Q4 2011 www.businessmonitor.com

MeXiCo oil & Gas Report INCLUDES BMI'S FORECASTS

ISSN 1748-4111 Published by Business Monitor International Ltd. OIL & GAS REPORT Q4 2011 INCLUDES 10-YEAR FORECASTS TO 2020

Part of BMI’s Industry Survey & Forecasts Series

Published by: Business Monitor International

Copy deadline: October 2011

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Mexico Oil & Gas Report Q4 2011

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Mexico Oil & Gas Report Q4 2011

CONTENTS

Executive Summary ...... 7 SWOT Analysis ...... 9 Mexico Political SWOT...... 9 Mexico Economic SWOT ...... 10 Mexico Business Environment SWOT ...... 11 Mexico Energy Market Overview ...... 12 Regional Energy Market Overview ...... 16 Oil Supply And Demand ...... 16 Table: Latin America Oil Consumption (000b/d) ...... 19 Table: Latin America Oil Production (000b/d) ...... 20 Table: Latin America Oil Refining Capacity (000b/d) ...... 21 Gas Supply And Demand ...... 22 Table: Latin America Gas Consumption (bcm) ...... 23 Table: Latin America Gas Production (bcm) ...... 23 Liquefied Natural Gas...... 24 Table: Latin America LNG Exports/(Imports) (bcm) ...... 24 Business Environment Ratings ...... 25 Latin America Region ...... 25 Composite Scores...... 25 Table: Regional Composite Business Environment Rating ...... 26 Upstream Scores ...... 27 Table: Regional Upstream Business Environment Rating...... 27 Downstream Scores ...... 28 Table: Regional Downstream Business Environment Rating ...... 28 Business Environment ...... 29 Legal Framework...... 29 Infrastructure ...... 30 Labour Force ...... 32 Foreign Investment Policy ...... 32 Tax Regime ...... 33 Security Risk ...... 34 Industry Forecast Scenario ...... 36 Oil And Gas Reserves ...... 36 Oil Supply And Demand ...... 37 Gas Supply And Demand ...... 38 LNG ...... 40 Refining And Oil Products Trade ...... 40 Revenues/Import Costs...... 41 Table: Mexico Oil And Gas – Historical Data And Forecasts ...... 41 Key Risks To BMI’s Forecast Scenario ...... 43 Oil and Gas Infrastructure ...... 44 Oil Refineries ...... 44

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Table: Refineries In Mexico ...... 44 Service Stations ...... 46 Oil Storage Facilities ...... 47 Oil Terminals/ ...... 47 Oil Pipelines ...... 47 LNG Terminals ...... 48 Table: LNG Import Terminals In Mexico ...... 49 Gas Pipelines ...... 51 Macroeconomic Outlook ...... 52 Mexico – Economic Activity ...... 54 Competitive Landscape...... 55 Executive Summary ...... 55 Table: Key Energy Player ...... 56 Overview/State Role ...... 57 Licensing and Regulation ...... 57 Government Policy ...... 60 International Energy Relations ...... 62 Table: Upstream Player ...... 63 Table: Downstream Player ...... 63 Company Monitor ...... 64 Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) ...... 64 Repsol YPF Mexico ...... 71 Shell – Summary ...... 74 Chevron – Summary...... 74 Petróleo Brasileiro – Summary ...... 74 Total – Summary ...... 75 Sinopec – Summary ...... 75 Others – Summary ...... 75 Service Companies ...... 76 Oil And Gas Outlook: Long-Term Forecasts ...... 77 Regional Oil Demand ...... 77 Table: Latin America Oil Consumption (000b/d) ...... 77 Regional Oil Supply ...... 78 Table: Latin America Oil Production (000b/d) ...... 78 Regional Refining Capacity ...... 79 Table: Latin America Oil Refining Capacity (000b/d) ...... 79 Regional Gas Demand ...... 80 Table: Latin America Gas Consumption (bcm) ...... 80 Regional Gas Supply ...... 81 Table: Latin America Gas Production (bcm) ...... 81 Methodology And Risks To Forecasts ...... 82 Glossary Of Terms ...... 83 Oil And Gas Ratings: Revised Methodology ...... 85 Introduction ...... 85 Ratings Overview ...... 85 Table: BMI Oil And Gas Business Environment Ratings: Structure ...... 86

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Indicators ...... 87 Table: BMI Oil And Gas Business Environment Upstream Ratings: Methodology ...... 87 Table: BMI Oil And Gas Business Environment Downstream Ratings: Methodology ...... 88 BMI Methodology ...... 90 How We Generate Our Industry Forecasts ...... 90 Energy Industry ...... 91 Cross Checks ...... 92 Sources ...... 92

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Mexico Oil & Gas Report Q4 2011

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Mexico Oil & Gas Report Q4 2011

Executive Summary

This latest Mexico Oil & Gas Report from BMI forecasts that the country will slow the rate of production decline that has plagued its vital oil sector over the short term, but that the downward trend will persist without new discoveries or further sector reform – potentially seeing the country turn into a net oil importer by the end of the decade.

BMI forecasts that oil production will actually rise slightly from 2.953mn barrels per day (b/d) in 2010 to 2.954mn b/d 2011, the first year-on-year (y-o-y) rise since 2004 when production was 3.83mn b/d. However, this will fall beyond 2011, with production coming in at 2.75mn b/d in 2015. Oil consumption over the same period is expected to rise at a moderate rate, reaching 2.35mn b/d by 2015, implying net exports of just under 400,000b/d.

Unlike oil production, gas output is forecast to rise over the coming years. Gas production is forecast to expand from 52bn cubic metres (bcm) in 2010 to 54.2bcm in 2015. This will do little to reduce import needs, however, as consumption is forecast to rise rapidly from 62.4bcm in 2010 to 74.7bcm in 2015, implying an import requirement of 20.5bcm by 2015, about double the 2010 import requirement.

The long-term forecast for Mexico’s oil sector is dire. Oil production is seen continuing its downward spiral, falling to under 2.5mn b/d in 2018 before reaching 2.32mn b/d in 2020. Meanwhile, a healthy economic growth outlook is expected to see consumption rise by between 1-2% per year. That trend is forecast to see consumption exceed production for the first time in 2019, with an implied net import requirement of 156,000b/d by 2020. This would mark a dramatic turnaround for the country considering that exports peaked at 1.8mn b/d in 2003 and the country was exporting more than 1mn b/d as recently as 2008. There is still plenty of time for Mexico to alter this long-term trend, but without more urgency in oil sector reform and new exploration efforts aimed at tapping deepwater Gulf of Mexico reserves the country faces the loss of crucial oil export revenues.

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Mexico Oil & Gas Report Q4 2011

Global GDP growth in 2011 is forecast at 3.2%, down from 4.3% in 2010. Growth in the eurozone should be marginally higher than 2010, while US and Chinese economic expansion will slow and Japan’s growth will be negative, reflecting the devastating earthquake and tsunami in March 2011. Our oil price assumption for 2011 is US$101.90/bbl for the OPEC basket, falling to US$95/bbl in 2012.

Unless the government introduces a radical shift in energy policy, we expect state- owned Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) to retain full responsibility for oil production, with limited international oil company (IOC) involvement.

Mexico holds seventh place, behind Venezuela, in BMI’s composite Business Environment Ratings (BERs), which combine upstream and downstream scores. In spite being one of the region’s largest oil producers, the country now sits in ninth place in BMI’s updated upstream ratings. It lags well behind Bolivia and Ecuador, so is unlikely to move further up the league table over the short term. Although the absolute resource base may be large, the output growth outlook is poor, reserves-to-production ratios (RPR) are low, state ownership of oil assets is absolute and country risk is relatively high. Mexico ranks fourth in BMI’s downstream ratings, reflecting its high levels of oil and gas consumption, refining capacity and moderate country risk, plus low levels of projected oil and gas demand growth. Colombia is just one point behind Mexico and could mount a near-term challenge.

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Mexico Oil & Gas Report Q4 2011

SWOT Analysis

Mexico Political SWOT

Strengths ƒ Democracy seems to have taken root after the 71-year tenure of the PRI ended in 2000, and there are effective checks and balances on executive power to prevent a return to one-party rule. ƒ Largely free press ensures a lively political debate.

Weaknesses ƒ State officials cannot be re-elected, which makes them effectively unaccountable to the electorate and reduces the incentive to pass legislation. ƒ High levels of violence in the government's war against powerful drug cartels have highlighted that much more work is necessary to reduce regional inequalities.

Opportunities ƒ There are signs that Calderón and US President Barack Obama are able to cooperate more closely on key issues such as immigration, which has traditionally been a source of tension between the two countries.

Threats ƒ The success of the PRI in the July 2009 mid-term legislative elections will make it much harder for Calderón's government to force major reforms through congress without granting significant concessions. ƒ President Calderón must continue to seek support among Mexico's poorer classes, given his weak electoral performance, which could further hamper his business-friendly reforms.

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Mexico Oil & Gas Report Q4 2011

Mexico Economic SWOT

Strengths ƒ Close proximity to the US and NAFTA membership gives Mexico an important advantage when trading in the US market. ƒ The country has signed a plethora of free trade agreements in recent years, fostering rising international trade and investment.

Weaknesses ƒ The economy remains largely tied to economic prospects in the US, which is a concern given the still-weak outlook for the US consumer over the next few years. ƒ With oil production continuing to look weak, we remain concerned about fiscal and current account dependence on energy receipts.

Opportunities ƒ Sound economic policy under the Calderón administration, supported by an independent central bank, means Mexico is better placed to register sustainable growth going forward. ƒ FDI is set to increase over our 10-year forecast period, provided the government maintains its business-friendly policies.

Threats ƒ Asian, especially Chinese, competition in the key US export market remains a concern. ƒ Tight credit markets and global deleveraging could continue to have a negative impact on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows.

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Mexico Business Environment SWOT

Strengths ƒ The government's focus on improving infrastructure should improve the overall business environment, making Mexico a more attractive location for future FDI inflows. ƒ The government remains committed to free trade, despite the current suspension on new FTA negotiations to allow present treaties to become more effective. ƒ Oil production and reserves remain substantial. Production costs are relatively low in an industry context.

Weaknesses ƒ Education levels are a concern, with Mexico having one of the lowest levels of educational achievement of all Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. ƒ Regional policy is required to help shift resources from the relatively prosperous north to the poorer south. ƒ Labour markets are quite heavily regulated at the moment, making hiring and firing difficult for employers. ƒ Mexico’s upstream oil industry remains out of bounds to foreign companies, which leaves a heavy investment burden for Pemex and gives it considerable technical and fiscal operating disadvantages compared with other regional oil suppliers.

Opportunities ƒ Rules on foreign investment are relatively relaxed in some sectors, with majority ownership allowed in some circumstances. ƒ The gas initiative is designed to bring IOCs into the upstream segment for the first time, albeit on a very restricted and regulated basis. ƒ The Tertiary Gulf Oil Project envisions the drilling of nearly 20,000 wells over the next 16 years at a total cost of around US$30bn. Pemex maintains that the project's output will reach 600,000b/d by 2020.

Threats ƒ Energy prices are likely to rise over the forecast period given a lack of investment in the government-owned sector. ƒ Rising crime levels have led to social protests, prompting the Calderón government to reassess its crime strategy. ƒ Security costs and public dissatisfaction could rise during the forecast period if the government is unsuccessful in curbing rising crime rates and regional disturbances. ƒ Maintaining oil supply and the country’s reserves base will become increasingly difficult without IOC investment and technological input.

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Mexico Oil & Gas Report Q4 2011

Mexico Energy Market Overview

The Energy Information Administration (EIA) puts end-2010 oil reserves at 11.7bn barrels (bbl) – down from nearly 30bn bbl in 2000. The country’s reserve-replacement ratio has been poor over recent years and that is likely to continue. As a result, reserves could slip to below 10bn barrels before the end of the decade.

