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11 /2015 November 1 € 22 1 C 11 180 11 /2015 November 1 € 22 1 C 11 180 www.eurailpress.de/sd Rail Signalling and Telecommunication • INSTANDHALTUNG • SICHERHEIT • ETCS Deutliche Effizienzsteigerung GFR 2000: Eine Lösung zur The implementation of durch den Einsatz von Gefahrenraumfreimeldung an ETCS Level 1 in the mobilen Anwendungen Bahnübergängen Slovenian sector of Corridor D • Satellite-based train control systems Cost efficiency analysis of the satellite based train control system 31nSat in Germany Benedikt Seheier / Anja Bussmann / Florian Brinkmann / Uwe Wendland DB Netz AG is aiming at cost effective several international project partners the highest comparability with the oth­ alternatives to conventional train con­ are involved, including DB Netz AG and er systems that have no sophisticated trol systems on low density lines. For the German Aerospace Center (DLR). fall-back technology), this purpose, the cost efficiency of the The project's work plan comprises sev­ • ERTMS-Regional, (a cost-reduced 31nSat system - a satellite-based plat­ eral work packages regarding nation­ variant of ETCS Level 3 for region­ form for train protection - is analysed al scenarios of a number of countries. al lines without conventional lineside by comparing the net present value of Besides the economic assessment, the signals and without track-side train equipment cost for 31nSat with the al­ German scenario includes a compari­ detection) and ternative systems ERTMS-Regional, son of the system's functionalities with • Germany's common conventional sig­ ETCS Level 2 without lineside signals the operational procedures and require­ nalling system (the so-called Ks-Sys­ and conventional signalling. From the ments of the German rail system. From tem). results it can be told that 31nSat offers this, further requirements for the 31n­ The current track equipment does not a cost saving potential, mainly due to Sat system are derived. The analysis of affect this analysis since all scenarios the fact that physical Eurobalises can the cost efficiency, the so-called Busi­ are assumed to have equal dismantling be replaced by virtual balises. ness Case German Scenario, is pre­ costs. A re-use of any part of the pre­ sented in this article. lt is carried out ceding track equipment, as weil as any by the DLR in close cooperation with questions of migration are also excluded 1 lntroduction and motivation DB Netz AG. The aim is to deliver a ba­ from the scenario definition. sis for a decision about whether or not In contrast to the application of 31nSat Germany's national infrastructure man­ DB Netz AG should continue their par­ in other countries, in the German scenar­ ager DB Netz AG operates about ticipation in the pursuit of this satellite­ io the telecommunication components 33 300 kilometres of the German rail net­ based technology. That is why the anal­ of 31nSat are not considered. This is be­ work, 12 000 kilometres of which are ysis is strictly bound to the framework, cause it is still unclear if voice radio will characterised as low traffic density lines. conditions and boundaries of the Ger­ be realised in 31nSat. This functionality Most of these lines belong to the region­ man railway network. Since the cost ef­ is however mandatory in the German rai l al network. A crucial aspect of cost effi­ ficiency analysis is worked out in par­ network for passenger transport. On the ciency is the train control and manage­ allel to many other activities at a rela­ other hand, there is a dense voice radio ment system. Currently, most of these tively early stage of the project and be­ GSM-R network available in Germany on lines feature a system with relatively high fore the completion of a prototype, not most of the considered lines. Yet, an up­ capital and operational expenditures in all information about the 31nSat system grade is necessary in order to meet the relation to their number of trains. In order architecture and functions are available European EIREN E requirements to pro­ to improve the cost efficiency of these in detail, so a number of assumptions vide ETCS data communication between lines, DB Netz AG scouted for innova­ have to be made. trackside infrastructure (Radio Block tive alternative systems, amongst them Centre (RBC)) and trains. 31nSat and ERTMS-Regional [1]. The aim The line characteristics are derived of the following analysis is to assess the 2 Method and approach from generic line standards according cost efficiency of one of the most prom­ to DB Netz AG regulations (3]. DB Netz ising ones, which is the 31nSat - Train ln­ AG's network of regional lines consists tegrated Safety Satellite System [2]. 