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Appendix A

ERTMS/ETCS Railway Signalling

Salvatore Sabina, Fabio Poli and Nazelie Kassabian

A.1 Interoperable Constituents

The basic interoperability constituents in the Control-Command and Signalling Subsystems are, respectively, defined in TableA.1 for the Control-Command and Signalling On-board Subsystem [1] and TableA.2 for the Control-Command and Signalling Trackside Subsystem [1].
The functions of basic interoperability constituents may be combined to form a group. This group is then defined by those functions and by its remaining external interfaces. If a group is formed in this way, it shall be considered as an interoperability constituent. TableA.3 lists the groups of interoperability constituents of the Control-Command and Signalling On-board Subsystem [1]. TableA.4 lists the groups of interoperability constituents of the Control-Command and Signalling Trackside Subsystem [1].

  • S. Sabina (
  • )

B

Ansaldo STS S.p.A, Via Paolo Mantovani 3-5, 16151 Genova, Italy e-mail: [email protected]

F. Poli Ansaldo STS S.p.A, Via Ferrante Imparato 184, 80147 Napoli, Italy e-mail: [email protected]

N. Kassabian Ansaldo STS S.p.A, Via Volvera 50, 10045 Piossasco Torino, Italy e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 L. Lo Presti and S. Sabina (eds.), GNSS for Rail Transportation, PoliTO Springer Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79084-8
233

  • 234
  • Appendix A: ERTMS/ETCS Railway Signalling

Table A.1 Basic interoperability constituents in the Control-Command and Signalling On-board

Subsystem

  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4

  • N
  • Interoperability constituent IC
  • Characteristics
  • Specific

requirements to be assessed by reference to Chap.4 [1]

  • 1
  • ETCS on-board
  • Reliability, Availability,
  • 4.2.1

Maintainability, Safety (RAMS)
4.5.1

  • 4.2.2
  • On-board ETCS functionality

(excluding odometry) ETCS and GSM-R air gap interfaces 4.2.5

  • – RBC (level 2 and level 3)
  • 4.2.5.1

– Radio in-fill unit (optional level 1) 4.2.5.1

  • – Eurobalise air gap
  • 4.2.5.2

– Euroloop air gap (optional level 1) 4.2.5.3 Interfaces – STM (implementation of interface 4.2.6.1 K optional) – GSM-R ETCS Data Only Radio – Odometry
4.2.6.2 4.2.6.3

  • 4.2.8
  • – Key management system

– ETCS ID Management – ETCS Driver–Machine Interface – Train interface
4.2.9 4.2.12 4.2.2
– On-board recording device Construction of equipment
4.2.14 4.2.16

  • 4.2.1
  • 2

3

  • Odometry equipment
  • Reliability, Availability,

Maintainability, Safety (RAMS)
4.5.1
On-board ETCS functionality (only 4.2.2 Odometry) Interfaces – On-board ETCS Construction of equipment Interfaces
4.2.6.3 4.2.16
Interface of External STM

  • – On-board ETCS
  • 4.2.6.1

(continued)

  • Appendix A: ERTMS/ETCS Railway Signalling
  • 235

Table A.1 (continued)

  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4

  • N
  • Interoperability constituent IC
  • Characteristics
  • Specific

requirements to be assessed by reference to Chap.4 [1]

4

56

  • GSM-R voice cab radio
  • Reliability, Availability,
  • 4.2.1

Note: SIM card, antenna, connecting Maintainability, Safety (RAMS) cables and filters are not part of this Note: no requirement for safety interoperability constituent
4.5.1

  • Basic communication functions
  • 4.2.4.1

  • 4.2.4.2
  • Voice and operational

communication applications Interfaces

  • – GSM-R air gap
  • 4.2.5.1

– GSM-R Driver–Machine Interface 4.2.13

  • Construction of equipment
  • 4.2.16

  • 4.2.1
  • GSM-R ETCS Data only Radio
  • Reliability, Availability,

Note: SIM card, antenna, connecting Maintainability, Safety (RAMS) cables and filters are not part of this Note: no requirement for safety interoperability constituent
4.5.1

  • Basic communication functions
  • 4.2.4.1

  • 4.2.4.3
  • ETCS data communication

applications Interfaces – On-board ETCS – GSM-R air gap Construction of equipment
4.2.6.2 4.2.5.1 4.2.16

