DOCSLIB.ORG

Report on Railway Accident with Freight Car Set That Rolled Uncontrolledly from Alnabru to Sydhavna on 24 March 2010

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Report on Railway Accident with Freight Car Set That Rolled Uncontrolledly from Alnabru to Sydhavna on 24 March 2010 Issued March 2011 REPORT JB 2011/03 REPORT ON RAILWAY ACCIDENT WITH FREIGHT CAR SET THAT ROLLED UNCONTROLLEDLY FROM ALNABRU TO SYDHAVNA ON 24 MARCH 2010 Accident Investigation Board Norway • P.O. Box 213, N-2001 Lillestrøm, Norway • Phone: + 47 63 89 63 00 • Fax: + 47 63 89 63 01 www.aibn.no • [email protected] This report has been translated into English and published by the AIBN to facilitate access by international readers. As accurate as the translation might be, the original Norwegian text takes precedence as the report of reference. The Accident Investigation Board has compiled this report for the sole purpose of improving railway safety. The object of any investigation is to identify faults or discrepancies which may endanger railway safety, whether or not these are causal factors in the accident, and to make safety recommendations. It is not the Board’s task to apportion blame or liability. Use of this report for any other purpose than for railway safety should be avoided. Photos: AIBN and Ruter As Accident Investigation Board Norway Page 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS NOTIFICATION OF THE ACCIDENT ............................................................................................. 4 SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................... 4 1. INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACCIDENT ..................................................................... 6 1.1 Chain of events .................................................................................................................... 6 1.2 Scene of the accident ........................................................................................................... 9 1.3 Notification and rescue efforts ........................................................................................... 10 1.4 Injuries ............................................................................................................................... 11 1.5 Personnel involved ............................................................................................................. 11 1.6 Rolling stock involved ....................................................................................................... 12 1.7 Infrastructure and roads ..................................................................................................... 12 1.8 Traffic control .................................................................................................................... 14 1.9 Weather .............................................................................................................................. 15 2. INVESTIGATIONS CARRIED OUT ............................................................................... 15 2.1 The investigation – process, methods and limitations ....................................................... 15 2.2 Railway infrastructure – design, conditions and use ......................................................... 16 2.3 Condition and functionality of the technical systems ........................................................ 23 2.4 Traffic control and communication ................................................................................... 28 2.5 Recordings ......................................................................................................................... 29 2.6 Documentation of operational conditions .......................................................................... 32 2.7 Rescue operations .............................................................................................................. 35 2.8 The Norwegian National Rail Administration (NNRA) .................................................... 36 2.9 CargoNet AS ...................................................................................................................... 45 2.10 Oslo Havn KF .................................................................................................................... 49 2.11 Interaction between the organisations ................................................................................ 50 2.12 Structural changes and growth in freight traffic by rail ..................................................... 51 2.13 Risk picture for Alnabru .................................................................................................... 54 2.14 Supervision by regulatory bodies ....................................................................................... 64 2.15 Acts and regulations ........................................................................................................... 68 2.16 Relevant theory .................................................................................................................. 74 2.17 Other information ............................................................................................................... 77 3. ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................................ 78 3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 78 3.2 Event analysis .................................................................................................................... 78 3.3 Barrier analysis .................................................................................................................. 82 3.4 Impact analysis and analysis of survival aspects ............................................................... 