TOKUGAWA SHOGUN Title 著者 Bodart-Bailey, Beatrice M
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タイトル THE ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF THE FIFTH TOKUGAWA SHOGUN Title 著者 Bodart-Bailey, Beatrice M. Author(s) 掲載誌・巻号・ページ Kobe University Economic Review,44:37-54 Citation 刊行日 1998 Issue date 資源タイプ Departmental Bulletin Paper / 紀要論文 Resource Type 版区分 publisher Resource Version 権利 Rights DOI JaLCDOI 10.24546/81000916 URL http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/handle_kernel/81000916
PDF issue: 2021-10-08 . Kobe Jnl.1'lpr.'~it...IEconomic Review 44 37
THE .ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF THE FIFTH TOKUGAWA SHOGUN
This article discusses the economic conditions at of .the fifth Tsunayoshi in 1680. It is that Tsunayoshi was the first ruler who a government without subs tan· financial reserves, but at the same time had to take for . a wide range of obligations his had contracted.
I. Introduction
traditionally been re~ His most criticized pol- infamous .. Laws of Compassion" (shorui awaremi no rei which earned him the nickname of . Shogun. Even though these dealt with much more than contained' un-
policies 1 such as the of of seven prevent infanticide. they. nU.!ea'lile as the of a The Genroku period (1688-1704), which .spanned the central part the fifth shogun's governrnent, was one of the most in prior to the post-Wodd War boom in the second half' of the Sh6wa era. As a result the term Showa-Genroku has been coined. of the prosperity of the period, the finan- government, just as . the of roundly as bankrupt lu~ury-Ioving and spendthrift tyrant. Such. still made. even though plenty of evidence. that, unlike .Tsunayoshi inherited a government with empty coffers. Moreover, the financial kept the bakufu have almost totally the of the
1 The author wishes to thank Dr and Professor for the and valuable comments. 2 For details see B.M. Bodart-Bailey, "The Laws of \.,;ompa,SfilOll," Monumenta Nipponica, 40:2, Summer 1985, pp. 163-189. 38 BEATRICE M: BODART-BAILEY
Tsunayoshi cannot be ,documented., While records outside the bakufu have made it to reconstruct to some extent the government's financial situation from the ,....,,.,.1"1"'1'; "'..,'...... '·'n Yoshimune onwards~ this has been in the lier period. During the last decade, however, fragmentary material on the expenditure of the fifth shogun come to light. Yet this interpreted with the a priori that it must thrift habits. When the first Tokugawa shogun the bakufu Keicho 5 (1600), had various sources revenue at his disposaL most lucrative were the revenue the lands had his political the output of gold and mines, as weH as alluvial precious and the profit from trade. When revenue from the latter two the four were to on' had accumulated. With rich sources of revenue the of the central ernlTIent were initially well and no financial contribution to the of administration of the country was sought from the daimyo or hatamoto when the of the bakufu were established. The early shogunate, moreover, had the financial resources to its hegemony over the country by providing for up- keep ,. national institutions, J! such the imperial and the Kyoto aristocracy. important shrines, like those at· and Atsuta, as well as many Buddhist temples. At the course, this had political significance. as their support and were considered for the continued and prosperity of the country. To expenses were added after Ieyasu's death not only the construction the shrine at Nikko, but an additional (Toshogu ..mrS) in various parts of the country. Another way the shogunate came to publicly demonstrate the scope of its powers and riches was to the lrn ..... o,...., or the mausoleum Nikko. The fifth shogun Tsunayoshi came to inherit but not the resources had pay them. paper bad reputation of the fifth ...... " .... r""' .... quate consideration. THE ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF THE FIFTH TOKUGAWA SHOGUN 39