  • 4.2.4.1
  • GSM-R SIM card
  • Basic communication functions

Construction of equipment
Note: it is the responsibility of the GSM-R network operator to deliver to railway undertakings the SIM cards to be inserted in GSM-R terminal equipment
4.2.16

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  • Appendix A: ERTMS/ETCS Railway Signalling

Table A.2 Basic interoperability constituents in the Control-Command and Signalling Trackside Subsystem

  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4

  • N
  • Interoperability

constituent IC

  • Characteristics
  • Specific

requirements to be assessed by reference to Chap.4 [1]

  • 1
  • RBC
  • Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety

(RAMS)
4.2.1 4.5.1

  • 4.2.3
  • Trackside ETCS functionality (excluding

communication via Eurobalises, radio in-fill and Euroloop) ETCS and GSM-R air gap interfaces: only radio communication with train
4.2.5.1
Interfaces

  • – Neighbouring RBC
  • 4.2.7.1,

4.2.7.2
– data radio communication – Key management system – ETCS-ID Management Construction of equipment
4.2.7.3 4.2.8 4.2.9 4.2.16

  • 4.2.1
  • 2
  • Radio in-fill unit Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety

(RAMS)
4.5.1

  • 4.2.3
  • Trackside ETCS functionality (excluding

communication via Eurobalises, Euroloop and level 2 and level 3 functionality) ETCS and GSM-R air gap interfaces: only radio communication with train
4.2.5.1
Interfaces – data radio communication – Key management system – ETCS-ID Management – Interlocking and LEU Construction of equipment
4.2.7.3 4.2.8 4.2.9 4.2.3 4.2.16

  • 4.2.1
  • 3
  • Eurobalise
  • Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety

(RAMS)
4.5.1
ETCS and GSM-R air gap interfaces: only Eurobalise communication with train
4.2.5.2
Interfaces – LEU – Eurobalise Construction of equipment
4.2.7.4 4.2.16
(continued)

  • Appendix A: ERTMS/ETCS Railway Signalling
  • 237

Table A.2 (continued)

  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4

  • N
  • Interoperability

constituent IC

  • Characteristics
  • Specific

requirements to be assessed by reference to Chap.4 [1]

  • 4
  • Euroloop
  • Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety

(RAMS)
4.2.1 4.5.1
ETCS and GSM-R air gap interfaces: only Euroloop communication with train
4.2.5.3
Interfaces – LEU – Euroloop Construction of equipment
4.2.7.5 4.2.16

  • 4.2.1
  • 5
  • LEU Eurobalise Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety

(RAMS)
4.5.1

  • 4.2.3
  • Trackside ETCS functionality (excluding

communication via radio in-fill, Euroloop and level 2 and level 3 functionality) Interfaces – LEU – Eurobalise Construction of equipment
4.2.7.4 4.2.16

  • 4.2.1
  • 6
  • LEU Euroloop
  • Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety

(RAMS)
4.5.1

  • 4.2.3
  • Trackside ETCS functionality (excluding

communication via radio in-fill, Eurobalise and level 2 and level 3 functionality) Interfaces – LEU – Euroloop Construction of equipment
4.2.7.5 4.2.16

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  • Appendix A: ERTMS/ETCS Railway Signalling

Table A.3 Groups of interoperability constituents in the Control-Command and Signalling

On-board subsystem

  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4

  • N
  • Interoperability constituent IC
  • Characteristics
  • Specific

requirements to be assessed by reference to Chap.4 [1]

  • 1
  • ETCS on-board Odometry

Equipment
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety (RAMS)
4.2.1 4.5.1

  • 4.2.2
  • On-board ETCS functionality

ETCS and GSM-R air gap interfaces 4.2.5

  • – RBC (level 2 and level 3)
  • 4.2.5.1

– Radio in-fill unit (optional level 1) 4.2.5.1

  • – Eurobalise air gap
  • 4.2.5.2

– Euroloop air gap (optional level 1) 4.2.5.3 Interfaces – STM (implementation of interface 4.2.6.1 K optional) – GSM-R ETCS Data Only Radio – Key management system – ETCS ID Management
4.2.6.2 4.2.8 4.2.9
– ETCS Driver-Machine Interface – Train interface
4.2.12 4.2.2
– On-board recording device Construction of equipment
4.2.14 4.2.16

