Institutionalizing Rajadharma: Strategies of Sovereignty in the Eighteenth Century Jaipur

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Institutionalizing Rajadharma: strategies of sovereignty in the eighteenth century Jaipur

Fatima Ahmad Imam

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Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Department of History,

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INSTITUTIONALIZING RAJADHARMA: STRATEGIES OF SOVEREIGNTY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY JAIPUR (RAJASTHAN)

Fatima Imam

PhD dissertation, Department of History

University of Toronto

2008

My study deals with a neglected aspect of South Asian historiography, that is, the ways used by the rulers of indigenous states to legitimize and to institutionalize

Rajadharma: duties of the king This dissertation demonstrates that the Kachchwaha rulers of Jaipur reconfigured ritualistic and symbolic notions of kingship, modified political ideology, bolstered bureaucracy, and used urban space to assert their authority.

This in-depth analysis of a regional kingdom focuses on the political agency of its rulers to demonstrate how they articulated complex ideological frameworks of governance by engaging their societies in the institutionalization of sovereignty. The rulers and their subjects were not passive actors in the processes through which political authority was consolidated and systemized. These states strengthened their rule by incorporating urban and rural social groups in the realm of politics through a variety of

ii mechanisms. Furthermore, the most successful manifestation of the sovereignty of the

Indian rulers was their propagation of moralizing rhetoric articulated through the interpretation of law and the control of the judicial process. These were conscious and deliberate attempts by the Kachchwahas to delve more intrusively into their subject's lives at the level of everyday practice. This is especially evident in the realm of the family in order to reproduce gendered patriarchies.

This analysis of a regional kingdom adds to the existing critiques of models that have been hitherto used to study Indian political structures. Use of such models has led to study of the states as static, stagnant, and distant powers active only at the level of extraction and coercion. I have examined mostly un-catalogued archival material for the

Jaipur state that has been preserved in the Rajasthan state archives. The archives contain official correspondence, letters of direction, and statistical data on revenue, income, expenditure, fines, market rates, and taxes. The data contributes to present a multifaceted view of the political structure in Jaipur, where the practice of politics involved the management of the day-to-day lives of subjects through new forms of surveillance and control, including an efficient bureaucracy.

in Acknowledgments

I would like to express my utmost thanks and appreciation to Professor Ritu Birla for agreeing to take me as her graduate student and for her persevering guidance as my supervisor. Her unflagging support and encouragement made it possible for me to write my dissertation. I would like her to thank her especially for helping me to cultivate my academic voice. She inculcated the capacity for critical thinking with much patience and kindness. My sincere appreciation and gratitude for her time that she spent to revise, modify, and refine my arguments. I would also like to acknowledgement her generosity for recommending me for various teaching positions and scholarships.

I am very grateful to Professor Malavika Kasturi for her insightful comments and for her encouragement to clarify my thoughts as logical arguments. She was gracious enough to give me time whenever possible to discuss various aspects of my research and also to read my final draft. Professor Katherine Rankin, who has been a pillar of support during these years, introduced me to Foucauldian studies and thus helped me to analyze archival materials more critically. She generously offered her expertise on urban planning and helped me to write my chapter on the urban history of Jaipur.

I would also like to thank Professor Narendra Wagle, under whose guidance I started this project. Professors Julian Dent and Milton Israel were also very supportive during the early stages of my work.

iv The department of history, which has been very been generous in its financial

support, gave me grants from 2002 to 2005. My research trips to India were made

possible by grants from the Indo-Shastri Institute, the South Asian Program, and the

Asian Institute graduate program. Many thanks also to the Indo-Canadian Advisory

group and Eiproc for their generous grants. I thank the archivists and the staff members

of the Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner in India, for their assistance and patience during my stay. The librarians and support staff at the Sawai Man Singh II Museum Library in

Jaipur, the department of history, Aligarh university, was also very supportive. I am also very thankful to the members of history department at the University of Toronto, especially Professor Allan Greer, Jennifer, Louise, Vicky, Marion and Davina. My

sincere thanks are also due to Virginia Smith for editing my dissertation and for working with my deadlines patiently.

To Rashmi Swamp, my dear friend and mentor, I want to say a particular thank you for being there whenever I needed her, and sincere thanks to Poonam. I want to thank all my family members, especially my uncle Ilyas Safavi, and my brother Fazal Imam, for giving me much needed moral support. Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my mother, Khursheed Zia Begum, and my children, Mohammad and Zehra Hasnain.

Thank you for being there for me. You have made my life so wonderful and meaningful, and I did this for you.

v Table of contents

Introduction: 1

Pre-colonial states: Orientalist writing and uni-dimensional critiques 3 Debates about Eighteenth century in India 8 Lacunae in historiography on Pre-colonial states 11 Methodology and Sources 14 Jaipur state: geographical background and political history 16 Chapter summaries 20

One: Political transformation of Amber from a small patrimony to a Sovereign state

Introduction/Historiography 23 Legitimization of rule through religious and social reform 30 The Mughal-Kachchwaha alliance: pre-eminence in the sixteenth and 39 seventeenth centuries Processes of State formation in the Jaipur state 45 Concluding remarks 64 Appendixes 66

Two: The State and its fiscal partners: the ruling elites as bureaucratic co-sharers of power and resources

Introduction/Historiography 72 Bureaucratic functions of the state 74 Methods of assessment, agrarian changes, and re-distribution of income 82 among the ruling elites Merchants, Markets and State surveillance 102 Concluding remarks 116 Appendixes 118

Three: The city of Jaipur: exemplification of the use of urban space

Introduction/Historiography 141 Hindu Muslim models for Pre-colonial Indian cities 146 Selection of the site and planning of the city 153 Use of urban space 167 Concluding remarks 171 Appendixes 173

Four: Law, administrative practices, and the institutionalization of power

VI Introduction/Historiography Organization of judicial system 185 Violent crimes, theft, and moral vices 192 Everyday acts of disorderly behaviour 213 Concluding remarks 220

Five: Moralizing rhetoric or an interventionist state? Gender relations, social institutions and the imposition of caste (jati) norms

Introduction/Historiography 223 Social institutions and Gender relations 228 Domestic violence and the state 246 Crimes against women: cham-chori or sexual misdemeanours 251 Concluding remarks 261 Appendixes 263

Conclusion 275

Glossary 280

Bibliography 282

vn INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the innovative processes developed by the Kachchwaha rulers of eighteenth century Jaipur to legitimize and negotiate sovereignty.1 This investigation of the strategies and methods of governance expands the theoretical framework for the study of Indian political structures, which have not been thoroughly studied for two major reasons. First, study of the eighteenth century has been dominated by the examination of empires; second, only recently has research about state formations been released from the use of Orientalist models.

Elements of Kachchwaha sovereignty are mapped beyond the territorial domain and explored in relation to new aspects of indigenous societies, such as the involvement of these rulers with different communities. A focus on the intrusive nature of the Jaipur state reveals the contentious relationship between the Kachchwaha rulers and their subjects. This study also details the ways in which socio-cultural norms, gender relations, and economic resources were managed and controlled in Jaipur. The themes addressed in this analysis broaden the conventional definition ofrajadharma (the duties of the king) to encompass the techniques of rule deployed by the

Indian rulers to accommodate various social groups' competing aspirations and to incorporate them into the realm of politics.

The study of pre-colonial Indian states has been influenced by theories of Oriental despotism, and for a long time historians were preoccupied with either proving or refuting this concept, that Indian states were authoritarian, distant, and active only on the level of revenue extraction. The Western interpretation of the Mughal emperors as despotic rulers was evoked

This Rajput clan claimed patrimonial rights over this area fromth e eleventh century onwards after defeating the ruling dynasty of the Minas. 1 by Francois Bernier in the seventeenth century when he commented on the desolate conditions

of the common people. He pictured "a tyranny often so excessive as to deprive the peasant and

artisan of his necessities of life, and leave them to die of misery and exhaustion." South Asian

scholarship has successfully altered Orientalist notions about pre-colonial Indian states; most of

the credible contributions to an overall critique of this model, especially in relation to the

Mughal Empire, have come from the Aligarh historians. These scholars have focused upon the

fiscal abilities of the Mughal Empire to prove that it was a quasi-modern state.3 However, their

overemphasis on the features of the centrally controlled sub-continental empire has led some

scholars to argue that the Oriental despotic model has been reshaped by these historians into a

2 Francois Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire, 1656-68, trans. Irving Brocke and A. Constable (London: University Press, 1916), 224. This idea of Oriental despotism gained popularity when Bernier's testimony was accepted by the French philosopher Charles de Montesquieu. Asiatic states that lacked private property or a hereditary nobility were depicted as tyrannical and arbitrary in nature. Montesquieu further elaborated this model by asserting that these societies were unchanging and devoid of any legal or written codes. For more details, see Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1974), 464. Adam Smith refined this concept in his explanation of the difference between European and Asian economies. He made the assumption that because the rulers in Asia and Africa were owners of all land and their policies encouraged only the agrarian sector. See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: W. Strahan & T. Cadell, 1778), vol. 2,28. In the nineteenth century, German scholar W. G. F. Hegel followed on the framework created by Montesquieu by commenting that "we found a moral despotism in China, whatever may be called a relic of political life in India, is a despotism without a principle, without any rule of morality and religion; in India, therefore, the most arbitrary, wicked, degrading despotism has its full swing," W. G. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History (Trubner: K. Paul & Trench, 1892-6), 161. After the start of the political conquest by the English East India Company, the characterization of Indian states as despotic was revived in the writings of James Grant and John Shore in the Fifth Report of 1812. This theory was further embellished by James Mill, who agreed that all the backwardness of Indian society was due to medieval despotism; James Mill, History of British India (London: Baldwin, Cradock, & Joy, 1818). Oriental despotism appeared in a different form and context in the writings of Karl Marx, whose views were based on considerable economic data from colonial administrative records and on Bernier's account. Marx offered an example of non-capitalist economy that subsisted on self-sufficient village communities. For more details, see Irfan Habib, "Marx's Perception of India," In Essays in Indian History towards a Marxist Perception (New Delhi: Tulika, 1995), 22-29. Marx's idea of the Asiatic mode of production was criticized by Karl Wifftogel, who condemned all socialists and aspiring welfare states as mere vestiges of Oriental despotism {Oriental Despotism, Yale: Yale University Press, 1957). Indian nationalist historians defended the pre- colonial states by tracing the republic's principles of equity and constitutionalism. The nationalist historians contributed to an understanding of a medieval state that was designed to have checks and balances within it. Beni Prasad, Theory of Government in Ancient India (Delhi: Bharitya Vidya Bhawan, 1927); R. C. Majumdar, Corporate Life in Ancient India (New Delhi, Bharitya Vidya Bhawan, Reprint, 1969); R. S. Sharma, Indian Feudalism (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1980); R. P. Tirpathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration (New Delhi: Indian Press, 2nd Edition, 1956); Ibn Hasan, The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire (New Delhi: Munshi Manohar, 1970) and P. Saran, Provincial Government of the Mughals (Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1941). 3 Irfan Habib, Agrarian System of India (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, First edition, 1963, Reprint, 1999) & "Potentialities of Capitalistic Development in the Economy of Mughal India," The Journal of Economic History, vol. 29, No. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 32-78; M. Athar Ali, "Passing of the Mughal Empire," Modern Asian Studies, vol. 9, No. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 385-96, and, most recently, Shireen Moosvi, Presidential Address to the Medieval Section, Indian History Congress, Burdwan session (Delhi: Tulika, 2004). 2 vision of class-based exploitation and of a uni-dimensional relationship between the rulers and their subjects.4 In the debate about the nature of Indian states, the term "Oriental despotism" seems to have receded into the background by 1950s.5 Still, the specific features associated with this model continue to dominate most of the writings on the political history of the Indian sub continent.

The overarching features of this model that still dominate the historiography have to do with political agency, or lack thereof, especially in the states of the eighteenth century. In short, there remains a flat analysis of indigenous rulers' political agency. They are cast as excessively coercive as manifest in military mythology, and at the same time as excessively passive and indifferent to their subjects. Moreover, many analyses override the question of rulers' strategies of sovereignty by emphasizing the ultimate authority of tradition: caste, religion, and ritual in

Indian society. Such works thus repeat the classic Orientalist worldview that religion subsumed politics in Indian society.

INDIAN STATES: ORIENTALIST WRITINGS AND UNI-DIMENSIONAL CRITIQUES

The historiography of eighteenth-century states has been particularly influenced by the notion of coercive and military-minded states. Burton Stein, for example, put forward the model of "military fiscalism," one that accounts for the operation of the eighteenth-century state of

4 See Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Muzaffar Alam, ed., The Mughal Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), for a stinging attack on the historiography produced by the Aligarh historians on the Mughal Empire. Recent works by Farhat Hasan, State and locality in Mughal India: power relations in western India, c. 1572-1730 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) and Nandita Prasad Sahai, Politics of patronage and protest: the state, society, and artisans in early modern Rajasthan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006) have also critiqued their scholarship. 5 Shireen Moosvi, Presidential Address in Medieval History section, Burdwan session (Tulika, 2004). 3 Mysore. B. Stein defines this structure as follows: "military fiscalism pertains to a centrally controlled body of officials who collect revenue from a broad base of payers for the purpose of maintaining a centrally controlled and hegemonic military system."7 In his seminal study on the

Marathas in the eighteenth century, Andre Wink suggests that "Jitna" that is sedition and rebellion—were basic features of Indian polities and those military contestations for political sovereignty were frequent throughout Indian history. Frank Perlin contributes to this analysis by elaborating the notion that political power was mostly localized and rural.9 This analytical approach to the study of pre-colonial Indian states asserts that instable and fluid political structures could be sustained only through military might and coercion. The rhetoric implicit in these characterizations of Indian states has been that the states were either centrally controlled coercive regimes10 or personalized patrimonies.11 Both kinds of argument depict the state as alienated or as a party to a one-sided relationship with the society. There has been very little analysis about the successes and failures of the Indian states in their efforts to sustain their power vis-a-vis dominant social groups. The rulers are depicted as coercive, but without subtle analysis of their idioms of authority or strategies for managing different sectors of society. Most often, the Orientalist notion of arbitrary power is depicted as the mainstay of the Mughal

Empire. Doyens of South Asian history like Tapan Raychaudhari have concluded that the rulers'

6 Burton Stein, "State Formation and Economy Reconsidered," in Modern Asian Studies, 19, 3, (July, 1985), 387- 413. 7 Stein, "State Formation Reconsidered," 302-3. 8 Andre Wink, Land and Sovereignty: agrarian society and politics under the 18th century Maratha Svaraja (Cambridge: Cambridgeshire, 1986), Introduction. 9 Frank Perlin, "State Formation Reconsidered," in Modern Asian Studies, 19, 3, (July, 1985) 432-33. 10 Broadly, Aligarh historians assign too much importance to the centralized bureaucracy and also assume that as soon as the leadership crumbled and failed to steer the system smoothly, the empire collapsed under its own weight as articulated in M. Athar Ali, "The Passing of Empire: The Mughal Case," Modern Asian Studies, IX, Cambridge, 1975; "Eighteenth century—An Interpretation," Indian Historical Review, Nos. 1-2, 174, and Satish Chandra's Medieval India—Society, the Jagirdari Crisis, and the Village (New Delhi: Manohar, 1982), 63. Satish Chandra revised his analysis on the decline of the Mughal Empire in Deuskar Lectures, 1983, Eighteenth century in India (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1992), 6-18. 11 Stephen Blake has used Max Weber's model of Patrimonial Bureaucracy for the Mughal Empire; see "The Patrimonial Bureaucratic Empire of the Mughals," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 39, 1, November 1979, 77- 99; Shahjahanabad: The Sovereign City in Mughal India, 1639-1739 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). John F. Richards agrees with Stephen Blake; see The Mughal Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 59. 4 violent and brutal methods of dealing with their subjects are evident throughout the history of the empire.12 Kate Teltscher has made one of the most recent additions to the historiography of

Oriental despotism in her account of the brutality and violence used by Haider Ali and Tipu

Sultan.13

In tandem with this un-problematized image of violence is the belief of some scholars that Indian rulers showed complete indifference towards their subjects, and were only concerned with the extraction of revenues from them. These scholars say that local affairs were looked after by the caste and village councils.14 The reason usually cited by scholars for the limited authority of these states includes the ruler's lack of a sustainable ideology that could evolve and integrate different sections of the population. That is, sovereignty has been understood as deriving its power from ritualistic and spiritually ordained performances. The study of the political agency of rulers has been eclipsed by a focus on the agency of tradition and its ritualistic scripts. In this vein, the Vijaynagar empire and other south Indian kingdoms have received the attention of historians and anthropologists, who emphasize the ritualistic sovereignty and religious aspect of Indian kingship. There has been general consensus among scholars that the Indian rulers could claim autonomous powers only through religious rhetoric.

12 Tapan Raychaudhari, "Nearly every foreign observer spoke of the relentless tyranny suffered by the artisan, a description confirmed by the indigenous accounts of the manner in which the sair duties on the manufactured goods were collected and literary references to extortions by even the village headmen. The whip and cudgel were freely used not only by the noble's minions but by the middlemen as well." "Non Agricultural Production," in Tapan Raychaudhari & Irfan Habib, ed., The Cambridge Economic History of India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), vol. 1.284. 13 Kate Teltscher, India Ascribed: European and British writing on India (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1995), 229-59. 14 This line of argument has gained a lot of currency, and it is contended that "government seldom interfered into the affairs of the merchants," Ashin Das Gupta, "Indian merchants and the trade in the Indian Ocean," in Tapan Raychaudhari & Irfan Habib, ed., The Cambridge Economic History of India, 421-22. Bayly in Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, 5 and 11, argues that only eighteenth-century states were able to penetrate beneath the pargana (provincial-level) administration. 5 They have therefore undermined Indian rulers' active and conscious production of new

administrative structures for sovereign authority.15

Newer research, however, has emphasized that rulers used ritual authority to redefine the

political sphere.16 Now, the ritualistic performances of Indian rulers are discussed in the context

of political strategies and how they became integral for the institutionalization of power. Ronald

Inden's study on the medieval kingdom of Rashtrakutas (Central India) charts how ritualistic

functions enabled Rashtrakuta rulers to legitimize their rule. Inden also points out that the

multiple rites performed by the kings were signs of a constant struggle to maintain their

sovereignty among competing groups in the kingdom.17 Nicholas Dirks emphasizes the role of

the tradition of gifts and honours in the "little kingdom" of Pudukkottai as a practice that

systematized the political authority of the kings.18 Norbert Peabody concludes that an alliance

established between the rulers and the dominant social groups was contentious and discusses at

length how the Kota Maharajagaran utilized ritualistic and spiritual modes of Hindu kingship to

assert their authority.19 In this dissertation, I am interested in supplementing these analyses by

exploring how Kachchwaha rulers deployed ritualistic idioms to legitimize the new arenas of

sovereignty they produced.

15 Norobu Karashima, ed., Kingship in Indian History (Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1999). The overview of the Vijaynagar Empire as a ritualistic centre has been revised by Champak Lakshmi and Chattopdhaya. For more details, see N. Karashima, Kingship in Indian history, Introduction. Stanley Tambiah, The Galactic Polity of South East Asia, in Culture, Thought, and Social Action: An Anthropological Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 252-86. 17 Ronald Inden, "Ritual authority and Cyclic Time in Hindu Kingship," in John F. Richards, ed., Kingship and A uthority in South Asia (Madison-Wisconsin, 1978), 41 -91. 18 Nicholas Dirks, The Hallow Crown: Ethno-history of an Indian Kingdom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 19 Norbert Peabody has extended Stanley Tambiah's concept of Galactic polity of South East Asia to study the eighteenth-century Kota state in Rajasthan. For more details, see his Introduction: Hindu Kingship and polity in precolonial India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 6 Furthermore, the emergence of certain Mughal successors has been attributed

wholeheartedly to ethnic affiliation, where modern homogenized understandings of caste and

Of)

ethnicity are read back into the eighteenth century. Again, it is the agency of "tradition" rather

than that of rulers that is emphasized. In the case of eighteenth-century Rajput states, no account

has captivated the imagination of the literary audience as much as James Tod's Annals and

Antiquities ofRajputana, where he describes these groups as "brave and chivalrous warrior

tribes of Rajpootana (Rajputana)". His work remains the most authoritative, alongside William

Crooke's The Tribes and Castes of North Western India. The colonial perception of fixed caste

hierarchies also influenced the construction of caste and ethnic identities. This image of the

Rajputs has permeated post-colonial studies. R. G. Fox, whose work on Rajput brotherhoods is

based on genealogical histories, believes that Rajput clans were the building blocks from which

small regional structures were formed in Northern India. He views kinship as the fixed and sole 0~K

driving force behind Rajput identity and social change. Other scholars who have studied the

Rajputs, like K. H. A. Kolff, Norbert Peabody, and Norman Zeigler, have modified Fox's

analysis to a large extent.24 Nonetheless, their focus primarily centres on the importance of

James Tod, Annals and Antiquities ofRajasthan or the Central and Western Rajpoot States of India, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1920). Norman Zeigler has revised James Tod's perceptions of Rajput clans by elucidating their openness to adapt and align themselves with other communities, especially during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See "Rajput Loyalties during the Mughal period," pp. 215-51, in John F. Richards, ed., Kingship and Authority in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1978). B. D. Chattopadhyaya has traced the earliest origins of the Rajput to Central Asia and has described how the Rajputs integrated themselves into warrior groups for centuries before settling down in western India; see "The Emergence of the Rajputs as Historical Process in Early Medieval Rajasthan," in Karine Schomer et al., ed., The Idea ofRajasthan in Regional Identity, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1994), pp. 161-91. 21 Tod, Annals and Antiquities ofRajasthan. 22 William Crooke, The Tribes and Castes of North Western India (Delhi: Oriental Books Corp, Reprint 1969, First edition, 1915), 4 vols. 23 R. G. Fox, Kin, Clan, Raja, and Rule: State Hinterland Relations in pre-Industrial India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), Introductions. For more details on Fox's hypothesis, see Malavika Kasturi's Embattled Identities: Rajput Lineages and the colonial state in nineteenth-century north India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), Introduction. 24 Norman Zeigler has revised James Tod's perceptions of Rajput clans by elucidating their openness to adapt and align themselves with other communities, especially during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See "Rajput Loyalties during the Mughal period," in John F. Richards, ed., Kingship and Authority in South Asia (New Delhi, 1978), D. H. A. Kolff, Naukar, Rajput, and Sepoy: The Ethno-history of the Military Labour Market of Hindustan, 7 lineages, kinship, and tradition as the cornerstones of Rajput polities. On the contrary, I am arguing that ethnic and clan solidarities, though utilized in the initial stages of state formation

(examples can be taken from Sikh, Afghan, and Jat principalities), were not responsible for the ultimate successes or failures of Indian states. These were dependent upon political alliances, the systemization of rule, and the subtle utilization of administrative infrastructure to assimilate various sections of populations into their jurisdiction.

In this dissertation, the relevance of preconceived models is questioned by illustrating the flexibility and adaptability of Indian states. The rulers of Jaipur epitomized the predisposition of the eighteenth-century regional kingdoms to transform and integrate traditional forms of kingship to legitimize their power. They continued to maintain cordial relations with the Mughals and at the same time reasserted their clan ties as a way of consolidating their hold on Jaipur and neighbouring areas.

DEBATES ABOUT EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY INDIA

The eighteenth century in India has been studied to formulate theories on the fall of the

Mughal Empire and its repercussions on the regions or to explain and understand the transition to colonialism by the English East India Company. More specifically, this century has been the focus of historians who want to understand the effects of British imperialism on the Indian economy, polity, and society. This kind of categorization of historical periods, which classifies progress and advancement of societies according to the purview of empires, is also questioned here through in- depth study of a regional state. Recent historiographical works have shifted the focus to the study of

1450-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Kolff also delineates the abilities of the Rajputs to make alliances with other communities in his book. 8 different forms of state formation in the eighteenth century in their specific environments, and not as extensions of the centralized and bureaucratic Mughal Empire, or simply as a preamble to the history of Indian colonialism.

Aligarh historians focus on the Mughal Empire and the processes through which its political hegemony was established on the Indian sub-continent during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. According to these historians, the Mughals were able to both assimilate the local and regional administrative personnel into their fold and standardize the land revenue system, coinage, urban taxes, weights and measures, credit, and interest rates, leading to the monetization of the economy. There is little disagreement on these issues among scholars who are working on the eighteenth century, but their opinions diverge on what happened after the death of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (1707). Aligarh historians regard the death of

Aurangzeb as the starting point for what they call the "decentralization" and "decline" of the

Mughal Empire. According to them, this process resulted in the weakening of the administration and led to famines, rebellions, wars, and foreign invasions. The chaotic conditions of the eighteenth century were responsible for the establishment of the East India Company's rule in

Bengal in 1765.26 Broadly, Aligarh historians' point of view is as the centre became weak; the regions withered away into oblivion and chaos.

This overarching view of the Mughal decline has been modified by a number of social and political historians, who have proceeded by diverting attention from the centre to the

25 Main historians of this group are Irfan Habib, Athar Ali, Satish Chandra, Iqtidar A. Khan, Shireen Moosvi, and Satish Chandra. 26 Irfan Habib, "The Eighteenth Century in Indian Economic History," Leonard Blusse and Femme Gaastra, ed., On the Eighteenth Century as a Category of Asian History: Van Leur in Retrospect (Hampshire, 1998), 217-235; Athar Ali, "The Passing of Empire: the Mughal case," 385-96; "The Eighteenth Century—An Interpretation," Indian Historical Review, vol. 5, No. 1 (Jan-Apr 1978), 175-86; and "The Mughal polity—A critique of Revisionist Approaches," Modern Asian Studies, vol. 27, No. 4 (October 1993), 699-710. 9 regions. The dissociation of the centre from the regions has been studied in an effort to

understand the nature of political transformation in the eighteenth century. Christopher Bayly

challenges the "dark ages" interpretation of the eighteenth century by outlining three major

developments in North India: a) the emergence of mercantile organization, which featured the

coalescence of merchant and agrarian interests and their involvement in politics, b) a

"gentrification" process, which brought together a class of scribes, accountants, and other

Mughal service groups that served the new powers locally and invested in small towns (qasba);

and c) the practice of "military fiscalism," which meant the maintenance of large armies and

97 their deployment in revenue collection. In his later writings, Bayly has shown how the regional

rulers increased their control through an "informational order" that formalized their bureaucratic

networks.28 According to Bayly, these developments in eighteenth-century India were part of a

larger global picture that included regional powers in North Africa, South America, and Russia 9Q who were similarly posed on the eve of their colonialization. There was restructuring of power relations in these societies, and the new gentry's power was linked to an increasing consolidation of landed power.

During the past forty years, seminal studies have been produced on the successor states of Awadh, Bengal, Punjab, Maratha states, and Rajasthan.30 These works indicate that the

Christopher Bayly, Rulers, townsmen, and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion 1770- 1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1-34. Christopher A. Bayly, Empire and Information: intelligence gathering and social communication in India 1780- 1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 32-36. 29 Bayly, Empire and Information, 1-36. Richard Barnett, North India between empires: Awadh, the Mughals, and the British, 1720-1801 (California: California University Press, 1980); Muzaffar Alam, The crisis of empire in Mughal north India: Awadh and Punjab, 1707-48 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986); Sushil Chaudhary, From Prosperity to Decline: Eighteenth Century Bengal (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1995); Chetan Singh, Region and empire: Punjab in the seventeenth century (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1991); J. S. Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab (Delhi: Manohar, 1995); Stewart Gordon, "The Slow Conquest: Administrative Integration of Malwa into the Maratha Empire, 1720-60," in Modern Asian Studies, vol. 11, No. 1, (January 1977), 1-40; Frank Perlin, "Of White Whales and Countrymen in eighteenth century Maratha Deccan," in Journal of Peasant Studies, 5 (1978), 72-237; Andre Wink, Land and Sovereignty in India, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Dilbagh 10 trajectories of regional alienation from the centre were diverse. The consensus seems to be that the shift to regional powers occurred differently in every region. With their critical analysis, these scholars of the successor states have enhanced historiography on the politics, societies, and economies of these kingdoms. The regional powers started reasserting themselves once the

Mughal administrative system began to collapse in the early decades of the eighteenth century.

Their attempt to isolate themselves from the chaotic conditions of Mughal court politics resulted

-3-1 in the establishment of regional kingdoms also known as the successor states.

The commercialization and monetization of the Mughal economy had brought prosperity to the local areas and had resulted in a strengthening of the power of the hereditary landholders, who had first collaborated with the Mughal mansabdars in order to keep their areas under control. Starting in the early decades of the eighteenth century, these zamindars in

Awadh, Bengal, and Bihar and the regional rulers Rajputs, Jats, Sikhs, and Afghans started creating problems for the Mughal administration and refused to comply with its demands. As these groups raised rebellions, the Mughal subedars enhanced their power by using the resources of their provinces.32

These works on the eighteenth century have certainly developed a more nuanced understanding of the political transformation to colonialism. Yet many pertinent questions regarding the processes of legitimization and assimilation, and also regarding contestation of the authority enacted by these states, still have to be asked. The study of eighteenth-century regimes has to be addressed individually in order to discover possible answers. This analysis on the

Singh, The State, Landlords, and Peasants: Rajasthan in the 18th century (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1990) and Madhu Sethia, Rajput polity, warriors, peasants, and merchants, 1700-1800 (Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 2003). Alam, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India, 14-17. 32 Habib, The Agrarian System of India. 11 formation of Jaipur state seeks to broaden and enhance existing historiography on the reassertion of regional powers. The rich archival material in the vernacular languages of the regional states illustrate that the classification of the periods of Indian political history from the dynastic point of view ignores the vitality of the political activity going on in the peripheral areas.

LACUNAE IN HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE EIGHTEENTH INDIAN STATES

The processes of state formation in several successor states to the Mughals saw a coalition of new ruling elites and the promotion of regional cultures. Most historical writings about Indian states focus on their dynastic, political, social, and cultural contributions. Missing from these narratives are accounts of contradictions that the Indian states had to resolve in order to maintain power. The majority of political and cultural histories to date have not indicated that power had to be shared, accommodated, and tolerated at several levels to maintain rulers' control.

More attention must be paid to the ways in which these states experimented with the nature of sovereignty itself. For instance, the architectural marvels of the city of Jaipur are here examined not, as they usually are, as examples of a classical Hindu worldview. By challenging this approach, and, more broadly, the approach to Indian cities as manifestations of either Hindu or Muslim architecture, I place the focus of analysis on the strategies of the king himself. I argue that the study of the pattern and specificity of design followed in urban centres can offer new perspectives about the visions of political authority. I thus explore the architectural history of Jaipur to address the wide range of strategies through which the rules established and reproduced their legitimacy.

12 Historians working on the eighteenth century Indian states have not addressed the various ways in which sovereignty was actively produced: how did Indian states deal with their subjects, and what kinds of strategies were deployed to establish efficient administrative systems? This dissertation emphasizes that Indian states were constantly negotiating and redefining their authority by containing contestation for power with the help of caste councils. The states sometimes interfered with the councils' jurisdiction. Probing the contours of jurisdictional authority reveals the contentious nature of Indian kingship. This reality contradicts notions that either the kings enjoyed hegemonic powers or were delegated symbolic governance. The argument that caste and communal norms had mummified Indian communities and prevented them from retaliating or challenging the hegemonic political power proclaimed by the kings is contested here. Farhat Hasan and Nandita

Sahai have also criticized this kind of historiography in relation to the Indian states by providing examples of how these states legitimized and institutionalized power through multiple alliances with different social groups.33

Perhaps the most neglected aspect of Indian political history are the ways in which moralizing rhetoric was used by rulers to intervene in and mediate the day-to-day lives of their subjects. Evidence from Jaipur state and other contemporary polities elucidate surveillance and enumeration techniques that were articulated as the gendered and moral discourses of the eighteenth century. New kinds of control that would properly manage and control various sections of the population were made possible through successful implementation of a cohesive ideology of rule. A specific achievement was the development of an efficient system of governance that provided equitable justice irrespective of caste status. The systemization of rule and propagation of moralizing rhetoric was a collaborative effort in which the rulers incorporated the ruling elites. The process was initially started by including the members of ruling clan, and, in Jaipur's case, the

33 Hasan, State and Locality in Mughal India and Sahai, Politics of patronage and protest. 13 Kachchwahas were the ones, whose cooperation was solicited in the early decades of the eighteenth century. Then the mercantile communities were gradually brought to the forefront through encouragement of their activities, and giving them control of the financial resources of the state.

The rulers, who are usually depicted as distant and hesitant individuals, are not given enough credit for accumulating resources and income through various sources, such as trade, markets, or the establishment of bureaucratic positions that were sold, bought, and mortgaged by them. Jaipur state was not structured along militaristic lines, and it became one of the richest states of Northern India through the political strategies of incorporation, that is, involvement of different sections of the society into the production of sovereignty.

The primary focus of this analysis is the rise of the state of Jaipur from a small Rajput patrimonial state to an independent polity through new forms and patterns of governance. The rulers of this polity envisioned political and economic security that would be achieved by collaborating and re-distributing its financial resources among its active supporters, who belonged to different ruling and non-ruling sections of the population. This project addresses sovereignty as a wide range of practices and so presents a notion of sovereignty that cannot be reduced to military coercion.

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

This dissertation explores Indian states, focusing on the Kachchwaha rulers of Jaipur and the ways in which they integrated social groups through the tactics of incorportional politics.

During the institutionalization of the power structure that began in the early decades of the eighteenth century, an embedded contradiction arose between the centralizing aims of the rulers and the claims of the social groups that had been brought under control by the Kachchwahas. 14 This contentious relationship is discernible in the official discourse, which shows how the

strategies of both the rulers and the ruled changed and evolved to accommodate each other. This

dissertation engages into an analysis of power as a combative, integrative, and also as an

incorportional process. It views the emergence of political authority in the Jaipur state as a two-

way process that required both the kings and their subjects to engage in give-and-take

exchanges. It argues that the states operated within previously established societal norms and

that their success or failure depended upon their ability to use strategies to establish and

institutionalize sovereignty. Equally important considerations are the processes through which

the different social groups of this kingdom used their status to co-share and exercise sovereign

authority by appropriating the ruler's claims as their own and institutionalizing those claims in

most instances. •34

This thesis examines the archival material, mostly un-catalogued, in vernacular

Rajasthani (or dhundari style, which is highly Persianized) preserved in the Rajasthan state

archives at Bikaner. These sources contain extremely rich empirical data on revenue statistics,

income, expenditures, fines, market rates, and taxes. The material also consists of official

Michel Foucault's analytical approach to the strategies, tactics, and mechanisms of power in eighteenth-century France is quite helpful in the study of pre-colonial Indian states. More specifically, Foucault's engagement with the production of sovereignty through his attention to discourses on the art of governing is useful in analyzing the incorportional politics of the Kachchwaha rulers. Foucault investigates how, by the eighteenth century, sovereignty no longer referred only to rule over territory, but also became involved in the lives of subjects. For more details see Michel Foucault, "Governmentality" in Graham Burchell and Colin Gordon, ed. The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. More broadly, Foucault's analysis of power as "a network of relations constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess;" as a "perpetual battle rather than a contract regulating a transaction or the conquest of a territory," is helpful in drawing attention to the ways in which subjects challenged new forms of sovereignty and also worked within them. See Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Random House, 1995), 26-7. The official correspondence of Jaipur state, which consists of letters, instructions, and royal orders, reveals how Jaipur's rulers negotiated with local elites, modified political ideology to accommodate changes, and used the rhetoric of morality and symbolic notions of kingship to legitimize their authority. Furthermore, the Kachchwaha's use of urban space for the assertion of political authority is also inspired by Michel Foucault to discuss the construction and political dimensions of the capital city of Jaipur. In his interview with Paul Rainbow, Foucault commented on the development of urban architecture as a political strategy, for more details see "Space, Knowledge and Power", in Paul Rainbow ed. Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 239-56.

15 correspondence and other directive letters. The largest category of documents in the archives consists of the arhsattas, which contain mostly statistical information about the annual income and expenditures of Jaipur state. These sources were compiled from 68 (arhsatta in Rajasthani) different sources.35 In order to perform an in-depth examination of the official discourse, the arhsattas of six contiguous provinces of the Jaipur state were used: Sawai Jaipur (also known as

Amber until 1724), Bahatri, Chatsu, Lalsot, Dausa, and Malarna. Most of the information in the documents from 1700 to 1798 regarding revenue assessments, taxation, criminal penalties, and commercial levies is similar. The arhsattas from pargana Sawai Jaipur are the main focus of this dissertation. Besides the arhsattas, there is a large number of official orders (or parwanas) issued by the rulers to their officials regarding various administrative details. There are also sanads, which are the statements regarding: emoluments, titles, privileges, offices, revenue concessions, tax and revenue exemptions, which were issued by the diwarts office on the orders of the Kachchwaha rulers.36 The most numerous of all are the letters (or chittis), also known as muwazana-kalan or muwazana khurd. These are usually short documents that are compiled in the archives on an annual basis. The letters from 1700 to 1780 were reviewed to obtain valuable information about state policies regarding social groups, including ordinary peasants, artisans, merchants, mendicants, and members of the elite population living in the rural and urban areas of the Jaipur state. Dastur-ul-amals (schedules of revenue rates) were instructive orders by which the rulers wrote to their officials about revenue rates, levies on agricultural and non- agricultural products, taxes, and tolls on the mercantile communities. The Dastur-ul-amal chabutra kotwali pargana Phagi of 1713 and the dastur-ul-amal Mapa Rahdari of Bahatri and

Chatsu (1798) are used in this dissertation for the examination of urban taxation.

35 The Arhsattas were compiled annually, but for some years the statistical information for several months is missing. This is due to the fact that the archives are kept in deplorable conditions and there is no attempt to preserve or microfilm these documents. 36 The abridged versions of the parwanas and sanads that have been published are more detailed and conclusive than what is now available in the Bikaner archives. Most of the material has been lost, misplaced or eaten by moths. The author visited the archives in 1999, 2001, and 2005 to collect material for this dissertation. 16 THE JAIPUR STATE: ITS GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL HISTORY

Amber (Jaipur) under Sawai Jai Singh (1700-1743 CE) became an independent state because of the fluid political situation at that time and the slackening control of the Mughal

Empire's authority over its provinces. As an astute politician and capable administrator, Jai

Singh began expanding the boundaries of his patrimony fief of Amber. When he had succeeded in establishing full control over the neighbouring region through intimidation and conquest, he became the de facto ruler of that region. The state of Amber (Jaipur), popularly known as the

Dhundhar, had been the homeland of the Kachchwahas clan after its migration from Narwar

(Gwalior) in Madhya Pradesh. The state more or less covers the districts of Jaipur, Sawai

Madhopur, Alwar, Tonk, Sikar, and Jhunjhunu in present day Rajasthan.39 The physical features of the varied landscape include mountain ranges, rivers, valleys, forests, fertile plateaus, and a desert. The Aravalli Mountains, one of the oldest mountain ranges in the world, divide

Rajasthan from end to end into two natural divisions. These mountains affect the climate of the state and protect it from the influx of sand. Jaipur is situated in the central Aravalli region, which extends from Sambhar Lake to the Bharat Plateau south of Deogarh peak. This area is an elevated tableland of a triangular landform 1400 feet to 1600 feet above sea level.40 Jaipur is bounded by the districts of Churu of Rajasthan, Hissar, Rewari, and Mahendragarh of Haryana

There are different spellings of this term. I am using Kachchwaha based on the standardized charts approved by the Library of Congress. 38 "The Cuchwaha or Cuchwa race claims descent from Cush, the second son of Lord Rama, king of Koshala, whose capital was Ayodha (modern Oude). Cush and some of his immediate offspring are said to have migrated from the parental abode and erected the celebrated castle of Rohtas on the Soane, whence in the lapse of several generations another distinguished scion Raja Nal, migrated westward in AD 295 and founded the kingdom of Narwar (Nishidhia)." Tod, Annals and antiquities of Rajasthan, 333. 3 Shy am Singh Ratnawat, Rajput nobility: with special reference to the Kachchawaha nobility of Jaipur during 1700-1858 A.D (Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 1990), 1. 40 Jadunath Sarkar, A History of Jaipur, revised and edited Raghubir Sinh, (New Delhi: Orient Longman Publications, 1984), 2. When Sarkar was commissioned by the Maharaja of Jaipur in 1939 to write the official history of Kachchwahas, many rare documents were made available to him from the personal collection of the Kachchwaha royal family which are not available in the archives. 17 in the West, by Nagpur and Ajmer in the North, by Bhilwara and the Bundi districts of

Rajasthan in the South, and by Gwalior of Madhya Pradesh, Bharatpur, and Dholpur Rajasthan in the East.41 The territory lies between northern latitudes 25.40 and 27.40 and between eastern longitudes 78.40 and 77.20.42

Amber, a centrally located region, was ruled by the Minas before the coming of the

Rajputs.43 The Minas, believed to have belonged to a mixed and impure caste, were the original inhabitants of that area. The Kachchwahas conquered Mina territories and converted them into hereditary land holdings. Mina lands were divided into twelve parts, and hence were known as

Baramina.44 Kachchwaha history is shrouded in myths created by oral traditions and bardic exaggeration and the written records about this dynasty began only after their alliance with the

Mughals. However, it seems that the importance of the Kachchwahas increased around the tenth century, according to epigraphical evidence found in the areas around the Chambal River in

Central India. Several inscriptions have been discovered that show that at that time, three important families of this clan ruled over a vast territory in Madhya Pradesh, with Gwalior,

Dubkhund, and Narwar as the clan's capitals. Dulha Rai was the real conqueror of the Dhundhar land. He left Gwalior around 1071 CE to invade the territory of the Minas. He subdued the

Minas and married the daughter of Chauhan Raja of Lalsot, receiving Dausa fort upon his marriage. He then conquered the strongholds of the Minas, which were the forts of Khor and

Jhatwara. His successors Pajvan and Malesi continued their father's expansionist policies and elevated the state to a higher status by establishing their capital city in Amber. However, between the reigns of Malesi and Prithviraj Kachchawaha, a separation of the junior branches of

41 Irfan Habib, Atlas of the Mughal Empire (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986), Sheet 9A. 42 Ibid. 43 Philogists derive the name of their cradle land Mewat from the Sanskrit Minawati or rich in fish. The term matsya-desh or fish country was applied to this region up to the northeastern part of Jaipur in the ancient Hindu epics. Sarkar, A history of Jaipur, 10. 44 Ibid., 11. 18 the royal family occurred. Udaikaran, one of the Malesi's successors, gave the territory of

Mauzabad (35 km from Jaipur) to his son Bar Singh, who founded the Narukha branch of the clan. Udaikaran also gave the district of Banswara to his younger son Baloji. Baloji's son

Mokal, after remaining childless for much time, had a son born to him through the blessings of

Shaikh Burhan. The child was named "Shaikhji" and the territorities he conquered came to be known as Shekhawati.45 Prithviraj Kachchwaha was the ruler of Amber from 1503 to 1527 CE, but Maharana Kumbha of Mewar, who ruled the neighbouring state, defeated him and exacted tribute. Prithviraj assigned estates to all of his sons in perpetuity. This arrangement led to the configuration of bara-kotri or twelve chambers, which formed the aristocracy of Jaipur state.46

After the death of Prithviraj in 1527, there was some struggle of power between his successors until Bharamal, his fourth son, sat on the throne in 1548. He entered into an alliance with the

Mughal emperor Akbar by marrying his daughter to him and accepting Mughal service.47

However, the true emergence of Jaipur state as an independent entity only began under the leadership of Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh (1699-1743), who was the highest-ranking Mughal mansabdar. He used his position to consolidate his power over his small patrimony. A review of the archival material of Jaipur state, aided by the decoding of the implicit messages in the administrative data and official correspondence, reveals the discourse of power. Such an investigation brings to the forefront the challenges faced by the Kachchwaha rulers and the ways in which they dealt with these challenges through appeasement and negotiation. Technical details about the conduct of rulers contest the commonly drawn conclusion about Indian rulers' inability to manage and control their subjects. An argument can be made that ethnic communities might have

Tod, Annals and Antiquities, 339 and 372, also see Sarkar, A history of Jaipur, 27. Ibid., 32.

19 worked for some rulers to assert their political independence, as was the case with the Rajputs.

Ultimately, the rulers' institutions and methods of governance were the tools that prolonged and even permanently cemented their power.

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

Each of the five chapters in this thesis focuses upon a different aspect of the state's structure through which the rule of law was legitimized and institutionalized. This study attempts to provide a multifaceted view of a regional political structure in which the scope of politics also included control and management of subjects' day-to-day lives. The rulers' success in these areas helped them obtain more revenue through different sources in order to achieve financial stability. The institutionalization of authority proceeded through establishment of long-term alliances and consensus building rather than violence and coercion.

Chapter one questions the relevance of the "oriental despotism" and "military fiscalism" models in the study of state formation in pre-colonial India by focusing on the processes through which the Kachchwaha patrimony (watan-jagir) was transformed into an independent state. It provides a history of the emergence of the Kachchwaha tribe in the Dhundhar region after defeating the original rulers known as the Meenas from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries. The Rajput-

Mughal alliance is discussed to map the steady rise of this clan to the upper echelons of the Mughal bureaucracy and describe how it exploited its positions to enlarge its territories around Amber.

Lastly, it delineates the reinvention of the traditions and idioms of sovereignty adopted by these rulers to legitimize their rule.

Subramanyam and Alam, ed., The Mughal Empire, 68. 20 Chapter two explicates how the entrenchment of sovereignty was made possible by the

Kachchwaha bureaucracy, mercantile communities, and rural and urban elites. These groups helped expand the state's political legitimacy through their incorporation as co-sharers of power. The rulers of the Jaipur state redistributed more than fifty percent of their income to the ruling elites, who institutionalized Kachchwaha political ideals by propagating and then adopting them to further their own interests. The state managed to increase its financial resources by stimulating the activities of the elites, merchants, and government officials through various incentives. The ruling elites helped the state augment its income from a number of sources, such as land revenue, taxes on rural and urban trade, and charges on festivals and professionals. The credit for the transformation of Jaipur state from a small patrimony to one of the richest states of North India in the eighteenth century goes to its ruling elites and bureaucracy.

Chapter three presents a case study regarding the building of the Jaipur city before comparing the city to the Mughal capital at Delhi to explicate the techniques used by pre-colonial rulers to symbolize and crystallize their sovereignty. It shows the details of a ruler's plan to construct settlements and position various communities and buildings in patterns that would help him systematically manage and control his subjects. This chapter includes a reflection on how the predominance of a "culturist" model has influenced the study of Indian cities. The overemphasis on classical examples of Hindu and Muslim cities in pre-colonial India is an example of how historians are preoccupied with proving the existence of homogenous conflicting religious communities. The primary limitation of this kind of historiography is that it never explores the flexibility of Indian states which allowed them to accommodate diversity.

Chapter four highlights the contentions and accommodations of the political authorities of eighteenth-century states by elaborating on the extent and nature of state control, focusing on the

21 judicial administration of Jaipur. An investigation of criminal offences illustrates everyday forms of resistance by providing a view of the interaction between law-enforcing political authorities and the subjects bound by law. The notion of the "immutability" of Indian communities is also explored to show the vitality, diversity, and flexibility of these communities. This chapter particularly focuses on state interactions with social groups and those groups' issues, as well as the ways in which the groups' actions were declared lawful or unlawful irrespective of their caste or clan status.

Chapter five discusses the interventionist nature of the Jaipur state and challenges the idea that Indian rulers were indifferent toward their subjects. The nature and extent of the Jaipur state's authority are elaborated through a focus on the ways used by the rulers to resolve social, familial, and caste-related issues. Such matters had traditionally been regarded as the domains of caste councils or the Brahmans. This analysis contends that Jaipur rulers used moralizing rhetoric as an ideology that enabled them to act both as upholders of dharma and legitimize their rule without the support of the Brahmanical authorities. By utilizing the idioms of morality and controlling the sexuality of women, the Kachchawaha rulers were able to develop a gendered patriarchy that effectively controlled the contentious elements of their society.

22 CHAPTER ONE: POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMBER FROM A SMALL PATRIMONY TO A SOVEREIGN STATE

This chapter addresses the political processes through which Jaipur emerged as a sovereign state in the eighteenth century. An examination of these negotiations and its complexities adopted by the Kachchwahas, especially Sawai Jai Singh (1699-1743 CE) are highlighted in the discussion. The chapter seeks to illustrate how the boundaries of the Jaipur state were enlarged by acquisition of territory through land assignments, contractual farming, and land transfers. After the Kachchwaha rulers established full control over these territories, they started to assert their independence by successfully combing clan and kinship ties. Therefore, the shift of power from the centre (Mughals) occurred in various ways in specific region. In Jaipur, the shift was made possible through subtle re-alignments of clan based lineages, introduction of traditional norms of legitimacy and continuation of the administrative institutions of the Mughals.

Eighteenth century states were different from earlier regimes in terms of managing political alliances, re-distribution of revenue resources, and experimentation with surveillance techniques as ways to control everyday lives of their subjects.

Historiography of past two decades has generated an interesting set of questions to be applied to the study of the history of the regional kingdoms of the eighteenth century.

First, there has been a strong trend toward assertion of the continuity between the successor states and the English East India Company. Christopher Bayly, for example, has elaborated the general characteristics of these states in the context of colonialism.

According to Bayly, the political powers in the regions encouraged the growth of the new

23 landed gentry and the merchant class. This urban and mercantile society responded to the

profound overall trend of population and agrarian growth. Lastly, the new political power

generated demands for consumption and protected mercantile activities. It is evident that

these regional elites managed and manoeuvred the regional economies, and shifted

trading patterns to their advantage in times of war and pillage. l Burton Stein, who also

argues for continuity and according to him the singular factor responsible for that, was

military fiscalism. He defines it as, "military fiscalism pertains to a centrally controlled

body of officials who collect revenue from a broad base of payers for the purpose of

maintaining a centrally controlled and hegemonic military system". This system was

introduced in Southern India by Tipu Sultan by extracting tribute from the peasants

through military aggression. Stein further argues that there was little change in South

India, and especially in Madras and Mysore when the area were taken over by the

officials of the East India Company"

1 Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, 14-16. 2 Stein, "State Formation Reconsidered", 392-93. 3 Stein, "State Formation Reconsidered", 404-6," The major element of continuity during the early nineteenth century was military fiscalism. However, it is certain that the company's high expenditures on its military extended its capacity to increase the level of total revenue collection in the same way and for the same reason that Tipu Sultan had sought, that is by eliminating tribute paying, petty lordships. Here is the second continuity with the Mysorean regime of the late eighteenth century. Another element of continuity between the brief Mysorean regime and that of the Company under Reed and Munro was the employment of non-local, intermediary officials to link the state with the base agrarian population. Tipu Sultan was excoriated by Munro for his use of Muslim officials recruited from Hyderabad and Nawab of Arcot's realm. Many of these, Munro said, were soldiers to whom the sultan had taken a fancy, and in most cases, they went 'through all the grimace of statesmen, while the real business was conducted by the Brahmans (In Gleig, Sir Thomas Munro, vol.1, 221) often non-local. The numerous corruption scandals in the Madras presidency during the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century suggests a situation not much different from that of invidiously noticed by Munro in Tipu Sultan's regime. British collectors as a result of their ignorance, sloth, or venality frequently lost control of the management of their districts to 'cutcherry Brahmans'. Yet other elements of continuity may be noted. Tipu Sultan who adopted Persian as an official language, the company imposed a new official language and a new technical vocabulary upon older terms."

24 There is no doubt that these scholars have successfully dismantled the myth that

the eighteenth century was a period of chaos and confusion through their work about

Mughal successor states. The thrust of their argument is that British colonialism did not

precipitate a fundamental change in Indian history; rather colonialism was the

continuation of the transition process started by the regional rulers during the eighteenth

century. Burton Stein identifies the elements of continuity in military fiscalism in the

state of Mysore and elaborates the similarities between the colonial regime of John

Munro and Tipu Sultan.4 Frank Perlin, who has worked on the Marathas, especially

Peshwas, continues the debate further by adding that the coming of the English East India

Company only accelerated the centralizing elements of the earlier regimes.5 Another

important strand of this historiography stresses the inability of the Indian rulers to break

the close knit clan and kinship ties of the landed aristocracy and local elites due to the

lack of an ideology or a system that would legitimize their power. Thus the argument is

made that only the military power held the kingdoms together. The assumption that the

indigenous Indian states had a limited role was confined to the extraction of revenues

from the population. For that purpose they used state administrative mechanisms to bring

economic institutions under state control.

The most important limitation of these regimes was that they lacked any

persuasive means of legitimizing their rule, except though military expeditions or claims

to ritualistic power. In the first category of states were the Marathas, Jats and Sikhs in the

North and the rulers of Mysore, in the south, and, in the second category were the smaller

4 Stein, "State Formation and Economy Reconsidered", 387-413. 5 Perlin, "State Formation Reconsidered", 432-33.

25 regional kingdoms in south and eastern India.6 The control exercised by the central power

was limited due to the lack of an ideology that could justify the growing number of

revenue demands.7 Military power held these empires together, and the Mughal Empire

has been called a "war state" by John F. Richards. In the theocratic model of rule, the

rulers were understood to be apprehensive of assuming any real power; their states were

actually ruled by the Brahmans. This model was used to designate the non Muslim

kingdoms for early Medieval India of South India by the British colonial officials. J. C.

Heesterman, Ronald Inden, and Nandini Sinha have also used this concept as the basis for

understanding some Hindu polities.9 More recently, different legitimization mechanisms

for the states of Marathas and Rathors have been presented that were not coercive rather

incorportional.10 Instead of focusing on the prescribed models for study of the pre-

colonial states, several historians have emphasized the specific qualities of various

6 Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, 20-27. 7 Ibid., 11. 8 John. F. Richards, The Mughal Empire, 282, "By far the greater proportion of the state's resources was devoted to war and preparation for war. Every year Mughal troops were engaged in active campaigning against foreign enemies or domestic rebels. The Mughal emperors made little apology for attacks on neighbours and they regarded adjoining state as either tributaries or enemies- no other category was possible Given these characterization of indigenous states, it seems that British East India Company was the only agent of historical change in the Indian polity, the only actor to emerge as centre strong enough to impose peace on the sub-continent and effectively demilitarize the regional leadership. Kolff, Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy, 48: presents this view after examining the evidence of availability of military labour or armed peasantry in North India. According to him, "Never before in Indian political history had a centre emerged that convincingly presented itself as strong enough to impose its peace on the subcontinent to such a degree. The year 1818 CE stands not only for the effective demilitarization of Indian regional leadership, but also for the abolition of a phenomenon that had been crucial to the Indian old order: a military labour market, characterized by the practical impossibility for any power, whether Mughal badshah or Maratha confederacy, to monopolise the employment of its endless recruits or to impose its regulations upon it". 9J. C. Heesterman, ed., Ritual, State and history in South Asia in Essays in Honour of J C Heesterman, (Leiden: E J Brill, 1992); Ronald Inden, "Ritual, and Authority and Cyclic Time in Hindu Kingship" in John F Richards, ed., Kingship and Authority in South Asia (Oxford, 1978), 28-73 and Nandini Sinha, State Formation in Rajasthan: Mewar during the Seventh-Fifteenth Centuries (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002). 10 For the Marathas, see Sumit Guha, "An Indian Penal Regime: Maharashtra in the Eighteenth century", Past and Present 147 (1995) 101-126; For the Rathors see Nandita Sahai, "Crafts and Statecraft in Eighteenth Century Jodhpur", Modern Asian Studies, 41,4 (July, 2007), 683-722.

26 regimes the role of historical contingency and rise of dynamic statesmen. This analysis

endeavoured to add to this kind of historiography by highlighting the diplomatic efforts

used by the Kachchwaha rulers to gain independence from the Mughals and assert their political hegemony among the Rajput kingdoms.