n.. The First Shogun leyasu
the bakufu by erable wealth. the of his uv~ (1615) reached approximately 2,300,000 koku/' Y\V"'"""Hr>lY'1 ...... with a A further source of wealth was his direct In both dornestic and 4 But the g'n~avest source of wealth was undoubtedly the country's and mines. Indeed, some maintain that the bakuhan could not have been established without < the wealth derived from the < mines in first half of the century.s ""Y""JCJ.LU, < niques came to be known that permitted adequate exploitation of Japan's mineral resources.6 From the late Ashikaga onwards it '"''''' ....' ...... '''' apparent that of mines was an In determining political C'1l1'... or1l'YY'11"..r Tensho 17 (1589), one after the minting of his gold coin, the Tensho :RI£**'L began to confiscate the coun~ mines and declare them tenka no yama :.R""fO)W, .. (or government's) mountains." This was backed by the that the central government taking on the responsibility the system the bullion to strike the CQllIlag-e. On establishing his political superiority over the Toyotomi regIme, Ieyasu sirnilarly of the country's Moreover, was In in Okubo (1545-1613) a skilful administrator who t by introducing Western methods and new management techniques, considerably 3 Kokushi daijiten henshu iinkai Kokushi daijiten m5f:~1A, Tokyo, 1979. 9:1043; Mizuo *!Jf!l~. Edo baku/u zaisei shiron rlp.f&Iti&.5f:iiB, 1996, p. 28. 4 Tokutomi lichiro fiam-~, Kinsel nihon kokuminshi iEft!t B -r·"""',.· ...L..- 1936, 13:190-192; Kurita Edo shi 1976, 1:234. 5. Keiji WO;a:=., Sakohu to kaikoku OOm), Tokyo, 1993, p. 20. 6 Kokushi daijiten t 5:354-5. 7 Junnosuke and Watanabe Norifumi fti~*.zIlb .. vtma1j)(, "Sho sangyo no gijutsu to rod6 keitai mm~O)U:&C:11(1:w3~" in lwanami kfJza Nihon rekishi, ~!~IH3*Hl~. 11:212; 13:177. . productive gold and of and equally rich and Izu came under and superViSIon """.tv'.AV 6 (1601). cient management the of 6,000 kan of during and at 10,000 han ih .LI.. C.lvH.V at the 181,800 ry8 In given an obligatory tour Buddha of 8 13:177~181; Kurita, Edo jidai 9 Kurita, Edo jidai ski, 1:150-152; :m::frJlJ~IJSJllX, Sado kinginzan ski no kenkyfl 1tii1l~ihij!if:O)iJf9¥:, Tokyo, 1991; p. 62. One kan is 3.75 10 See B.M. trans. and Tokugawa ,Culture Observed. 1999, pp. 378-384. 424-428. 11 Michael Cooper, Rodrigues the Interpreter. New York; 12 Michael trans, and ed., This Island of Japan, 13 For some of the difficulties encountered in ..... ",,'<>.,uuu,u.o "''''''\.,UCLJ''6'' " The and Uses of and Silver in S12ctetmU'l- ua.l-,eHl, " Economic History 2"" ser., 18, no. 14 Mich'ael trans and ed., They Came p. 10. The tael is usually considered G4U.,Q.H:;H. grams. at the time measurements f ... .c.r,,,,,.,+l .. 'rHE ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF FIFTH TOKUGAWA SHOGUN 41 U.UJ,'lvO when he died in Genna 2 (1616). Adding up ,'VOl,.UJl~'a,IVv ' that it to nearly two' million valuable Tv·c,ne>. r-,.r.,"'lrl", 15 But this was bullion stored by Initially his successor Hidetada intended to divide the bullion "'-LJ.,IVL"':;;; Mito domain, and initial claim that v..::,.'