85 3.5 Work practice and operational conditions ......................................................................... 86 3.6 Safety management ............................................................................................................ 97 3.7 Culture .............................................................................................................................. 106 3.8 Internal and inter-organisational collaboration ................................................................ 110 3.9 History and development ................................................................................................. 114 3.10 Supervisory authority ....................................................................................................... 116 Accident Investigation Board Norway Page 3 4. CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 117 4.1 Investigation results ......................................................................................................... 117 4.2 Main conclusion ............................................................................................................... 121 5. MEASURES TAKEN AFTER THE ACCIDENT .......................................................... 122 5.1 Measures taken by the NNRA after the accident ............................................................. 122 5.2 Measures taken by CargoNet AS after the accident ........................................................ 123 5.3 Measures taken by Oslo Havn KF after the accident ....................................................... 124 6. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................. 125 REFERENCES..................................................................................................................................... 1 LIST OF DEFINITIONS ..................................................................................................................... 3 ANNEXES ........................................................................................................................................... 6 Accident Investigation Board Norway Page 4 REPORT ON RAILWAY ACCIDENT Train number: Freight car set for trains 5806–5807 Train data: Weight 435.5 tonnes Length 458.4 metres Rolling stock involved: Special freight cars for containers, semi-trailers and swap bodies Registration: Norwegian Owner: CargoNet AS User: CargoNet AS Crew: None Passengers: None Accident site: Port of Oslo, Sydhavna Time of accident: Wednesday, 24 March, at approximately 13:13:15 NOTIFICATION OF THE ACCIDENT The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) was notified of the accident by the Norwegian National Rail Administration (NNRA) at 13.15 and by CargoNet AS some time afterwards. Three members of the AIBN travelled to Sydhavna. Later that day another three people were sent for, to assist with the preliminary investigation, which continued at Alnabru throughout that afternoon. Loenga and Alnabru yards were closed after the accident. All the relevant communications logs and signal logs were secured. The technical investigations were undertaken jointly by the police and the NNRA. An additional three people joined the AIBN's investigating group on the following day. The parties concerned were informed by letter of 29 March 2010 that the AIBN was launching a safety inquiry into the accident. SUMMARY On Wednesday, 24 March 2010, a freight car set consisting of empty container freight cars rolled uncontrolledly from Alnabru shunting yard, down to Loenga and into the sea at Sydhavna in the Port of Oslo. The AIBN has carried out a safety inquiry into the accident and is submitting a total of seven safety recommendations based on this. The accident was triggered by a misunderstanding between the local traffic controller
Load more

Recommended publications
  • ATOC Guidance Note – Risks & Opportunities from Rocs and TM
    Uncontrolled When Printed Document comes into force on 24/05/2016 Published by RSSB on behalf of Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) on 03/09/2016 ATOC/GN036 Issue 1.1 24 May 2016 ATOC Guidance Note – Risks & Opportunities from ROCs and TM Submitted by Steve Price Synopsis Operations Planning Advisor, ATOC This document provides guidance to train operators on identifying the risks Authorised by: and opportunities that arise from the introduction of Rail Operating Centres and Traffic Management. Roger Cobbe Chair, ATOC ERTMS Steering Group Gary Cooper Director of Operations, Engineering and Major Projects, ATOC Uncontrolled When Printed Document comes into force on 24/05/2016 Published by RSSB on behalf of Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) on 03/09/2016 ATOC Guidance Note - Risks & Opportunities ATOC/GN036 Issue 1.1 from ROCs and TM May 2016 Contents Section Description Page Part A Issue Record 3 Responsibilities 3 Explanatory Note 3 Document Status 3 Supply 3 Part B 1 Purpose 4 2 Scope 4 3 Definitions 4 4 Introduction 4 5 Industry Standards and Governance 8 6 Rail Operating Centres 11 7 Traffic Management 19 8 Reference Material 40 9 Abbreviations 41 Appendices A Three models of control co-location 42 B Upgrading stock & crew provision Case Study 1 45 C Upgrading stock & crew provision Case Study 2 47 D Checklist of Train Operator Responsibilities and Actions – Activities moving to a ROC 50 E Checklist of Train Operator Responsibilities and Activities – Introducing TM 52 Page 2 of 53 Uncontrolled When Printed Document comes into force on 24/05/2016 Published by RSSB on behalf of Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) on 03/09/2016 ATOC Guidance Note - Risks & Opportunities ATOC/GN036 Issue 1.1 from ROCs and TM May 2016 Part A Issue Record This document will be updated when necessary by distribution of a complete replacement.