Jaipur, a patrimonial state, offers an example of an alternative structure of governance with elements of continuity from the Mughal Empire. These rulers also introduced the rhetoric of Hindu kingship and deployed caste and kinship strategically to legitimize the central authority. I argue that Kachchwaha rulers used religious symbolism to gather a coherent body of supporters, but the political structure of kinship retained its character as the protector and benefactor of all communities. It is important to note that concept of homogenous religious communities was not even prevalent during the eighteenth century. Sawai Jai Singh's moves to oust the Mughal mansabdars from his state can hardly be characterized as a communalism because he was simply driving out the Turks, which was the term used for the Mughals in the vernacular Rajput sources, and not for Muslims (as a

11 Medieval Indian polities have been studied fromthi s point of view by the following historians: Cynthia Talbot, Pre-Colonial India in Practice: society, region and identity in Medieval Andhra (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001); Shulman, David, Symbols of substance: court and state in Nayaka period Tamilnadu (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992); Irfan Habib, Confronting Colonialism: resistance and modernization under Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan (New Delhi: Anthem, 2002), Karashima Norobu, ed. Kingship in Indian history; Dilip Menon, "Houses by the Sea: State Formation Experiments in Malabar 1760-1800", Economic and Political Weekly, ( July, 1999), 1-20. 12 Ritualistic aspects of Sawai Jai Singh's ideology has been described in detail by Monika Horstsmann, in her article, "Visions of Kingship in the Twilight of Mughal rule", 13th Gonda Lecture, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Science, November 27 2006, 1-40.1 strongly disagree with many of her assertions that Sawai Jai Singh was articulating his identity as a Hindu king (although she agrees that this term was not even used in vernacular texts). She also claims that Maratha resistance against the Mughals would have appealed to Sawai Jai Singh's ideology of rule. This is completely erroneous because Jai Singh was vehemently opposed Maratha excursions into Northern India and tried to amass support against them throughout his lifetime.

27 homogenous religious community).13 By adapting earlier institutions, reinventing the religious role of the king as a social reformer, and taking full advantage of kinship ties, the rulers of Jaipur state were able to control and manage every aspect of their subjects' lives and to adjudicate conflicts between individuals and the caste councils (panchayats).14 The rulers of Jaipur utilized the local idioms, the religious symbols, and the imperial alliance with the Mughals to create a state more centralized than its predecessor.15

This state became independent without openly rebelling against the Mughal emperors and continued to serve the Mughal Empire right up to the time it joined the subsidiary alliance with the British in 1818.16 In the beginning Kachchwaha rulers spent little time and resources on military expeditions against their neighbours and enemies and instead tried to secure peace and stability through diplomatic relations with the immediate enemies: the Marathas, and through marital relations with their erstwhile neighbouring

•••••17

Rajput principalities. These rulers used their high status in the Mughal imperial system to gain dominance first among the states of Rajputana and then in Northern India.

Sawai Singh, especially, became the protectors ofDharma by influencing the Mughal emperors to abolish the unpopular jiziya tax and other pilgrimage taxes throughout the

The use of religion by the eighteenth century rulers or their dealings with other communities cannot be termed as communal to predate the rise of communal in the nineteenth century. Chris Bayly had tried to show the instances of communal violence in eighteenth century states by concentrating on few examples from Awadh, Punjab and Mysore, but he offers no examples from states of Bengal, Rajasthan, and Hyderabad. Christopher A. Bayly, "The Pre history of Communalism: Religious Conflict in India 1700- 1860", Modern Asian Studies, 19, 2 (July, 1980), 177-203. 14 This point is discussed in more detail in chapter four. 15 See the following chapters -where this point will be discussed further. 16 See Appendix A: for the details of the posts and mansabs held by the rulers of Jaipur. 17 The diplomatic procedures taken especially by Sawai Jai Singh were for peaceful co-existence with his neighbours rather than military confrontation. 18 The correspondence between the rulers of Jaipur and states of Mewar, Marwar, Kota, and Bikaner are full of details how the Kachchwaha rulers were approached settle disputes between them and present their cases for promotion and succession in front of the Mughal Emperors.

28 Mughal Empire. The Jaipur rulers made full use of the knowledge and expertise they had gained by holding the highest positions in the Mughal administration. They thus established a more elaborate administrative apparatus, and, most importantly, they successfully regenerated caste and kinship ties with their clansmen by reasserting their hereditary patrimonial rights.21

An analysis of the shift of political power from the centre to the regions illustrates that the eighteenth century states were not merely revenue-extracting regimes based on coercion (an argument put forward for the Mughal and the Vijaynagar Empires). Instead, they had solid foundations of statesmanship, ingenuity, administrative policies. More specifically they had equipped themselves with ideological idioms that enabled them to control and manage their kingdoms more effectively. For example, Maratha military fiscalism gave way to a newly centralized authority of the Peshwas; the Brahman

00 ministers started to dominate the Maratha polity. The state of Mysore under Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan established a centralized bureaucracy with modernizing elements. In this state, political legitimacy was also sought through the medium of religion. Tipu Sultan sent his emissaries to Turkey to get a letter of recognition from the Khalifa, which had not been done by any Muslim ruler after Mohammad Bin Tughlaq, who had sought such

More details in the chapter but basically the Jaipur rulers used religion for cultural integration and traditional legitimacy. 20 Sawai Jai Singh held the posts of the subedar and thefaujdar of the areas he was ruling. (Please see Appendix A). 21 The members of the Kachchwaha clan got the highest honour and administrative post in the state to incorporate them in the state building process and solicit their support on the basis of clan solidarity. 22 Uma Chakravarty, Rewriting History: The Life and Times ofRamabai (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1998), see the Introduction.

29 a letter in the fourteenth century. The Nawabs of Awadh had started supported Shii

branch of Islam and patronize scholars from Iran to institutionalize variegated Shii

practices to claim legitimacy.24 Similarly, Sawai Jai Singh reinvented Rajadharma to

legitimize his position in Jaipur and make himself the arbitrator of religious issues, the

promulgator of new social reforms, and the patron of religious institutions and

organizations.

LEGITIMIZATION THROUGH RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL REFORMS

The classical Indian texts postulate an ideal state where the king has an important

place, but, at the same time, has to share his power with the religious authorities, namely

the Brahmans. This concept of kingship has been topic of a long debated, and most

scholars that pre-colonial politics were organized at least as much around the institution

of kingship as around the caste system. This kind of authority, which featured power

that either shared or bestowed upon by a divine power, was not implemented in the state

of Jaipur. In Jaipur, the rulers and not the deities were given prominence, unlike other

Rajput states where the rulers honoured the deities in order to legitimize their power. 26

Ishtiaq H. Qurieshi, "Tipu Sultans' Embassy to Constantinople, 1787", in Irfan Habib, ed. Confronting Colonialism: Resistance and Modernization under Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan, 69-78. 24 J. R. I. Cole, Roots of North Indian Shiism in Iran and Iraq, Religion and State in Awadh, 1722-1859 (Berkeley, 1985), 25-9. 25 The caste system will be discussed in the following chapters but the scholars who are of this opinion in alphabetical order are Nicholas Dirks, The Hallow Crown (Cambridge, 1987); J C Heesterman & Ronald Inden in John F. Richards ed. Kingship and authority in south Asia (Madison, 1978); Norobu Karashima, Kingship in Indian history (Oxford, 1999), Norbert Peabody, Hindu Kingship and polity in Pre-colonial India (Cambridge, 2003) and David Shulman, Symbols of substance, court and state in Nayaka period Tamilnadu (Oxford, 1992). 261 am primarily concerned about political ramifications of rhetoric of religious symbolism. For the Sisodias of Mewar, see Sinha, State Formation in Rajasthan, 198-202; the state of Kota patronized deities

30 However, the kings were involved in religious activities, which gave them the semblance

of divinity and legitimized their power as followers and protectors of dharma. For

instance, Sawai Jai Singh performed various Vedic rites after ascending his throne in

")7

Amber, and some of the notable yagnas (sacrifices) were the sarvamedha, purusamedha, and ashvamedha.2* There has been some controversy about whether

ashvamedha was actually performed or not,29 but it seems that the revival of the ancient yagna by Sawai Jai Singh made a significant impression on his contemporaries .

While adopting the role of a ruler who was following the precepts of dharma-

shastras, Sawai Jai Singh actually worked systematically to usurp the power and

authority of Brahmanical and ecclesiastical organizations. Indeed, a series of written

through which the legitimacy was institutionalized, Peabody, Hindu Kingship and Polity in Pre-colonial India, 15-49. 27 The highest sacrifice was considered to be the Sarvamedha in which the sacrifice offered all of his possessions as the fee at the end of the ceremony. The usual reason to perform this Yagna is to establish a King as the overlord of the World. (The Raja-Surya yagna also performs a similar function.) The horse is an important part of the ritual. A flawless horse is sanctified as the sacrificial horse. It is then set loose, with the armies of the King following it. Whenever this procession enters the realm of another King, that ruler either has to fight the army or has to agree to pay tribute. 28 Letter, # 1523, Ramnath Deva Sharma to Sawai Jai Singh," Ramnath Deva Sharma, son of Sri Krishna deva Goswami Bhattacharya born in the family of Sri Manu Goswani, who descended from Gadadhar, a follower of Chaitanya Mahaprahbhu declares, the treatises complied by Sri Maharajadhiraja are based on the old Vaishnava granthas. The Maharaja is the propounder of Bhakti marg which not against Shrutis and Smritis. He is the performer of five Ashvamedha yagnas. The doctrines explained in Janan Vivriti and Siddhantaikya prakashika are agreed by all and followed traditionally." Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur & Siyah-huzuri, dated August 1724, 1734, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner (RSA, Bikaner, the abbreviated form will be used from hereafter), where the details of the invitees and the celebrations are given. 29 Tod speculated that it had unlikely to have been held in the midst of scions of houses of Sisodias and Rathors in Annals and Antiquities, vol. 2. 423. 30 The invitees to this event were highly impressed by the ruler Raja Indra Singh expressed his sentiments when he wrote. "Maharaja can alone perform this sacred act. Even in this kalyuga, the Maharaja had established satyuga" chitti from Raja Indra Singh to Sawai Jai Singh, July 10th 1742, quoted in V S Bhatnagar, Life and Times of Sawai Jai Singh (1688-1743) (Delhi: Impex Publications, 2002,second edition, first edition, 1974). This kind of manifestation of sovereignty was more attuned to parallel Mughal authority and very different from what Rosiland O Hanlon has suggested for the Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad. Kachchwaha rulers articulated their ancestral patrimonial rights to assert their authority and they invested lot of resources to imitate Mughal courtly culture rather portraying the simple soldiery culture of Mohammad Khan, Rosalind O Hanlon, "Issues of Masculinity in Northern Indian history: The Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad", Indian Journal of Gender Studies, 4:1 (January, 1992), 1-19.

31 declarations by the chief priests of Mathura and Vridanvan made very clear that, in matters of religion, the king's principles will be followed, and not priest's principle.31

These priests, who were contacted and consulted on various religious issues, were made to abide by the laws laid down by the Maharaja in instances of religious conflict and controversy.32 There is wide range of correspondence between Sawai Jai Singh and the leading priests of that time. For example, in letter (summati) #1530, undated, Shyama

Charan Gusain (head of Gaudiya sampraday), "I will follow the principles of religion suggested by the Maharaja; Letter # 1529, undated, Tridandiji (head of Shrivaishanava sampraday, Tamil Naidu) that says, "I agree with the views of the Maharaja that the texts written by ancient Archaryas should be coordinated and all controversies should be removed sincerely."33

The ecclesiastical orders, especially the most influential Vaishnava orders of that time were brought under control. Though Sawai Jai Singh was a follower of Lord Rama, after his posting as the governor (subedar) of Mathura and Vrindavan, which were great

Vaishnavite centres for learning, he felt inclined towards Gaudiya Krishnavites.34 He used his influence and religious knowledge to remove the outward differences that existed among various organizations (sampradays) and convinced them to achieve

31 This policy is different from the Marathas who had appointed Brahmans as their ministers. The Brahmanical authority was being limited to following religious duties in the Jaipur state. For the Maratha states under the Peshwas see Chakravarty, Rewriting history: Life and Times ofRamabai, introduction. 32 The letters exchanged between these priests and Sawai Jai Singh are preserved in the Kapad-dwara collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 33 Ibid., 34 Gaudiya Vaishnava as a widespread movement of Bhatia or devotion was started by Sheri Tatiana Mahaprabhu, who appeared in West Bengal in the late fifteenth century. He is accepted by all Gaudiya Vaishnava as an incarnation of Krishna but in the "hidden" role of devotee of Krishna, and this is supported by references from Srimad Bhagavatam, the Chaitanya Upanishad of The Atharva Veda, the Mahabharata, and other scriptures.

32 reconciliation amongst themselves. The heads of the Vaishnavite orders decided, at the

behest of Sawai Jai Singh that there was not much difference between the worships of

Rama and of Krishna except in the mode of worship. Sawai Jai Singh arranged

conferences with the heads of these sampradays and discussed various modes of worship.

It was mutually decided and declared that all heads preached the same principles.

Vrindavan Deva (Neem ka Thana) of Nimrak sampraday presided over the conference

and gave his verdict that the principles announced by the Maharaja were agreeable to all

four Vaishnavite organizations (sampradays). Sawai Jai Singh also involved himself in

resolving the outward differences that existed among different sects of Gaudiya

sampraday. He therefore called for opinions from the learned authorities of the

Vrindavan and Navadip centres. These authorities responded with a statement agreeing

that the goals, means and methods of worship were the same as those described by

Mahaprabhu Sampradaya and expounded by the leading Brahman priests of that time.

Sawai Jai Singh collected these responses and had them compiled, where all the

Vaishnavite abbots agreed to solve the persistent differences within the sect.36

In addition to these religious institutions there were a large number of mendicants,

who were theoretically outside the parameters of the established religious organizations,

but who had assumed the self-imposed responsibility of protecting the Vaishnavite

dharma, and some of sadhus were living in the environs of Jaipur. In order to assert the

The correspondence is preserved in Kapad-dwara collection Nos. 1501-28, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 36 Ibid., navisht # 2625 preserved in Khas Mohar collection.

33 state authority, Sawai Jai Singh evolved certain mechanisms to control these ascetics.

There were four main groups of mendicants, namely, the Ramanandis, the Vairagis, the

Sanyasis, and the Dadupanthis residing in the state. These groups constituted themselves into militant bands and led soldierly lives. As Sawai Jai Singh became actively involved in religious reforms from 1720 CE onwards, he imposed strict rules for all ascetics. The different sects were required to follow the rules laid down based on the basis of the dharma-shastras and compiled as Sidhanditika Prakashan on the orders of the

•JO

Maharaja. The ascetics living in the vicinity of the Jaipur state had to sign a written bond after agreeing to the general principles laid down by the Maharaja. The details of the agreement were as follows: The sadhus would dine in separate rows and food would be served to them separately; defaulters would not be allowed to take the seat in the rows; they could not consume the residue of each other's food. In addition, untouchable castes could not be their disciples, and all ascetics coming from the dvij (twice-born) castes had to wear the sacred thread. The chief priest of the ascetics had to be a Brahman. All the ascetics were forbidden to wear or keep arms, except the Dadupanthi sect. The ascetics could not marry without the permission of the state and they had to abstain from keeping women and having relations with them. Celibacy was not enforced but if someone went astray, then he was compelled to marry. They could not undertake any business or

His policy can be compared to the East India Company's measures to control and legalize the activities of the sadhus in the nineteenth century. For details, see Sandria Freitag, Sanyasiahs and the State: the changing nature of "Crime " and "Justice " in the Nineteenth Century British India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), see also Michael Anderson and Sumit Guha ed. Changing Concepts of Rights and Justice in South Asia (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 82-113. 38 The book was written by Sawai Jai Singh is available in the Sawai Man Singh museum Library, Jaipur.

34 accumulate wealth.39The ascetic group known as the Lalpanthis of qasba Saganer was

forced to give up ascetic way of life and Sawai Jai Singh took written bonds from them.40

Perhaps the most significant factor that legitimized Sawai Jai Singh as the rightful

ruler for his subjects and established his credibility amongst his contemporaries was his

involvement in persuading the Mughal emperor to abolish discriminating and unpopular

taxes imposed on the non-Muslims.41 The jiziya42 was the main tax that was re-imposed

by the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb in 1679. In the words of his (Sawai Jai Singh) court

poet, "it was a custom of Delhi at that time that every rich Hindu had to pay 20 rupees

and every poor 1 rupee annually as jiziya. Sawai Jai Singh persuaded Mohammad Shah

to abolish this tax forever. But Wazir Husain Khan did not take out the orders when

Mohammad Shah came to know about it through Jai Singh, the order was issued through

Dayashankar"43 This tax was abolished throughout the Mughal empire in 1725 CE.44

Bhadar was a ritual practice that required all male members of a family would have to

shave their hair when an elder member died. The Mughal authorities levied a tax on these

occasions this tax was abolished on the recommendation of the Maharaja in the Mughal

Empire. 5

39 Navisht # 1282 dated August 1733 CE, Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 40 Ibid., bond # 1145, from Mayanand Joshi Subanand Natana to Sawai Jai Singh. 41 The details about the abolition of taxes are narrated in Sawai Jai Singh Carita which was compiled by Kavi Atmaram who was a notable poet in Jai Singh's time and had written other books on the orders of the Maharaja. He wrote Raghuvansh and Jai Singh Prakashan. Later on, he combined both the texts and published them as Sawai Jai Singh Carita, edited and compiled by Bahura, Gopal Narayan (Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 1979). 42 Jiziya refers to what is taken from the Dhimmis, according to (what is stated in) al-Nihayah. It is obligatory upon 1) the free, 2) adult members of those who are generally fought, 3) who are fully in possession of their mental faculties, and 4) gainfully employed by the Muslim rulers. 43 Kavi Atmaram, Sawai Jai Singh Carita, verses # 674-81. 44 Ibid, verse #681. 45 Parwana, # 643, Nov 13, 1728, Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur.

35 Then a monthly tax was taken by the Mughals from Brahmans who came to take bath in the Ganges river from areas of Maharashtra and Gujarat. This tax was also abolished at the request of Sawai Jai Singh.47 Collection of another tax paid by the non-

Muslims of all castes to take baths in river Ganges River was also stopped on the orders of Mohammad Shah. The royal order made it clear that the tax was abolished in perpetuity on the request of Sawai Jai Singh48 Besides these taxes, Mughal authorities used to confiscate the properties of the mendicants after their deaths. Because of this practice, the funeral rites of the mendicants, both Muslim and non-Muslims, could not be completed on time, and their bodies were often left unattended for days. Sawai Jai Singh convinced the Mughal emperor Mohammad Shah to issue royal orders to the officials of all the Mughal parganas to stop the confiscation of the properties of the mendicants.49

Since most of the people living in the state of Jaipur in the eighteenth century were non-Muslims, the rulers were more concerned about promoting their images as being followers of the Dharma-shastras (religious texts). There were a small number of

Muslim communities that included mainly peasants. So there are no references to their being persecuted or evicted from their lands.50 In religious matters that involved

Muslims, the Kachchwaha rulers consulted the qazi (clerics) and maintained as state employees for most of the eighteenth century.51 The state also continued to defend their

At Allahabad, Sangam is the point at which the holy river Ganga (Ganges) meets with another river Yamuna and the mythical Saraswati and was regarded as holy by the non-Muslims. Parwana # 273, Sept. 30, 1732, Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur 8 Void., parwana, # 88, Mughal court to the mutasaddis of suba Allahabad. 49 Ibid., parwanaNos. # 272: Chakla Bareli, #354: Orissa, # 363: Agra, # 375: Allahabad, # 359: Lahore, # 367: Banaras, # 370: Bengal, # 373: # Multan, # 358: Patna, # 379: Malwa, # 376: Ahmadabad, # 368: Mathura, # 365: Surat (port), # 373: Awadh, # 360: Berar, # 361: Hyderabad, # 362: Garh Mukhteshwar, # 359: Bharan, # 366: Burhanpur, # 364: Ajmer, # 355: Saharanpur, and #357: Hardwar. 50 Gupta has worked on the agrarian system, agricultural communities of this state and does not refer to any of these instances. For details: Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan in the Seventeenth Century. 51 The references about the qazis are found till 1790s.

36 Muslim inhabitants from being persecuted by other authorities. This is illustrated by the case of Wazir Khan, a convicted murderer, who was pardoned by the British authorities at the request of Pratap Singh in 1799. Kachchwaha rulers were also actively involved in the maintenance and upkeep of the famous Sufi shrine in Ajmer as the provincial governors (subedars) of that province. Annual donations and occasional gifts were sent to the shrine, and the state offered support to other Muslim mendicants as well.

Sawai Jai Singh in his role as protector of all sections of Jaipur's society introduced many social reforms and gave orders to forbid certain ritual and practices.5

The first step in this direction was constant intervention in the decisions of caste and village councils against their members. On some occasions, the Maharaja had to intervene to resolve caste disputes. For example, there was a dispute amongst the

Maheshwari Mahajans about their status, and, because Sawai Jai Singh had access to their family records in Vrindavan, his opinion was sought. He consulted the family bards and checked the ancestral records preserved in Mathura. He then rendered his judgement which was accepted by the concerned parties.55Surveillance techniques which will be elaborated in later chapters were disguised in the rhetoric of Rajadharma and in that spirit

Jaipur rulers endeavoured to limit how much various communities spent on social occasions and religious ceremonies. Sawai Jai Singh and his successors issued instructions to their officials to monitor spending on social functions and people were

52 J. Collins, Resident with Daulat Rao Scindhia to Pratap Singh, dated Nov. 28th, 1799, #301, Kapad- dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 53 It is interesting to note that the official documents refer to the Mughals and Muslims as "Turks" in their correspondence. 54 Likhait, Year 1731, preserved in RSA, Bikaner. 5 Yaddasht # 1313, June 9, 1731, Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur.

37 fined if they extended the invitations to the people of different castes. Extravagance on

the marriages, bethorals, and funerals were also discouraged, and officials were instructed

to impose fines if people were found spending more than specified amount (that was two

thousand rupees).57

The Kachchwaha rulers also utilized their influence on the Mughal court to stop

practices that were disliked by non-Muslim subjects and buttressed their position as the

rightful rulers of their patrimony. Concomitantly, the reforms were enacted

institutionalized so that they could be adhered to by future generations; all the signed

treaties, agreements, documents and private papers were preserved to formalize the

changes and policies.58 Sawai Jai Singh centralized his power first by taking control of

the religious authorities, reinforcing moral codes of conduct, and introducing social

reforms. However, this was not the only reason for his success in carving out his own

principality. The Mughal- Kachchwaha alliance in the sixteenth century had already

launched the process of Jaipur's pre-eminence in the area.

THE MUGHAL -KACHCHWAHA ALLIANCE: PRE-EMINENCE IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

Rajah BharamaPs accession to the throne of Amber changed the history of this

clan forever. When he met the young Mughal emperor, Akbar (1556-1605 CE) a new

56 Yaddasht, Year 1724, RSA, Bikaner. 57 How effective were these policies it is difficult to ascertain, but they were certainly contentious because the fine collection on these infractions throughout the eighteenth century. 58 All the documents and treaties which were concluded are preserved in their personal collections, now preserved mostly in Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner and Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur.

38 chapter was opened in Rajput history. At the time of the Mughal intervention, the

Kachchwahas were divided into two major sub-clans: the Rajawats and the Shekhawats.

The clan was hard pressed by the neighbouring Rajput states, especially Marwar, and by

Mirza Sharafuddin, the Mughal mansabdar of that region. Bharamal offered one of his daughters in marriage to the young emperor, who was heading to Agra after visiting the shrine at Ajmer. Akbar agreed to the proposal, and the marriage led to a fruitful alliance between the Mughals and the Rajputs. Eventually the state of Amber became the largest and most powerful Rajput principality. This development, which occurred entirely as a result of the close association of the Kachchwahas with the Mughals, led to the territorial expansion of Amber. Most importantly, this expansion was not accomplished through any military campaigns, but through the assignment of large tracts of lands by the

Mughal emperors to their able Kachchwaha mansabdars.59

The arrangement initiated by Akbar with Rajah Bharamal came to be known in the annals of the Mughal Empire as the "celebrated Rajput policy". Bharamal, his son, and his grandson were officially enrolled in the imperial service and raised to the status of the nobility.60 At the time of Bharamal's submission to Mughal authority, his domain consisted of the villages and town of Amber pargana (district). The Mughal administration estimated Amber's annual revenues and applied them to the pay and perquisites of the Raja (ruler) according to his rank as a Mughal nobleman (mansabdar).

In return for imperial service and privileges, Bharamal publicly acknowledged the

59 All historians who have worked on Eastern Rajasthan history are in agreement on this: Jadunath Sarkar, Satya Prakash Gupta, Dilbagh Singh, and Satish Chandra. 60 Abul Fazl, Akbar-nama, Agha Ahmad Ali and Abdur Rahim ed. (Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1887) vol. 2, 63.

39 authority and supremacy of the Mughals and promised personal service to the Emperor.

By the 1580s, the Rajput chiefs of Bundi, Kota, Bikaner, and Mewar had negotiated entry

into the imperial service, and Akbar awarded high rank, pay, and perquisites to all of

them. These clan heads, who were generally scions of great noble houses or claimed

royal blood, considered the aristocrats of Rajput society.

In this way, the province of Rajputana (modern Rajasthan) was immersed in the

Muhgal Empire and the governance of this suba (province) was very similar to that of

other directly administered provinces in Northern India. A governor with a substantial

number of troops occupied a newly built fortress at Ajmer, which became the provincial

capital. The territories recognized as those of the Rajput chiefs because of their hereditary

rights were known as their watan-jagirs (patrimonies). All Mughal mansabdars received

lands or jagir as salary assignments, but they obtained only the right to collect the taxes

assessed on the stipulated areas. The Rajput rulers were entitled to the full revenues of

their domains with no obligation to remit any part of it to the Mughal emperor. The

Mughals levied no revenues on their watan-jagirs, but they expected a substantial peshkash or tribute in cash at the time of a ruler's accession or at the time of the grant of

a. jagir.61 In assigningy'ag/r.s, the Mughal administration took considerable care in fixing

the jama (notional revenue figure) and tried to obtain full particulars for one or more

years regarding the area under cultivation, crops raised and other features of the land.

Sabha Chand and Abhai Raj informed Diwan Kalyan Das that "Demand has been made

Miscellaneous Papers (Persian), Undated, Year 1704, RSA Bikaner, Jai Singh informs that he would pay Rs. 20,000 as a peshkeshjon receipt oisanad for the grant ofnakkarah (drum) and the parganas of Dausa, Chatsu and Mauzabad in jagir.

40 from the emperor to send taqsim for ten years." And adds further that "Gopinath

(qanunqo) has submitted the taqsim for three years and then for seven years."

The watan-jagirs were appropriated in order to meet the personal (zat) salary claims of the Rajput rajas and the pay claims of the contingents. If a person's status or the personal rank (zat), or military (sawar) rank was raised, the additional pay claims were met by allocating other territories in ordinary transferable lands known as salary assignments or tankhawah-jagirs. The revenue derived from the latter jagirs was, sometimes much more than that of the chieftain's hereditary domain. This was almost always the case with the Amber rulers, who normally obtained very high mansabs, while their hereditary domains remained relatively small.63 These additional jagirs were usually assigned in tracts contiguous to the watan jagirs of the Rajput rulers. For this reason, these territories were often wrongly identified as the watan-jagirs by the Kachchwaha chiefs. This misunderstanding surfaced in 1693 CE, when jagirs in the parganas adjacent to Amber were not reassigned to Raja Bishan Singh. A petition to the Mughal court on the grounds that since the time of Raja Man Singh (1589-1614 CE.) the parganas of

Deoli, Baswa, Newai, and Phagai had always been assigned to the Amber rulers. The emperor issued an enquiry to resolve this matter.64

In this way, the principalities were integrated into the Mughal Empire without uprooting the Rajputs from their ancestral lands. This policy had far reaching effects on

62 Amber Records, 1692 CE, RSA, Bikaner. 63 See Appendix C for the details of Sawai Jai Singh's postings. 64 Inayat Zaidi, "Akbar and the Rajput principalities: integration into the empire", in Irfan Habib ed. Akbar and His India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 15-24.

41 the rajas as they moved away from their local polities to establish illustrious careers all

over the Mughal Empire.65 However, Mughal emperors retained the right to confer jagirs

on the Rajput chiefs and consistently asserted the principle of "paramountcy"; which

meant that the chief needed the good-will of the emperor as well as a hereditary claim to

the land to receive watan jagirs. Sawai Jai Singh's decision to take Prince Azam's side

during the war of succession in 1708 CE caused him to lose his patrimony briefly,

because the new emperor, Bahadur Shah, had resumed Amber to Khalisa (territory under

the emperor's revenue administration). Eventually it was returned to the Maharaja with

full honour.66 Among other Rajput rulers, Kachchwaha rajas were accorded a special

status by the Mughal emperors. Amber chiefs were promoted to the positions of highest-

ranking mansabdars by Akbar (1556-1605 CE), and they continued to retain the same

position until Mohammad Shah's (1729-48 CE) reign, namely, for nearly two hundred

years. The Kachchwahas were one of the select families whose daughters were married to

the Mughal royalty during the seventeenth century. The most important sign of

recognition Jahangir (1605-27 CE.) recognized the close association with the Amber

rulers by bestowing on them the title of Mirza Rajas, an honour that was only granted to

the Mughals.67

The power and prestige acquired by the Kachchwahas put them in a very

advantageous position vis-a-vis other Rajput states. Their strategic alliance with the

65 Man Singh built beautiful city known as Rajmahal in Bengal in 1596, Sawai Jai Singh built JaiSinghpuras in Delhi, Kabul, Peshawar, Lahore, Varanasi, Mathura, Agra, Patna and observatories in Delhi, Ujjain, Varanasi, Allahabad and Jaipur. 66 Kavi Shyamaldas, Vir Vinod: history o/Mewar (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, Reprint 1986, First edition, 1886), vol. 3. 767-778. 67 The Mughal emperors were descendents of Timur and were known as the Mirzas. Jahangir, Tuzuk-1- Jahangiri, trans. Alexander Rogers and ed. T. Beveridge (Calcutta: Calcutta Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1909-14), 266.

42 Mughals enabled them to enlarge their own watan (Amber) and to use the privileges conferred by the emperors in the expansion and consolidation of their hold over the areas surrounding Amber. However, the creation of a state by Sawai Jai Singh in the eighteenth century was preceded by the continuous enlargement of the territories by his forefathers.

Raja Bharamal's successors Bhagwant Das and Raja Man Singh rose to the mansab of

7000/7000 zat/sawar ranks and were given large jagirs in Punjab and then in Bengal, besides their watan-jagirs. But Bhagwan Das and Raja Man Singh did not try to acquire any jagirs near Amber, because the jagirs outside Rajasthan yielded larger

/TO revenues. Mirza Raja Jai Singh (1621 -67 CE) was assigned many contiguous jagirs beside his watan-jagir, and also some parganas outside Amber. These grants included

Chatsu, Phagi, Mauzabad, Jhak, Bahrana, Pachwara, Khori, Deoli, Sanchari, Bharkol,

Jalalpur, Umran Sakres, Bawal, and Jat Kalyawa.69 Emperor Shahjahan (1627-57 CE) awarded Kama to Mirza Jai Singh's son Kirat Singh. Then Emperor Aurangzeb (1658-

1707 CE) conferred upon him (Raja Jai Singh) the mansab of 7000/7000 zat/sawar in

1661 CE and 7000/7000(do-aspa-sih -aspa) in 1662 CE.70These jagir assignments were awarded for a short duration only and Mirza Raja Jai Singh made no attempt to absorb them to his watan.71 Mirza Raja Jai Singh's son, Ram Singh had a lower rank of

5000/5000 zat/sawar and held the parganas of Amber, Bahatri, Niwai, Hindaun, Phagi,

Mughal Empire was expanding and new and fertile areas were being absorbed in the state and Rajasthan was dry and less fertile area. The Rajputs preferred to have land assignments in more fertile areas of the empire. 69 Mohammad Kazim, Alamgir-nama (Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1868), vol. 2, 618. 70 Do aspa sih aspa was further reduction in the maintenance of the military contingent. Do aspa (meant the Mansabdar was required to maintain military contingent which just 33% of his sowar rank and Sih aspa meant that the Mansabdar was required to maintain 66% of his quota of troopers). 71 Shahnawaz Khan, Maasir ul Umara, trans. T. Beveridge (Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal 1919), vol. 2, 301-3.

43 and Nihar. Then in 1699 CE Raja Bishan Singh held thepargana of Maharana as his jagir, in addition to his watan (Amber).73

A significant feature of these jagirs assignments held by the Kachchwaha rulers was that, besides, beyond the fact that the assignment was temporary the jagirs did not often cover the whole (dar-o-bast) of an individual pargana. The parganas were shared with other Mughal mansabdars or with emperor's reserve or khalisa. For example: in pargana Naraina (district in the province of Ajmer) out of eighty-five villages, eleven villages were assigned to the Mughal mansabdars, and seventy-two were assigned to

Sawai Jai Singh. In pargana Lalsot (district in the province of Agra) there were one hundred and forty-six villages, and twenty-six villages were assigned to the Mughal emperor, twenty-five villages to other Mughal mansabdars. A total of sixty-nine villages were assigned to the rajas of Amber.74 These figures indicate that the Mughal imperial administration maintained a parallel level of authority in these areas and did not assign the whole jagir to the mansabdars

PROCESSES OF STATE FORMATIONS OF THE JAIPUR STATE

The politically astute Mughal policy of assxgnmgjagirs to other Mughal mansabdars around Rajput principalities was ingeniously altered by the efforts of Sawai

Jai Singh when he ascended the gaddi (seat) of Amber in 1700 CE. At that time, the

72 C. U. Wills, Report on Land Tenures and Special Powers of certain Thikanas, Appendix II, RSA Bikaner, 20. 73 Arhsattapargana Naraina, Years: 1700-43, RSA, Bikaner. 74 Void, pargana Chatsu, Years: 1700-43.

44 Kachchwaha principality consisted mainly of Amber pargana, and that alone was

recognized as their watan by the Mughal authorities. The parganas close to Amber, like

Chatsu and Manoharpur, formed part of the khalisa (imperial reserve).75 Thus the

successor of Raja Man Singh and Mirza Raja Jai Singh had a very humble beginning.

Very soon, however, this young prince was able to achieve high status and mansabs by

serving the Mughal emperors earnestly and also striving for the growth of his own

domain (see complete the list of postings held by Sawai Jai Singh under the Mughals:

Appendix A). The Mughals acknowledged the great services provided by Sawai Jai Singh

and his ancestors by proclaiming that the affairs of Hindustan were effectively managed

with their clan's co-operation.76 In July 1713 CE, he received the title of Sawai (second)

and the title of Mirza Raja from the Mughal emperor Farrukhsiyar and also an increase in

mansab.77 He received further favours and was offered the faujdari (military command)

of Mathura and Hindaun (North India). In addition, parganas of Chatsu and Dausa were

exempted from land revenue.78

In November 1713 CE, Jai Singh was appointed the governor of Malwa for four

years (till 1717 CE). He was only able to stay in Malwa only for one year, but, even in

such a short time, he was able to crush the rebellions of Churaman Jat near Agra and

Chattar Singh in Bundelkhand. The Jat chieftains had been creating problems for the

Mughals since the beginning of eighteenth century endangered law and order. Sawai Jai

75 Vakil Reports Year 1693, Megh Raj to Maharaja Bishan Singh informing him that when the dol of his jagir was submitted to the emperor, he granted parganas of Hindaun, Bayaba and Toda etc to the Maharaja. The vakil added "Amber is in the Maharaja's watan the said mahals or districts should also be granted to the Maharaja." RSA, Bikaner. 76 Farman from the Mughal court to Sawai Jai Singh (undated), # 195, Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 77 Arzdasht from Jagjivan Das to Sawai Jai Singh, dated July 6th 1713, RSA, Bikaner.

45 Singh's campaign against them was a great success and earned him more land assignments in jagir and inam from the Mughal emperor. However, the factions at the imperial court made it impossible for Jai Singh to stay uninvolved in politics, and he decided to go back to Amber in 1715 CE. In 1729 CE, he was recalled by the emperor to take the post of governor of Malwa, a position that he held for ten months, after which came the tenure of Mohammad Khan Bangash79 It is evident from his various postings that Sawai Jai Singh was actively involved in the service to the Mughals until his death.

Nevertheless, he was also the first Amber ruler who deliberately increased the boundaries of his watan (Amber) jagir by securing the areas around it. Most of time, he used diplomacy to enlarge the territories and to form a compact domain from Sambhar Lake to the Jumuna River (see Appendix B).80

THE AREAS UNDER CONTROL AS A MUGHAL MANSABDAB81

In the Mughal tradition, the regional rulers and mansabdars maintained their representatives in the Mughal court, and these vakils 82 formed dense networks of political representation, communication and intelligence gathering. Furthermore, they reported about current developments at the court and advised their employers about possible success of strategies that might be undertaken. The agents of the Kachchwaha rulers were also posted at the Mughal court. These agents also tried at all levels of diplomacy to obtain more jagirs, mansabs, and higher postings for their rulers. All the

79 Sarkar, A history of Jaipur, 174. 80 He followed the peaceful means to acquire the territories around Amber. 81 See Appendix C. 82 They were known as vakils.

46 agents worked very hard to establish relations with the Mughal administrative staff as well as high officials in order to promote the causes of their rulers and at the same time maintain their own positions.

Sawai Jai Singh instructed his agents to convince the Mughal authorities to transfer more lands around Jaipur to him. The archival records are full of the correspondence of the agents and details about how the jagirs adjacent to Amber were secured for the Maharaja.84 There is a remarkable parwana (an official letter written by the rulers) of Jai Singh to one of his agents, in which he talks about the areas that he would like to have and gives reasons for his interest. The Maharaja replied to one of his agents,

"You wrote to me to obtain thepaibaqi (area not assigned to anyone injagir) of

Ajmer {suba-dar-ul-khair) on condition of posting a force there. The paibaqi of

the said suba is of no use to us, because it is scattered and far away. It is not a

business proposition. The parganas of Chatsu, Mauzabad, Dausa and Niwai are

close to our watan. The Rajputs who are to be posted are already residing there (in

the said pargand). In these circumstances, it is essential to obtain these mahals, so

that the zamindari may be well administered and also the forces may be kept

ready for the service of the emperor as desired. Bearing all this carefully in mind,

you should act according to the instructions given above. If the paibaqi is to be

given to any agent you should not be in a hurry to accept.... You would only

83 The jagirs assigned to the Sawai Jai Singh adjacent to his watan were Malarna, Malpura, Manoharpur, Nariana, Tonk, Toda Bhim, Amarsar, Khohri and Bhangarh. (see the map for more details). 84 The correspondence between the Maharajas of Jaipur and their agents has been preserved in the Rajasthan state archives.

47 obtain the zamindari Toda Bhim, Toda Raj etc near the watan. It is hoped you

as will give effect to this proposal..."

This parwana reveals the policy of Jai Singh and the ways in which he wanted to expand his territories. He had to envisage schemes to alter the usual Mughal practice, which was to assign the adjoining territories of Amber to other mansabdars. For instance, ihepargana Amber was assigned to the following mansabdars.

NAME POST PLACE YEARS

Sukhrullah Khan Faujdar Nahar Khoh 1704

Sayyid Husain Khan Faujdar Amber 1708

Nawab I Khan Faujdar Bairath 1718

Pirang Das Faujdar Bahatri 1750

The Mughal emperors followed this policy to keep the Rajput rajas under their control and to prevent the emergence of opportunities that would enable the rajas could become independent in their principalities. This Mughal policy was changed by Jai

Singh's perceptible encouragement to his clansmen to "harass Turks" (Mughal mansabdar). The goal was to make the Mughal mansabdars to lose interest in retaining

85 The translated version appears in C. U. Wills, Report on the Land Tenures, Appendix II, RSA, Bikaner

86 Their names are mentioned in the arhsatta documents of Nahar Khoh, Amber, Bairath and Bahatri, RSA, Bikaner. 87 The word harassment is not mentioned in the sources but it was implied because the nature of complaints that were lodged against him in the Mughal court.

48 the jagirs around the Jaipur state. Later on, the Maharaja was able to secure the rights to

the so -called "disturbed territories".

Sawai Jai Singh did not hesitate to create problems in the territories under

imperial control, and forcibly realized land revenue from the peasants of the parganas of

Chatsu and Manoharpur.89 The Mughal court had to order Sawai Jai Singh to remove the

check posts (thanas) he had unlawfully established mpargana Sambhar, which was also

part of imperial reserve.90 Evidence of the problems created by the Maharaja also

surfaced when his vakils faced difficulties as they tried to petition for more jagir postings

for Sawai Jai Singh in the Mughal court. To cite one example, Bhikari Das, a diwan of

Jai Singh, was instructed by Purohit Devi Singh (an agent) not to pick any quarrel with

the people of Ajmer, since the agent he was trying to obtain a higher mansab for the

Maharaja. The agent added that if he (Jai Singh) did not solve the matter of the dargah

peacefully, Sawai Jai Singh would not be able to get the subedari (governorship) of pargana Ajmer. l

In tandem with the complaints against Sawai Jai Singh's aides and clansmen who

were creating problems in the imperial reserves, the Mughal jagirdars posted near and

around Amber also made reports against the Maharaja. Ani Rai, an agent of Jai Singh at

the Mughal court, mentioned the names of the complaints and the nature of complaints

88 Yaddashti from Kesho Singh to Bhikari Das and Fateh Chand (1712), Hindi, RSA, Bikaner, about ousting the Turks from the Maharaja's territories; Parwana # 135, Dec 15, 1718, Mughal court to Samandar Khan, subedar of Ajmer. Vat parganas of Amber and Amarsar villages are near Amber and should be treated as connected to Amber for administrative purposes. 89 Arzdasht from Kesho Rai to Jai Singh (#110/ 533), undated, RSA, Bikaner. 90 Farman # 155, undated, Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II Museum, Jaipur. 91 Letter from Purohit Devi Singh to Diwan Bhikari Das (# 280/272), 17th Feb. 1709, RSA, Bikaner.

49 made to the emperor against Sawai Jai Singh. Rohilla Khan, the jagirdar ofparganas

Chatsu and Jhak complained about the unjust capture of some tracts of his jagirs by

Maharaja Jai Singh.93 Khushla and Sabla, businessmen of Ajmer, protested that Jai Singh

had wrongly acquitted Ram Chandra (mutasaddi) for some accounting error. Sawai Jai

Singh had had him arrested and had demanded 100,000 rupees as apeshkesh (tribute)

from him.94There was a complaint about collection of extra money from Amanat Khan's jagir in the pargana Chatsu. 5 Similar complaints were reported from the jagir of Amir-

ul-Umara, where the mutasaddis (agents) of Sawai Jai Singh were interfering in the

administration of the jagir.96 There were also reports about the collection of too much

revenue from the zamindars by the officials of Sawai Jai Singh's officials, who had

compelled the poor peasants to hand over more than the assessed amount.97

Bhikari Das, Jai Singh's agent at the Mughal court, informed the Maharaja about

the complaints made by Bahramand Khan, Mirza Khan and Mohammad Taqi against

Maharaja's interference in their jagir. The agent also made it clear in their letters to the

Maharaja that he had to be on good terms with the mansabdars since they could be a

great help in promoting the Maharaja's cause in the Mughal court and also instrumental

in getting additional assignments For him98 The disturbed conditions of the Jaipur region

were also evident in a representation made by Harji at the Mughal court. He had come to

seek justice for the murder of his brother, the chaudhari (village headman), of the

92 Ibid, arzdasht from Ani Rai to Sawai Jai Singh (# 85/480) undated. 93 Ibid., arzdasht from Kesho Rai to Sawai Jai Singh (# 162). 94 Ibid., from Megh Raj to Sawai Jai Singh, (# 187/612). 95 Ibid., (#95/519). 96 Ibid., (#96/519). 97 Ibid., from Kesho Raj to Sawai Jai Singh (# 201/626). 98 Ibid., from Bhikari Das to Jai Singh (# 436/1351).

50 pargana Chatsu. This initiative was taken against the wishes of the Kachchwaha rulers, who did not like their people to complain to the emperor directly about anything."

Bahadur Shah (1707-12 CE) received a deputation led by Aqil Ali (a Mughal mansabdar), who was interested in retaining his jagir near Amber. The spokesman stated that Sawai Jai Singh was too young to handle areas under his control. His lack of experience was the reason for a great deal of the mismanagement in Amber and the neighbouring parganas.100 The actual fact was that Jai Singh had instructed his men to harass and oppress the people who were under the jurisdiction of other officials because he knew the areas considered disturbed could be transferred to the imperial reserve

(khalisa) or to other Mughal officials. Sawai Jai Singh worked against this policy by not cooperating with the Mughal mansabdars, and in this way imperial officials lost interest in retaining their jagirs in the areas around Amber.101 An agent, Chhail Das, requested that Maharaja Jai Singh not give an opportunity to anyone to complain, since the agent was working with the imperial bakshi (officer in-charge of the military department) to obtain more jagirs around Amber for the Maharaja. It seems that by 1730s, Jai Singh's strategy was successful because the Mughal officials were not ready to undertake any assignments near Jaipur until there was a guarantee from the Mughal emperors that Sawai

Jai Singh would not create problems for them.

99 Ibid., from Megh Raj to Jai Singh (# 186/611). 100 Ibid., arzdasht from Kanwal Nain to Jai Singh (# 201/626). 101 Ibid., the complaints against the Maharaja were filed in the Mughal court as early as 1690s. Mohammad Taqi complained that the gumashtas (agents) of Jai Singh: Hari Ram and Roop Chand had collected the entire revenue of pargana Chatsu. 102 Ibid., arzdasht from Megh Raj to Jai Singh (# 81/504).

51 SAWAIJAI SINGH AS A CONTRACTUAL ADMINISTRATOR

The enlargement to the state boundaries was also done by securing lands on ijara

primarily from the Mughal mansabdars who were posted in the vicinity of Amber.

Ijara was a limited contract that conferred the right to farm an area consisting of a

village, or a cluster of villages or even apargana. The ijaradar was required to pay a

fixed amount for the revenue he was to collect from the area. He had to abide by a

document of lease that he signed. The ijaradar was expected protect the interests of the

state and also those of the peasants (rai 'yati). His vigilance and personal labours might

increase the collection of revenue beyond the estimated sum (jama).

From the beginning of the eighteenth century it was becoming increasing difficult

for the Mughal mansabdars could not realize the revenues from their assigned areas in

many parts of the Mughal Empire. At that time and it was more profitable deal for them

to transfer their jagirs to the contractual farmers. Sawai Jai Singh offered gifts and

monetary payments to the Mughal officials so that they could help his agents to procure

more lands- as jagirs and ijaras from the imperial nobles.104 Pancholi Das, the agent of

the Maharaja informed him that he had arranged for the ijara of'the following jagirs for

three years (1712-15) from the court of Bahadur Shah (1712 CE):105

Wilson and Wilson Dictionary: Ijara: contractual farmer, 214.

104 "jjjg mutasaddis (officials) of Jai Singh forced the zamindars (hereditary landowners) to lease their lands on ijara in pargana Chatsu, and this was reported to the emperor. Mir Lateef, a Mughal mansabdar had transferred his tankhawah-jagir (salaried assignment) that was worth 148,000 rupees to Jai Singh in pargana Chatsu. Kanwal Nain (agent) at the Mughal court, arranged for the grant of pargana Malpura on ijara through the bakshi-ul-mulk (minister in charge of the military department) for the Maharaja", Gupta, The Agrarian system of Eastern Rajasthan, 225. 105 C. U. Wills Report, Appendix II, RSA, Bikaner.

52 YEAR 1712 CE

NAMES PARGANAS

Shuja't khan Amarsar, Mauzabad, Bahrana and Nagina

Hasan khan Lalsot

Ikhlas khan Ghazi ka Thana (Mohammadabad)

Rai Ghasi Mauzapur

Ram

Aizuddin Mewat (extending till/>argana Akbarabad and Ferozpur ofpargana

Jhar)

The agent also added that after these large jagirs near the watan (Amber) were

secured, the smaller jagirdars would readily assign their jagirs on ijara.106 There is no

record about these areas going back to the previous assignees from Sawai Jai Singh. After

the areas were obtained on ijara and jagirs from the Mughal emperors as a mansabdar,

the Amber state was extended through the acquisition of four Mughal parganas. The jagirs that were granted to Jai Singh by the Mughal Emperors in different years are listed

in Appendix C.107

The areas that eventually came under the control of Sawai Jai Singh are shown on

1 AO

the map. Yet the changes in the jagir assignments were quite frequent and because of

these changes the parganas constantly changed hands. According to S. P. Gupta, "these

106 Pancholi Das to Jai Singh (quoted in C. U. Wills Report, Appendix II), RSA, Bikaner. 107 Source: Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 108 See Appendix B. 53 changes tended to increase the overall authority of Jai Singh around his watan Amber and its neighbouring areas. The Maharaja started with the control of one part of the pargana in his jagir and gradually established fall control over the entire pargana." In the beginning, some of the parganas held by Sawai Jai Singh retained their separate identities, but gradually, with the process of consolidation of the Jaipur state, they were absorbed into other parganas. The boundaries of Amber (watan) were enlarged, and in

1726 CE, a new name was given to the district at the time of the building of the capital city at Jaipur; the pargana was named Sawai Jaipur. The following parganas and villages were incorporated in the pargana Sawai Jaipur:110

PARGANAS ABSORBED INTO YEAR

Shahpura Sawai Jaipur 1726-7

Patan Sawai Jaipur 1726-7

Kaladera Sawai Jaipur 1726-7

Khoh Sawai Jaipur 1726-7

Jaitpur Sawai Jaipur 1726-7

Lalgarh Sawai Jaipur 1726-7

Tunga Sawai Jaipur 1726-7

Amber Sawai Jaipur 1726-7

VILLAGES ABSORBED INTO YEAR

Sursingpura Sawai Jaipur 1726-7

Gupta, The Agrarian system of Eastern Raj as than, 225. ' Muwazana tappa haveli, qasba sawai Jaipur, RSA, Bikaner.

54 Ajitgarh Sawai Jaipur 1726-7

Bakhtpura Sawai Jaipur 1726-7

Renamed Kishanpura

Through the process of acquisition of land and territories, the pargana Jaipur grew to include 1,010 villages in 1744 CE (See Appendix B). Similarly, some parganas around Jaipur were enlarged at the expense of the adjoining parganas. The parganas of

Bahatri, Dausa, Lalsot, Khohri, Maujpur, and Geejgarh were enlarged at the expense of the pargana Udai, Paota, and Toda Bhim.111 Much of this process of incorporation became a permanent, but some of the parganas were temporarily separated and grouped together for the purpose of revenue administration.

The territorial expansion under Sawai Jai Singh was not accomplished not through military expeditions, but was mainly due to the transfer of various parganas by the Mughal authorities. The transfer of lands, which was not intended to be permanent, was made in the form of either ordinary jagir (salaried assignment) or ijara (contract farming). The tracts of land were given on lease for a short- term profit for the party.

These lands were later taken over by Sawai Jai Singh on a permanent basis after the central authority became unstable. As a high official, he could easily secure farming

111 See Appendix B.

55 119 rights (ijara) in any area that he thought he would be able to control effectively. There is extensive evidence about how he obtained a large numbers of areas on ijara.

THE JAIPUR STATE: REALIGNMENT WITH THE BHAIBANDH

The acquisition of a large number of territories outside his hereditary land (watan:

Amber) by Sawai Jai Singh necessitated the creation of a special land tenure system known as watan zamindari- wa- istamrari- ijara. In order to consolidate his possession of the newly acquired areas, he combined zamindari rights with long term farming rights.

He exercised these rights in the areas, which were assigned to a number of Kachchwaha sub-clan leaders. This process culminated in the acquisition of new areas that were contiguous to the Kachchwahas hereditary domain. The acquisition occurred at the expense of the zamindars of Chauhans, Tanwar, Qaimkhani, and Meos.114 This revival of the old Rajput policy considerably strengthened the position of the Kachchwaha clan leaders who constituted the nobility. The waning control of the Mughals, who had earlier provided protection to the Rajput chiefs also contributed to the growing dependence of the latter on clan solidarity. 115Sawai Jai Singh gave lands on ijara to his subordinates, namely, persons who had local standing or deemed capable of retaining their holdings amid turbulent conditions. The size of a land assignment could be a villager or even a part of a village. In some cases, only particular taxes such as the ghas-charai (grazing),

112 As it is discussed in this chapter. 113 See Appendix B. Singh, The state, the landlord and peasants, 197. 115 Ibid.

56 salrul (iron), or kul-hubutat (all taxes) could be leased out by the ruler who assigned the land.116

The period of ijara granted by Sawai Jai Singh was not uniform, and the leases were generally for six months to one year. Sometimes, they might be given for two or three years, but rarely for four or five years. If the lease was more than a year, then half of the village was in khalisa and half in jagir or ijara. The ijaradar was required to produce a surety, which was usually provided by apatel, mahajan, or sahukar (banker).

Particular instructions were issued at the time of the lease, and the ijaradar had to abide by them. For example, protection of the sahukar was the responsibility of the ijaradar.

There are instances when the mal-I-zamini (security cash) was stolen in the jurisdiction of the land holder, and the ijaradar had to return the money to the banker. In some cases,

117 the state paid back the security to the banker and then recovered it from the ijaradar.

The sub-assignees had limited control over the land and had the right to collect only certain revenues, while Jaipur state retained the administrative control and these areas were amalgamated with the state for all practical purposes.

The cases of the houses of Unaira, Chomu, Jhilai, Achrol, Isarda, Diggi,

Sarsop, and Sikar were different. They were ordinarily regarded as hereditary owners of their lands (territories assigned by the Rajput rulers) and were subjected to few conditions. They were therefore free to manage their own affairs. It is noteworthy that

Sawai Jai Singh signed an agreement with these thakurs, which stipulated that they would

116 The details of ijara revenues and administration will be discussed in chapter two. 117 See chapter two. 118 Arzdahst # 1000 dated Jan 3, 1742, Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur.

57 not create any disturbance in the region.119 They willingly acknowledged the authority of

the Maharaja and also agreed to rule according to his instructions.120 The state did not

appoint officials in the thikana, which otherwise was treated as an integral parts of the

state that were fully and exclusively under the state's authority. These chieftains had no

separate political jurisdiction and no pretensions to semi-sovereignty. This lack of

evidence was evident in their obligation to perform military service and to attend the

court whenever, they were summoned. The successor of a chief also had an obligation to

secure recognition (tika) from the Maharaja. These chieftains did not have a right to sub-

191 lease their holdings to family member or subordinates.

Sawai Jai Singh preferred to distribute the areas under his control among his own

1 99

officers, and most of these assignees were selected from his own clan. Most of these

assignees were from his own clan: Ram Singh Shekhawat procured the qasba (small

town) of Fatehpur on ijara in 1739 CE for six years. He agreed to enforce the authority of

the Maharaja in the area to prevent the tax collectors of other clans from coming.

Nawal Singh Kalyanot got the faujdari of Poata for the year 1729 CE after he agreed to

pay the arrears (Rs. 100,001).124 Jeet Singh Narukha was appointed the subedar and faujdar of Ajmer, Ranthambor (fort) and Unaira for the year 1730 CE125 Sawai Ram

Narukha got the lease of the pargana Mandawar for five years.126 Shyam Singh Rajawat

119 Ibid., yaddashti # 1023 dated Jan 3, 1742. 120 Ibid., arzidasht # 1005 dated Jan 3, 1742 & Qaul-qarar # 1316 dated May 20, 1759. 121 Bhatnagar, The life and times of Sawai Jai Singh, 278. 122 See Appendix E: for listing of the Kachchawaha chiefs. 123 Lakhatang, undated, Year 1739, RSA, Bikaner. 124 Navisht # 1127 dated Nov. 24, 1730, Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 125 Ibid., # 1162 dated Nov. 8, 1730. 126 Ibid., # 1090 dated Jan. 16, 1728.

58 was assigned the parganas of Pidayani, Maujpur, and Harsana on ijara. The pargana of Manoharpur and Amarsar were assigned to Ajeet Singh on a temporary basis.128 In a few cases, local magnates were also allotted some parganas on lease. For example,

Dayaram, a diwan of the Jaipur state, had the lease of the pargana of Malarna, and

Naraindas Natani (famous banker) was assigned the pargana Wazirpur on a limited lease.129 Less land was assigned to the Muslims and not a single piece was assigned to them in some of the parganas 13° At the beginning of the eighteenth century, a large part of the state was sub-assigned to the Kachchwaha clan members or the state officials, but as Jai Singh consolidated his control over this region, the areas under state control

(khalisa) began to increase proportionately. The changes made in the pargana Amber can be considered as an example:

PARGANA YEAR KHALISA JAGIR VILLAGES HELD IN INAM (GIFT) &

CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS.