Mexico produced 2.95mn b/d of oil and gas liquids in 2010 (of which around 2.63mn b/d will have been crude), with net exports well below 1.0mn b/d. Most of these exports go to the US. The country had six refineries with a total capacity of 1.46mn b/d at the end of 2010 (BP review). The December 2010 Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ) annual refining survey states 1.54mn b/d as Mexico’s end-year capacity. Company data gathered by BMI also suggest total crude distillation capacity of 1.54mn b/d.

Oil is Mexico’s dominant fuel, accounting for an estimated 50.4% of 2010 primary energy demand (PED), followed by gas at 37.4%, coal at 4.7%, hydro-electric energy at 3.8% and nuclear energy with a 1.6% share of PED. Our projections suggest that, by 2015, Mexico will be dependent on gas for 39% of PED, with the share of oil down to a forecast 47%. Coal, at this point, should have claimed a 5% market share, while nuclear is set to register 1% and hydro should have almost 5% of the market. Renewables by 2015 are forecast to represent more than 4% of PED.

Mexico plans to invest around MXN334bn (US$27.5bn) through to 2025 in an effort to increase refining capacity to meet surging demand for fuels, according to an energy ministry plan cited by Dow Jones on January 13 2011. Mexico has been hit by rising gasoline demand at a time when its crude slate is becoming heavier, increasing the need for larger and more complex refineries.

Proven natural gas reserves were stated at 476bcm by the BP Review in 2009, well above the end-2010 OGJ estimate of 339bcm. Production in 2010 was an estimated 52.0bn cubic metres (bcm). Mexico’s gas production has grown, along with consumption – driven largely by the power sector, which now consumes some 40% of

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all gas used in the country. As a result of a domestic shortfall in gas production, Mexico imported 10.4bcm of the fuel in 2010.

The country has some 1.21bn tonnes of recoverable coal reserves, located largely in Coahuila in the north-eastern part of the country. Mexico imports coal from the US, Canada, Colombia and Australia. Most coal consumption is for electricity generation, followed by steel-making.

According to BMI calculations, Mexico’s installed electricity generating capacity was in excess of 56 gigawatts (GW) at the end of 2010, more than three-quarters of which came from conventional thermal sources. In 2010, Mexico generated an estimated 267 terawatt hours (TWh) and consumed an estimated 209TWh of electricity. Mexico has an active electricity trade with the US. Many companies have built power plants near the US-Mexico border, with the aim of exporting all output to the US. Since 2000, electricity generation has risen by more than 20%, with consumption up 40%.

Electricity generation in Mexico is based on oil, gas, coal, hydro-electric and nuclear. Gas provides an estimated 53% and oil 16% of generated electricity. The share of coal in 2010 was estimated at 11%. Hydro-electric accounts for 11% of generation, with nuclear claiming 4% of the power pie.

Nearly all private generators are fired by natural gas. As a result, the recent trend in overall fuel consumption has seen a decline in oil, with growth in gas and coal. Mexico has a single nuclear power plant, the 1.4GW Laguna Verde reactor in Veracruz, operated by state utility Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE). Hydro-electricity supplies 12% of Mexico’s electricity and the biggest plant in the country is the 2.4GW Manuel Moreno Torres in Chiapas.

The cornerstone of Pemex’s strategy of raising crude oil output back above 3mn b/d by 2015 is the ambitious Chicontepec project, which spans the Veracruz and Puebla states. Chicontepec holds estimated reserves of 6.5bn bbl of oil spread over around 30 fields. The development of these prospects, however, is technically challenging and requires the application of sophisticated horizontal drilling techniques to access small pockets of

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oil in densely populated areas. Pemex lacks the technology to accomplish this following a 70-year ban on foreign involvement in the oil industry.

In a major step towards opening Mexico's oil sector to IOC involvement, the board of Pemex has approved the use of a new incentive-based contracting model. The model will allow Pemex to pay foreign oil companies to operate oil fields in the country on a per-barrel basis. Pemex has said that it wants to attract industry majors ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell and BP as well as other large independent players to take part in the projects. Initial contracts, however, did not attract serious interest from these major players and contracts instead went to service provider Petrofac and domestic firms.

Further along the line, Pemex plans to explore the deep water Gulf of Mexico (GoM), from which it aims to start producing oil between 2012 and 2014. While deep water acreage offers the best hope of reversing Mexico’s output decline, there remain large downside risks to plans to exploit it over the timescale considered under the company’s existing budget and technical limitations.

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Mexico Oil & Gas Report Q4 2011

Main Upstream Areas

Source: BMI

Main Downstream Areas

Source: BMI

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Mexico Oil & Gas Report Q4 2011

Regional Energy Market Overview

Latin America is set to be the fastest-growing region in terms of oil production growth over the next decade as billions of barrels of reserves offshore Brazil and in the heavy oil Orinoco belt in Venezuela are brought onstream.

Smaller producers like Colombia and Peru, which have been successful at attracting foreign investors, will also be sources of production growth, helping to offset declining production from established oil producers such as Mexico, Argentina and Ecuador. Although the region is set to experience strong economic growth over the coming decade, production growth will outpace consumption, making the region an increasingly important supplier to international markets.

The gas picture in Latin America is more complex. Trinidad & Tobago faces a challenging future finding markets for its gas beyond the US, but liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports of around 20bcm, along with growing exports from Peru’s rapidly expanding gas sector and planned LNG exports from Venezuela, will ensure that the region remains a net exporter of LNG over the next few years.

Strong demand growth and investment in LNG regasification capacity in Brazil, Argentina and Chile, however, will see the Southern Cone become a major LNG importer. Venezuela’s LNG potential continues to be unpredictable. Our forecasts show the country will begin exporting in 2015, though investment in the country’s initial LNG exporting projects has been delayed and there are risks of further delays.

The most important pipeline trade will continue to be between Bolivia and its southern neighbours, Argentina and Brazil. Although Bolivia should be able to meet its supply commitments over the coming decade, a major downgrade to the country’s gas reserves has raised questions over the country’s reliability as a long-term supporter.

Oil Supply And Demand

Although the supply outlook is bright for Latin America, there are major challenges and risks ahead.

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In Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, three of the region’s core oil and gas producers, a move towards greater state control of oil and gas assets has made a noticeable impact on investment. Some companies have simply decided to pull out of these countries altogether, such as ExxonMobil in Venezuela, while others have reduced their investment levels and will now focus on project development rather than new exploration.

Dwindling foreign investment in these countries has seen production levels decline in recent years and thrown future production levels into doubt. Venezuela holds massive but technically challenging heavy oil reserves that will require significant foreign investment to produce. So far the country has secured foreign partners for most of the Orinoco heavy oil blocks and we expect these projects to lift production substantially over the coming decade. However, there remains a constant threat that those partners could pull out of their projects if oil prices were to fall significantly or the operating environment was to deteriorate further.

In Mexico, although tentative reforms are being made, strict controls on foreign participation in the country’s oil and gas sector continue to hold back the investment needed to stem the country’s declining production levels.

Argentina has been experiencing reduced investment levels and has relatively few options with regard to longer-term supply expansion, although growing unconventional potential and improved fiscal terms have brightened the outlook somewhat.

The supply outlook is much brighter in some of the region’s emerging oil sectors. Billions of barrels of deepwater subsalt discoveries are drawing huge levels of exploration investment into Brazil and, although there are concerns that state-run Petrobras is stretching itself too thin, the country is set to realise huge production growth. Meanwhile, Peru and Colombia, in spite of there more modest resource potential, have attracted IOC investment by implementing attractive fiscal regimes.

The overall regional story remains one of medium-term growth in both supply and demand, with the region’s relative importance as an oil exporter growing. Latin American oil supply in 2010 averaged 9.915mn barrels per day (b/d), with 10.24mn b/d

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expected in 2011 thanks largely to Brazil and Colombia. By 2015, we see the Latin America region pumping an average 12.41mn b/d – up 25% on 2010 levels thanks to Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela.

Venezuela is pumping above its agreed OPEC ceiling and heavy oil projects point to healthy long-term growth. We are forecasting output in the country to recover to 3.10mn b/d by 2015 and continuing to rise to 4mn b/d by 2020, assuming that the country is able to attract sufficient investment.

Brazil is doing its best to boost regional supply, minimising its import requirements and developing a growing export capability. Crude oil production should rise from 2.14mn b/d in 2010 to a forecast 2.18mn b/d in 2011, a smaller rise than previously expected, indicating that medium-term growth could be slower than predicted. We expect production to hit 3.65mn b/d in 2015 as new deepwater fields come on stream and the contribution of sub-salt discoveries increases. Brazil’s overall production benefits from the rising ethanol output derived from sugar.

Colombia has consistently surpassed expectation over the past several years as an improved fiscal regime and security situation have encouraged investment in new production and infrastructure. We forecast production rising from 792,630b/d in 2010 to 1.2mn b/d by 2015 as new pipeline infrastructure unlocks production bottlenecks and investment levels continue to rise.

Oil demand, which reached 8.43mn b/d in 2010, is forecast to rise about 12% to 9.45mn b/d by 2015. There will be no exclusive driving force behind the rising consumption trend, with all countries expected to experience steady growth on the back of relatively strong economic growth across the region.

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Table: Latin America Oil Consumption (000b/d)

Country 2008 2009 2010 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f

Argentina 594.00 580.00 618.00 642.72 662.00 681.86 702.32 716.36

Bolivia 62.00 60.00 62.00 63.24 64.50 65.79 67.11 68.45

Brazil 2,485.00 2,522.00 2,654.00 2,783.84 2,867.36 2,953.38 3,041.98 3,118.03

Chile 298.00 297.65 302.11 314.20 323.62 326.86 330.00 332.79

Colombia 288.00 279.00 296.00 300.44 307.95 315.65 323.54 331.63

Ecuador 186.00 192.00 201.00 210.05 219.50 228.28 237.41 246.90 Mexico 2,147.62 2,084.15 2,140.50 2,194.02 2,248.87 2,293.84 2,328.25 2,351.53

Peru 172.00 181.00 189.00 195.62 201.48 207.53 213.75 218.03

Trinidad 39.00 40.00 41.00 42.23 43.71 45.89 48.19 50.60

Venezuela 705.00 723.00 746.14 753.67 761.21 768.90 776.66 784.51

BMI universe 6,976.62 6,958.80 7,249.75 7,500.02 7,700.20 7,887.99 8,069.22 8,218.84

Other LatAm 1,187.84 1,181.57 1,182.75 1,194.58 1,206.53 1,218.59 1,224.69 1,230.81

Regional total 8,164.46 8,140.37 8,432.51 8,694.60 8,906.73 9,106.58 9,293.90 9,449.65 e/f = estimate/forecast. Source: Historical data: EIA/BMI. All forecasts: BMI.

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Table: Latin America Oil Production (000b/d)

Country 2008 2009 2010 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f

Argentina 767.49 779.93 748.65 733.67 725.00 743.50 728.63 714.05

Bolivia 50.14 45.72 52.37 56.00 57.00 60.00 59.00 58.00

Brazil 1,898.64 2,029.04 2,137.45 2,188.20 2,366.20 2,733.70 3,137.20 3,652.20

Chile 10.72 10.77 9.04 8.70 8.00 7.30 6.40 5.70

Colombia 594.75 677.90 792.63 912.92 982.15 1,110.73 1,189.86 1,219.53

Ecuador 506.28 486.99 487.29 502.00 515.00 500.00 495.00 485.00

Mexico 3,156.77 2,971.57 2,953.03 2,954.10 2,921.70 2,871.27 2,821.84 2,749.19

Peru 120.03 145.28 157.16 160.00 180.00 240.00 285.00 300.00

Trinidad 152.39 150.27 145.42 141.00 138.00 135.00 132.00 130.00

Venezuela 2,622.01 2,454.81 2,341.55 2,495.00 2,550.00 2,650.00 2,800.00 3,100.00

BMI universe 9,879 9,752 9,825 10,152 10,443 11,052 11,655 12,414

Other LatAm 89 89 90 92 95 99 104 109

Regional total 9,969 9,841 9,915 10,244 10,538 11,151 11,759 12,523 e/f = estimate/forecast. Source: EIA/BMI. All forecasts: BMI.