. m. The Third Shogun Iemitsu Scholars '-'!J~,"U,'iA<"'V that on his death in Kanel 9 (1632) Hidetada left some and a half million ryo to ,his successor. The third shogun Iemitsu funds, because he distributed a hundred thousand .ryo as from his fa- thousand people. ranged from two thousand and ten ,thousand pieces of silver to T6fukumon-in, 1/"1" ..... 1''''' .... who ,married the down "rA'''''''''' of Iemitsu's rule, though there are no of govern- available, Iemitsu's, extraordinarily lavish spending The most f arnousof his 1:0~3nC)gu at Nikko, where the body of In In 3 (1617), to turn it still admired 18 What 15 , Nihon no rekishi B:;$:,co!Mse, vol. 13, Edo haifa , 173-176. Kurita Mototsugu's calculatio,ns amount to 1,930.,0.0.0- tn.l.lrn,a.' Edo fideii ski, 1:226). (A History Japan~ Stanford 1963, gives 1,950.,000 but does not state source" 16 Kurita, Edo fidai shi, 1:226; pp. 176-177. 17 pp. 176-177; Kurita, Edo 1:230.. 18 Nikko shishi hensan iinkai Nikko shishi (3 1979-1986, 2:223, 342-345. 42 BEATRICE M. AJ"-".lJ.n...... " attention that the bakufu also constructed some thirteen !es:ser Toshogu shrines throughout the country.19 Among the moreelabo- rate' of these was the no maru (Second Enceinte), construction which began in Kanei 13 (1636). From 'Kanei 17 (1640) Iemitsu also began enlarging the original Toshogu at Kunosan Rff~ili in Suruga.Finally in 3 (1650), one year before his death, Iemitsu construction of a at Kaneiji *jXwJl7l<:~ Ueno.:!!) 110reover, in his he that he himself be buried at Nikko, thus committing the bakufu to further build- lng 21 The cost of at Nikko Iemitsu amounted to over 570,000 ryo the time. 22 This was of course only the initial outlay of what was to prove a constant drain on the nances of all future governments. finely buildings with their extensive use of and painted inside and out re- quired constant maintenance and frequently major repairs. Earthquakes, fires and even rats took their tolpa By the time of Tsunayoshi's =1''\.,,£:>1'..... ment the shrine complex was old and in need ofa overhaul. Over sixty-two cent of all government expenditure on pIe repairs during the period Genroku 1 - 9 (1688-1696) was allotted to the Nikko Toshogu. the expenses of to the Kuno are added, this amounts to nearly 65 cent.24 Also previously, in Jokyo 2 (1685)t the bakufuts outlay for construction had risen to a fire at mausoleum and the surrounding settIements.25 material p'resented by Ono Mizuo the Genroku 2"O'ver'nnlerlt was burdened by an extraordinarily heavy schedule of temple build ing repairs outside Edo. In addition to Nikko, these ranged from repairs Sunpu, Nijo and Osaka at at Atsuta and 26 Such were of no financial during the first half of the seventeenth century when the bakufu al"'l1r.u/',/"I liquidity. By the time of the fifth however; building 19 K okushi da ijiten , 10:110-113. 20 Fujii Joji1fi#iil/Et, Tokugawa Iemitsu f.mJII~*. Tokyo 1997. pp. 199-20L 21 Tanabe Yasushi EBi2Z., Nikko kenchiku B*.LI~~! 1944, pp~ 105-106, 109- 115; Nikko shishi, 2:418423. 22 T6shodaigongensama .Jl~l*.~JUiill:ift'g.cited in p. 194; Nikk6 shishi,2:392. 23 pp. 44-47; Nikko shishi, pp. 424 .. 437. 24 Takebashi yohitsu besshfl ¥rtlii'i¥grJ#! as cited by 6no. pp. 210-211. 25 6no, pp. 199-200. 26 6no, pp. 204, 210. THE ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF 'rHE FIFTH TOKUGAWA SHOGUN 43 the Analyzing 3 construction as 31.87 per cent of the ""n .rl .... , ... t- T.rt''' .... ,...,''' 27 The bakufu's boom in temple successors the ...... ,.., .. "".