Amber 1715 17 70 13

Amber 1724 43 47 10

Amber 1734 40 45 15

Amber 1744 32 42 26

The bulk of sub-assignments were given to state officers and holders of such jagis r had to maintain a number of rasi (horses), dol (horsemen) and bandukshahi

127 Ibid., # 1087 dated Nov. 9, 1727. 128 Ibid., # 1089 dated Dec 7, 1727. 129 Ibid, # 1091 dated Nov 12, 1727. 130 For example in pargana Chatsu, there were 873/4 villages and only half of a village was assigned to a Muslim, Arhsattapargana Chatsu, Year 1730, RSA, Bikaner. 131 Ibid, arhsatta pargana Amber, Years: 1715, 1724, and 1744.

59 (musketeers). The sanad (legal document) was not issued until the horses were actually obtained and presented at the office of Bakshi (head of the army department). The Jaipur state did not assign mansab to its officials because these were considered prerogatives of the Mughal authority.132 The salary of a jagirdar was fixed on the basis of the size of the contingent he maintained. The quotas were irregular and the emoluments of a cavalier were between 400 and 600 rupees annually, depending on the quality of the horses.

These salaried assignments were always subject to renewal, and every year, sanad (legal document) had to be produced for inspection and confirmation.

Unlike the other Mughal jagirdars, the Jaipur rajas began to assert the right of sovereignty and emphasized that the tenure of their sub assignee (jagirdar) depended on personal service and loyalty. Yet a study of contemporary evidence suggests that in their turn, their subordinate officials began, in course of time, to claim their tenure by right of inheritance and could not be easily dislodged. The Jaipur rulers held their sub assignees duty bound to pay peshkash (offering). The sub assignees were also expected to enter the service of the Maharaja, and, in times of peace, to pay homage to the Jaipur rulers.

Kachchwaha rulers also raised the positions of many important chieftains (thikanadars), such as Manoharpur and Khandela.I34

The deliberate policies of the Jaipur state, which were intended to convert these hereditary chieftains into regular state officials as may be seen in the case of the

Shekhawats. Through such policies, the Amber rulers intended to extend their absolute

132 Only the Mughal Emperors assigned ranks and the salaries accordingly for their officials. 133 See chapter two for more details. 134 C. U. Wills Report Appendix, I, RSA, Bikaner.

60 sovereignty over these areas. The Shekhawati clan claimed special status since its members considered themselves as autonomous chiefs. They gradually developed as independent rulers, and owed an uncertain allegiance the Kachchwaha rulers. Following the Anglo-Jaipur treaty in 1818 CE, the Shekhawati territorial rights were firmly established, but the political independence that they had acquired during the previous period was, of course, lost. The British government did concede these thikandars

IOC autonomy in the management of their internal affairs.

Sawai Jai Singh's successors continued to retain their control of the territories secured by the Maharaja. Ishwari Singh (1744-50 CE) received confirmation from the

Mughal court that all territories would be permanently assigned to the Kachchwahas, and that the friends and foes of the Maharaja would be regarded the friends and foes of the emperor. Ishwari Singh was able to control the state of Amber effectively without making any new acquisitions. When Madho Singh succeeded to the throne of Jaipur in

1750 CE, he attached Rampura to his state. This pargana was given to him by his grandfather, the Maharana of Mewar (head of the Sisodia clan and ruler of the

•I ->n neighbouring state of Amber). Later on, Madho Singh ceded Rampura and Tonk to the

Marathas.138The extent of Amber state under Jai Singh made it the biggest territory among the Rajput states of that time and the territories under the control of Amber are shown in the Map (see Appendix B).

135 C. U. Wills Report, Appendix, II, RSA, Bikaner. 136 Farman issued in 1748 to Ishwari Singh, (Reg. # 759 Persian) & Qual-nama # 141, dated Feb. 25, 1748, Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 137 Ibid., Yaddashti # 1413 dated May 21, 1729. 138 Shyamdaldas, Vir Vinod, vol. 2, 976.

61 ALLIANCES WITH THE RAJPUT, MARATHAS AND OTHER STATES

In order to maintain Jaipur's regional predominance, Sawai Jai Singh established friendly relations with his neighbours. There were eighteen Rajput (see Appendix D) principalities and Sawai Jai Singh developed successful alliances with all of them. He chose the most conventional method to neutralize the main principalities of Rajputana, that is, his marriage to the Sisodia princess of Mewar, whom he agreed to make the pat- rani (main queen).139 The rulers of Jodhpur and Bikaner became his son-in-laws, and in this way, he became influential in the political affairs of those states. 140 The ongoing occurrence of conflicts, which continued within the Rajput clans, made it clear that Sawai

Jai Singh was not able to achieve undisputed hegemony in the area. Nonetheless, he was able to secure credibility, strength, and legitimacy for his kingdom in North India. He convened the Hurda Conference in 1734 CE, where the representatives of principal

Rajput states of Mewar, Marwar, Bikaner, Bundi, and Kota were invited to come and discuss a possible strategy to drive the Marathas out of Malwa and to secure their states from constant raids from the Deccanis.141 In spite of the inspiring pledges made at the conference, the agreement was never implemented because the rulers did not trust each other. Still, it was an important event in terms of Sawai Jai Singh's strategy. His most important achievement at the conference were the settling of differences with the

Sisodias of Mewar, the most respected Rajput principality, the negotiation of peace with nearly all the Rajput states.142

139 Shayamdaldas, Vir Vinod, vol. 2, 974. 140 Agreement # 904 dated Nov 1, 1732, Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 141 Marathas were refereed as Deccanis in Jaipur sources. 142 Agreement, # 1497, July 17, 1734, Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur.

62 The assumption that the pre-colonial states regarded their adjoining states either as tributaries or enemies which was enunciated by John F. Richards and others is contested by these historical events. Sawai Jai Singh adopted the roles of mentor and spokesperson in relation to most of the Rajput rulers, and their correspondence has been a vital resource in the reformulation of the policy of this ruler towards his neighbours and contemporaries.143 It has become clear that in order to maintain Jaipur's regional predominance Sawai Jai Singh established friendly relations with his neighbours. Sawai

Jai Singh encountered the Marathas when he was the governor of Malwa in 1715 CE. He had realized the futility in fighting with them and had advised the Mughal Emperor to come to terms with Baji Rao. When he realized that his advice was not being taken seriously at the Mughal court, he took immediate measures to protect his territory from plunder and unnecessary ruin. He sent a proposal to Baji Rao to come to Jaipur and he promised to cover the daily expenses for Balaji's army of 5000 men.144 The negotiations were fruitful, as long as Jai Singh was alive; his territories remained undisturbed by

Maratha inroads initiated under the leadership of Baji Rao.145 The Jaipur rulers have started negotiating treaties with the states of the Sikhs, the Jats, the Ruhellas, and also with Nawabs of Awadh. Most of the states signed peace treaties that said that they would support Sawai Jai Singh and his successors in times of need. They also agreed not to start the hostilities without attempting consultations.146

Letters from all the Rajput states are preserved in Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, and Jaipur. 144 Khutut-I-Maharajgan, Persian, Year 1737, RSA, Bikaner. 145 William Irvine, Later Mughals (London: Luzec Publications, 1922), vol. 2, 248 146 The correspondence is preserved in Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur.

63 In order to fully understand the power and position attained by Sawai Jai Singh, one has to analyze the income of Jai Singh that came from various parganas, which he held as a Mughal mansabdar and as an ijaradar (contract farmer). In 1700, when Sawai

Jai Singh succeeded his father to be the new Maharaja, he controlled only 701 villages with an estimated income of Rs. 500, 000. At the time of his death (1743 CE) just 43 years later, he had control of 5,422 villages jagirs yielding the revenues worth 3, 86,

5886 rupees. His jagirs were scattered in four parganas of the Mughal Empire. 147 Of this total, the revenues from his parganas in Rajasthan were around Rs. 24, 2530."° The income from the ijara (revenue farming) totalled 68411 rupees in 1727 CE; this income to grew to 45, 8257 rupees in 1734 CE.149

CONCLUDING REMARKS

An analysis of an emergence of Jaipur state as an independent state adds to the existing historiography on the nature of pre-colonial state formation by highlighting the political strategies of the Kachchwaha rulers. It seems that military coercion was not the only means through which kingdoms were established or enlarged: diplomatic strategies were preferred by many sub-continental statesmen. The vulnerability of political alliances was buttressed by a coherent ideology of rule, and in Jaipur's case, it was invigorating use of Rajadharma. Kachchwaha rulers used their diplomatic influence at the Mughal court to abolish unpopular taxes imposed on non-Muslims and became the protectors of

147 Parganas of Ajmer, Akbarabad (Agra), Ranthambor and Shahjahanabad (Delhi). 148 Sarkar, A history of Jaipur, 22. 149 The details will be discussed in Chapter two.

64 all castes, including the Brahmans. To assert themselves as the legitimate rulers of their

kingdom, they intervened to reorganize religious communities and introduced social

reforms that protected the underprivileged sectors of their society. This achievement

ultimately contributed to Jaipur's remarkable success in its effort to control and manage

various avenues of income as discussed in the next chapter. The political alliances with the religious elites were crystallized as they became co-sharers of this political power to venture to control the finances of Jaipur to make it one of the richest Northern India states of the eighteenth century.

65 APPENDIX A13U

ADMINISTRATIVE POSTS HELD BY SAWAIJAI SINGH (1688-1743 CE)

# DOC D/Y POST PLACE SOURCE

1 34 1713 Faujdar Ahmadabad Farman

2 34 1713 Faujdar Allahabad Farman

3 30 1714 Mansabdar All mansabs were restored which were Farman

taken away in 1712 ce

4 20 1715 Jagirs Deductions in jagirs were restored Farman

5 100 1715 Subahdar Amber, Dausa, Chatsu, Phagun, Mauzabad, Yaddashti

& Niwai

6 175 1716 Faujdar Bhim & Kama Farman

7 58 1721 Zamindar Kiraya Farman

8 60 1721 Faujdar Hinduan & Toda Bhim Farman

9 37 1722 Subahdar Akbarabad Farman

10 37 1722 Faujdar Mathura Farman

11 37 1722 Faujdar Udehi Farman

12 98 1723 Jagir Amarsar Parwana

13 261 1725 Faujdar Bayana Farman

14 154 1732 Subahdar Malwa & Mandsowar Farman

All documents are preserved in Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur.

66 67 APPENDIX C

JAGIRS ASSIGNMENTS OF SAWAIJAI SINGH

# DOC. D/Y JAGIR TRANSFERRED FROM SOURCE

1 266 Apr 23, Jagir Churaman Jat Parwana

1723

2 268 Sept 25, Lahar Aniruddha Singh Parwana

1716

3 97 Feb 1, 1724 Akbarabad Churaman Jat and Hasbul-

(villages) Narukhas hukum

4 99 June 5, Naraina Devi singh, lal singh & Parwana

1719 suraj singh

5 ? May 8, Bhangarh {Par. Akbarabad) Parwana

1732 Wali Mohammad

6 121 Sept 11, Gaya (Bihar) Isqand y. Khan Parwana

1723

7 126 Jan 15, Nusrat Yar khan Parwana

1728

8 130 May 3, Jagir Raja hardlal Parwana

1721

9 58 Undated, Pargana. Kanwar Abhay Singh Parwana

1721 Amarsar

10 Zamindar of Wali Mohammad Parwana

68 Kiyara

11 272 April 15, Naraina Aladdin khan Parovaria

1725

12 179 March 1, Malarna Lai singh Parwana

1722

APPENDIX D

RAJPUT PRINCIPALITIES OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY RAJASTHAN

# Principality Clan

1 Udaipur Sisodias

2 Dhungarpur Sisodias

3 Bhaswara Sisodias

4 Pratapgarh Sisodias

5 Jodhpur Rathors

6 Bikaner Rathors

7 Kishangarh Rathors

8 Jaipur Kachchwahas

9 Alwar Kachchwahas

10 Bundi Chauhans

11 Kota Chauhans

12 Sirohi Chauhans

13 Jaiselmer Yadavas

14 Karauli Yadavas

69 15 Jhalgarh Jhalas

16 Bharatpur Jats

17 Dholpur Jats

18 Tonk Muslims

APPENDIX E131

LIST OF KACHCHWAHA CHIEFS

Jaswant Singh Rajawat

Jodh Singh Nathawat of Chomu

Gulab Singh

Chatur Bhujat of Bagaru

Jagat Singh

Nand Singh

Rao Vikramditya of Barwara

Dalel Singh Rajawat of Dhula

Rao Sardar Singh of Unaira

Zalim Singh Nathawat

Ratan Singh Nathawat

Sultan Singh

Fateh Singh Khumbhani

Ajeet Singh Sheobrahmamputra

151 Kapad-dwara collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur

70 Dalel Singh

APPENDIX F

LIST OF KACHCHWAHA RULERS 1700-1818 CE152

1688-1743 Sawai Jai Singh

1743-1750 Ishwari Singh

1751-68 Madho Singh

1768-78 Prithvi Singh

1778-1803 Pratap Singh

1803-1818 Jagat Singh

152 Ibid., Ahadnama # 628: Maharaja Jagat Singh had signed the subsidiary alliance treaty with the English East Company on April 2nd 1818 after much deliberation.

71 CHAPTER TWO: THE STATE AND ITS FISCAL PARTNERS: THE RULING ELITES AS BUREAUCRATIC CO-SHARERS OF POWER AND RESOURCES

This chapter discusses the financial system of eighteenth century Jaipur, examines the ways used by this state to augment sources of income, and reviews how those resources were re-distributed. Chapter one contests the theory of military fiscalism by showcasing how Kachchwaha rulers used diplomatic alliances not militaristic aggression, to expand their territories, it addressed the military part of the theory. The "fiscal" aspect of the theory is questioned by illustrations of the infrastructural sophistication of this state, which facilitated the augmentation of its income in various ways. The Kachchwaha rulers promoted the participation of the ruling elites and, more specifically, the input of the mercantile communities by incorporating them in the administrative structure and by transferring a sizeable proportion of their income as remuneration for their services. The ineffective character of the Indian state has been blamed for the area's unchanging economy and endemic poverty, even in fairly recent scholarship.1 The Indian land revenue system is always included in these discussions: the point is made that the system was limited and catered only to the needs of the ruling class, since the peasants continued to live in self- sufficient villages.2 The role of the Indian states and their supposed resistance to the dynamic economic policies, that helped Western societies to develop capitalism have usually been blamed by scholars who were trying to explain the economic backwardness of the Indian subcontinent.3

1 Deepak Lai, Hindu Equilibrium The Hindu Equilibrium, India c 1500 B.C-2000 AD (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Rev. Edition, 2005), 40. Eric Jones, The European Miracle: environments, economies and geopolitics in the history of Europe and Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 199. 3 Jean Baechler, "The origins of modernity: caste and feudality-India, Europe and Japan", in Jean Beachler, Jbhn A Hall & Michael Mann ed. Europe and Rise of capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 24-8.

72 Scholars who deal with the development of the Indian economy have presented various factors that inhibited Indian society from moving towards a capitalist mode of functioning. Most of the arguments are grouped around the notion of social immobility that is the caste system or the failure of the state as a political agent to impose its will and usher in institutional changes.4 Historians working on the Mughal Empire have formulated theories about how excessive demands for land revenue resulted in the ruination of the natural economy of the countryside. Furthermore, there is implicit insistence in these works on the parasitical relationship between the villages and the towns. Yet the extension and specialization of the craft sectors and commercial enterprises did not affect the self-sufficiency of the villages.5 Advocates of this

"parasitical" viewpoint believe that the demands of the relationship were responsible for ushering in the "crisis" that occurred when the Mughal Empire collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions.6 A recent monograph on the state's formation under the

Mughals has critiqued this perspective by focusing on the role of mercantile classes who helped in the consolidation of Mughal sovereignty.7 Chris Bayly, Sanjay Subrahmanyam,

Andre Wink, Muzaffar Alam, and Sumit Guha have discussed this phenomenon of increased participation by merchants in the process of state building in the regions during the eighteenth century. This analysis seeks to add on to this historiography by focusing upon the financial system of the Jaipur state.

4 Gunnar Mrydal discussed the nature of the pre-colonial states in his Asian Drama and became well- known for the formulation of a slogan "soft state". For more details see Sanjay Subramanyam, "Institutions, Agency and Economic changes in South Asia; A survey and some suggestions", in Burton Stein & Sanjay Subramanyam ed. Institutions and Economic Changes in South Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 14-47. 5 Habib, "Potentialities of Capitalistic development in the Economy of Mughal India", 32-78. 6 Tapan Raychaudhari, "The State and the Economy" in Tapan Raychaudhari and Irfan Habib, ed., The Cambridge Economic history of India, vol. 1, 172. 7 Hasan, State and Locality in Mughal India, 117-9.

73 This chapter is divided into three sections: the first section elaborates the administrative infrastructure, in which the state officials played an important role in the performance of bureaucratic functions on behalf of the rulers in their traditional as well as official capacities. These states were capable of forming stable political structures through diplomacy and negotiations with local elites, and their energies were not always channeled into coercion, conquests, and chaos. The second section focuses on agrarian taxation: the magnitude of land revenue demands, the methods of assessment, the expansion of agriculture, changes in the agrarian sector through the intervention of the state, and the redistribution of agrarian resources. The role of the state in facilitating trade and commercial activities is the subject of the last section of this chapter. Examples are provided to show that these states showed hardly any ambivalence regarding economic ventures and opportunities. In fact, comparative analysis of the eighteenth century states proves convincingly that they were actively involved in facilitating trade that increased their revenues. They took control of markets by fixing prices to maintain the balance between supply and demand, restricted imports and exports to encourage local trade, and closely monitored their mercantile communities. The role of mercantile communities was important in both the rural and urban economies.

THE BUREAUCRATIC FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE

The following discussion demonstrates that Indian states functioned efficiently on the basis of an institutionalized bureaucracy. Administrative authority was dispersed

74 among the elite and propertied classes, and the rulers mediated between these officials

and the people in order to enforce their authority and prevent oppression and the misuse

of power. The evidence about the administrative functions of these officials contradicts

the position of some current scholars regarding the aloofness of these rulers and their

inability to establish long- standing political institutions in pre-colonial India. It seems

that the three-tiered bureaucracy had the privilege of sharing the states' resources in

Jaipur through their role assisting in the administration and management of the avenues

of income. The state rewarded and integrated these elites by assigning them jagirs though

symbolic titles, cash payments, and most importantly, through reduction of the land

revenue demand by twenty five percent and up to fifty percent on their lands. Most of the

administrative positions were regularly farmed out, mortgaged, and sold to the interested

individuals.

Theoretically, all administrative positions, even the hereditary ones, such as

village headmen, revenue collectors, and assessors, were subject to the state's approval,

which was usually given after the payment of lump sum installments of cash known as peshkash.8 This method of operating is evident in the official correspondence between the

state diwans and different provincial and village level officials. The hereditary claims of

some positions were altered after the payment of more cash by another individual.9 The

ruling elite and the commercial classes competed to acquire these positions from the

court, and gradually the administrative positions for land revenue came to be dominated

See Appendix A: Peshkash. 9 Ibid

75 by the mercantile communities. The members of the Kachchwaha clan were initially encouraged to discharge the administrative duties of the state on a contractual basis; for example, the magisterial position (faujdari) of pargana Sawai Jaipur was taken over by

Bhoop Singh Rajawat during the reign of Jai Singh.11 These actions contradicted the precepts of the Mughal Empire, where imperial positions such as the faujdar, subedar and kotwal were leased out to any interested individuals (not to members of the royal household) from the early decades of the sixteenth century, although this practice was officially banned by Shahjahan in 1640.12 It should be noted, however, that the centralizing policies of Sawai Jai Singh and the increasing monetization of official positions became excruciating for some of members of the ruling elite. They countered the trend by standing against the state authorities and became independent rulers by taking over khalisa (crown lands). Rao Pratap Singh Narukha of Macheri founded the state of Alwar by confiscating the villages under khalisa, and Devi Singh Champavat carved out a large principality in pargana Dausa in the same way.14 Overall, the ruling elites, which also included the mercantile communities, supported and helped to consolidate the Kachchwaha rulers in their initiatives, which were intended to establish sovereign power. These communities became co-sharers in this process.

The Jaipur rulers retained the Mughal administrative institutions, as pointed out in chapter three, and replicated the imperial structure on a smaller scale by becoming

10 For more details see Dilbagh Singh, "The Role of the Mahajans in the Rural Economy in Eastern Rajasthan during the eighteenth century", Social Scientist, Vol. 2, No. 10 (May 1974), 20-31. 11 Agreement # 1303 between Bhoop Singh Rajawat and Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh, August 21, 1743, Kapad-dwara collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 12 Hasan, State and Locality in Mughal India, 36-7. Singh, The State, landlord andpeasants,156. 14 Arhsattas of pargana Dausa Years: 1775, 1780, 1786, & 1789, the khalisa lands were slowly converted into the jagirs of Devi Singh, RSA, Bikaner.

76 autonomous chieftains. The Maharaja himself was the head of state and looked after the

administrative functions of the region as the Mughal mansabdar, jagirdar, and ijaradar}

He was assisted by the diwan, who was in charge of revenue and finance and supervised

the entire administration.17 He kept the ruler updated about the day-to-day activities in the

state by maintaining a constant barrage of correspondence with state officials. It has been

reported that the diwan maintained at least twenty-two types of records at his office.18 In

addition, fives types of papers were sent to him by the Bakshi,19 and about eleven types

of records were officially sent to him from the pargarnets. This level of correspondence

and the bureaucratic set-up of the Jaipur state are comparable to the arrangement of the

Mughals and the Marathas in pre-colonial India. The major expenses of the state and the

salaries and claims of the jagirdars, faujdars, kotwals, and other administrative officials were supervised by the diwan. The diwan worked closely with the Bakshi, who was in-

91 charge of the army and intelligence to take care of the military expenditure. The Bakshi looked after the recruitment of soldiers and the maintenance of the data about the military contingents supported by the jagirdars for the state. The diwan after consultation with

15 This point has been discussed in detail by Singh, The State, Landlords and the peasants, 166-184 16 As mentioned above. 17 See Appendix H: for the diwans of the Jaipur State 18 Bhatnagar, Life and Times o/Sawai Jai Singh, 282 has given the names of the following records maintained at his office: 1) Kharitas, 2) Khatut Maharajgan 3) Khutut Diwanan 4) Khutut Ahalkaran 5) Akhbarat 6) Wakil Reports 7) Siaha Haqiqat 8) Siaha Maharaja 9) Siaha Huzur 10) Siaha Waqia 11) Tojih Dastur 12) Chitiyat Khizan 13) Roznama Khizana 14) Safayat Khizana 15) Khizana Huzur 16) Punja 17) Siga Imarat 18) Jagir, Muwazana, Awarija, Baqait Papers 19) Kharcha Nyaya Sabha 20) Siaha Adalati 21) Nuskha Udak, Inam & 22) Khar da Jama Kharch Khizana. Ibid., 283, papers sent to him by the Bakshi were: 1) Kharch Dag Ghora Mulazim 2) Roznama Da/tar bakshi 3) Siaha Daftar Bakshi 4) Qilejat & 5) Jama kharch o/the military campaigns 20 Ibid., the records sent to him from the parganas: 1) Nirakh bazaar 2) Roznama Potdar 3) Dastur al amal 4) Arhsattas 5) Barat 6) Papers relating to mapa, rahdari, kotwali chabutra and punyartha (charity) 7) Yaddashit Baqi Hawalgi (dealing with arrears) 8) Mavajana Kalan 9) Yaddashti Parganavati \Qi)Tankhadar Parganavati & 11) Yaddashti 21 It is evident from the official correspondence between the diwan and the bakshi (preserved under the category of chittis) RSA, Bikaner. Also the type of records maintained at this office such as Jama Kharch Ghora Mulazim, Roznama Daftar Bakshi, Siaha Daftar bakshi, and Jama kharch of the military campaigns.

77 Bakhsi was also responsible for taking action against defaulters. These two officials

worked closely with the Maharaja and more or less monopolized the bureaucratic

functions at the central level.

The second tier of bureaucracy functioned at the provincial level, and these

officials had to report directly to the diwan and the bakshi. Jaipur state was divided into

41 parganas, which were administrative as well as territorial units. The parganas were

subdivided into tappas and each tappas included about fifty to 200 mauzas (villages).24

The lowest administrative unit was the village, as was the case under the Mughals. These

territorial divisions were designed mainly to help in the assessment of peasant cultivation,

the collection of revenues, and the maintenance of law and control. The provincial

officials, such as the faujdars (governors)25, kotwals (magistrates), amils (revenue

collectors), chaudharis, and qanungos, were assisted by subordinate staff members and

were in charge of the whole pargana. Local officials such as the patels and patwaris,

were mostly hereditary landholders, and held their positions on the basis of customary

rights and privileges. They acted as middlemen between the state and the general

population by arbitrating and adjudicating disputes. It should be noted that the

Kachchwaha rulers adhered to the basic tenets of the Mughal institutions by co-sharing

Bhatnagar, Life and Times ofSawai Jai Singh, 285: he gives references from Roznama Daftar Bakshi, 1726, "It records the resumption of jagir on the complaint of the tawaichi that the trooper had not presented himself at the time of muster. Similarly, there is a case of a soldier who had gone on leave after leaving a substitute, but did not return. His jagir was resumed." 23 As it is evident from the official correspondence send by the pargana officials to the diwan and the Bakshi. 24 The size of the parganas was not constant as it kept on changing from time to time. For example, there were around 700 villages in pargana Jaipur in 1715 that increased to about 998 villages in 1737. 24The information is derived from the arhsattas of different parganas where the territorial units are given as tappas and mauzas. 25 Faujdars were not appointed in all the parganas and there are references of the faujdar in the six main parganas of Jaipur, Bahatri, Lalsot, Dausa, Lalsot, & Malarna.

78 their resources with local hereditary chiefs and by giving the chiefs the task of administration. The rulers claimed sovereign powers through this system of cooperation.

Besides these authorities, the amils and amins were important officials who were in charge of revenue administration at the pargana (provincial) level. These were two distinct positions, but they were often held by one person, particularly in the areas held by the Maharaja directly (khalisa lands).26 The mercantile communities of money lenders and bankers occupied most of amils and amins posts in Rajasthan, and this pattern is also evident in the examples of Kota, Mewar, and Marwar.27 The primary responsibilities of the amil were to look after the revenue income records and take care of the peasants. No one was allowed to leave or settle in the villages without the permission of the amil of the pargana, especially in times of crisis such as crop failure and famine.28 Most importantly, the amil was invested with power to settle disputes arising out of the sharing of jurisdictions among the zamindarsjagirdars, ijaradars and raiyati and to intervene when members of any of these groups sought help. For example, in 1725, the patels of the mauza Peelwara and village Samel in pargana Udai complained to the diwan (Narain

Das Kirpa Ram) about a land dispute. They were then instructed to settle the dispute with the help of the amils.29 Again in 1745, Jai Singh Khumbhani, the jagirdar of village

Udaipur, pargana Sawai Jaipur, complained to the diwan that the amil had assigned his

26 In 1736 Nanag Ram was appointed as the amil and amin of pargana Sawai Jaipur, Arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1736, RSA, Bikaner. 27 Ibid., The bania community known as sahs dominated the position of amils in pargana Sawai Jaipur from 1712 to 1749: Sah Nain Sukh from 1712-15; Sah Sewa Ram and Mohan Das from 1716-25; Sah Nanig Ram for 1741; and Sah Har Narain from 1744-49, their names appear in the arhsatta of the above mentioned years. 28 Ibid., chitti to amils of parganas Jaipur and Khohri, Year 1753 from the diwan instructing them (amils) about their duties. 29 Ibid., chitti to the diwan from the patels of mauza Peelwara Sumel, pargana Udai, Year 1725.

79 jagir to ijara (contractual farming). The diwan wrote to the amil, instructing him to settle

the matter with ihejagirdar immediately.

Another important official at the provincial level was the chaudhari, who was

primarily obligated to render all possible assistance to the amil in the process of revenue

collection. This hereditary office was always subject to renewal by the state, and the

state retained the right to dismiss these officers if there were complaints by the raiyati

about negligence or abuse of power. The chaudhari was also expected to pay peshkash

to the state when he started his position.33 The chaudharis paid land revenue at a

concessional rate, and they were entitled to levy a nankar (customary charge) on the

raiyati.34 The Qanungo was another hereditary village official who collected detailed

information about the land revenue assessments and entitlements of all superior classes

and sent their records to the office of the amil. The state also appointed a treasurer at the pargana level known as the potdar (meant fotadar in Persian) whose primary function

was the maintenance of accounts and disbursement of cash. His office was responsible

for dispensing out salaries of all pargana officials, such as the faujdars, amils, amins,

tappadars, and others.36 The potdar's duty was to dispatch all the cash collected in the parganas to the central treasury at Jaipur, with details about the remaining amount

30 Ibid., chitti to the diwan from Sawai Jai Singh, Year 1745. 3'By the eighteenth century this office became a private property and was bought, sold and mortgaged on a regular basis, Appendix A and for more details on the provincial administration see Singh, The State, Landlords and Peasants, 173-5. 32 Chitti to the amil of pargana Bahatri from the Maharaja, Year 1760, RSA, Bikaner. 33 Singh, The State, Landlords, and Peasants, 173. 34 They had to 1/6 of the produce instead of lA paid by the rest of the peasants, chitti to amil of pargana Malarna, Year 1753, RSA, Bikaner. 35 Ibid., arhsatta pargana Amber, Year 1663. 36 This information was ascertained on the basis of the correspondence between the diwan and the amils of different parganas.

80 (baqaya) sent to the diwan's office.37 The tappadar for each pargana headquarters was appointed by the diwan and was directly supervised by the amils. The position of shahna was at the lowest level in the hierarchy of the agrarian administration. The shahna's main job was to supervise the crops when they were ready in the fields, and wherever they were taken for safe storage.39

The village level administration (the third level) was conducted by the patels

(village headmen) and patwaris (village accountants). The patel was the chief village official, whose ancestors were generally related to the original settler of the village.4 The office of patel could also be conferred on an individual who was ready to give peshkash

(gift) to the state or was responsible for the foundation of a new settlement.41 The office of the patel was primarily occupied by agrarian groups such as the Ahirs, Jats and

Meenas and more rarely by the banias or Brahmans.42 The patels were responsible for maintaining law and order in the villages and for informing the higher authorities, such as the faujdar, about any criminal activities. The patels also helped with criminal investigations.43 They played an important role in time of crisis, when it was their duty to repopulate the villages by encouraging the raiyati return to cultivation, and by arranging tools, implements, and loans for them.44 They were not paid in cash for their services, but were authorize to collect customary perquisites, known as nankar from the raiyati

37 Arhsattapargana Amber, Year 1663 and Arhsattapargana Ganori, Year 1665, RSA, Bikaner 38 Ibid., Chitti from the diwan to the amil of pargana Sawai Jaipur , Year 1754. 39 Ibid., Chitti from Sri Ram Navgi to Diwan, Year 1749. Singh, The State, Landlords, and Peasants, 176 and Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 180. 41 Ibid, 181 has given several references from the primary sources (mainly chittis) about these cases. 42 Ibid. 43 Singh, The State, Landlords, and Peasants, 111. 44 For more details see Dilbagh Singh, "Position of the Patel in Eastern Rajasthan during the eighteenth century", Proceedings of Indian History Congress (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1970), 360-66.

81 (peasantry). In addition, their lands were assessed under the privileged classes' category

for the purpose of land revenue.45 The village accountant and keeper of the revenue

records was known as the patwari who had a function were very similar to those of the

patwaris of the Mughal Empire.46 He maintained the village records in the local

languages, and, in eastern Rajasthan, the records were known as Khasra. The patwari

kept records of the names of the cultivators, their castes, the areas under cultivation, and

crops harvested in the spring and winter.47 Like the office of the patel, his office could be

bought, sold, and mortgaged, and cash payments were made to the state. He also paid

land revenue at a concessional rate, and was charged a lower rate than usual for selling

his grain in the village markets in order to pay taxes to the state.49

The ability of the Jaipur rulers' to become involved in the day- to -day lives of

their subjects was made possible by the efficient bureaucracy, which they had inherited

from the Mughal Empire. The official discourse regarding the administrative details of

revenue collection and its distribution among the rural elites, the fixing of prices and the

conversion of food grains into cash reflects the sophistication of the state's involvement

and its success in the economic realm.

METHODS OF REVENUE ASSESSMENT, AGRARIAN CHANGES AND RE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME

Singh, "Position of the Patel in Eastern Rajasthan during the eighteenth century", 360-66. Gupta, The Agrarian system of Eastern Rajasthan, 182-4. 47 Ibid., 184. 4%Chitti from the diwan to the amil of pargana Bahatri, Year 1753 and chitti from diwan Kanhi Ram Nand Lai to the amil of pargana Chatsu, Year 1769, RSA, Bikaner. 49 Ibid., arhsattapargana Chatsu, Years: 1664, 1730 and 1766.

82 Jaipur was the one of the largest and richest states of pre-colonial northern India.

Sawai Jai Singh is credited for enlarging and enhancing the state's revenues, first of all by becoming the highest ranking mansabdar of the Mughal Empire.50 Then he acquired land assignments (jagirs) from the Mughal mansabdars, adjacent to his patrimony Amber on contractual farming (ijara).51 Lastly, he established a well organized administrative set up to collect land revenue and other taxes in his newly acquired territories. The state's income was derived from various sources, such as the land revenue, agrarian levies, income from ijara (contract farming), dues from peshkash (customary fee given to the rulers), custom tolls, and various urban taxes. Land revenue was the main source of income for the rulers of Jaipur, as was the case in other pre-colonial states. The state's officials maintained meticulous accounts of each area under cultivation and of the people cultivating the land. Under the Mughal Empire, the land revenue or mal was essentially a tax on crops, as was the case in other pre-colonial regimes. In addition, there is a consensus among historians working on the agrarian and administrative structure of

CI Rajasthan that these states continued the Mughal land revenue policy with few changes.

The methods of land revenue assessment and the procedures for land revenue collection firstly demonstrate the ability of the Jaipur state to collect more than fifty percent of the income of their subjects. Secondly, the methods are examples of the functioning of an administrative infrastructure that facilitated collaboration with various

50 See Chapter One Appendix A. 51 Ibid. 52 Habib, "Agrarian Relations and Land Revenue", 235. It was known as bhog in western Rajasthan; Bhadani, Peasants, artisans and entrepreneurs: economy ofMarwar in the seventeenth century, (Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 1999), 199. 53 Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan; Singh, The State, Landlords and Peasants; B. L. Bhadani, Peasants, artisans and entrepreneurs: economy ofMarwar in the seventeenth century; and Sethia, Rajput Polity: Warriors, Peasants and Merchants.

83 local agencies to transfer revenue to the central treasury. It seems that the rich cultivable

land in eastern Rajasthan (Jaipur state) was heavily dependent on the annual rainfall. The

peasants used different modes of irrigation such as wells, tanks, and natural drainage, but

the uncertainty about the rainfall remained the focus of the revenue assessment. The

arhsatta records, which are ledgers and receipts of income and expenditures, provide

statistical data about the land revenue demanded by the Jaipur state. The land revenue

statistics and other details about agrarian and non agrarian taxation in these documents

are as rich and detailed as the Mughal and Maratha chronicles.

The processes through which the land revenue demand was calculated contest the

theory of military fiscalism. The evidence from Jaipur about revenue collection indicates

that most of the revenue was redistributed among the elites as salaries and perquisites.

The Kachchwaha rulers were not involved in any military aggression that they had

initiated themselves; yet they were as successful as the militaristic states of Marathas and

Mysore in collecting more than fifty percent income of their subjects. This was done by

adopting and perfecting the land revenue procedures that had been in place since the

beginning of the seventeenth century. 54Land revenue calculations involved a number of

factors: first of all, the land was classified as cultivable (polaj) or uncultivable (banjar),

with the former category taxed more highly. Secondly, the land revenue rate differed for

hilly and sandy areas, and hilly areas had lower rates. Thirdly, the tax on lands that were

dependent on rain (barani) was higher than the rate for irrigated (chahi) lands. Fourthly,

there were variegated rates for cash crops, which were higher than the rates for food

54 For more details see Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 163-210 and Singh, The State, Landlord and Peasants, 108-125.

84 grains. Fifthly, the prevailing market prices determined the revenue demand every year.

Lastly, concessional rates were applied to the privileged classes or castes while peasants had to pay at least twenty percent higher taxes than were paid by the upper castes.55

The land revenue demand was made both in kind (Jinsi bataf) and cash (zabti) on two harvests, namely, autumn (kharif) and spring (rabi). The average revenue from the

^ton/harvest was thirty-five percent higher than the revenue from the rabi harvests.56

The state's share of the total land revenue or mal was around forty two percent but the common peasant or raiyaA had to part with more than forty, or sometimes fifty percent of his produce to compensate for the low contributions of the lightly assessed higher castes or riyayati.51

Besides the realization of mal, there were other cesses levied on the agrarian classes, which were known as sair-i-jihat. To ensure that an exorbitant amount of revenue was collected from these classes, the state allied with the rural aristocracy, whose members were exempted from this category.58 Sair-i-Jihat was a broad category that included both agricultural and non agricultural taxes. For instance, the perquisites of revenue officials and the administrative expenses involved with the assessment and collection of revenue were levied under this category. Then there were taxes imposed on grazing cattle and cutting wood from the forests and also rents charged for borrowing

55 Brahmans, Rajputs, and the Mahajans were assessed at concessional rates in Eastern Rajasthan, for more details see Gupta, The Agrarian system of Eastern Rajasthan, 146. 56 Ibid., 58-9 and Singh, The State, Landlords and Peasants, 111. 57 For Marwar: Bhadani, Peasants, artisans and entrepreneurs, 211-2: "the cash nexus was prevalent in all the localities of Marwar in the seventeenth century. On an average about 33% of the produce was collected as land revenue from Marwar." Examples on Jaipur see Dastur ulAmal copy the tables from Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 126-8. 58 Arhsatta pargana Chatsu, Year 1760 and the above mentioned dastur ul amil, RSA, Bikaner.

85 agricultural implements, e.g., bullocks and ploughs for irrigation. In addition, the interest on loans provided by the state and taxes on the sale of the commodities by the artisans were also included in this category. These cesses varied from locality; and the maximum numbers of these was noted in pargana Sawai Jaipur (about sixty-seven) and the minimum was inpargana Lalsot (about six).60 The state also levied siwaijamabandi in addition to the above-mentioned charges in order to cover categories of taxes and cesses that could not be included in the regular revenue assessment. Siwaijamabandi levies were quite nominal except for those in pargana Sawai Jaipur but the state's share kept on fluctuating because of changes in the market prices of commodities.

The above -mentioned statistics indicate that there is no doubt that the agrarian population was under tremendous pressure from the state officials and rural aristocracy to meet high revenue demands. The right to levy high taxes was also routinely challenged by the peasantry; the state was always under pressure to address these issues. Moreover, the high land revenue demands were seldom met by the peasants. This was one of the major concern that was always commented on by state officials. The contentious relationship between the state and its subjects is also evident in the references to peasants protests about high taxes. To keep discontent under control, officials often sanctioned exemptions and advanced loans (taqavi) to the peasants.63 Payment of arrears was

59 For more details see Appendix D: Sair-i-Jait taxes. 60 Singh, The State, Landlords and Peasants, 112. 61 Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 155 and Sethia, Rajput Polity, 143. 62 The correspondence between the diwan and the different pargana officials such as amils, amins and patels known as chittis is preserved in RSA, Bikaner. 63 Ibid., Numerous chittis are available where the state had advanced loans to the peasants to alleviate the misery of the peasants, chittis issued to the amils and patels of the following parganas: Sawai Jaipur, Lalsot, Chatsu, Narnaul, Tonk, Bahatri, Khohri, Ghazi ka Thana, Niwai, Bairath and Ramgarh, Years 1758- 1760.

86 usually excused by the state in order to facilitate cultivation. The major source of

peasant's discontent was the overall level of surcharges or "cesses" levied in addition to

the land tax.64 It may be surprising that most of the complaints were made in

extraordinary situations caused either by natural calamities such as scarcity of rains, or by

the military devastation in the countryside. It seems that the peasants were used to being

highly taxed, and the Kachchwaha rulers did not introduce fundamental changes.65

According to the revenue statistics, agrarian taxation was uniform in the whole state,

although all the details are not available about lands held under ijara (contract farming).66

Though the Kachchwaha rulers followed the fundamental principles of the

Mughal land revenue system and did not introduce any significant changes, even in the

magnitude of the mal, there were certain subtle shifts starting at the beginning of the

eighteenth century. More specifically, there was an increase in the production of cash

crops such as cotton, indigo, and sugarcane, which required high level of inputs, such as

artificial irrigation, better seeds, and ploughing.67 This trend indicates there were

adequate resources available in the villages for the intensive cultivation and extension of

fro agriculture, and this pattern could be discerned in the other states as well. However,

most of the resources were in the hands of members of the upper class peasantry or

Singh, The State, Landlords, and Peasants, 117. 65 For more details see Sethia, Rajput Polity, 146. 66 The average land revenue assessment which included mal, sair-i-jihat, sawaijamabandi and other agrarian taxes was about forty two percent in the Jaipur state, in which the most highly taxed pargana was Bahatri (fifty-two) and the peasants of pargana Dausa paid the lowest land revenue. The following is reproduced here from Singh, The State, Landlords and the peasants, 118 and the information is rechecked by the author for theseparganas for year 1728-62. 67 This change was noticeable in the state of Jaipur, Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Raj as than, 38- 73. 68 Satish Chandra, "Institutional Factors in Providing Capital Impetus for the Improvement and Expansion of Agriculture in Medieval India", Indian Historical Review (July, 1976), vol. 3, no. 1. 121-145.

87 moneylenders. This change also implies that the main agrarian producers were the

ordinary peasants, but unfortunately, they continued to remain at subsistence levels

because of high land revenue demands.70 During the course of the eighteenth century, it

became more profitable even for ordinary peasants to remain invested in growing food

grains, mostly wheat and barley. These peasants were able to obtain some profits by

producing staple crops, since there were severe food shortages caused by continuous

famines.71

The argument put forward by the historians who support the theory of military

fiscalism on the basis of the high incidence of land revenue is not supported by the

evidence available in the state of Jaipur. An overwhelming amount of official

correspondence indicates that state officials intervened to alleviate the miseries of the

peasants, especially when the peasants were forced to pay the surcharges. In fact, the

most common complaint of the peasants was about the extra cesses taken by the jagirdars, zamindars, and other state officials.72 The state's role was to balance this

Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 66. 70 This aspect of the subsistence level of ordinary peasants has been discussed by Man Habib, Satish Chandra and for Eastern Rajasthan especially by S. P. Gupta and he cites scarcity of resources and initiatives as reasons for this condition. 71 There were environmental famine conditions in the Jaipur state in 1755, 1757,1758,1760,1761, 1762, 1763,1765 and 1770, mentioned in different chitties exchanged between the state officials and the Maharajas. For Kota famine years, see Sethia, Rajput Polity, 146. 72 Chitti from Lai Chand Hirday Ram to Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh in regards to his inquiry about the problems created by Faulad Singh patel (also the zamindar) during the revenue collection m pargana Amber, Year 1699; chitti from the amil of pargana Mauzabad to the Maharaja about the excessive demands of the bhomias and how the peasants are fleeing the villages because of that, Year 1699; chitti from Purohit Paras Ram to Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh about the activities of zamindars and their illegal cess collection from the peasants mpargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1703; chitti from the amil Paras Ram, pargana Sawai Jaipur against the bhomias who were charging four annas on top of the state revenue demand from each peasant and he wanted the Maharaja to intervene immediately, Year 1743; chitti from the amil pargana Sawai Jaipur to the Maharaja about the illegal cesses including rahdari (toll tax) and requests the intervention of the Maharaja; parwana from Sawai Jai Singh to Shyam Singh Rajawat for handing over the rent which he had illegally collected from the villagers of Abid Khan, pargana Ajmer,

88 relationship, since the state needed the support of the elite castes that helped them to handle the revenue collections. The state directed officials and hereditary landholders to encourage cultivation by offering concession, and exemptions from the land revenue. The eighteenth century was an era when the state increased its role as a facilitator of expansion of the agriculture.73

In fact, as financial pressures increased, there was a substantial extension in agricultural cultivation to meet the high land revenue demand. At this point, the peasant's agriculture proved to be resilient, and continued to meet the state's demand with few significant changes. In addition, the agricultural production came to be dominated by the markets as the revenue demand was made for in cash.74 However, the problematic aspect of this phenomenon was the concentration of even more wealth in the hands of members of upper strata in society, who could afford to invest large amounts in cash crops, and in irrigation facilities.

REDISTRIBUTION OF THE RESOURCES

This section delineates the intricacies of revenue assessment in eastern Rajasthan, including the involvement of the state in collecting information about individual peasant holdings, and describes the methods of levying taxes. Some historians have asserted that

Year 1717. Also chitti fromth e amil of pargana Mauzabad to the Maharaja about the excessive demands of the bhomias and how the peasants are fleeing the villages because of that, Year 1699, RSA, Bikaner . 73 Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, 14. 74 Sethia, Rajput Polity, 35-6.

89 this system of taxation intensified the differentiation among rural classes, and this process

seems to have occurred in of the state of Jaipur too.

Rural society was highly stratified in pre-colonial India; the basic features of this

society need to be identified in order to understand the magnitude of land revenue

demand by the state. The smallest unit in the administrative records was the village

(mauza) which consisted of cultivable land, residential area, hills, rocky area, and roads.

These villages were classified as peasant (raiyati) or landlord (tallu 'qa) categories, but a

very high percentage of them were raiyati villages. The tallu 'qa ones were usually less

than one percent of the total in eastern Rajasthan.77 For official purposes, these

distinctions meant that state officials were directly involved in revenue collection in the

raiyati villages, whereas the tallu 'qadars paid a lump sum to the state in lieu of land

revenue. Sometime a group of villages that formed an administrative unit were also

known as tallu 'qa. The land revenue paid by the raiyati category villages was assessed

on the basis of a detailed examination of the land, crop rotation, market prices, and the

quality of the soil, but this procedure was not followed in the tallu 'aqa villages.78

There were various classes in the rural society who held superior rights over the

land, and the state identified the rights of these classes in its land revenue policies. This

way of operating reinforces the argument that the revenues were not collected merely for

military purposes. Rather, recognition and respect were accorded to long standing land

75 Ibid., 149. 76 This was a universal feature of all villages including Eastern Rajasthan.. 77 Arhsattapargana Malarna, Year 1727, 1729, andl730, out of 148 villages only 4 were tallu 'qa village. Gupta, has given more details about these classifications in the rural society. For more details see The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 80. 78 Arhsatta pargana Malarna, Year 1727-30, RSA, Bikaner, the lump sum amount is stated for the 4 tallu 'qa villages in the arhsattas without any specific details about either the land assessment or the peasants.

90 ownership rights in the villages. The states' land revenue policies, as explained in this

dissertation, were in many ways responsible for the hierarchical nature of village

holdings. Still the system needs to be seen in the context that the state needed allies to

extract revenues from the rural areas. The rural elites were pressured to perform this task

and, for this reason, they were taxed lightly.

In eastern Rajasthan, land holdings were divided into three broad categories. The

first category, the khud-kasht holdings were cultivated by their owners, who also claimed

occupancy rights. These holdings were assessed at concessional rates. The second type of

holding was known as a raiyati-kasht. On this type of holding, ordinary peasants

cultivated their own lands but did not enjoy any privileges. The third category of holding

was the pai-kasht, which was tilled by non resident peasants who paid rent to the state.

Pai-pahis holdings were owned by peasants who usually lived in neighbouring villages.

These peasants were apparently encouraged to cultivate the land by the state, which

provided tools, implements, and loans. The last category of landholding was that of the paltis, were the majority of the village population. The state documents identify paltis as

peasants of lower castes. It seems that these peasants could migrate either voluntarily or

by force to inhabit new areas or villages.79 Besides these different land holders, each

village also had landless labourers who generally belonged to non peasant castes such as

those of barbers, oil sellers, carpenters, shoe maker and gardeners. These classes were

compelled to provide labour for the convenience of the upper strata of the village based

79 Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 120 has quoted a chitti of 1692 from pargana officials to Maharaja Bishan Singh, "the land in mauza Syenar, tappa haveli is lying fallow (parat). Therefore, I have invited the palti of mauza Halsurpur of pargana Chatsu and founded a new mauza (village) naming it Birian ka nagar".

91 society. The village communities in eastern Rajasthan had a sizeable population of superior landholders, but small-scale peasant cultivation dominated the agrarian scene.

This class of cultivators needed constant support and regular provisions from the state to continue even subsistence level agriculture that would meet land revenue demands. This kind of subsistence agriculture could not withstand any natural calamities and for that reason, the state encouraged merchants and moneylenders to embark on agricultural production. This shift meant the introduction of non-peasant groups, namely, agricultural farmers or daily wage labourers into the agrarian scene.

The involvement of the mercantile classes in agriculture resulted in a substantial increase in the granting of contractual farming (ijaras) after the 1730s in many parganas of Jaipur state, namely, Dausa, Chatsu, Bahatri, Malarna, Lalsot, and Sawai Jaipur.82

There were two main reasons for this increase: one of the reasons accounts for the difficulties that arose for the state in its collection of land revenue. The other reason for the increase was the penetration of non agrarian sectors into the village economies.

Financial pressure on money-lenders to lend money to the state increased every year from the 1740s onward, after the Maratha incursions. At that time, the grain merchants

(mahajans) and moneylenders (sahukars) preferred to obtain lands in lieu of payment from the state. The data available on ijara shows that more and more land was allotted for contract farming starting from the 1720s. This increase meant that the state was able

Chitti, Yearl741 from diwan Sita Ram to faujdars and amils of pargana Mauzabad reprimanding them for not stopping the forced labour in their areas, RSA, Bikaner. Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 66. 82 Satya Prakash. Gupta, "Ijara System in Eastern Rajasthan: 1650-1750", Medieval Miscellany, Aligarh, (1977), vol. 1,263-75.

92 to receive a fixed income from the contractual farming which augmented and stabilized its own income.

The ijaradars had to follow the states' directives for the collection of land revenue in their areas. Usually, the state officials did the assessment of land revenue, and their presence must have provided security for the raiyats in the countryside. Most importantly, these ijaradars could not collect more cesses or taxes from the peasants in the presence of state appointed officials. It should be noted that the state was responsible for remuneration of the revenue officials.83 Initially, the ijaras were granted to rehabilitate villages devastated by famine or military invasions. The state granted lands on the ijara system to interested parties if they were willing to encourage cultivation. The ijara was considered a temporary arrangement that was given by the state for a fixed period of time. The assignees preferred by state officials were the local zamindars, hereditary village officials, merchants, and members of higher castes. The land revenue of ijaradars was also assessed at reduced rates for some years so that they would have time to increase their cultivation or at least bring it to the previously assessed production

Singh, The State, Landlords and Peasants, 135: The table is reproduced here: IJARA OF TAPPA SHAHPURA, PARGANA SAWAI JAIPUR, YEAR 1754.

Salaries Amount in Rupees Tankhawah Puny a ( 325 Religious endowments) Amil's salary 300 Chowkayat khazana 55 (guarding the treasury) Stationary etc 100 Messengers 50 Faujdar's salary 300 Ghora nagara 200 (horses and drums) Meena Chowkayat 200 (guard's salary

Ibid., 137 had compiled the composition of the Ijaradars and it seems zamindars along with mahajans and sahukars were the ones who held most lands on ijara in Jaipur State.

93 level. Although the ijaras were primarily granted for the collection of land revenue (see appendix B) there were contractual agreements for other taxes such as the rahdari, ghas charai, chungi (custom duties), and the taxes collected only from grain merchants.

Perhaps the most significant change in the agrarian structure at that time was the participation of the merchants in the life of the countryside.

The mercantile communities in eastern Rajasthan acted as middlemen between the state and the peasants. The mahajans (grain merchants) played an important role in rural society by procuring grain from the countryside and transporting it to urban markets. They also reported to state officials about the food grains and to some degree controlled prices at various markets, as is evident accounts by the diwans, amils, and patels. The daily prices recorded in the nirakh roznama and nirakh bazaar were signed by panch mahajans. Various chittis also refer to this practice. For example, there are letters confirming how the prices of food commodities were fixed by the amils Khushhal

Singh and Udai Ram after consultation with the mahajans. The state officials were responsible for conforming to uniform market prices. This requirement usually led to confrontation with the mahajans, especially in times of scarcity of rain or famine. Kishor

Chitti to the amilpargana Chatsu, Year 1758 and chitti to the amilpargana Bahatri from the office of diwan, Year 1758 that the amils should take land revenue from the ijaradars at concessional rates for at least three year, RSA, Bikaner. To illustrate this further: For example: the ijara of village Ram Singh Pura mpargana Bahatri was granted to Sukh Ram Brahman for a period of five years. He was required to pay roughly 50% of the total demand which a substantial relief: Year: 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 Rupees: 40 80 128 175 250 86 Ibid., navisht # 1103, Apr. 18* 1728, Dholaram and Moharam got the ijara and rahdari of pargana Sawai Jaipur for 13,000 rupees for one year. Chitti fromth e diwan Lai Chand to Maharaja Bishan Singh, Year 1694, which was about the ghas charai tax collections. Chitti from diwan Lai Chand to Mahajan of Dausa: Inder Sen and Roop Chand, Year 1689. Letter (Persian) from diwan Lai Chand to Anoop Chand, Jan. 10th 1713, where Anoop Chand got the ijara to collect taxes from the grain merchants, RSA, Bikaner. 87 Ibid., chitti, undated, 1734, From Kishor Das amil to Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh, explains that the prices were fixed after consultation with the mahajans. 88 Ibid., chittis, undated, 1711, 1714, 1716 and 1720.

94 Das, the revenue collector (amil) of'thepargana Sawai Jaipur, informed the Maharaja:

"The prices are rising to one and a half times more due to the scarcity of rains. I (amil)

have called upon one mahajan not to raise the prices. Then he informed me that he had no

grain left, and that is why Purohit Shyam Ram (other mahajans), who had hoarded the

grain, are selling it at their own prices. I, the amil, instructed them also to sell the grain, at

the usual (fixed by the state) rates and not charge excessive prices."

Furthermore, the mahajans were frequently consulted by the state about the

appointment of land revenue officials.90 Gradually the mahajans and their families came

to dominate the offices of the revenue administrators, for example, the office of amil was

maintained by the mahajan in thepargana Malpura for three generations.91 Besides

providing information about prices and consulting about the appointment of revenue

officials, the mahajans also advanced loans to the peasants and the state. The ijaradars, jagirdars, and other people also started borrowing, but bohras (moneylenders) in eastern

Rajasthan were the main ones who provided these services independently and also on

behalf of the state.92

State officials maintained detailed records about the bohras (moneylenders) who

were operating in Jaipur so that the state could monitor their activities. Their activities

were closely watched during times of crisis such as crop failures and famines.93 This was

89 Chitti, undated, 1705, R S A, Bikaner, this letter is also quoted by Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 141. 90 Arhsattas ofparganas Malpura and Niwai, RSA, Bikaner. 91 Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 141. 92 Chittis, Years: 1666, 1665 & 1726, RSA, Bikaner. 93 Ibid., chittis, Years 1726 and 1766.

95 done to ensure that the bohras could not charge illegal interest (biyaz ghiwai); they were

entitled to charge only one to two rupees per month.94 The amils of different parganas

were allowed to use force against the bohras if they refused to advance loans to the

peasants or harassed them in any way.95 It seems that there was an understanding

between the state and the bohras to lend money to the state at the rate of 2 5% per

month.96 The mahajans and bohras were thus two distinct groups in the mercantile

97 community who together exercised considerable control over village economies.