31n­ 2.1 Scenarios of three standards, called R1 20, R80 and Sat offers satellite-based train position­ GSO, the characteristics of which are ing and enables the replacement of fixed In order to evaluate the cost efficiency of summarised in Tabel 1. Eurobalises by virtual balises. In doing 31nSat , the life cycle costs of this sys­ The most significant differences be­ so, it is supposed to meet the Safety ln­ tem are compared to alternative technol­ tween them are the number of tracks, tegrity Level 4 (SIL4) safety requirements ogies. Thus, the cost saving potential of the number of stations and the block and to be compatible with the ERTMS the 31nSat system due to the reduction lengths. standard. Furthermore, the system pro­ of fixed Eurobalises will become appar­ Since R120 and R80 are described by vides functionalities for satellite-based ent. an upper and lower limit, the arithmetic telecommunication between train and For the low density lines in focus, there mean of every attribute constitutes an infrastructure. are three alternative signalling systems additional "mean scenario" for R1 20 and In the 31nSat project, this system is to tobe considered: R80. Altogether, this leads to a number be developed, tested and validated in a • ETCS Level 2 without lineside colour­ of seven generic lines. The total length real set-up. Led by Ansaldo STS and co­ light signals (since a variant without of the network considered for the ap­ funded by the European Space Agency, conventional lineside signals provides plication of 31nSat in Germany adds up 36 SIGNAL + DRAHT (107) 11/201 5 Satellite-based train control systems • to around 10 000 kilometres of regional lines (as shown in Table 1) plus an ad­ R120 R80 G50 ditional 2 000 line kilometres of the G50 upper lower upper lower standard within the core network. The limit limit limit limit generic lines have a standardised length line length (generic) [km] 100 100 100 100 50 of 100 and 50 kilometres respectively. By track length [km] 180 120 100 100 50 means of the parameter "line length (re­ number of tracks [-] 1-2 1-2 1 gional network)" the cost analysis can however be extended to any network in number of stations [-] 4 4 9 5 3 focus. mean distance [km] 20 20 10 17 17 The number of trains to be equipped is between stations assumed to be seven for R120, five for block length [km] 5 10 no blocks --> station distance R80 and three for G50. Due to the fact line speed [km/h] 81-120 81-120 51-100 51-100 < 50 that they are presumed to vary in prac­ number of trains per tice, these figures are subject to a sensi­ day and direction [-] 50 25 30 18 5 tivity analysis. regional trains per day [-) 40 20 25 13 All in all the cost efficiency of the 31n­ and direction 0 Sat system will be analysed on the ba­ freight trains per day sis of a cost comparison between four [-] 10 5 5 5 and direction 5 equipment alternatives for seven refer­ line length (regional ence lines to allow for conclusions about [km] network) 4971 4639 287 the systems' suitability for different line characteristics. Table 1: Characteristics of generic lines {source: authors] 2.2 Assumptions for alternative systems ETCS Level 3 ETCS Level 2 In this analysis, costs are not contrasted to any benefits. This is due to the fact system elements 31nSat ERTMS-R ETCS L2oS Ks-System that the benefits of the compared sys­ lnfrastructure tems are considered equally high, as no significant differences in track capacity, electronic IXL with OFC X X X X revenues, safety or external effects were lineside colour-light signals X identified. Table 2 shows a comparison lineside axle counters X X of the elements that determine the sys­ intermittent ATP (PZB) X tems' costs. The most significant feature of 31n­ ETCS RBC X X X Sat in terms of cost reduction is the fact ETCS Eurobalises (fixed) X X that no fixed Eurobalises are needed. GSM-R upgrade for In return 31nSat requires a special train ETCS L2/L3 X X X equipment in addition to the ETCS on­ 31nSat EGNOS-service x board equipment. This includes GNSS­ 31nSat TAL-Server x Receivers and antennas, a location de­ termination system (LOS) as weil as a Train track database in the form of a digi­ PZB on-board equipment X tal map that provides the position of ETCS on-board equipment X X X each Eurobalise and its contained in­ 31nSat on-board equipment x formation. The allocation of the digital map as an element of the train equip­ Table 2: System elements of equipment alternatives [source: authors], ment is based on an assumption, since OFC = Optical Fiber Gable; /XL = /nterlocking; ATP = Automatie Train Protection; no detailed information about its archi­ PZB = "Punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung"; TALS = Tracking Area LOS Server tecture is avai lable at present. lt is also possible that it may become a central­ ised element of the infrastructure. Also, in terms of the infrastructure, additions reasonable to assume the same for the tenance centre, and includes the cost have to be made in the form of the so­ rail sector.
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