ISRAELI-AZERBAIJANI ALLIANCE AND IRAN By Mahir Khalifa-zadeh*

This article discusses cooperation between Israel and the Republic of Azerbaijan in order to neutralize foreign threats and ensure regional security. Expanding and improving ties with Azerbaijan has been part of Israel's newly adopted strategy toward non-Arab Muslim states. Also addressed is Iran's attitude towards Azerbaijan and the political and ideological opposition between the two mainly Shi'a-populated countries. Highlighted is the cooperation's strategic importance for improving security and defense capabilities for both Israel and Azerbaijan. Last, U.S. priorities in the South Caucasus are viewed in the context of the Israeli-Azerbaijani alliance.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Even earlier, in 1883, oil companies owned by the Rothschild family (of Jewish origin) Historic sources and research confirm that entered the scene in Baku, followed by Jews of both Persian (also known as Rockefeller’s gigantic Standard Oil Caucasian Mountain Jews) as well as Company.5 Thus, the Jews lived in peace Ashkenazi origin have lived in Azerbaijan and friendship with local Azeris and had for centuries.1 The presence of Persian Jews successful businesses in the country. in Azerbaijan can be traced back over 2,000 During the period of the Azerbaijan years, to even before the fifth century. Democratic Republic (ADR, 1918-1920)-- Historically, Azerbaijan has been very which formulated key ideological, political, welcoming toward the Jews. During the and security priorities for independent periods of both the Russian and Soviet Azerbaijan--the Jewish Popular University empires Azerbaijan had no antisemitic was established (1919) and Yiddish- and traditions. In the nineteenth century, under Hebrew-language periodicals were the Russian Empire, Jews of Ashkenazi published. Moreover, Dr. Yevsey Gindes, an descent began to settle in Azerbaijan. Others Ashkenazi Jew, served as Minister of Health arrived during World War II to escape the in ADR's cabinet under the first prime Nazis.2 . Many famous Jews were born and minister, Fatali Khan Khoyski. have studied in Azerbaijan, including Jews continued to arrive and settle in scientist of modern physics and Nobel Prize Azerbaijan during the Soviet period as well. Laureate Lev Landau. Born in Baku, The Jews in Soviet Azerbaijan were not Azerbaijan, in 1908, he enrolled in Baku exposed to the widespread discrimination State University in 1922.3 that was typical in other parts of the USSR. During the nineteenth century, Baku Thus, the Ashkenazi Jews formed a became a center for the Zionist movement in significant part of the intellectual and the Russian Empire. The first branch of technocratic elites in Soviet Azerbaijan.6 Hovevei Zion ("Lovers of Zion") was established in Baku in 1891, and in 1910, the first choir synagogue opened in the city.4

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POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN THE cooperation with Azerbaijan and Georgia. SOUTH CAUCASUS AND IRAN'S Iran welcomed the Russo-Georgian war of PRIORITIES IN THE REGION 2008, which it saw as a brilliant opportunity to reverse the region's strategic atmosphere The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 shifted from pro-Western to a much more pro- South Caucasus politics significantly and Russian atmosphere --hence a more pro- created a new political atmosphere in this Iranian one also. part of the world. As a result of the war, a The Islamic Republic of Iran considers completely new strategic situation has Russia to be a key ally in resisting the emerged in the region.7 Prior to the war, United States. Tehran prefers to be under since 1994, when Azerbaijan signed the Russia's strategic umbrella and cooperates "Contract of the Century" (agreement with a with Moscow on global and regional levels. consortium of international oil companies Tehran supports the strengthening of for the exploration and exploitation of three Russia's influence in the South Caucasus offshore oil fields in the country), the and Central Asia for strategic reasons.8 In strategic situation in the South Caucasus face of possible U.S. and/or Israeli military could be characterized as a period of large- options to stop the Iranian nuclear program, scale Western penetration. The United Iran hopes Russia’s dominance in the South States, the European Union, and Turkey, Caucasus and Central Asia would prevent began to play a significant role in South the United States or NATO from deploying Caucasian affairs, which had traditionally military bases in close proximity to the been orchestrated by Iran and Russia. Iranian border. Moreover, several strategic programs At the same time, Russia also needs were launched by the Clinton administration Iran’s cooperation in order to secure both (and continued under the Bush the South Caucasus and Central Asia under administration) and the EU. These included Moscow, or under shared Iranian control. Partnership for Peace, the Silk Road Tehran's strategic priorities in the South Strategy Act, Caspian Watch, the EU's Caucasus can thus be identified as follows: Eastern Partnership, and others. The goal of these programs was to strengthen the 1. To counter and reduce U.S. Western presence and minimize both Iranian influence; and Russian influence in this very sensitive 2. To oppose U.S., NATO, and EU part of the world. Unlike Armenia, initiatives and long-term objectives; Azerbaijan and Georgia slowly began to 3. To prevent the deployment of drift toward NATO membership. In U.S./NATO troops; addition, South Caucasian countries, 4. To block both Georgia and particularly Azerbaijan and Georgia, started Azerbaijan from moving toward to develop strong ties with the State of NATO/EU membership; Israel. 5. To minimize Israel's influence and In the meantime, Iran, as a key regional cooperation with South Caucasian player, reacted very concerned about the countries; West's “aggressive advance" into the 6. To align the security order with traditionally Iranian and Russian sphere of Iran’s strategic interests; influence. Iran's hostility toward the United 7. To control Caspian energy resources States and Israel pushed Tehran to stop or and transportation routes; limit Western penetration as well as Israel's