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Oil: Downstream

Table: Latin America Oil Refining Capacity (000b/d)

Country 2008 2009 2010 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f

Argentina 631.18 631.18 631.18 631.18 631.18 631.18 631.18 631.18

Bolivia 41.20 41.20 41.20 41.20 41.20 41.20 41.20 41.20

Brazil 1,908.2 1,908.2 2,009.7 2,009.7 2,199.7 2,389.7 2,689.7 2,989.7

Chile 226.80 226.80 226.80 300 300 300 300 300

Colombia 285.85 285.85 285.85 285.85 315.85 345.85 345.85 345.85

Ecuador 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175

Mexico 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540

Peru 192.95 192.95 193.10 193.10 193.10 193.10 193.10 221.10

Trinidad 168 168 168 168 215 215 215 215

Venezuela 1,303 1,303 1,303 1,303 1,303 1,303 1,385 1,385

BMI universe 6,472.2 6,472.2 6,573.9 6,647.1 6,914.1 7,134.1 7,516.1 7,844.1

Netherlands Antilles/Aruba 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555

Regional total 7,027.2 7,027.2 7,128.9 7,202.1 7,469.1 7,689.1 8,071.1 8,399.1

e/f = estimate/forecast. Source: Historical data: EIA/BMI. All forecasts: BMI.

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Mexico Oil & Gas Report Q4 2011

Gas Supply And Demand

The gas story in Latin America will be sharply divided between surging demand in the Southern Cone countries, requiring rising imports, and growing export potential to the north in the region’s largest LNG exporter, Trinidad & Tobago, as well as Peru and potentially Venezuela.

Overall gas production is expected to rise by around 16% from 204.14bcm in 2010 to around 237bn cubic metres (bcm) in 2015. Production growth will be driven by Brazil (primarily, associated gas from its rapidly rising offshore oil production), Venezuela, Trinidad & Tobago and to a lesser extent Bolivia and Peru. The only country that is expected to see a noticeable decline in production is Argentina, though there is upside risk to our Argentine gas production forecasts due to the country’s burgeoning shale potential.

Regional consumption is expected to grow by nearly 25% from 198.63bcm in 2010 to nearly 250bcm in 2015, far outpacing production. Consumption growth is expected to be spread fairly evenly across the region, though Brazil will see the strongest rate of growth.

Brazilian gas consumption is expected to rise by about 48% from 25.11bcm in 2010 to just over 37bcm in 2015 on the back of increasing utilisation of gas for power generation. Mexico, the region’s largest gas consumer, is also expected to see a sharp rise in consumption, with demand set to increase about 20% from 62.42bcm in 2010 to nearly 75bcm in 2015.

On a whole, the region’s LNG exports will decline rapidly as Brazil, Argentina and Chile ramp up imports faster than exporters can increase production. Total LNG exports are forecast to decline from 10.91bcm in 2010 to just 1.75bcm in 2015, and the region could even become a net importer if Venezuela is unable to start exporting by 2015, which is a distinct possibility considering those plans have already been delayed repeatedly. Trinidad and Tobago will remain by far the region’s largest LNG exporter, with exports expected to reach 22.4bcm by 2015. Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, meanwhile, are all expected to dramatically increase their LNG imports, though there is

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some downside risk to Mexican LNG imports if the company ramps up pipeline exports from the US.

Table: Latin America Gas Consumption (bcm)

Country 2008 2009 2010 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f

Argentina 44.41 43.14 43.46 44.33 46.10 47.95 49.86 51.86

Bolivia 2.87 2.83 3.00 3.12 3.24 3.37 3.51 3.65

Brazil 23.65 18.72 25.11 28.88 31.04 33.22 35.21 37.32

Chile 2.62 2.84 4.26 4.69 5.15 5.67 6.24 6.86

Colombia 7.50 8.69 8.99 9.26 9.53 9.82 10.11 10.42

Ecuador 0.26 0.30 0.36 0.52 0.67 0.83 0.83 0.83

Mexico 60.29 60.92 62.42 63.30 64.18 66.81 69.45 74.73

Peru 3.65 3.47 3.99 4.19 4.48 4.98 5.47 5.97

Trinidad 21.94 20.86 21.97 22.27 22.72 23.29 23.87 24.59

Venezuela 22.25 20.23 25.08 26.33 27.52 28.62 29.76 30.96

Regional total 189.45 182.00 198.63 206.88 214.65 224.55 234.32 247.17

e/f = estimate/forecast. Source: Historical data: EIA/BMI. All forecasts: BMI.

Table: Latin America Gas Production (bcm)

Country 2008 2009 2010 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f

Argentina 44.06 41.36 40.08 39.00 38.00 37.50 38.00 38.00

Bolivia 14.66 12.62 14.72 15.30 15.50 16.00 16.70 17.00

Brazil 12.62 10.28 12.60 16.60 19.10 19.60 20.60 22.60

Chile 1.87 1.35 1.10 0.84 0.90 0.90 0.80 0.80

Colombia 9.00 10.49 10.50 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.50 12.00

Ecuador 0.26 0.30 0.36 0.52 0.67 0.83 0.83 0.83 Mexico 47.97 50.23 52.00 52.44 52.88 53.32 53.77 54.22

Peru 3.65 3.47 7.50 9.20 10.00 11.00 11.50 12.00

Trinidad 39.30 40.60 42.38 42.06 43.50 44.20 45.00 47.00

Venezuela 20.75 18.43 22.90 24.00 25.00 26.50 28.00 33.00

Regional total 194.15 189.13 204.14 210.95 216.55 220.85 226.70 237.45

e/f = estimate/forecast. Source: Historical data: EIA/BMI. All forecasts: BMI.

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Liquefied Natural Gas

Table: Latin America LNG Exports/(Imports) (bcm)

Country 2008 2009 2010 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f

Argentina (0.41) (0.96) (1.83) (3.00) (3.00) (7.00) (7.00) (10.00)

Brazil (0.50) (0.40) (4.00) (4.00) (4.00) (5.00) (6.00) (6.00)

Chile 0 (0.65) (3.07) (3.85) (4.25) (4.77) (5.44) (6.06)

Mexico (3.6) (3.6) (3.6) (3.6) (4.6) (6.0) (7.0) (9.6) Peru 0 0 3.00 5.00 5.50 6.00 6.00 6.00

Trinidad & Tobago 17.36 19.74 20.41 19.79 20.78 20.91 21.13 22.41

Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.00

Regional total 12.85 14.13 10.91 10.34 10.43 4.14 1.69 1.75

e/f = estimate/forecast; na = not applicable. Source: Historical data: EIA/BMI. All forecasts: BMI.

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Business Environment Ratings Latin America Region

BMI’s Latin America universe comprises 10 countries. Government involvement in the oil and gas industry has become the major theme in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, with nationalisation, price controls and shifting fiscal policy all damaging the appeal of the sector in the region. However, while high oil prices have seen companies continue to invest in these countries in spite of the risks, if prices were to come down significantly, we would expect investment in these countries to suffer the most. Ecuador, Mexico, Trinidad & Tobago and Chile all suffer from oil supply growth deterioration, with the trend particularly worrying in Mexico, one of the region’s main producers. Brazil has become the region’s key country in terms of upstream potential, although Colombia and Peru are also delivering significant gains.

Composite Scores

The composite BE rating is calculated by combining the individual country scores for the upstream and downstream segments. Brazil holds the top spot and is likely to remain there for the foreseeable future on the back of both strong upstream and downstream prospects. Colombia and Peru have risen in the rankings as stronger fiscal and regulatory regimes have encouraged increasing levels of investment and growth. The election of Ollanta Humala has led some to question whether or not Peru’s business environment could worsen, though we have not seen any evidence to indicate Humala will take steps to alienate investors. Chile languishes at the bottom of the table just below Bolivia largely because of its weak upstream position.

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Table: Regional Composite Business Environment Rating

Upstream Rating Downstream Rating Composite Rating Rank

Brazil 70.2 64.7 67.5 1

Colombia 71.5 47.0 59.2 2

Peru 68.3 45.8 57.0 3

Argentina 52.2 56.9 54.5 4

Trinidad and Tobago 57.2 38.9 48.0 5

Chile 34.7 57.1 45.9 6

Venezuela 56.0 29.8 42.9 7

Mexico 35.8 47.5 41.6 8

Ecuador 43.7 37.4 40.5 9

Bolivia 42.5 31.0 36.8 10

Scores are out of 100 for all categories, with 100 the highest. Source: BMI.

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Upstream Scores

Colombia and Brazil come in at the top of the upstream ratings, with Brazil expected to pull away over the medium term as production starts in the country’s subsalt region. Mexico and Chile are the worst performers in this segment, amassing just 36 and 35 points respectively from the available 100. Venezuela is in fifth place, although the country could move up the table rapidly if it is able to bring production onstream in the Orinoco heavy oil belt.

Table: Regional Upstream Business Environment Rating

Rewards Risks

Industry Country Industry Country Rewards Rewards Rewards Risks Risks Risks Upstream Rating Rank

Colombia 65 85 70 85 56 75 71 1

Brazil 79 70 77 55 56 55 70 2

Peru 75 55 70 70 53 64 68 3

Trinidad and 44 70 50 80 61 73 57 4 Tobago

Venezuela 69 65 68 25 35 29 56 5

Argentina 40 65 46 70 58 66 52 6

Ecuador 51 55 52 20 31 24 44 7

Bolivia 56 33 50 20 32 24 43 8

Mexico 49 15 40 10 53 25 36 9

Chile 40 15 34 15 78 37 35 10

Scores are out of 100 for all categories, with 100 the highest. The Upstream BE Rating is the principal rating. It comprises two sub-ratings ‘Rewards’ and ‘Risks’, which have a 70% and 30% weighting respectively. In turn, the ‘Rewards’ Rating comprises Industry Rewards and Country Rewards, which have a 75% and 25% weighting respectively. They are based upon the oil and gas resource base/growth outlook and sector maturity (Industry) and the broader industry competitive environment (Country). The ‘Risks’ rating comprises Industry Risks and Country Risks which have a 65% and 35% weighting respectively and are based on a subjective evaluation of licensing terms and liberalisation (Industry) and the industry’s broader Country Risks exposure (Country), which is based on BMI’s proprietary Country Risk Ratings. The ratings structure is aligned across the 14 Industries for which BMI provides Business Environment Ratings methodology, and is designed to enable clients to consider each rating individually or as a composite, with the choice depending on their exposure to the industry in each particular state. For a list of the data/indicators used, please consult the appendix. Source: BMI.

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Downstream Scores

Brazil and Venezuela bracket the remaining eight Latin American states in the downstream ratings, with the former driven by strong oil and gas demand growth, plus likely refining capacity expansion. Chile and Argentina are tied for second place on the back of strong demand growth.

Table: Regional Downstream Business Environment Rating

Rewards Risks

Industry Country Industry Country Downstream Rewards Rewards Rewards Risks Risk Risks Rating Rank

Brazil 58 78 63 75 60 69 65 1

Chile 50 48 50 80 67 75 57 2=

Argentina 42 80 52 80 53 69 57 2=

Mexico 47 54 49 35 60 45 47 4=

Colombia 29 60 37 80 58 71 47 4=

Peru 36 52 40 60 60 60 46 6

Trinidad and 24 30 26 75 61 69 39 7 Tobago

Ecuador 39 34 38 35 40 37 37 8

Bolivia 28 27 28 30 53 39 31 9

Venezuela 26 27 26 40 37 39 30 10

Scores are out of 100 for all categories, with 100 the highest. The Downstream BE Rating comprises two sub-ratings ‘Rewards’ and ‘Risks’, which have a 70% and 30% weighting respectively. In turn, the ‘Rewards’ Rating comprises Industry Rewards and Country Rewards, which have a 75% and 25% weighting respectively. They are based upon the downstream refining capacity/product growth outlook/import dependence (Industry) and the broader socio-demographic and economic context (Country). The ‘Risks’ rating comprises Industry Risks and Country Risks which have a 60% and 40% weighting respectively and are based on a subjective evaluation of regulation and liberalisation (Industry) and the industry’s broader Country Risks exposure (Country), which is based on BMI’s proprietary Country Risk Ratings. The ratings structure is aligned across the 14 Industries for which BMI provides Business Environment Ratings methodology, and is designed to enable clients to consider each rating individually or as a composite, with the choice depending on their exposure to the industry in each particular state. For a list of the data/indicators used, please consult the appendix. Source: BMI.