REDISTRIBUTION OF THE REVENUES AMONG THE RURAL ELITES

In order to maintain hierarchical power relations, the state had to share or

redistribute the resources among the hereditary landholders, namely, the zamindars, jagirdars, bhomias, and the religious elites. These classes formed the elite dominated

structure of the village societies and also knew how to control the peasants. The state

needed the support of these elites in its initiatives to take control of society's finances.

That is why the elite holdings were assessed at rates lower than those charged to other

groups. In addition, they enjoyed certain privileges such as exemptions and the right to

collect extra cesses from the peasants (raiyati). However, the result of this system was

less revenue and the subsequent loss of income for the state. For this reason, the

concessional land revenue demand areas were never more than twenty percent of all

94 Parwana, Year 1730, preserved in Kapadwara collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 95 Chittis written fromth e amils to the diwan, Years 1726 and 1766, RSA, Bikaner. 96 Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 142. He has quoted figures from Arhsattas of different parganas from165 0 to 1750. 97They amassed lot of wealth through their trading and commercial activities, but never converted that wealth in appropriating landed rights. Maybe, this was the reason why the rural aristocracy was dominated by the Rajputs and other upper caste individuals, who continued to enjoy the status of the jagirdars in eastern Rajasthan, Ibid., 142.

96 cultivated areas. The state did not follow the policy of granting exemptions

indiscriminately, and there was always official anxiety about fraud and overcharges. The

rulers kept themselves updated by the revenue officials via daily correspondence. They

sent instructions to these officials so that the state's share could not be compromised by

the rural aristocracy. Any complaints about the misappropriation of privileges or

exemptions led to the resumption of land assignments and other punishments. For

example, in 1713, diwan Sri Chand took action about complaints against the officials of

pargana Lalsot. He ordered that the taxes will be collected without distinction from the

both the raiyati and riyayati classes in that pargana.

At the top of the social hierarchy in eastern Rajasthan were the bhomias, who

were equivalent to the Mughal zamindars. Bhomias were found in all the Rajput states.

The Rajput states granted landholding rights (bhom) to individuals who had served them

with distinction either in military conquests or administration. Usually, the bhomias

belonged to the clan of the rulers; for example, the majority of the bhomias in Jaipur state

belonged to the Kachchwaha clan. The most prominent of the biradaris (lineages) were

the Shekhawats, Narukhas, Kalyanots, Rajawats, and Chauhans. Occasionally there were

bhomias from other castes, such as the Jats, Meenas, Jadanes, and Panwars, whose status

was lower than that of the Rajput clans.100 Besides the clans who claimed hereditary

ownership of the land, there were people who were granted lands in recognition of their

services. The bhomia lands were assessed at a rate lower than that charged to other

98 Sethia, Rajput Polity, 149. 99 Letter from diwan Sri Chand to the amil of pargana Lalsot, Year 1713, RSA, Bikaner. 100 R. P. Rana, "Agrarian Revolts in North India during the late 17th and early 18th century", Indian Economic and Social Review, vol. 18 3 & 4 (January, 1981),, 291-326.

97 villagers, and the bhomias usually had a share in the surplus from their produce.

However, the Amber rulers tried to increase the extent of their authority over the lands

held by the bhomias, especially during the reign of Sawai Jai Singh, who appropriated

their rights and privileges by enlarging the crown lands and assigning lands on ijara.m In

response to this, the bhomias continued to protest against state policies. It seems that the

problem of revenue collection was one of the primary reasons for the enlargement of

lands under contractual farming. 102There is considerable information in the official

correspondence about hereditary landowners' forcible occupation of lands and their

oppression and terrorization of peasants. Sometimes the peasants sided with the bhomias

in measures against high revenue demands. For this reason the state preferred to lease the

territories so that the responsibility for land revenue collection could be fulfilled by the

ij'aradars.103

In Jaipur state, the Kachchwaha rulers also distributed the areas under their

control to their officers through sub assignment or contractual farming. The assignees

were selected either from the Kachchwaha clan or from the group of local magnates in a

particular locality. For example, Ram Singh Shekhawat took the ijara and zamindari of pargana Fatehpur in 1739, and agreed to enforce the authority of the Maharaja in the

territory.104 It should be noted that the Amber rulers assigned territories only to their clan

members to gain their support and force out the Mughal mansabdars out of the area. As

soon as they were successful in consolidating their hold over the areas around Amber,

101 See Appendix B & C. 102 Will be discussed later in the chapter. 103 See Appendix A: Income fromContrac t Farming {Ijara). 104 Lakhait, Year 1739, Kapad-dwara collection, Sawai Man Singh museum, Jaipur.

98 they extended the area of crown land (khalisa) by taking the land held by their sub

assignees.105

Usually the lands granted in jagirs to the state officials were in lieu of salaries.

There were some jagirs known as ghair baitha, which means "sitting at home" which

were given to individuals because of their illustrious service to the state. Ghair bhaitha jagirs were renewable after the death of an assignee through a payment of peshkash by

his heirs.107 The jagirdars had to maintain a military contingent for the state, but these jagirdars were not assigned any mansabs such as the Mughal jagirdars were assigned,

because the assignment was still considered an imperial prerogative. The salary indicated

the size of the military contingent a particular jagirdar had to maintain for the state and

the types of horses he used.108

The terms and conditions of land assignments were specified in documents so that

the jagirdars could not realize more revenue than was allowable.109 Land revenue was the

main income of these jagirdars, who were responsible for revenue collection in their

areas. Their share varied from one-half to one- sixth of the agricultural produce, and they

were also entitled to claims (talab) in case the standard assessed revenue could not be

collected in any given year. The state also sanctioned reductions in their share of revenue

105 See Appendix E. 1 Singh, The State, Landlords, and Peasants, 145. 107 Ibid. 108 For example, the jagirdars who had Turki or Tazkilan horses were paid higher salaries than who had contingent of the Indian bred horse's contingents S. P. Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 214-15, He has tabulated the salaries of the jagirdars where these specifications are mentioned. 109 Chitti, Year 1679 From Diwan Bhikari Das to Has jagirdars ofpargana Chatsu, RSA, Bikaner.

99 in times of crop failure or famine. 110Their salary assignments were renewed every year, and in cases of the death of the jagirdars, their land was allotted to their heirs or to their immediate male relatives.111

The jagirs were invariably accountable for the obligations imposed on them. In cases of non payment ofpeshkash (donations) absence from the darbar, failure to provide troops, or maintenance of an inadequate military contingent, the state transferred their

117 jagirs into khalisa (crown lands). In order to exert greater control over the jagirdars, the Amber rulers emphasized personal loyalty and services owed to them. Eachjagirdar paid a specified amount in order to enter the service of the Maharaja.113 The fiscal claims of the jagirdars were quite restricted. They were not allowed to impose new taxes, but they were allowed to obtain some customary services from ordinary peasants on special occasions such as marriages, festivals, and the harvest season.114 The raiyati

(commoners) were also obligated to supply consumable products such as milk, curd, honey, jaggery, and cooking mediums (ghee and tet) to the jagirdars. Merchants were required to pay cesses to the jagirdars in order to pass through their territory. This prerogative was not sanctioned for every jagridar in the state of Jaipur, and in some cases, the state withheld this right.115

Jagirdars in turn were under tremendous pressure from the state to pay large amounts of money like the matami which was condolence dues, in order to be considered

110 Muwazna pargana Lalsot, Year 1728, RSA, Bikaner. 111 Ibid., Yaddashit, Yearl715, Subha Ram was two years old when he was granted his father's jagir which was worth 500 rupees annually. Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Raj as than, 219. 113 See Appendix B. 114 Chitti to the amil ofpargana Lalsot, Year 1766, chitti to amil of pargana Chatsu, Year 1766, and chitti to amil of pargana Malarna, Year 1753 RSA, Bikaner. 115 Ibid., chitti to diwan Khushik Nand Lai to Vohra Khushali Ram, 1759. 100 for posts held by their fathers or relatives.116 After their reinstatement, the jagirdars were required to pay peshkash annually or in installments. In addition to this, they were also expected to pay nyota (invitation) dues to the state on the occasion of engagements, marriages, and births.117 At times of political crisis, especially from the middle of the eighteenth century, the state demanded one month's salary from its officials to make payments to the Marathas. Excessive financial burdens led to the accumulation of arrears, since the jagirdars could not make full payments. The eventual result was loss of income for the state.118 The jagirdars countered official demands by resisting state authorities, and, in some cases, becoming independent rulers by taking over crown lands. Rao Pratap

Singh Narukha of Macheri119 founded the state of Alwar by confiscating the villages under khalisa, and Devi Singh Champavat carved out a large principality in the pargana

Dausa in the same way.120

The jagirdari rights were often held by the same individuals who held zamindari

(hereditary ownership of land) in a given area. If the jagirdars were not from the area, then they had to work closely with the rural superior classes to establish their control. The state received lot of complaints from the zamindars, patels, and amils of the parganas

191 about abuse of power by the jagirdars. Most of the disagreements between the

Ibid., chitti to the ami! of pargana Bahatri, Year 1751. 117 Ibid., chittis to amils of pargana Khat, Khohri, Ghazi ka Thana, Niwai, Chatsu, Toda Bhim, and Dausa, Year 1757. 118 The arhsattas of parganas Chatsu, Bahatri, Lalsot and Dausa mentions the arrear dues of the jagirdars frequently from 1757. For details see Singh, The State, Landlords and Peasants, 150-2. 119 Ibid., 156. 120Arhsattas of pargana Dausa Years: 1775, 1780, 1786, andl789, the khalisa lands were slowly converted into the jagirs of Devi Singh, RSA, Bikaner. 121 Ibid., chitti to the Maharaja, Year 1753, from the zamindar of village Niwaro mpargana Chatsu complains about the exploitation of peasantry by thejagirdar. Chitti of amil of pargana Malarna Year

101 jagirdars and the village aristocracy related to the collection of revenue, overhead

charges, and other customary cesses which were the responsibility of both of these

classes.122 Generally, they collaborated with each other in exploitation of the peasantry or

in plans to not remit all the revenue collected to the state. Sometimes, the jagirdars sided

with the inhabitants of their areas and protected them in times of crises from harsh

treatment by the state officials.

The rural aristocracy shared the fortunes of the rulers of Jaipur state and provided

unsolicited support towards the maintenance of Kachchwaha dominance in their areas.

These co-sharers in power helped the state to survive its toughest challenge that is the

Maratha onslaught, which continued on for nearly six decades before the signing of the

subsidiary alliance in 1818.

MERCHANTS, MARKETS AND STATE SURVEILLANCE

In addition to the land revenue, the state levied non agricultural cesses and urban

taxes. The state appropriation of land revenue in cash facilitated trade and commercial

activities in the regions. The importance of merchants and traders increased in tandem

with commerce. As discussed above, the mercantile classes played an important role in

the countryside by supplying loans to the peasants and taking lands on ijara. The

operation of the cash nexus led to the rise of regional markets and the expansion of trade

1769, when the whole raiyati petitioned against Fateh Singh Harha, Chitti of amil of pargana Chatsu to the Maharaja about the activities of Samant Singh Chaturbhajat. 122 Ibid., chitti of amil of pargana Tonk, year 1727 to the Maharaja. 123 Ibid., chitti of amil of pargana Chatsu, Year 1758, to the Maharaja, where he complains about the jagirdars who were refusing to help in revenue collection process in the area.

102 in the state. This trend was also observed in other northern and central states of pre- colonial India.124

The state's demand for cash provided impetus to the market economy when the mercantile classes started dominating commerce especially in the eighteenth century.

These classes still worked under the close supervision of state officials, who took steps to fix the market value of food grains and to check acts of hoarding or price hikes. Most importantly, the state provided the infrastructure for commerce to grow and monitored the activities of merchants. The state also maintained uniform prices for food grains, and these products were geared up for commerce in a unified and controlled market. The collection of land revenue in cash generated an increase in commercial activities at the village level. As discussed above, the peasants had to part with more than half of the produce of every harvest in order to meet their tax obligation to the state. Most of the peasants sold their crops to local merchants in order to meet the states' demand in cash.

Only a privileged few had the resources to transport their grains to the nearby areas or to negotiate high prices for their products. Although in many areas of Jaipur state, there was a preference for the revenue demand in jinsi, which means "in kind," but the revenue records indicate that, wherever the state demand was in kind, its immediate concern was to sell off the grains to anyone who was ready to buy it at approved prices. The state managed to sell the bulk of the revenue collected in kind from the raiyati to grain

Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, 14-23. Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 93.

103 merchants.126 The remaining grain was transferred to the state granaries for storage purposes.127

The official correspondence makes it clear that the mercantile communities, especially the mahajans and the banias, played a very important part in transporting the grain collected as revenue to the markets and the state storage facilities. The quick disposal of grain by the state led to sale of grains in villages, which was usually handled by the village banias, the mahajans from the qasbas, the village teli (sesame seed oil maker), and the raiyati themselves. The mahajans to some extent dominated sales and purchases, and they also controlled market price because all market price documents

{nirakh bazaar) were signed and validated by the panch mahajan (the local mahajan's organization).129

Apparently, the mahajans were able to buy the bulk of the states' share in kind and hence helped in the monetization of the economy. Yet sometimes the peasants were able to sell their own produce in the markets.130 The peasants who were able to bring their produce to be sold in the local markets or even to transport it to the nearby district

(qasba) markets were well-to-do peasants, jagirdars, or ijaradars. The documents related to rahdari and chabutra kotwali mention that most of the rural aristocracy such as the

126 ibid. 127 Satya Prakash Gupta, "Prices and rural commerce in 17th century Rajasthan", Proceeding of Indian History Congress (New Delhi: Manohar publications, 1982), 270-282. 128 Chitti from Abhay Ram to diwan Kalyan Das, Year I664;chitti from Amra kotwal to diwan Kalyan Das and Fateh Chand, Year 1665; chitti of Khushal Singh Udai Ram and Anand Ram to diwan Bhikhari Das and Fateh Chand, Year 1714; and chitti of diwan Khushlal Chand Kishan Chand; Year 1743, RSA, Bikaner. 129 Ibid. 130 Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 100.

104 chaudharis, qanungos, zamindars, and ijaradars were exempt from all tolls and exactions

in their localities.131

In spite of considerable evidence that indicates the importance of local trade and

the availability of a variety of food grains in the local markets, most of the peasants did

not enter or means to access to markets at all, and had to sell locally to the village

merchants (byopari). These merchants dominated the grain trade both at the local level as

well as in the urban centres. These merchants had to pay high levels of custom duties and

levies to transport food grains from the villages to the local markets and to the towns.

Fourteen types of tolls and customs were legally enforced by the state, and there were

several other minor cesses that the high level officials could charge or over charge the

merchants. Some points are noteworthy: and first, the state levied duties varied from pargana to pargana, and, secondly, some of the cesses were taken on contract by the

merchants or rural aristocracy.133

Interestingly, several privileged classes were exempt from paying these duties and

cesses. This is important in the context of redistribution of income and the states' ways of

negotiating power between customary practices and newly created areas of authority. To

illustrate this point further, there is the example of pargana Chatsu in 1712, where all the

hereditary village officials, higher castes, revenue officials, and mercantile classes were

; Chabutra kotwali qasba Phagi, Year 1664; Yaddasht amal dastur mapa rahdari, pargana Khohri, Year 1724 and the Arhsattas of different parganas, RSA, Bikaner. 132 See Appendix F. 133 Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 108-114.

105 exempt from paying the above mentioned cesses and tolls.134 This discussion makes it clear that the state was actively involved in regulating and facilitating the grain trade by fixing prices, supervising demand and supply trends, and granting exemptions and concessions to the mercantile groups. I35 As merchants began to gain more control over trade there was an expansion of markets and commercial networks.

The eighteenth century was also the era of the rise of small qasbas (townships), which had huge grain markets. The state sponsored concessions extended not only to the big merchants and wealthy moneylenders' houses, but also to small-scale merchants and, most importantly, to the banjaras who dealt in bulk trade. 137 For example, the Kota rulers invited traders, banjaras, mahajans and bohras to settle down in new qasbas after offering them the incentives of rent-free shops and exemptions from tolls and cesses.

In the same way, the Kachchwaha rulers populated the city and markets of Jaipur city in

1728.139 In the eighteenth century, these types of initiatives were taken in many states to encourage trade and commerce in the regions by the states of Awadh, Rohilkhand,

Farrukhabad, Patna, Bengal, and Punjab.140 The administrative restrictions that placed hurdles on the entry and exit of the merchants were removed, and excessive levies on goods were lowered down in the eighteenth century Rajasthan states.141 States'

Dastur ul Amal ghascharaipargana Chastu, Year 1712: the list is reproduced by Gupta, The Agrarian system of Eastern Rajasthan, 113: where he has translated the entire document. 1 5 This view is also expressed by Sethia, Rajput Polity, 280-2. 136 For example: Umed Ganj, Shahbad and Ganesh Ganj were developed in Kota at state's initiative 137 Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 69. 138 Sethia, Rajput Polity, 283. 139 As discussed in chapter three. 140 For more details see Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, 14. 141 Sethia, Rajput Polity, 284-5.

106 preference was that the merchants buy the grains directly from the villages and be in

charge of taking it to the nearby markets, pargana headquarters, or to other cities 142

Scholars writing on the economic history of eighteenth century India, who have

researched different regions, have established that the decline and decentralization of the

Mughal Empire did not disrupt the economic structure of the regions. Chris Bayly and

Sanjay Subrahmanyam suggest in their assessment of the political economy of early

modern India that merchant families increased their influence during the first half of the

eighteenth century.143 Merchant families and castes such as the Khattris, Agarwals,

Kashmiri Mul, Gujaratis, and Marwaris had come to dominate both the internal and

external trade in northern India.144 In reference to the Rajputs and Marathas, G. D.

Sharma writes that the administrative policies of these powers indirectly caused the

commercialization of capital a process in which the merchants played a vital role.145 Data

about the income and expenditures (jamabandis) different parganas for the state of

Jodhpur were used in his analysis.146

142 ibid. 143 Sanjay Subramanyam and Christopher Bayly, "Portfolio capitalists and political economy of early modern India", in Sanjay Subramanyam, ed. Merchants, Markets, and State in Early modern India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 242-65; G. D. Sharma, "Urban Economy in Western India In Late Eighteenth Century" ed. Indu Banga, The City in Indian History (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1999), 99-115. 144 Subrahmanyam and Bayly, "Portfolio capitalists and political economy of early modern India", 259. Definition of portfolio capitalist: "an entrepreneur who farmed revenue, engaged in local agricultural trade, commanded military resources (war animals, arms and human labour), as well as on more than the odd occasion had a flutter in the Great Game of Indian Ocean Commerce-was a characteristic feature of Indian political economy" 145Sharma, "Urban economy in western India", 99. 146 Ibid., Sharma also uses the hundis received against the revenue of Tappah Sadari for 1782, the statement of income and expenditure of Pali for 1770 and the income and expenditure of Kotwali Chabutra of Jodhpur for 175. Records of the family of Mirzamal, records of merchant bankers of Gujarat have also been brought to light like the records of the firm of Haribhakti, a leading house of Baroda.

107 Merchants' participation in the administrative functions in Jaipur is also documented, where they were allowed to collect sair-i-jihat (taxes other than land revenue) on contractual farming (ijara) as was the case in Maharashtra and other Rajput states. There are two possible reasons why the level of the sair-i-jihat increased from the second half of the eighteenth century in this state: first, the encouragement of commercial activities by the state and the consolidation of merchant capital in the urban economies, and, second, the increasing claims of superior rural classes on the land revenue led to an overall decline in agrarian taxation.147 Evidence from Marwar, Kota, and the Marathas also supports the view that there was a trend of how these states explored different avenues of revenue to augment their income.1 The sair-i-jihat was one of those

149 resources.

These states not only extended patronage and encouragement to merchant capital, but also started participating in commercial enterprises to share the economic benefits.

With the inclusion of the state in the economy there was intensification of commercial credit, and bills of exchange (hundis). Usury became an essential part of the market economy in the eighteenth century. The initial impetus to invest more money in the market came from the pressing demand of the state and its auxiliaries to take loans from the merchants and to makejagirs available for contract farming. Similar trend was evident seen in the state of Jaipur, where people from different castes could act as mahajans or join the business of money lending. The Brahmans were one of the castes

147 Sharma, "Urban economy in western India", 104, he has given examples of state of Jodhpur. 148 Ibid., he has given examples for the state of Jodhpur, and Madhu Sethia, Rajput Polity, 284-6 discusses the trend in the state of Kota. 149 This must have the case with the other pre colonial states, but the detailed data is not available for other states and for more details see Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen, and Bazaars, 13-15.

108 whose members lent money on interest and operated as guarantors for the ijaradars.

They played an important role in rural and urban commerce because of their trade and provision of monetary support to the state, peasants, state officials, mdjagirdars.

Most importantly, the state borrowed money from the mahajans to advance loans to the peasants whenever possible. There are several references in the official correspondence to instances when peasants were provided monetary relief by the state through loans from the mahajans.152 Sometimes the bohras were allowed to collect the amount with interest from the peasants directly.153 The Jaipur state also borrowed heavily from the bohras to provide taqavi loans to the peasants from the 1730s until 1760.154 The resources were also used to repopulate deserted villages in times of scarcity and famine conditions.155 For instance, the mahajans gave loans to the state so that relief efforts could be established in the famine stricken parganas Bahatri, Lalsot, and Chatsu.156

Other classes of rural aristocracy also borrowed heavily from the moneylenders and often mortgaged their properties. Ordinary peasants were usually in debt and often had to pawn everything to the mahajans. Sometimes, the money was taken on credit collectively by the whole village, and, in such instances, the jagirdars or the higher village officials stood surety for the peasants. In one case, Udai Chand lodged a

150 Singh, "The Role of the Mahajans in the Rural Economy", 20. 151 Chittis to the amils of different parganas from the office of diwan; for more details see Singh, "The Role of the Mahajans in the Rural Economy", 22. 152 Chittis to amils of the following parganas from the office of diwan, 1760, the state borrowed from the bohras to advance loans to the raiyats of'28 parganas, including Sawai Jaipur, Khohri, Ghazi ka Thana, Narnaul, Tonk and Bahatri, RSA, Bikaner. 153 Ibid., chitti from the diwan to the amils of parganas Narnaul, Ghazi ka Thana and Malarna. 154 Ibid., arhsattas of parganas Chatsu, Malarna, Bahatri, and Sawai Jaipur. 155 Singh, "The Role of the Mahajans in the rural economy", 21. 156 Chitti from the diwan to the ami! of pargana Bahatri, Year 1760, RSA, Bikaner.

109 complaint in the darbar about the non payment of his loan by the peasants of pargana

Sharpur.157 The bohras also loaned seeds, tools and implements of agriculture, and

manure to the peasants with some conditions. They also rented these items at rates of

interest that ranged from ten to twenty-five percent for six months.

Furthermore, the involvement of the mahajans increased after 1750s in acquisition

of landed property in villages either on a contract or crop-sharing basis. In 1763, out of

350 fields in pargana Chatsu, 175 were bought by the mahajans during the worst famine

year there.159 From 1750s, they started acquiring agricultural properties on mortgages and

contract farming after lands were provided at concessional revenue rates by the state in

Jaipur and Kota.160 The presence of the mahajans and bohras brought unimaginable

misery to the lives of ordinary peasants if they could not pay back their debts. Usury was

one of the biggest evils in rural society in pre-modern India, as documented by East India

Company officials, foreign travellers, and several notable writers.161 The financial burden

of the peasants often became so unbearable that they had to leave their homes and fields

in desperation or become landless labourers in other villages. The mahajans only gained

from non payment by these poor peasants because they eventually gained control of the

lands. The presence of the moneylenders became more widespread as the indebtedness of

common people increased, beginning in the eighteenth century. Along with the

157 Ibid., chitti from the diwan to the amils of parganas of Lalsot & Chatsu, Year 1760 and 1762. 158 Singh, "The Role of the Mahajans in the rural economy", 23, According to him, the documents is mostly silent about how the Mahajans organized the renting of implements to the peasants. 159 Chitti from the amil of pargana Chatsu to the office of diwan, Year 1763, RSA, Bikaner. 160 Singh, "The Role of the Mahajans in the rural economy", 23-4. 161 Apart from the criticism of foreign travellers and East India Company, the plight of peasants has been captured by Munshi Prem Chand in his brilliant short stories in early twentieth century like Gowdan and Kafan. 162 Chitti from Amil Shah Dod Raj Narayan of pargana Fagi to the Maharaja, Year 1727, RSA, Bikaner.

110 peasants, the rural aristocracy, zamindars,jagirdars, and ijaradars were also heavily

dependent on the bohras for their monetary needs. Members of the aristocracy

sometimes, got into financial crises when they stood surety for the raiyats. The

mahajans occupied pivotal positions in the rural economy because of their resources, and,

during this period, they started buying administrative offices: for example the posts of

chaudhari, patel, and patwari, most notably in the parganas of Chatsu, Lalsot, and

Bahatri.164

The state had a considerable stake in marketing and selling food grains, at least at

the local level, but it was not able to monopolize the trade. Sometimes the state arranged

for large quantities of grain to be transported from the region to make a profit and to take

advantage of higher food prices. For instance, in 1726, the rulers of Jaipur state ordered

the amils of the parganas of Phagi, Bahatri, Chatsu and Amber to transport wheat, barley

and gram for sale in Delhi, because the prices prevailing in the regions were three times

higher than those in Jaipur.165 Sawai Jai Singh monopolized the trade in salt from

Sambhar Lake by offering his men to transport the salt to different markets and providing

assurances to the banjaras for their safety on the routes.166 The cost of the transportation

of salt to the wholesale market in Jaipur was also taken over by the state then the money

For more examples: see Singh, "The Role of the Mahajans in the rural economy", 25. 164 Chitti to amilpargana Chatsu from the office of diwan, Year 1755; chitti to amilpargana Lalsot from the office of diwan Year 1769 and chitti to amil of pargana Bahatri from the office of diwan, Year 1760, RSA, Bikaner. 165 The above mentioned chittis have cited this information as well. 166 Navisht #21 A, Muhammad Kale Khan, Naib Amanat and faujdari of pargana Sambhar and Didwana to Mughal court &Arzi # 971 from Joshi Anandram and Lunakaran to Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh, Nov 10, 1728, about deals with traders and banjaras of Kama for the sale and purchase of salt, Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur.

Ill was recovered by the salt traders. In addition, the state also restricted the import of goods, especially embroidered cloth from Agra and Gujarat, and forced the merchants not to bring goods from these places. 168 The cloth merchants oipargana Sawai Jaipur had agreed not to buy silk and other materials from Gujarat and to deal only in cloth manufactured in the environs of the city.169 In addition to the profits gained by the state by imposing monopolies, urban taxation and the regulation of markets also brought considerable income into the state's exchequer.

The markets were closely monitored by the state, which exercised strict control over the sales of goods and services in the area under its control. The merchants and shopkeepers had to have the government's permission to bring and sell commodities in the city and its surrounding areas. Persons found selling unauthorized items were had their goods confiscated, and they had to pay fines. The main mercantile communities who had the maximum fines from 1728 until 1791 were the mahajans, and especially those who were dealing in grain. The evidence presented in this section is from the city of

Jaipur, where the fines were reported by the office of the faujdar under the farohi section of the arhsatta documents. The mahajans paid most of the taxes and they were only authorized to sell their products only in particular localities. If they were found selling in another part of the city then they faced repercussions from state officials. Most of the time the mahajans' goods were confiscated, and they had to appear in the kotwal's office

Ibid., parwana # 305 from Sawai Jai Singh dated 1738. 168 Ibid., navisht # 1101 Kaluram Santosh Ram Jhalani to the Jaipur State, August 14, 1732. 169 Ibid., Agreement # 1002, Panchas of cloth merchants of Amber and Saganer to the state (Jaipur) which was signed by 55 shop keepers in Jaipur.

112 to pay fines.170 The grain merchants were also fined for cheating in weighing of any kind

of commodity, for example, sugar, wheat, maize, and barley. It seems that the kotwal's

officials used to raid, the shops and caught people cheating red handed.171 In one such

raid the kotwal fined five mahajans who were cheating about weights in the Kishan

Bazaar of the city.172 Also, there are cases reported against the jewellers (Sunars) who

cheated in the making jewellery or its weight. There were fines for selling low-quality

products, and the kotwals dealt with complaints from people concerning the inferior

nature of products.174

170 Arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1728,20: Jhupram Mahajan sold items in city main market, Chautra Gary, for which he was not unauthorised. His goods were taken away by the Kotwal and had to pay Rs. 230; Arhsatta, Year 1743,278: Dewa Mahajan sold some items in the weekly market, for which he was fined Rs. 201; Year 1744, p. 412: Jeewan Mahajan fined for selling unauthorised goods in the market, RSA, Bikaner. 171 Ibid., Year 1734, p. 2072: Shokha and Nathu Mahajan had cheated in weighing grain 11 times and both of them had to pay fine of. 140 rupees to the Kotwal. They were caught weighing by one of the clerks of the Kotwal who had gone to their shop to buy grain. In another case, Lasa Mahajan had been caught weighing less grain and was fined Rs. 11, Year 1736, p.2018, Year 1736, p.2018: Fakhira, owner of a grain shop was fined for weighing less and had to pay a fine of 6 rupees and.25 annas. Radha Kishan was fined 1 rupee and 5 annas for cheating in weighing jaggery (gur). Khushla Mahajan had cheated in weighing and was fined 11 rupees. 172Ibid., Year 1755, p. 252: Nahar Mahajan fined 5rupees, Deep Chand Mahajan fined 5 rupees and 50 annas; Maparam Mahajan fined 25 rupees; Makkad Mahajan fined 33 rupees &Rama Mahajan fined 1 lrupees. 173 Ibid., Year 1756, Ieshar Sunar cheated in weighing gold and was fined 18 rupees. Tiku Sunar cheated in making ornaments and was fined Rs. 5 Mayarma Mahajan cheated in weighing silver of Kishan Mina. He had to pay 13 rupees as a fine. Mansa Sunar cheated in making ornaments and kept the gold in his house. He was caught and had to pay a fine of 58lrupees. Chanda Sunar cheated in making Chajju's (barber)'s ornaments. Kotwal's men investigated the matter. Chanda Sunar had to pay a fine of 33 rupees. Pancha Sunar cheated in weighing gold, which the customer had brought to make ornaments. Rupla Sunar gave a copper nose-stud after taking a gold one from Veerju. Veerju complained to the authorities and Rupla had to return the gold nose-stud to Veerju and paid a fine of 5 rupees and 50 annas Jodha Mahajan sold false pearls instead of real ones to Gulabiram. Jodha was fined 22rupees for selling false pearls; Khushla Sunar cheated in selling a nose-stud to Manna and paid a fine of 5 rupees. 174 Ibid., Year 1761 :Kala Teli had sold bad quality oil to the customers. The complaints reached Kotwal's office and Kala was called for questioning. He had to pay a fine of 44 rupees. Gangu Teli had sold bad quality oil and was fined 111 rupees by the authorities. Bela Teli had sold 34 pounds of bad quality cooking oil (ghee) and was fined 17 rupees. Hema mixed something in making surma (eye ointment) and was fined Rs. 44. 174 Ibid., Year 1764: Radho Teli sold bad quality oil and was fined. 22 rupees.

113 All commodities that came inside the towns and the cities for sale and purchase

were taxed by the state. However, there were some specifications for these taxes, which

provide information about the nature of state control. First of all, the local merchants

(dealing in cloth, grain, and raw material) were preferred over the non local merchants

(bichhaiti) and the latter had to pay more in sales tax, tolls, and official fees. Secondly,

the sale of commodities like cloth, iron, and wood were heavily taxed if these sales were

not made to the local merchants by the manufacturers. More concessions were available

for the merchants, especially the banjaras, who dealt in bulk trade and transportation.

Most importantly, locally manufactured products were given preference by the state, and

the merchants were specifically asked to deal in local goods. The office of the kotwal

maintained a register of sales and purchases in the city, and then the urban taxes were

also collected by the faujdar in different parganas}15

All professional classes had to pay taxes to the state, though these taxes were not

uniform and seem to have varied in different parganas. The taxes levied on the brewers,

oil makers, leather makers, potters, dyers, cloth printers, clay makers, coal makers, shoe

makers, fire wood sellers (for the kitchen) hay sellers for animals, animal sellers are

After the analysis of these documents the following observations can be made firstly, the outside merchants {bichhaiti) had to pay taxes while selling their commodities, secondly, the village merchants had to pay taxes on the sale of raw cotton, iron, salt, grain and fruits to the local merchants. Rahdari (toll tax) was higher for the bichhaiti merchants and for example: rates for carriages carrying cloth, zinc (jasad), lead (sisa), indigo, raw sugar for different: for local merchants the rate per carriage was around 9 rupees while the bichhaiti had to pay 12 rupees. Banjaras were lightly taxed and only paid 3 dams per pack (100 pack oxen) for carrying cloth, sesame seeds and food grains. The local merchants had to pay higher tolls if they took the commodities outside their areas. It seems that local merchants were lightly taxed and there were restrictions on the commodities coming from outside to promote indigenous products. But outside merchants and traders were encouraged to bring cotton, indigo, zinc and copper products as they were not locally available.

114 mentioned in the sources.176 The state took commissions from brokers in goods of every

kind such as cloth, grain, currency, animals and other products. Hasil tulai (charges for

weighing) were taken from the merchants and peasants for the all the products they

bought for sale in the markets.178 There were charges for the putting up a stall in the

weekly markets and a fee for hiring camel and bullock carts.179 The agents (arzi-navis)

who drafted complaints and promissory notes took commissions on behalf of the state.

There were charges for receiving stamped receipts in the state offices (such as the

chabutra kotwali).m

Jaipur, which had become the richest state in northern India, covered an area of

approximately 20,000 square miles and had 41 parganas (under its control).181 Its annual

budget was 10500,000 rupees.182 Apart from the revenues collected by the state of Jaipur

the personal income of the rulers was also quite significant. As the highest ranking

176 DASTUR-UL-AMAL QASBA SAGANER, PARGANA SANERI YEAR 1760'-2 Professions Taxes in Takas (one taka was Tax Worth 50 Rajasthani dams) Distillers 10 takas Kaladi Ghee maker Ghani Cloth printers 1 taka per 100 metres of cloth Chappa Earthen potters 8 dams per head load Fire wood sellers 1 taka per head load lakri Hay sellers 1 taka per head load chara Leather makers 9 takas per patti (board) Nardi/chamdi Animal sellers 1 taka per goat and sheep Forest wood Bid khatai Slave traders VA of the sale price was taken by the state Varda Faroshi

Dastur-ul-amal qasba Saganer, pargana Saneri Year 1703, RSA, Bikaner. 178 Ibid. For more details see Bhatnagar, Life and Times ofSawai Jai Singh, 296-300. ' Ibid. 180 Known as mohrana ki lag. 181 These 20,000 square miles included 5200 miles of Shekhawatis, 3000 of Macheris (Alwar state), 1800 miles of Tonk. More details on these specific areas are provided by Tod, Annals and Antiquities, vol 1, 349-50 and Bhatnagar, Life and times ofSawai Jai Singh, 269. 182 Draft Budget # 1132, Year 1741 Orders on the budget appears to be in Maharaja's handwriting, Kapad- dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II Museum, Jaipur.

115 mansabdar Sawai Jai Singh collected Rs. 500,000 in revenues from his jagirs in 1700.

This amount increased to 3, 86, 5886 rupees in 1741.183 The annual income from peshkash (gifts) was 83000 rupees in 1725, which also increased to 100 0001 rupees in

1743. This was the revenue of the state even after the continuous Maratha incursions from 1740 onwards, which continued unabated until 1799. These figures by themselves establish that the eighteenth century states could not have functioned in a militaristic mode without a strong infrastructure. This would not have been possible without state initiatives and institutions to legitimize the rule and create a long-lasting legacy. So the

Indian states flourished on the strength of their own institutions, which were a blend of old, hereditary and new features (centralization).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This discussion has demonstrated that the rulers of the eighteenth century states were able to increase sources of income on the basis of strong administrative structures and an efficient bureaucracy. More importantly, they could move beyond basic fiscal arrangements, with the cooperation of their ruling elites, by engaging the elites in state building processes. The ruling elites had to buy, contract, and pay commissions in order to secure administrative positions and had to make it effective and financially productive.

If they proved ineffective, the positions were resold to other interested parties. The cooperation of the ruling elites was secured by linking their interests with those of the state authorities. In this way, the elites became the main connection between the ordinary people and the rulers.

183 See Chapter One.

116 The next step towards systemization of their rule was the establishment of an administrative centre that would consolidate this newly independent state. One of the specific functions of the new centre would be to map out the innovative trends in new governance that aimed to incorporate surveillance, the re-designation of social groups, and the power of the political authority to participate in the day-to-day lives of its subjects. Sawai Jai Singh decreed the building of his capital city to symbolically entrench

Kachchwaha political dominance in and around the principality of Amber. This capital city was inspired by the existing Indie cities like Shahjahanabad, Lahore and Agra.

117 APPENDIX A

PESHKASHI SURETY (INCOME HEAD)

Year 1725

Doc# Date Guarantor For Amount Income head

(rupees) peshkash/surety

1406 June Thakur Badan Churaman 83000 Surety

19 Singh Oat)

Total collection Rs. 83000

Year 1727

Doc. Date Guarantor For Amount Income head

# (rupees) peshkash/surety

1211 Nov,lo Purohit Gangaram Sagat Singh of 17600 Surety for peshkesh

Kirparam Manoharpur

1261 Nov,21 Purohit Gangaram Rao Sakat Singh 13500 Surety

Kirparam

1263 Dec 27 Ibid., Kishan Singh 15000 &?

Narukha

Total collection Rs. 46,000

Year 1728

Doc Date Guarantor For Amount

1177 Jan 3 Kesari Narukha Kishan Singh 25,000

118 Narukha

1147 Jan 7 Kesari Singh Narukha and Zorawar Singh Kanh Singh 14,200

Sheobrhahmapota Narukha

1179 Jan 10 Rawal Sawai Nathawat and Zorawar Singh Badan Singh and 1,00,000

Sampat Singh

Kalyanot

1262 Feb 2 Rao Zorawar Singh Mokham Singh, 3801

Ajit Singh

Narukha

1201 Feb 5 Kesari Singh Narukha and Zorawar Singh Bhagawat Singh 10,001

(s/o Sutaram

Narukha

1174 Feb 13 Kesari Singh Harnath Singh Narukha Durjan Singh s/o 2,201

Abhay Singh

1075 Mar 30 Bhikaridas Natani and salagram Jhalani Chua Singh 15,000

(gumashtas)

1139 Apr 13 Chaudhari Sabel and Man Singh Anand ram 10000

1155 Apr 29 Ghasiram bikhachand and the residents of Thakur Harnath 1,819

pargana Saganer Singh panchayat

1262 May 1 Kashiramjat Badan Singh 2500

Kalyanot

1171 May 27 Jodh Singh Kalyanot Patels of tappa 4000

abhaneri

119 1444 June 2 Purohit Gangaram Himself 4001

1398 June 2 Purohit Bhoj Raj Himself 4001

1175 June 6 Khushyaliram Chainram Patelsof Dausa 24,021 and 4

annas

1153 June 6 4? Birad Singh 353 and 8

Chauhan annas

1287 June 10 Bhikaridas Lunkaran Self 1,351

1290 June 10 i Bhojraj 1,15,000

Kumbhani

863 June 12 Sanghi Udairaj and Amar ram Themselves 3000

1226 June 12 Purohit Hridayram and deep Singh Godha Jiwan ram 439

Chabra

1172 June 13 Sanghi Kesari Singh Himself 326

1269 July 2 Kanwarpal and Vasantpal Sarraf Anandram 6,000

Bankhawat

1210 July 6 Jivaraj and Sahibram of Tonk Patels of Tonk 10,000

1250 Aug 20 Bohra Meghraj and Sundardas Nandwara Pargana Geejgarh 4,021

1464 Sept 4 Zorawar Singh Badan Singh and 2,00,000

Gulab Singh

Kalyanot

1245 Dec 2 Bhikaridas and Lunkaran Natani Chand Singh 1,562

Khangarot

1255 Dec 4 Bhikaridas and Ram Krishna Natani Kunwar Singh 64,000

120 and gaj Singh

1224 Dec 12 Bhikaridas and Lunkaran Natani Sur Singh 5000

panchayat

1268 Dec 24 Shah Lalchand Jiwandas Khamsi 500

(who stood on

behalf of

Anandram

Chaudhary)

1193 Undated Pr. Gangaram Champaran Sahibram 1098

1213 » Bohra Khetsi of Nandwana Krishna Singh 15,000

Total collection Rs. 6, 37,844,000

Year 1729

Doc, Date Guarantor For Amount Income head

# (rupees) Peshkash/surety

1158 Jan 1 Purohit Gangaram Jaswant Singh 9800 Sub a Ajmer

and Champaran

1456 Mar Sabal Singh Sarraf Themselves 40000 Pargana Lawan

20 and Man Singh

1246 June Bhikaridas and Ram Bhojraj Kumbhani 20,001 i

1 Kishan Natani

1144 June Purohit Kunwar Singh and 115000 Pargana Saganer

16 Ghasiramand Amar Singh

121 residents of Saganer Khangarot

1194 June Pr. Raichand and Kanwar Jagat 10,000 c

16 Shobha ram Singh khangarot

1280 June Kushal Singh Bhojraj Kumbhani 3,333 i

1472 June Bhikaridas and Kesari Singh s/o 3,333 i

18 Lunkaran Tej Singh

1470 June Ram Krishna Natani Bhojraj Kumbhani 3,333 i

1249 June Kesari Singh Bhojraj Kumbhani 40,001 i

19 Narukha

1220 June Ram Krishna natani Pahar Singh s/o 25,000 i

22 Hathi Singh

Khangarot

1198 July Kushal Singh Sah Sahib Ram 4000 (fixed Peshkash outstanding

10 for suba ag. Sahib ram

Ajmer)

1195 July Daulat Ram Sahib Ram 1000 (suba Peshkash

17 Pahariya Ajmer)

Total Collection: Rs. 274,801,000

122 Year 1730

Doc.# Date Guarantor For Amount Peshkash/surety

1237 Aug Malukchand and Anandram 35,000 Arrears Outstanding against

16 Ramjidas bankawat him

(mentioned

1236)

1188 Aug Khushali Chand Anandram 35,000 Half amount was payable

16 Jodhraj and Bankawat by Jodhraj and half by

Bhikaridas Bhikaridas Roopchand

Roopchand

1271 Nov Bhikaridas and Ragunath Singh 900 Peshkash of suba Ajmer

26 Lunkaran Khangarot (year 1729)

1297 Nov Bhikaridas and Deep Singh 362 and 8 Peshkash of suba Ajmer

26 Lunkaran Khangarot annas

Total collection Rs. 71,262

Year 1743

Doc.# Date Gaurantor Amount Peshkash For

1341 Jan 29 Rao Jeet Singh Him 100001 Peshkash

Narukha self

Total Collection Rs. 100001

123 APPENDIX B

INCOME FROM IJARA (CONTRACTUAL FARMING)

Year 1727

Doc D/y Guarantor For Amount Ijara

1069 Mar Bhikaridas Lunkaran Jagat Singh Shekhawat 930 rupees and Narainpur;

14 4 annas Mandawar

1092 Aug Patels, patwaris and For themselves Unknown Geejgarh

9 raiyats of Geejgarh

1057 Aug Bhikari Das Himself 922 Naraina

19,

1184 Aug Shardul Singh and Personal surety 922 house

10 Salahardi Singh

1448 Octl Khusyal Chand and Ramchandra 3,201 Khetri

Jodhraj

1087 Nov Gangaram For 10 biswas against 48,705 Dues

9 Shah Lalchand and 3 annas Jalalpur

Bhojraj of Baswa 10 Biswas (half amount) i 5 4?

for Pohkarmal Sethi

1209 Nov Purohit Kirparam Keshavram Soni and 38, 543 Dausa,

9 Mohachand Bhavsa and 13 annas Saneri

124 1088 Nov Indraraj Anupchand Shah Moitram (gumashtas 85,837 and 7 annas Pidayani,

11 of Shyam Singh Rajawat) payable on different Maujpur

dates and

Harsana

(for 1 yr)

1089 Dec Purohit Gangaram 80,664 Shah Ajitdas Manohar

6 Kirparam Chhabra pur

Amarsar

1091 Nov Purohit Gangaram Shah Naraindas (son of 43,385 and 10 annas Wazirpur

12 Kirparam and Hirachand Natani)

Joshimangali

1258 Dec Bohra Khetsi and Vijairam Unknown Naraina

20 Roopchand winter cror

Year 1728

Doc# D/y Guarantor For Amount Ijara/surety

(rupees)

1248 Undated Shah Hari Singh Himself Unknown Khatu and Amarsar

1257 Jan 3 ShahLalchand and Personal i

Balachand

1265 Jan 9 Bohra Dhaneshwar Ramchandra Bakliwal i pargana Naraina

1058 Jan 10 Purohit Hridayram Shah Jiwanram Half share pargana Ajabgarh &

125 Bhangarh

1212 Jan 10 Purohit Kirparam Chaube nathuram and 4000 3 vil. 1) Hirapur

and Gangaram Shobha Chand who had (Amber) 2) Kachrya

stood surety for Har (Chatsu)3)Sadu-ka-

Bhagat khatri nangal (Baswa)

1186 Jan 10 Purohit Gangaram Dholaram Unknown Half share of pargana

and Kirparam Bhangarh and

Ajaibgarh

1207 Jan 16 Purohit Kirparam Ask for an increase of

ijara at rate of 1 anna

per rupee, par. Dausa

1090 Jan 16 Purohit Arat ram Sawai Narukha Ijara of pargana

Mandawar

1298 Febl Purohit Gangaram Personal 3000 Ijara increase of

and Kirparam villages in Amarsar

and

Manoharpur

1102 Mar 6 Kushal Singh Dholaram 9000 Surety to pay the

amont. In two months

1199 Apr 7 Joshi Shyamdas of Sah Gulab Chand 15000 Ijara of pargana

Nindar Natani and Rikab Das Lalsot

Bhavsa

1150 Apr 8 Inder Raj and Anup Zorawar Singh Unknown (winter crop) in

126 Chand Kheri

1137 Apr 9 Khushyaliram and Gulab Chand Natani 15000 Pargana Lalsot

Chainram of Dausa

1129 Apr 13 Manohardas Man Singh Patani 4001 Jaisingpura in

Luhadir Ujjain

1103 Apr 18 Purohit Gangaram, Dholaram and 13000 Rahdari

Gujaram and Moharam in pargana

Champaran Amber

1071 Apr 30 Bhikaridas Hari Singh 13000 Amarsar

Lunkaran

1228 Apr 30 Kanwarpal and Mirza Avezbeg 650 10% (from 6,500

Basantpal ofjagir

village Gudda

(Rampura)

1399 June 2 Bhikaridas Himself Unknown pargana Mundawar

1152 June 6 Purohit Gujaram Shah Keshoram Soni 87,459 pargana Dausa

1181 June 10 Mangal Joshi and Maujiram 10000 pargana Toda Bhim

Josh Tawdya

1241 June 10 Hridayram of Jiwan Ram Chhabra 19,604 Half share of pargana

Jamroli and Deep Ajaibgarh

GodhaofRini

1303 June 11 InderRaj and Shyam Singh Narukha 579 and 1 Sale of 1/3 share

Anupchand anna of grain

127 from Badagaon

1286 June 17 Bhikaridas Bhojraj Khumbhani 4000 village Salawad

Lunkaran

1447 My 19 Khushyaliram Deep Kumbhani 1901 village Jaikipura

Chainram (Salawad)

1061 Sept 5 Bhikaridas Himself 12000 Jagdhalpura

Lunkaran

1222 Sept 5 Harnath Singh Uday ram Bhagat (Jat) 500 out of half share

1000 In village

(Hindaun)

1097 Sept 13 Raja Gopal Singh Dayaram 10,137 pargana

of Karauli Malarna

1180 Oct 18 Ram Krishna Self 14,210 Village of qasba

Chainram (Sarraf Geejgarh and the

ofDausa) mauzas of

Kala khoh,

Abwadi,

Ayodhya,

Rampura,

Mohlai

and Gairoli.

128 Year 1729

Doc# Date Guarantor For Amount Ijara /surety

(rupees)

1244 Jan 4 Bhikaridas and Bakhat Singh and 94 and 8 Jagir yielding

Lunkaran Himmat Singh annas 1,700

1146 Jan 9 4 Badan Singh 1,51,901 Ijara of suba

Akbarabad

1455 Feb Purohit Bhagwandad 111& Jagir (par.

4 Mansagar annas 2 Jaipur)

1133 Oct Churaram Sitaram kotwal 8001 Ijara ofparganas

15 Baksarai Toda Rai Singh

1251 Oct Bohra Khetsi Lalchand Tongya Unknown Ijara of pargana

24 and Balachand Mauzabad

Chhabra

1454 Oct Bhikaridas and Kishan Singh 18,500 Ijara of pargana

31 Lunkaran Narukha Tonk

1227 Nov Bohra Khetsi Balachand Sawda Ijara half share

11 and Roopchand of pargana

Mauzabad

129 Year 1730

Doc. Date Guarantor For Amount Ijara/surety

# (rupees)

1266 Aug Chanrabhan and Hariram 2000 Ijara

16 Sukhanand (qanungo)

1237 Aug Malukchand and Anandram 10,000 Ijara of pargana

16 Ramjidas bankawat Lawan

1160 Sept Kushal Singh Hasan khan 500 Ijara of par.

20 Pathan Sudana

1098 Sept Pr. Gangaram and Anandram 1,00,000 Ijara of pargana

21 Ram Kishan Natani Bankawat Lawan

and Kushal Singh

1256 Sept Sah Inder Raj and Sheo Singh 3000 Sardoha

25 Anupchand Sarraf Narukha

1165 Oct 7 Kushal Singh Jeet Singh 12,000

Todarai Singh

1124 Oct Gangaram, Ram Anand Ram Unknown Provided that

12' Natani and Kushal Bankawat pargana Lawan,

Singh Pararda and

Sanedar allowed

in his jagir

1161 Nov Kushal Singh Jeet Singh 1,425 Ijara of mauza

130 10 Narukha Suroli (pargana

Sarsop)

1178 Nov Bohra Hemraj Sandul Singh 19,000 Ijara of 5

27 parganas (for 1/3

share)

taken by

Sadul Singh from

the Nawab

And then given to

Sawai Jai Singh

Year 1732

Doc# Date Guarantor For Amount (rupees) Ijara/surety

1264 May 31 Anandramjoshi Himself 42,000 Received

Year 1733

Doc. Date Guarantor For Amount Ijara/surety Doc.

# (rupees) Type

1010 Oct Surajram Himself 20,00,0001 Parganas of Mortgage

31 Bankawat Lawan, Paparda and To Sawai

Saneri Jai Singh

131 Year 1765

Doc. Date Guarantor For Amount Ijaral surety

# (rupees)

1400 Nov Subedar Govind Rao to Himself 5001 Permanent lease of

1 Madho Singh Baroda,

Banthali,

Kasia,

Kharvoda,

Khogla, Dehra,

Dantri,

Antoli and

Kuhaheda

APPENDIX C

DASTUR-UL-AMAL PARGANA BHAIRANA, SUBA AJMER1723

Cultivators State share Sair-Jihat

Patels 40% exempted

Raiyati 50% Not exempted

Dastur-ul-amal Bhairana, suba Ajmer and this document has been translated by Gupta, Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 126.

132 (peasants)

Chaudharis, Qanungos and 25% exempted

Kayasths, and Mussalmans,

Rajputs 25% exempted

Bohra Har Dutt 25% exempted

Banias 11% Some are exempted

APPENDIX D185

SAIR-I-JIHAT

Patwaro On account of fees of patwari (varied from 12/2 to taka 18614 per hundred

rupees.

Pani Tax on irrigation at the rate of three per hundred rupees (land tax).

Chailli: A tax on goat. The rate ranges from takas 6 to 9 per head.

Mapa Toll tax on banjaras (grain merchants), in both khalisa and jagir lands;

Rahdari

Kayali and Tax on account of fees paid to kayal (weigher), when the grain was sold to

Tulai the merchants. The rate of tax was Rs. 10 per hundred rupees of the land

185 This table is based on the information given in Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, 106-8 and Singh, The State, Landlords and Peasants, 120-22. 186 A copper coin (40 takas was equal to 1 rupee).

133 revenue.

Ghugri On account of the grain presented to the shahna, whose duty was to watch

Shahna over the grain in a village. He was entitled to take 15 maunds of grain as

shahnagi.

Juro Tax on a pair of bullocks drawing the plough.

Jhuprx Tax on cottages and varied from rupees 8 to 12 per hut or cottage.

Ghiwah Collected on account of interest given to the mahajan or the moneylender.

Rozina : Daily perquisites of the tappadar. This rate under the zabti was takas 8 tappadar per hundred bighas, and injinsi, takas 2 on one hundred mans.

Rozina (Lit. daily tax): According to the dastur the rate was takas 29, and perhaps

the tax was imposed to meet charges of the revenue officers and their party

during their stay in a village.

Farohi A tax to meet loss or to cover the loss of crop/ grain. It also seems to have

Qasur comprehended as fines.

Pichotri A levy of 5% on the land revenue. (Exact for the imposition is not clear).

134 Ekotri (Lit. one): It was imposed on the patwari upon the sale of grain (tulai) at

as 12 and 2paisa (cents) and the merchant at as 10 and Ipaisa on Rs 100

of sale price.

Nirotri (Lit. nine): It was levied at the rate of Rs. 9 per hundred bighas.

Go-sumari: Cattle tax, rates varied from pargana to pargana.

APPENDIX E 187

VILLAGES UNDER THE KHALISA (CROWN LANDS)

Pargana Year Khalisa Jagir Miscellaneous 188

Malarna 1717 33 66 1

1741 74 23

Chatsu 1708 21 70 6

1724 66 28

1741 62 33

1748 46 48

187 This table has been taken from Gupta, The Agrarian System of Eastern India, 213. 1 These villages were given as charitable trusts or gifts.

135 Dausa 1719 83 12 5

1741 33 56 1

Bahatri 1665 37 62 1

1715 17 70 1

1718 18 81 1

Amber 1715 17 70 13

1724 43 47 10

1734 40 45 15

1744 32 42 26

136 APPENDIX F189

THE URBAN TAXES

Tehbazaari Rents paid by the sellers for temporary shops in the town

markets or weekly fairs in the towns or the villages

Hasil Tulai Charged on weighing corn, kirana, oil, gur, sugar, sutli etc.

brought for sale in the market.

Fee for hiring camel-carts The rates being 1 taka per camel and \taka 37 dams per and camels bullock cart. The fee was charged from the brokers.

Rahdari transit duties on goods entering and exiting the cities

Kaladi: charged per distillation from brewers

Ghani: charged from oil manufacturers

Chappa: Charged on cloth printing, the rate depending on the variety

of cloth.

Tolls on chara (hay), The rate ranging from 1 taka and 25 dams per cart was

charged.