~,....,... cere monial worship by the the rnet. Iernitsu's generosity also extended to a many other places of worship, To my knowledge no scholar attempted to gain some in- this Baku/u nikki or Tokugawa jikki and individual records, and such re- search also beyond the scope of the present But even a casual glance at the histories of major temples, such as Kiyomizu. Chion-in and Enryaku-ji reveals that an of them building works from the third shogun.SIt Another drain on the bakufu's treasury was Iemitsu's famous visit to and with a of 307,000 11 (1634). for months. It was the and most lavish of his journeys to the capitaL No financial of the re- main. but the fact that distributed a total of ten thousand kan silver between the citizens of Kyoto and must "~~l.\;H" to indicate that in other no were 31 21 pp. 199. For figures not mcjludE~d see p. 201. 28 Edo jidai shi, 1:230. Fujii 194) has 9 times. 29 RM. Bod art-Bailey , .. A Case of Political and Economic Expropriation: the Monetary Reform of the Fifth Shogun," Papers on Far Eastern History, March 1989, 39:179-180. 30 Kokushi daijiten, Kiyomizu: 4:412; Chion~in: 9:368. Shimonaka Hiroshi ed., Nihonshi daijiten 1992, 1:950, 962. See Nikko 2:342-343. 31 Edojidai 1:230; Tsuji Tatsuya, Tenno to shogun 2 of Nihon no kinsei 8=*CDilI1ft,Tokyo, 1991,p. 110-113. Based on ..... """"'"'u ....""" ....., .. this amounts to 172 ,000 44 BEATRICE M. BODART-BAILEY Gifts were perial household was ~ •• '''vu additional InC:OIrle At the same its fudai daimyo and 508,700 ryo was distributed to them in 12 (1635), while at same they were to 3~ It said that Iemitsu was unable to understand U SlnrlDJle and had no value anlBcclot,e, that it when he re organized administrative structures might indicative of this fact. However, that Iemitsu all understanding of the of underestimating his ...... """", ... 1<~'" With the death of Hidetada in Kanei 9 (1632) the shogunate a new political phase. Until that time Tokugawa rested on the prin- ciple authority. the title of himself, and Hidetada, cementing the Tokugawa with a dual seat of authority. Hidetada, larly, handed over the title to son at an to source of political On Hidetada's death time since the inception the Tokugawa as yet had no children. ,At the the Kaneifamine a decade society, It political sense vv, JII HI use his wealth to "T ...... ,.',rlC':t'£Tl it - to use .Herman term PO,l1tllCal authority. near-contemporary, the French rot the funds '-'V1UUlUv'U 0·...... '£"·· of Sallr''''''/O> sums of money to. the In in anybody's mind what 32 Tokutomi , 19:15-16. 33 Tenno to snc)gu;n, 34 Kuroita Katsumi ~:fE(DI~~; in Shintei, zoho kokushi taikei ifU1:titmOO5t!*~, 7' D,1 M,'Kanei 12. 35 3:26. THE ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF THE FIFTH TOKUGAWA SHOGUN 45 resources Kanai 9 (1632) from from Suruga Edo.31 IV. The FQurth Shogun Ietsuna when on in Keian 4 (1651) the fourth shogun, government was by no means bankrupt. distributed among court, the family, bakufu (hatamoto) and the number of women In oku amounted some 526,428 ryo, and thus not much than the sum on the death the shogun. than two \..1.'"''-, ...... '.;;0 however, in Enpo 4 (1676). the bakufu was bankrupt reluctantly minting the which as fund for military ,""vJ''VH>''>''''. What had brought govel~nrneIlt finances to such a rapid decline? reasons: the declining output, of Japan's and the the Meireki '. fire, . V. The . Mines. . There record of· the output of the but we know that the the most important silver rnine t that of sUClOenlY feU to one third in 12 (1635). An Ilnl:liUOn then on,by Meireki 2 (1656) the yield was at times than one hundred thousand kan: of silver, one sixth of 36p. 19. Iwao Seiichi believes that the silver that left Japan through the t(n·~'H,.n trade' to 30 or 40 percent of the total world silver prC1Ciuc- 11 tion outside Trade in the 16"" and 17 • . ".. Acta Asiatica, no. 30, 1976, p, 10. 