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Business Environment

Legal Framework

Originating in Roman law, Mexico's legal system is based on the civil law system, as further developed and evolved in continental Europe, with more recent Anglo-Saxon influences. The civil law system is based on 'written law': that is, the codes or statutes that present the general principles governing broad areas of law. Unlike in common law jurisdictions such as the US, the judiciary does not play the central role in law-making and interpreting.

Private enterprises are able to establish freely, acquire and dispose of interests in the course of business operations. Secure rights to property ownership are enshrined in law, and under NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) Mexico may not expropriate property, except for a public purpose and on a non-discriminatory basis. Expropriations are governed by international law, and require rapid fair market value compensation, including accrued interest. Investors have the right to international arbitration for violations of this or any other rights included in the investment chapter of NAFTA.

Certain technicalities persist in terms of foreign ownership of residential real estate, in that non-nationals are prohibited from owning directly property within 50km of the coast and 100km of the borders. Acquisitions of effective and free use of real estate in these areas, which make up around 40% of the country's territory, are done through the establishment of a 50-year extendable trust called a fideicomiso, arranged through a Mexican financial institution that acts as trustee.

Under NAFTA and the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Mexico is duty bound to implement certain standards for the protection of intellectual property and procedures to address infringement.

Although the administration has stepped up efforts to tackle organised crime behind music, film and software piracy, piracy remains a problem in Mexico. Indeed, the country is one of five on the US Congress's Congressional International Anti-Piracy

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Caucus 2009 Watch List. With the government more concerned with tackling drug and kidnapping activities, we do not expect much headway in this side of organised crime for the time being.

The Industrial Property Law (Ley de Propiedad Industrial) and the Federal Copyright Law (Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor) are the two laws providing the core of IPR protection.

Fighting corruption is a major plank of Calderón's administration. However, despite Mexico's membership of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, a regional legal instrument that provides a framework for fighting corruption ratified by 33 countries, the country still suffers from widespread problems of graft. This is highlighted by Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which puts Mexico in 98th place in a global ranking of 178 countries, a substantial drop from its 89th position in held in the 2009 rankings.

Corruption manifests itself at all levels, but is particularly problematic within the police service and an intrinsic part of the struggle against the drug cartels. Chronically low salaries make it easy for cartels to bribe – or intimidate – police and border officials, and many of the gangs' advanced weapons have been sold to them by corrupt police officers. Corruption in the legal and penal systems has allowed some drugs figures to buy their way out of detention soon after capture. Additionally, at a political level, a recent survey by the Centro de Estudios Económicos del Sector Privado (CEESP) found that many companies still pay bribes to influence public officials, particularly at the federal level, but also at the state and municipal levels. Nevertheless, while we believe corruption will remain a major problem for the foreseeable future, the decriminalisation of possession of small amounts of drugs should help remove at least one source of corruption, in our view.

Infrastructure

The Mexican construction is showing signs of cooling down, given the persistence of global risk aversion and tight credit conditions. Key to the development of the industry in the future will be the progression of the National Infrastructure Plan (NIP) 2007-

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2012, which is already facing significant backlog because of a lack of private sector uptake.

The aim of the NIP is to address the bottlenecks in infrastructure capacity, but of the 330 projects contained in the plan some are no longer economically viable and others have had to be restructured, according to local press and industry reports. According to its mandate, the National Infrastructure Fund (FONADIN) is 'a financial platform for developing infrastructure projects and promoting the participation of the public, private and social sector'. FONADIN obtains part of its funding from the Infrastructure Investment Fund (FINFRA), which was created in September 1995 to promote investment in infrastructure and help lift Mexico out of the economic crisis. Based on the initial plan, FONADIN would have seed money of MXN40bn, and over the five years to 2012 it would be able to channel investment of MXN270bn for NIP projects. Transport infrastructure and water infrastructure projects were priority sectors. However, the combination of the financial crisis, institutional incapacity, and chronic underinvestment in the sector has compelled the government and ministries to reassess parts of the plan. For instance, the FARAC II package of highway concessions was slimmed down and re-launched in July 2009 to attract investors that were not willing or able to commit to the larger, original project. Delays in projects have become the norm in the region, with the most often cited examples other than the FARAC package being the construction of the Riviera Maya airport and the .

The success of the NIP is predicated on the participation of the private sector through long-term concessions. This is even more crucial now, with state finances unable to sustain the same level of allocations as seen in previous years. For instance, the budget of the Ministry of Communications and Transport (SCT) for road projects was reduced by 25% for 2010. The tender for Punta Colonet could be seen as a litmus test for the viability of the NIP post the financial crisis, as the level of participation will be an indication of the willingness of the private sector to once again become engaged in Mexico's infrastructure sector and provide much-needed capital to ease the capacity constraints.

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Labour Force

Mexico's labour force is estimated to number around 45mn, of whom around 23% are employed in industrial manufacturing and construction, about 60% in the growing services (and commerce) sector, and the remaining 15-20% in agriculture.

Mexico's relatively impressive official unemployment levels conceal a chronic problem of underemployment, which we estimate could be as high as 25% as a proportion of the overall population, The population displays a high level of literacy, around 92%, but there is a shortage of technically skilled workers and engineers.

Mexico's labour market is highly unionised, and trade unions are aggressive and hold significant political influence. Under Mexico's Federal Labour Law enacted in 1931 and revised in 1970 – and based on article 123 of the Mexican constitution – workers enjoy the rights to associate, collectively bargain and strike. Negotiations generally focus on salary increases and long-term employer obligations. As unemployment levels rise and the government seeks more ways to reduce bloated fiscal expenditure levels, we anticipate further tensions between the authorities and the country's powerful labour unions.

Foreign Investment Policy

Mexico is among the top emerging markets in terms of inward foreign direct investment (FDI), attracting US$22.5bn in 2008. Its membership of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has made the country a prime destination for foreign investors, especially those seeking a cheap manufacturing base for exports into the US market. US investors still make up the largest component of Mexico's inward FDI flows, although this looks set to diminish.

The investment regime is very open and the government is pro-foreign investment. However, in recent years, Mexico has become less of a magnet for investors as lower wages in other emerging economies, notably India and China, provide increasing competition. This dip in the country's attractiveness is attributed by some to Mexico's failure to push ahead with structural reforms and simplify the investment regime quickly enough.

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The basic statute governing foreign investment in Mexico is the 1993 Foreign Investment Law. Consistent with the foreign investment chapter of NAFTA, it provides national (ie non-discriminatory) treatment for most foreign investment, eliminates performance requirements for most foreign investment projects, and streamlines criteria for automatic approval of smaller-scale foreign investment.

Most sectors of the economy are open to FDI; the Foreign Investment Law identifies 704 activities, 656 of which are open for 100% FDI stakes. There are 18 activities in which foreigners may invest only 49 percent: 13 of these require Foreign Investment National Commission approval for a 100% stake, five are reserved for Mexican nationals and 10 reserved for the Mexican state. The most important sector is hydrocarbons, where Pemex retains the monopoly according to the constitution. Although the government appears to still be pushing for more foreign investment in this sector, we believe even partial privatisation of Pemex is still a long way off.

As a member of NAFTA and the OECD, Mexico has open currency conversion and transfer policies.

Bilateral investment agreements exist with more than 20 countries, including most of the EU countries, plus Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba, South Korea and Switzerland.

Tax Regime

A slew of tax reforms have come into effect in recent years. Aspects of these benefit foreign firms, some of which have cited a heavy tax burden as an obstacle to investment in the past. The latest reforms, centred on a new corporate flat rate tax, received congressional approval in late 2007 and came into force in 2008. Most Mexican taxes are applied at the federal rather than the state level.

Corporate tax: a new corporate flat rate tax of 16.5% was introduced in 2008, which rose to 17% in 2009 (although the government is negotiating potential tax hikes with the congress for 2010-2012 as we go to print). Companies are required to choose between the graduated and flat rate systems, paying whichever gives the highest amount of tax. Resident firms are taxed on global income. Non-resident firms pay tax on Mexican-

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sourced income only. There is also an asset tax, charged according to the net value of the assets of Mexican companies and some non-resident firms.

Individual tax: progressive rates of up to 28%, compared with 29% in 2006 (and this could be raised to 30% until 2012 according to government proposals). A reduction is then applied to an individual's tax liability, according to income and tax payable.

VAT: standard rate is 15%. A lower rate of 10% applies to supplies by residents of a frontier area if they take place in that area. Exports are zero-rated, as are food, books and newspapers, fertilisers and medicines. Exempt from VAT are construction of residential dwellings, some financial and insurance services and teaching and medical services.

Capital gains: corporate and individual capital gains are usually taxed as income. Gains of individuals on the sale of publicly traded securities are exempt. Gains of individuals on the transfer of personal property are exempt, apart from those on corporate shares, securities and investments.

Security Risk

Both Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the US State Department consider Mexico to have a low terrorism risk profile. Since the bombings of several Pemex gas pipelines in July and September 2007, the Marxist terrorist group Ejército Popular Revolucionario (ERP) has been quiet, and the group is not believed to pose a significant threat.

Nevertheless, short-term kidnapping of businesspeople for ransom is on the rise. This is a more extreme manifestation of the general rise in street crime being seen in the cities, with petty theft and pick-pocketing common on public transport. It is not unknown for entire buses to be robbed at gunpoint, and so the FCO and State Department advise travellers to travel first class where possible, as many of these bus operators perform security checks before boarding. Similarly, routes that use toll roads tend to be safer.

The key security risk is the armed violence of the drug gangs, which has spread from being an issue for the northern regions to a nationwide problem. The government

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launched a major initiative on the drug gangs and organised crime, but casualties – including civilians – increased significantly in 2008, and continue to rise. There is a growing concern that the rise in business confidence may rest more on the hard-line approach of the government than on an absolute improvement in security, and the high level of corruption in the police force has allowed the violence to escalate as the drug cartels expand their operations.

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Industry Forecast Scenario Oil And Gas Reserves

BMI’s reserves figure ( which reflects the EIA’s figure) puts Mexico’s end-2010 oil reserves at 11.7bn bbl. Pemex’s reserves have been declining for 12 consecutive years. At end-2010, the company claimed 13.9bn bbl of proven crude oil reserves, or over 2bn bbl more than the BP estimate. Pemex is hoping to begin adding to the net reserves figure again in 2013. There have been some offshore discoveries that have long-term potential, but need full appraisal. The company claims that a deepwater discovery in the Mexican section of the Gulf of Mexico (GoM) could potentially hold 10bn bbl of reserves. While the country’s section of the GoM clearly holds significant reserves potential, we currently see reserves continuing to decline, dipping below 10bn bbl in 2018.

Pemex has made a new gas discovery at its Labay well in the deep water GoM, a company official told reporters in April 2010. Antonio Escalera, a Pemex exploration manager, characterised the discovery as 'significant' and said that the company would carry out additional drilling in the Lakach area to learn more about its reserve potential. The drilling in Lakach is part of Pemex's deep water GoM exploration campaign which has been more successful at discovering gas than oil.