189 These tolls were usually collected by the Kotwal of the cities and his office maintained the accounts of these tolls for the state. The above mentioned tolls were collected regularly by the office of kotwal in Jaisingpura, pargana Shahjahanabad, arhsatta chabutra kotwali, Jaisingh pura, pargana Shahjahanabad, Year 1713-20, RSA, Bikaner

137 Tolls charged on iron- Brought for sale in the market. wares Tolls on clay, Used by potters to make pots

Tolls on the sale of rice, The rate ranging between 12/1/2 dams to 1 taka per rupee gur, ghee, khand, bajra, worth of sale. moth

Tolls on the sale of cotton The rate being pevjevri (rope), or per bhar (head-load). yarn, ban, and munj,

Tolls on the sale of Tolls on the sale of camels, horses, oxen, buffaloes in the animals weekly market, the usual rate being 25 dams per rupee of

sale price

Tolls on dyes brought for 2 takas per bullock cart sale

Tolls on sale of babul takas per cartload leaves

Tolls on betal leaves charged per thousand leaves

Chhipas On the sale of printed cloth: for the rate was 12/1/2 dams per

rupee worth of sale, and for the brokers 1 taka on the

brokerage of 20 thans (meters

Vachayat: Tolls on carts carrying grain to the markets

Varda Farosi: On the sale of boys and girls, the rate being lA of the price

fetched

138 Nardi or Chamdi: Charged from shoe-makers and leather dressers

APPENDIX H 190

LIST OF DIWANS OF THE STATE

Names Tenures

Kishor Das 1705-6

Lakshi Das

Sah Fateh Chand 1708

Bhikhari Das 1709-13

Fateh Chand

Sri Chand 1713

Rai Narain Das & Kirpa Ram 1716

Kishor Das& Tara Chand 1717

Kishor Das & Tara Chand 1719

Tara Chand 1721

Rai Narain Das & Kirpa Ram 1725

Rai Narain Das & Kirpa Ram 1728

Rai Narain Das & Kirpa Ram 1731

Vidhyadhar 1731

190 The names of these diwans are mentioned in the correspondence between them and the different state officials.

139 Rai Narain Das & Vidhyadhar 1737-8

Vidhyadhar & Fateh Ram 1739-41

Rai Narain Das Bakht Ram 1742

MurliDhar 1744

Ram Narain Das Fateh Ram 1745

Rai Narain Das Har Govind 1748

Vidhyadhar 1749

Har Govind Kanhi Ram 1750-1

140 CHAPTER THREE: THE CITY OF JAIPUR: EXEMPLIFICATION OF THE

USE OF URBAN SPACE

This chapter discusses the urban planning of Jaipur city and analyzes the ruler's

vision of sovereignty and how it was symbolized in architectural design. The previous

chapter elaborated on the complexities of political change and the transformation of the

Kachchwaha's patrimony into an independent state. A new capital city was built in 1727

CE; the details involved in its planning as well as the execution of its design of this city

are remarkable. This analysis discusses the specific features of the city of Jaipur in order

to understand the dynamics of urbanization and its subsequent role in the administration

of eighteenth century states. Pre-colonial India was ruled by ingenious statesmen who had created cohesive centres of power and whose capital cities were nuclei of power or miniature states. Scholars studying the Indian cities have not analyzed the ways in which the architectural discourse had embedded political forms of representing political

authority. Foucault's discussion about the use of urban space in the French state and its commitment to the urban development in eighteenth century France provides a basis for comparison for this chapter. According to Foucault, architecture became political in the eighteenth century: architecture and urbanism were fundamental for better governance of the state and societies and represented a powerful site of governmental rationality. The discourse on architecture was an important part of the treatises written about the art of governance in France.1 The construction of the city of Jaipur and the importance given to its design and planning offers a non-Western example of this process. The capital city

1 Michel Foucault, "Space, Knowledge, and Power", 236-256. The excerpts from his interview with Paul Rabinow on 239-42 were particularly insightful where he discusses the development of urban

141 and its management are a template that can be applied to the whole state. The evidence from other Indian cities, especially the capital city of Shahjahanabad (Delhi) reveals that

Jaipur was not the first example of urban planning but an exemplification of the long processes in the urban planning in India.2

HISTORIOGRAPHY ON INDIAN CITIES

The present scholarship on Indian urbanization has been either too involved in providing social, economic, and cultural account of the Indian cities 3 or in offering models i.e. Hindu and Muslim.4 These scholars view Indian cities only from an economic or political perspective. So far these studies have presented descriptive accounts of great urban centres that merely emerged and continued to prosper as their needs arose. The reasons for the rise of the towns and cities were either political or economic or commercial or sometimes even religious. According to these works, the Indian rulers built capitals cities, and other urban centres mostly to immortalize their name or dynastic glory. Some historians have refuted western analysis of Indian cities; these assertions were made on the basis European travellers' testimonies that Mughal cities were merely

2 The evidence of the predominance of this viewpoint can be seen from the invitation letter sent by the organizers of Fifth Rajasthan History Congress which was held in Jaipur in 2005, "The Conference is being organized in the beautiful city of Jaipur that is the first planned city of India and is known as pink city the world over". 3 Few examples would be: Hameeda Naqvi, Urbanization and Urban Centres under the Great Mughals: 1556-1707: An Essay in Interpretation, vol. 1, (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced study, 1972); Narayani Gupta, Delhi between two empires, 1803-1931 : society, government, and urban growth (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981);Mahendra P Singh, Town, market, mint, and port in the Mughal Empire, 1556-1707 : an administrative-cum-economic_study (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1985); Michael Brand ed. Akbar's India: art from the Mughal City of Victory (New York: Asia Society galleries, 1985); Indu Banga ed. The City in Indian history: urban demography, society, and politics, (New Delhi: Manohar, 1991); Stephen Blake, Shahjahanabad: sovereign city in Mughal India, 1639-1739 (Cambridge, 1991); T G Percival Spear, Delhi, its monuments and history (Oxford: Oxford university Press 1994). 4 V. Sachdev and G. Tillotson, Building Jaipur: the making of an Indian city, (London, Reaktion Book Ltd, 2002).

142 camp cities. These cities were called parasitic centres because they were dependent on self-sufficient villages that catered to their demands and the towns had nothing to offer back except being seats of political authority and they changed the towns and urban centres decayed with them.

European travellers were the first to describe the Indian cities for a western audience and they compared them to with western cities of that time. The size of the urban populations in seventeenth century cities was calculated on the basis of these observations. It seems that the cities of Agra, Delhi, and Ahmedabad had more people than did the cities of London and Paris in the seventeenth century. 5 Significantly, these

European travellers, also, criticized the appearance of even the largest Indian cities such as Delhi and Agra. The apparent lack of planning and the low standards of housing as well as the striking contrast between the affluence of the ruling elite and the conditions of the poor were the major criticisms made by these travellers. Among these observations and writings on Indian towns and cities, one that stands out is Francois Bernier's comment that Delhi was a camp city and derived its employment and maintenance from the court and army. Bernier's conception of a city with no alternative but to follow the camp in its march or to perish from want during its absence, made a lasting impression on subsequent writings on Indian urbanization.6

Bernier's theory about the nature of the Indian towns as mere camp cities has been critically examined and modified to a large extent by scholars. According to consensus, the presence of the ruler or the Mughal emperor attracted people to that

5 See Appendix A. 6 Bernier, Travels in Mughal India, 381.

143 particular capital city or to wherever he was residing during his rule. However, the cities

established as the capital cities or as commercial centres did not simply disappear as soon

as the emperor moved to a different city. Two prominent examples are of the cities of

Delhi and Agra. When Shahjahan decided to shift his capital from Agra to Delhi

(renaming it Darul-khilafa Shahjahanabad) in 1639 CE, the city of Agra continued to thrive as the most important commercial centre of the seventeenth century. Nor did

Shahjahanabad suffer a long-term loss of populace after Aurangzeb left for Deccan in

1686.7

Many towns and cities grew in this period (e.g. Agra, Delhi, Lahore and

Aurangabad). At the same time, the regional cities of Ahmadabad, Golconda, Surat, and

Hyderabad retained their status as regional political and commercial centres. The presence of the imperial residence did not make any permanent changes in either their status or importance.8 Although the majority of the Indian population lived in the rural areas, the towns always had significant populations.9 The cities played an important role in the political, cultural, and economic development of that time. After the coming of the

Turks in the thirteenth century, the ruling class (who were mostly of foreign origin) preferred to settle down in the urban areas. This resulted in the growth of a large number of towns and cities. These urban centres became thriving manufacturing, trading, and cultural centres. 10

Fatima Imam, The Economic History of Shahjahanabad from 1639 to 1739, chapter.2 (unpublished M. Phil diss., Aligarh University, India, 1986). 8 M. P. Singh, Town, Mint and Market in the 17,h century Mughal India (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1985) 1-45. 9 Habib, "Population", 169. According to Man Habib 15% of the population lived in the urban areas in the seventeenth century. 10 Some historians have even termed this age as "Urban Revolution", Mohammad Habib and K. A. Nizami, ed. The comprehensive history of India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), vol. 5, 1- 55.

144 The consolidation of the Mughal rule influenced and accelerated the pace of urbanization during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially in the north. The

Mughal ruling class recognized the advantages to be gained from supporting the mercantile activities and the merchant classes in general. The ports cities of Surat, Broach

and Cambay on the west coast, and Masulipatnam on the east, and Patna and Benaras on the Ganges saw un-precedented growth during this period. 11 The founding of a new settlement and the restoration of the old area was a recurring feature of the Mughal period and seems to have continued into the eighteenth century. The creation of new settlements was a relatively straightforward business, and was undertaken by members of local elite or by officials with an interest in developing the economic potential of the area. 12

The early Turkish dynasties mostly preferred to adapt to the requirements of old established Hindu settlements: namely to build cities near the natural frontiers such as mountains, rivers or ridges as was the case with Delhi, Laknawati, Mandu, Bidar and

Bijapur. The Mughals were also content to follow their predecessors' example and consolidate their power around traditional metropolitan centres of Delhi, Agra and

Lahore. Shahjahan was the first Mughal ruler who built a city on the plains, thereby setting up a new paradigm that put the problem of the defence of the city at risk. Before him, all the cities had been built either on a ridge or over the top of a mountain range to keep the capital safe from potential attacks. 13 Many cities rose into prominence either as

11 Banga, City in India, and Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, Introduction. 12 Examples of the cities in Uttar Pradesh i.e. Shahjahanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Farrukhabad, Fyzabad and Rampur, for more details see Gavin Hambly, "Towns and Cities", 434-51. 13 The seven cities of Delhi: starting from Qutub Delhi to Din Panah of Humayun, for more details see Robert E Frykenberg, Delhi through the Ages: essays in urban history, culture, and society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

145 administrative centres, trading entre-ports or because of religious significance. 14

However, most of the cities in the Indian sub-continent were built to mark the accession of a new dynasty or a ruler. The eighteenth century saw the emergence of capital cities such as Murshidabad (Bengal), Poona (Marathas), Hyderabad (Nizam) Seringanapatnam

(Tipu Sultan), Lucknow (Awadh) and Jaipur (Kachchwahas).

HINDU-MUSLIM MODELS FOR THE INDIAN CITIES

As previously mentioned, the ruler's vision of authority and its symbolic representation in architecture and planning have not been analyzed so far. That is to say, scholars make an assumption that these cities were simply expressions of either Hindu or

Islamic model. These cities have been studied for their art, culture, architecture and trading activities. For example, G. Tillotson and V. Sachadev in Building Jaipur claim that Jaipur city was built on a shastric (Hindu) model and that the design was inspired by the mythical cities of Ayodha and Videha.15 Ekhlart Ehlers and Thomas Kraft suggest an

Islamic model for the city of Shahjahanabad (Delhi). 16 This chapter, in contrast, examines the processes of urbanization as central to consolidation of sovereignty and to the incorporation of diverse social and political groups. So far the historiographical debates on Indian urbanization have discussed some of the specific features of the Indian cities and how they served as regional centres of power, pilgrimage or commerce. Very

14 Examples: Banaras as a religious centre, Agra as a commercial centre and Delhi as a political as well as cultural centre. 15 Sachadev and Tillotson, Building Jaipur, 29. 16 Ehler Kraft, "Islamic Cities in India? Theoretical Concepts and the Case of Shahjahanabad/Old Delhi", in Eckart Ehlers and Thomas Kraft ed. Shahjahanabad/ Old Delhi: Traditions and Colonial Change (Manohar, 2003), 11-18.

146 few cities were planned and constructed in such a way that they could represent rulers a political vision.

This chapter proposes that that the two imperial cities (at least in North India) that come closest to this phenomenon are Shahjahan's Shahjahanabad and Sawai Jai Singh's

Jaipur. Shahjahanabad and other cities in Medieval India were influenced by both Islamic and Hindu classical patterns. Both styles complemented each other, rather than working in isolation. In fact, it would be difficult to identify a typical Hindu or Islamic model during this period. 17 According to Gavin Hambly, "Although some of the most flourishing cities of sixteenth and seventeenth century India were unmistakably centres of

Muslim political and cultural hegemony, the pluralist nature of Indian society and the fact that almost everywhere the Muslims were in minority community, make it difficult to regard even such metropolitan centres as Delhi or Agra as being truly Islamic." 18 Also, these cities have been presented as a classically Hindu (Jaipur) and Islamic

(Shahjahanabad) by modern scholars. This comparison has been made in order to discuss the limitations of these models. Moreover, the ruler's political vision cannot be seen as a copy of previous blueprint or as an entity separate from the historical context in which it was constructed and developed.

Both cities have been credited as being built with the help of foreign designs and drawings. In the case of Shahjahanabad, it is said that the city of Isfahan (Safavid capital in Iran) was used for inspiration in the development of its design. But the city of

Shahjahanabad was designed, planned and evolved by the Indian architects of that time

17 Gavin Hambly, "Towns and Cities", 438. 18 Ibid.

147 and was closely supervised by the Mughal emperor Shahjahan.19 The official historians

of his reign reported that it was a part of the emperor's daily routine to examine the plans

and designs of the buildings presented by the imperial architects and engineers. The

emperor not only approved these plans but also modified them.20 On two occasions,

Shahjahan made alterations to the plan after the complexes had been built, and modifications were made by demolishing the structures.21 As Stephen Blake aptly points out, "Shahjahanabad was predominantly a Hindu city governed by Muslims, the capital of a Muslim dynasty in an overwhelmingly Hindu sub-continent."22

In the same way there are many theories about the creation of the new city by Sawai Jai

Singh. Jadunath Sarkar reports that an early British records (1820) included a story that the city of Jaipur was planned by an Italian who was sent to Europe by Sawai Jai Singh to procure materials and information. The British official doubted the credibility of this story and added that "the arrangement of the buildings and streets of Jaipur is superior to the genius of a Rajput or any other native of India." According to Jadunath Sarkar, the reason for the circulation of this story was that the Jesuit fathers were sent to Europe by

Sawai Jai Singh to buy astronomical books and instruments.23 Some scholars suggest that he had procured blueprints of far- away cities with strange sounding names. This theory is based on the discovery of the book of maps of European cities in his library

A. Qazwini, Badshah- nama, transcript of the Rampur manuscript, department of history, Aligarh University, Aligarh, 266, and Abdul Hamid Lahori, Badshah-nama, transcript of the Rampur manuscript, department of history Aligarh University, Aligarh,, vol. 1, 149-55. 20 A. Qazwini, Badshahnama, 152. 21 Ibid., p. 266 and Mohammad Waris, Badshah-nama, transcript of the Rampur manuscript, department of history, Aligarh University, Aligarh, 53. 2 Blake, Shahjahanabad: the sovereign city, 36. 23 Sarkar, A History of Jaipur, 216.

148 collection.24 Susan Gole contradicts this theory by pointing out that the volume was acquired after the construction of the city.25 It is the opinion of some scholars that Don

Xavier, a European traveller, was the one who inspired Jai Singh to build a city. Don

Xavier was a medical professional who came to Jaipur after 173 ICE, at the request of

Sawai Jai Singh. His family continues to live in Jaipur and Ashim Roy has published the family details after conducting personal interviews with the family members.26 Nilsson

Sten asserts that the city plan for Jaipur reflects Sawai Jai Singh's astrological bent of mind. According to Sten, the city's grid can be explained because it is in alignment with the sign of Leo (the birth sign of the ruler).27 Actually, the lack of alignment in the city is due to natural topography. The northern side of the city has a ridge that was included in the plan so it could act as an impregnable boundary.28

Another viewpoint held by one of most eminent historians on the history of Jaipur states was that the city was the brain child of Jai Singh's able minister Vidyasagar (a

Bengali Brahmin) who was appointed the finance minister (desk diwan) in 1728 CE and was in charge of the construction of the city.29 Many scholars who ascribe to the Hindu model for this city believe that Jai Singh took full advantage of the holy texts of the ancient shilpa- shastras. These shastras established specific rules for the construction of towns and villages. The supporters of this theory say that Jaipur was built according to the Prastara plan, which is described in one of the important books about Shilpa

24 Nilsson Sten, "Jaipur: In the sign of Leo", Megasin Tessin No.l, (1987), 12-14; Yashendra Sahai, Kalavriitt, Quaterly Magazine of Art: Jaipur Architecture, no 23, (1993), 2. 25 Gole, Indian Maps and Plans, AA. 26 Roy, History of the Jaipur city, Appendix 1. 27 Nilsson Sten, "Jaipur, In the Sign of Leo", 19-22. 28 This theory has been critiqued in detail by Sachadev and Tillotson, Building Jaipur, 60. 29 Sarkar, A history of Jaipur, 30; and Dastur Komwar (history of castes and their families and Vidyasagar's family account is given there), preserved in RSA, Bikaner.

149 shastras. 30The Mansara shastra describes eight types of villages (e.g. dande, danadaka, sarvabhadra, nandayarta, padmaka, svastika, prastara, karmuka and chaturmukha).

Space is left between the town wall and the main buildings that go around and the town is divided into four, nine or sixteen wards. The prastara plan is square or rectangular in

shape. Jaipur, however, is neither square nor rectangular; it has an irregular shape.3l

Historians have not sufficiently analyzed the fact that Jai Singh did not need to be inspired or to copy blueprints from other sources. Sawai Jai Singh was a Mughal statesman and could use the examples of the capital cities built by the Mughal Emperors.

He had lived in most of the major cities of the Empire and had added important monuments as well as small quarters popularly known as Jai-Singh/wras' (quarters).32

Besides his military and administrative achievements, he was well known for his great intellect, scientific achievements and interest in astronomy. He had established five astronomical centres in Jaipur, Delhi, Ujjain, Banaras and Mathura. The task of planning and building a city was no great feat for a person of Sawai Jai Singh's caliber. His achievement lies in successful deployment of traditional and new forms of sovereignty; he incorporated Mughal patterns but changed them to suit the specific needs of his region.

Jai Singh modelled his capital city on Shahjahanabad which had been built more than a century earlier in 1637 CE. This Mughal capital served as a model to most of the

30 For details see Roy, The history of the Jaipur city, 12. 31 Yadusendra Sahai, "Sawai Jai Singh: Patron of Architecture", in A.K. Asopa ed. The Cultural Heritage of Jaipur (Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 1982.) 31; Roy, The history of the Jaipur city, 38. 3 The most known were in Shahjahanabad, Agra and Mathura.

150 Indian cities of eighteenth century. V. Sachadev and G. Tillotson in their recent book on

Jaipur focuses on the shastric model and also describe how it was modified to accommodate the existing buildings in the city. They compare Jaipur with other so-called

Hindu cities (e. g. Madurai, Dabhoi, Sikar, and Saganer). They trace the Kachchwaha

Mughal alliance and highlight the career of Sawai Jai Singh, but do not discuss the

Mughal influence on the Kachchwahas. The building of Jaipur city is depicted as self- assertion by the king against the Mughals and other regional kingdoms. These authors have overemphasized the application of the shastric model in their portrayal of a "Hindu" city. Contrary to these arguments this chapter explicates the similarities in construction, design and planning of Jaipur and Shahjahanabad and argues that having a Hindu model for Hindu cities and an Islamic model for Muslim cities is misleading and incorrect.

Jaipur was build within the environs of the old capital city of the Kachchwahas Amber.

As in the case of Shahjahanabad, cities in India always mushroomed around forts and kings always took residence in a capital with difficult access due to natural or artificial barriers (e.g. deserts, ridges, trees and above all, by fortresses and mountains). Jaipur possessed all these advantages and more. At the same time, Jaipur was very different from other Rajput cities because it was not built on a ridge or mountain like the cities of

Jaiselmer, Jodhpur, and Bharatpur. Jaipur was very accessible and like Shahjahanabad, had less emphasis on fortifications around the city. Both of these cities became easy targets for attacks from the outside. 33 Sawai Jai Singh planned this city himself with the help of other architects and a large collection of maps and drawings of major cities of that

Shahjahanabad was invaded from the northwest by Nadir Shah in 1739 and by Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1764. Jaipur was raided nearly every year from 1741 onwards by the Marathas.

151 time (preserved in his pothikhana collection). 34 Notes and specific details on the maps of the construction are available with added notes in the handwriting of Jai Singh.35

Both the cities were built and developed around the main palace complex and the existing temples and mosques were included within the plan. The new temples (in

Jaipur's case) and mosques (in Shahjahanabad's case) were designed with the architecture of the city in mind. The minarets and other architectural details, specific for the places of worship were modified to fit into the over-all design of the city. 3 6 Jaipur represents a juxtaposition of existing architectural templates already evolving on the

Indian sub-continent; thus judging it by the shastric model would limit the unique features of the city to one specific model. Jaipur was developed through a progression of design and town planning. It should be studied as a form for understanding the new power structure of that time and its institutional entrenchment in the mapping of political sovereignty through architectural design.

Urban space was used and utilized by a political authority to control their subjects more effectively by allocating designated spaces for their settlements and by establishing sustainable areas of control i.e. check posts, boundary walls and by taking responsibility of sanitation, resettlement and futuristic planning. The town planning and its specific features should be a key to answering these questions. Studying about the cities and their construction will shed new light on the political structure of pre-colonial India and help to

34 Details of the collection are available in Sawai Man Singh II museum Library, Jaipur. 35 See Appendix B. 36 Catherine Asher, "Jai Singh's Jaipur" (paper presented in The Barbara Stoler Miller Memorial Conference: Jai Singh's Jaipur: Scientific, Religious, and Artistic Mediations, Columbia University, Feburary 7-8, 2003).

152 eradicate some of the inherent biases such as categorizing cities into specific Hindu and

Muslim models. The selection of site, construction, and development of design had specific purposes and fulfilled the vision of particular periods and rulers. More specifically, the architecture of buildings not only addressed the needs of the divinely inspired political powers but also projected the developments of a political space for a particular sovereign state. 37

SELECTION OF THE SITE AND PLANNING OF THE CITY

The design of a city reflects a ruler's vision of how to control and manage his state: thus the selection of the site for building the city was an important step in urban planning. The major concern was to select a site that had the potential to grow into a large city capable of supporting an ever-growing population. Other requirements were that the city has the ability to defend itself and be accessible to other parts of the state and neighbouring areas. The site selected by Sawai Jai Singh to build his capital lay five miles south of Amber (the old capital city). It was on a small plain and the northern part of it on a basin known as Man Sagar dam and it was surrounded by hills on three sides.

This selection was a bold departure from earlier Rajput cities, including Amber, which was built on high hills and were impregnable to military attacks. The selection of the site on an open plain was the reflection of his confidence and he used the vicinity of Amber

This point was discussed by Foucault in the context of West European societies fromth e eighteenth century in his interview, "Space, Knowledge and Power", 241. His viewpoint is taken as an inspiration to talk about the dynamics of construction of the Jaipur city and the ways in which it manifested political sovereignty.

153 was utilized to continue the traditional relationship in the area.38 As discussed in the previous chapter, Sawai Jai became a powerful ruler primarily through Mughal alliances and fruitful negotiations with other powerful neighbours (e.g. Marathas, Sikhs and the

Rajput principalities). Sawai Jai Singh had also made several renovations in the city of

Amber similar to those made by Shahjahan had done in Akbarabad before he decided to build a new capital city.39

Certain essential features were kept in mind during the planning, and the arrangements for the defense of the city were the first step. While building the city, Sawai

Jai Singh had the rock faces overlooking the city scraped and dressed to form steep cliffs, on top of which he constructed his forts. He constructed Nahargarh (Sudershangarh) to the northeast side. Jaideep fort was built to the North, overlooking the Amber fort complex and Amargarh fort was built to the east. For the protection of the weaker south side, he used the existing low hillocks and built the Hatroi fort in the southwest and

Shankergarh in the southeast. 40 The city of Jaipur occupied an area that spanned across some existing villages. According to the Jaipur municipal records, the site of the city covered parts of six villages namely Nahargarh, Talkatora, Santosh Sagar, Moti Katla

Galtagi, and Kishanpole.4l

The plan also conceived of a city that was not only aesthetically beautiful but also had the potential to support an ever-growing population. Agra had become over populated and congested because of its uneven development, which was one of the

38 The Kachchwaha clan had been patrimonial rulers of Dhundhar region with Amber city as the capital for more than 700 years. 39 Lahori, Badshahmana, vol. 1,22. 40 Roy, The history of the Jaipur city, 45. 41 Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Years: 1731-44, RSA, Bikaner.

154 reasons why the Mughal capital was moved to Shahjahanabad.42 Sawai Jai Singh had been the subhadar of Akbarabad and was responsible for some renovations in the city.

Jaipur's plan was probably made keeping these defects into consideration.43 The plan for

Jaipur as it finally emerged was very simple. Jaipur was to have four rectangular blocks, the palace, Purani Basti, Topkhana Desh and a block combining Modikhana and

Visheshwarji. No road was originally planned to divide these two named blocks. It is not clear when the present Chaura Rasta and the Tripolia gate were planned and built. But clearly, Chaura Rasta was not built like a market, just as the way John Bazaar was.44

The area now occupied by the Chowris, Ghat Darwaza, Topkhana Hazuri and

Ramchandraji was left completely undeveloped in the beginning. The city maps shows that the area was full of depressions, sand dunes and so on. These parts were included within the city limits by the city wall. Originally, only four bazaars were planned for the city. These were later named as Johri bazaar, Sireh Deori bazaar, Kishanpole bazaar and

Gangori bazaar. The number of shops under construction was eighty-eight on side of

Kishanpole bazaar and one hundred and sixty two shops were planned for other bazaars.

As the city population grew, the undeveloped land was occupied and later on, extended to three blocks.

Access to the water supply was another important factor. The failed development of the capital city of Akbar and the dry climate of Jaipur were taken into consideration.

42 Salih, Badshahnama, vol. 3,27 and Lahori, Badshahnama, vol. 1,478 and Bernier, The Travels in India, 285. 43 Map of Agra (Akbarabad) had been found in his Pothikhana with details and drawing on certain buildings and belongs to the period when Jai Singh was the subedar. For details see: Gole, "Plans of Indian Towns: an outline of the extant maps and plans of Indian towns up to the middle of the 19th century with special reference to maps of Delhi", 121-134. 4 There is no mention of this market in this progress map, preserved in the City Palace Museum, Jaipur, or in the Imarati (building) arhsatta, RSA, Bikaner.

155 The arrangement for water was made possible through the availability of a lake to the north of the city called the Talkatora and another lake just east of this lake was called

Rajamal- ka- talab.45 To the northeast of the palace, about two kilometers away, there was a marshy land, which was later converted into a lake and resort building was constructed there. A dam was built on this site under the supervision of an architect named Ganga Ram and it provided enough water to the city inhabitants.46

As pointed out before Jaipur was built around the palace complex (i.e., in the manner of

Shahjahanabad and it can be seen how parallels can be drawn within the so-called Hindu and Islamic models. After the area was earmarked for the capital city and the supply of water was ensured, the landscape developed. The symbolic reason to develop a city around a palace complex has been discussed by Stephen Blake who states that, "the

Mughals conceived the city as an axis mundi, the meeting place of heaven and earth. The palace fortress was the centre of not only the city and the empire but also of the universe.47 According to the traditional theories of Islamic architecture, the city lay between the two major poles of men and cosmos and incorporated the principles of both.48 The sacredness of the capital cities as centres of universe has been discussed in the classical Hindu texts as well.49 The laying out of the city of Jaipur as a miniature model of the universe on earth has been emphasized by many authors and it is neither the intention nor the purpose of this analysis to go into the details of that discussion.50

However, it is obvious that the cities of Shahjahanabad and Jaipur were representative of

45 Roy, The history of the Jaipur city, 46. 46 Dastur Komwar, vol.23, Year 1735, RSA, Bikaner. 47 Blake, Shahjahanabad the sovereign city, p.xiv. "Ibid. 49 Inden, "Ritual Authority and Cyclic Time in Hindu Kingship", 33. 50 For details see Diana Erk, Banaras: City of Light (New York: Knopf Publications, 1982), 6 and Blake, Shahjahanabad the sovereign city,29.

156 the urban development of the Indian cities, which in turn, were strongly influenced by both Hindu and Islamic architectural texts, traditions, and features.

The centrality of the palace complex, as the sacred centre or centre of the universe has specific political dimensions as well. The location of the palace is such that any visitor would be confronted with its grandeur because it dominated the landscape. The omnipotent presence of the palace signified the dominance of the political authority residing there. Most importantly, the palace complex was the administrative centre of the state, as well as the dwelling place of the king and his family. It was appropriately designed to function both as a public space as well as a residence for the rulers. The administrative headquarters of the state were the focal point of the complex. The rulers made executive decisions, sent military expeditions, celebrated victories, bestowed honours, convicted criminals, tried traitors and rebels, welcomed dignitaries, and conducted diplomatic missions in this palace complex. The hall of public audience was a grand, ceremonial place and it was decorated in style. Bishop Heber, a Catholic missionary, visited Jaipur in 1832 CE and commented on "its open pavilions with marble pillars, richly cared, rather inferior in size but in other respects equal to hall of audience in the castle of Delhi. The interiors contain an oblong vaulted hall, surrounded by a very spacious verandah (corridor).51

The main palace can be reached by traversing seven tunnel gates and several courtyards along a circuitous route. Jai Singh utilized his forefather's hunting ground and gardens as the locale for his residential quarters. Chandra Mahal is seven storeys high and

51 Sarkar, A history of Jaipur, 211.

157 is the tallest structure of the royal complex. Sawai Jai Singh constructed Jai Niwas

Garden and Nichla bagh in the tradition of the Mughal Gardens.52 The complex has

seven gates and first of these is sir ah deorhi (boundary door), located at the entrance of the eastern side of the palace sarhad, (the public bazaar that takes its name. Aligned with

it is naqqqarqwal ka darwaza as its name indicates it was a drum house and musician

gallery from where the arrivals and departures of the maharaja were announced. 53 This door gave access to the large open square of Jaleb Chowk, which held some administrative offices. On the opposite side of the chowk is another gate, known as Udai

Pol (rising sun). Two less impressive gates are the constricting passages designed to impede any invading force. These gates open into a small courtyard in front of Sabha

Nivas (diwan-i-am). Then the path continues westward, leading to the western side of the court into a large courtyard of the building known as Sarvato Bhadra (diwan-i-khas). 54

The nobles and the common people built places of their own that followed the layout of their maharaja's palace. People of wealth and those with fewer resources all had houses planned that mimicked that of the king. If they were able, they had various sections,

Waris, Badshah-nama, vol. 1, 52, in fronto f these buildings was a garden known as Hayat Baksh, which was beautifully laid. The most attractive feature of this garden was its central tank (hauz), measuring sixty by sixty yards. It contained forty-nine silver fountains and one hundred and twelve fountains around the tank. The four avenues, on its four sides, were each paved with red sand stone measured twenty yards. The niches below the water-chutes were adorned with silver and golden vases full of golden flowers (coloured) in daytime and in the night candles of camphor were lit in the niches, which sparkled like twinkling stars. The amount spent on this garden and the hammam (bathroom), attached to the Diwan-I-Khas was six hundred thousand rupees. All the cities founded by the Mughals are well-known for their beautiful gardens. 53 The details of the palace complex are given to show the similarity of construction between these complexes. Waris, Badshah-nama vol. 1, 54, "To the West of Imitiaz Mahal was the Hall of Ordianry Audience (Diwan-I-a 'm), which is the place where the Emperor sat. The throne chamber was entirely made of white marble and looked like a bungalow measuring four by three yards and comprised of four pillars. Behind the bungalow there was an alcove (taqh) that was seven yards in length and two and a half yards in breadth. Outside the hall of Ordinary Audience {Diwan-I-A 'm) was a terrace (schati), measuring one hundred four yards by sixty yards that separated the nobles from the local people. This terrace was surrounded on three sides by a fence (katehera) of red sand stone adorned with ropes. Beyond this hall was a spacious courtyard, that was two hundred and four yards in length and one hundred and sixty yards in breadth around which the apartments were constructed to provide shelter from rain and sun." 54Sachdev and Tillotson, Building Jaipur, 64.

158 including the deorhi (entrance), diwan khana (living rooms), sahan ki kothri (sleeping chambers), zenana (female chambers), pothikhana (library collection), rasora (kitchen), kothris (store- houses for provisions), feelkhana (elephant stable), shuratkhana (camel houses), atish (stable), sawan- bhadon (open pavilions for the hot months).55

Besides the palaces, public halls, courtyards, and garden this complex also housed thirty-six karkhanas (departments) for various manufacturing and patronage purposes. G.

N. Bahura has compiled a list of thirty-four karkhanas working from Madho Singh's reign (1750-67 CE). These departments served several administrative functions such as patronage to scholars, musicians, artisans, singers; funding and donations for charitable organizations and priests, maintenance and upkeep of state gardens, construction, and cartography, organization of state processions, festivals and other occasions, and preparation of costumes, jewellery, weapons, utility items, clothes for the maharaja and his family. 56

The palace and other city structures were constructed by procuring materials that were locally available and cheaply transportable. The architectural features of the Jaipur city were determined by the availability of local materials, namely the greyish sandstone and red lime quarries. The plans, drawings and maps of the city show the surrounding environs of Amber, Sudarshangarh, Amargarh, and Nahargarh. 57 The greyish sandstone

55 Ibid, p. 12. 56 The complex at Shahjahanabad housed more than fifty karkhanas, Imam, The Economic History of Shahjahanabadfrom 1639 to 1739, chapter 4 and Bernier, Travels in Mughal India, 250-70 also describes the functioning of these karkhanas for the Mughal cities. 57 Maps: # 197, 203, 217 (mountain ranges), #219 (mountain range: western side), Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur.

159 of Amber and Amargarh were used to build the interior structures. The stone quarried from Dhanau mines (twenty-four miles away from the city) was very coarse grey stone, but was more durable and was utilized for the other structures like doors, brackets, pillars and balustrades.58 The stone slabs were transported from Bankri (thirty-six miles from the city) and were used for the roofs of the main structures. Marble was used sparingly in the construction of the city because it was an expensive material and also it was difficult to transport it from Makrana which was more than 200 miles away from Jaipur.

Interestingly, marble was not used extensively in Shahjahanabad as well and only Imitiaz

Mahal and diwan-I-khas (hall of private audiences was made of marble).59 The inferior or coarse variety of sandstone was utilized for building the city, and the systematic layering of thick line (locally available) plaster gave durability to the structures.

The architectural methods and utilization of materials in the building of Jaipur were indeed revolutionary for the building industry of the eighteenth century. The materials used in the construction of the city were considered too base to even erect town walls or compound walls. But the mathematical genius and architectural skills of the planners utilized the available materials in such a way that the end product gave the viewers the visual satisfaction from textures and materials.60The pattern was continued and linear drawings were made in white over these surfaces in order to bring out the effect of marble inlay in the stone. Even the lattices were made of mortar and not stone, and then they were given a terracotta wash. All this helped to create the illusion that plaster blinds were made of red sandstone. At places, the relief decoration was also made of mortar, and these were given a terracotta wash. Thus, the effect of a liberal use of expensive building

58 Sahai, Kalavritt, 13-4. 59 Waris, Badshahnama, vol. 1, 65. 60 See Appendix E.

160 materials (marble, red sandstone, and semi- precious stones) was obtained without their actual use.61 Nevertheless, the planners and designers achieved the look of the grand sandstone look of Shahjahanabad (Delhi), Agra and Fatehpur Sikri because they were continuing in the tradition of the Mughal cities.62

I argue that Jaipur was the fulfillment of a ruler's vision where he envisioned order and harmony. The most striking feature of the city of Jaipur is the symmetry and uniformity of design in the construction of its buildings. The collection of maps, drawings, coloured sketches, paintings of the city, letters of instructions, daily reports on the planning and execution of plans, and progress maps depicting the building of walls, streets, markets, and houses is not found for any other contemporary city.63 This city was not planned to function as an architectural anomaly or to become an unique example; on the contrary, it was designed like Shahjahanabad, to serve as a model of planning, execution, and production of social and political hierarchies under state control and mode of power that could be reproduced in other parts of the state.64

The main thoroughfares of the city were very wide and the roads were straight and cut each other at right angles and it became a marked feature of the city as can be seen in the description of Jesuit Father Jose Tieffenthler described these roads in 1736 CE65

" The view of Jaipur city from the hill behind it is ravishing

the city, while it is new, is assuredly the most beautiful

61 Sahai, Kalavriit, 13. 62 Appendix E. 63 See Appendix F: for a complete list. In fact the collection of these documents is so large that it can be called treatises on planning and building of Jaipur city. 64 The city was divided into wards on the basis of caste and professions. 65 It is not clear whether it was his own observation or was based on the reports of Father Srobel who lived in Agra for a long time and must have seen Jaipur as well.

161 among the ancient cities of India, because in the latter

everything is old; the streets are unequal and narrow.

This on the contrary has been the splendour of the

modern with equal and long streets. The

Principal roads, which begins at the Saganer Gate, and

goes on to the south gate is so broad that

six or seven carriages can drive abreast without

difficulty and without having to touch each other

or turn aside."66

The development of a city along its main street was not a unique phenomenon of

Jaipur, although the streets of Jaipur were certainly wider than even Shahjahanabad. As

Ashim Roy points out the streets of Delhi were seventy to eighty feet wide whereas the streets of Jaipur were hundred and eight feet wide.67 The centrality of the king's palace, and the axial streets were notable elements of many Indian cities and a similar pattern can be seen in the cities of Shahjahanabad, Agra, Hyderabad and Lucknow in the pre-colonial

India.68 A sad consequence of these cities was that they were more susceptible to outside attacks and were easy targets for marching armies and at least in the cases of

Shahjahanabad and Jaipur, these events were repeated many times.69

66 Sarkar, A History of Jaipur, 207. 67 Roy, The history of the Jaipur city, 77. 68 Imam, The Economic History of Delhi from 1639 to 1739, (Delhi), Jean B. Tavernier, Travels in India, trans. V. Ball, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925), vol. 2, 114 (Agra), and Llewelleyn Jones, "Lucknow the city of dreams, Lucknow, ed. Graf Violette, Oxford, Delhi, 1997 (Lucknow). 69 Jaipur was invaded and looted by the armies of the Marathas throughout the eighteenth century, and Shahjahanabad was attacked and looted by Nadir Shah in 1739 CE and then by Ahmad S Abdali in 1765 CE.

162 The planners were quite specific about the width, length, and the height of the structures of the city, which is evident from the notes and instructions on maps and plans.

Thus, the planning of the city was a project in which all aspects of the architectural details were given prime importance. The project not only included the planning, and building of the city, but also the settling of the population as well. The cohesive arrangement of the buildings with pre-determined height and width signified how political authority was exercised. The emphasis on preciseness of design was antithetical to Sawai Jai Singh's ideal ofashastric model or even just a sacred centre.

Because most of the shops belonged to the raj (state) and a few others to baniyas (private persons) all construction, repairs, and upkeep were made by the state and the cost was recovered from the business owners or the tenants. The shops were required to have only arched openings to allow access from the main streets. It was compulsory that the roofs of the shops be left open as terraces to serve as vantage points for people to watch the frequent processions or festivals (e.g. teej, gangore, deshara and holi). Even the upper levels of buildings facing the main streets behind the shops had to provide projected balconies and windows that could be used for the same purpose. 70 The city's main roads were built around the existing temples which were allowed to remain, even if they were in the middle of the road.7l

One of the main features that emerged from this planning process was that, except for commercial and religious structures, no buildings were allowed to have access from the main street. The main entrances to a residential mansions and ordinary houses had to

70 Sahai, Kalavriitt, 3-4. 71 Ibid.

163 be located in the side streets and the lanes. Thus, whenever it was required, necessary traffic could be blocked from entering the main streets without disrupting the normal movement of people. In fact, all the havelis (houses) that hug the bazaars have their entrances in side lanes and their back walls were toward the main road. They have only windows and balconies with jalee (plaster blinds) in the jharoka (windows). The height of each floor was pre determined and they are hardly traceable from outside only the windows and blinds (jalee) and balconies gave hints. The houses were characterized by low storeys, close rooms without ample ventilation and with latticed windows, plastered walls with small projections from them called chajja (cornice) or terraces. In addition to a usually narrow stairway, the upper floors of many Jaipur houses, especially the royal apartments and havelis can be reached by long passageways. There are also many subterranean corridors and cellars called teh-khanas (underground apartments), which were built primarily to provide cool repose during the hot summers. In private houses, the rhasas (inner galleries) with katahars (ornamental railings) ran round the central square on the upper storeys. From these, entry was obtained to the different rooms all around, with the staircase usually being at one corner.72

After the completion of the palaces and the city walls, the layout of the city streets and main markets began. According to Jadunath Sarkar, "Sawai Jai Singh devoted his treasure in building pucca (permanent) shops and bazaar with every splendour and summoning traders, bankers, and artisans from Udaipur, Delhi and other places at a cost of thousand rupees to colonized Jaipur. Ishwari Singh (his successor) ordered upper rooms to be built on these shops with stone lattices; whoever pleaded poverty was given

72 Ibid., 13-14.

164 money for their construction out of Government funds."73 This signifies that the rulers of

Jaipur did not compromise on the layout of the city even after its completion in 1737.

When Jai Singh decided to build the city, he invited his prominent clan members and officials to settle down in Jaipur. An order was issued by the ruler in 1728 CE stating that houses would be built for the clan members by the state and that they would have to pay back by sending ten percent of their income to Vidhyadhar (who was in charge of the construction of the city).74 Akbar (1556-1605 CE) had sent similar invitations to his nobles and mansabdars to build their houses and mansions in Fatehpur Sikri, and they were also allotted an area (approximately five to seven miles each) in the city. 75

Shahjahan (1648-56 CE) had ordered his nobles to come and stay in Shahjahanabad and the plots near the river Jumuna were given to them. The palaces and mansions of important officials and nobles were the central institutions in these pre-modern cities. A description of the city of Ahmadabad shows how the nobles and their living arrangements inhabited the city. "Since the beginning the city was not greatly populated, each of the principal nobles selected a place (makari) for his mansion (hisar) and houses of the followers were built alongside. That place was called a quarter (pura), each pur a was like a city in all of them were traders, artisans, craftsmen, labourers, government servants and soldiers, both Hindus and Muslims."76

73 Sarkar, A history of Jaipur, 207. 74 This order was quoted by Roy, The history of the Jaipur city, 38 on the testimony of Hanuman Sharma who had seen the document and referred to it in this book, Nathowaton ka Ithihas, 163. However, mis document is not available now in the archives (did not surface in research trip in 2001). The credibility of this order is that there are other references in which Sawai Jai Singh has asked people to follow Vidhyadhar's instructions. 75 Irfan Habib, "Fatehpur Sikri: the economic and social setting", Michael Brand & Lowry Gleen ed. Fatehpur Sikri (Mumbai: Marg Publications, 1987), 76. Mohammad Khan, Mirat-I-Ahmadi, a Persian history of Gujarat, trans. M.F. Lokhandwala, (Baroda: Gaekwad Oriental series, 1965), 11.

165 Indian cities were divided into quarters from the earliest times on the basis of caste and craft occupations. Jaipur was also divided into wards based on caste

(professions), and Bishop Heber comments on the separate wards for Brahmans, thakurs, ordinary Rajputs, kayasthas, baniyas or traders and cowherd communities.77 These divisions were mostly named after the castes that lived there; for example in Jaipur there were wards of telivas (oil makers), brahmanpuri (Brahmans), chhipavas and maheshvaris

(traders). The houses of the rich and poor were built side by side showing that the division of the city was according to the castes and not class. The significance of the caste hierarchies in the production of sovereignty will be discussed in the fourth chapter.

Most of the cities had the same divisions and mostly the wards came to be known for the craft people practiced there. 78 The literary works composed during this period praise

Sawai Jai Singh for building the city and represent Jaipur in glowing praises. Poet

Girdhari in his book Bhojanasa says: 79

"Sawai Jai Singh laid out many streets and thus enhanced the joy of heart.

He said to Vidhyadhar that a city should be founded here, (verse 182).

Jainivas should come within the city this is my wish. There should be

many crossroads with shop on them. The backyards of the houses should

meet together (verse 183). It (Jaipur) should be populated in one year and

Heber Bishop, Journey through Upper Provinces of India from Calcutta to Bombay (London: John Murray, 1828-1830), 33-9. 78 In Shahjahanabad: there are wards known as Katra Neel, Ballimaran, Imam, The Economic History of Shahjahanabadfrom 1639 to 1739, chapter 5. 79 Verses on Jaipur in Girdhari Bhojanasa (1739 CE) have been published by P. K. Gode as an extract in Dr. C. Kundan Raja Presentation volume, 285-94. The fifty four lines of this work describe the city of Jaipur (verse 182-236). The only known manuscript is preserved in Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, for more details, see Roy, The history of the Jaipur city, 51-2.

166 should be twelve kos (miles) in extent. Merchants from different places

should be called to stay here (to make it their home). There are scrubs,

sand-dunes and gullies all over. They should be levelled up and then the

havelis should be constructed (verses 187-8). I have got immense treasure.

Take what you want and use it. Sawai Jaipur should be made a unique city,

(verse 189).

THE USE OF URBAN SPACE

The infrastructure of the city followed the specific requirements of the state. Land was allotted to the private citizens and they were told where to build their havelis in

Jaipur.80 In fact, the houses were planned and built for them and the state recovered the cost incurred by their houses. The revenue collectors of Amber were ordered to take ten percent of their income every year. 81 It was obligatory for all the jagirdars to take up residence in the city. Naturally, the dependents of these families also moved and settled down in Jaipur. All the government officials and people associated with the state had lived on the site even before the city was built. The state gave specific orders that everyone should co-operate with the chief architects of the city Vidyasagar and Jag

Ram.82 The officials had to immediately comply with their requests for money, building materials, carts for transportation and manpower. Records indicate that the revenue

There are directions for the constructions of these houses on the progress map LS/17 preserved in Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 81 Ibid. 82 Chitthi from the dxwan to Vidyasagar, Year 1727, RSA, Bikaner.

167 collection of 1731 CE was handed over to Vidyasagar and Jagram respectively. 83 Not

only were the revenues of the Amber State utilized but money coming from other states

was used too, for Jaipur. Some amount was spent from the revenue collected in

Mathura.84

The most notable feature in preparing the capital city with its citizens,

professionals, and the richest trading houses was that everyone was asked to live and

establish their businesses according to the state regulated terms and conditions.

Sawai Jai Singh invited all the prominent Brahmans and the mahajans (money lenders) of

his State to settle down in Jaipur. They were encouraged to contact Vidyasagar, who was

responsible to arrange for their settlement process.85 Even the height of the houses was

determined by the state.86 He arranged for the transportation of the velvet and

embroidery workers of Gujarat, so they could relocate. The merchants who were ready to

relocate were given special concessions. 87 Those workers of Agra who were experts in

gold embroidery were also invited to settle down in the city. 88 There are reference that

the merchants dealing in different businesses were encouraged to come to the city and the

state provided all available resources such land and commercial concessions.

Many prominent trading houses of that time came to settle down in Jaipur. Bhikhen

Singh Chaudhari of Delhi accepted Jai Singh's invitation and was put in charge of

Parwana Sawai Jai Singh, year 1731, Kapad-dwara collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 84 Ibid. 85 Chitthis from Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh to Vidhyadhar, Year 1729, RSA, Bikaner. 86 The old maps in Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur, contain such instructions for nearly all the building sites of the city. 87 Parwana Sawai Jai Singh, Year 1728, Kapad-dwara collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum Jaipur. 88 Yaddashti, Year 1728, RSA, Bikaner.

168 insurance business of the Jaipur city. 89 There are many references in the administrative records of the merchants who were granted special concessions. Most of the merchants had to pay fewer taxes and their import duties were also reduced.90 For example, the

Jaina community was very prosperous in the city and they sent out invitations to all

Jainas to come to the puja (prayer ceremony) that was to be held in Jaipur in 1764 CE.

This letter of invitation praised the ruler and his two Jain diwans for sponsoring the event and described Jaipur as follows, "about the city, it lacks seven things. This is to say, in the city you would not find wine sellers, butchers and prostitutes. Also the killing of animals is prohibited. The raja's name is Madho Singh. In this kingdom you would not find sinful activities, which are prohibited by the raja. And there are many Jaina residents here. All-important courtiers are Jainas. Though there are others but they are in minority not in majority".91

In a poetical composition commended Jai Singh's efforts, Girdhari wrote,

"Many elephants, Arab horse, camels from Kutch (Gujarat) come here.

Embroidered cloth and plain cloth and jewelled ornaments are brought

to Jaipur from different parts of the worlds as Jaipur is founded by

Rajadhiraja. The Europeans (firangis) also live here. They have come

after crossing the oceans. They are wise and intelligent. In this way the

merchants of many places come here. Hundis (bills of exchange) of lac

and crores are current here. They are all happy and do their business peacefully."

89 Parwana Sawai Jai Singh, Year 1728, Kapad-dwara collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 90 Ibid. 91 Letter reproduced in Veer Vani in March 1967, for more information see James Laidlaw, Renunciation and Riches: religion, economy and society among the Jainas (London: Claredon Press, 1995), 44 and Roy, The history of Jaipur city, 57.

169 There were many other reasons besides the administrative skills of the ruler account for the prosperity and prominence of Jaipur. The disturbed situation in northern

India and the deteriorating state of the Mughal Empire fuelled Jaipur's prosperity. Many trading houses started taking refuge in the city after Nadir Shah's invasion of 1739 only twelve years after the foundation of Jaipur.92The shifting of the trade routes as a result of plundering by the Marathas benefited Jaipur. The main Mughal route towards the south passed from Agra to Burhanpur through Gwalior and Malwa.93 This was closed after the

Maratha raids seriously affected the communication and trade for several months at the beginning of the 18th century.94Meanwhile, the alternate route between Gujrat and Agra, which passed through Pali, Ajmer and Jaipur, gained in importance. The route from Agra to Pali which passed through Jaipur and further on to the seacoast, became one of the important trade routes in the country and remained so until the advent of the railways.

95 Jaipur was also placed on the main trade to the northwest by the rise of the Sikhs, who plundered everything between Ludhiana and Karnal. The lawlessness on the main highway shifted the trade route southwards towards Jaipur. 96

CONCLUDING REMARKS

92 W. Franklin, Twilight of the Later Mughals (New Delhi: Oriental books, 1971), 86. 93 Habib, An Atlas of the Mughal India, Sheet 9 B. 94 W. Franklin, Twilight of the Later Mughals, 86. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid.

170 The city rose to prominence as soon as it was built because of expert town planning and state managed policies to make the city prosperous and populous from the time of its inception. Jai Singh did not build a city in order to leave behind grand palaces or temples that would glorify a dynasty; his intention was to create a legacy that included well built and administered city. This capital became the foci of power as the administrative headquarters of the Jaipur state. Effective control of subjects' day- to day lives was made possible by elaboration of the administrative machinery through reinterpretations of existing caste norms and practices. This ruler's extraordinary sense of state control encompassed all aspects of his subject's lives irrespective of their caste or class status. This control is elaborated in the following discussion on the administrative practices of the Jaipur state. Next chapter also highlights the efforts of Kachchwaha to establish their hegemony by institutionalizing criminal laws without the help of the

Brahmanical authorities. These centralizing features of Kachchwaha' sovereignty illustrates the ways in which this state had to accommodate the contestations by its social groups, especially the ruling elites.

171 APPENDIX A97

ESTIMATE OF POPULATION OF TOWNS IN MUGHAL INDIA

# CITY YEARS OF INHABITANTS REFERENCES ESTIMATE 1 Agra A: J Xavier's letter tr. Hasten, (A) 1609 500,000 JASB,xxiii(192)p. 121 (B) 660,000 B: Fray Sebastian Manrique, © 1629-30 800,000 Travels, tr. C E Laurd & Hosten, 11, p. 152 1666 C: Thevenot, Travels of Thevenot and Careri, p. 49. 2 Delhi 1659-66 500,000 Francios Bernier, Travels in India, pp. 281-2 Bernier said Delhi was as large as Paris. 3 Lahore 1581 & 1615 400,000- Monserrette, commentary, tr. J S 700,000 Hoyland, p. 159-60 & Coryat, early travels in India, ed. Foster, p. 243; He said that Lahore exceeded Constantinople in size. About that time the city had more than 700,000 people. 4 Ahmadabad 1613 100,000- Ahmadabad is said to have as big 200,000 as London and its suburbs in letters received by the East India company from its servants in the east, vol 2, p 28 6 Surat 1700 200,000 Hamilton, a new account of the east Indies, ed. W foster, vol 1, p. 89 7 Dacca 1630 200,000 F Manrique, vol. 2, p. 140 8 Masulipatnam 1672 200,000 J Fryer, a new account of east India and Persia, ed. W. Crooke, vol. l,p. 90

Habib, "Population", 171.

172 APPENDIX B

PROGRESS MAP OF JAIPUR CITY 1

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173 APPENDIX C

WARDS OF THE CITY OF JAIPUR

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174 APPENDIX D

MAP OF CITY OF SHAHJAHANABAD

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175 APPENDIX E

MAPS OF JAIPUR CITY98

#99 PLACES

11 Garden of Hawa Mahal

12 Palace of Chimanji: where assembly hall stands

13 Sabha Niwas (diwan khana)

14 Plan of the markets (Jaipur city in Progress

31 Plan of Sarvatobhadra: a building in the city palace

33 Plan of a city (Jainagar near Talkatora)

34 Map of city of Jaipur

41 Plan of purana ghat in the eastern part of the city

45 Line drawing of the positions of the havelis (mansions) in the city

49 Plan of the courtyards in zenana (women's quarters) in the city palace

61 Architectural drawings and plans of the canal near the city

103 Jai-Niwas bagh (garden in the city palace

108 Plan of Jaipur and its palaces

109 Plan of the seven storeyed palace

113 Plans of the chowks (squares) and bazaars of Ram Chowk, Shivapol, Pahaarganj,

Chandni Chowk, Topkhana & Rampol

131 Map of the environs of Jaipur

197 Maps of the environs of Jaipur (drawings)

The maps are preserved in Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 99 These numbers have been taken fromGopa l N Bahura and Chandramani Singh ed. Catalogue of Historical documents in Kapad-dwara Jaipur Maps and Plans (Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 1990).

176 200 Map of the Ramganj bazaar

201 Painted plan of Jaipur

204 Partly coloured plan of Ramganj bazaar

205 Map of Jaipur city (Mansagar reservoirs and temples)

207 Coloured sketch of Jaipur

208 Plan of Jaipur (on paper)

209 Coloured map of talai (ponds), gaitor khani (mines), and dungar (hills) around the

city of Jaipur

211 Plan of garden in the city palace

216 Plan of embankment of Mansagar dam

217 Map of mountains in the southern side of the city

218 Plan of the city palace complex

219 Map of the mountains in the western side of the city

220 Pencil sketch of the dam of Jhatwara (work in progress map)

223 Drawing of Hawa Mahal

228 Plan of zenana (women's quarters) (drawing)

230 Map of the proposed canal from Darbhavati

232 Plan of the proposed canal route

234 Map of the villages situated on the route of the canal

235 Map of the city of Jaipur

238 Graph paper: palaces of the city of Jaipur

259 Ground plan of the city palace

270 Baradari in the city palace

177 339 Plan of the city of Jaipur

341 Sketches of the residences in the city

343 Map of the city Jaipur

358 Plan of the Chandni chowk bazaar in the city

363 Sketch plan of Kishanpol bazaar in the city

178 CHAPTER FOUR: LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES, AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POWER

This chapter elaborates the methods utilized by the Kachchwaha rulers to interpret existing legal practices in ways that would legitimize their initiatives to control and manage their subjects. They claimed to act as the protectors of the life and property of their subjects by administrating equitable justice.1 Their performance as just and moral rulers was in reality an expression of the inability of these states to be hegemonic or coercive. They lacked power because they had to contend with local authorities such as the hereditary zamindars or their own clansmen.2 Jaipur state sought legitimacy by vigorously incorporating its dominant social groups and building consent through alliances.3 The existing historiography does not elaborate on the processes and negotiations through which this rule was legitimized in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.4 However, scholars working on the nature of state control in eighteenth century India have recently pointed that the rulers were not dependent on divine or scriptual law or even on their own will and wishes. On the contrary, the rulers interpreted and codified customary practices to legitimize their rule. Sumit Guha has pointed out that, the Peshwa rulers, although belonged to the Brahman caste, the influence of scriptual jurisprudence, whether Islamic or Brahmanical was very limited in the regions

1 The archival data of the Jaipur state suggests that generally there was no discrimination on the basis of caste or status. 2 The clansmen of the Kachchwahas were contending for power and eventually declared their independence from the parent clan. Edward Haynes has given the history of rise of the Alwar state in the neighbourhood of Jaipur in the last decades of the eighteenth century. Edward Haynes, "Lineage, State, and Symbolism of Rule in Late Eighteenth century Eastern Rajasthan", in Richard Barnett, ed. Rethinking Modem India (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002), 33-55 3 This point has been elaborated in chapter one: how Sawai Jai Singh adopted an aggressive policy of supplanting the Mughal mansabdars from his region and distributed lands to his own clansmen and supporting groups. 4 John. F. Richards, The Mughal Empire (Cambridge, 1993, and Andrea Hintze, The Mughal Empire and its decline: an interpretation of the sources of social power (London: Ashgate, 1997).