    [Show full text]
  • ERTMS/ETCS Railway Signalling
    Appendix A ERTMS/ETCS Railway Signalling Salvatore Sabina, Fabio Poli and Nazelie Kassabian A.1 Interoperable Constituents The basic interoperability constituents in the Control-Command and Signalling Sub- systems are, respectively, defined in TableA.1 for the Control-Command and Sig- nalling On-board Subsystem [1] and TableA.2 for the Control-Command and Sig- nalling Trackside Subsystem [1]. The functions of basic interoperability constituents may be combined to form a group. This group is then defined by those functions and by its remaining exter- nal interfaces. If a group is formed in this way, it shall be considered as an inter- operability constituent. TableA.3 lists the groups of interoperability constituents of the Control-Command and Signalling On-board Subsystem [1]. TableA.4 lists the groups of interoperability constituents of the Control-Command and Signalling Trackside Subsystem [1]. S. Sabina (B) Ansaldo STS S.p.A, Via Paolo Mantovani 3-5, 16151 Genova, Italy e-mail: [email protected] F. Poli Ansaldo STS S.p.A, Via Ferrante Imparato 184, 80147 Napoli, Italy e-mail: [email protected] N. Kassabian Ansaldo STS S.p.A, Via Volvera 50, 10045 Piossasco Torino, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 233 L. Lo Presti and S. Sabina (eds.), GNSS for Rail Transportation,PoliTO Springer Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79084-8 234 Appendix A: ERTMS/ETCS Railway Signalling Table A.1 Basic interoperability constituents in the Control-Command
    [Show full text]
  • CONTRACT T-8000-1415 AUTOMATIC TRAIN CONTROL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Contents
    ATTACHMENT C PART 2 – ATC SYSTEM MARYLAND TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION CONTRACT T-8000-1415 AUTOMATIC TRAIN CONTROL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Contents 1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 2 COMMUNICATIONS BASED TRAIN CONTROL REQUIREMENTS 3 MAIN LINE AND STORAGE YARD SOLID STATE INTERLOCKING REQUIREMENTS 4 AUTOMATIC TRAIN SUPERVISION REQUIREMENTS 5 DATA COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 6 AUXILIARY WAYSIDE EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS 7 ENVIRONMENTAL AND EMC 8 SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 9 RELIABILITY, AVAILABILITY, AND MAINTAINABILITY REQUIREMENTS 10 INSTALLATION CUTOVER AND CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS 11 ATC TESTING 12 QUALITY ASSURANCE AND CONTROL 13 TECHNICAL SUPPORT 14 TRAINING Attachment C, Part 2, ATC System T-8000-1415 i September 2015 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Attachment C, Part 2, ATC System T-8000-1415 ii September 2015 SECTION 1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS Contents 1.1 GENERAL..................................................................................................................................1-1 1.2 PROJECT OBJECTIVES ...............................................................................................................1-2 1.2.1 PROVEN DESIGN......................................................................................................1-3 1.2.2 COMMISSIONING ON A REVENUE SYSTEM...............................................................1-3 1.2.3 DESIGN LIFE.............................................................................................................1-3 1.3 SCOPE OF WORK......................................................................................................................1-3
    [Show full text]
  • CBTC Test Simulation Bench
    Computers in Railways XII 485 CBTC test simulation bench J. M. Mera, I. Gómez-Rey & E. Rodrigo CITEF (Railway Technology Research Centre), Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros Industriales, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Spain Abstract Due to its safety characteristics, signalling equipment requires a great amount of testing and validation during the different stages of its life cycle, and particularly during the installation and commissioning of a new line or upgrade of an existing line, the latter being even more complicated due to the short engineering periods available overnight. This project aims to develop a tool to reduce the above-mentioned efforts by simulating the CBTC trackside, fulfilling the interfaces between subsystems and elements of these subsystems, and using some real elements. In this way, a testing environment for signalling equipment and data has been developed for the CBTC system. The aims of the project that were set out at the beginning of the development and completed with the present simulator are as follows: Real CBTC equipment trials and integration: CBTC on-board equipment, CBTC Radio Centre, etc. Other signalling elements trials and integration: interlockings and SCCs. CBTC track data validation. In order to achieve these objectives, various simulation applications have been developed, of which the most important are the following: Infrastructure, Automatic trains, Train systems, Planning and Control Desk, etc. This system has been developed, and is currently adding new modules and functionalities, for companies of the Invensys Group: Westinghouse Rail WIT Transactions on The Built Environment, Vol 114, © 2010 WIT Press www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3509 (on-line) doi:10.2495/CR100451 486 Computers in Railways XII Systems in the UK and Dimetronic Signals in Spain, which are using it for the new CBTC lines under their responsibility.