In August 2010, Pemex announced that it would delay its ultra-deep water exploration programme in the Perdido area of the GoM until Q211. However, in early 2011, the company delayed the Maximino-1 well further, to 2012.

Unlike oil reserves, gas reserves have generally been on the rise over recent years, with the EIA putting end-2010 gas reserves at 470bcm. However, we see gas reserves falling as rising production outpaces new exploration.

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Oil Supply And Demand

Oil production was arounund Mexican Oil Productioion, 2.95mn b/d in 2010, whilhile Consumption And Expoports demand hit 2.14mn b/d, 2000-2015 implying net export volumes of 0.81mn b/d.

Pemex announced on July 13 that crude oil production through the first half of 2011 was down only 0.6%, or 27,000b/d, year-on-year (y-o-y) to 2.56mn. When

natural gas liquids (NGLsLs) are factored in, as they arare e/f = estimate/forecast; Source: Historical, Energy Informrmation Administration; Estimates/Forecasts, BMI in line with BMI 's forecasts, total liquids production throughout the first half of 2011 was likely to have been around 2.95mn b/d, down about 0.7%. Looking at the data more closely, the numbers show small increases in more valuable light and extra-light crudes. Heavy oil volumes, which account for about half of production, continue to fall but at a much slower rate than in the mid 2000s.

Although production is expected to decline at a slower rate than in recent years, the downward trend looks seset to continue. Our forecasts indicate that the country will become a net oil importer in 2019, when oil consumption of 2.45mn b/d exceeds production of 2.4mn b/d.

The cornerstone of Mexico's strategy of raising crude oil output is likely to be the ambitious Chicontepec project, which spans the states of Veracruz and Puebla. Chicontepec holds estimated reserves of 6.5bn bbl) of oil spread across 30 fields. Other projects with the potential to boost production include the Mexican deepwater sector of

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the GoM, although we doubt that Pemex has the capacity to effectively explore and develop large-scale deepwater GoM projects without investment and technical assistance from foreign players; something that is unlikely considering the Mexico’s limited oil reforms to dateate.

Gas Supply And Demand

Our forecast for gas production predicts no more than 4% growth between 2010 and 2015, even assuming continued private sector participation. Gas is expected to play a more important role in the future as demand rises quickly, especially in the power sector, which is expected to account for 43% of the country’s total gas demand in 2015. We see gas supply at a possible 54.2bcm by 2015, falling further behind demand, which we expect to reach 74.7bcbcm in the same year.

In response to expected Mexican Gas Producuction, demand growth, Pemex plans Consumption And Impmports to increase Mexican-USS border 2000-2015 infrastructure and capacity, and to focus on gas exploration and production (E&P) activities. Mexico currently imports more than 8% of its gas from the US.

Production growth will bbe centred in the Burgos Basin, located in north-eastern Mexico, which contains massive volumes of largely

non-associated, recoverabrable e/f = estimate/forecast; Source: Historical, Energyrgy Information Administration; Estimates/Forecasts, BMI natural gas resources. The US Department of Energy (DoE) is forecasting a 3.4% annual increase in Mexican gas consumption to 2020. However, growth over the remainder of the current decade is expected to be nearer 7% per annum.

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In November 2009, Mexico’s Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos (CNH) ordered Pemex to reduce gas flaring at its fields in order to raise state revenues and cut carbon emissions. The CNH directed Pemex to reduce flaring of associated gas from 17% to 2%, the maximum level permitted for private contractors developing non-associated gas blocks. CNH hopes to end gas flaring in Mexico completely by 2024. The targets are to be implemented between 2010 and 2012, after the decree came into force on December 1 2009. According to the CNH, gas flaring was expected to have cost the country around MEX40mn (US$3.1bn) in lost revenues in 2009. Flaring is also contributing to Mexico's rising carbon emissions, which President Felipe Calderón has promised to reduce during his term in office. According to Reuters, Pemex is aiming to invest US$2.4bn in gas flaring reduction through to 2012, although it is not clear whether the spending is committed or merely planned.

In 2003, Repsol YPF began developing Mexican gas under a so-called multiple service contract (MSC) designed to attract investment in the country’s gas sector. IOCs such as Repsol were initially keen to play a part in upstream development, but have since scaled back operations. Years of rising costs, a difficult political environment and unattractive contract terms have reduced interest and slowed the rate of investment in the MSC schemes. In March 2007, Pemex said production from the first seven MSCs was around 1.6bcm per annum, which represents a small fraction of overall Mexican gas output. Pemex expected these contracts to have an average output of 6bcm from 2008 through to 2014, according to a company presentation. However, the figures look increasingly overoptimistic.

In April 2010, Pemex announced plans to drill Mexico's first ever shale gas well in the state of Coahuila, located along the border with Texas – the site of several major shale plays, including Eagle Ford. Pemex is clearly hoping to duplicate the success of the US in exploiting domestic shale reserves towards boosting natural gas output. This new line of exploration underscores Mexico's inability to satisfy its gas demand through conventional domestic gas production. Pemex board member Hector Moreira told Market News International on August 31 2010 that the new line could reduce the company's growing dependence on natural gas imports. He also stated that the shale

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exploration effort would include the hiring of private companies. In March 2011, Pemex said that it had begun production from its first shale gas well in Coahuila in the previous month, and had a total of 10 oil and gas exploratory wells in the area.

LNG

Despite being a major oil exporter, historical neglect of gas exploitation has meant the country has to import about 10% of its gas needs. Rising domestic consumption and opportunities for gas resale to the western US have led to the development of an LNG import sector. Mexico intends to import more LNG than it can consume, with the ‘spare’ volumes exported to the US. Mexico currently has two operational LNG terminals and one under construction. The relative ease of securing construction permits in the country in comparison with the US has been attracting investors from across the northern border, but the slump in US LNG demand is set to cool interest in Mexico’s regasification projects.

Mexico imported 3.6bcm of LNG in 2010, unchanged from the 2009 level. Our forecast is for LNG imports to increase steadily to 9.6bcm by 2015. The Manzanillo LNG project is expected onstream by end-2011, but will not be importing at full capacity until 2015.

In February 2010, safety concerns prompted officials from the Mexican city of Ensenada to urge US firm Sempra Energy to close its Costa Azul LNG plant. Sempra, however, says production at its facility in , north Mexico, is protected by a court order. The city said it was not satisfied the company had provided local officials with sufficient information on handling emergencies at Costa Azul.

Refining And Oil Products Trade

The Pemex refining division operates six refineries with a total installed capacity of 1.46mn b/d, according to BP review data. According to Pemex data, actual throughput in 2009 was 1.52mn b/d, up from 1.49mn in 2008. Company data compiled by BMI and the end-2010 OGJ survey suggest that crude distillation capacity is nearer 1.54mn b/d.

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Mexico plans to invest around MXN334bn (US$27.5bn) between now and 2025 in order to increase refining capacity to meet surging demand for fuels, according to an energy ministry plan cited by Dow Jones on January 13 2011. Mexico has been hit by rising gasoline demand at a time when its crude slate is becoming heavier, increasing the need for larger and more complex refineries.

Mexico is also aiming to boost gasoline production in particular, following a rapid rise in domestic consumption. A large part of the increased gasoline production will come from the planned 250,000b/d Tula Hidalgo refinery, which Pemex expects to produce around 145,000b/d of unleaded gasoline. According to the report, this will boost the country's total gasoline production to 735,000b/d by 2016 and 750,000b/d by 2025.

Revenues/Import Costs

The BMI base case oil price assumptions are US$101.90/bbl (OPEC basket) in 2011, US$95.00/bbl in 2012, and an average of US$90.00/bbl in 2013-2015. Based on our production and export forecasts, crude oil export revenues are set to fall from an estimated US$28.2bn in 2011 to US$13bn by 2015.

Table: Mexico Oil And Gas – Historical Data And Forecasts

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Oil Proved Reserves, bn barrels 11.90 11.70 11.70 11.50 11.20 10.98 10.76 10.54

Oil Production, 000b/d 3,157 2,972 2,953 2,954 2,922 2,871 2,822 2,749

Oil Consumption, 000b/d 2,148 2,084 2,141 2,194 2,249 2,294 2,328 2,352

Oil Refinery Capacity, 000b/d 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540

Oil Net Exports, 000b/d 1,009 887 813 760 673 577 494 398

Oil Price, US$/bbl, OPEC Basket 94.28 60.96 77.39 101.90 95.00 90.00 90.00 90.00

Value of Net Oil Exports, US$mn (BMI base case) 34,726 19,747 22,951 28,270 23,331 18,968 16,214 13,063

Value of Net Petroleum Exports, US$mn (BMI base case) 29,373 16,494 18,941 22,765 17,990 12,927 9,193 3,882

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Table: Mexico Oil And Gas – Historical Data And Forecasts

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Value of Net Oil Exports at constant US$50/bbl - US$mn 18,417 16,195 14,829 13,872 12,279 10,538 9,008 7,257

Value of Net Oil Exports at constant US$100/bbl - US$mn 36,834 32,391 29,657 27,743 24,559 21,076 18,016 14,514

Value of Net Petroleum Exports at constant US$50/bbl - US$mn 21,256 18,863 17,420 16,573 15,090 13,894 12,909 12,358

Value of Net Petroleum Exports at constant US$100/bbl - US$mn 42,511 37,725 34,840 33,146 30,180 27,788 25,818 24,715

Refined Petroleum Products Imports, 000b/d (BMI) 1,440 1,378 862 916 971 1,016 1,050 1,073

Gas Proved reserves, bcm 392 373 470 470 450 450 441 432

Gas Production, bcm 48.0 50.2 52.0 52.4 52.9 53.3 53.8 54.2

Gas Consumption, bcm 60.3 60.9 62.4 63.3 64.2 66.8 69.5 74.7

Net Gas Imports, bcm (BMI Research) 12.3 10.7 10.4 10.9 11.3 13.5 15.7 20.5

Value of Net Gas Imports, US$mn (BMI base case) 5,352 3,252 4,010 5,505 5,340 6,041 7,021 9,181

Value of Net Gas Imports at constant US$50/bbl - US$mn 2,839 2,667 2,591 2,701 2,811 3,356 3,901 5,100

Value of Net Gas Imports at constant US$100/bbl - US$mn 5,677 5,335 5,182 5,403 5,621 6,712 7,802 10,201

LNG Net Imports, bcm 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 4.6 6.0 7.0 9.6

LNG Price, US$/mn btu 10.5 9.1 11.5 15.1 14.1 13.4 13.4 13.4

LNG Net Imports, US$mn (BMI) 1,335 1,149 1,458 1,920 2,294 2,866 3,344 4,562

Reserves/Production Ratio 8 7 9 9 9 8 8 8

e/f = estimate/forecast; Source: Historical, EIA; Forecast, BMI

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Key Risks To BMI’s Forecast Scenario

Mexico is faced with considerable oil and gas production risk. Investment levels need to remain high, even if prices do not, in order to minimise the decline from existing fields and maximise output from new projects. Government policy and fiscal health means that spending could fall short, leading to still greater volume contraction. Major non- OPEC producers are also affected by fluctuating world oil prices. A flat OPEC basket oil price of US$100/bbl, for example, would provide 2015 oil export revenues of US$14.5bn, compared with the estimated US$7.25bn yielded if the price were a constant US$50/bbl. Gas import costs are also influenced by prevailing oil price trends.

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Oil and Gas Infrastructure Oil Refineries

The Pemex refining division operates six refineries with a total installed capacity of 1.54mn b/d. Despite having the fourth largest proven crude oil reserves in the Western hemisphere, the country imports over a quarter of its oil products, a farcical situation that stems from Pemex’s failure to balance refining capacity with growing domestic demand for fuel. Pemex has stated that it needs to spend at least US$19bn over the next decade in order to make up for domestic shortfalls in gasoline production. It is committed to a major programme of refinery upgrades in order to meet expected growth in demand. According to government projections, Mexico will need to build a new refinery every three to four years over the next two decades to meet growing domestic demand for oil products.