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8. To contain the rising influence of direct challenge or threat to its security and Turkey and the Turkey-Azerbaijani political future. This key point in Tehran's alliance; calculations towards Azerbaijan has deep 9. To prolong the Turkish-Armenian historical roots. hostility; 10. To oppose the Turkey-Georgia- Historical Factors Azerbaijan triangle of strategic cooperation; From ancient times, the Azeri Turks and 11. To ensure Russia's dominance and Azerbaijan were both heart and part of the the current status-quo; and Persian Empire. Azeri Turk dynasties like 12. To support Russia's leading role in the Ghaznavids, Safavids, Qajars, and others the Caspian-Caucasus region. played a key role in expanding and defending the Persian Empire, and the Last, it is beneficial for Iran to maintain Azerbaijani city of Tabriz served as capital the current status-quo and to support of the Empire for centuries. Several Iranian Russia's dominance in the region. In this shahs, in fact, are of Azeri Turk origin.9 case, Iran is able to ensure its paramount It was only in the nineteenth century with strategic goal: to limit or decrease U.S. the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay that influence and prevent American attempts to Imperial Russia gained control of part of the redesign the region’s political landscape in Persian Empire, the then semi-independent order to secure Washington’s dominance. northern Azerbaijani khanates. These territories became the nucleus for the IRAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE modern republics of Azerbaijan and REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN Armenia. The Persian Empire officially renounced its claim to the northern Notwithstanding, Iran and Azerbaijan are Azerbaijani khanates, leading to the division both Shi’i Muslim countries and have a of Azerbaijan into two: Northern Azerbaijan common historical and cultural heritage. or Russian (Soviet) Azerbaijan and Southern History as well as ideological and political Azerbaijan or Iranian Azerbaijan. Since the factors have shaped relations between the Soviet Union's collapse, this history has two countries and have influenced the created an illusion among Iranians that policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran Tehran's government has the right to take toward the Republic of Azerbaijan. Iran was Azerbaijan back under its control, to among the first countries to recognize intervene in Azerbaijani politics, and to Azerbaijan's return to independence in 1991, manipulate Azerbaijan's future in establishing diplomatic relations with Baku accordance with Iran's interests. Baku's in March 22, 1992. Since the Soviet assertion of independence and its clear disintegration, however, the unstable and unwillingness to be reincorporated into Iran complicated Iranian-Azerbaijani relationship has made for a rocky relationship with has demonstrated Tehran’s discomfort with Teheran. Azerbaijan’s existence as an independent and secular state. In addition, Tehran resents Political Factors Baku's strategic relations with Iran's key enemies--the United States and Israel. It is On May 28, 1918, following the collapse clear from the actions of the Iranian of the Russian Empire, Azerbaijan declared government that it considers Azerbaijan a its independence and identified itself as the

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Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR, important historical figure both in Iran and 1918-1920).10 Iran attempted to in Azerbaijan.11 reincorporate Azerbaijan, but the ADR While Iran follows the Shi’i ideology, government refused and established Azerbaijan has adopted a Kemalist ideology. relations with the Entente governments in Azerbaijani nationalism is based on the order to secure its independence. The ADR's ideological and political values as Azerbaijan Democratic Republic adapted a well as on Azeri Turk or Turkish identity. secular and political system based on the Thus, despite its common historical heritage principles of Western-style democracy and with Iran, the Republic of Azerbaijan had established a multi-party parliament. ADR close ties with Kemalist Turkey and shared was thus the first Western-style state in the the late Azerbaijani President Heydar Muslim world. It declared equal rights to all Aliyev's "one nation, two states" ideology citizens, including ethnic minorities, men, and strategy with the Turkish Republic.12 and women, and granted Azerbaijani women Even after the coming to power of an the right to vote. Islamist-oriented, post-Kemalist government Today's Republic of Azerbaijan is a in Turkey, this relationship continues and it successor of ADR and shares its political supports Azerbaijan's sense of identity. On and ideological values. It is a secular and the other hand, the Azerbaijani government pro-Western nation in the South Caucasus. considers nationalism and Kemalist ideology The country’s political development has as well as the "one nation, two states" very much differed from that of the Islamic strategy as powerful tools to contain Iran's Republic of Iran, though they both have attempts to strengthen Shi'i ideology in predominantly Shi’i populations. In the eyes Azerbaijan, which has created a major of the government and the mullahs in ideological gap and opposition between the Tehran, this is unacceptable. two countries. Last, Tehran's hostility toward Ideological Factors Azerbaijan is deeply rooted in the history. The fundamental and most influential factor Azerbaijan's secular and Western-style in Tehran's relations with Baku is that of statehood is based on an ideology that two "divided" Azerbaijans. Iran fears Iranian totally contradicts that of Iran. Tehran's Azeris may establish their own Azerbaijani mullah government considers Shi'ism a state--as occurred in the early twentieth unique ideology and a powerful force to century13--or will become part of the unite the nation. The Iranian government has Republic of Azerbaijan. The mullah regime thus strengthened Shi’i ideology and in Tehran is greatly concerned that suppressed the identities of the ethnic Azerbaijan's success as a secular state could minorities in the country, including Azeri inspire or ignite Iranian Azeris to bring Turks (Iranian Azeris). It has also attempted about the downfall of the current regime in to eliminate independent Azerbaijan’s Iran. These fears are exacerbated by the ideological and political impact. possibility of the West using Iranian Azeris Interestingly, Iran's Azeri Turk Safavid against Tehran. The Azerbaijani republic is dynasty officially converted Iran from Sunni thus a major factor in Iran's long-term to Shi'i at the beginning of the sixteenth strategy and the Azeri national liberation century. Shah Ismail Safavid, an Azeri Turk movement in Iran has become an element of and founder of the Safavid dynasty, is an global politics. In this context, Iran has thus