37 Edo 1 :230. 46 BEATRICE M. l..)V.L/-t"l.l." what it had earlier in the 38 At the same time bakufu was facing an unexpected drainage of funds: VI. The. Meireki Fire. 'tt£H~""'''' after the fourth C-y"·,,,.,.,n month of Meireki 3 (1657). a fire for the city of Edo and the shogunal va.D\J~O;;:;. ing but Tokugawa jikki hundred city wards. nine thousand sixty hundred tem- ples and five hundred buildings daimyo compounds, as well as the main with iive-storytheNi no maru, and San no maru, were all destroyed.31t 108,000 people are to have died in the ... £u...• uv..,.40 The bakufu's reserve of bullion In had melted, but there still enough funds immediate measures, as the distribution of 41 than a month later a detailed program of grants to with than 100;000 koku and hatamotot was announced. The were scaled according to income and provided a daimyo with a domain of 99,000 koku with a grant of 300 kan of while the owner 100 koku received 15 ryo. The town (shisei jfjJf) within were promised a total of 10,000 han 42 To pay for relief measures, gold and were being distri b- uted directly from the government +- ...... ,"''''" ...... ",... and and transport of bullion was being months after the fire, 10,000 han of silver Suruga to Edo, while during the of silver were received from Kurita calculation, the total amounted to some 979 1090 ryo.44 ning of the fifth month it was to first half of the ten thousand han to the A~"' ..n'..,.y,,... 45 At the same 38 Hasegawa, pp. 62-64. 39 Tokugawa jikki. 4:209, 191M, 3. 40 Tokugawa jikki, 4:217, 29 D, 2 M, Meireki 3. 41 Tokugawa jikki. 4:212, 29 D, 1 M, 3. 42 Tokugawa jikki, 4:214-215, 9 D, 2 Meireki 3. 43 Tokugawa jikki, 4:215, 217, 221, etc. 44 Takebashi yohitsu besshll rrtl1t,iHJIJ ...... u'-,~O"u roku izen ni edo bakufu no zaisei ni ~\--C," Shigaku zasshi ~~ji~. voL momme; 66 momme 1 ryo.) 45 Tokugawa jikki, 11 5 M I Meireki 3. THE ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUN 47 time Ni no maru were The top was by fourth month, and the construction cornpleted by the eighth.46 t€c:onstI'uct!on of the main (hon maru) had in the fifth month.47 The timing of government's pay-outs schedule of tion important, it supports the conclusion Kurita that the the Meireki fire were met from the reserves at ,..... n'rT1c~~ the bullion that had melted during the it was not 2 (1659) and Kanbun of some 3,900,000 ryo was obtained from which Kurita the expenses resulting directly from the had been 49 Yet just over a decade and half later the was rupt. One must therefore ask why the bakufu that had so jealously pro moted supremacy previously; permitted its to to a nnanClaJ, and political, VII. The Governmenfs Balance Sheet. Iemitsu eXI;en(lea the authority thebakufu. introduced the system Edo for the daimyo, dornains with :manded to the Tokugawa neF~enlOnlY original status of primus inter pares to one of '"''','''1'''''''<''<1'" authoritarian over the whole country, Iemitsu 0'1">101"''''''£:\1''1 the bakufu's responsibili- The g'o"erloment authority, and were set an maintenance of the IJ.l.U\,..,oo of worship. as well as {y£:llnOl"I"'\t1IC' and distribution funds to samurai and commoners 'QJ.,L.Q..C. ;erl9monlal functions and 46 Tokugawa Jikki. 4;225,20 4 M. Meireki 3, 4:238, 8M. Meireki 3. 47 9 5 M. Meireki3. 