179 under their control. They preferred to use punitive practices that were customary and local.5 In the social milieu of Rajasthan which was even more informal, the rulers usually enforced customary norms and practices on their subjects.6

This analysis adds to the existing historiography that focuses on questions about the nature and extent of state control eighteenth century states. Did the decentralization of central authority meant that regional powers lost control over the fiscal and judicial functions? Radhika Singha points out that the picture is not quite clear in the Bengal and

Awadh regions.7 However, some historiographical works do mention the success of regional rulers in effectively performing these functions in other states. Sumit Guha and

Gordon Stewart have worked on the nature of the conquest by the Marathas in central

India, which was accomplished through marauding and plunder. The two scholars have presented evidence that, within decades, these Peshwa rulers had rebuilt the same economic and political structure and achieved success by being more vigilant and

o systematic than the previous rulers had been. Nandita Sahai deftly discusses the role of the Rathor rulers of Jodhpur and their creation of a cohesive and complex state society.

She points that the incorporation of Mughal institutions and the development of better

5Guha, "An Indian Penal Regime," 103. 6 The formal caste system was not maintained or rigidly followed in Rajasthan. This view has been presented by Dilbagh Singh, Madhu Sethia and Nirmal Kumar and this analysis presents material to support this viewpoint too. 7 Radhika Singha, A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), Introduction. 8 Gordon Stewart, "The Slow Conquest: Administrative Integration of Malwa into the Maratha Empire, 1720-1760", Modern Asian Studies, No. 11-1, (January, 1977), 36-7 He comments, "Maratha revenue- collecting apparatus was the exact antithesis of marauding raids in the previous two decades. Malwa had come to full circle. By 1745, it was the Marathas who held towns and roads. It was their garrison troops who walked the ramparts and anxiously watched for marauders. Their civilian officials made surveys, collected revenues, tried cases, and regulated Bazaars. Now the Peshwa and his kamavisdars (revenue officials) worried over and depended upon the very communication and trade they had so recently disrupted, and committed themselves to the economics of rebuilding of the province they had plundered."

180 surveillance techniques to control their subjects contributed to the Rathor rulers' success.

The military fiscalism of Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan is critically examined by Irfan

Habib, who argues that the state of Mysore was successful because of the rulers' administrative policies.10 For example, a royal order issued by Tipu Sultan, which dealing with state policies regarding revenue, trade monopolies, and market rates illustrates the centralizing features of the Mysore state.11

The Kachchwaha rulers established control over territories that were previously administered by Mughal mansabdars. These mansabdars were theoretically required to conform to Mughal systems of administration. However, effective enforcement depended on the efficiency of the centralized authority. When imperial control began to weaken in the early decades of the eighteenth century, Sawai Jai Singh and his successors started to enforce their own laws in Jaipur and the surrounding areas. They were ruling a pre-dominantly clan based Rajput society, where laws were largely local in their application despite their roots in normative Dharmashastras. The alliance with the

Mughals in the last decades of the sixteenth century had brought many changes to the

Rajput polity. The Rajputs rulers, who had been exposed to the Indo-Muslim cultural ethos, because of the close association with the Mughals had adopted a lifestyle that was more bureaucratic and autocratic than it had been previously.

Sahai, "Crafts and Statecraft in Eighteenth century Jodhpur",691. 10 Two books have been edited by Irfan Habib: 1) Confrontation colonialism: Resistance and modernization under Haider Ali & Tipu Sultan, (New Delhi:Anthem, 2000), 2) State and Diplomacy under Tipu Sultan, (New Delhi, Tulika, 2001). 111. G. Khan, "State Intervention in Economy", in Irfan Habib ed. State and Diplomacy (Tulika, 2001), 66- 118.

181 The Rajputs imbibed the Mughal emperors' methods of centralized control of over their subjects. Mughal officials combined threats and rewards as inducements to local warrior-aristocrats or village lords to assist in the collection of imperial revenues.

The Kachchwahas of Amber were in the forefront of this political assimilation of the

Mughals' ethos. They had a thorough understanding of the Mughal Empire's political and administrative institutions. John F. Richards explains that in order to survive, the

Kachchwaha shaped regional systems of power. From the early decades of the eighteenth century, the Kachchwahas emerged as the influential rulers in eastern

Rajasthan by reconfiguring the jagirdari system of the Mughals.14

The administrative records of Jaipur indicate that the state {raj) intervened and controlled all levels of society and the economy. Individuals of every caste and status had to abide by the rulers' laws. When a violation of a law occurred, the matter was taken up by civil and criminal officials, such as the faujdars, kotwals, and diwans and by their subordinates, the amils and amins. State policies regarding crimes, infractions of social norms, rebellions, theft, and also regarding non payment of taxes, family matters, marriages, sexual relations, religious crimes, and the slaughter of animals can be ascertained through an inventory of all income and expenditures, of the state, known as arhsatta documents.

A section calledfarohi or miscellaneous income falls under the "income head" section of the arhsattas. State officials collected fines, fees, and dues from the population

12 John F. Richards, The Mughal Empire, 282-284 Subramanyam and Alam, The Mughal State, 53. 13 John F. Richards, The Mughal Empire, 284. 14 As has been elaborated in chapter one.

182 and submitted details about their collections under this section. The data are largely statistical and can be corroborated from other sources, such as letters exchanged between state officials and rulers, daily records maintained at the courts, and official orders or parwanas issued by the rulers.15 These documents reveal the incidence of criminal activities and of actions taken to control or punish various communities living in the state at that time.

The following information is based on 3,000 cases reported in the arhsattas about different crimes committed by individuals who belonged to different castes. Collection of fines varied from one individual to another, and this variation was based on their ability to pay rather than on caste. The statistical information on fine collection not only sheds light on penal practices, but also establishes how the rulers administered justice.

The records indicate the offences committed by members of different communities, from

Brahmans, Rajputs, and Jats, to the lower castes, such the Ahirs, Lohars, Bhujars, Telis, and Gujjars. The list also includes the mercantile communities namely, the Mahajans,

Agarwals, Sunars, and Sarrafs. The state was dealing with everyone directly through its bureaucracy or indirectly by intervening on behalf of the caste and village councils.

As the cases enumerated in the following pages demonstrate the Kachchwaha rulers supported a broad- based politics of incorporation that involved everyone, not just one or another caste or clan exclusively. The processes of state formation were inclined towards consensus rather coercion, and the rulers were able to establish control through

15 All official orders are preserved in the Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur, and are known as the Kapad-dwara Collection.

183 rhetoric that invoked justice and morality to protect the interests, customary laws, social environment, and properties of their subjects. They were not claiming to be the sole representatives of justice; rather they were trying to build strong working relationships with the local authorities and dominant social groups. This chapter explores the nature of state control in the eighteenth century Jaipur, which was exercised through consensus and incorporative politics.1

These documents expose the political strategy of this state, which was able to penetrate deep into the lives of its subjects and establish firm control through the ideology of law, benevolence, and paternalism.17 The discourse on penal practices and its accompanying decisions actually veiled a strategy that involved disciplining various communities though these practices. Discipline was the goal of these eighteenth century states. In fact, most of the states were able to control their subjects closely because of the areas were much smaller and could be managed cohesively.18 Most importantly, the political turmoil of the century had made it imperative for the states to create consensual societies that would enable them remain in power.19 The administration of justice and the attempt to codify certain norms and practices was an endeavour on the part of the ruling class and its bureaucracy to maintain a semblance of order and peace in violent and

20 uncertain times.

16 Sumit Guha and Nandita Sahai have also talked about this sort of politics. For more details see Guha, "An Indian Penal Regime", 101-126 and Sahai, "Crafts and Statecraft in Eighteenth century Jodhpur", 683- 722. 17 E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunter: the origin of the Black Act (London: Allen Lane, 1975), 259-63. 18 This point has been discussed by Subramanyam and M. Alam, The Mughal State, Introduction and more recently by Nandita Sahai, "Crafts and Statecraft in Eighteenth century Jodhpur", 683-722. 19 Gordon, Scarf and Sword: Thugs, Marauders and State Formation in Eighteenth century Malwa, 20-22 and Guha, "An India Penal Regime", 101-26. 20 The Jaipur state was continuously attacked by the Marathas after 1740s.

184 Questions about the establishment and entrenchment of sovereignty in eighteenth century Jaipur are discussed in three sections. The first section provides a preview of the judiciary and administrative structure of the Mughal Empire and traces changes that were introduced by the Kachchwaha rulers and that were both ideologically (moralizing claims) and technical the imposition of fines instead of imprisonment for most criminal offences.21 The next section elaborates the role of the state in upholding the responsibility of maintaining a moral society. Also, how the main concern of the rulers was the preservation of the life and property of their subjects, because the majority of offences were in these two categories. Furthermore, the archival material presented in this section indicates that the subjects were kept under surveillance on the pretext of supporting morality because drinking, recreational gambling, verbal abuse, and other ethical issues were closely monitored by the state authorities. The last section of this chapter elaborates the vulnerability of this state, which became apparent through interaction with its subjects and outlines how everyday forms of resistance were handled. This section delineates how the quest of legitimacy was fulfilled through the ideology of law, because the state lacked

99 the capability to rule through coercion or military threat.

ORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

The administration of justice was efficiently organized in eighteenth century

Jaipur on the pattern of the Mughals, with subtle changes that will be elaborated. Sawai

21 These points will be elaborated in more detail in chapter five. 22 This point has been discussed in more detail in the first chapter.

185 Jai Singh as mentioned before was one of the highest ranking mansabdars of the Mughal

Empire and, therefore, was able to oust other jagirdars from the region and establish his sole control over his patrimony and the neighbouring region. 23 As head of state, the

Kachchwaha rulers dealt with both civil and the criminal cases. The same trend can be seen in the states of Awadh and Mysore, and in the Rajput principalities and the

Marathas. The separation of civil and criminal cases ultimately led to the establishment of separate courts: Sadr Diwani for the civil cases and Sadr Nizamat (faujdari). This happened only in Bengal.24

Several chaukies (police stations) were established by the offices of the faujdar in provinces, of the kotwal in towns, and of the amils and amins in the villages. Whenever people lodged a complaint with these chaukies, the officials investigated the matter. The multifarious functions of the kotwali chabutra (urban police station) were described quite aptly by Robert Orme:

"At this place are perpetually heard the clamours of the populace: some

demand redress for the injury of a blow, or a bad name; others for a fraud in the

commerce of far-things; one wants assistance to take; another has taken a thief;

some offer themselves for bondsmen; others are called upon for witnesses.

Gentoos who have commerce with public women; Moors who had been addicted

23 In the same way the Nawab of Bengal Murshid Quli Khan had combined the offices of Nazim (governor) and diwan into one and had ousted all other Mugaal jagirdars from Bengal. For more details, see M. Athar Ali, "The Passing of Empire: the Mughal case", 392-93. 24 When the East India Company got the right of Diwani in 1765 from the Mughal emperor Shah Alam, the dispensation of justice was left with the nawabs. This kind of schism never happened in the princely states ofRajasthan.

186 to drinking spirituous liquors; all persons who hazard money in gambling—such

are subject to be narrowly watched by the Catwall (Kotwal)."25

All complaints and actions taken at various locations were recorded and sent to the Maharaja. The arhsatta documents have a continuous record of all state activities from 1728 to 1798 CE. State officials or caste councils usually settled civil and criminal cases, and in some cases, the ruler personally intervened.26 Offenders were required to pay fines; those who were unable to pay were detained in jails. Taking their family members into custody was another method of coercing offenders into submission. It is documented, after the surrender of the offenders or payment of fines the family members

97 were released. Government authorities also levied additional fines for late payments or nonpayment of fines. The records contain many references to these charges. For example, Khushla Sunar of Jaipur owed seventy-one rupees for paying a fine late, and

Gauri Khan Patwari (revenue official) of Tappa Khoh was fined thirty-three rupees for the same offence. Bhagwan Agarwal of qasba Saganer had to pay fifty-eight rupees as a late charge on his original fine of only fifteen rupees.29

Fine extraction became a recurring feature of eighteenth century states. This rising trend might have been an indication of the vulnerability of these states in their

Robert Orme, Of government and people oflndostan (Calcutta: Pustak Kendra, 1971), 290. 26 For the murder cases, the Jaipur officials requested the Maharaja's intervention. 11. Krishna Brahmin wrote an arzdasht to Sawai Jai Singh asking for release of his wife, who was in the Maharaja's custody. He said he had paid 45 rupees of his debt and would pay the remaining 25 rupees later, arzdasht # 574/109, undated, RSA, Bikaner. 28 Ibid., arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year, 1758, 1450. 29 Ibid, 1484.

187 maintenance of control over their subjects. The Mughal emperors had discouraged their officials from fine collection for criminal activities.31 Aurangzeb's Farman of 1661 CE refers to the exaction of fines and fees for various functions, i.e., putting seals on official documents, recovering loans or stolen property, arbitrating between parties, performing marriages, or giving death and birth certificates. His order forbade collection of these cesses and fines, and the officers in charge were instructed to pay the state back.

However, the political strife of the early decades of the eighteenth century had made this policy useless in many Mughal provinces. Illegal exactions became a permanent feature in Gujarat. Ali Mohammad Khan, the diwan of Gujarat, complained,

"Many innovations in illegal exactions took place during my governorship. None

of the succeeding Nazims were graced in eradicating them. Now they have

reached to the utmost height. Information about them, God the great willing, will

be given as far as possible. Fines imposed in patrolling Faujdar of Nainpur, and

what happened in the chabutra of Kotwali, was beyond man's power."

By the early eighteenth century, the practice of fiscal punishment for criminal activities was prevalent in the states of Bengal, Awadh, and the Maratha territories. In

Bengal and Awadh, where the nawabs theoretically followed Islamic law, fine collection for criminal activities occurred frequently and was only abolished by the colonial rulers.

The Marathas levied fines on all criminal activities and in cases of non payment the

30 Fisch, Cheap Lives and Dear Limbs, 120: for criticism and collection of fines by the Nawabs of Bengal. 3'Mohammad Khan, Mirat-I-Ahmadi, 261. 32 Ibid, 343. 33 For details: Fisch, Cheap Lives and dear Limbs 56.

188 offenders were either detained or imprisoned until full payment was made. Eighteenth century regional states like Bengal, Awadh, Jaipur, and Hyderabad inherited Mughal institutions; states such as the Marathas, Rohellas, and Jats adopted them. These states did not transport these systems in their entirety, but instead made substantive changes according to their local customs, traditions, and specific needs. Most states were heavily involved in military conflict with each other, with their survival at stake; hence they needed more money to sustain their armies. The fiscalization of criminal punishment became an avenue of cash flow for state economies and also facilitated the justice system

if in those changing times.

Shifts in political authority from centralized to regional governments led to more coordination and efficiency. The changes resulted, for instance, in the imposition of fines for criminal offences and also in the quick dispensation of justice. The original procedure of sending offenders to court and establishing defendants' and victims' claims was still in place, but the offenders had to pay the costs of the administration of justice. The extent of state control over the activities of individuals in every aspect of life can be discovered from the arhsatta documents.36 The state's primary role was to establish peace and maintain law and order in society. Authorities properly investigated any violations of established laws and regulations, and meted out due punishments. Maintaining order in the kingdom meant that taxes could be collected from the peasants; the traders could

N. K. Wagle, "The government, the jati and the individual: Rights, discipline and control in the Pune Kotwal Papers, 1766-94", Contributions to Indian sociology, N S. 34, 3, (2000), 321-360 and Gordon, "The Slow Conquest", 28-9. 35 This chapter presents credible data to explicate this point. 36 Fine collections in various crimes explicate this point.

189 bring commodities in and out of the state and the merchants could carry on commercial activities. The result was that more revenues could be accumulated for the state.

The Jaipur state had inherited Mughal institutions for its administrative purposes, but it was ruled by non Muslim rulers who were great patrons of shastric learning. Their knowledge and interest in the dharma-shastras helped them to institutionalize Mughal administrative policies with local customs and traditions. The Mughal rulers were also attentive to local customs and they left adjudication of their non Muslim subjects to the local or religious authorities. The Mughals legitimized their rule sovereignty by emphatically repeating that they were protectors of the social and religious matters of

-in their non-Muslim subjects that they let local or religious authorities handle them.

Ideologically, sharia was the guiding force behind the Mughal institutions. In practice, it was impossible to enforce a criminal code according to Islamic law on their non Muslim subjects, so they elaborated their criminal justice system by incorporating local customs and traditions. 38 According to sharia, the Muslim rulers had the right to interfere in the administration of justice in cases of public interest where sharia had not made provisions.

This intervention was known as siyasa, or extraordinary justice.

Mughals had integrated many shastric maxims with their political ideologies when they came to India, which helped them to legitimize their rule. The Muslim kings did not present themselves as lawmakers for their non Muslim subjects, but as their

37 Fisch, Cheap lives and dear Limbs, 5. 38 Satya Prakash Sangar, Crime and Punishment in Mughal India (New Delhi: Manohar publications, 1998), chap. 1. 39 Fisch, Cheap lives and dear Limbs, 2.

190 protectors, who guaranteed the continuity of traditional social and economic institutions.

Moreover, the Mughals adopted a general policy of tolerance vis-a-vis the largely non

Muslim population. These rulers elaborated an entirely new system of cultural and ethnic integration, and thereby introduced a new quality of imperial rule in India. They claimed to be responsible for the welfare of all their subjects, and undertook to defend the realm and to maintain peace, justice, and prosperity, regardless of the population's origin or religion. Emperor Akbar (1556-1605 CE), in a rare official document known as dastur- amal (regarding the duties of officials), wrote: "The best service to god in this world is the growth of relations and accomplishments of works of people's welfare which are performed without regard to personal friendship, enmity, or relationship."40

Jaipur's rulers drew parallels from both the Mughal and shastric models. The idea of a universal monarch, or chakravartin, was always prevalent in the Dharma shastras, and the qualities of this king were elaborated so the role could be fulfilled by any capable person.41 It was also a king's duty to apply certain rules and to balance the political and economic structures of his state, as mentioned in the shastras,,42 Jaipur's rulers followed the shastric political ideology by choosing to uphold social order in certain jurisdictions. Thus, they could interfere in religious, social and cultural affairs of their subjects and control them effectively. To establish control over a more traditional

Rajput society, Jaipur rulers fully utilized the moralizing aspect of sovereignty. Sawai Jai

40 Mansura Haider, Insha-i-Abul Fazl: Farman and Letters of Emperor Akbar. 1556-1605 (New Delhi: Manohar publications, 1998), chap. 3. 41 Hintze, The Mughal Empire and its decline (Ashgate, 1997), see the Introduction 42 According to Manusmriti, "In politics, the two (dharma/ artha) are balanced, and if the loss of artha would be greater than the gain of dharma, artha is to be pursued, and if necessary, a penance performed for the breach of dharma.'''' K. V. Aiyangar., Indian Cameralism, p. 47 cited in Derrett, Duncan, Religion, Law, and the State in India (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1968, Reprint, 1999), 201.

191 Singh, in particular, promulgated laws to check the activities of priests and social organizations to step lavish expenditures on marriages, and to abolish certain practices.

His changes continued to be the cornerstone for the administrative policies of later rulers as well. 43

The following section discusses how the Kachchwaha rulers used moralizing rhetoric that clothed the real politics involved in the protection of lives and the properties of their subjects. This was primarily done to ensure stability and continuance of the consensus among social groups by maintaining control over violence, theft, and moral vices.

VIOLENT CRIMES, THEFT, AND MORAL VICES

Safeguarding life is the most crucial aspect of any administrative set-up constitutes the basis of any justice system. The rulers' capabilities depend on the placement of officials and deployment of armies to keep and maintain peace and security. Criminalizing elements are targeted, and punishments are inflicted to deter or eliminate crimes. Indian states established elaborate systems of justice to protect their subjects' lives. States punished offenders by imposing penalties such as fines, confiscation of property, payment of compensation, or imprisonment. Homicide was not a capital offence and was usually taken as crime against another person. The Kachchwaha rulers interfered in murder cases to arrange penalties and to give compensation to the victims' families, sometimes in the form of

There was no change in official policies of the later rulers in the Jaipur state.

192 money donated to temples." They followed Mughal administrative practices, as did other the states, such as Bengal, Hyderabad, Awadh and the Marathas. Islamic law restricted capital punishment to wilful murder, but the law was so complicated that it was virtually impossible to give any offender a death sentence.45 According to Jorg Fisch, when the

British took over the administration of Bengal and Awadh, the widespread belief existed that a family's satisfaction was the most crucial form of justice in homicide cases. A magistrate of Bakargang noted that, "It is agreeable to the Law, and a Maxim likewise among the

Hindoos that, in cases of Murder, if the perpetrator can find means to satisfy the next Heir of the murdered and obtain from him what is called a Razeenamah, no prosecution can, or ought to be carried on against him."46 This aspect of the Indian judicial system drew the most criticism from the colonial rulers because there were at least two hundred capital statutes in England. These statutes indicated that the protection of property was more important than the protection of life.47

Homicide cases in eighteenth century Jaipur society were settled by either payment of fines or agreements involving compensation for the victim's family. This also seems to have been a common feature of justice in other states. James Forbes, a British administrator

(1812) commented about the practice in Gujarat: "Capital punishments are seldom inflicted under these administrations; fines are more frequent and more acceptable to all parties;

4 Derrett, Religion, Law, and the State in India, 215. Fisch, Cheap lives and dear Limbs, 26-30, "Capital punishment was possible only if an instrument was used which was normally served for shedding blood. Thus, killing a man with the wooden part of an axe was no capital offence, while killing him with the iron part was. Sometimes the restriction went a step further-the crime was capital only if death was inflicted with a sharp edge of the iron, not with its other sides." 46 Singha, Despotism of Law, 56. 47 Fisch, Cheap lives and dear Limbs , 24, He quotes Radzinowicz's list of capital punishments which included murder, homicide, counterfeiting, false impersonating another with intention to defraud, simple larceny, pick pocketing of a value of 12 pence, and all kinds of arson (on 611-659).

193 pardons can generally be purchased for the most atrocious crimes between man and man, where the prince and his rulers are not affected."48 Payment of money or confiscation of properties as compensation was also a common feature in Punjab, as was the case in the regions of Banaras, Awadh, and Bengal.49 The system of fine collection differed significantly from that of the Mughals, who dealt with murder cases either by capital punishment or imprisonment. If the murder was committed by Mughal mansabdars then the usual procedure was dismissal and the diminution in their ranks or they were sent into self- imposed exile.5

In the following examples of homicide cases from Jaipur, most perpetrators were fined, and one was imprisoned. These cases were all reported by the faujdar's office, complete with the names of the defendants and the accused. In addition, the reports contained details about their castes and the locations of their offences. The Maharaja of

Jaipur, as head of a state, was notified; he sometimes intervened personally to reach an agreement (razinama) with the victim's family. For example, Balchand, a banker from pargana Chatsu, was poisoned by two other bankers, Mukunda and Ajmeri, over a dispute involving the ownership of a mansion (haveli). Bhikari Das Diwan requested that the

Maharaja to negotiate for a razinama from Balchand's heirs in order to solve the case.5 In another instance, the Sitaram kotwal had fined Dewa Gujar forty-six rupees on a charge of poisoning resulted in man's death.52 Through investigation, it was found that there was

48 James Forbes, Oriental Memoirs (London : White, Cochrane & Co, 1812) vol. 2,25. 49 H. L. O. Garrett and G. L. Chopra, Events at the court ofRanjit Singh (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 2002), 10-14. 50 For more details see Sangar, Crime and Punishment in Mughal India, chap. 6. 51 Arzdasht from Diwan Bhikari Das to Jai Singh, (# 32/1345), 18* Jan. 1709, RSA, Bikaner. 52 Ibid., arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1762, 827.

194 family feud going on, but the details are not provided in the documents. In the previous century, murder by poison resulted merely in severe verbal warning and imprisonment.

Mughals ordered financial compensation to the heirs of the deceased if the victim was murdered by any kind of poison.54

As mentioned above, the Jaipur records mention the offenders' castes. Fewer reports contain accusations against Brahmins, as compared with people from the other castes, possibly because of the privileges and position they enjoyed. For example, Brahmans could not be charged for murder in the states of Bengal and Awadh.55 It can be inferred from

British complaints that people were hesitant to report cases against Brahmins out of fear of religious problems.56 However, some murder cases were reported in Jaipur and the records do indicate that the Brahmins were involved. 57For example, faujdar Dalel Singh had collected a fine of 250 rupees from Nand Lai Brahmin ofTappa Khoh (pargana Jaipur) for committing a murder.58 Another Brahmin, Dharma Tulcha of pargana Chatsu, was fined fifty rupees for murdering and then cremating an unnamed victim without informing the government authorities.59 Apart from the Brahmans, there were homicide cases against other high castes as well. For example, one Kesri Singh Rajput was called to Jaipur from qasba

Saganer by the faujdar to answer some murder charges. He was ordered to pay the state thirt- three rupees to the cover costs of the inquiry, and was told to get a razi-namah

53 Mohammad Khan, Mirat-i-Ahmadi,26\ and 281. Fatawat-I- Alamgiri, cited in.Sangar, Crime and Punishment in Mughal India, chap. 6. 55 Singha, Despotism ofLaw,53. The British eliminated this practice in Bengal and later on in Awadh in 1797, and Fisch, Cheap lives and dear Limbs, 49-50. 56 Singha, Despotism of Law, 53. 57 N. K. Wagle, "The government, the jati, and the individuals", and Guha, "An Indian Penal Regime", also argues the same thing about the Maratha states. 58 Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1745, RSA, Bikaner. 58 Ibid, Year, 1734, p. 2085. 59 Ibid., chitti of Bhagi Ram to Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh, 12 Nov. 1712.

195 (reconciliation letter) from the deceased's family. Mansa Singh (Rajput) and his associates in Jaipur had murdered Sona Brahmin and were ordered to pay 201 rupees. It seems that a fight had erupted about the issue of performance of some rituals that Sona Brahman was reluctant to complete. In this case, the state had negotiated for reconciliation with the deceased's family.61

Faujdars and the Qazis usually investigated the homicide cases and reported their deliberations to the rulers. For example, Shyam Singh (faujdar) reported about Bhim

Singh's Gujar murder ofqasba Saganer to the Maharaja Ishwari Singh; the report gave full details of the investigations. The records indicate that the qazi was trying to reach a settlement with the Gujar (caste) community in obtaining a razinama. This homicide case seems to have been related to some property dispute between Bhim Singh and the

Gujar community. The issue was later on resolved through the invention of the

Maharaja.

The records do not explicate the details of the murder cases. It seems that usually the official investigation involved family members who were brought in as critical witnesses. For instance, Jangla Gujar was convicted of murdering his daughter-in-law, after her body was found in a well near his house in qasba Jaipur. He was imprisoned after paying a fine of sixty-three rupees.64 Dewi Singh had killed Kohri in a public place.

Both men were from pargana Jaipur and were Rajputs by caste. Officials found Dewi

60 Ibid., arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1740, p. 381. 61 Ibid. 62 Chitti from diwan Bhikari Das to Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh, undated, RSA, Bikaner. 63 Ibid., chitti Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh to diwan Bhikari Das, Year 1731. 64 Ibid., arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, 1745, p. 466.

196 Singh guilty of murder, and he was ordered to pay a fine of fifty-two rupees. Both these homicides were related to property disputes: the matter was later investigated by the

Faujdar on orders from the Maharaja66 According to the cases reported in Awadh these types of murders were resolved through retaliation (kisas) under the Mughal administration.67 The victims' families could demand either capital punishment or mutilation of any of the perpetrator's body parts. However, official records from Jaipur contain no references to mutilation and very few to capital punishment. This is another example of how the scriptural law was not followed in this state. Protection of private property and the public safety were the most important elements of the states' administrative structure. The following examples of highway robbery and procedures used to prevent and punish this type of crime lend support to this argument. The cases presented illustrate that the Jaipur rulers were capable of enforcing authority and instilling discipline among their subjects by dealing with recalcitrant elements effectively.

There is no doubt that there were criminal activities in Jaipur state, and might have been an indication of the rise of marauding groups that plundered the properties and the countryside. These groups were either trying to establish control or to gain quick access to cash and resources as has been suggested by Stewart Gordon about the Malwa region.68 According to John F Richards who has studied the rise of banditry in the

Mughal province of Golconda, political disorder and the breakdown of state power

65 Ibid, Year 1763, p.725. 66 Ibid., chitti from the diwan to the Maharaja, undated, RSA, Bikaner. 67 For more details see Singha, A Despotism of Law, 15-17. 68 Gordon, Scarf and Swords, Thugs, Marauders and State Formation,. 20-1.

197 pushed many impoverished groups and demobilized soldiers to form bandit groups.

However, this was not the case in Jaipur state, where rulers like Sawai Jai Singh had taken firm steps to curb the activities of bandits and other violent groups.

The Jaipur state considered thefts of any kind to be severe offences, and officials were instructed to deal sternly with culprits. One standard action was to exact fines from the culprits. However, the faujdar and revenue officials such as the amils and amins were authorized by Sawai Jai Singh to pronounce death sentences in serious theft cases. If proof was found that a theft was committed on highways, roads, or in a market, the thief would be deprived of one hand as punishment. To prove charges, either the thief was forced to produce stolen the items or witnesses were called to testify against him. If the theft was less serious in nature, a hot iron rod branded the word "thief on his hands.

Sawai Jai Singh's order makes it clear that the Jaipur rulers followed the Mughal

71 policies in dealing with thefts and highway robberies. Islamic law prescribed the loss of one limb for theft, two limbs for highway robbery, and, if weapons were used with intent to murder, the death sentence was imposed as punishment.72 Akbar's Farman delineated a kotwal's duties as follows: "Investigation and pursuit of thieves, cut purses, and wagerers, etc. No trace of them of should be left. Whatever articles are lost or plundered in that locality should be found out along with thieves, or else, he (kotwal)

This aspect has been discussed in detail in chapter one. 70 Letter of diwan Kirpa Ram to Vidhyadhar, Yearl737, cited in Bhatnagar, Sawai Jai Singh and His Times 306. 71 The Mughal policy is explained in the following paragraphs. 72 Fisch, Cheap Lives and dear Limbs, 14-15 and Sangar, Crime and Punishment in Mughal India, chap. 4.

198 should come out of that responsibility and give a reply." Jahangir followed his father's policy of dealing with theft and highway robbery.74 In other words, those in charge of the area's law and order were held responsible when cases of robbery and theft were reported. Jahangir ordered uninhabited areas to be rehabilitated and properly supervised to be kept safe from thieves and robbers. Aurangzeb made some changes in punishments prescribed for thieves. Its instruction was, "If a man stole an article not worth ten dirham, and for which he incurred no hadd or legal punishment, he, in the first instance, was to be chastised. In case of repetition of the crime, he was, after tazir, to be kept in prison till he repented. If he committed theft again, he was to be sentenced to life imprisonment or executed. For a third offence, the thief, after tazir, was to be kept in prison till he repented. Commitment of any other theft resulted in life imprisonment or punishment by death."75

Highway robberies and looting were taken as very serious crimes and the Indian states used harsh measures to deal with these situations. As has been noted above, these crimes could be punishable by death. The need to prevent of looting and theft, especially by miscreant groups, was an ongoing problem for the Mughal rulers. If an emperor learned that robberers were ravaging a part of the empire then large armies were sent to subdue them, and they were treated as rebels in most cases.76 Sawai Jai Singh, in his capacity as a Mughal mansabdar, had led many expeditions against such rebels.

Churaman Jat, the most notorious zamindar in the area around Delhi and Jaipur,

73 See Mohammad Khan, Mirat-i-Ahmadi, 145: where Akbar'sfarman has been reproduced 74 Ibid, p. 160. 75 Sangar, Crime and Punishment in Mughal lndia,ll-l%. 76 Ibid., 85-90: Sangar has given several examples of such expeditions during the seventeenth century.

199 plundered the Mughal trade routes in this region. He and his group was captured by Jai

Singh, and, on one such expedition, the Maharaja had to risk his life.77

Once the Kachchwaha rulers established their virtual control over the Jaipur territories, they made more efforts to maintain law and order in the region. They took written bonds from their clansmen, who resided in neighbouring areas to provide security on the highways. In addition, the authorities removed the troublemakers by force and resettled them in other areas after taking surety from some credible person for their

78 conduct. The positions of the faujdars were given to those who were ready to establish check posts and took the responsibility for security in their respective parganas.

There was also a trend to the criminalization of certain communities; for example, the Meenas were categorized as a hereditary criminal tribe, and their members were continuously grouped together with the Bhils and Meos as violent social groups.

According to Shail Mayaram, the Jaipur rulers suppressed competing regional powers on their periphery such as the Jats and Meos.81 The Kachchwaha rulers subjugated the

Meena chiefs during the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries and had gradually settled theme as zamindars. Their more troublesome elements were given responsibility as

There are many farmans related to the actions taken by Sawai Jai Singh against Churaman Jat: Kharita # 48 From the Mughal court to Sawai Jai Singh, undated, where he has sent Shyam Singh Khangarot to devastate the Jats; Kharita # 54 From the Mughal court to Sawai Jai Singh, undated, "It is good that Maharaja has vanquished the rebels and culprits; rains and cyclones have also been helpful in his efforts." 78 Mauji Ram Mishra was removed from Utagirgarh and settled in Dhodharpur on the surety of Raja Gopal Singh and Padam Chand Jadam, Arzis, # 903 and 904, December 14 and 15, 1745, Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 79 Ibid., Anup Singh a thanadar of Tappa Khoh near the city of Jaipur had informed Sawai Jai Singh that he was taking charge of the area's security Letter, #905, From Anup Singh to Sawai Jai Singh, July 22, 1728. 80 Nandini Sinha, "Restructuring Identity and Situating themselves in history", Indian Historical Review, Vol 22, No. 1, (January, 2000), 31. 81 Shail Mayaram, Against State, against History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 102-3.

200 watchmen (chaukidari) in the rural areas. Furthermore, as Sawai Jai Singh while

tightening control over his patrimony, he established peaceful cooperation with the

Meena chiefs by taking written bonds from them. They agreed to take responsibility for

peace and security in the parganas of Toda Bhim, Tonk and Malpura.83 A fortress with a

thana was later on constructed nearby to control their activities. Yet this tribe

presumably continued its activities and was referred to as the "boldest of the criminal

classes" by the colonial administrators.

Whenever a robbery was reported, the faujdar was required to apprehend the

guilty party and recover the stolen property. These officers were obliged to discover the

culprits and deal with them sternly to prevent recurrence of the crime. For instance,

Bhoop Singh Rajawat signed a bond promising to investigate all thefts in return for

assignment to the posts of faujdar and kotwal in the pargana Jaipur. These officers

were also responsible for the prevention of theft and other crimes in their areas. The

faujdar's duties in Jaipur were very similar to this description of duties in Bengal by

Gholam Husain: "In general Fodjdary, which in these days means preservation of the

country from highwaymen and house-breakers, and power of pronouncing final judgement upon crimes of house-breaking, thieving, murder and fornication."86

Evidence available from the arhsatta documents shows that the faujdar or his officials

82 Kavi Shymaldas, Vir Vinod, vol. 1, 1262. 83 Arzi # 987, From Purohit Dinanath to Sawai Jai Singh, March 8 1741, Kapad-dwara collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 84 Sarkar, A history of Jaipur, 11. 85 Bond, # 1302 signed by Bhoop Singh Rajawat to Sawai Jai Singh, Dated August, 21st 1743, Kapad- dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur: Bhoop Singh was the faujdar of pargana Jaipur from 1743-45. 86 Ghulam Husain Tabatabai, Seirul Mutaquerin, printed, James White (Calcutta: The Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1789-90), Vol. 3, 80.

201 looked after most criminal activities. Few crimes were reported to the qazi 's court, and more serious cases were routinely reported directly to the Maharaja.

Sometimes only the fines were collected from the culprits in cases of highway robbery. In one looting case on the highway between pargana Chatsu and Jaipur, the authorities apprehended Prabhat Mina and his companions. Officials seized the goods from the robbers, who had to pay a high fine of 200 rupees.87 Other reports were of a marriage party looted in a village {pargana Lalsot) and a fight between government officials and Naruka Rajputs, who belonged to the Kachchwaha clan. The faujdar was injured, and four of his companions died in the incident. These Rajputs were later caught, fined, and imprisoned on the orders of Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh.

Theft, robbery, and highway looting were considered serious threats to a state's authority that had to be controlled effectively. The Jaipur state sought legitimacy through the rhetoric of law rather than through coercive or purely militaristic measures. Thefts reported in the arhsatta documents can be broadly categorized as petty thefts, stealing grain, thefts in homes, or pick pocketing. The records also enumerate several other types: buying stolen goods, stealing or using animals, cutting wood without permission, and assisting thieves in any way were also categorized as offences. Arhsatta records mention many cases of thefts; fines collected from these offences constitute approximately thirty- five percent of the total income under the farohi section.89

Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1741, p. 357, RSA, Bikaner. Ibid., letter from Shyam Singh to Jai Singh, Year 1703. The Arhsatta records from 1728-1796 CE.

202 Thefts were consistent throughout the period and it seems that the state authority dealt with these infractions in accordance with a moral and ethical discourse. The theft cases and surveillance techniques adopted by the state officials shed light on the nature of state control. The legitimization of power was accomplished not through coercion or military threat, but by being effective rulers who could protect their subject's lives and properties. Hence, support was built through benevolence and vigilance. Most of the cases documented are from the urban areas, where people from the different communities were interacting with each other on a daily basis. These interactions and their complexities were solemnly watched and controlled by the Kachchwaha bureaucracy.

Thefts often occurred in the marketplace in the Jaipur state, and the mahajans usually reported them. The authorities routinely fined and reprimanded the thieves even after the stolen articles were returned. The following examples illustrate that fines were imposed on everyone regardless of caste or class, and varied according to the thief s ability to make payments. The majority of complaints came from the shopkeepers who had reported thefts to authorities and named culprits whenever possible. The following cases were recorded in the chabutra kotwali of Jaipur city in different years. Bhera

Mahajan reported that Vadul Bhujar stole some pounds of wheat from his shop, and

Vadul had to pay fine of six rupees. Similar cases were reported by Tula, Gogha Ajaba, and Chaina Mahajans in their grain shops. Usually the culprits were apprehended by the shopkeepers and handed over to the authorities. Thieves were fined and the stolen grain was confiscated.90 Women were also involved in stealing grain, and their reprimands and

90 Arhsattas ofpargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1739, 266; Year 1743,292, p. 268and Yearl734, 2075-2083, RSA, Bikaner.

203 offences were frequently reported in the documents. Grain theft was the most common kind. The reason for it might have been recurring famines, but the evidence certainly does not any indicates any bread riots like the ones that in England in the eighteenth century.

It seems that the city officials patrolled markets continuously and caught thieves red-handed. For example, faujdar Bhoop Singh caught three people stealing in Ramganj area of Jaipur. He apprehended the items and returned them to the shopkeepers.93 The detailed reporting of crimes indicates that the markets and commercial activities were actively watched and supervised by state authorities. Miscellaneous thefts were also reported to the authorities, such as shoplifting small items (not specified), stealing money

(which was reported by Kisaram Mahajan), or pilfering five pounds of iron from Nura

Lohar. The records show the amount of the fines and the identity of each offender by his/her caste and name.94

The state also fined individuals who were caught or even accused of stealing. 5

The following cases were reported from Kishanganj bazaar (city of Jaipur). Officials had caught two individuals for shop-lifting: Veernam Bhujar (sarkar) was nine rupees and

Jeevan Darji was fined three rupees. In another case, Lajja Manhihar was caught stealing from a shop (not specified), and the items were confiscated from him.96 Similarly, Moti

For example, Shobha Gujari was fined 8 rupees and Chaitra Darjan was fined Rs. 5 for stealing from Jetmal's shop, arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1738 & 1739, RSA, Bikaner. 92 E. P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Working Class", Past and Present, No. 50 (Feb. 1971), 76-136. 93 Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1736,2018, RSA, Bikaner. 94 Ibid., Year 1738,250,Year 1739, 270, Year 1739, 270, Year 1739, 270, Year 1790. No page numbers; Year 1790. No page numbers; Year 1737, 324. , Year 1737, 324. 95 Ibid., Year 173, where Jamin (Muslim) had accused Jafar of stealing grain. 96 Ibid, Year 1736,2019-2020.

204 Mahajan caught Rudra Mina stealing from his shop and handed him over to authorities.

Authorities had caught Hari Mina stealing and fined him five rupees.98 Sobha Chand khatri was caught stealing from Jewni Brahmin's house and was fined eleven rupees.

These cases were all reported from the kotwal's office in Jaipur city; most thieves were caught red handed in their acts. These incidents illustrate that state officials kept a close watch on activities to maintain law and order and ensure smooth transactions in trade and commerce. Individual cases of household theft were also investigated, and the culprits were incarcerated, reprimanded, verbally chastised, and fined. Thieves were often caught by householders and then handed over to the authorities. Even people of high caste did not deal with the culprits directly and depended, instead on the state authorities to solve these cases for them. Some thieves even tried to outsmart the authorities by shaving their heads to conceal their identities. Nathu chamar ofpargana Saganer had stolen some items from Dungar Ahir and then fled away from the area. Dungar was caught by officials of the kotwal and ordered to return the stolen money to Nathu. Dungar had to pay a fine to cover the costs of the faujdar and his men incurred in solving the case.

Theft was a punishable offence, and assisting or sheltering thieves and keeping stolen things were also regarded as crimes. Merely talking to a thief was an offence and

Setaram Ahir was fined eleven rupees for having a conversation with a thief who was being detained by officials in the chabutra kotwali, Jaipur.101 Thefts reported in Jaipur records indicate that the Mughal policies continued in the state. It is useful to study

97Ibid., Year 1738, 237. 98 Ibid,, Year 1739,274. 99 Ibid,, Year 1741, 363. 100 Ibid,, Year 1739,272. 101 Ibid., Year, 1740, 393.

205 recorded criminal activities and analyze the state's initiatives to deal with those situations. People found guilty of any crime were usually fined and later incarcerated if they were unable to pay the fines. If a thief could not be apprehended, then his family members and relatives were questioned and fined. In one instance, Heera Brahmin's brother had fled with stolen goods which were worth 1,161 rupees. Due to his brother's disappearance, the kotwal of the Jaipur city fined Heera 391 rupees and questioned him about his brother's whereabouts.102 Abetting a crime was also a punishable offence.

When his partner (name not mentioned) fled with stolen articles, Rewaram Khatri was detained, questioned about the missing man's whereabouts and later on fined five rupees.103

Buying stolen articles from thieves or shopkeepers was also an offence. Records note the name of individuals who purchased and sold stolen items, such as ornaments, cloth and wood and also include the details of their fines.104 The documents even contain accounts of people who stole or diluted oil from street lamps.105 Stealing wood, fruits, or vegetables from the orchards that belonged to the government {sarkar) or private individuals was another punishable offence. Fines for these transgressions ranged from eleven to 101 rupees, but individuals who stole from government properties had to pay heavier fines.106 For example, Mahakka and Janhilya Gujar were fined thirty-nine rupees for stealing wood from the royal garden in Kishan Bagh in 1743, whereas Govardhana

102 Ibid., Year, 1736,2018. 103 Ibid., Year 1737, 328. 104 Ibid., Year 1740, 393, 396-397, 405, and Year 1744, 445. 105 Ibdi., Year, 1737, p. 325, Govardhan Ahir stole oil from a street lamp, fine was Rs.l. 106 Year 1738, 244; Year 1737, 328; 337; Year 1740, 372; Year 1741, 327, 340 and 42; Year 1743, 278; 291; Year 1744,413, Year 1762, 831, Year 1797, 6.

206 Ahir had to pay thirteen rupees for cutting wood from Aghat Ahir's place. Cutting or stealing expensive wood like timber and teak led to high fines ranging from sixty to eighty-one rupees.108 Cases of cutting trees considered as having therapeutic or religious significance, like thepipal or neem are few, and in those cases, the fines ranged from thirty-three to sixty-six rupees.109

People convicted of stealing animals and using stolen animals were interrogated and punished with fines averaging around fifty-one rupees.110 Workers and labourers from the fields, orchards, and farms were the usual offenders in these types of crimes.

The castes involved in animal offences were usually Jats, Ahirs, khummars, and chamars.111 Merely using animals without their owner's permission led to fine assessment and chastisement by the faujdar. For example, Allah Baksha Mussalman had tried to steal Todo Khummar bulls from the field, but another farmer caught him and took him to the faujdar.112 Bhema Ahir stole a pair of oxen from state property and was fined eleven rupees.113 People who stole buffaloes, goats, and oxen were fined, and every effort was made to return the animals to their rightful owners.114 It is interesting to note

107 Ibid., Year 1741, .327. 108 Ibid., Year 1762, 831 and Year 1797, .6. 109 Ibid., Year 1744,143: In Sanskrit it is spelled aspipali, a species of fig tree noted for its great size and longevity; lacks the prop roots of the banyan; regarded as sacred by Buddhists. Neem or margosa tree, a fast-growing broad-leaved evergreen, Azadirachta indica, native to India and Myanmar. Its extracts have been used for centuries in Asia as pesticides, toothpaste, medicines, and health tonics. 110 For more details see Nirmal Kumar, "Camel Theft in Rajasthan during the seventeenth century", (paper presented in theFifth International Conference on Rajasthan, December 28-30,2005, Jaipur). 111 Most of the cases were reported from pargana Sawai Jaipur. 112 Arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1743, p. 291, RSA, Bikaner. 113 Ibid., 1738, 240. 114 Ibid., Year 1740, 383; Year 1743, 277 & 291 and Year 1763, 723.

207 that the fine amount for animal theft was uniform, which was not the case with other

offences. 5

MORAL VICES

Kachchwaha rulers were careful to protect the religious beliefs of the majority of

their subjects, especially the elite populations of Jainas, Vaishnavites, and others

privileged groups.116 The Mughal emperors also prohibited the slaughter of cows,

buffaloes, bulls, and peacocks on certain days and months. During Aurangzeb's reign

this policy was abandoned, but several instances were related in which non Muslim

subjects protested and took the law into their own hands when they saw animals being

slaughtered. A Persian merchant was brutally killed by villagers in Dantivar (Gujarat)

after he shot a peacock with his gun.117 Manucci, an Italian traveller, was able to save his

life with great difficulty when he tried to kill a peacock near Burhanpur (Deccan).118 The

slaughter of cows during the Muslim festival ofBakr-id led to several skirmishes in the

seventeenth century. The eighteenth and the early nineteenth century successor states

followed a strict policy forbidding the slaughter of cows.119 The evidence from Jaipur

115 Of course, records gave no explanation, but it seems that the crimes related to agricultural activities were done by more well-to-do castes like Jats and khummars, who were able to pay the higher fines. 116 This letter of invitation praised the ruler and his two Jaina diwans (finance ministers) for sponsoring the event. The letter described Jaipur in this way, "about the city, it lacks seven things. This is to say; in the city you would not find wine sellers, butchers and prostitutes. Also, the killing of animals is prohibited. The raja's name is Madho Singh. In this kingdom you would not find sinful activities, which are prohibited by the raja. And there are many Jaina residents here. All-important courtiers are Jainas. There are others, but they are in the minority, not majority. 117 Jean B Tavernier Travels in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925) vol, 1 71-72. 118 Niccolao Manucci, Storia Do Mogor, trans. W. Irvine, (London: J. Murray, 1902-8, Reprint, 1966), vol. 1. 169. 119 Ian Copland, "What do about Cows: Princely versus British approaches to South Asian dilemma", (paper presented in a panel: The History of the Princely States, in 18lh European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies, Lund, Sweden, July 6-9, 2004).

208 also shows that the animals were protected from being injured or killed. Fines related to animal killing were collected throughout the eighteenth century in the state and the fines ranged from 551 rupees for killing a cow to two rupees for injuring a peacock.

Drinking alcohol and selling liquor were criminal offences in Jaipur state, statute that was as a continuance of Mughal policy. Mughal emperors forbade drinking alcohol or any intoxicants and instructed their officials to punish drunkards, wine sellers, and distillers in ways that would serve as warnings to others.121 In spite of these orders, drinking was still quite common during that period. The Mughal state only succeeded in regulating the consumption and selling of alcohol. However, the king and his nobility were exceptions.122 According to European travellers, everyone had access to wine, which was frequently sold and distilled.12 Aurangzeb, who was known for his puritan measures, had ordered severe penalties for selling wine. For the first offence, a wine seller was to be severely whipped. Repetition of the offence meant confinement in prison until the seller repented. Wine merchants and other assistants were also reprimanded and

120 The fine collections mentioned here are from pargana Sawai Jaipur from 1728 to 1766: Gomal Ahir had to pay 1401 rupees for killing a bull. This is the highest fine mentioned in Jaipur documents for killing an animal. Parla Jat was fined 206 rupees for killing a buffalo. Mallu Mina was fined 551 rupees for killing a cow; Chauka Jat was fined 141 rupees for the same crime. In 1762, Dharma Patel paid 300 rupees for killing a cow by beating it ferociously. Sultan Mussalman killed a goat on Bakai'd and was fined 11 rupees. Bala Mussalman killed a goat to eat its meat. In addition, some people were fined for physically hurting animals. Khema Ahir had to pay 1 lrupees for hurting a cow; Lallu Gujar was fined for beating a cow with a stick so hard that it died; he had to pay authorities 31 rupees. Kirpa Ahir was fined 5 rupees for beating a bull with a stick & similarly Dula Mali was fined 1 rupee for hurting a cow. Harji's (Ahir) daughter in law hurt her animals by beating them with a stick in rage. When it was reported to the authorities she was called for questioning and later fined. Khemla Ahir was accused of injuring a pregnant cow and had to pay a penalty of 1 rupee; and Nanak Mali was fined 2 rupees for injuring a peacock. 121 Mohammad Khan, Mirat-i-Ahmadi, 145,161 and 223. 122 Jahangir himself was an alcoholic, as he confessed to one of his Farman: "Wine should neither be distilled nor sold. Even though I have issued this order, I am very much inclined to it. I started drinking wine from the age of 16 years... It has become so predominant over my mind that if I do not drink for an hour, my hands begin to shake. I have no power to sit." Mohammad Khan, Mirat-i-Ahmadi, .145. 123 Many references are quoted by Sangar, Crime and Punishment in Mughal India, 168-172.

209 fined.124 Imperial officials were chastised if they were reported or caught drinking alcohol.125

Sawai Jai Singh also became addicted to locally made liquor towards the end of his career. He instructed his officials not to involve him in any official work when he was in a state of intoxication.126 Jaipur state officials chastise people who were involved in either selling or making wine. Similar and sometimes more severe punishments were given in other states for the same offences. Mysore records mention that Tipu Sultan ordered his officials to cut off the hands of individuals who were involved in activities related to selling, growing, or distilling any intoxicants: wine, liquor, or opium.

Anyone caught selling wine was penalized severely and fine for this offence was extremely high. Authorities had caught Gangaram Mahajan of Jaipur selling wine; his shop was confiscated and he had to pay a fine of 501 rupees. In another case, Khema

Lai Gujarati (not identified) was fined 401 rupees for selling liquor in the market place;

Sada Mohan Agarwal ofpargana Jaipur was caught buying it and had to pay authorities twenty-two rupees.129 A barrel of wine was confiscated from Kheja Jat, who had to pay a fine of fifty-one rupees.130 Sometimes the brewing and selling of any kind of wine led

124 Mohammad Khan, Mirat-i-Ahmadi, 280. 125 In many cases the Mughal official's mansab was reduced on account of drinking. For example, Fatehullah's excessive drinking habit deprived him of his mansab of 250 zat and 80 sawar. Mohammad Ali and Mohammad Ishaq had to pay fines and had their mansabs reduced when their alcoholic habits were reported to the emperor. Adbul Karim was accused of drinking, and his rank of 900zat/900 sawar was reduced to 400zat/200sawar. Thevenot, a French traveler in the seventeenth century, reports an interesting incident from Qandhar: "A Moor who has both drunk wine and committed any scandal is set upon an ass, with his face to the tail, and led about the town, attended by officers of the Cotoual who beat a little drum, and they are followed by the children of the neighbourhood, who whoop and hallow after them." 126 Tod, Annals and Antiquities, vol. 1,84 & 296. 127 Khan, "State Intervention in Economy", order # 55 (a), 78. 128 Arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1734, 344, RSA, Bikaner. 129 Ibid, Year, 1740, 353-354. 130 Ibid, Year, 1743,26.

210 also to imprisonment in Jaipur state. Lalchand Mahajan, a wine seller, was imprisoned in

Jhawda fort after a severe whippings and a penalty.131

Most of the cases reported were usually about individuals who created a disturbance in the city of Jaipur after drinking liquor. Overall, the problem of drinking was considered as a matter related to disturbing peace and order. The following cases will explicate this point further. Godha Thakur and his group were fined seventeen rupees for drinking. Jeva was caught drinking and was fined nine rupees by the faujdar but

Lokha was fined sixteen rupees for the same offence. Differences in fines for the same offence occurred for various reasons. Fines were less for individuals caught drinking alone. The main factor determining, the fine amount, however, was the ability of individuals to pay. Higher caste people usually had to pay higher fines than lower caste people. For example, Mudra Rajput became intoxicated and created a scene on the streets near Chaura Rasta; for that offence, he was fined eleven rupees, whereas Chipa

Teli was fined just four rupees for the same offence. Other recorded cases of drinking and creating a disturbance in the city were reported against Lalsuni Thakur, Narabala Jat,

Gangaram Mahajan, and Chajju gujar.134 Drinking, which was a favourite pastime and leisure activity for nobles, royal princes, and kings, was a carefully monitored activity as far as their subjects were concerned.

1 Parwana # 836, Kapad-dwara Collection, Sawai Man Singh II museum, Jaipur. 2 Arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1739, 344, RSA, Bikaner. 3 Ibid., arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year, 1740, p. 395, and Year 1745. 4 Ibid, Year 1743, 291, 93, 58 and 63.

211 Recreational gambling was prevalent in India and has been reported by many sources. Although the practice started as a royal pastime, it gradually came to be enjoyed by common people. Rulers never tried to abolish the practice, but most of them brought it under state control. Regulations regarding gambling in India were intended to maintain public order. Most importantly, these laws were a way of legitimizing authority through a code of moral behaviour. The Jaipur records hold no references to commercial gambling, which became a major issue in the colonial cities of Calcutta and Bombay.

Jaipur's official policy against gambling is discussed here in the context of the nature and extent of state control. Gambling was considered a crime against the state, and officials, especially the faujdar and kotwals, were authorized to punish gamblers. Although the

Mughals prohibited gambling, there are still a few recorded instances of penalties for common people on gambling charges in the seventeenth century.

In Jaipur state, people found gambling either in groups or inside their homes were also fined. Most reported cases concern groups of gamblers who were fined according to the amount of money they won in the game. For example, Gangaram Mahajan and three of his associates had to pay sixteen rupees and eight annas as a fine; Modi Jat and his four friends each paid authorities four rupees.136 The records refer to individuals being penalized for merely sitting in the company of gamblers; Chajju Gujar, Mukka Chamar and Hemashu Ahir were fined on the same day for this offence near John bazaar. It is interesting to note that women were also penalized for gambling in their homes. In one

135 Ritu Birla, Stages of Capital: Law, Culture and Market governance in Colonial India (Durham: Duke University Press, forthcoming in 2009), chapter 4. 136 Arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1736, 234; Year 1737, 339, RSA, Bikaner. 137 Ibid., Year 1736, p. 268 and Year 1737, 324 and 339.