    [Show full text]
  • Road Level Crossing Protection Equipment
    Engineering Procedure Signalling CRN SM 013 ROAD LEVEL CROSSING PROTECTION EQUIPMENT Version 2.0 Issued December 2013 Owner: Principal Signal Engineer Approved by: Stewart Rendell Authorised by: Glenn Dewberry Disclaimer. This document was prepared for use on the CRN Network only. John Holland Rail Pty Ltd makes no warranties, express or implied, that compliance with the contents of this document shall be sufficient to ensure safe systems or work or operation. It is the document user’s sole responsibility to ensure that the copy of the document it is viewing is the current version of the document as in use by JHR. JHR accepts no liability whatsoever in relation to the use of this document by any party, and JHR excludes any liability which arises in any manner by the use of this document. Copyright. The information in this document is protected by Copyright and no part of this document may be reproduced, altered, stored or transmitted by any person without the prior consent of JHR. © JHR UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Page 1 of 66 Issued December 2013 Version 2.0 CRN Engineering Procedure - Signalling CRN SM 013 Road Level Crossing Protection Equipment Document control Revision Date of Approval Summary of change 1.0 June 1999 RIC Standard SC 07 60 01 00 EQ Version 1.0 June 1999. 1.0 July 2011 Conversion to CRN Signalling Standard CRN SM 013. 2.0 December 2013 Inclusion of Safetran S40 and S60 Mechanisms, reformatting of figures and tables, and updating text Summary of changes from previous version Section Summary of change All Include automated
    [Show full text]
  • B5 B6 B7 B7 C2 D2 B9 E3 B1 B11 B9 D10
    Søndre Sognsvann Svartkulp Putten Mysme r b e Maridalsveien k Maridalsvannet Nordre k Småvann e Delemyr n KRINGLEFJELL Skytebane Søndre Linderudkollen VETTAKOLLTOPPEN Småvann idr.anl. Lange- A 595000 B 596000 C 597000 D 598000 E 599000 F 600000 G 601000vann H Langsetløkka Kapteinsputten Kjerringmyra en evei Langmyr kk Sandåsmyra re a Kapteinsmyra B lv e Sk å d a le n s 1 Radioveien A k er 1 Norsk LACHMANNSFJELL C2 Telemuseum Kjelsåshallen Norsk Brekkedammen M Teknisk Rønningen n y Lytterveien Kjelsåsveien Museum re folkehøgskole e Kjelsås STORHAUG k r n k Folkets v e sk. e Norges SOGNSVANN s e 6649000 L k 6649000 i n hus e a b n idrettshøgskole k ø n c s e e i l r KJELSÅS h Langmyrgrenda b e nad m a r o a G i v e B10 n i t d ldve i i e d jo t k S a l B n vre r Olav M. e Ø i v v å n a e r e t s n k t k d o Korsvoll terrasse l G Troviks vei v e Sømveien s o S V e Kjelsåsmyra H F i Pe Stilla v Kringsjå ei Skjoldveien e R v n rs i i idr.park r Anke e s de i Solligrenda e WalstadsDaniel vei i Båntjern P Langmyrveien Korsvoll b e Mindedammen e v e v sk. t Al m e d al e n grenda k n n Kringsjå- Midtoddveien s n KRINGSJÅ o l k e e i i e t i e m Oslo k e Minister e e n Å Hansemyrveien v j Nordberg v Trollvannsstua Montessoriskole K Myrerveien g Nordstjernevn.
    [Show full text]
  • The Norwegian Railway Museum
    2009 On track for More! Photo: RuneFossum,Jernbanefoto.no Parliament Jernbaneverket in Norwegian Government society Ministry of Ministry of Fisheries and Transport and Coastal Affairs Communications Norwegian Railway Inspectorate Norwegian Coastal Public Road Avinor AS Administration Administration (airports) The national transport agencies jointly Train companies formulate proposals for the National Transport Plan (NTP) Passengers Freight shippers Ownership In 1996, the former Norwegian State Railways (NSB) was split into a train company, NSB BA, and an infrastructure manager, the Norwegian National Rail Administration (Jernbaneverket). Jernbaneverket owns: • Railway lines • Platforms and waiting areas • Stations built since 1996 • Electrification equipment • Signals and interlockings • Traffic control systems • Telecommunications systems Our core processes • Planning, designing and constructing rail infrastucture • Operating and maintaining rail infrastructure • Allocation track capacity • Operational traffic management Our tasks • To provide Norway’s train companies with a safe and efficient transport system • To plan, improve and maintain the rail network, including stations and freight terminals • To manage rail traffic • To plan and produce timetables • To allocate track capacity between different train companies Our core areas • Safety, Punctuality and Customer Satisfaction • Productivity and Quality • Competence and Culture Our organizational structure National Transport Plan (NTP) 2010-2019 The Government’s White Paper for the
    [Show full text]
  • Archives) INFORMED SOURCES E-Preview December 2018
    Informed Sources e-preview by Roger Ford (view all archives) INFORMED SOURCES e-Preview December 2018 INFORMED SOURCES e-Preview December 2018 Some old favourites return this month including an update on the spread of zombie franchises and a farewell to the Traffic Management System (TMS) procurement which has kept us diverted for the last nine years. Steventon Bridge highlights APCO challenge Explosion of the Zombie franchises. TMS boondoggle ends with a whimper Informed Updates However, we start with the practical implications of the Department for Transport’s cunning plan to cut costs by not providing clearances for electrification at bridges and tunnels. Instead, you buy bi-mode trains, which can drop the pantograph and run through tunnels and other height restrictions under diesel power. This would be achieved, quite painlessly, with the use of Automatic Power Change Over (APCO). Back in November 2017 I revealed that the first opportunity to test this concept would be on the Great Western Main Line at Steventon High Street Bridge west of Didcot. The problem is not the clearance under the bridge itself, where Special Reduced Clearance has been used. However, approaching the bridge from the West, the adjacent Stocks Lane level crossing requires the contact wire to be at maximum height, before reducing to the minimum height for the bridge in about a quarter of a mile. As the contact wire height falls, the wire is pushing the pantograph head down and for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction, which is not good for either the catenary or the pan’.