48 Officials. were appointed on 9 D, 4 M, Manji L Tokugawa jikki, 4:264. 49 Kurita, "Genroku.,. IS, 1150-1158. 50 For a of the works at Edo see pp. 114:-117, 48 himself, they able pomp It might,· nmler'tneless, nances if Iemitsu ruthlessly upon dominance and financlal of the administration. But was not. With the of a minor in the . of the sickly letsUlrla. the personal authority of abruptly Naohiro have cnr,urn '\"\---.,"' ...... structure is mirrored in the terminology of the for Military Households (buhe shohatto iit~mi!Il). While the document of 12 (1635) and nal of Kanbun 3 (1663) substituted terms like .. the " (bugyo sho .rrm) and ., the house" (ie ruler to that by a where not, as previously, determined by the shogun's recognition of. qualities} but the and its gained in some tirne how this sudden change distribution of authority within the bakufudetermined the as the prohibition to the decline in are seen as re- fleeting acq uiredpolitical authority, When a cnCHce and or ~_'~'.".' taining the absolute authority of the sn~Jg\ln8lte, philosophy 51 Asao Naohiro "P.I'lR;;;IE.·JU. lwanami koza nihon rPR.ir.!;;h.r ~jJ;~~:1iJA Tatsuya" Gaba snog'un Yokohama shiritsu daigdku ronso II.m'Jun~na;RaJ?'U b,nrc·t<::11 .~~fLrt.:j~~~ll) ,,"' ...... -.. -:r/.' !i!J. vol. 30, 1979,p. 30 .. THE ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF THE FIFTH TOKUGA WA SHOGUN 49 in which bakufu itself suffered most a proportionally much of buildings than did the daimyo, some daimyo. were as~ns);. with various 53 on the whole seriol/irs bakufu building to dainlYo and over above the initial measures after the Tokutomi Iichir6 the bakufu's fiscal pr1DDJ.eUlS one inherent bakufu's fi fi~ " The financial the financial of . the bakufu. The financial of the related houses was the financial the bakufu. The financial distress the was the financial . of the bakufu. The responsibility for all this financial wholesale on thebakufu. "!iii view of the and the bakufu in the policies of the of the fourth shogun. But it was not the only solution. At the tilne the bakufu was still possession of considerable, wealth. Under a strong, authori- ruler, the destruction the Meireki could have served not to weaken the financial foundations of the bakufut but to strengthen them. The .reserves the bakufu had and' could .ha ve been to rebuild make the tance between the ruler and more Yet in- ...,..1...... ''-''", ...... 1'1../ Ch{)Se to use its to itself forgoing the rebuilding of' the keep, the symbol of shogunal Iemitsu, had distributed relief funds to the and hatamoto, but did this at a time of financial liquidity, and, TY'I1'"'...... n ..-..nr'.,.. funds had been limited to fudai daimyo.57 It doubtful whether Iemitsu have bankrupted OWn to i.l,;;;i>;:ill::iL 52 pp, 41-42; Harold Bolitho, Men, New 1974, 166.-167. 53 I.e. Tokugawa jikkt, 4:258, 2M, Manji 1; 4:259, 2M, 1, etc. 54 Bolitho, p. 168; "Genroku ... ", p. 1159. Tokugawa jikki, 4:259, 26D,. 2M, Manji 1; 4:262, lSD, 3M, Manji 1; 4:265, 18D, 4M, Manji 1;4:266, 23D, 4M. Manji 1; 3D and 7M,Manji I, etc. .' . 55 Tokutomi, 17:245-252. 56 Tokutomi, 17:253. 51 Tokugawa jikki, 2:685, 7M, Kanei 12 with 9 2 M,3.. 