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) 59 Mahir Khalifa-zadeh adopted an aggressive stance toward the 4. To damage or discredit neighboring republic.14 Azerbaijan's independence, as well as its secular and democratic IRANIAN PRIORITIES VIS-À-VIS nature; AZERBAIJAN 5. To intensify intelligence activity and expand its espionage Tensions between Baku and Tehran are network; manifest in more than one area, though in 6. To limit and minimize particular in foreign policy and security Azerbaijan's influence on Iranian issues. To counteract the strong Russian and Azeris; Iranian opposition, Azerbaijan has 7. To support the separatism of local maintained strategic relations with the ethnic groups (Talish, Lesgi, and United States, the European Union, NATO, others); and Israel. Moreover, Baku continues to 8. To halt Israel's cooperation with espouse a pro-Western strategy, despite Azerbaijan and Georgia; direct calls from Tehran to end its 9. To minimize U.S. influence and cooperation with the "Great Satan" (United curtail Azerbaijan's bid for States) and "Small Satan" (Israel).15 EU/NATO membership; Tehran's official propaganda declares 10. To damage Azerbaijan's Israel as a main enemy of the Islamic world. international image and pro- Azerbaijani policy, however, differs. It does Western foreign policy; not view Israel as an enemy and considers it 11. To contain Azerbaijan’s rise to a friendly country, in which Muslims and regional power; Jews can live in peace and friendship. At the 12. To exert constant pressure on and same time, Azerbaijan has developed close intimidate Azerbaijan to use ties with Turkey, Iran's rival in the Islamic military force; world. Baku and Ankara cooperate and 13. To provide assistance to operate as a strong alliance on the global and Azerbaijan's regional rival-- regional levels, which has angered Iran. Armenia--to maintain the balance Thus, Azerbaijan's independence and its between the two countries, and to secular and democratic nature of power as keep Azerbaijan engaged in war well as its pro-Western government are with Armenia; strong exacerbating factors for Iran's 14. To support Russia's "cosmetic" policymakers. In light of this, Iran's key attempts to solve the Nagorno- priorities towards Azerbaijan can be Karabakh conflict; identified as follows: 15. To preserve Azerbaijan under Russia's dominance. 1. To spread the Iranian Islamic Revolution's ideas to Azerbaijan; Last, as tensions between Iran and both 2. To intensify Shi’i ideology the United States and Israel has grown, Iran propaganda and expand the has increased pressure and threats to use Islamic network; military force against Azerbaijan.16 In face 3. To destabilize the political of America's military option to stop the situation in Azerbaijan in an Iranian nuclear program, Iran has attempted attempt to establish a pro-Islamic to keep Azerbaijan outside of the anti- or Shi’i regime; Iranian alliance. There is also an ideological