Table: Refineries In Mexico

Owner Refinery Capacity (b/d) (Contractor) Completion Date Details

Cadereyta 275,000 Pemex na Reconfigured in 2003

Ciudad Madero 190,000 Pemex 1918 na

Minatitlan 185,000 Pemex na na

Salamanca 245,000 Pemex na na

Salina Cruz 330,000 Pemex na na

Tula Hidalgo 315,000 Pemex na na

Total capacity 1,540,000 Planned additional capacity

Tula 300,000 Pemex 2015 First new refinery since 1979

Salamanca na Pemex 2014 US$3bn expansion programme

na = not available. Source: Company data

To boost investment in domestic refining projects, Pemex has suggested the possibility of opening up the country’s downstream segment to private operators. The arrangement would allow outside firms to build and operate Mexican refineries for a fee and under

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Pemex’s supervision. Much will depend on the political fortunes of Felipe Calderón’s pro-business government. Private investment in the downstream segment would allow Pemex to preserve its funds for the upstream development projects, which are required to stem falling oil production.

Salamanca Refinery (Active) Pemex has said that it intends to spend US$3bn up to 2014 on expanding the existing Salamanca refinery in Guanajuato state. Under previously announced plans, Pemex is also aiming to expand other existing facilities, such as the Minatitlan, Tula and Salina Cruz refineries.

Cadereyta Refinery (Active) Cadereyta is Mexico's third largest refinery, behind the 330,000b/d Salina Cruz and 315,000b/d Tula Hidalgo plants. The refinery, which is the country's most complex and advanced plant, is located in north-east Mexico at the junction of four oil pipelines linking it to the Madero refinery, the Matamoros marine terminal and Juarez City on the US border. The refinery provides fuels to the north of the country.

A fatal explosion at the refinery in September 2010 led to throughput being cut and two units being shut down. According to a Pemex press release, the fire was caused by a compressor explosion in a diesel hydrodesulphurisation unit. The explosion killed one worker, injured eight others, and led to the shutdown of the hydrodesulphurisation and coker units. Pemex said that the remaining 30 units of the refinery were operating as normal. Nevertheless, it said that it had reduced crude runs from 215,000b/d to 200,000b/d. According to Pemex, the 275,000b/d refinery processed an average of around 219,000b/d in 2009, which meant that it ran at approximately 80% of capacity.

Minatitlán Refinery (Active) The expansion of the Lázaro Cárdenas refinery at Minatitlán on the Gulf Coast was first announced in 2007, but has been repeatedly delayed. The expansion is designed to increase the refinery's crude distillation capacity from 32% to around 60%. The refinery's capacity will rise from 186,000b/d to 350,000b/d, increasing gasoline output from 57,000b/d to 186,000b/d to meet soaring Mexican demand for the fuel.

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Tula Hidalgo Refinery (Proposed) A Mexican official has said that the country is interested in involving India's Reliance Industries in a project to build a 300,000b/d greenfield refinery in Mexico. This refinery is almost certainly the proposed 300,000b/d Hidalgo refinery in Tula in Hidalgo State. The project, which was announced in April 2009, would be Mexico's first new refinery since 1979. The location of the proposed plant, close to Mexico City, was chosen to allow it to supply products almost exclusively to the Mexican market. The refinery is expected to cost up to US$10bn and is due onstream by 2015.

With Mexican law preventing Reliance from owning a stake in refineries in the country, it is unclear whether Mexico will be able to make the project sufficiently attractive to the Indian company. Mexico’s energy secretary, Georgina Kessel, had said that Reliance could only enter Mexico’s refining segment as a service provider, as Mexican law would preclude the possibility of a Pemex-Reliance joint venture (JV). Kessel raised the possibility of Indian companies setting up export refineries in Mexico.

Pemex has awarded construction and engineering firm ICA Fluor a US$622mn contract to provide engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) services for low- sulphur gasoline projects at two refineries in Mexico. The contract includes the installation, testing and start-up of catalytic desulphurisation facilities, amine regeneration units, off-sites and utilities. Both projects, at Minatitlan and Salina Cruz, will include the installation of 25,000b/d catalytic distillation trains. The work is scheduled to be completed by mid-2013.

Service Stations

Pemex operates all of the country’s 8,800 service stations (many under franchise agreements). Their number keeps growing at a rapid pace, underlining the potential size of Mexico’s fuel market.

Mexico’s motor lubricants market is worth an estimated US$600mn per annum, with the Mexlub JV between Pemex and local private company CICQ holding around half of the market. IOCs such as ExxonMobil, BP, Royal Dutch Shell and Chevron are able

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to market their products in Mexico but only through mechanics, garages, self-service stores and oil-change shops.

In 1997 the country’s competition authority, Comisión Federal de Competencia (CCF), ruled that Pemex’s decision to award the sole refined product sales concession to Mexlub was monopolistic and illegal. Although the JV was awarded a temporary stay on the decision, Pemex was later forced to open up the market to other companies.

Oil Storage Facilities

According to Pemex data, Mexico has 25.3mn bbl of oil storage capacity. Around 46% of this capacity is located in four oil terminals, the most important of which, Dos Bocas, can hold up to 7.5mn bbl. A further 8.1mn bbl of capacity is provided by the Tuzandépetl salt dome.

Oil Terminals/Ports

According to the Petroleum Economist, Mexico had 16 oil terminals in 2007. Nine were located on the country’s east coast and seven on the Gulf of Mexico. According to World Port Source, the country’s most important terminal is Dos Bocas in the state of Tabasco, which handles up to 85% of the country’s crude oil exports. The port, which began operations in 1982, also provides an import route for oil-related machinery. In 2008 the port exported 8.1mn tonnes of cargo, almost entirely made up of oil and oil products. Exports were down significantly from a peak of 30mn tonnes in 2003, when Mexican oil exports reached their 2003-2004 peak.

Oil Pipelines

The bulk of Mexico’s oil pipeline infrastructure is located on the country’s west coast, with spurs linking production centres to major inland refineries such as those at Salamanca and Tula. The pipeline network also includes offshore sections such as the one linking the Cantarell oil field to the coast at Atasta and Dos Bocas. Mexico currently has no major oil export pipelines.

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LNG Terminals

Despite being a major oil exporter, historical neglect of gas exploitation has meant the country has to import about 10% of its gas. Rising domestic consumption and opportunities for gas resale to the western US have led to the development of an LNG import sector. Mexico intends eventually to import more LNG than it can consume, with the ‘spare’ volumes exported to the US. Mexico currently has two operational LNG terminals and one under construction. The relative ease of securing construction permits in Mexico in comparison with the US has been attracting investors from across the northern border, but the slump in US LNG demand is set to cool the interest in Mexico’s regasification projects.

Altamira Terminal Mexico’s first terminal, Altamira LNG, came onstream in 2006. The Altamira consortium comprises Shell (50%), Total (25%) and Japan’s Mitsui (25%). Its two existing trains have a combined capacity of 3.5mn tonnes per annum (tpa), although there are long-term plans to boost this to around 9.7mn tpa (13.4bcm). All of the facility’s output is sold to Mexico’s Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE) under a 15-year purchasing agreement. Altamira is supplied with LNG by Shell from Nigeria and, from 2009, with 0.7mn tpa (1bcm) from train 5 of the Qatargas 2 project.

The facility’s associated infrastructure came onstream at the same time as the launch of the regasification terminal. This infrastructure includes a 1.12GW power plant built by Spanish company Iberdrola as an independent power producer, and a 130km gas pipeline operated by TransCanada (TRP) that carries gas from the LNG terminal to the power plant. In May 2009 TransCanada was awarded another pipeline contract to connect the Manzanillo LNG project (currently under construction) to Guadalajara city.

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Table: LNG Import Terminals In Mexico

Capacity Capacity Completion Terminal Trains (mn tpa) (bcm) Date Main Owners

Altamira LNG 2 3.5 4.8 2006 Shell 75%, Total, Mitsui

Costa Azul 1 7.5 10.3 2008 Sempra Energy

Total Capacity 3 11.0 15.1

Planned Additional Capacity

Manzanillo na 2.9 4.0 2011 Mitsui, Samsung, Kogas

Sonora na 9.7 13.4 2012 El Paso, DKRW

Costal Azul na 2.2 3.1 na Sempra Energy

Manzanillo Phase 2 na 4.3 6.0 na Mitsui, Samsung, Kogas

Total Additions 19.1 26.5

na = not available. Source: Company data, BMI

Costa Azul Terminal The Costa Azul project, near Ensenada on the western coast of Baja California, was completed in May 2008. Project leader Sempra Energy plans peak capacity of 7.5mn tpa (10.3bcm). Shell had originally obtained a permit to build its own LNG-receiving terminal in the area, but later decided to acquire a 50% share of Sempra’s project instead. Sempra Energy signed a supply deal with BP’s Tangguh project in Indonesia. Shell, on the other hand, is looking initially to source its LNG supply from the Russian Sakhalin-II project operated by Gazprom, then later from the Gorgon LNG project in Australia. Most of the LNG will be used to supply domestic customers in north western Mexico, but some could also be exported to California or .

Manzanillo Terminal An Asian consortium known as KMS de GNL is constructing an LNG terminal at Manzanillo, in the central-western Michoacon state. The terminal will have an initial capacity of 2.9tpa (4bcm), eventually ramping up to 10.3bcm. The consortium comprises Japan’s Mitsui and South Korea’s Samsung, both with 37.5% stakes, and Korea Gas (Kogas) with 25%. The KMS consortium was awarded the Manzanillo LNG

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construction and operation contract in March 2009. The plant was due onstream in September 2011 and will be supplied primarily from the Camisea project in Peru.

The Asian consortium won the plant contract, which was tendered by Mexico’s CFE, in March 2008, beating competition from two consortiums: one led by Belgian Tractebel, a subsidiary of French group GDF Suez currently known as Suez Energy International, and another one by Mexican company ICA and Tokyo Gas. Repsol YPF will supply the terminal with LNG from its Camisea project in Peru under a 15- year contract.

Sonora Terminal (Proposed) In May 2004, DKRW Energy, a US-based company that specialises in non-oil hydrocarbon technologies, signed an agreement with the state government of Sonora to build a 9.7tpa (13.4bcm) LNG-receiving terminal at Puerto Libertad, on the Gulf of California. DKRW purchased land for the project, dubbed Sonora LNG, in August 2004, and the plant was to begin operations by 2009, although the start-up has now been pushed back until 2012. The company has signed an agreement with US gas company El Paso to develop a pipeline system to distribute the gas within Sonora and to the US.

Other Proposed LNG Import Terminals The Mexican Pacific coast gained a new LNG project after local infrastructure firm Indi Group and South Korean conglomerate STX resurrected plans for a regasification terminal at the port of Lázaro Cárdenas. Indi and STX told Mexican newspaper El Milenio in February 2010 that they had submitted a regulatory application to build a 3.8mn tpa LNG terminal in the central state of Michoacán. The partners plan to invest US$700mn in the project and bring the Lázaro Cárdenas plant onstream in 2014-2015. Imported gas is to be sold to Pemex, which will then resell it to utilities in central Mexico.

STX is hoping to begin a feasibility study for the Lázaro Cárdenas LNG plant by mid- 2010 and begin construction in H111, a company spokesperson said earlier in February. Through its shipbuilding arm, STX also intends to construct two 200 thousand cubic metres (mcm) LNG vessels for the project. The South Korean firm is hoping to use the

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Mexican LNG project as a starting point for its expansion into the Latin American infrastructure market.

US major Chevron was planning to build an offshore LNG receiving terminal near the Coronado Islands, near in Baja California, but shelved the plans in 2006 because of opposition from local residents and environmental activists from both Mexico and the US, despite gaining approval from the federal government. The plant was to have initial capacity of 5.2mn tpa (7.2bcm), later growing to 10.5mn tpa (14.5bcm). The project was to supply 75% of its gas output to California and 25% to Baja California.