212 case, Chandu Mahajan's wife was fined thirty-six rupees, which she had pay to the faujdar after her husband was questioned and warned to take care of the situation at home.138 Gambling fines continued to be recorded from 1728 to 1761 CE, but these were less common than reports of theft, fights, and creating disturbances in Jaipur city.

Most fines for gambling were collected from mahajans (traders), who were targeted for various reasons. First, they were an important part of the economy, and their commercial practices brought economic prosperity to the state; secondly, they could afford to pay the fines. Additionally, they led public lives' and their activities were closely observed by other sections of the population. Regulation of their commercial and social activities indicated the extent of the state control over the daily lives of common people.

EVERYDAY ACTS OF DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR

Solutions to problems of law and order have always been high priorities in any civilized society, and have been closely related to state's ability to control illegal activities of its subjects. Political authorities need to initiate and implement policies to combat disturbing elements in their domains. Rulers' administrative acumen facilitates their success and asserts their right to rule over their subjects. Jaipur, Awadh, Bengal,

Mysore, and Hyderabad became dominant states in the eighteenth century on the basis of their rulers' abilities to control and consolidate their kingdoms efficiently after Mughal

138 Ibid., Year 1736,268, Year 1737, 324 and 333. 139 Ibid., Year 1728, Sawai Jaipur, the gambling fines: In 1728, Panchdhana Mahajan was fined 14 rupees; in 1736, 32 people were fined for gambling; most of them belonged to the trading community. In 1737, 12 out of 205 crimes recorded were for gambling; in 1738, only three instances of gambling were reported. In the arhsattas pargana Sawai Jaipur from 1739 to 1764, only three or four cases of gambling fines were reported each year.

213 authority had weakened. The arhsatta documents about Jaipur are taken as examples of how cases of misconduct, unlawful activities, or disturbance of peace were dealt by the state. Evidence of attempts to centralize rule can also be discerned in the following cases. To solve problems of law and order, the state detained, penalized, and imprisoned people from all sections of society. This argument is consistent with the broad perspective of this chapter, which explicates the nature and extent of state control in eighteenth century Jaipur.

There are numerous references to people fighting and creating disturbances in the city or its nearby areas. The state intervened to punish individuals by imposing penalties, incarceration, and fines. No discrimination was made between the higher and lower caste people who tried to break the law or disrupt and challenge the state administrative machinery in any way. High-profile cases included people from the upper castes like

Rajputs, Thakurs, and Patels. For example, Sardar Singh (Rajput) and his group were arrested on charges on looting and harassing the public on highways between the city of

Jaipur said pargana Chatsu.140 They were intercepted by faujdar Harnam Roop Chand and jailed for several days; they were released after paying fines and agreeing to not to create any problems in the future.141 In another case, Khairnath Thakur and Manu Patel were arrested for fighting and creating a disturbance near chabutra kotwali (police headquarters) in Jaipur.142 The state intervened to stop violent fights between groups by making people sort out their differences. Gukhal Ram Thakur and his group from

140 Original letter mentions that the men of Sardar Singh ke admi ne looto aur maaryu pargana Chatsu ke raastepar. 141 Chitthi from Harnam Roop Chand to Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh, Year 1700, RSA, Bikaner. 142 Ibid., arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur Pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1734,2088: it is described as: ilariyu aur tofail kiyu.

214 pargana Dausa signed a razi-namah (reconciliation letter) and gave a guarantee of their good behaviour to Girdhar Das, the faujdar in order to stay in the area. Sukhram

Gujarati was taken into custody by Kishor Das faujdar in Jaipur for lighting aggressively with Ughrah Singh Gumashta (a revenue official), and both men had come to Jaipur from the city of Kotla. Sukhram Singh was found guilty of assault, for which he was sent to jail and later released on payment of security.144

Non violent skirmishes between people were also regarded as offences, and it is evident that Jaipur's rulers evolved a policy of discipline and control for all sections of the population. Harla Mahajan and Bala Agarwal of qasba Saganer had to sign a razinama (reconciliation letter) in front of the faujdar for getting involved in a heated and violent argument.145 Dehra Ahir and Rudra Bhujar of Toda Bhim got into a fight, in which Dehra was injured146 with an axe. Both men were questioned and fined.147

Fighting with edged weapons was a common occurrence in Jaipur and its neighbouring

1 AQ areas. For example, Lalchand Rajput and Bala Brahmin of Tappa Khoh were involved in a sword fight and the faujdar had to intervene to end the conflict.149 Chera and Panch, both Mahajans of Ram Ganj bazaar (Jaipur city), were fined fifty-one rupees for fighting with swords in the marketplace.150 Khushla Sunar attacked Gangaram Purohit151 with a sword during an argument in Jaipur city. Gangaram was slightly injured in the clash, so

143 Ibid., chitthi from Girdhar Das to Maharaja Bishan Singh, Year 1695. 144 Ibid., chitthi from Kishor Das to Maharaja Bishan Singh, Year 1695. 145 Ibid., Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1738, 232. 46 maar lagayu kulhari so. 147 Ibid., arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, 335. 148 As mentioned in the sources. 149 Ibid., arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1741, 359 both were fined 33rupees. 150 Ibid., Year 1741,252. 151 A priest by profession and a Brahmin.

215 he went to the authorities and lodged a complaint. After the investigation, Khushla was found guilty and had to pay a fine.152 Fines were collected from people who exhibited violent behaviour for no reason, regardless of who started the fight or behaved aggressively.153 Jaipur was not the only state to punish individuals responsible for violent behaviour. The Marathas routinely imposed fines on people who engaged in sword fights in the areas under their control.154

The state authorities in Jaipur also regarded snide remarks and verbal accusations as acts of punishable misbehaviour. The fines collected under this category were not very high, and individuals were usually fined between one to two rupees for each offence. Any public behaviour that disrupted others' lawful activities also fell under the jurisdiction of the state. Individuals were fined and incarcerated if they caused a fight by verbally abusing someone. Koda Mina of Tappa khoh spent a night in jail for picking a fight with Soma sunar.155 People in the marketplace were generally targeted for these types of transgressions. There are many references to the collection of fines from individuals involved in verbal harassment, comments, and remarks involving shopkeepers and their customers.156 Marketing skills were taken seriously, and anyone found misusing them or creating disturbances was fined. One Gulla Mahajan of Ram

Ganj bazaar in Jaipur city was fined for interrupting a neighbouring shopkeeper's jingle

152 Ibid., Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1764, 1320. Ibid., Year 1754,For example, Mahaseri Mahajan had fought with Bhema Agarwal without any apparent reason and was penalized by the authorities for that. Chitra (a woman) got into a verbal brawl with other women at the city's well (place not specified in the document) and was fined 1 rupee. In Year 1758: one Dewla Bhujar was also fined 14 rupees for starting a fight with Shreekishan Mali in the marketplace. Nirakha chamar and Harma Mina had apparently quarrelled without any reason and both of them were fined 16 rupees and 50 annas. 154 For details see Gordon, "The Slow Conquest: Administrative Integration in Malwa", 28. 155 Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, 1764, p. 1334, RSA, Bikaner. 156 There was continuous collection of fines for verbal harassment from 1734 to 1761 in the state of Jaipur.

216 as he called to his customers. The faujdar was informed of this act, and Gulla Mahajan had to appear in the kotwali for questioning. He was released after being reprimanded and fined.157

Even if a person hit someone by mistake or hurt him unknowingly, authorities investigated the matter and treated it as an offence. For example, Khushla Sunar slapped

Rupo's face, and Khema Mina hit somebody by mistake in the city of Jaipur. A fine was collected from both men. In other incidents, Kheta Patel had hurt someone with a sword, and Dewa Gujar was accused of poisoning someone. Tulna Bhujar hit Madho chamar on the head with an iron tool,159 and Chetek Patel broke Kallu's julaha axe in a brawl.160

All these cases were reported to the faujdar in areas around the city of Jaipur, and fines were collected from the culprits.

State intervention in the verbal or physical brawls between individuals indicates that it closely monitored the activities of the residents of Jaipur. The intervention also reinforces the argument that eighteenth century states were ruled by increasingly centralized administrative structures, which could not continue due to various political and social changes.161 Disorderly conduct or misbehaviour (sarkar ke admi se lariyu am

157 Arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, 1743, 274, RSA, Bikaner. 158 Ibid., Year 1762, 827. 159 Ibid., Year, 1758, 1487. 159 Ibid., Year 1764, 1319. 160 Ibid., Year 1761, 1426. 161 In the case of Jaipur it was the constant attack by the Marathas from 1740s onwards which totally ruined the economy and moral of this state.

217 shokhi kiyo) toward government authorities was an offence punished with fines or other measures. Such types of criminal activities were reported during nearly every year of the period under study here (from 1728 to 1761 CE). This is the only category of offence that involved mainly rich and high caste people, and the fines collected were quite high, ranging from forty-five to three hundred rupees.162

The arhsatta records document acts against the state authority, such as bringing false witnesses to testify, wrongly accusing someone without proper proof, tampering with official documents, non payment of taxes, unlawful possession of government property, and unauthorized employment. The government dealt with these infractions by issuing stern warnings, seizing properties in some cases, and imposing fines in all other categories of offence. The following tables documents state intervention in enforcement.

Individuals who were apprehended for either abusing or taking advantage of the system were routinely penalized, but mostly through fines. Generally, when the faujdar was informed that an offence had been committed, he sent his subordinates to the make necessary inquiries. Witnesses, usually two males, were required to either establish that an offence has been committed or dismiss the claim. The evidence gathered was oral, and close relatives' testimonies were not accepted. Individuals involved in an offence were required to produce their own witnesses in front of the authorities at the appointed time and date, and failure to do so resulted in penalties.

Sometimes witnesses gave false evidence or told lies to win the culprits' freedom.

False witnesses, if apprehended, were fined by the faujdar and his officials. Khema Mina

218 had produced false witnesses to clear himself of some charges, but he was arrested again and had to pay a fine of seventy- eight rupees before he was released. Lying to the government officials or misleading them about criminal behaviour was perceived as an act against the state's authority. Individuals guilty of such crimes were heavily fined and sometimes put in jail for several months or years. The cases mentioned below illustrate the variety of offences committed this period. One Ghasi Khema of Saganer gave a false statement to get an official document (patta, or sale deed) about his property from the government.164 Pratap Singh and Nahar Singh got into a fight and then gave erroneous statements for which each of them was fined twenty rupees each.165 Khushla Sunar of

Jaipur, who gave a false statement to government authorities about his income and he was fined by the office of the kotwal.166 Giving a wrong testimony in cases being investigated by the government authorities' office was a punishable act. Even when cases were dismissed by the courts, if the officials involved in the case found out about fabricated testimonies the individuals responsible were penalized.168

Tampering with or destroying official documents was a criminal offence. In one instance, Manha Balahi of Tappa Khoh, pargana Sawai Jaipur, did not write an official

179Arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1728, 2018, RSA, Bikaner: Manorath lied about the camels owned by Gegla. Manorath testified that Gegla had 40 camels, but it was established that he had only 10. Manorath was fined for giving the wrong number of camels. 180 Ibid., Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1794: Joshidevi was fined 40 rupees for giving false testimony for Dewla. 164 Ibid, Year 1755: a similar case was brought in the Ram Ganj kotwali of Jaipur, where Nanhu Jat produced a witness to testify that he was not present at a crime scene. Later, the witness confessed that Nanhu had bribed him to testify on his behalf. Vasfaujdar then demanded a fine from Nanhu for bringing a false witness and lying to authorities, and he had to pay 101 rupees. 165 Ibid., Year 1758, 1490. 166 Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1794, (no page #). 167 Ibid,. Year 1736,2018. 168 Ibid., Year 1744, 469.

219 document properly and changed the wording; he had to pay five rupees and 50 annas.169

Hera Patel mutilated an important official grant chapter (sanad) that belonged to Alari

Bhujar by dropping some ink on it. He was required to pay an official fee for the property papers (sanad) and also had to compensate Alari.170 Janna Chamar was fined with tampering and changing some lines on the charge sheet prepared by the faujdar.171

The state authorities took seriously offences that involved unlawful possession of land or government property. The punishments were offences confiscation of properties, imprisonment, and fines. Any person occupying unassigned property or land was ordered to leave the property immediately and to pay a fine.172

CONCLUDING REMARKS

A review of administrative practices of the Kachchwaha rulers explicitly negates the supposition that Indian states failed to centralize their rule or cogently legitimize their power. This view, which was presented by the colonial rulers in the early eighteenth century, focuses primarily on two kinds of rules and practices. The first is the system of fines, which led to venality. Rich and influential people could bribe those who administered justice in order to secure freedom, while the poor and less fortunate could be imprisoned for life if they were unable to pay. Secondly, the British criticized Indian laws that led to inadequate punishment because they were full of loopholes. In addition,

169 Ibid., Year 1755, 254. 170 Ibid., Year 1755,252. 171 Ibid., Year 1744,412. 172 Ibid., Year 1756, Ram Singh Rajput had occupied a piece of land next to his field near the city of Jaipur, although it did not belong to him. He was fined 50 rupees and the land was confiscated by the government officials. In another case, Sukhla Patel had taken possession of government property in the Jaipur city and was fined 151 rupees. In a related case of misuse of government property, Ram Krishna and his friends were fined 1 rupee and 75 annas each for riding government horses.

220 cruelty was evident in practice of mutilation sanctioned by religious law. Both Islamic

and shastric laws prescribed this form of punishment. However, when these criticisms

are reassessed in the light of available evidence, it becomes apparent that mutilations as

punishments for crimes were always discouraged.173 The Jaipur records indicate that

most criminals were punished by fines or imprisonment. This trend can be seen in most

of the Rajput states and in the areas controlled by the Marathas. In Bengal, the records

indicate that, as late as 179ICE, offenders were imprisoned for crimes such as highway

robbery without murder, breaking and entering, and even petty theft.

Most importantly, the Kachchwaha rulers were able to control their subjects more

effectively than their predecessors' by disguising discipline and surveillance in the

ideology of rule and the dispensation of justice. These states were not remarkably

different from their predecessors, but definitely had more cohesive centres of

administration. Unfortunately, they could not develop into elaborate bureaucratic

structures for various political reasons that had nothing to do with the Indian states'

inability to build institutions or their supposed lack of administrative acumen. The next

chapter elaborates this theme by shifting the gaze to the social realm of Jaipur state and

how the Kachchwaha rulers cloaked their interventionist nature through the use of

moralizing rhetoric. The performance of morality and just rule exposes the ways in which

rulers had to negotiate with local communities: eighteenth century states had to manage a

173 Akbar forbade his mansabdars from punishing offenders by skinning, trampling them under the feet of the elephants... Mohammad Khan, Mirat-i-Ahmadi, 141 (original Farman is reproduced). Jahangir ordered that officials should not blind people or cut off their ears and noses for punishment, 166 (original Farman is reproduced). 174 Fisch, Cheap Lives and dear Limbs,\\%-\9 makes the significant point that British rationalization of law was motivated by the needs of a foreign power wanting to replace the extralegal and illegal elements of extraordinary justice.

221 variety of local interests even as they sought to consolidate their rule-they intervened most effectively by providing a discourse of moral authority. CHAPTER FIVE: MORALIZING RHETORIC OR AN INTERVENTIONIST STATE? GENDER RELATIONS, SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND THE IMPOSITION OF CASTE (JATI) NORMS

This chapter discusses the interventionist nature of Jaipur state and challenges suppositions about Indian states' passivity and indifference in dealing with their subject's social matters. The states' interference to resolve these issues was threefold. First, it worked with the caste councils to deal with family disputes, marital problems, and inter- caste marriages. Second, the state intervened on behalf of individuals to override the decisions of the caste councils (panchayats). Lastly, the most critical area of state involvement was in problems experienced by women, for example, domestic violence, rape, sexual harassment, incest, illicit sex, or adultery. In such matters, the caste councils or norms were not even consulted. This analysis inquires about the nature of state control and contends that the Jaipur rulers used moralizing rhetoric in order to act as the upholders of dharma and to solidify and legitimize their rule without the support of

Brahmans.1 The empirical data available about Jaipur state elucidates how these rulers legislated about and interfered in the everyday social and individual issues of their subjects' lives. The state's attempt to regulate social relations changed and reformed local customs regarding marriage, spousal relations, domestic violence, sexual misdemeanours, and caste transgressions.

1 Guha, "An Indian Penal Regime", 104 and N. K. Wagle, "Women in Kotwal's papers", in Anne Feldhaus, ed., Images of Women in the Maharashtrian society, (New York: Suny Press, 1998), 52, have come to a similar conclusion about the eighteenth century Maratha states where the criminal justice system was not influenced by the dharma-shastras.

223 The moral regulations were needed to solidify the rulers' legitimacy but they led to constant struggle between the state and its social groups.2 Caste councils acted as bulwarks of local authority that might be used to contain the state's effort to concentrate its authority. The interactions among the caste councils, different social groups, and the state continuously redefined the contours of power. The contentious relationship of the state with its subjects is indicated by the high incidence of fines (nearly a quarter collection of revenue came from fines imposed for social infractions). Jaipur society was defined by customary practices rather than by Brahmanical interpretations of the

Dharmashastras. As elaborated in chapter one the rulers appropriated the prerogative of legislating caste rules and ordinances for their subjects. The most important new trend was the emergence of the notion that non-compliance with caste norms be considered non- compliance with the political authority, the Maharaja. The Kachchwahas asserted themselves as undisputed sources of both political and social authority. More specifically, the imposition of fines for all types of social infractions radically transformed the functioning of caste councils and eliminated the role of Brahmans completely.

Reinforcement of caste norms through fines also became the joint responsibility of the state and the caste councils.3

Through an ideology that made rulers mere mediators and protectors rather than law-makers, Indian rulers, including the Mughals, could subtly redefine and sometimes

2 Romana Falcon, Force and Search for Consent: The Role of Jefaturas Politics of Coabuila in National State Formation: Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, ed Gilbert M Joseph and Daniel Nugent, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 113: R. Falcon discusses the formative struggles of the government through which a series of regulatory matters were impinged upon the private lives of the people and particularly their domestic life. 3 Kumar, "Crime and Gender in eighteenth century Rajasthan", 40 and Sethia, Rajput Polity, 181.

224 institutionalize caste hierarchies.4 The attempt by the Kachchwaha state to implement a coherent moral order accepted by consensus can be seen as an extension of this strategy.

The issue of gender relations is a prime example in eighteenth century Jaipur state. The state authorities and not male members of society championed and protected the rights of women. Through the logic of their position as the upholders of Dharma, the Kachchwaha rulers could interfere with intimate and intricate matters related to family, gender, caste, and society. There was also no distinction between the higher and lower castes, and anyone responsible for the violation of caste injunctions was punished by the state. It is true that the imposition of the caste norms meant the caste hierarchies were maintained indirectly. Crimes and offences related to women were dealt with sternly because of the states' claims to morality and legitimacy, not because of the predominance of

Brahmanical authorities, as Uma Chakravarty claims regarding the Maratha state under the Peshwas.5

The previous chapter outlined the judicial practices of the Jaipur, demonstrated how the state worked with the caste councils to maintain and reinforce the caste hierarchies. However, in cases of violence, everyone was held equally responsible.6 This chapter further elaborates the theme by illustrating how state interference with familial issues produced gendered patriarchy. Jaipur state could maintain strict control over male subjects by interfering in familial matters, especially those related to women. Jaipur state

4 As was the case in the areas ruled and governed by the Marathas. 5 Uma Chakravarty, "Wifehood, Widowhood, and adultery: female sexuality, surveillance and the state in 18th century Maharashtra", Contributions to Indian Sociology, No. 29 (1995), 7. 6 The archival records of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota and Pune (Maratha) are also quite impressive and as comparisons with practices in Jaipur, examples from these states will be used to explicate the nature of the eighteenth century states and how they were different from earlier regimes.

225 took its role as upholder of dharma quite seriously by monitoring and controlling the sexuality of women.7

The evidence explicitly establishes that social issues such as marital matters and inter caste marriages were volatile and complicated by the contradictions within the eighteenth century society.8 The states worked closely with the village and caste councils to regulate behaviour and impose fines, or to otherwise discipline people who did not act according to the laws and rules within their jurisdictions.9 Individuals faced fines, ostracism, and imprisonment irrespective of their caste status in matters that involved illicit relationships, rape, sexual misdemeanours, violent or abusive behaviour; inter caste marriages, or violation of caste norms or state laws. Most impressive of all was the fact that, in cases involving women either as victims or perpetrators, both men and women were held responsible and were punished equally.

Some historians have also pointed out that development of quantification and enumeration processes did not occur in the Indian states.10 For example, the intricate methods of the Mughal Empire have also been dismissed as only pertaining to revenue

7 In contrast, Chakravarty argues that Peshwas maintained a strict code of behaviour and norms as well controlled sexuality of women with the help of Brahmans, for more details see her article: "Wifehood, Widowhood, and adultery: female sexuality, surveillance and the state in 18 century Maharashtra", 9-10. 8 The role of the Brahman was minimal and they were treated for violating the caste norms in the same way as other caste members. 9 Class and the caste status or even the hierarchical position did not matter in the states of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota, and Pune. 10 For instance, Bernard Conn's assumption that colonial census played an important role in the formation of religious and social identities in south Asia. For more details see his article, "The Census, social structure and objectification in South Asia", ed. Bernard Cohn, Anthropologists among the historians and other essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 224-54.

226 statistics and collection. Sumit Guha and Norbert Peabody criticize these works on pre- colonial India that depict traditional societies devoid of any such institutions. The evidence from Jaipur supports Sumit Guha's argument that, in pre-colonial times, enumeration projects were an important tool of the administrative machinery in Indian times. The enumeration was not only used for revenue statistics but also for organization and the surveillance of social groups. In this context, the interventionist nature of the

Kachchwaha state is best described as contradictory. The state continuously asserted its role by imposing caste norms through surveillance techniques, but at the same time ignored caste jurisdictions, especially in cases involving violence and issues related to women. This analysis challenges the conventional historiography of Indian states, which usually treats undisputed Brahmanical authority as a norm.13

This chapter illustrates the interventionist nature of the Jaipur state through discussion of use of moralizing rhetoric to sustain morality and caste norms. The chapter has three sections: section one focuses on social institutions and gender relations to show the access eighteenth Jaipur state to the lives of its subjects. In this section, the state's views on the sanctity of the marriage, its measures to curb expenditures on social functions, and its treatment of issues related re-marriages, spousal relations, domestic violence, illicit relations, and abortions are elaborated. Section two deals with the

"Sumit Guha, "The politics of Identity and Enumeration in India c. 1600-1900", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 45: 148-167 (Cambridge, 2003) ,151 12 Guha, The politics of Identity and Enumeration in India c. 1600-1900, 150 and Norbert Peabody, "Cents, Sense, Census: Human Inventories in Late Pre-colonial India", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 43, No. 4, 819-50. 13 This kind of historiography is still produced and more details see Nandini Sinha, State Formations in Rajasthan, see the Introduction, and Monika Hortsmann and Heike Bill, In Favour ofGovinddevji: Historical documents Relating to a Deity ofVrindaban and Eastern Rajasthan (New Delhi: Manohar publications, 1999), introduction and Chakravarty, Rewriting history: Life and Times of Ramabai, introduction.

227 women's representation by the state authorities and with the ways women were treated and their voices heard in Rajput society, where men were dominant. State policies towards women became integral to this dynasty's legitimacy, and women's voices were heard because women had become an icon of the state's paternalism. It seems that women reported cases of various kinds of male sexual misdemeanours, which involved

Jaipur's residents of nearly every caste. An investigation usually followed the report, and the responsible males were disciplined, imprisoned, or, in most cases, fined for their offences. Cases of domestic violence and of state intervention in day to day matters of family matters again indicate that, in cases of violence or misconduct, the state overrode caste distinctions and decisions. Section three elaborates the role of the state as the protector of dharma, which it enacted through strict surveillance of different social groups. This section also deals with the issues of violation of caste (Jati) norms and of ostracism. In these cases, the state reinforced caste regulations through direct intervention, fines, and sometimes corporal punishments. The imposition of caste norms also implied maintaining strict control over changing circumstances. Contention between the state and its subjects (nearly every caste and not just artisanal communities) is implicit in the state records. The collection of fines continued to rise for caste infractions in the eighteenth century and, at the same time, it was became increasingly difficult for the state to recover its dues. This analysis cannot deal with instances of everyday resistance against the state because of lack of evidence it does expose the vulnerability of the state in its maintenance of the status quo in society and speculate about the limitations of state power.

228 SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND GENDER RELATIONS

By claiming to be the protectors of dharma and upholders of the sanctity of caste norms and practices, Jaipur rulers made themselves responsible for interfering even in the familial issues of their subjects. They did not follow any paradigm of morality except, of course, the customary caste laws of their kingdom. For this reason, the definition of a moral code of conduct and behaviour was open to contradictions and interpretation. What was lawful and unlawful, or permissible and non-permissible could be interpreted through the state's words and deeds. It is difficult to ascertain state's role as the supreme authority that dictated moral behaviour, but it was certainly expressed through its institutionalization of gender relations. The interventionist agenda of the state in relations to social institutions was tolerated by social groups because of the assertion of rulers' assertions that they were the sole arbitrators and negotiators. The Kachchwaha rulers were committed to resolving disputes within the domestic sphere by imposing penalties without reference to caste (jati) laws. The documents clearly indicate that the government had the authority to intervene in the familial domain in the relationships between husbands and wives, which sometimes also involved relatives by marriage and members of the extended family. The caste norms were not adhered to in cases of domestic violence; family disputes were deemed a punishable act by the state. Individuals were fined and imprisoned, and their caste status and jati norms were overridden by the state.

By becoming defenders of women's virtue and honours, the Kachchwaha rulers developed a gendered conception of power and its legitimization. At the same time, the states' discourse on the familial matters was patriarchal in the sense that women were

229 protected by the state, and men were held responsible if they were guilty of any crime or neglect.

This paternalism was clear in the states' role, which was to impose the sanctity of marriage and compel subjects to abide by the caste-prescribed procedures of this institution.14 The examples enumerated below reveal that the state played a critical role in structuring familial relationship through the imposition of the sanctity of marriage. By focusing on the processes rather than on the paradigm of this social order, different kinds of questions can be asked. How were issues of morality defined by the state? More importantly, how were these issues interpreted and contested by the ordinary subjects of this regional kingdom? For example, whenever the authorities discovered that proper marriage rites had not been performed by individuals, they were reprimanded and asked to legalize their unions as soon as possible. Numerous incidents of the imposition of fines on individuals who did not conform to caste injunctions indicate that this was another contentious issue between the state and its subjects. In this way, the state provided security in marriage to women through the proper working of the institution. This initiative also implied that a high moral order could be maintained.

The Kachchwaha rulers showed no discrimination on the basis of caste or class in cases of domestic violence. Everyone was punished on the same basis, a way of proceeding that was contradictory to caste norms, but was essential to maintain a semblance of morality and order in the society. Still, the state authorities enforced the

14Singh, "Regulating the Domestic", 84 states "marriage contracts could not be undone without the permission of the caste panchayat and the state. The state sought to enforce these contracts in the absence of any valid reason for their dissolution".

230 caste andjati norms in matrimonial alliances and in cases where the individuals belonged

to the same caste and were found living together without having been married. In the

latter circumstances, couples were simply ordered to pay fines and perform the marriage

rites as soon as possible.15 If the people of different castes were involved in a

relationship, then the woman/girl had to return to her parents' house.16 In its dealing with

moral issues such as marriage, adultery, and extra-marital affairs, the state enforced caste

norms by intervening and mitigating the caste council's decisions.

Although marrying outside of one's caste in the eighteenth century Jaipur state

was against caste rules, there still were reported cases of inter caste marriages that

involved Brahmans, Rajputs, Jats, Ahirs, and also cases of marriages between members

of different religious communities. The individuals who performed the inter caste

marriages were charged with violating and contaminating caste norms, and usually all

such associations were usually declared null and void by the state authorities. The state

15 Sada Darji of Jaipur had got a woman from his village and had kept her without proper rites. He was fined 44 rupees and was told to get married to the woman., Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1740, RSA, Bikaner, one Manha Ahir of Jaipur city was caught when he was fleeing away with a woman named Dulaji and was fined 11 rupees. Pera Teli had tried to flee away with Nuran (Telini) from Jaipur city but they were caught and had to pay a fine of 9 rupees, arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1761,424, RSA, Bikaner. 16 Murad Mussalman of Delhi had fled away with Udaiya. They had started living together in Jaipur and when the Kotwal came to know of their elopement, Murad was called in for investigation. He was ordered to send Udaiya to her parents and was also fined 11 rupees, Ibid., Year 1761, 424. 17 The cases related to Brahmans: a Rajput woman was found living with a Bhudhur Brahman and their alliance was called off by the state, Ibid., arhsatta pargana Lalsot, 1713. Rajputs: Udai Singh was found living with a Mahajan caste woman in Ibid., pargana Lalsot, Year 1713. Jats: Khushla Jat of Newla village had kept a woman of Bhat caste, lbid.,arhsatta pargana Bahatri, Year 1711. Ahirupees: Pema Ahir of qasba Tonk who had married his sister to Pancham Dakhini was ordered to break the marriage and pay the fine for breaking the caste norm by the state, Ibid,. arhsatta pargana Tonk, Year 1761. Muslims: Two Muslim men were told to break off their nikah (marriage) with other caste women in pargana Tonk in 1761.

231 also punished those who had contracted inter caste marriages, even if the spouse had been

i o misled about the real caste status of the partner.

Jaipur rulers used the endogamous nature of the caste- based eighteenth century

Rajasthani society to control gender relations. Despite its rhetoric about protecting

women, the state did not take an interest in the status of women after its moral authority

has been exercised. In inter caste relationships, women were forced to go back to their

parents, but men were acquitted simply by paying fines. The sources do not say what

happened to women who were involved in inter caste marriages but given the state of

gender relations in Rajput societies, these women must have found it difficult to readjust

back in their families or communities. The state, in consultation with the caste councils,

ignored the plight of women in these types of cases. The ramifications of the need to

protect women against violence were not considered in situations where inter caste or

extra marital affairs were involved. Obviously, these issues related to the moral order of

the society, and the state of Jaipur presented itself unequivocally as the upholder of the

existing social order. It is important to note that none of the cases related to matrimonial

or caste issues were reported to the Brahmans.19 The enforcement of these customs was

done primarily through the imposition of fines and attempted reconciliations with the

caste councils. The Kachchwaha rulers did not punish or imprison anyone for violating

18 For example, Bandhu Thathera married a woman of the Bhatiar caste without knowing her real caste in Jaipur, Ibid., arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1740, 394; Nanig Mahajan, a Vaishnav had fixed his marriage with the daughter of a Saravagi (Jain) Mahajan of qasba Fagi and he was fined and was made to go to his decision by the state, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1740; Another interesting case is from pargana Chatsu, when Rupla Khatai of village Girdharpur in pargana Chatsu got engaged to a Teli girl who was supposed to belong to his caste. He married her, but broke the marriage when her true caste was revealed. The girl was restored to her Teli parents. However, Rupla couldn't escape the punishment, Singh, "Regulating the domestic", 81. 19 The same was the case in the eighteenth century states of Jodhpur, Kota, and the Maratha states.

232 caste norms and this pragmatic approach was appropriate. It has been documented how people from all castes and sects lived together in close proximity; inter caste relations were bound to happen. At the same time, the authorities had to intervene in order to maintain the moral order, since such intervention was one of the primary duties of the king.20

Another dimension of the states' intervention in familial affairs was the effort to make everyone responsible and respectful of the laws vis-a-vis their relationships with each other. Individuals were obliged to report engagements or marriages in their families to the state authorities. The kotwal of the city of Jaipur reported to the Maharaja how he reprimanded several individuals for breaking off the engagements of their children without consent and marrying the children to others.21 These examples of how the state insisted on fulfillment of promises about marriage alliances also show that protection of the environment of mutual trust and courtesy also fell within the purview of the state.

There are other examples from the provinces of Malpura, Mauzabad, Toda Bhim,

Hindaun, and Bahatri of fines collected by the state authorities when people did not

99 honours their prior commitments in arranging marriages.

20 As was discussed in chapter one. 21 Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1734, RSA, Bikaner: Choka Teja Mahajan had broken the engagement of his daughter and had married somewhere else. The matter was reported to the Kotwal and Teja was summoned for an explanation and after questioning he was ordered to pay a fine and not to break engagements of his other children. Pala Jat had broken his engagement with Majira without any reason. Majira's father lodged a complaint against him with the kotwal and Pala was made to apologize to Majira and had to pay a fineo f 22 rupees for government expenses. 22 Ibid., arhsatta pargana Malpura, Year 1773; arhsatta pargana Mauzabad, 1666; arhsatta pargana Toda Bhim, Year 1747; Arhsatta Pargana Hindon, Year 1742; Arhsattta pargana Baharti, Year 1691; also see Singh, "Regulating the domestic", 81.

233 In addition to controlling the sexuality of women, the state also exercised moral authority by instituting limits on extravagant expenses on social occasions. It was customary and still is in South Asian societies to spend lavishly on all social occasions, especially on weddings.23 In his attempt to become an ideal ruler, Sawai Jai Singh fined individuals, irrespective of caste, for being extravagant on social occasions especially marriages. Why an amount was set as the limit is not clear in the sources. Still, the implementation of these measures made it clear that rulers of Jaipur would be always remembered as social reformers.24 They also ensured that everyone, the rich and the poor, could get married and not have to form illegitimate alliances because of lack of the funds needed to conduct a marriage. Sawai Jai Singh not only ordered the people of his state to spend only two thousand rupees on the marriages, but also imposed restriction on the number of people who could be invited to attend weddings, social functions, or funerals at someone's house.25 Anyone spending above this amount was to be fined by rulers' officials. People could send invitations only to their caste members on the above mentioned occasions.

Although there is no evidence how successful these measures were, the arhsatta documents mention fines imposed by the Jaipur state for these offences throughout the eighteenth century. The fines were invariably collected from both the high and the lower castes and from the members of the mercantile classes. Mahajan, Sunars, Khatris, and

23 Yashdashti dated 1734, RSA, Bikaner. 24 Tod, Annals and Antiquities, vol. 1, 353, "Jai Singh was a social reformer as described by Col. Tod "Inspite of his many defects, Jey Singh's name is destined to descend to posterity as one of the most remarkable men of his age and nation... The sumptuary laws which he endeavoured to establish throughout Rajpootana for the regulation of marriages, in order to check those lavish expenses that led to infanticide and sati." 25 Parwana of Sawai Jai Singh, Year 1724, Kapadwara collection, Sawai Madho Singh II museum, Jaipur.

234 Agarwals paid the highest fines. In one instance, Vaji Sunar, of the city of Jaipur, was

fined 700 rupees because of extra expenses for his daughter's wedding.27 In spite of the

imposition of fines for extravagance on social occasions, people continued to spend. For

instance, Ram Chand Agarwal was fined nine rupees for his spending on his first

daughter's wedding and seventy-five rupees for his spending on his second daughter's

wedding.28 The fines on individuals who were accused of indulging in extravagance on

social occasions were imposed on members of almost all castes and religious

communities in the state—Rajputs, Jats, Mahajans, Sunars, Agarwals, Gujars, Khatri,

Dhuniyas, Khummars, Balahis, Bhujars, Teli, Minas, andNaths (religious community)-

then finally on some Muslims. In these cases again, the collection of fines from these

communities implies that state directives were not followed without resistance.

These fines were not imposed in the state of Jodhpur, Kota and other eighteenth century states. 27 Arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1740,400, RSA, Bikaner. 28 Ibid., All these cases belonged to the city of Jaipur. 29 Rajputs: Ajit Singh was fined 500 rupees for spending more his daughter's wedding, and Gurnam Singh was also fined for the same offence, Yadashti, Year, 1734 Yadashti, Year, 1734, RSA, Bikaner, Thakur Devi had to pay 51rupees for inviting more people on his daughter's wedding, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1740, p. 383; Jagga Thakur was fined 201rupees & Tiku Nar Singh 1 lrupees, Arhsatta pargana, Sawai Jaipur, 364. Jats: Jat was fined 81 rupees for spending more on his daughter's reception (lagan ka khanar kiyu), Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1740, 375; Dharu Jat was fined 12 rupees for his wedding, Year 1741, 364. Dhaniya Mahajan was fined 251rupees for extra expenditure on his daughter's reception, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, 1740, 387; Natha Mahajan was fined 404 rupees for spending more, 327; Sundarnath had to pay 141 rupees , 376; Soma Mahajan of Tapa Haveli was fined for inviting more people on his daughter's wedding, Arhsatta pargana, Sawai Jaipur, 1734, 2077. Mahajans: Deepa Harmi Mahajan was fined for the same offence, 376. Sunars: Lala Sunar had to pay a fine of 42 rupees for spending more on his daughter's marriage, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur Year 1740,401; Kishan Agarwal paid 22 rupees for his extravagance, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur Year 1741,354. Gujars: Hema Jiva and Chajju (Gujars) were fined 1 lr upees for spending more on their children's weddings, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1740,401. Khatris: Lubiya Khatri was fined 500 rupees for having extra expenditure on his niece's wedding, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1737, 371. Dhuniyas: Neta Dhuniya had to pay a fined of 5 rupees for spending more on a reception, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1737, 373. Khummars: Bhauja Khummar had to pay 32 rupees for spending more on his children's marriage, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1740, p. 389. Balahis: Maparam Balahi was fined 125 rupees for extra expenditure, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1740, 353. Bhujars: Bahramal Bhujar was fined 11 rupees for spending more on the wedding of his children, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1740, 373. Telis: Manya Teli was fined 11 rupees, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1740, 35. 29 Minas: Masiram Mina was fined 5 rupees for inviting people from other castes to his daughter's wedding, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1734, 367. Natha Jagga was fined for spending more on his

235 There are also cases reported of individuals who were fined either for sending out

invitations to members of other castes or for inviting more than the permitted number of

people to their homes. The expenditures on marriages were investigated by the faujdar

and then reported to the Maharaja. Even the highest officials were required to take care

not to invite too many people to a marriage. Diwan Ram Chand sent invitations to his

son's marriage and demanded five rupees from the invitees; this was reported to the

Maharaja, Sawai Jai Singh, who demanded a full inquiry into this matter. The Maharaja

had to be informed about the money spent by higher officials on the marriages. For

example, one Purohit Jewan Ram spent around four thousand rupees on his son's

marriage; he was required to provide a list of invitees to the court and also pay a fine.31

Notwithstanding caste regulations, the various communities continued to undermine their caste councils' authority. Such behaviour indicates the contentious nature of Indian society. It is clear also from the evidence provided below that the demand for proper moral behaviour by the state was continuously challenged by various communities.

The officials intervened continuously to enforce the caste (jati) norms and assert their authority over social and cultural matters. A few examples of individuals' defiance of caste norms that required government intervention are as follows: Tillu Mali ofqasba Jaipur kept

daughter's wedding. It should be noted that Sawai Jai Singh had forced this celibate community to change their way of life by introducing marriage in their customs but they also had to comply with the laws of the state. Masiram Mina was fined 5 uupees for inviting people from other castes to his daughter's wedding, Arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1734, 367. Naths: Natha Jagga was fined for spending more on his daughter's wedding. It should be noted that Sawai Jai Singh had forced this celibate community to change their way of life by introducing marriage in their customs but they also had to comply with the laws of the state. Mussalmans: Murad Musssalman of Tapa Khoh now living in Jaipur was fined 11 rupees for spending more on his daughter's wedding, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur Year 1740, 385. Ibid., arzdasht from Kishor Das to Sawai Jai Singh, # 380, 1756,. 31 Ibid., chitthi from Kishor Das to Maharaja Bishan Singh, Year 1693.

236 Dala Mali's daughter-in-law without the consent of his caste members the faujdar summoned Tillu Mali for questioning and ordered him to perform proper marriage rites in front of his community members.32 In another example, Setaram Bhujjar started living together with his sister-in-law (bhabhi) without obtaining permission from his caste members. He was ordered to properly marry his sister-in-law and was also fined eleven rupees. Ghasiram Gujjar's case is another example of how caste norms were challenged by caste members. Ghasiram Gujjar of Tappa Haveli pargana, Jaipur, had kept a widow

(vidbha) in his home without informing his caste members. When the authorities found out he was fined five rupees, which was the charge for the investigation. In another case,

Bhemla Khummar of Tappa Khoh. pargana, Sawai Jaipur, had violated his caste norms by adopting a male child on his wife's side by arranging for his marriage in the same caste.

if For this violation, he had to pay a fine of eleven rupees to the kotwal.

Generally non adherence to prescribed customs, rituals and forced inter-caste

marriages were considered within the jurisdiction of the caste councils and the state. The

state also responded to direct appeals from individuals and panchayats that requested the

resolution of such matters as per caste regulations. The involvement of the states' in the

social sphere of their subjects' lives is also evident in the fine collection from the people

who got married or formalized their unions. The office of the faujdar in the parganas of

32 Ibid., Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1743, 269. 33 Ibid., 1324. 34 Ibid,. 1325. 35 Ibid, Year 1743, 839. 36 Singh in his article: "Regulating the Domestic", 36-7, says that action was taken against Bhagirath Ojha who had married Ganga Ram Joshi' daughter without performing the prescribed ceremonies. Lakshi Das Mahajan, Lala Jat, Khemla Balahi, Vija Sunar, Hem Rai Saraogi, Gagla Brahmin, all residents of qasba Sawai Jaipur were held guilty of violating one or the other norm governing the institution of marriage (Jaipur, Years: 1738 and 1740).

237 Jaipur, Lalsot, and Bahatri mentions the names and castes of individuals who had not registered their marriages with the state authorities. The different castes, such as the

Minas, Lohars, Gujars, Telis, and Balahis were mentioned as offenders and were charged nominal fines for this offence, ranging from one to hundred rupees. Only Vidu Mahajan of Jaipur was fined forty rupees for getting married. It is obvious that fines were imposed on the basis of ability to pay.37

Although one marriage {lagan or sadi) was the norm of eighteenth century Indian society, the middle and lower castes in many states followed the practice of remarriage and even the remarriage of widows.38 These marriages had to be sanctioned by the caste councils and approved by the state. The states routinely fined people of various castes who did not inform the authorities about their remarriages. The documents use different names such as nata, gharvasa, gharijana or gharecha for remarriages and second marriages. Both men and women were allowed to remarry. Still, it is implied in the sources that individuals were required to follow caste regulations and that the state granted the permission to remarry (parwana)39 The Pune archives contain documents that include information about the circumstances that remarriages or second marriages permissible. These marriages were sanctioned by the caste councils, and out of eighty-six

37 Arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, Year, 1741, 352, RSA, Bikaner: Vadu Mahajan had got married without informing the government authorities. He had to pay a fine of 40 rupees, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, 1763, 726, other examples of marriage without informing the authorities are of Lala gujar who had got married without informing the authorities and was fined 1 rupee. Dewa gujar and Chatra gujar were fined the same amount for not informing the government of their marriages. 38 V. S. Kadam, The institution of marriage and position of women in eighteenth century Maharashtra, The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 25, 3, (1988), 341-370; Chakravarti, "Wifehood, widowhood, and adultery", 2-21; N. K. Wagle, "Women in the Kotwali papers" ; Kumar, "Crime and Gender in Eighteenth Century Rajasthan", 40-5; Sethia, Rajput Polity, see the introduction, and Singh, "State and Society in Medieval Rajasthan", 235-52. 39 Singh, "State and Society in Medieval Rajasthan", 248.

238 castes living in Pune, seventy-six allowed remarriages and second marriages. Proof had to be presented that the marriage was not consummated, that the spouse was ostracized from the caste, or that the spouse was from a lower caste. In such cases, a second marriage (pat in Marathi) could be performed. Other reasons included impotence (male), infertility (female), insanity, or incompatibility.40

The second marriages named in the Kota state referred to contracts primarily within the same caste, and sometime upper caste men had relations with lower caste women. But there is no evidence of occasions when lower caste women had relationships or marriages with upper caste men. The state was responsible for maintaining the caste hierarchies and discouraging inter caste marriages, and this was the arrangement in other states as well.41 There is also evidence that the rulers of the Jaipur state intervened on numerous occasions to penalize individuals for not following the caste directives in cases of remarriages, or for not obtaining the official permission that was needed to legalize the marriages. These examples show that people married within their own castes and there were no cases of inter caste marriages. It should be noted that the state was imposed

The British collector of Pune collected this information in 1824 when he was instructed to gather data on the legal customs and practices of the castes living in the city. The castes (86 were represented) were asked fifty six questions (savals) and it included topics like internal organization of the castes (jatis), the laws governing the marriage, adoption, division of property and inheritance. All eight six caste councils submitted a legal disposition to the collector and agreement that their answers are true and correct to the best of their knowledge. These questions were first included by Arthur Steele in his book: Summary of Law and Customs of Hindoo Castes within Dekhun Subject to the Presidency of Bombay Chiefly Affecting the Civil Suit, August 1826. These questions are still preserved in Pune Archives. For more details: N. K. Wagle, "Women in the Kotwal's papers", 15-59. 41 Sethia, Rajput polity, cites evidence for the state of Kota, 184 43 CASES OF REMARRIAGES WITHOUT INFORMING THE CASTE COUNCILS (for more details see Singh, "Regulating the domestic", 82.

YEAR PLACE ACCUSED CHARGE SOURCE 1723 Chatsu Lala Lodha married Uday's Ladha wife after she gharecha Arhsatta pargana was separated from her husband Chatsu

239 caste norms, whereas, in criminal cases, officials did not pay attention to the caste status

and punished everyone in an equitable way.

Widowhood did not force women to lead on an ascetic life unless they were

members of upper castes that were the Brahmans or the Rajputs in Rajasthan. They were

not subjected to harsh celibate lives as their counterparts in Maharashtra were.43 Lower

caste women could remarry after obtaining a written document (kagad) signed by her

previous husband's families.44 The caste panchayats usually fixed the amount of the fee

which was charged by the deceased husband's family. The evidence from Jodhpur

indicates that the rulers of Jodhpur actually interfered on behalf of the widow if there was

any objection by family members or the caste councils.45

1724 Niwai Mathura Sunar gharijana Arhsatta pargana Niwai 1742 Khohri Puroshatam Khumhar gharecha Arhsatta pargana Khohri 1763 Lalsot Gangaram Gujar gharecha Arhsatta pargana Lalsot

CASES OF REMARRIAGES WITHOUT INFORMING THE STATE AUTHORITIES (for more details see Singh, "Regulating the domestic", 82. YEAR PLACE ACCUSED CHARGE SOURCES 1739 Jaipur Jogi Chamar ghaijana Arhsatta pargana Jaipur 1742 Malarna Ram Lai Mali gharecha Arhsatta pargana, Malarna 1743 Jaipur Telu Mali gharecha Arhsatta pargana, Jaipur 1744 Toda Bhim Shukla Gujar gharecha Arhsatta pargana, Toda Bhim 1744 Malpura Ghasi Darji gharecha Arhsatta pargana, Malarna 1762 Tonk Ropla Dhobi gharecha Arhsatta pargana, Tonk 1764 Ghazi ka Thana Hansa Balahi gharecha Arhsatta pargana, Ghazi ka Thana

43 V. S. Kadam, The institution of marriage and position of women in eighteenth century Maharashtra, Indian Economic and Social Review, 355-6. 44 For Jaipur: Singh, "State and Society" 248-9 & for Jodhpur: SanadBahi Parwana, Years 1767 and 1769, RSA, Bikaner. 45 For more details see Nirmal Kumar, Socio-Economic basis of crime in Mughal India in the 17th and 18th centuries-with special reference to Rajasthan, (unpublished Ph.D diss., Delhi University, India, 2000).

240 Inter personal relationships were handled primarily by caste councils, and these councils were responsible for resolving any issues arising out of unconventional relationships. Still, the state in Jaipur worked closely with these councils to resolve matters by punishing the individuals responsible through fines or by ordering them to legalize their affairs (get married).46 In many cases, women went back to their husbands or to their family members after hefty fines were paid for their conduct. The cases reported in the Jaipur pargana were mostly report about consenting partners and, even then, only men were fined by the authorities. This could have happened because women did not have any income or money. In the Pune records, when women had sexual relations with other men, the men were fined, and the women were either detained or imprisoned. In some instances, women were sent to other places away from home as punishment.48

In the Jaipur records there are more documented cases of illicit relations than of adultery. The following cases were reported in the vicinity of the Jaipur city, which was controlled by the kotwal. From 1740 to 1763 CE, there were about twenty cases of illicit affairs, and the most common course of action taken by the authorities in consultation with the village councils was to fine the male partners involved in the crime, while the

Instead of leaving these matters into the hands of caste councils the state assumed a distinctive role in establishing a moral order in society that did not include intervention by any religious authorities, especially Brahmans. 47 The examples are given in the following pages. 48 N. K. Wagle, "Women in KotwaPs papers", 37: "A Brahman woman, Yemuni, the wife of Sivram Brahman of Kanade of Akalkot, now of Budhwarpeth, had a steady relationship with one man, it was Hemchand Gujrathi. The informant reported that Hema Chand, by keeping her in his house, defiled her person (bhrastra kele). Yemuni was summoned and the allegations were established by evidence. But then she wrote down the names of the men she has sexual relations with. Fines were collected from those men: 55 rupees from Hemchand. 100 rupees from Narayandas of Vani of Ganespeth; 85 from Jyouti Saraph of Budhwarpeth; and 8 rupees form Cimji Naik Saraph Nagarkar of Ravivar. With the permission of Ramsastribaba, the chief law officer of Pune, Yemuni was sent packing across the Godavari River'. There are other examples of women involved in illicit relations on pages 33 to 37.

241 women were usually sent back to their families. In most cases, the individuals were

intercepted by officials with the help of informants, who were probably neighbours or

members of the family. The cases illustrate that an individual who kept mistresses (ghar

mein aurat dhar liye) had to pay heavy fines, which ranged from twenty-five to five

rupees. People from all castes, from Brahmans to Telis (oil makers), were found to be

involved and were fined for these types of relationships.49

Individuals found committing adultery was punished with severe fines and

warnings by the state officials and also by the village councils. As soon as the state

authorities became involved, after a complaint was lodged by a woman's parents or her

husband, the first step was to send the woman in question to their homes. The man

involved was ordered to pay all the charges for the investigation and also the fines for

having an illicit relationship.50 These out-of-wedlock alliances also led to unwelcome

Here are the details from the arhsatte pargana Sawai Jaipur from 1728 to 1784, RSA, Bikaner: one Kheta Rajput took Khushi Brahmini from Amber to Jaipur and kept her as a mistress (ghar mein dhar leyu) and he had to pay a fine of 141rupees after being caught by the authorities. Chema sunar was fined for keeping a mistress secretly (ghar mein aurat dhaar liye). In another instance, Khemchand balahi kept Ramchand's daughter-in-law in his home and was fine 9 rupees and he was ordered to send the woman back to Ramchand by the Kotwal. The authorities fined Dhanya Khatri had kept Gangli Brahmini as a mistress (ghar mein dhar leyu). Sukha was fined Rupees 51 when a woman was found in his house by the authorities Higher castes individuals like Chetarahari Jat was also fined for keeping a mistress and the fine was 22 rupees. Bhai Singh Rajput had kept a mistress and he was fined 5 lrupees. Bhema Mahajan was caught with a woman in his house and was fined 41rupees. Professional castes were also fine like Mota Nathu and Sada Darji had kept a woman in their house without proper rites and they had to pay a fine of 44 rupees. In another instance, Chimram Mahajan had kept a village girl in his house in Jaipur. When the authorities found out he was fined 6 rupees and was ordered to send the girl back to his village. A person of Gujjar caste (name not mentioned) had kept a mistress in his house and he was fined 1 rupees 1 (nominal fine) and Darga teli was fined 5 rupees for keeping a woman in his house. Nathu was fined 1 rupee for having an affair, (rishtajodeyo). In a rare incident Sawal (caste not mentioned) was accused of seducing his own daughter and was fined 1 rupee Godha (caste not mentioned) had an affair with a minor and was fined 1 rupee) Nanak had kept a woman in his house and he was fined 8 rupees. Sahib Singh Jat had kept a Mina (lower caste) woman in his house and he was fined 467 rupees. Thakur had kept Jodha as a mistress and was fined 8 rupees. Bhai Singh Rajput had kept a mistress and he was fined 51 rupees Jeda Manhari (bangle maker) had kept a woman and he was fined 11 rupees. 50 Ibid., Year 1736: In one instance, a man named Khera Mali of Jaipur had kept Jodha's wife in his home. Jodha lodged a complaint about his wife's disappearance and the woman was found living with Khera. He

242 pregnancies and abortions. It is obvious that impulsive sexual relationship was not

uncommon at that time, and that they resulted in unwanted conceptions that sometimes

were eliminated.

The Kachchwaha rulers dealt with issues about the termination of pregnancies

more sternly. There are different terms used for abortions in the documents are

mentioned as adhura-nakha and gharba-khatya.51 It seems that the abortions noted in the

records were generally induced by pregnant women themselves, sometimes with help

from by their relatives. All kinds of abortion cases, those done to end unwelcome pregnancies, those done with the consent of the spouses, and those done by alleged rape victims were penalized by the state.52 Anyone involved in aiding or facilitating abortions,

including spouses, family members, or outside helpers was held responsible for this act by the state. In some cases, people were ordered to leave the town after the relationship was publicized.53 The kotwal papers of the city of Pune elaborate the ways in which the unwelcome pregnancies were terminated. Pregnant women often visited or obtained

was ordered to send Jodha's wife back and had a pay a fine of 17 rupees and 50 annas. In second instance, Mallu Mahajan had given a wrong statement about his daughter-in-law and kept her as his mistress. When it was found out by the authorities, he was fined Rupees. 7 In the fourth instance, Sukha Jat had kept Bawa's daughter-in-law as a mistress and when the news of this affair reached the authorities, Sukha was called to the Kotwal's office with the woman. He was fined 15 rupees and the woman was returned back to Bawa. 51 Still in usage in Rajasthani dialect 52 The following cases were reported by the faujdar of pargana Jaipur in different years: Year 1728:Alisar, a Muslim by caste was fined 5 rupees and 5 annas for aborting her child by the authorities. On the same day, in another case, Harji (Gujjar caste) was fined 5 rupees and 5 annas for having an abortion. In another case, Garupeesi Telini was fined 33 rupees for having an abortion. Year 1730: aother case of abortion reported was of Ramsiya Sunarni who was finedRupees . 51 for aborting her child in a similar case Jewni Brahmini was fined lOlrupees for an abortion. Manha Mahajan's daughter-in-law was fined 10 rupees for having an abortion. The last case reported was of Ramanya, who was fined 9 rupees for helping in aborting her widowed sister's child. The last case is fcampargana Lalsot where Bija Patwari of was fined by the state when he tried to cover up his brother's wife abortion. All cases were reported as fines in the arhsattas pargana Sawai Jaipur, RSA, Bikaner. 53 Kumar, "Crime and Gender Crime and Gender in eighteenth century Rajasthan", 50.

243 medicines from self-proclaimed nurses, who were able to prepared homemade medicines that could induce an abortion within days.54 The method for making an herbal medicine that would end a pregnancy has also been described in the archival records.55

The above-mentioned cases which were dealt with primarily by the kotwal in the city of Jaipur, illustrate the volatile relationships in a society where adultery, extra marital affairs, and sexual relationships were quite common and routinely regulated through the interference of state authorities. The sanctity of marriage and lawful unions was regulated through the direct intervention and cooperation of the state with caste councils and village councils. The cases make clear also that eighteenth century society addressed sexual issues, which were later deemed, in open ways.56

The rulers of Jaipur supported the notion that the husband had to make adequate provisions and a wife could report her spouse to the authorities for not affording her proper maintenance. Officials routinely heard complaints from wives about alleged neglect by their husbands. Behaviour that was regarded as an offence included failing to provide for spouses' material needs or causing mental stress for a spouse.57 More importantly, the act of leaving a pregnant wives without any support was penalized by

54 N. K. Wagle, "Women in Kotwal's papers", 44. 55 Ibid, A Brahman widow described the ingredients of the medicine she ate to terminate her pregnancy during testimony in front of the Kotwal of Pune. The medicine comprised a mixture of the leaves and gum (cik) of the Rai tree (gigantic swallowwort or Aslepias), chillies, mustard seeds, raw sugar {gut), and the roots of the Pipal tree, which together induced the abortion. The ingredients used in the medicines were easily available and the same types of remedies might have been popular in the state of Jaipur and in its neighbouring areas. 56This also strengthens the argument that there was no division of 'public' and 'private' spheres in Indian India. 57 Vaidh Singh Jat of Jaipur was fined Rupees. 29 by the Kotwal and he was ordered to take better care of his wife: Arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, RSA, Bikaner, Year 1745,4691.