60 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) Israeli-Azerbaijani Alliance and Iran dimension to Iran's desire to secure between Azerbaijan and Israel in the areas Azerbaijan's neutrality. As the second of security, diplomacy and the economy."19 largest Shi’i country in the world, if Peres’s visit took place despite strong Azerbaijan were to become a member of an opposition from Iran.20 President Aliyev's anti-Iran alliance, this would significantly decision earned him great respect in Israel. decrease the mullah's ideological defense "The clear position of Azerbaijani President that only the Shi'a can fight against enemies Ilham Aliyev on relations with Israel, in and stop "crusaders" and Jews. particular his refusal to submit to the demands of Iran to cancel the visit of Israeli AZERBAIJAN'S APPROACH President Shimon Peres to Baku and his TOWARD ISRAEL refusal to join any anti-Israel campaigns” have garnered “sincere respect in Israel."21 Since the Soviet Union’s disintegration, Cooperation with Israel is vital for Azerbaijan has been under direct pressure Azerbaijan for several strategic reasons. from Russia and Iran. Russia supports First, both Azerbaijan and Israel face Armenia politically, militarily, and regional security threats.22 Despite official economically, which helps Armenia to slogans of friendship and brotherhood occupy Nagorno-Karabakh--which is between two nations,23 Azerbaijan very internationally recognized as Azerbaijani much fears Iranian threatens to use force and land.17 Iran has also provided support to expand its intelligence network in Baku and Armenia and blames Azerbaijan for its close in other parts of the country.24 Moreover, links with the United States and Israel. Iran provides large-scale support to Since the time of its restored national Armenia, which seriously damages independence in 1991, Azerbaijan has Azerbaijani-Iranian relations and creates strived to become an important regional serious mistrust between the two player and to retake lands occupied by countries.25Azerbaijani political elites Armenia. In line with these goals and as a consider Israeli or Jewish support a key result of Russian and Iranian pressure, the element in countering the Armenian late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev diaspora, particularly in the United States oriented the country's strategic foreign and Europe. In 1997, during an official visit policy toward the West and Israel. In 1997, to the United States, President Heydar he met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Aliyev met with representatives of Netanyahu, who made a brief stop in Baku. American Jewish organizations in New The two discussed the Iranian threat as well York and openly asked them to help as Israeli-Azerbaijani intelligence Azerbaijan.26 Azerbaijan is grateful to Israel cooperation. The meeting was considered by for lending the pro-Israel lobby's weight in some to be the starting point for the alliance Washington to improve Azeri-American between the two countries.18 relations.27 As a continuation of Heydar Aliyev's Another strategic factor was the strategy, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev successful experience of the Turkish-Israeli welcomed Israeli President Shimon Peres in partnership for over a decade, which Baku on in June 2009. President Ilham inspired Azerbaijani decisionmakers to form Aliyev said, "I am happy to host you in my strategic ties with Israel. Despite current country. This is a most important visit for problems in the Turkish-Israeli relationship, Azerbaijan and we are interested in Ankara "understands that its regional expanding and strengthening the cooperation aspirations require correct relations with

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[the] Jewish state."28 Former Israeli military, economy, and intelligence, Ambassador to Turkey Zvi Elpeleg also Azerbaijan does not have a diplomatic noted, "I do not think that relations will mission in Israel for fear of jeopardizing its deteriorate because there are fundamental relations with Muslim countries. Moreover, reasons why Turkey and Israel have the both sides do not want to publicize their same interests."29 Azerbaijan has attempted relations. Azerbaijani President Ilham to play the mediator between the two Aliyev described his country’s relationship countries following tensions and with the Jewish state as being like an disagreements that emerged as a result of the iceberg: "nine-tenths of it is below the Mavi Marmara incident. Undoubtedly, this surface."34 type of mediation can expand Baku's role in Middle Eastern affairs and strengthen ISRAEL'S PRIORITIES VIS-À-VIS Azerbaijan's international standing. AZERBAIJAN Baku welcomes the triangular security and defense partnership between Turkey, According to Dr. Ariel Cohen of the Israel, and Azerbaijan. This model of Washington, D.C.-based Heritage cooperation has been successful concerning Foundation, "Israel's strategic priorities energy affairs.30 The strategic triangular include developing good diplomatic and partnership could be an effective tool in economic relations with Caucasus and strengthening and supporting U.S. Central Asia countries, preventing Iran from diplomacy, as well as counterbalancing the increasing its influence in the region, and Iran-Russia axis in the South Caucasus and participating in energy projects, including Central Asia. oil and gas imports to Israel."3535 In April Modernizing the Azerbaijani Army as 2012, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor part of this defense cooperation is clearly the Lieberman paid an official visit to Baku. He next and most important strategic dimension met with President Ilham Aliyev, with for Baku in its relations with Jerusalem. whom he discussed bilateral relations and From 1992 to 1994, Israel supported Iran. According to Israeli analysts, Azerbaijan in a war with Armenia, "Lieberman’s visit comes one month after supplying Stinger missiles and other the American magazine Foreign Policy weapons to Azerbaijani troops.31 Moreover, reported that Azerbaijan has given Israel the Jews of Azerbaijan fought together with access to Azerbaijani airbases, which is Azeris against the Armenians during this considered an important step towards a war. Albert Agarunov, an Azerbaijani Army possible attack on Iran."36 Both Azerbaijan officer and a Mountain Jew, became a and Israel rejected the allegations. In Baku, national hero in Azerbaijan following the Lieberman commented, "Such reports are war.32 More recently, in February 2012, as from the sphere of science fiction and do not part of this bilateral defense cooperation, correspond with the truth."37 Undoubtedly, Azerbaijan signed a deal to purchase $1.6 Lieberman's visit once again confirmed the billion worth of arms from Israel.33 strategic character of the Israeli-Azerbaijani Last, Azerbaijan views its relations with relationship. According to Israeli news Israel as part of a long-term strategy to media, "The foreign minister acknowledged develop close ties with the United States, in that Israel and Azerbaijan--which is order to contain Iranian and Russian threats. strategically located on Iran’s northern Though Israeli-Azerbaijani cooperation has border--have good, stable relations, and he expanded to include foreign policy, the described it as an ‘important country which