50 other the shift the distribution had resulted In a corresponding shift political priorities. bakufu's to solidify authority, if ne(~es:sar'y had changed to concern for the stability the military houses at the of the bakufu. Under the third shogun the financial the bakufu In- reflect the authority wealth these again to maintain authority and standing of the military When the fifth shogun Sll(~celem:)a in Enpo 8 (1680), he inherited a government with n-r,""XY'lncr nancial obligations, ael[:)le:r;ea reserves,and a '\t. The Currency One the most public measures of the financial sol veney was the currency. The coins minted by the bakufu mated their worth in bullion. The gold '-'VJ,~.1i;), 8ban after the era (Keicho 1596-1615) in were initially minted, contained 68.11 per cent of gold, and 31.89 per cent of The small gold coins, the koban, contained an even higher ""'lC\lr'nnnt.,;,N'D. of gold: 84.29 per cent. The silver coins contained 80 20 per of 6S The reserves accumulated by Ieyasu, together with the high yield of Japan's in the first half of the 0r..,on,.",on century, permitted the government to continuously mint to cover its deficit. The enterprises by bakufu to the minting of the at the beginning of the century were still in con- stant operation some 59 However, some the Meireki fire. at the beginning (1661-1673), bul- c lion to be in short supply and the mIntlng nuusE~s IJ~:;F,U"U ...... OTl1 lrH.... _ the government to the gold 60 Only the gold content, of 8ban was C'lu'1'I'\" from 68.11 to 67.27 per SI while the bakufu the to own financial difficulties, it dairnyo in financial the right to money (hansatsu .:f'L). The Fukui han was the 58 Kodama K6ta Nihonshi sfJran 1984, 4:516. 59 For appointment of J.HUHHjL6 houses see Obata Atsushi 'l\~~mili!, Nihon kahei ryfltsu shi B*.M'i1rtil~, 1943, pp. 472-475. 60 Sankazui .=.1t~. cited in and ~"'n,.t"lurn ..... , p. 1161. 61 Nihonshi 4: 516. THE ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF THE FIFTH TOKUGAW A SHOGUN 51 1 (1661), and than by the time the fifth suc~ce'ea€!a in Enpa 8 (1680), a total of domains were their own paper money. further until 4 (1707),62 administration of to dip the bakufu's reserves, military In Enpa 4 (1676) seven were minted to produce 57,800 ryo. In the following some of the silver of emergency fund was into 5 (1692), final reserves were the bullion, were re-mint.G4 When the government finally the coinage in ..;.1:> ...... 11·11 8 (1695), reasons were to the public. Apparently insufficient coinage in circulation to meet the growing and imprint on the worn 65 important reason was the funds. According to Arai :Hakuseki, the initial at the seventeenth century brought the bakufu a profit of five million ryo.56 are divided about the economic the debasement while it certainly stimulated the economy, it also re- sulted in inflation.67 detailed study yet made on how the de- the of and commoners uu.~... ,-, .. naLK~lseKl, who opposed of the debasement, ...... ",...£'\'" rose the chain of natural that Genroku . both 62 Nihon, Hansatsu FI:fLtlIL 1964, p. 21. 63 "Genroku ... fl. p. 1160. jikki, 6:672, 13 10 M, 4. 64 Hirokichi Ginza no kenkyu jff'tltiUIO.):m~, 1963, pp. 162-164. 65 *_111, Nihon zaisei Keizai shiry6E3*lltillg~3t!f4, Tokyo, "''''''.<..-IJV. 2:568- 569. 66 AraiHakuseki Oritaku shiba no ki tJT t) t:::. < in Nihon koten oun~galieu taikeil3*tiJJjt~~*~, 1964, 95:233. 67 Sakud6 f'Fii~*ilB, ..... 1."''''. nihon kaheishi ;affta*ii~!i!.Tokyo, 1958, pp. 96~ 97. 68 'ray a , pp. 168-169. 