  • Appendix A: ERTMS/ETCS Railway Signalling
  • 239

Table A.4 Groups of interoperability constituents in the Control-Command and Signalling Trackside Subsystem

  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4

  • N
  • Interoperability constituent IC
  • Characteristics
  • Specific

requirements to be assessed by reference to Chap.4 [1]

  • 1
  • Eurobalise LEU Eurobalise
  • Reliability, Availability,
  • 4.2.1

Maintainability, Safety (RAMS)
4.5.1

  • 4.2.3
  • Trackside ETCS functionality

(excluding communication via Euroloop and level 2 and level 3 functionality) ETCS and GSM-R air gap interfaces: only Eurobalise communication with train
4.2.5.2

  • Construction of equipment
  • 4.2.16

  • 4.2.1
  • 2
  • Euroloop LEU Euroloop
  • Reliability, Availability,

Maintainability, Safety (RAMS)
4.5.1

  • 4.2.3
  • Trackside ETCS functionality

(excluding communication via Eurobalise and level 2 and level 3 functionality) ETCS and GSM-R air gap interfaces: only Euroloop communication with train
4.2.5.3

  • 4.2.16
  • Construction of equipment

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  • Appendix A: ERTMS/ETCS Railway Signalling

A.2 Cross-Talk Protected Zone

To define a cross-talk protected zone, let us first provide the definition of the following coordinate system used for the orientation of the Balise and the Antenna Unit of the Eurobalise Transmission System with respect to the rail direction; see Fig. A.1:

• A reference axis in parallel with the rails (the X-axis), • A reference axis at right angles across the rails, and which is level with the top of rails (the Y-axis),
• A reference axis directed upwards, at right angles to the rail plane (the Z-axis).

The Balise has reference marks on each of the six sides that indicate the positions of the three axes, related to the electrical centre of the Balise. The Antenna Unit has reference marks on each of the six sides that indicate the positions of the X-, Y-, and Z-axes, respectively.
Based on such reference axis, TableA.5 provides the definition of the crosstalk protected zone. The complete description of intrinsic cross-talk protection for Eurobalise Transmission System is provided in [2].

Fig. A.1 Eurobalise

Transmission System reference axes

Reference marks of an Antenna Unit.

ZZ
YY

Z

X

X

Electrical centre

Y

X

Positive rotation
Reference marks

of a Balise.

  • Appendix A: ERTMS/ETCS Railway Signalling
  • 241

Table A.5 Definition of cross-talk protected zone

  • Type of cross-talk
  • Involved equipment
  • Zone where cross-talk shall

not occur

  • Lateral (direction Y)
  • One Balise and one antenna

unit
1.4m or more between the Balise and the antenna unit (related to the Z reference marks)

  • Lateral (direction Y)
  • One or two Balises and two

antenna units
3.0m or more between the cross-talk Balise and the interfered antenna unit (related to the Z reference marks)

  • Vertical (direction Z)
  • One Balise and one antenna

unit
4.8m or more talk Balise related to the X and Y reference marks

  • Longitudinal (direction X)
  • Two Balises and one antenna Any location of the antenna

unit. 2.6 or more between two unit along the same track as consecutive standard size Balises, and 2.3 or more between two reduced size Balises (related to the Y reference marks). 2.6m applies if combinations of Balise sizes are applicable the Balises

  • Longitudinal (direction X)
  • One Balise and two antenna
  • Any location of the antenna

units. 4.0 or more between two units along the same track as antenna units the Balises

References

1. EU. Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/919 of 27 May 2016 on the technical specification for interoperability relating to the control-command and signalling subsystems of the rail system in the European Union, 27 May 2016
2. UNISIG. SUBSET-036 v.3.1.0 (2016) FFFIS for Eurobalise

Glossary

Automatic Train Protection A safety system that enforces either compliance with or observation of speed restrictions and signal aspects by trains.

Balise Group One or more Balises which are treated as having the same reference location on the track. The telegrams transmitted by all the Balises of a group form a track-to-train message.

Balise Group Coordinate System The means to ensure common location referenc-

ing between on-board and trackside, for all location-based information exchanged through the ERTMS/ETCS transmission media.

Balise Group Location reference Location of Balise number 1 in a Balise group.

It is the origin of the Balise group coordinate system. Expectation window The interval between the outer limits to accept a Balise group. Fail-safe A design philosophy which results in any expected failure maintaining or placing the equipment in a safe state.