62 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) Israeli-Azerbaijani Alliance and Iran is now a member of the UN Security moderate Sunnite countries which… [fear Council.’”38 the] Iranian nuclear threat." In addition, Israeli policymakers consider Azerbaijan according to Israeli analyst Uzi Rabbi, and the Caspian littoral as part of the Greater "Israel must conduct active diplomacy in the Middle East.39 Israel, which for decades has regions surrounding Iran,” and “to resist had to deal with hostile neighboring Arab Iranian aggression several coalition alliances states, has attempted to improve its security should be formed."42 as well as its foreign image and international Thus, Azerbaijan, with its strategic relations. As part of this strategy, Israel has location along Iran's northern border, plays tried to develop relations with non-Arab an important part of Israel's foreign policy Muslim states. "Expanding its influence into agenda vis-à-vis the Commonwealth of an area of the world heavily Muslim but not Independent States (CIS). Israeli Arab has long been a strategic Israeli policymakers are aware of Azerbaijan’s objective."40 This strategy is designed not insecurity and mistrust towards Iran because only to improve relations with the Islamic of Tehran's aid to Armenia, which occupies world, but also to demonstrate that Israel can territory internationally recognized as part of have peaceful relations with Muslim states. Azerbaijan. It has attempted to prove that there is no In this regard, Israel has repeatedly Israel-Muslim or Jewish-Muslim declared that Jerusalem supported confrontation. The collapse of the USSR Azerbaijani territorial integrity. The former provided a brilliant opportunity for Israel to Israeli ambassador to Turkey and the ex- develop relations with the newly deputy foreign minister, Pinkhaz Avivi, said, independent former Soviet Muslim "Our position is the following: We republics. As of this writing, Israel has recognize the principle of Azerbaijan's successfully established diplomatic relations territorial integrity. We don't try to hide the with nine non-Arab Muslim states.41In this fact that our relations with Azerbaijan are light, Azerbaijan's experience of the more intense and rewarding than our peaceful cohabitation of Azeris and Jews relations with Armenia and that relations was attractive for the Israeli political elite. with Azerbaijan are strategically important This model served as a foundation upon for us." He also added in an interview, "We which to develop a long-term partnership. have common goals. We understand Israeli policymakers enthusiastically Azerbaijan's concern with its Iranian responded to Azerbaijani attempts to neighbor better than anyone, and that's a establish close bilateral ties. good ground for rapprochement. Our A key element in the Azerbaijan-Israel dialogue with Armenia, on other hand, has relationship has been their mutual concern always been interconnected with our over the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran relations with Turkey."43 presents the most serious threat to Israel. As Undoubtedly, Turkish cooperation is result, Jerusalem has launched a strategy of essential for Israel's foreign and security active diplomacy in the region surrounding policy. Israel considers the Turkish- Iran. At a May 2009 conference at the Azerbaijani alliance as a favorable factor for Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv deepening and enhancing security and University, the former head of the Israeli defense cooperation with Azerbaijan despite Military Intelligence Directorate Major the cooling of Israel's relations with Ankara. General Aharon Ze’evi Farkash said, "It is Israel, for its part, considers the expansion very important to form a coalition with the of political and defense cooperation with

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Azerbaijan an influential factor for groups and companies in Baku. In February improving its relations with Turkey. The 2012, the Azerbaijani Ministry of National Israeli military industry is now a major Security announced the arrest of a terrorist provider of advanced aviation, anti-tank group allegedly working for Iran's secret artillery, and anti-infantry weapon systems services. In January 2012, Azerbaijan's to Azerbaijan. Furthermore, Israeli secret service arrested two people accused of Aeronautics Defense Systems have helped plotting to kill two teachers at a Jewish Azerbaijan assemble unmanned aircrafts.44 school in Baku. In 2007, Azerbaijan arrested In February 2012, Israeli defense officials 15 people in connection with an alleged reportedly confirmed a deal to sell Iranian-linked spy network accused of unmanned military aircrafts as well as providing intelligence on Western and antiaircraft and missile defense systems to Israeli activities.48 Azerbaijan for approximate $1.6 billion.45 Azeri-Israeli security cooperation is vital Israel and Azerbaijan maintain intense and beneficial for both Baku and Jerusalem. cooperate on security issues as well. In The failure of the Azerbaijani-Israeli October 2001, President Heydar Aliyev met alliance to work together to counter Iran with Israel's ambassador, Eitan Naeh, and would be irresponsible and would have confirmed that "their positions in the fight unpredictable consequences for Baku and against international terrorism... were Jerusalem. Tehran's attempts to expand its identical." According to Israeli experts, Shi’i and Iranian ideology could have a groups like Hizb al-Tahrir pose a threat both catastrophic impact on Azerbaijan's to Jerusalem and to Baku. Israeli analysts potential to be an independent and strong also argue that some Wahhabi organizations American ally in the region. It is clear that may be operating in Azerbaijan.46 Security the fall of secular Azerbaijan would badly cooperation between the two countries has damage Israel's security and America's entailed intelligence exchanges, data strategic interests. Moreover, this would analysis (including satellite information), strengthen Iran and create a totally new briefings, and other activities. Israel also balance of power in the Greater Middle East, trains Azerbaijani security and intelligence particularly in the South Caucasus and services and provides security for the Azeri Caspian basin, as well as in Central Asia. president on foreign visits. Some sources Last, Azerbaijani energy is a critical also report that Israel has set up electronic factor in Israel's strategic calculations. In listening stations along the Caspian Sea and 2011, Azerbaijan exported as much as to 2.5 Iranian border.47 million tons (about 18.5 million barrels) of Israel's next priority is to counter the oil with total worth of $2.1 billon to Israel. Iranian intelligence network in Azerbaijan Last year trade turnover between Israel and and in other Muslim countries of the CIS. Azerbaijan reached $4 billion, making Iran has attempted to expand its political Azerbaijan Israel's top trade partner within influence to its immediate neighbors as well CIS countries.49 According to Ariel Cohen, as to intensify intelligence operations, Israel "... can benefit from projects designed particularly in Azerbaijan. According to to bring Caspian and Central Asian oil and Azerbaijani media reports, the national gas to Western markets as they allow Israel security services have arrested 22 people to diversify supply and receive abundant who were sent by Iran to carry out terrorist energy at affordable price."50 attacks against the U.S. and Israeli Israeli-Azerbaijani energy cooperation embassies, as well as against Western-linked has clearly become an extremely important