52 I../v<::;'O(:l.U\'''' were financially Genroku (1688- 1704) and (1704-1711) (1716-1736) under Y oshimune , n ....." ...... yy, '" 69 It Inten~st].hf! that while even more drastic devaluation took gO'llernrrlenlt, under the sixth shogun Ienobu;1O and the the Tokugawa period to their 72 This, it anoet:trs had acquired pn?OE!Ce:SSClr 13 Today the still seems to be taken as an a priori For example, Ono compares figures of bakufuannual expenditure corresponding roughly to the 1680's (A) and :1690's (B). under four headings, he notes that expenditure for official amount to 48.3 per cent for and 36.5 cent for to government buildings outside Edo, including those at and SUhpU come to 28.4 per case of A and 19.4 per cent the case B. Shogunal household expenditure, whichOno includes sho- official and clothing (nando ~F) reach 13.4 per cent 18.1 per ous that an1011nt He then individual and notes that the expenditure for workmanship (saiku kata and as well· as· (goryoku kin had On the crease 69 Sakudo, p.122; Yamamura A Study Samurai Income and f<:rdrpnl.rpr.'Plll~.<::h:in Cambridge. Mass. 1974, p. 43. 70 Ito Nihon ' 1952, 2:134. 71 Sakudo, p. 120. 72 For instance 17:266; Naito Chiso Tokugawa JUJ;[oaau;Jm ft;e, 6:106. 73 For a discussion of the 'process of authority see B.M. Bailey, (A Weberian " Asiatische AS1.atllques, XLIIIJ.1989, pp. 5-27. THE ECONOMIC OF THE FIFTH SHOGUN 53 an in the guard stations. the .::>tkt,j'{..U, kata tatami, out that they a particu- large Saiku kata included detailed. repair work, as that of shoji, but the production of public signboards and other plements.75 Ono no evidence that items pertained just to the shogunal or to and one must therefore assume that they, similarly, covered all structures under government control in Thus, to conclude .from an construction particularly of. mentioned that had something to. do with the piety or love luxury problelnatic. Secondly, fails to mention that one itt::m which can be most closely related to the standard of living of the shogunal family) that. for food stuffs (go makanai kata 1lPlifih) , drops by roughly ,on,e third from A to B, both in and pe]['centaLg tenns presumably to avoid inflation. But that raises the question of how COIIl- under examination ate. The individual are very large, and there no break-down of what expenditure they con- Moreover, there no evidence that the two sets the whole of the bakufu's budget, and that some expenditure included under In were not included and set out in a differ- ent budget in case of A, and vice versa. had not reached a high sophistication, such inconsistencies cannot discounted. This true since the two documents do not originate from the same source. Finally one whether one may accuse 74 Dna, pp. 200-202. 75 Sasama Y oshihiko ~J"JP'(;I?;:i> Eda oaK:UlU 1965, pp. 244-:245, 54 of spendthrift habits on the basis of an in expenditure within the period of his government. With no figures available for the C!'('\i!ay'n ment of the previous one might similarly that A, the expenditure during the early 1680s, was a of while B, that of the early 1690's, rer:)re~)ented until the expenditure of the fifth shogun seen within the that of his and SUCC9ssorS t and within the II.. "'.""""", it tens us comparatively little. IX. Conclusion. The fifth Tokugawa shogun Tsunayoshi much maligned on account of his spendthrift habits. What is seldom pointed out is that received a of and overheads from his but none of the reserves they had at their disposaL His ten successors in the of shogun similarly had to conduct ernment without any of the reserves the first four enjoyed. time went on the government had no choice but many of ob- ligations, until finally it could not even afford to reconstruct the main building of the shogunal castle when it burnt down in Bunkyii 3 (1863), In hindsight efforts to fulfill the government's traditional commitments could not but appear as and spendthrift. When viewed within a larger however. a different picture 'am~/:Ir(:rac.