Last Relevant Balise Group The LRBG is used as a common location reference between the ERTMS/ETCS on-board and trackside equipments in levels 2 and 3.

LevelThedifferentERTMS/ETCSapplicationlevelsareawaytoexpressthepossible operating relationships between track and train. Level definitions are related to the trackside equipment used, to the way the trackside information reaches the on-board units and to which functions are processed in the trackside and in the on-board equipment, respectively.

Linking A functionality to protect against missing data from BALISE GROUPS by announcing them in advance through LINKING INFORMATION and by checking whether they have been read within a certain EXPECTATION WINDOW.

Mission Any train movement started under the supervision of an ERTMS/ETCS on-board equipment in one the following modes: FS, LS, SR, OS, NL, UN or SN. The ETCS mission is ended when any of the following modes is entered: SB, SH.

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 L. Lo Presti and S. Sabina (eds.), GNSS for Rail Transportation, PoliTO Springer Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79084-8
243

  • 244
  • Glossary

Mode An operating state of the ERTMS/ETCS on-board equipment with a specified split of operational responsibilities between the ERTMS/ETCS system and the driver.

Movement Authority Permission for a train to run to a specific location within the constraints of the infrastructure.

Moving block A block whose length is defined by the position of the train occupying the section of track ahead. The minimum block length would be from the rearmost part of the occupying train to a point on the track where, if the train braked from its current speed, the front of the occupying train would be when the train came to a stand.

Radio Block Centre A centralised safety unit that receives train position information via radio and sends movement authorities via radio to trains.

Spot Transmission Transmission between trackside and on-board that takes place at discrete locations.

Track description Information complementing the Movement Authority and providing as a minimum the static speed profile and gradient profile. Optionally, it can contain axle load profile, track conditions, route suitability data, areas where shunting is permitted, etc.

Train data Defined set of data which gives information about the train. Data that characterises a train and which is required by ERTMS/ETCS in order to supervise a train movement.

Train detection The proof of the presence or absence of trains on a defined section of line.

Train integrity The level of belief in the train being complete and not having left coaches or wagons behind.

Train movement When vehicles are moved with train data available, as a rule from station to station, and as a rule under the authority of proceed aspects from main signals, or similar procedures.

Train position information The train position information defines the position of the train front in relation to a Balise group, which is called Last Relevant Balise Group (LRBG).

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    Precise and reliable localization as a core of railway automation (Rail 4.0) Michael Hutchinson, Juliette Marais, Emilie Masson, Jaizki Mendizabal, Michael Meyer zu Horste To cite this version: Michael Hutchinson, Juliette Marais, Emilie Masson, Jaizki Mendizabal, Michael Meyer zu Horste. Precise and reliable localization as a core of railway automation (Rail 4.0). 360.revista de alta veloci- dad, 2018, 1 (5), pp149-157. hal-01878793 HAL Id: hal-01878793 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01878793 Submitted on 21 Sep 2018 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. 25 número 5 - junio - 2018. Pág 149 - 157 Precise and reliable localization as a core of railway automation (Rail 4.0) Hutchinson, Michael Marais, Juliette Masson, Émilie Mendizabal, Jaizki Meyer zu Hörste, Michael NSL, IFSTTAR, RAILENIUM, CEIT, DLR 1 Abstract: High Speed Railway services have shown that Railways are a competitive and, at the same time, an environmentally friendly transport system. The next level of improvement will be a higher degree of automation, with partial or complete automatic train operation up to fully automatic unattended driverless operation to reduce energy consumption and noise, as well as improving punctuality and comfort.
  • 11 /2015 November 1 € 22 1 C 11 180