64 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) Israeli-Azerbaijani Alliance and Iran factor for Israel's energy security. This administration has not been active in cooperation allows for the diversification of managing Iranian and Russian influence in supplies of oil and gas and for exploration of this part of the world. As result of the Israel's energy resources. Baku provides Russo-Georgian war of 2008, the Tehran- Jerusalem with over one-third of Israel's oil Moscow axis effectively decreased supply.51 As a result of former Israeli America's influence in the Greater Caspian Foreign Minister Lieberman's April 2012 Basin. Now, the axis continues to limit or visit to Baku, SOCAR will start drilling in minimize U.S. political activity and Med Ashdod, Israel's oil field, located 16 increases pressure on Washington's allies. kilometers off the Mediterranean coast. The Indeed, Azerbaijan is under double Israeli Ambassador to Baku, Michael Lotem pressure from Iran and Russia and needs said, “The drilling will begin soon. The strong U.S. support to secure its national work is at a very advanced stage and independence, sovereignty, and territorial delivery of a drilling rig to the field is now integrity. Azerbaijan's pro-Western expected.52 The project is SOCAR’s first independence ensures a U.S. strategic oil-production or drilling operation outside presence in the Caspian basin and facilitates of Azerbaijan. The contract allows SOCAR its power projection deep into Asia. In this to gain international experience and expand context, Azerbaijan is of the utmost its operations in Turkey, Georgia, Israel, and geostrategic importance for the United other countries. States. The loss of a secular and independent Azerbaijan, as previously discussed, would IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED badly damage both U.S. and EU strategic STATES interests. The United States should thus support Israeli-Azerbaijani cooperation in It is well-known that the United States order to counter the regional threat and to has declared the Caspian basin as vital to its strengthen both countries' security as national interests. In this context, the Israeli- reliable U.S. allies. Azerbaijani partnership is an effective tool to strengthen and support America's CONCLUSION strategic presence in this very sensitive part of the world. Furthermore, the Israeli- Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Azerbaijani alliance to counter Iran has historically close and warm relations strategic importance for U.S. interests, between Jews and Azeris became a solid particularly in the Greater Middle East and base for mutual cooperation between the Central Asia. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan State of Israel and the Republic of and Georgia are America's allies in the Azerbaijan. Both countries are strategically South Caucasus and the Caspian basin. The located but in hostile environments. This has strengthening of Azerbaijan's secular and strengthened their rapprochement and led to pro-Western independence should be a expanded cooperation. strategic priority for U.S. diplomacy in the Despite strong opposition from Tehran region. and Moscow, Azerbaijan has established a However, the Obama administration's close partnership with Israel. Today, Baku lack of focus on South Caucasus affairs and Jerusalem are partners on a wide range jeopardizes America's strategic interests in of issues. The insecurity and regional threats the region. Unlike the Clinton administration have pushed both Azerbaijan and Israel to and the Bush administration, the Obama