    [Show full text]
  • STATENS EIERBERETNING 2016 Contents Innhold STATENS EIERBERETNING 2016 1 Innhold 2 Statsrådens Forord 3
    STATENS EIERBERETNING 2016 Contents Innhold STATENS EIERBERETNING 2016 1 Innhold 2 Statsrådens forord 3 Norfund 94 Norges sjømatråd AS 95 Omfang Norsk Helsenett SF 96 Statsrådens forord 3 Kategori 3 – Forretningsmessige mål Norsk rikskringkasting AS 97 Omfang og hovedtall 5 og andre spesifikt definerte mål Norsk Tipping AS 98 Sentrale saker for staten som eier 9 Argentum Fondsinvesteringer AS 64 NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS 99 og hovedtall 5 Avkastning og finansielle verdier 13 Eksportfinans ASA 65 Nye Veier AS 100 3 Nøkkeltall økonomisk utvikling 19 Electronic Chart Centre AS 66 Petoro AS 101 Hovedtall 2016 Eierstyring 25 GIEK Kredittforsikring AS 67 Rogaland Teater AS 102 Kontinuerlig forbedring Investinor AS 68 Simula Research Laboratory AS 103 er kilden til evig ungdom 36 Kommunalbanken AS 69 Siva – Selskapet for Industrivekst SF 104 7 NSB AS 70 Space Norway AS 105 Posten Norge AS 71 Statnett SF 106 Statkraft SF 72 Statskog SF 107 Staur gård AS 108 Sentrale saker Kategori 1 – Forretningsmessige mål Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani AS 109 Ambita AS 42 Talent Norge AS 110 Baneservice AS 43 Trøndelag Teater AS 111 Entra ASA 44 Kategori 4 UNINETT AS 112 for staten som eier 9 Flytoget AS 45 – Sektorpolitiske mål Universitetssenteret på Svalbard AS 113 Mesta AS 46 Andøya Space Center AS 76 AS Vinmonopolet 114 SAS AB 47 Avinor AS 77 Veterinærmedisinsk Oppdragssenter AS 48 Bane NOR SF 78 Avkastning og Bjørnøen AS 79 Carte Blanche AS 80 AS Den Nationale Scene 81 Regionale helseforetak Den Norske Opera & Ballett AS 82 Helse Midt-Norge
    [Show full text]
  • General Technology Strategy
    General technology strategy 1 Contents Foreword 3 Introduction 4 Strategy process 5 The National Rail Administration business strategy 6 Requirements and performance targets 7 Technological trends and development features 9 Framework conditions for choosing technology 14 General technology strategy 20 Firm links with the National Rail Administration’s focus areas 22 Contact us 23 2 Foreword Anita Skauge Executive Director, Strategic Planning Jernbaneverket, the Norwegian National Rail Administration, is currently facing major technological challenges in conjunction with choosing the technical systems and facilities of tomorrow. This applies both when carrying out renewals and in the construction of new infrastructure. The challenges imply a need for a general technology strategy that clarifies goals and guides for technological choices. In this context, the central approaches to problems may include: • The choice of the technological platforms of the future and performance requirements for central facilities and systems • Management of the ageing stock of facilities, in terms of maintenance, prioritisation and pace of renewal • International standardisation and requirements for interoperability • Accelerating development and use of ICT-based railway engineering facilities and systems The strategy has been drawn up primarily for internal use, and shall be used mainly as a basis for investigations and principal plans where alternative technological choices and solutions are to be evaluated, and in the procurement of technical systems and facilities. We assume that the strategy can also be useful in other contexts, such as in conjunction with technical discussions with railway undertakings, suppliers and railway administrations. Anita Skauge Executive Director, Strategic Planning Introduction Technology strategy is a broad term, for signalling systems, energy supply and and initially it was necessary to limit and KVIKT (Kjørevei [Eng: track], Informasjon prioritise in order to make the scope [Eng: information], Kommunikasjon manageable.
