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Trainguard MT Optimal Performance with the World’S Leading Automatic Train Control System for Mass Transit Trainguard MT

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Trainguard MT Optimal Performance with the World’S Leading Automatic Train Control System for Mass Transit Trainguard MT siemens.com/mobility/mobility Trainguard MT Optimal performance with the world’s leading automatic train control system for mass transit Trainguard MT Intelligent and future-oriented mass transit solutions for smiling cities Cities are becoming increasingly larger The overall performance of mass transit As a modern modular ATC system, and more complex. This also imposes systems depends largely on the perform- Trainguard MT offers all these features, increased requirements on mass transit ance of the automatic train control (ATC) providing the basis for attractive, safe systems. Their operators have to cope system employed. With increasing auto- and efficient mass transit systems which with rapidly growing traffic flows and mation, the responsibility for operations satisfy the needs of both passengers and passengers' rising expectations. Their management gradually shifts from drivers railway operators throughout the world. success is measured against factors and operators to the system. such as safety, punctuality, conve- nience and energy efficiency. An ATC system comprises functions for the monitoring, execution and control Benefits Siemens' intelligent and future- of the entire operational process. It can oriented mass transit solutions feature different levels of automation • Short headways by implementing support operators in successfully such as driver-controlled train operation, real moving-block operation meeting these challenges. semi-automated train operation, driver- • Cost-effectiveness less and unattended train operation. • Scalability We regard our customers as partners • Upgradability up to driverless systems who we support through our work in The ATC system continuously indicates • Maximum reliability, availability and sustainably developing their urban the current movement authority on safety environment and making their public the cab display and super vises the per- • Economical maintenance mass transit both efficient and effec- missible train speed. Color light signals • Support of mixed-traffic environments tive. You thus boost your passengers' are therefore no longer required. • Flexible refurbishment and migration quality of life and the attractiveness solutions of your city as a business location. The modular and future-proven • Support of holistic rail automation Trainguard MT automatic train control solutions system is Siemens’ answer to the • Energy-efficient driving comprehensive requirements of urban (saving of traction power) rail transport today and offers the latest standard in automation at different levels. 2 The advantages of Trainguard MT Key factors for efficient transportation in mass transit Performance Scalability Upgradability Mixed traffic/mode Life-cycle costs Higher performance Easy upgradability simultaneously. This also increases system Trainguard MT is a high-performance When the demand for higher transport availability during the upgrade or migra- CBTC (communications-based train capacity arises, existing Trainguard MT tion phases of an existing train fleet or control) system which enables operators installations can easily be upgraded to signaling system. Trainguard MT can be to maximize their network capacity and reduce headways and to increase the used in addition to existing train control throughput. Headways of 90 seconds or level of automation. The level of auto- systems and offers flexible modernization less are achieved by using the real moving- mation goes from interlocking operation strategies to the customers. block principle for train separation in to semi-automated train operation (STO) combination with continuous, bi-direc- or unattended train operation (UTO) Reduced life-cycle costs tional communication free-propagation step-by-step, in accordance with the Trainguard MT optimizes life-cycle costs radio. This means the number of trains required functionality and performance. by reducing the number of outdoor in operation is increased and more pas- Upgrades can be implemented without elements to a minimum and operating sengers are transported at the same time, interrupting operations and it is not the trains with an energy-efficient driving resulting in a more punctual service and necessary to uninstall any of the already algorithm. Trainguard MT uses fully elec- higher passenger satisfaction. installed system components. By using tronic computer boards that are mainte- these key concepts, Trainguard MT allows nance-free. Trackside transponders Better scalability stepwise commissioning. (Eurobalise) do not need external power Trainguard MT can operate at different supply or battery power and are mainte- train control levels. In suburban and Mixed traffic / mixed mode nance-free. commuter areas, where the required Trainguard MT can handle trains with headways and train intervals are medium, different train control equipment at Long-term quality intermittent train control is used. In the same time in the same network. Siemens produces the safety-related metropolitan areas, where minimal This allows for mixed fleets to be used hardware for Trainguard MT using state- headways and short train intervals on the same line, i.e. both Trainguard MT- of-the-art SMD components at its own are essential, continuous train control and ETCS-equipped trains can be operated plant and uses specially selected sub- provides the required performance. together. Trainguard MT is therefore the supplier, where necessary. In this way, By offering different train control levels, optimum choice for mixed-traffic environ- we continuously ensure a constantly high Trainguard MT is a highly scalable solu- ments. The range that each train can level of quality. What is more, so that the tion in terms of performance and costs. travel is expanded, whether normal trains, system can function perfectly even many Thanks to its modular system design, express trains, suburban trains, mainline years later, we ensure that high-quality Trainguard MT can be configured to trains or freight trains. Furthermore, it is spare parts will be always available exactly match customer requirements. possible to operate both semi-automatic throughout the entire life cycle by means trains with driver and fully automatic of alternative supply sources, re-design trains without driver on the same route and long-term storage. 3 Matching operator requirements for upgradable train control and automation levels Trainguard MT is a versatile and modular system which can be individually tailored to the railway operator’s needs. Different train control and automation levels can be implemented, depending on the requirements for performance and functionality. Intermittent train control Continuous train control The following train control levels can Continuous train control (CTC) Depending on the chosen train control be used jointly or separately. Trainguard MT with continuous train method, the following levels of automa- control features a bi-directional radio tion can be implemented: Intermittent train control (ITC) transmission channel (CBTC) as well Intermittent track-to-train communi- as real moving-block functionality in • Semi-automated train operation cation allows fixed-block operation combination with comprehensive ATO (STO) with continuous supervision and already capabilities. Train separation according The train is driven automatically from offers automatic train operation (ATO) to the moving-block principle results in station to station and the driver merely functionality. The intermittent train minimum headways, thereby enhancing initiates train departure. control level can be used for parts of system performance significantly. Color the line with lower headway require- light signals can be reduced to a mini- • Driverless train operation (DTO) ments or as a temporary system during mum or even completely omitted. Train movements are fully automated refurbishment and switchover periods. and a driver is no longer required. In CTC operation, the energy consump- Passenger transfer, automatic depar- tion of trains is optimized by intelligent ture and reversals are handled by ATO algorithms. Trainguard MT. An attendant is present onboard the train to manage at least emergency situations. • Unattended train operation (UTO) At this level of automation, additional safety-related measures are needed because there is no staff onboard a train. Safe departure and arrival of the train, including door closing and open- ing, is controlled automatically. 4 Platzhalter Train control levels Unequipped STO DTO UTO Trains Unequipped STO DTO UTO Moving-block Continuous train control n. a. operation Fixed-block Upgrading Intermittent train control n. a. n. a. n. a. Improving equipment operation headway Interlocking train control n. a. n. a. n. a. Fixed-block operation Mode of operation / functionality STO: Semi-automated train operation | DTO: Driverless train operation | UTO: Unattended train operation | n. a.: not applicable Comprehensive greenfield solutions Efficient refurbishment and flexible migration strategies Installation Refurbishment Commissioning Greenfield installation Refurbishment and migration Stepwise commissioning The ideal solution for a greenfield instal- When lines are refurbished, Trainguard MT Headways and the safety of existing lation of a modern mass transit signaling can be used as an overlay system for systems can be improved by connecting system is the combination of Trainguard MT existing systems. This solution offers balises to existing trackside signals to and the following well-proven Siemens enhanced performance
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