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) 65 Mahir Khalifa-zadeh create a strategic alliance that enhances umbrella and to protect the strategic Western security and defense capabilities. oil infrastructure in the Caspian basin. However, the future of the Israeli- Richard Morningstar's 2012 nomination as Azerbaijani relationship depends on the U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan was a political nature of the ruling power in strategic move aimed to revive and push Azerbaijan. Iran continues its attempts to forward U.S. diplomacy in the South spread its Islamic Revolution ideology into Caucasus and Caspian basin. Azerbaijan through Shi'i propaganda, while With regard to any military option to stop expanding its intelligence network in Baku Iran's nuclear program, Azerbaijan continues and other major Azerbaijani cities. to attempt to remain neutral. On a May 29, The strengthening of pro-Islamist or Shi'i 2012, visit to Tehran, the Azerbaijani political forces would have a catastrophic minister of defense said, "The Republic of impact on Azerbaijan's political future as a Azerbaijan, like always in the past, will secular state and a strong Israeli and never permit any country to take advantage American ally. In this light, the of its land, or air, against the Islamic strengthening of ties in all areas is crucial in Republic of Iran, which we consider our order to combat Iranian influence. It is also brother and friend country." of fundamental importance that the Azeri- Indeed, Baku would like to avoid any Jewish/Israeli-Azerbaijani alliance is possible military clashes with Iran and cultivated as a long-term and mutually maintain its neutrality. However, advantageous relationship. Azerbaijan's actions and pragmatic foreign One idea for a joint project is the policy indicate that Baku's position is more establishment of a university named after pro-Western than pro-Iranian. Baku will Baku-born Nobel Prize laureate Lev Landau thus continue to cooperate with Israel in (Lev Landau University). The university, order to protect and advance Azerbaijani financed by Israel or by both sides, could national interests. offer Jewish studies as well as other disciplines. An Azeri Studies center could *Mahir Khalifa-zadeh, Ph.D. is a political also be opened at one of the major Israeli analyst based in Toronto, Canada. He is universities, such as at Tel Aviv University. affiliated with the Montreal-based Center Initiatives like these would contribute to for Research on Globalization and is a the development of the history and culture member of the Canadian Political Science of both nations and would thus strengthen Association. He is also Professor of ties and create a solid foundation for Political Science at the International Eco- maintaining relations in the long-term. Energy Academy (Baku, Azerbaijan) and a With its pro-Western foreign policy, regular contributor to international journals Azerbaijan is strategically important for on global politics and security. His latest U.S. and Israeli interests in the Greater article is “Iran and the South Caucasus: A Middle East and in the post-Soviet space. Struggle for Influence” (Sweden, 2011). Ensuring Azerbaijan's future as a secular, independent state should be a key priority NOTES for Israel and the United States. It is likely that the new U.S. administration will 1 Joanna Sloame, “The Virtual Jewish intensify efforts to support Azerbaijan's History Tour: Azerbaijan,” American-Israeli independence and territorial integrity in Cooperative Enterprise, The Jewish Virtual order to position it under NATO's security Library,

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http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ 9 Shapour Ghasemi, “Safavid Empire 1502 - vjw/Azerbaijan.html. 1736, History of Iran,” Iran Chamber 2 Aryeh Tepper, “The Azeri Exception,” Society, September 24, 2012, Jewish Ideas Daily, October 29, 2010, http://www.iranchamber.com/history/safavid http://www.jewishideasdaily.com/content/m s/safavids.php; Ben Madadi, “Origins of odule/2010/10/29/main-feature/1/the-azeri- Azeri Turks,” Iranian.com, January 27, exception. 2008, 3 Lev Davidovich Landau, MacTutor http://www.iranian.com/main/2008/origins- History of Mathematics, University of St azeri-turks-0. Andrews, Scotland, http://www- 10 U.S. Department of State, “Azerbaijan,” history.mcs.st- Background Note: Azerbaijan, andrews.ac.uk/Biographies/Landau_Lev.htm http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2909.htm. l; “The Nobel Prize in Physics 1962: Lev 11 “History of Azerbaijan,” Explore Landau,” Nobelprize.org, Azerbaijan, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/phy http://exploreazerbaijan.com/?page_id=57; sics/laureates/1962/landau.html. Ghasemi, “Safavid Empire.” 12 4 “History of Jews in Azerbaijan,” Saban Kardas, “Turkey and Azerbaijan: Wikipedia, One Nation-Two States?” Eurasia Daily http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_ Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 193, October 21, 2009, Jews_in_Azerbaijan. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/si 5 Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: ngle/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35630&c Power and Identity Under Russian Rule Hash=560416055f. (Hoover Institution Press, 1992), p. 22, 13 Nasib L. Nassibli, “Azerbaijan- Iran http://ebookee.org/The-Azerbaijani-Turks- Relations: Challenges and Prospects,” Event Power-and-Identity-Under-Russian- Report, Kennedy School of Government, Rule_776519.html#3wBsPMWYsEpAcHCu Harvard University, .99. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publicati 6 Alexander Murinson, Jews in Azerbaijan: on/12750/azerbaijan_iran_relations.html. a History Spanning Three Millennia, Vision 14 Nasib Nasibzade, “The Azeri Question in of Azerbaijan, Iran: A Crucial Issue for Iran’s Future,” http://www.visions.az/history,112/. Caspian Crossroads, Winter 1998, 7 Krzysztof Strachota and Wojciech http://www.azeri.dk/en/articles/The%20Azer Gorecki, “The Southern Caucasus and i%20Question%20in%20Iran.pdf; Central Asia After the Russian-Georgian “Rohrabacher Introduces Resolution War: the Geopolitical Consequences,” Supporting Right of Azeri Self Center for Eastern Studies (CES) Determination,” Congressman Dana Commentary, No. 10, September 24, 2008, Rohrbacher website, September 12, 2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/co http://rohrabacher.house.gov/uploadedfiles/b mmentary_10.pdf. ills-112hconres137ih.pdf. 8 Mahir Khalifa-Zadeh, “Iran and the South 15 Nick O'Malley, “'Great Satan' Backs Caucasus: A Struggle for Influence,” 'Small Satan': Obama Reaffirms Stance Journal of Central Asia and Caucasus, Vol. Against Iran,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 12, No. 1 (2011), http://www.ca- March 6, 2012, c.org/journal/2011-01-eng/05.shtml. http://www.smh.com.au/world/great-satan-