    11 /2015 November 1 € 22 1 C 11 180

    11 /2015 November 1 € 22 1 C 11 180 www.eurailpress.de/sd Rail Signalling and Telecommunication • INSTANDHALTUNG • SICHERHEIT • ETCS Deutliche Effizienzsteigerung GFR 2000: Eine Lösung zur The implementation of durch den Einsatz von Gefahrenraumfreimeldung an ETCS Level 1 in the mobilen Anwendungen Bahnübergängen Slovenian sector of Corridor D • Satellite-based train control systems Cost efficiency analysis of the satellite based train control system 31nSat in Germany Benedikt Seheier / Anja Bussmann / Florian Brinkmann / Uwe Wendland DB Netz AG is aiming at cost effective several international project partners the highest comparability with the oth­ alternatives to conventional train con­ are involved, including DB Netz AG and er systems that have no sophisticated trol systems on low density lines. For the German Aerospace Center (DLR). fall-back technology), this purpose, the cost efficiency of the The project's work plan comprises sev­ • ERTMS-Regional, (a cost-reduced 31nSat system - a satellite-based plat­ eral work packages regarding nation­ variant of ETCS Level 3 for region­ form for train protection - is analysed al scenarios of a number of countries. al lines without conventional lineside by comparing the net present value of Besides the economic assessment, the signals and without track-side train equipment cost for 31nSat with the al­ German scenario includes a compari­ detection) and ternative systems ERTMS-Regional, son of the system's functionalities with • Germany's common conventional sig­ ETCS Level 2 without lineside signals the operational procedures and require­ nalling system (the so-called Ks-Sys­ and conventional signalling. From the ments of the German rail system. From tem).
  • Trainguard MT Optimal Performance with the World’S Leading Automatic Train Control System for Mass Transit Trainguard MT

    Trainguard MT Optimal Performance with the World’S Leading Automatic Train Control System for Mass Transit Trainguard MT

    siemens.com/mobility/mobility Trainguard MT Optimal performance with the world’s leading automatic train control system for mass transit Trainguard MT Intelligent and future-oriented mass transit solutions for smiling cities Cities are becoming increasingly larger The overall performance of mass transit As a modern modular ATC system, and more complex. This also imposes systems depends largely on the perform- Trainguard MT offers all these features, increased requirements on mass transit ance of the automatic train control (ATC) providing the basis for attractive, safe systems. Their operators have to cope system employed. With increasing auto- and efficient mass transit systems which with rapidly growing traffic flows and mation, the responsibility for operations satisfy the needs of both passengers and passengers' rising expectations. Their management gradually shifts from drivers railway operators throughout the world. success is measured against factors and operators to the system. such as safety, punctuality, conve- nience and energy efficiency. An ATC system comprises functions for the monitoring, execution and control Benefits Siemens' intelligent and future- of the entire operational process. It can oriented mass transit solutions feature different levels of automation • Short headways by implementing support operators in successfully such as driver-controlled train operation, real moving-block operation meeting these challenges. semi-automated train operation, driver- • Cost-effectiveness less and unattended train operation. • Scalability We regard our customers as partners • Upgradability up to driverless systems who we support through our work in The ATC system continuously indicates • Maximum reliability, availability and sustainably developing their urban the current movement authority on safety environment and making their public the cab display and super vises the per- • Economical maintenance mass transit both efficient and effec- missible train speed.
  • ERTMS/ETCS - Indian Railways Perspective

    ERTMS/ETCS - Indian Railways Perspective

    ERTMS/ETCS - Indian Railways Perspective P Venkata Ramana IRSSE, MIRSTE, MIRSE Abstract nal and Balise. Balises are passive devices and gets energised whenever Balise Reader fitted on Locomo- European Railway Traffic Management System tive passes over it. On energisation, balises transmits (ERTMS) is evolved to harmonize cross-border rail telegrams to OBE. Telegram may consist of informa- connections for seamless operations across European tion about aspect of Lineside Signal, Gradients etc., nations. ERTMS is stated to be the most performant Balises are generally grouped and unique identifica- train control system which brings significant advan- tion will be provided to each balise. It helps to detect tages in terms of safety, reliability, punctuality and the direction of train. There four types of balises ex- traffic capacity. ERT.MS is evolving as a global stan- ist based their usage - Switchable, Infill, Fixed and dard. Many countries outside Europe - US, China, Repositioning balises. Switchable balises will be pro- Taiwan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia have adopted vided near lineside signals and they transmit aspect ERTMS standards for train traffic command and con- of lineside signal, permanent speed restrictions, gra- trol. dient information etc., Infill balises are provided in advance of signals to convey aspect of lineside signals earlier than Switchable balises. Fixed balises convey 1 Introduction information in regard to temporary speed restrictions and Repositioning balises provides data corrections. Signalling component of ERTMS has basically Balises transmit data in long or short telegrams four components - European Train Control System and those pertaining to direction. They are of two (ETCS) with Automatic Train Protection System, types - standard and reduced.