Gas Pipelines

Mexico remains a net gas importer, although it also exports small volumes to the US. All gas exports take place through the country’s pipeline network. Mexico has several gas pipeline links to the US at locations including Tijuana, , Naco and Ciudad Juárez.

North Baja Pipeline The North Baja pipeline is one of several linking the US and Mexico. Opened in 2002, the pipeline is reversible and links Mexico’s pipeline network around the city of Mexicali to the US gas pipeline network in Arizona. The 130km pipeline has a capacity of 6.2bcm. Its US section is operated by TC Pipelines.

Proposed Guatemala-Mexico Pipeline An agreement was signed between Mexico and Guatemala in 1999 as part of the Plan Puebla Panamá to construct a pipeline to transport gas from Ciudad Pemex in Mexico’s Tabasco region to Escuintla in Guatemala. The 560km pipeline was expected to cost US$450mn. Although the project received preliminary support from both governments, it has since been suspended.

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Macroeconomic Outlook

No Upward Revision To Growth BMI View: At present, Mexican economic activity looks strong, but with the consumer story not yet convincing and high oil prices likely to dampen demand for exports, we are happy to stick to what is now a below-consensus real GDP growth projection of 4.1% for 2011.

In December 2010, we revised our Mexican 2011 real GDP projection to what was then an above-consensus 4.1%, since which time consensus has overtaken us. A recent survey of private sector economists conducted by Banamex showed average growth forecasts of 4.4% for this year, and even Mexico's finance ministry is now forecasting growth to hit 4.2-4.3%. Yet while there is certainly justification for more optimistic sentiment, with the Mexican consumer yet to join the party and the oil price trajectory posing its own downside risks, for now we resist the temptation for another upward revision to our growth projections.

Manufacturing Keeps Going As in 2010, the most impressive aspect of Mexican growth remains the manufacturing sector, with exports of manufactured goods close to record highs at the start of 2011. More importantly, the inventory-to-sales ratio for US wholesale firms is still low by historic standards, implying no slump in demand for Mexican exports over the near term. This will be crucial for keeping Mexican economic activity expanding at a rapid clip, since growth remains heavily dependent on the re-export (maquila) sector, as indicated by the correlation between manufacturers exports and growth in the economic activity index (or IGAE, a proxy for GDP, see chart).

The strong external picture is finally feeding through to investor confidence, with gross fixed investment up by 8.4% y-o-y on a seasonally-adjusted measure in January, from 6.4% the previous month. We view this as a particularly good sign, since it had been local companies' reluctance to invest throughout 2010 that raised warning signals over the sustainability of last year's growth story.

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Yet we also note that investment still remains some way off pre-crisis highs, and since the bulk of new capital appears focused on serving external demand - growth in construction-related investment significantly lagged the headline rate, actually slowing to 4.7% y-o-y in January from 5.1% in December – in our view this remains an externally-driven growth story.

But Where's The Consumer? Consumer confidence has made a pretty solid recovery in recent months, but we still see a large divergence between external and domestic demand performance. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the autos sector, where production and exports has been strong (as we argued they would be back in July 2010: see our online service, July 23, 'Autos & Infrastructure Key'), but domestic demand for vehicles much less impressive (see chart).

This trend has been reflected in other sectors of the economy, with Wal-Mart de México reporting a 1.1% y-o-y decline in same-store sales in March this year, after a tepid 1.8% expansion in February. With the bulk of new private sector credit still going to corporations rather than consumers, and remittances far off historic highs in nominal terms, at present there is little to like about the health of private consumption in Mexico.

Oil Impact: Net Negative For Growth Mexico is a net crude oil exporter, but it is also a net refined oil importer, and until it can boost its refinery capacity (which our Oil & Gas team believes is still a long way off) the positive impact on net exports from high oil prices will be minimal. Subsidised pump prices also mean that for now the fiscal accounts do not benefit either, implying the contribution to growth from public expenditure will also be negligible. Finance minister Ernesto Cordero will no doubt be considering more aggressive gasoline price hikes to ease the fiscal burden, but this would simply move the burden onto lower- income households, meaning little benefit to the broader economy.

Most concerning is the potential impact from oil price trajectory on US economic activity, and the effect this will have on demand for Mexican exports. Our Global team currently expects US 2011 real GDP growth to come in at 2.9%, slightly below

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Bloomberg consensus at 3.0%, with downside risks to consumption should the crude prices remain elevated for much longer (see our online service, March 22, 'Recovery Steady, But Mixed'). Such a scenario would have negative implications for the net exports, private consumption and gross fixed capital components of Mexican GDP, meaning that for now we are content to stick with our 4.1% GDP outlook for 2011.

Mexico – Economic Activity

2008 2009 2010e 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f

Nominal GDP, MXNbn 2 12,200.1 11,929.5 13,137.2 14,347.9 15,274.8 16,129.5 17,022.7 17,998

Nominal GDP, US$bn 2 1,089.6 884 1,040.2 1,202.7 1,357.8 1,500.4 1,640.7 1,734.7

Real GDP growth, % change y-o-y 1,2 1.5 -6.1 5.5 4.1 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.6

GDP per capita, US$ 2 10,245 8,228 9,585 10,985 12,296 13,476 14,619 15,338

Population, mn 3 106.4 107.4 108.5 109.5 110.4 111.3 112.2 113.1

Industrial production index, % y-o-y, ave 4 -0.7 -1.3 6.1 3.6 2.4 3 3 3.1

Unemployment, % of labour force, eop 5 4.3 4.8 4.9 4.4 3.8 3.8 3.5 3.2

Notes: e BMI estimates. f BMI forecasts. 1 Base year=2003; Sources: 2 INEGI/IBMI Calculation. 3 World Bank/BMI calculation/BMI; 4 Banxico/BMI Calculation; 5 INEGI.

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Competitive Landscape

Executive Summary

ƒ The main government vehicle is Pemex, which accounts for all oil and gas production, as well as the entire Mexican refining sector.

ƒ International oil company (IOC) upstream involvement is minimal and is confined to oil field servicing, engineering contracts, gas distribution and LNG investment. The current government is pushing for further liberalisation but is facing an uphill battle in the opposition-controlled parliament.

ƒ Shell operates a US$370mn LNG import terminal at Altamira on the east coast. It participates in another terminal in Baja California with Sempra Energy.

ƒ Repsol YPF has an upstream gas service contract from Pemex covering the Reynosa- Monterrey Block. It is to supply an LNG import terminal in Manzanillo on the west coast owned by a consortium of Mitsui, Samsung and Kogas.

ƒ Chevron had plans to build a US$650mn floating LNG regasification terminal off the Baja California peninsula. The first key permit was awarded in September 2004, but Chevron has since abandoned the project.

ƒ Petrobras has two gas service contracts for the Cuervito and Fronterizo blocks.

ƒ In early 2004, Total signed an agreement with Shell, agreeing to take a 25% stake in the Altamira LNG terminal and gas supply project that came onstream in 2006.

ƒ China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) made a bid for a drilling contract in the Chicontepec Basin in early 2009. Sinopec’s bid made it the first integrated foreign oil company to tender for a contract in Mexico since the government voted in favour of reforms to the country’s oil sector in October 2008, but the tender was later postponed.

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Table: Key Energy Player

Total 2009 Sales % share of No. of Year Assets Company (US$bn) total sales employees established (US$bn) Ownership

Pemex 80.6 58 139,000 1938 111.0 100% state

Source: Company data 2010

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Overview/State Role

Mexico’s oil industry is dominated by Pemex, which has a complete monopoly over domestic oil and gas production, as well as oil refining and oil products marketing. The bulk of Pemex’s oil output comes from the shallow waters of the Sonda de Campeche (Campeche Sound), offshore the country’s south-eastern coast. The Burgos Basin in north-eastern Mexico is the main gas producing region. Output at Mexico’s main oil field, Cantarell, continues to decline quicker than expected. By early 2010, its production fell to around 620,000b/d, down from a 2mn b/d peak in 2004 and significantly below Pemex’s original 2009 forecasts of 975,000b/d. Between 2009 and 2017, Pemex expects Cantarell’s output to average 423,000b/d, according to the figures presented to the Mexican senate in January 2009.

Licensing and Regulation

Pemex has announced the first tender that will allow foreign oil companies to develop Mexico's oil fields. Although the tender includes only six fields in the Magallanes, Carrizo and Santuario blocks, Pemex has said that it plans to launch another two tenders for onshore blocks in northern Mexico and in Chicontepec later in 2011. Access to Pemex's data room and the blocks offered in the first licensing round was available from March 1 to June 24 2011. In order to take part in the tender, interested companies had until June 24 to purchase the bidding guidelines for US$30,000. After pre-qualifications in July, Pemex announced in August that it had awarded contracts to the UK’s Petrofac and Mexico’s Administradora en Proyectos de Campos (APC).

The fields on offer included the Magallanes, Carrizo and Santuario blocks, which are located in Tabasco state in southern Mexico, and are said to hold proven reserves of 207mn barrels of oil equivalent (boe), with proven, possible and probable (3P) reserves put at 2.2bn boe, according to Pemex. Pemex believes that the fields have significant growth and profitability potential, because although they are mature, having been extensively exploited in the 1960s, the technical know-how of foreign companies joining the project should provide a significant boost in production at the fields. The blocks currently produce just 13,000b/d each, with output expected to increase to a total of 150,000b/d within three years.

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Multiple Service Contracts Part of the energy initiative carried out by the previous administration of Vincente Fox (2000-2006) was to promote the development of gas resources via Multiple Service Contracts (MSCs) involving foreign partners. Under an MSC, private companies will be responsible for 100% of the financing of a contract and will be paid for the works performed and services rendered. However, the gas produced remains the property of Pemex.

Repsol YPF was the first private company to be awarded a MSC for the development of the Reynosa-Monterrey block. Petrobras, along with Teikoku Oil of Japan and Grupo Diavaz of Mexico, were awarded contracts for two separate blocks: Cuervito and Fronterizo. Argentina’s Tecpetrol, in partnership with Mexico’s Industrial Perforadora de Campeche (IPC), won a contract for the Misión block. Texas-based Lewis Energy received the fifth contract for the Olmos block. In November 2004, Pemex awarded a US$900mn MSC to a Mexican group comprising privately held companies Compañía de Desarrollo de Servicios Petroleros and IPC.

In a major step towards opening Mexico's oil sector to IOC involvement, Pemex’s board approved the use of a new incentive-based contract in November 2010. The model will allow Pemex to pay foreign oil companies on a per-barrel basis to operate oil fields in the country.

The board approved the use of the contracts at the mature Magallanes, Carrizo and Santuario fields in the south-east of Mexico. The fields are expected to be auctioned in 2011, though Pemex has yet to set a date for the round. The round was initially expected to include 14 blocks, but those plans were drastically scaled back in October 2010. Pemex has said that it wants to attract industry majors ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell and BP as well as other large independent players to take part in the projects.

Initially, Pemex E&P head Carlos Morales told Reuters in October 2010 that Pemex plans to offer three marginal oil blocks to foreign investors in its first licensing round since 2008 energy sector reforms opened the door to international involvement. He said that field data packages had been assembled and were ready to be assessed by bidders.

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He did say that Pemex intended to make the remaining 11 blocks available in future licensing rounds.

Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos As part of a series of energy reforms in October 2008, the government set up a new and supposedly independent regulatory commission, Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos (CNH), to ensure Pemex’s compliance with best operational practices. Its first task was to review the economics of the Chicontepec project, which has been consuming funds without achieving any major output improvements. Announcing the results of the review in October 2009, CNH accused Pemex of inappropriate exploitation methods and recommended a comprehensive overhaul of the project’s development plan.