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backs-small-satan-obama-reaffirms-stance- News, November 17, 2010, against-iran-20120306-1uf46.html. http://en.president.az/articles/1103. 16 “Commander Urges Azerbaijan to 24 “Iran Threatens Pre-emptive Action amid Respect Islamic Rules,” Arabs Today (UK), Nuclear Tensions,” NBC News, February 21, August 10, 2011, 2012, http://www.arabstoday.net/en/index.php?opt http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46461790/ns ion=com_content&view=article&id=21867: /world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/iran- commander-urges-azerbaijan-to-respect- threatens-pre-emptive-action-amid-nuclear- islamic-rules-&catid=43:arab-world. tensions/. 17 “Russia Extends Lease on Military Base 25 “Iran Provides Every Support to Armenia, in Armenia Through 2044,” RIA Novosti, Azerbaijani MP,” News.Az, February 14, August 20, 2010, 2012, http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100820/160 http://www.news.az/articles/politics/54665. 276128.html. 26 Speech of Azerbaijani President Heydar 18 David Lev, “Iran Warns Azerbaijan: Keep Aliyev on the official reception in honor of Mossad Out,” Arutz Sheva, February 12, President Heydar Aliyev on behalf of the 2012, conference of presidents of major Jewish http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/N organizations--July 28, 1997,” Heydar ews.aspx/152671. Aliyev Heritage International Online 19 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Library, http://library.aliyev- “President Shimon Peres in Azerbaijan and heritage.org/en/7423863.html. Kazakhstan for Historic First Visit, Israel 27 Bourtman, "Israel and Azerbaijan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, June Furtive Embrace." 28, 2009, 28 Efraim Inbar, “Israeli-Turkish Tensions http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/C and Beyond,” Hurriyet Daily News, March ommuniques/2009/President_Peres_visits_A 12, 2010, zerbaijan_and_Kazakhstan_28_Jun_2009.ht http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.a m. spx?pageid=438&n=israeli-turkish-tensions- 20 “Iran Recalls Azerbaijan Envoy and-beyond-2010-03-12. Following Peres Visit,” JTA, June 29, 2009, 29 Serkan Demirtaş, “Amid Sound and Fury, http://www.jta.org/news/article/2009/06/29/ Turkey-Israel Alliance Endures,” Hurriyet 1006211/iran-recalls-azerbaijan-envoy- Daily News, April 13, 2012, following-peres-visit. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic 21 Ilya Bourtman, "Israel and Azerbaijan's /10705597.asp. Furtive Embrace," Middle East Quarterly, 30 Alexander Murinson, “Azerbaijan- Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer 2006), pp. 47-57, Turkey-Israel Relations: The Energy http://www.meforum.org/987/israel-and- Factor,” Middle East Review of azerbaijans-furtive-embrace. International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 12, No. 22 Arye Gut, “Azerbaijan, Israel Have 3 (September 2008), http://www.gloria- Become 'Strategic Allies',” News.Az, June center.org/2008/09/murinson-2008-09-04/. 28, 2011, 31 Soner Cagaptay and Alexander Murinson, http://news.az/articles/politics/39340. “Good Relations Between Azerbaijan and 23 “Ilham Aliyev and Iranian President Israel: A Model for Other Muslim States in Mahmoud Ahmedinejad Held an Expanded Eurasia?” The Washington Institute for Near Meeting,” President of Azerbaijan website, East Policy, March 30, 2005,

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arrested-in-azerbaijan-in-plot-on-us-israeli- embassies/. 49 “Lieberman: The Trade Turnover Between Azerbaijan and Israel Reaches $4 Billion,” Contact.az, April 23, 2012, http://www.contact.az/docs/2012/Politics/04 234650en.htm. 50 Cohen and DeCorla-Souza, “Eurasian Energy and Israel's Choices.” 51 Jen Alic, “Azerbaijan's International Energy Aspirations Raise Tensions in Middle East,” Oilprice.com, May 15, 2012, http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Middle- East/Azerbaijans-International-Energy- Aspirations-Raise-Tensions-in-Middle- East.html. 52 Shahin Abbasov, “Azerbaijan: SOCAR to Use Israeli Oil Field as Proving Ground,” Eurasianet.org, May 8, 2012, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65374.

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