    [Show full text]
  • Upcoming Projects Infrastructure Construction Division About Bane NOR Bane NOR Is a State-Owned Company Respon- Sible for the National Railway Infrastructure
    1 Upcoming projects Infrastructure Construction Division About Bane NOR Bane NOR is a state-owned company respon- sible for the national railway infrastructure. Our mission is to ensure accessible railway infra- structure and efficient and user-friendly ser- vices, including the development of hubs and goods terminals. The company’s main responsible are: • Planning, development, administration, operation and maintenance of the national railway network • Traffic management • Administration and development of railway property Bane NOR has approximately 4,500 employees and the head office is based in Oslo, Norway. All plans and figures in this folder are preliminary and may be subject for change. 3 Never has more money been invested in Norwegian railway infrastructure. The InterCity rollout as described in this folder consists of several projects. These investments create great value for all travelers. In the coming years, departures will be more frequent, with reduced travel time within the InterCity operating area. We are living in an exciting and changing infrastructure environment, with a high activity level. Over the next three years Bane NOR plans to introduce contracts relating to a large number of mega projects to the market. Investment will continue until the InterCity rollout is completed as planned in 2034. Additionally, Bane NOR plans together with The Norwegian Public Roads Administration, to build a safer and faster rail and road system between Arna and Stanghelle on the Bergen Line (western part of Norway). We rely on close
    [Show full text]
  • List of Numeric Codes for Railway Companies (RICS Code) Contact : [email protected] Reference : Code Short
    List of numeric codes for railway companies (RICS Code) contact : [email protected] reference : http://www.uic.org/rics code short name full name country request date allocation date modified date of begin validity of end validity recent Freight Passenger Infra- structure Holding Integrated Other url 0006 StL Holland Stena Line Holland BV NL 01/07/2004 01/07/2004 x http://www.stenaline.nl/ferry/ 0010 VR VR-Yhtymä Oy FI 30/06/1999 30/06/1999 x http://www.vr.fi/ 0012 TRFSA Transfesa ES 30/06/1999 30/06/1999 04/10/2016 x http://www.transfesa.com/ 0013 OSJD OSJD PL 12/07/2000 12/07/2000 x http://osjd.org/ 0014 CWL Compagnie des Wagons-Lits FR 30/06/1999 30/06/1999 x http://www.cwl-services.com/ 0015 RMF Rail Manche Finance GB 30/06/1999 30/06/1999 x http://www.rmf.co.uk/ 0016 RD RAILDATA CH 30/06/1999 30/06/1999 x http://www.raildata.coop/ 0017 ENS European Night Services Ltd GB 30/06/1999 30/06/1999 x 0018 THI Factory THI Factory SA BE 06/05/2005 06/05/2005 01/12/2014 x http://www.thalys.com/ 0019 Eurostar I Eurostar International Limited GB 30/06/1999 30/06/1999 x http://www.eurostar.com/ 0020 OAO RZD Joint Stock Company 'Russian Railways' RU 30/06/1999 30/06/1999 x http://rzd.ru/ 0021 BC Belarusian Railways BY 11/09/2003 24/11/2004 x http://www.rw.by/ 0022 UZ Ukrainski Zaliznytsi UA 15/01/2004 15/01/2004 x http://uz.gov.ua/ 0023 CFM Calea Ferată din Moldova MD 30/06/1999 30/06/1999 x http://railway.md/ 0024 LG AB 'Lietuvos geležinkeliai' LT 28/09/2004 24/11/2004 x http://www.litrail.lt/ 0025 LDZ Latvijas dzelzceļš LV 19/10/2004 24/11/2004 x http://www.ldz.lv/ 0026 EVR Aktsiaselts Eesti Raudtee EE 30/06/1999 30/06/1999 x http://www.evr.ee/ 0027 KTZ Kazakhstan Temir Zholy KZ 17/05/2004 17/05/2004 x http://www.railway.ge/ 0028 GR Sakartvelos Rkinigza GE 30/06/1999 30/06/1999 x http://railway.ge/ 0029 UTI Uzbekistan Temir Yullari UZ 17/05/2004 17/05/2004 x http://www.uzrailway.uz/ 0030 ZC Railways of D.P.R.K.
    [Show full text]