovens, old chests, home-woven blankets and rugs, icons, and so on. Everyday clothing was usually worn, although the national costume was preserved and used for holidays and celebrations. In their new settlements, the Estonians continued to engage in the farming and cattle-breeding they were accustomed to in their historical homeland. However, the Estonian

46 See: I. Kuznetsov, “Chekhi Kavkaza,” Bulletin No. 1, Publication of the Center of Pontic Caucasian Research at the Chair of History, Sociology, and International Relations of Kuban State University, available at [http://history.kubsu.ru/pdf/ kn2-122.pdf]; “Narody zarubezhnoi Evropy,” pp. 192-205. 47 See: Encyclopedic Dictionary on the History of Kuban since Ancient Times to October 1917, Edvi, Krasnodar, 1997, p. 553 (in Russian); I.Ia. Marr, Plemennoi sostav naseleniia Kavkaza, Petrograd, 1920, p. 27. 48 See: N.G. Volkova, “U grekov Gruzii,” in: Polevye issledovaniia instituta etnografii, 1974, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1975, pp. 124-131; “Greki Kavkaza,” in: Narody Kavkaza, in two parts, Part 2, ANSSSR Publishers, Moscow, 1962, pp. 425-431; T.A. Chikovani, “Formy vzaimopomoshchi u tsalkskikh urumov,” in: Kavkazsky etnografichesky sbornik, Vol. IV, Metsniereba, Tbilisi, 1972, pp. 84-86.

164 Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION settlers borrowed some occupations, for example, growing legumes and certain techniques of live- stock breeding from the local population. The spiritual culture was of immense importance in the life of the Estonian community. Most Estonians were Lutherans and performed the religious and national rituals characteristic of this religion, particularly confirmation, weddings, and so on.49 On the whole, when talking about the cultural life of the European settlers, it should be noted that throughout their residence in the Caucasus, they retained their traditional national ethnocultural features. These features were vividly manifested both in the material and spiritual culture of the European population—in the appearance of the German colonies and of the Greek, Czech, and Estonian settlements, everyday life and style of housing, clothing, cuisine, language, family, and religious and calendar rituals and customs. The German colonies and Greek, Czech, and Estonian settlements in the Caucasus were built in the national rural style reminiscent of the rural settlements in their historical homeland, and in so doing combined living quarters, technical and economic-industrial buildings, and sociocultural facilities that expressed the main vital activities of the European settlers. The Europeans and local population socialized with each other and enjoyed cultural interdependence, which was expressed in mutual enrichment of experience, knowledge, and techniques in different spheres of vital activity, particularly in economic and domestic affairs. The gradually developing interrelations and interdependence in everyday, economic, and cultural life had a direct influence on the development of the European communities in the Caucasus. The economic and cultural development of the German population should also be viewed through the prism of tolerance that existed in the Caucasus, where the representatives of different peoples lived in the same social space for centuries.

Conclusion

So as a result of the migration policy pursued by Russian czarism in the 19th-beginning of the 20th centuries, the size of the immigrant population and different ethnic groups increased, while the area in which they settled extended far beyond the boundaries of the territory. The migration processes in the Caucasus throughout the 19th century promoted the appearance and gradual increase in the size of the European ethnic communities—Germans, Poles, Greeks, Czechs, Bulgarians, Molda- vians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Swedes, and so on. Representatives of the European ethnic communities had similarities and differences in the reasons for, time and circumstances of migration, places of settlement in cities and villages, economic pursuits, quantitative indices, and social status. Economic activity, sociocultural adaptation, social activity, education, and preservation of the ethnocultural aspects of their material and spiritual culture had a direct influence on the formation of the European ethnic communities that left their mark on the history of the region.

49 See: Narody evropeiskoi chasti SSSR, in two parts, Part 2, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1964, pp. 259-269; “Etnografiia Rossii,” available at [http://www.russiafederation.ru /ethnography/].