244 higher than usual fine, and, in some cases, village and caste councils monitored the activities of the husband to ensure safety and the continuation of economic support for the spouses.58 The government authorities continuously intervened to safeguard the sanctity of marriage. In one case, Rupla Sunar of Jaipur sent his wife to her parents for no reason. The wife complained to the Kotwal about the unfair treatment by her husband.

Rupla was ordered to call his wife back and to pay a hefty fine of 404 rupees.59 Men were also required to take care of their wives and were considered responsible for their safety and welfare. An incident of negligence was reported in relation to Lakhait Gujjar of Jaipur. His wife was detained in Kotwali after she got lost in a fair. Lakhait was summoned for questioning and, after paying a fine, he was able to take his wife home.60

There were cases when women were found guilty of not respecting the sanctity of marriage; for example, a wife could not simply leave her husband without a reason or proper agreement (divorce). Manna Telini of Tapa Haveli had left her husband without any explanation. The village council was convened to settle the matter, and Manya who was found to be at fault, was ordered to return to her husband. The expenditure incurred for calling the council was seven rupees, which was paid by Manna.61 Married women had to have permission from their husbands to go to their parents' or other relatives' house. In one case, Nanag Jat's wife of pargana Jaipur went to her sister's house without taking her husband's permission. Nanag complained to the authorities about her action.

58 Jujjar Khummar ofqasba Malpura was fined 1 lrupees and 50 annas for not taking care of his pregnant wife and when he refused to pay the money the caste council referred the case to the faujdar of Jaipur. He was detained by the faujdar till he paid the amount, Arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur Year 1734, p. 2071. Also Karim Dad Julaha's wife of pargana Malpura represented to the state that she had been abandoned by her husband without any valid reason: Arhsatta pargana Malpura, Year 1766, RSA, Bikaner. 59 Ibid., 60 Ibid., Year 1744,415. 61 Ibid., Year 1740, 398.

245 When she came back from her sister's house, Nanag took her to the kotwal's office, where she was found to be at fault and fined fifty rupees. 62 In issues related to criminal activity, the directives of caste councils were often over -ridden but in issues related to marriages, their social norms were enforced. Subjects may have been treated uniformly in criminal cases, but hierarchies of gender and caste were reproduced in social issues.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE STATE

The issues of domestic violence became an arena for the contestation of power between the state and its subjects. The state had to contend with violence from all sections of the population. The identification of culprits and subsequent penalties in these cases, where mostly family members were usually involved, also signify how the state wanted to share the responsibility with kinship groups for upholding the moral order.

Jaipur was envisioned as an ideal society in which customary norms could be maintained by over-riding caste and status distinctions.

Cases of domestic violence dominate the fine collection data in many eighteenth century states such as Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota, and Pune. The structure of the families of these societies reveals conflicts, tensions, and emotional harassment. It seems that physical violence was widely practiced and suffered by many members of society, especially women. Complaints have been recorded that were lodged by mainly female victims against their husbands, relatives by marriage, fathers, and brothers. In some cases even mothers-in-law were the perpetrators. However, there were also a number of spouse

62 Ibid, Year 1740, 832; but it is not indicated in the document who actually paid the fines.

246 related complaints, which involved women as the assaulters, who used violence against their husbands. Although there are very few cases of this type, they nevertheless shed light on social relationships.

Individuals involved in incidents of violence belonged to different castes, clans and religions (Muslim or Sikh). They were systematically charged, and, after an investigation, fined or detained. Matters of domestic violence were usually brought before the village councils (panchayats). These arbitration bodies investigated these complaints thoroughly and rendered judgments about the persons accused. The most common way of dealing with these types of cases was the imposition of monetary fines as punishment. If the individuals involved did not obey the councils' decisions, then government officials dealt with them. The village or caste council (panchayaf) had to provide the information about important matters to the faujdar (military commandant) and the money collected as fines by the council was deposited in his office monthly.

Individuals found guilty of assaulting their spouses were usually fined, and the amounts ranged from five to forty rupees. It seems that assault (mareyu) was a blanket term used for all sorts of violence.64 However, there are examples of assaults where the wives had allegedly used violence. In such cases, the wife's role was highlighted during the investigation, and the males sometimes provided reasons for her behaviour. The state laid charges against culprits in domestic violence even if they gave reasons such as insanity, alleged use of witchcraft, excessive anger, or mismanagement of the

63 This kind of evidence was found in Pune records for more details see N. K.Wagle, "Women in Kotwal's papers", 15-59. 64 The Jaipur records use this word for all kinds of violence.

247 household. Some assaulters were acquitted if the charges were not proven. There were some high-profile cases of domestic violence. For example, murder charges were laid against Baksha Mahajan and Ganga Ram Joshi of qasba Tonk, pargana Malpura, and against Manaka Meena of village Nijhara pargana Lalsot. These individuals had allegedly killed their wives and hidden their weapons. They were brought to justice with the help of family members who informed the authorities about their crimes. As was mentioned in chapter four, murder was a punishable act, but life imprisonment or the death penalty was not the usual form of punishment for this crime in pre-colonial times.

Murderers could go free after paying fines or working for their communities. There are also several references to husbands who were held responsible for driving their wives to suicide. It was reported to the authorities that Maluka Lohar's wife in qasba Dausa,

Mehrab Mussalman's wife in qasba Kohri, and Ghasi Julaha's wife of qasba Dausa had ended their lives by jumping into wells because of their husbands.68 All the above- mentioned husbands were fined by the state. The involvement of eighteenth century states in familial issues can also be attested by examining the situations in other regions.

According to N. Wagle, who reviewed the administration of the city of Pune, there are many cases in the kotwal's papers of women's encounters with violence in their domestic

Insanity case: Allah Khan Mussalman of qasba Tonk, living in Jaipur was fined for assaulting (mareyu) his allegedly insane (bhahvli) wife and fined Rupees. 19 by the Kotwal, arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1739, 275. Witchcraft: Parsa Gujar constantly beat his wife up because he suspected her to be a witch {churait). His case was reported by the witnesses to the caste council, and he was fined by them on the orders of the kotwal, arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1762. Aggression: Dhanya Mali used to physically assault his wife to keep her uncontrolled anger under wraps. He was called in for investigation by the kotwal and was freed after a fine of 10 rupees, arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1763, 722. Behavioural Issues: Dhaiji Darji's wife complained to the authorities that her husband treats her with disrespect and after investigation Dhaiji explained that he is not happy with her house keeping skills (ghar meyu gandu rakheyu ho), arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1763, RSA, Bikaner. 66 Few cases of acquittal are mentioned in the sources. The main reason can be that the Arhsatta documents are records of income and expenditure and they only mentioned the cases from which the fines were collected. 67 For more details, see Singh, "Regulating the Domestic", 72. 68 Ibid.,

248 circles. The evidence used to document the violence women suffered at the hands of their

husbands and in- laws in Pune complements the material found in Jaipur.

Women also suffered violence and physical abuse at the hands of other family

members, especially their relatives by marriage. In the extended family households of

eighteenth century Jaipur, daughters-in-laws were often victimized by their husband's

relatives. The strained relationship between mothers-in-laws and daughters-in-law was

the authorities' main focus of attention in the sphere of domestic violence. Most

complaints were not related to physical attacks or assaults.70 There were some incidents

of violent attacks and fights between mothers-in-law and daughters -in- laws.71 In a few

reported instances, domestic problems were so acute that state officials had to physically

remove the victim (usually the daughter- in -law) and keep her in custody in the

kotwali.72 Similar cases of harassment by in-laws were also reported in the parganas of

Lalsot, Toda Bhim, Fagi, Dausa and Malpura. The victims in these places had recourse to

69N. K. Wagle, "Women in Kotwal's papers", 17 "Women suffered physical abuse fromthei r husbands and from their in laws. But in all cases of such violence against women, the perpetrators of the acts were punishable by the Kotwal laws. Equally important is the fact that women had the right to go to the police station and lodge a complaint against men. These observations are attested by the following examples. In each of the examples, the man was proven guilty and fined. Ranoji Kadam of Ganespeth hit his wife and broke her head and he was fined 4 rupees. Devi Bhoi of Ravivarpeth beat his wife on account of which she ate opium; the gunegari was collected fromth e husband. In the third instance, while Kasiram of Raviverapah was beating his wife, the aunt of Tuljaram Simpi, who went to her rescue, was also battered. Kasiram was fined. Mansi Chamar of Kasba was fined for badly battering his wife. Sitaram Pardesi of Mangal varpeth beat his wife without her fault and she complained to Cavdi, the police station of the ward, and he was fined one rupee." 70 Panni was fined for constantly fighting with her youngest daughter-in-law by the Kotwal of Jaipur Arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1737, 332. In another case, Mapa Gujri had misbehaved with her mother-in-law while fighting. Both of them were fined 5 rupees, Ibid, Year 1740. 71 Dhanya Mali's daughter-in-law had died after falling into a well. Dhanya and his wife were suspected of pushing her into the well. Although no evidence was found against Dhanya but he was kept in jail for long time on alleged involvement, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1760, p. 1430. 72 Ibid., Year 1740,393:, Ganpat Raja's daughter-in-law was detained in the kotwal's office to keep her safe from her mother-in-law. Ganpat and his wife were called for investigation and had to pay a fineo f 15 rupees.

249 the same types of investigations and fines, and the state initiated punitive charges against the relatives and in-laws.73

Though there ware numerous reported examples of domestic and spousal violence, it appears that many cases were not reported, and yet the state authorities still took actions against the alleged offenders. For example, in the village Vadora of pargana

Hindaun, Shahbaz Teli harassed his daughter- in- law to such an extent that, in despair, she committed suicide by jumping into a well. In this case, the village's headmen were punished by the faujdar of pargana Hindaun for covering up this crime.74 Sometimes an entire community was punished for covering up a crime that was related to domestic violence. It was obligatory for the family and the local authorities to report such occurrences to the state. Two Jat farmers of Ibrahimpur in pargana Lalsot had an ongoing feud. One of them killed his daughter in order to implicate the other. When the authorities discovered this murder, they fined the entire community of Ibrahimpur for concealing it. In another instance, an untouchable community of Chamars (a caste that dealt with the skin of dead animals) was fined for not reporting a case of sexual misconduct that had resulted in pregnancy in pargana Udehi.75

Singh "Regulating the Domestic", 73 says, "The records tell us numerous stories of harassment by in laws and other relatives. Again, we see the state intervening and initiating punitive action against the in laws who committed atrocities. Kanha Dube of qasba Lalsot cut off his daughter in law's nose, Arhsatta pargana Toda Bhim 1741. Luna Chippa of village Choru in pargana Fagi attacked his brother's wife without any reason, Arhsatta pargana Fagi, Yearl716. Chhajju Brahmin (resident of qasba Dausa) kick had led to the termination of his sister in law's pregnancy, Arhsatta pargana Dausa, Year 1713. Nathu Meo of qasba Mauzapur assaulted his brother's wife. The offended sister in law committed suicide by jumping into the well. Not only Nathu but Kumbha Meo, the husband of the deceased woman, were held responsible by the state for the death of his wife, Arhsatta pargana Lalsot, Year 1745. Mada Teli's intimidating behaviour forced his sister in law to give up her life by jumping into a well in village Khanpur, pargana Toda Bhim, Arhsatta pargana Toda Bhim, Year 1767". 74 Arhsatta pargana Hindaun, 1723, RSA, Bikaner, for more details see Singh, "Regulating the Domestic", 73. 75 Ibid., 77.

250 Moral rules against violence were imposed by the state on all castes regardless of status. Especially in the cases of violence against women, men had an advantage because they were financially independent and were active members of the society. The state's intervention and its implementation of consistent systems to punish acts of violence indicated how political power was used to control and manage society's recalcitrant elements.

CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: CHAM-CHORI OR SEXUAL MISDEMEANOUR

In the present context, it should be noted that the treatment of crimes against women is studied as a trajectory that indicates the nature of state authority. This chapter, which draws parallels from Maharashtra (Pune), Jodhpur, and Kota, provides an annual dairy of the crimes committed against women in the Jaipur pargana from 1728 to 1790

CE.'°The numerous offences in the arhsatta documents that were punishable by fines are the cases of sexual misdemeanours. The Rajasthani term for "sexual misdemeanours" is chant (skin) chori (theft). Fines collected for the cases of cham-chori (sexual misdemeanours) included rape, attempted rape, sexual harassment or any type of indecent behaviour in relation to women. Nearly fifty percent of the entire farohi (miscellaneous) documents were in the sexual misdemeanours category. The sources use the term cham- chori for all types of sexual misconduct. The documents do not comment on how these offences (sexual misconduct, rape, sexual harassment, and incest) were perceived by the local people or the victims' families. In all the cases reported, the state took action

76 See Appendix A.

251 against the male perpetrator and held him responsible, whatever his of caste and clan status.77 So the Brahmans or the caste councils were not rescuers of women; that role was performed by the eighteenth century states on their own.

Most importantly, in cases of rape or sexual misconduct, the male was adjudged as at fault. These judgments might reflect the inability of women to pay fines. Yet this inability cannot be considered as an important indicator because upper caste women, such as Brahmans, Rajputs or members of merchant's family could have afforded to pay a fine easily. All the cases of cham-chori were reported to the kotwal or the faujdar's office, and they were properly investigated through interrogations, oral testimony and written confessions. When women complained of sexual misconduct, their names and with professions were often cited, but, in most cases, the names of the male members of the family were recorded, and the victims were mentioned as daughters, sisters, wives or daughters-in-law.

Sometimes respected members of society such as Brahmans or Sanyasis (hermits) crossed their boundaries and acted inappropriately towards women. The state authorities dealt with these types of people quite sternly; as they were apprehended, fined, and even told to move out the premises of their temples and localities. In 1736, a sanyasi (hermit) on the outskirts of city of Jaipur was asked to leave the area after he was accused of engaging in cham-chori with a woman in his hut.78 Brahmans also had rather easy access to women as they performed religious duties, and people interacted with them on a daily

77 From Brahmans, Thakur, Rajputs to menial castes like Teli, Mochi and Chamar were fined in cases of cham-chori. 78 Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1736 RSA, Bikaner.

252 basis for social and religious functions and ceremonies. The highest fine quoted in the arhsatta documents was paid by Khema Brahman of Jaipur when he was accused of doing cham-chori with Lakhi Brahmani. He was ordered to pay 1701 rupees for this offence by the state authorities.

Most of the reported cases of cham-chori involved the mercantile communities of

Jaipur, and this is not surprising because they came into contact with women frequently.

They handled businesses as shopkeepers or as merchants exchanging money or selling jewellery, clothes, perfumes, and food grains. Every year, women reported infractions by such people (see Appendix A). Sometimes, the state imposed small fines (from one rupee to five rupees), usually when a person was accused of trying to touch a woman inappropriately or making a snide remark (shouki aur cham-chori kiyu). The cham- chori fines were generally quite high in the context of other offences, and ranged from

100 to 500 rupees. It seems that physically disabled women were more at risk of being violated by the members of mercantile communities. In 1737, Khannu sunar and Rupa mahajan of Kishan Ganj bazaar (Jaipur) were accused of doing cham-chori with a blind woman when she came to their shop to do some shopping. The records show that members of all professional castes such as Darji (tailors), Mali (gardeners), Barhi

(carpenters), Nai (barbers), Telis(oil sellers), Julaha (weavers), and Mochi (shoe makers) were fined (mostly small fines) for acts of cham-chori..

79 Ibid, Year 1740, and N. K. Wagle, "Women in kotwal's papers", 39-40 says that "the kotwal of the Pune city also reported cases when Brahmans were accused of having illicit sexual relations with women. One, Sakhram Mahadev Brahman had to pay a fine of 88 rupees and 12 annas when he was accused of having sex with a Brahman widow". 80 Ibid, Year 1740. 81 Ibid., Year 1737; for more details see Appendix A. 82 See Appendix A for more details.

253 Furthermore, more than fifty percent of the cham-chori cases were committed by family members. Members of extended families lived in close proximity, sometimes in the same house, and women were subjected to sexual violations by their fathers-in-law, brothers-in-law or cousins. Inappropriate behaviour by fathers and brothers was also reported to the authorities. It is not clear how the authorities were alerted to the incidents or who were the informants but, once the matter had been reported there would be an investigation, which might result in fines and the imprisonment of the culprits. The offenders who had committed cham-chori against the member of their families belonged to all castes. There were also documented cases of incest and homosexual affairs documented (very few though). For example, in 1740, Khema mahajan was accused of sexual misconduct with his twelve-year-old daughter and was fined. This is the only case discovered to date in which the term benzari kiyu (sexual assault) was used in the documents. 4 Rupa and Kasali Brahmanis of Tappa Khoh were fined eleven rupees for having an affair after the authorities were informed about their association by the village council. The affair created a scandal in the community.85

Sometimes there were false accusations and also the occasions when the accuser was found guilty of inciting a male by her remarks or gestures. In these types of cases, the female accusers were fined by the authorities. When Tulchini Telini of qasba Jaipur accused Tara Teli of doing cham-chori with her, the investigation determined that the accused person was not even present in the city at the time. Tulchini was found at fault

83 See Appendix A for details. For all other instances the term cham-chori has been used in the Jaipur state documents. 85 Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1762, RSA, Bikaner.

254 and fined sixteen rupees Further, Bheru Sunar's daughter-in-law from Kishan Ganj

bazaar of Jaipur city accused her brother-in-law of behaving inappropriately. The

interrogations in the case established that she had incited her accuser by making

suggestive remarks (should kiyu), and she was fined for that. Cases of inter caste sexual

relations appear nearly every year in the Jaipur records. It should be noted that cham-

chori cases were endogenous and there were very few exogenous cases. This fact is also

corroborated by the evidence from the Jaipur Kota and Jodhpur sources.87 The states'

documents considered in this analysis, such as in the states Jodhpur, Jaipur, and Maratha

(Pune), report hundreds of inter caste relationships. In Jaipur, women of the upper castes;

the Brahmani, Rajputani, and Jatni, notified the authorities about sexual misdemeanours

against them by Rajputs, Mahajans, Sunars, Minas and even Muslims.88 Pune records

also cite cases of inter-caste relationships, and, according to N. Wagle, examples of inter

religious relations are also not lacking in the kotwali papers.89

86 Ibid., Year 1743. 87 For Kota: see Sethia, Rajput Polity, 179 and for Jodhpur: see Nirmal Kumar, "Crime and Gender in the eighteenth century Rajasthan", 40-54. 88 Rajputs: Dhanya Patel had kept Gangli Brahmani in his home and he was fine 251 rupees and Gangi was sent back to her home, Arhsattapargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1740 Mahajans: Khushla Mahajan was fined 22 rupees for sexual misconduct with Tulsi Brahmini, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur Year 1743, Harnam Mahajan had done shouki (snide remark) with Bhadri Brahmani in a mela (fair) and was fined 2 rupees, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1739, Tara Mahajan was fined rupees 1100 for doing cham-chori with Chanda Brahmani. Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1740 and Amar Mahajan paid 401 rupees for doing cham-chori with Seva Brahmani, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1762. Sunars: Deva Sunar of Kishan ganj bazaar was fined 16 and 22 rupees for his offences (cham-chori), Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1737. Minas: Bhojya Mina was accused by Jogi Brahman's daughter-in-law and he had to pay a huge fine of 500 rupees after the investigations, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1734. Mussalmans: Sardu Mussalman was accused of doing cham-chori with a Brahmani and was fined 16 rupees and Fijju Mussalman was fined 7 rupees for the same offence when Maparam Jat's daughter-in-law complained against him, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1737, RSA, Bikaner. 89"Jagya Brahmin Nasikkar of Bhavanpeth had sexual relations with Jhaina Musalmanin (Muslim women) of the same peth (ward).The woman was insolvent, hence was sent away without a fine; a fine of nine rupees and eight annas was collected from Jagya. In a second instance, eighteen-year-old Ibrahim Gadekari of Ravivarpeth had sex with thirteen-year-old Rani Kadam. They were incarcerated and an investigation followed. Both of them 'were children and had committed sexual act out of ignorance according to the KotwaPs clerk explanation in his entry.' N. K. Wagle, "Women in Kotwal's papers" 36: there are other instances mentioned as well.

255 Besides cases of inter caste relationships, there were instances when women became targets of sexual harassment when they lived alone as hermits. For example,

Saheji Jat was accused of sexual misconduct by Veera Bairangani in the neighbourhood of Jaipur. He had to pay 1,100 rupees. He was kept in jail until his family paid the money to the faujdar.90 On another occasion, Shukhla Jat was fined 201 rupees for committing cham-chori with Jagli Bairagni, who came to Jaipur with a group of religious hermits from Mathura. When Shukhla went to receive her blessings, he found her alone in her hut and did cham-chori with her. Women entertainers identified as nautanki or natariki were respected as professionals, and people who took advantage of them were punished and fined by government authorities. Mannar Rajput indulged in sexual misconduct with a dancing girl {nautanki) and was fined twenty-five rupees. In another case, three men were accused of sexual misconduct in 1737 when they interrupted dancing that involved a number of women (names not mentioned).91

SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES AND THE IMPOSITION OF CASTE {JATI) NORMS

This section deals with surveillance techniques adopted by the state by looking into the collection of data on births, deaths, adoptions, migrations and cases of ostracization. Rajputana records (Jaipur and Jodhpur) are excellent records that provide a lot of statistical information about individuals, their castes, and members of their household. This data was mostly used for revenue collection purposes but it also served

90 Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1737, RSA, Bikaner. 91 Ibid., see Appendix A for more details.

256 another important element of the administrative machinery, which engaged in surveillance through enumeration. As will be examined later, the movement of communities and individuals from one place to another even within the state was closely monitored in Jaipur. In times of famine and food scarcity, the state took measures such as tax redemptions and revenue free land grants to discourage people from moving out of their areas. The official correspondence strongly suggests that state officials were instructed not to let people migrate and their contributions towards rehabilitation were rewarded handsomely.92 Management of communities was a major issue for the Jaipur state and that is why the enumeration process was quite useful in keeping track of people.

The imposition of fine on individuals belonging to different communities for not informing the state authorities about births and death could be considered precedent for the census introduced by the British. In pre-colonial times the enumeration of communities was used to organize and distribute social and economic privileges.

Different castes were made to account for their members both numerically and geographically to the state authorities in order to be considered for revenue concessions and administrative positions. This was the reason that even adoptions were closely monitored, since inter caste exchanges might disrupt social harmony and the caste hierarchy. Any case of adoption had to be registered, and it seems that both intra and inter caste adoptions were not allowed. For example, one case tells of merchant's wife had adopted a child from a Muslim couple and declared him as her son without disclosing the details. The state authorities fined her 401 rupees, and the child was returned back to the

Muslim parents. A lower caste person, Ramji mochi (shoe-maker), who had adopted a

92 Please see chapter two for more details. 93 For more details see Singh, "Regulating the Domestic", 84.

257 son from a Rajput and he was fined as well (details not mentioned) and had to return the baby to his parents.94 All people were required to report births and deaths in their families, and non compliance with these orders led to reprimands and penalties. 5 Family members of deceased persons were also liable for fines, if they failed to inform the faujdar about the death and the details of the funeral arrangements.96

Another aspect of the systems of surveillance was intervention to impose caste norms and to help the caste councils handle their members. Governments intervened to enforce caste rules and regulations. Some examples of such instances, which were reported by the kotwal of Jaipur involved members of all castes, such as the Mahajans,

Minas, Balahi, Bhujar, Ahirs, and others.97 State authorities helped the caste councils to impose jati norms on their individual members by implementing punishments, infractions such as defying caste norms, exhibiting immoral behaviour or breaking prearranged alliances. However, the records show few cases of state involvement in cases of defiance of caste norms. The reason might have been that caste councils were able to deal with individual violations locally.

94 Ibid. 95 Arhsatta pargana, Sawai Jaipur, Year 1763, p. 1330, RSA, Bikaner. 96 Ibid, Year 1763: Rahta Das gujar of Tappa khoh was fined for not informing about his father's death to the authorities, Harkia Jat did not inform the Sarkar about his father's death and was fined rupees 31, Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, and Hemu gujar was fined for cremating his mother. 97The following cases were reported from the office of Kotwal of qasba Sawai Jaipur from 1740 to 1761: Kesva Jewa fined 11 rupees for defying his caste rules Uday Sunar was fined 91rupees for not performing his duties like his other caste members. Nanda Meena did not follow his caste rules and was fined 6 rupees. Khushlal Sunar was fined for not following his caste regulations. Sukha Balahi announced the engagement of his niece without informing the government authorities and was fined 2 rupees. Bhema Bbhujar had kept a woman in his house on the orders of his caste council but did not inform the government and he was fined 11 rupees. 98 Ibid., Years: 1740 to 1751.

258 The state authorities strictly enforced the rules and regulations regarding inter- caste communications and also about their dietary and ritual customs. The officials reviewed any decision taken by a caste or village council and routinely intervened both to enforce the council's decisions regarding individuals and to uphold their own authority.

The state sometimes even superseded decisions taken by the caste councils and overruled the councils. Often the state had to take a confrontational stand on certain issues." Food was an important medium for participation in a caste at that time, and ostracism meant denying people the privilege of eating with others in a caste. Taking food cooked by a member of a lower caste resulted in excommunication from the community. Such individuals were usually readmitted after paying a fine or offering penance. 10°

References to individuals who were ostracized from their castes for not following the caste's dietary codes can be found in different regions of Jaipur state. For example,

Ganga Ghatka was found guilty of not following the dietary codes of his caste in pargana

Malpura. He was found dining with members of other castes and the caste council was convened to ostracize him. Through the intervention of the faujdar, the council decided to pardon him after payment of a fine of eighty-eight rupees for his reinstatement in his caste.101 Deva Jat of Tappa Khoh (pargana Jaipur) interacted with an ostracized person and was fined eleven rupees. In this case, the government supported the caste council's decision and fined Deva for his association with an ostracized person.102 Even accepting

The people continued to invite more (than allowed) to the marriages and other social occasions in spite of imposition of fines both by the state. 100 Singh, "Regulating the Domestic", 84 & N. K. Wagle, "Women in Kotwal's papers", 16-17. 101 Arhsatta pargana Sawai Jaipur, Year 1763, 370, RSA, Bikaner. 102 Ibid, Year 1740, 393.

259 food from an upper caste household was an offence, and Teja Chamar of village Vuroli

(pargana Ghazi ka Thana) was fined for that.

The state preferred to let caste councils manage their members, but somewhat eroded these councils' autonomy by insisting on being informed about each decision taken regarding caste infractions. All matters regarding violations of norms and ostracism had to be approved by the state authorities before decisions were made public.104

Individuals could lodge complaints with the government against the decisions of their village councils. For example, one Mula Teli appealed to the faujdar of Jaipur about his ostracism from his caste, which had occurred at the instigation of Sada, who had, with the help of the caste council, declared Mula Teli an outcaste without informing the government authorities. Such action indicates that individuals could not be ostracized unless the government authorities were involved. After an investigation, the faujdar discovered that Sada Teli was at fault, and Mula Teli was reinstated in his caste. Sada

Teli had to pay a fine of 11 rupees. In a similar case, Tiku Teli was instrumental in having Luna Teli of Tappa Haveli ostracized from his caste. When Luna lodged a complaint with government officials against Tiku, the matter was investigated, and Tiku was found at fault. His fine was thirty-one rupees.106 The Kalal panchas (members of caste council) of pargana Chatsu were punished by the state when they excommunicated

Ghasi Kalal, and they were ordered to reinstate Ghasi to the caste immediately.107 It appears that the state interfered on behalf of ostracized individuals because ostracism was

103 Ibid., 104 Ibid., 105 Ibid., Year 1740.,386 . 106 Ibid, Year 1740, 387. 107 Void, pargana Chatsu, Year 1752.

260 detrimental to their survival. The excommunicated person could not practice his own profession and was not accepted by other communities. Such individuals were potentially dangerous; therefore, state officials considered control of these types of situations as a law and order issue. Ostracism led to the migration of these individuals to different places and, hence, to loss of production and income for the state. To avoid such developments, the state intervened on the pretext of rescuing its subjects from the clutches of biased councils (panchayats). These interventions reveal the context of broad political and economic concerns that put social harmony at risk.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The contentious aspects of life in the eighteenth century Jaipur state can be discerned in the records of caste infractions. Through such infractions, common people defied both social and political authorities and exposed the vulnerability of the state.

Such activities forced the state to accommodate the contentions of social groups by acting as arbiter and negotiator. Through its use of moralizing rhetoric, the rulers of Jaipur state were able to infiltrate the most intimate areas of their subjects' lives-their families. This analysis has highlights the governance of eighteenth century Jaipur state, which assumed a paternalistic- cum-protectionist role, by dealing with issues of marriage, domestic violence, and sexual misdemeanours related to women. This discussion has brought to the forefront the contradictory and contentious nature of the state as its rulers' tried to legitimize its power and control by imposing both caste norms through control and surveillance techniques. At the same time, the state intervened to undo caste norms and

261 their jurisdiction if the norms interfered in the assertion of its authority. The contestations between the state and its subjects presented above have demonstrated that various communities, irrespective of their caste status, at times questioned and defied states' authority.

APPENDIX: A

The fines vary from the lowest being 1 to the highest 1700 rupees. Some interesting cases are discussed in detail in order to understand the society and social norms of that period.

The offences related to sexual misdemeanours are indexed in a tables attached year-wise.

The detailed analysis of the case of sexual misdemeanours and the fines collected against them are as follows:

YEAR 1728

There were eight cases of acts of sexual misdemeanours reported to the government authorities. The highest fine paid in this year was by Harji Jat of Chainpura who was accused of sexual misconduct with a married woman identified as Mohan's

262 daughter-in-law. Bhojya was accused and fined twenty rupees for sexually assaulting his own daughter-in-law identified as Ram Kishan's wife. In another case Khesra Ahir was fined fifteen rupees for having committed some sort of inappropriate behaviour with a

Brahmini (high caste). Other cases are miscellaneous forms of sexual misconduct with women.

YEAR 1731

There is very little data of the fine collection for this year only ten people were fined for miscellaneous offences. Only two cases were reported for sexual misdemeanours. In one case Khushla Mahajan was fined thirty-three rupees for sexual misconduct with Tulsi Brahmini. In other case a person identified by his caste; Jat was fined thirty-three rupees after being accused by a woman from his own caste Nathi Jatni.

YEAR 1734

In this year there are seventy- six cases of sexual misdemeanour out of one hundred and thirty-seven total cases, reported to the government authorities. These cases can be categorized as sexual assault, inappropriate behaviour and a rape committed by low caste people such as Ahirs and Chamars as well as the high caste people like the

Brahmans and the Rajputs. The highest fine in this year was paid by Bhojya Mina who had been accused by Jogi Brahmin's daughter-in-law. Bhojya paid 500 rupees for his conduct and was detained by Faujdar Roop Singh for questioning. In another case, Hira

Mahajan was fined ninety-one rupees for sexually assaulting his own daughter-in-law.

263 Women entertainers identified as nautanki or natariki were respected for their profession and people taking advantage of them were punished and fined by the government authorities. Manhar Rajput had indulged in sexual misconduct with a dancing girl {nautanki) and was fined twenty-five rupees.

People were fined even if they tried to indulge in an inappropriate behaviour. A person identified as Mina (his caste) was fined five rupees after being caught misbehaving with a woman (identified by her caste: bhar-bhujaya). In a similar case,

Maha Mahajan was fined eleven rupees for his snide remark against a woman.

It seems that the perpetrators were caught and fined after having fled from the place they had committed an offence. In one such case, Gulab Khan was fined eleven rupees by the faujdar after receiving a complaint from woman from Kasba Khoh. In another case, Ram Bihari had tried to sexual assault Sevaram's daughter of Tapa Haveli.

The faujdar was informed and Ram Bihari was caught in Jaipur and was fined nine rupees for his behaviour.

YEAR 1723

There were eleven cases of sexual misdemeanour reported for this year. The total numbers of offences reported were eight-one. Out of these four people were caught while trying to sexually assault women. In these cases, the most interesting case was of a hermit (sanyasi) who was a well-respected person in the city and was caught trying to do

264 cham-chori with a woman. He was apprehended by the faujdar and was told to go out of the city after paying a fine of 114 rupees. In another case, Gangaram Brahmin was fined nineteen rupees when he was caught trying to do cham-chori (sexual misdemeanour).

Avaram Mahajan was fined five rupees by the government authorities when he was apprehended for misbehaving with a woman (shouki aur cham-chori keyu). Harnam

Mahajan had passed a snide remark (shouki) to Bhadri Brahmini in a fair (mela) and was fined two rupees.

YEAR 1734

There were ninety-eight cases reported related to acts of sexual misdemeanour out of one hundred and eighty-six offences. In this year the highest fine was paid by Saheji who was accused for a sexual misconduct and a possible rape by a female hermit

(Bairangni) Saheji had to pay a hefty fine of 1100 rupees and kept in jail till the money was paid by his family. The word used is cham-chori but the nature and amount of fine suggests that maybe, he actually raped the woman. Three men had committed acts of sexual misdemeanour with dancing girls. One was identified as Jagga who was fined 5 rupees, the other person named Maha Singh Mahajan was fined sixteen rupees and Luna nai (barber) was fined twenty-five rupees. Khannu Sunar and Rupa Mahajan were accused of doing cham-chori with blind women. Both of them had shops in the main market and had tried to indulge in some sort of sexual misconduct with these women when they had come inside their shops. Khannu sunar was fined twenty-six rupees and

Rupa Mahajan was fined eleven rupees.

265 The usual victims of sexual misdemeanours (cham-chori) were women who came to the markets to buy things. Here the business community namely the Mahajans,

Agarwals, Patels, Sunars, Khummars, Nais, Darji had direct contact with women and tried to take advantage of them. Some examples are given below:

TABLE (A)

YEAR ACCUSED ACCUSER FINE REFERENCE

1737 Maha Singh Soni 16.50 Arhsattas pargana, Sawai

Mahajan Jaipur,

1737 Vagra Patel Munadi 11.00 Ibid

1737 Khannu Sunar ? 26.00 Ibid

1737 Rudra Kummar Harli 51.00 Ibid

1737 Luna Nai Chema 22.00 Ibid

1737 Rupa Mahajan Virayani 11.00 Ibid

1737 Khushal Darji Udaiyini 11.00 Ibid

1737 Hera Mahajan Bharmi 150.00 Ibid

1737 Deva Sunar Nanji 16.50 Ibid

1737 Deva Sunar Marili 22.00 Ibid

1737 Kishan Sunar Sawi 22.00 Ibid

266 Two interesting examples of acts of sexual misdemeanours were between Muslim men and Hindu women. Although it is not clear how these women came into contact with

Muslim men. a) Sardu Mussalman was accused of cham-chori with a Brahmini and was fined sixteen rupees b) Fijju Mussalman was fined seven rupees for cham-chori with

Maparam's daughter-in-law.

YEAR 1738

In this year there were ninety-one offences reported to the authorities, out of which fifty-two were related to sexual misdemeanour {cham-chori). Nathu Jat paid the highest fine amounting to 275 rupees for doing cham-chori with Musli Jatni. Mahawat

Rajput had to pay a fine of 250 rupees after being accused by a Brahmini for cham-chori.

Khushla Mahajan was also fined 250 rupees for doing cham-chori with Vijay's daughter- in-law.

YEAR 1739

Early 80% offences in this year were related to acts of sexual misdemeanour.

Amar Mahajan paid the highest penalty of 401 rupees for doing cham-chori with Seva

Brahmini. Nanstu Mussalman had to pay a fine of 125 rupees for sexual misconduct with

Nuri Mussalman. Other cases are of miscellaneous nature and most of the fines collected from these people ranged from three rupees to seventy-five rupees. Some examples are given below to illustrate the dynamics of Rajput society.

267 TABLE (B)

YEAR ACCUSED ACCUSER FINE REFERENCE

1739 Hammo Sumni 3.00 Arhsatta

pargana,

Sawai Jaipur

Year 1739

1739 Bhaura Veransi 18.00 Ibid

1739 Mesaram Gujri 33.00 Ibid

1739 Pursanath Kayatri 17.00 Ibid

1739 Alam Mayasi 6.00 Ibid

1739 Sukhram Maujiram's daughter-in- 33.00 Ibid

law

1739 Sultan (tobacco Rupu 11.00 Ibid

seller)

1739 Jodha Maha (malini) 44.00 Ibid

1739 Karimjulaha Jammo julahini 11.00 Ibid

1739 Ramkishan Narayan's daughter-in-law 41.00 Ibid

1739 Subha agarwal Bawa telini 11.00 Ibid

1739 Khushlal mahajan Kesri brahmini 25.00 Ibid

1739 Hera mahajan Marvi 75.00 Ibid YEAR 1740

There were two hundred and fifteen cases reported offences in year 1740 out of which one hundred and eighteen were cases related to acts of sexual misdemeanour.

Khema Brahmin paid the highest fine of this period when he was accused of doing cham- chori by Lakhi Brahmini. He was ordered to pay 1701 rupees for this offence. Other high fine payers of that year were: Ghasi who was accused of cham-chori by Jagni and he was fined 526 rupees. Tiku Teja was fined 400 rupees for acts of sexual misdemeanour.

Nathu Mahajan was fined 374 rupees for doing cham-chori with his younger brother's wife. Setaram was fined 300 rupees for cham-chori with his daughter-in-law. Dhanya had kept Gangli Brahmini in his home as a mistress. When authorities were informed about this matter, the officials were sent to his house to investigate. He was fined 251 rupees after being found with a woman. Chatrahari was also fined (221 rupees) for having relations with a woman. The most interesting case of Year 1740 was of Khema who was charged for indulging in sexual misconduct with his daughter. Khema was fined 201 rupees and the word used in this instance is benzari kiyu.\Q%

YEAR 1741

In year 1741 out of 237 reported offences 148 were acts of sexual misdemeanour. The highest fine was paid by Godha who had done cham-chori with a Brahmini (name not mentioned) and was fined 851 rupees. Other high fines for 1741 for sexual misdemeanour were as follows:

108 In local parlance it means sexual misconduct or assault.

269 TABLE C

YEARS ACCUSED ACCUSER FINE REFERENCES

1741 Khushlal Daughter-in-law 401 Arhsatta pargana, Sawai

Jaipur, year 1741

1741 Gega Brahmin's daughter- 301 Ibid

Mahajan in-law

1741 Faji Bhojya's daughter-in- 175 Ibid

Mussalman law

1741 Mulchand Karchyadarjan 175 Ibid

1741 Dhola mohan Gagri 175 Ibid

1741 Bhagwan Viddyi 101 Ibid

1741 Bhawani Parsa Mahanjan's 101 Ibid

daughter-in-law

1741 Pama Naththi 101 Ibid

Mahajan

1741 Jagram Mahari 98 Ibid

YEAR 1743

Most of the cases of acts of sexual misdemeanour for year 1743 are quite interesting and deals with variety of acts, which can be categorized under the term cham-chori. For example, Bheru sunar's daughter was fined four rupees for passing a remark to her brother-in-law. In another case Phula Chand went inside Kheta Rajputini's house without

270 permission to do some repair. He was fined eleven rupees for this act. There were wrong allegations of sexual assault as well, and Tara Teli was accused by Tulchi Telini of doing cham-chori with her. But it was found out that Tara was not present in the city at the time when Tulchi accused him. Tulchi was found at fault and was fined sixteen rupees. In another case, Ruphalahi was fined 151 rupees for doing cham-chori by the government authorities. The name of the woman is not mentioned.

YEAR 1745

In year 1743 only twenty-three cases of sexual misdemeanour were reported to the officials. All fines were collected by Sitaram Kotwal and submitted to faujdar Bhoop

Singh. The cases are mostly from the areas near Chabutra Kotwali and the fines collected were nominal ranging from four to thirteen rupees. The highest fine for sexual misconduct was paid by Madari for doing cham-chori with Harmi's daughter-in-law.

YEAR 1758

In the year 1758 there were sixty-eight cases of sexual misdemeanour and the highest fine was 250 rupees. The highest fines for this year were paid by Gangaram for doing cham-chori with Jagli and Bahma's daughter-in-law. Other high payers were Nola who was fined 111 rupees for sexual misdemeanour and Khushram Gujar who had kept a mistress in his house. Khurshram had to pay a fine of ninety-five rupees and was told to marry the woman with the consent of the panchayat.

271 YEAR 1761

The fine collection for this year was administered by Kotwal Rath Ram of Jaipur who was working under Faujdar Agadh Singh. There are thirty-four cases of sexual misdemeanour and the highest fine was paid by Sardar Singh Rajawat. He and his group were fined 1093 rupees but they were only able to pay ninety rupees for allegedly raping a woman. Tara Mahajan was fined 125 rupees after being accused of doing cham-chori by Bawli. Sawal Patel had to pay 80 rupees for sexual misdemeanour with Chajja Mali's daughter-in-law.

YEAR 1762

There were seventy-five cases of sexual misdemeanour for the year 1762 collection by faujdar Agadh Singh. The highest fine payers were: 1) Tapa Mahajan (?) was fined 1100 rupees for doing cham-chori with Chanda. 2) Sadami was fined 115 rupees for sexual misdemeanour with Narath's daughter-in-law. 3) Saha was fined 101 rupees for doing cham-chori with his daughter-in-law. 4) Badan Singh was fined ninety- six rupees for sexual misdemeanour with Shyamli (dancing girl). 5) Kishan Brahmin was fined seventy-one rupees for the same offence with Sobhli. The most interesting case was of Rupa and Kasli Brahmini; they were fined 11 rupees for their alleged affair. The authorities just reported about their association (rishta) and the objection of the panchayat over it. Both of them were fined for causing a scandal in their community.

272 YEAR 1763

The cases for 1763 are tabulated below:

# YEAR ACCUSED ACCUSER FINE REFERENCES

1 1763 Neta Jat Chaja Jat's daughter- 9.00 Arhsatta pargana, Sawai in-law Jaipur, 1763 2 1763 Khushlal Bhata's daughter-in- 5.50 Ibid law 3 1763 Manna His daughter-in-law 8.75 Ibid

4 1763 Peroz Government (sarkar) 4.25 Ibid mussalman 5 1763 Harkujat Phema 1.25 Ibid

6 1763 Teja Khatri 3.25 Ibid

7 1763 Hemraj Mina Kishan mina's 22.50 Ibid daughter-in-law 8 1763 Chaili Gujjar Khohli's daughter 1.25 Ibid

9 1763 Pheta Bairagni (woman 3.50 Ibid Brahman hermit) 10 1763 Ramu Bairagni (woman 9.50 Ibid hermit) 11 1763 Harji Baski 3.00 Ibid

12 1763 Sadda Agni 3.00 Ibid

13 1763 Tara Brahman Mina (caste) 15.00 Ibid

14 1763 Khelna balahi Government (sarkar) 5.50 Ibid

Year 1764

There were eighty-eight cases of sexual misdemeanour for the year 1764 in the city of Jaipur and its neighbouring areas (referred as thanas). Nand Kumar and Harlal

273 paid the highest fine for that year. Other high payers were Harji (131 rupees), Shyam

(111 rupees) and Sukhram (eighty-sixrupees). CONCLUSION

The historiography on the nature of Indian states has generally developed on the basis of two Eurocentric models: despotic and theocratic. This dissertation concludes that the Indian states cannot be strictly compartmentalized into any versions of these models.

The processes of state formation, entrenchment of sovereignty, and augmentation of variable resources were different in every state. The success or failure of states' structures depended on their rulers' strategies of power negotiation with the local and rural aristocracy. The rulers were able to establish and cohesive bases of power by reconstituting the ritualistic symbols and traditional norms of their societies.

The comparative analysis in this study of the major states of the eighteenth century explicates the redundancy of above mentioned models. Studies of Indian states that utilize the framework of the two pre-conceived models or caricatures deprive the states of any credibility that would justify their establishment of power in their regions.

One of the objectives of this study is to highlight the political initiatives of these rulers which enabled them to create their independent principalities. The preceding chapters revealed that the state of Jaipur was by no means passive, hesitant, or indifferent vis-a- vis its subjects. In this way, I have contested the historiography on military

fiscalism in eighteenth century, which implies that as soon as the states lost the military

capability to coerce their subjects, their power withered away as quickly as it had

emerged. Chapter one demonstrated how the state of Jaipur emerged as an independent kingdom without the involvement by its rulers in any aggressive campaigns against their neighbours, nor did they ever declare their hostilities towards the Mughal emperors. They

275 continued to enjoy the emperor's friendship and support until the beginning of the nineteenth century when the Jaipur state signed the subsidiary alliance with the English

East India Company in 1818.

The evidence provided in chapter one on the legitimization of rule provides a context for the debates about the inability of Indian rulers to create and sustain strong centralized states because of lack of political ideology. The rulers of Jaipur adopted the role as protectors of Dharma and by using several long-forgotten rituals to entrench their sovereignty. In doing so they operated like other eighteenth century states of Mysore,

Awadh and the Peshwas (Marathas).1 In Jaipur the use of symbolism in manifesting the ritualistic power of the king was emphasized to undermine the ecclesiastical position of the Brahmans in the political affairs. The rulers of Jaipur started to control the religious institution of Mathura, and through their intervention, the Mughal emperors abolished discriminatory taxes on their non-Muslim subjects. Through such initiatives, the rulers of

Jaipur asserted their position protectors of the religious and social order of their subjects.

Two important conclusion emerge from chapter one. First, the rulers of the eighteenth century states lacked neither ideology nor competence and, secondly, Indian states were capable of both establishing power structures through various methods and implementing both military (Mysore and the Marathas) and ritualistic (Jaipur and Awadh) systems. It is important to note that as far as back to Kautilya's Arthashastra, strategies for centralizing sovereignty and managing lesser states were subjects of discussions at courts of kings.

1 Tipu Sultan of Mysore had tried to legitimize his rule by seeking recognition of Caliph of Turkey, the Nawabs of Awadh had patronized Shiism to only challenge the Mughal authorities but also establish separate religious and spiritual milieu. The Peshwas rulers had inducted the Brahmans in their administrative structures to legitimize their position.

276 The models of kingship that came to dominate the historiography of Indian states after the nineteenth century foreclosed any engagement in this history, and so any subtle analysis of political structure and agency.

The next chapter of this dissertation addresses addressed the ways in which various avenues of income were utilized by eighteenth century states, thus contesting the military fiscalism model by highlighting that innovative revenue strategies, rather than territorial conquest, were responsible for the consolidation of sovereignty.. The role of elites is delineated in detail to point out how their interests were joined with those of the central authority to expand financial resources. The evidence that the states redistributed fifty percent of its income to these elites shows that Indian states were not leviathans that reduced their subjects to abject poverty. On the contrary, they were actively involved in facilitating the economic prosperity of their kingdom by seeking alliances and by sharing their wealth and income with their rural and urban elites.

Theories about Indian kingship have compartmentalized Indian kingdoms into neatly defined homogenous communities. This kind of dichotomy has also been introduced into the study of architecture and nearly all forms of art. Indian cities have also been studied from this point of view; cities are understood as legacies of dynastic glories or as fulfillments of the purely ritualistic and religious paradigms of a particular society. Adaptation and the synchronization of Indie architectural elements in buildings in the urban centres are rarely explored. Chapter three compares the capital cities of

Kachchwahas and the Mughal emperor's Shahjahan's to question this mode of

277 historiography. In this mode of study the aesthetic visions of Indian rulers and their capacities to enrich Indie cultural forms are undermined. The chapter concludes that

Jaipur was an example of the perfect assimilation of existing architectural forms that offered a futuristic model for amore efficient and well planned city. It universalizes Indie elements including Islamic trends for the capital city.

In the despotic and theocratic models; coercive or indifference of the Indian rulers informed the writings on the extent of state control, especially, in the judicial matters of their subjects. These writings suggest that the Brahmanical authorities fulfilled the role of administration of justice and implementation of caste ordained principles was one of the sacred duties of the kings. Chapter four and five critiqued this type of historical analysis by showcasing the areas of state control that transcended tradition and caste related obligations. The state intervened in their subjects' familial, individual, and social affairs.

A very important consideration is how the rhetoric of gender was utilized by the state in eighteenth century Jaipur to instutionalize political power. The state superseded the traditional social norms to intervene in day- to -day lives of their subjects such as domestic violence, martial issues and adultery. Chapters four and five also examine the administrative functions of the eighteenth century states by giving examples from states of Jodhpur, Kota, Awadh, Bengal, Mysore and Gujarat. Study of examples raises questions about the validity of imposing of pre-conceived models for the study of Indian states. The administration of justice was pragmatic and practical and did not follow the

Dharmashastras at all. In fact, the Mughal administrative institutions were retained to

278 organize and legitimize governance by different eighteenth century states, including

Jaipur.

The Indian political structures were much more diverse, innovative, and had the capability of not only establishing or conquering territories but also to sustain control over their principalities. The failure of the eighteenth century states to set up long lasting regimes was caused by other factors, such as political problems, economic changes, and military defeats. The eighteenth century in India was an era of great changes and the de centralization of the Mughal Empire had created a political vacuum. The constant wars were efforts to build an empire that would include the whole Indian sub-continent. At least the Marathas and state of Mysore were fighting for that purpose. In this tussle for power, other, smaller states were ravaged, especially the state of Jaipur. The state was raided continuously from 1743 to 1799 by the Maratha leaders on their journey towards

Delhi. The power of endurance of the Jaipur polity, economy, and society were tested up to their limits during this period. If its rulers had not been capable of establishing long lasting economic and administrative institutions, they could not have survived, almost half a century of continuous wars and invasions. More region-based micro studies are needed to highlight examples of ingenuity, innovative techniques, and methods of establishing and manipulating power relations of the Indian states. They might have been different from each other in their techniques or methodology of rule and further research will reveal a more textured understanding of these states. Without the study of that diversity, the dynamics of political experience of the Indian sub-continent cannot be appreciated or understood.

279 GLOSSARY

Arzdasht Formal requests made to the rulers Bania Merchants and shopkeepers Bhomia Rural potentates Bichchaiti Local merchants Bohra Merchants who dealt in insurance (Eastern Rajasthan) Chamar Cobblers and Porters Cham-chori sexual misdemeanour Chaudhari village headman Darbar Royal court Darzi tailor Darul-ul-Khalafa Capital city of the Mughals Dharma-shastras Law-books Farohi Miscellaneous Faujdar Military commandant Gujjar Cow-Herds Hundi Bills of Exchange Ijara Contractual farming Ijaradar Contractual farmer Jagir Land assignment Jama Notional income Jati Castes Jinsi Revenue collection in kind Khalisa Crown lands Khasra Land ownership details kept by the village officials Khud-khast Land-cultivated by the owners Khummar Potters Khutut-i-Maharajgaran Letters addressed to the rulers of Jaipur Kisas Retaliation Kotwal Magistrate Kul-hubatat All taxes Lakhtang Letters Mahajans Merchants Mansab Rank or title conferred by the Mughals Mansabdar Mughal bureaucrat Mir-Bakshi Minister for army and defence Mutasaddi Revenue assessor Nankar Customary charge Naqad collection in cash Navisht Bond for collecting revenues from villages on lease Nirarkh-bazaar Market Prices of agricultural and non-agricultural products Paibaqi Un-assigned jagirs managed temporarily under the Khalisa Panchayat Village council

280 Patel Village headman Patwari Revenue officials who assessed the land Peshkesh Presents on the appointments or renewals of offices to the rulers Potadar Treasurer Qanungo Official responsible for collecting the revenues Qasbas Small townships Raiyat peasants Razee-namah Reconciliation letter Riyati Concessions Sahukar Banker Sair-i-Jait Non-agricultural taxes Sanad Grant Sarkar Government Sarrafs Money-exchangers Suba province Subedar governor of the province Talab Pond Talluqadar Land-holder Taqavi Loans Thana Military check posts Thikanas Hereditary landlords in Eastern Rajasthan Vakil Agents Watan-jagir Paternal ancestral land Zamindax Land-holder

281 BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

RAJASTHAN STATE ARCHIVES, BIKANER, INDIA (RSA, BIKANER) • The Vikram- Samvat (VS) has been converted into corresponding Common Era.

ARHSATTA RECORDS: Years (CE) Pargana Amber 1694-1723 Pargana Bahatri 1702-1742 Pargana Chatsu 1708-1748 Pargana Dausa 1703-1740 Pargana Geejgarh 1708-1737 Pargana Khohri 1726-1730 Pargana Lalsot 1700-1708 Pargana Malarna 1708-1758 Pargana Malpura 1718-1748 Pargana Naraina 1725-1759 Pargana Niwai 1708-1760 Pargana Phagi 1710-1745 Pargana Saganer 1707-1747 Pargana Sawai Jaipur 1724-1798 Pargana Toda Bhim 1711-1749 Pargana Tonk 1727-1728

DASTUR-UL-AMAL OR AMAL-DASTURS (SCHEDULES OF REVENUE RATES)

Dastur-ul-Amal chabutra Kotwalipargana Phagi 1713 CE Dastur-ul-Mapa Rahdari ofparganas: Bahatri and Chatsu Years: 1798 CE

DASTUR KOMWAR DOCUMENTS (HISTORICAL RECORDS ABOUT THE POLTICAL HISTORY OF JAIPUR FROM 1718-1918 CE) There are 32 volumes in this series and the entries are arranged caste-wise and in an alphabetical order.

MUWAZANA-KALAN OR MUWAZANA KHURD OR CHITTIES (LETTERS OF THE OFFICIALS TO THE MAHARAJAS OF JAIPUR FROM 1700-1798 CE)

282 NIRAKHBAZAAR DOCUMENTS

(PRICES OF AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL PRICES)

Pargana Sawai Jaipur 1713-1750 CE

PUBLISHED WORKS: A Descriptive List of the Khatoot Ahlalkaran (Rajasthani) from 1633 to 1769 CE, Bikaner: Rajasthan State Archives, 1992 A descriptive List of the Arzdashts (Persian) addressed by the various officials to the rulers of Jaipur, Bikaner: Rajasthan State Archives, 1981,1986, & 1992.

SAWAI MAN SINGH II MUSUEM LIBRARY, JAIPUR, INDIA

KAPAD-DWARA COLLECTION: Arzdashts: letters of formal requests sent by the rulers of Jaipur to the Mughal emperors. Farmans: royal decrees issued by the Mughal emperors to the rulers of Jaipur. Hasb-ul-hukums: Letters of Mughal imperial officials written on behest of the emperors. Iqrarnamas: agreements papers recording important treaties. Kharitas: Letters exchanged between the rulers, officials and the nobles. Mahzarnama: reports about inquiries which the rulers of Jaipur conducted. Navishts: Bonds for collecting revenues from the villages on lease (contracts). Parwanas: royal orders written by the imperial officials to the rulers of Jaipur. Sammati-patras: letters of opinion. Sanads: grants for various types of land-holdings. Maps: rich archives of maps, drawings and other cartographical materials.

PUBLISHED RAJASTHANI SOURCES: Atmaram, Kavi. Sawai Jai Singh Carita, Edited and Compiled by Bahura, Gopal Narayan, Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 1979. Shyamdaldas, Kaviraja. Vir Vinod, vol. 4, Udaipur, 1886

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, ALIGARH UNIVERSITY ALIGARH, INDIA

Fazl, Abul. Akbar-nama, vol. 2, Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1887. Kazim, Mohammad, Alamgir-nama, II, Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1868 Lahori, Abdul Hamid, Badshahnama, transcript of the Rampur manuscript. Qazwini, Abdul Qadir, Badshahmana, transcript of the Rampur manuscript. Waris, Mohammad, Badshahnamah, transcript of the Rampur manuscript

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