Pemex executives were quick to reject CNH’s proposals, arguing that more time is required to exploit the field’s full potential. The company’s E&P director, Carlos Morales Gil, vowed to carry on with the project, maintaining the current levels of investment. Although CNH’s recommendations on the technical aspects of Pemex’s operations should normally be binding according to its charter, the agency’s exact remit is unclear.

Reformist Pemex board member Ruiz Alarcon told Bloomberg following the CNH’s announcement that the board needed to determine exactly ‘how far the commission’s mandate reaches’. CNH director, Juan Zepeda, said that the commission’s findings were a recommendation and were not binding. The commissioning of the Chicontepec report by the energy ministry coincided with a root and branch shake-up of Pemex aimed at reducing corruption and streamlining its operations. We therefore believe that a comprehensive overhaul of the Calderón project is not unlikely. Much will depend on Calderón’s success in convincing PRI, a party that created and built its power on Pemex, of the need for a radical overhaul of the bloated monopoly.

CNH’s final report on Chicontepec, published in April 2009, argued the project will start generating positive cash flow only in 2015 and that Pemex would not recover its capex until 2030, unless a major change in project management takes place. The CNH said that Pemex needs to cut costs at Chicontepec by US$2-7 per bbl to make the

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project profitable. To do that, the commission urged Pemex to move away from the 'rigid' drilling deals it has relied on historically and to award more performance-based contracts to international oil field service providers under foreign investment legislation introduced in late 2008. The incentivised contracts introduced by the law, however, remain shrouded in legislative uncertainty owing to a legal challenge brought forward by the political opposition.

In January 2011, CNH published a new set of rules governing deep water drilling. The regulations seek to establish a framework for safe exploration activity in the deep waters of the GoM and were formulated in response to BP's Macondo oil spill in 2010.

The regulations require Pemex to provide a number of reports on company safety processes over the next eight months and to have its safety system certified by an independent expert. They also require Pemex to prove that it has insurance or other easily-accessible funds to cover the cost of damages or compensation that could arise as a result of a deep water accident.

The rules steer clear of placing a temporary ban on deep water drilling while Pemex seeks to meet these requirements, however, underlining the crucial importance of Mexico's deep water resources to its oil reserves and production outlook. Pemex estimates that the Mexican part of the GoM contains nearly 30bn boe of undiscovered resources.

Government Policy

Oil Sector Reforms In October 2008, Mexico’s senate voted in favour of reforms to the country’s oil sector that granted Pemex greater financial autonomy and will allow it to hire foreign companies to assist it in oil exploration and development. The changes fell short of President Felipe Calderón’s initial proposals, and it remains to be seen to what extent they will improve the country’s business environment. The reforms aim to make service contracts more attractive to foreign companies by allowing Pemex to offer incentives, such as bonuses for contractors that complete projects ahead of schedule, to provide additional compensation for projects that are more successful than expected, and to

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offer rewards to service providers that pass on technologies to Pemex. Calderón said the initiatives would free up funds for exploration to help reverse the country’s declining production. Unlike the original measures proposed by Calderón, private sector involvement in refinery ownership, construction or operation is restricted. The reforms also place strict limits on the roles of IOCs and rule out the possibility of PSCs.

In February 2009, Calderón held meetings with several major IOCs at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, promising further energy reforms in 2009. Hopes for significant reforms were dealt a blow, however, following the July 2009 parliamentary and gubernatorial elections in which PAN lost its congressional majority. The centrist Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), along with its ally the Partido Verde Ecologista de México, gained an absolute majority in Mexico’s lower parliamentary house, relegating PAN to a distant third. While PRI’s backing was essential for allowing passage of the limited energy reforms in 2008, the party’s nationalist appeal means it does not want to be seen giving further help to PAN’s goal of privatising Mexico’s national resources.

Even the limited reforms that were passed in 2008 looked to be under threat in 2009 as PRI launched a legal challenge to block them. Calderón's administration, however, mounted a vigorous defence against this challenge. Given the public sensitivity to the issue of private participation in the national energy industry, both the government and the private sector have been expecting the opposition to attack the 2008 reforms.

Indeed, far from retreating from the October 2008 energy reforms, Calderón's administration is seeking to broaden them by developing performance-based upstream service contracts and introducing foreign investment in the oil refining sector. Calderón's ongoing efforts to widen energy reforms have demonstrated that his party's loss of its parliamentary majority does not necessarily mean that he is going to become a lame-duck president. The energy secretariat (Senec) is currently drafting a national energy programme, which was planned to be unveiled in February 2010 but has been delayed. The programme is expected to include several reform proposals that failed to pass in 2008, including private participation in refining projects. Legal battles continue to stymie the implementation of incentive-based contracts with foreign partners.

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Oil Price Hedging Since 2008 Mexico has been following an unusual but so far profitable policy of hedging some of its oil exports at a certain price floor. This de facto insurance against oil market volatility played out in mid-2008, when finance minister Agustin Carstens hedged 2009 export prices at US$70/bbl when oil prices were approaching the US$150/bbl mark. The subsequent collapse of the oil prices amid the global financial crisis earned the Mexican government a US$5bn windfall. The finance ministry spent US$1.17bn buying out options to sell its oil at US$57/bbl in 2010 and US$812mn on options to sell at US$63/bbl in 2011. Historically, Mexico has tended to hedge around 20-30% of its crude exports, keeping costs low but providing limited protection.

The 2011 hedge will cover a total of 222mn bbl. This is equivalent to around 608,000b/d, or 74.6% of Mexico's exports for 2011, according to BMI forecasts, which assume a drop in international sales from 985,000b/d in 2010 to 815,000b/d. This will provide a substantial degree of stability to the country's budget, which is based on a slightly higher average export price of US$65.40/bbl for Mexican crude. The oil sector accounts for around 30% of Mexico's government revenues, which makes price stability extremely important in planning government expenditure.

International Energy Relations

In March 2010 the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) agreed to lend the Mexican government US$600mn to develop the Chicontepec Basin, according to the Nikkei news agency. The loan is one of the largest ever received by Pemex for a single project and demonstrates Tokyo's reassessment of its historical neglect of Latin American oil producers. Japan is heavily reliant on Middle Eastern supplies for its oil requirements, a regional dependence it has been looking to reduce in recent years. Given the closed nature of the Mexican oil industry and poor returns from Chicontepec, the loan appears to be largely a goodwill gesture aimed at nurturing relations with the Mexican government.

The US and Mexican governments have discussed extending a moratorium on exploration activity in an unclaimed area of the Gulf of Mexico that lies outside their

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200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones known as the ‘Doughnut Hole’, from 2011 through 2014. The two countries are also discussing a broader treaty on boundary resources.

Table: Upstream Player

Oil/liquids production Gas production Company (000b/d) Market share (%) (bcm) Market share (%)

Pemex 2,953 100 72.5 100

Source: BMI, Company data 2010.

Table: Downstream Player

Refining capacity Company (000b/d) Market share (%) Retail outlets Market share (%)

Pemex 1,540 100 8,803 na

Source: Company data, 2009/10.

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Company Monitor

Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex)

Company Analysis Address ƒ Petróleos Mexicanos Faced with the multiple challenges of stemming the decline of Marina Nacional # 329 oil output, boosting gas production and upgrading refineries, Colonia Huasteca 11311 Mexico DF the state-owned company is struggling to meet volume growth ƒ Tel: +52 (55) 5531 6061 targets. The company can now link up with IOCs to access ƒ Fax: +52 (55) 5531 6321 their superior technology to exploit oil reserves, but on a ƒ www.pemex.com contractor basis only. Pemex can now offer incentives such as bonuses for contractors that complete projects ahead of Financial Statistics Sales schedule, additional compensation for projects that are more ƒ US$103.8bn (2010) successful than expected and rewards for service providers that ƒ US$80.6bn (2009) reduce costs by applying new technologies. ƒ US$98.2bn (2008) ƒ US$104.5bn (2007) SWOT Analysis Net income/(loss) ƒ (US$3.8bn) (2010) Strengths: Monopoly oil and gas producer ƒ (US$3.4bn) (2009) ƒ (US$8.1bn) (2008) Unrivalled access to exploration acreage ƒ (US$1.48bn) (2007) ƒ US$3.9bn (2006) Weaknesses: Limited financial or operational freedom

Operating Statistics Cost and efficiency disadvantages Oil/Liquids Production ƒ 2.95mn b/d (2010) Opportunities: Considerable untapped gas potential ƒ 2.97mn b/d (2009) ƒ 3.17mn b/d (2008) IOC involvement in gas development Gas Production (Company Data) Threats: Long-term fall in domestic oil production ƒ 72.5bcm (2010) ƒ 72.6bcm (2009) Changes in national energy policy ƒ 71.3bcm (2008) Refining throughput: ƒ 80% (2010) ƒ 84% (2009)

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Market Position

Pemex is the largest company in Mexico and among the 10 largest companies in the world in revenue terms. The entity was established on July 20 1938 by a parliamentary decree, following the nationalisation of the foreign-owned oil companies operating in Mexico. Since that time, Pemex has held a monopoly over the exploration, production, refining and marketing of oil and gas and their related products. Gas distribution was opened up to foreign companies in 1995, but Pemex retains sole production rights. From October 2008, Pemex has been able to offer service contracts to foreign companies.

The group estimated Mexican P3 oil reserves, including proven, probable and possible barrels, at 30.9bn bbl by January 1 2009, down from 62.4bn bbl in January 2005. However, these figures are questioned by some analysts owing to Pemex’s monopoly on reserve evaluation. Independent estimates generally show more conservative figures. Nevertheless, both sides are agreed that Mexico’s proven reserves are steadily falling as new discoveries fail to offset the maturation of the main fields.

By early-2009, the Ku-Maloob-Zaap (KMZ) complex in the Campeche Sound overtook Cantarell as Mexico’s largest single field. It will be difficult to replace the lost production from Cantarell, particularly if output continues to decline at the current rate. Pemex projects its crude output to be around 2.55mn b/d in 2011. This is down 1.18% y-o-y.

Strategy

Pemex’s E&P activity is focused on nine principal projects: the KMZ, Cantarell, Burgos, Antonio J. Bermudez, Chicontepec, Chuc, Jujo-Tecominoacan, Caan and the Strategic Gas Programme. Further down the line, the company is aiming to explore the deepwater GoM. Pemex will need to form partnerships with IOCs in an effort to gain access to the necessary technology, otherwise the firm’s drilling campaign could take much longer than expected.

Much of the company’s new drilling is at the Chicontepec (Tertiary Gulf Oil) project in the states of Veracruz and Puebla, where output stood at 30,000b/d by the end of 2009.

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Pemex is targeting 60,000b/d at the project by end-2010. By 2015, Pemex hopes production in the region will rise to nearly 600,000b/d following investment now pegged at US$1.7bn.

To stem the fall in production, Pemex has been aggressively boosting capex, with the company targeting spending of US$20bn in 2010, as it did in 2009. Pemex was one of the only non-Chinese NOCs to raise investment during the economic downturn. The US$20bn budget for 2009 was above an envisioned US$15.5bn and an increase on the US$11.8bn allocated to the company in 2008. Pemex specifically allocated US$2.2bn of the 2009 budget for stabilising the Cantarell field where the company is installing gas re-injecting units and water-pumping stations to rectify years of poor operational practices. In the 1990s nitrogen injection enabled Pemex to achieve superior rates of growth in Cantarell; these measures are now coming back to haunt the company, significantly reducing the field’s recovery rate.

The financing of other projects was expected to take up another US$10.5bn of the company’s 2009 capex. In July 2009, Pemex announced that it was close to keeping its capex guidance for the year despite the economic downturn. Fiscal obligations, however, continue to place a heavy burden on Pemex’s accounts, with government claiming about 63.2% of the company’s 2007 net revenue in taxes.

Pemex requested an investment budget of MXN300bn (US$23.4bn) for 2011, citing the need to boost production. However, Mexican President Felipe Calderón only allocated MXN286bn (US$22.3bn) in his request to congress on September 9 2010. Although lower than Pemex desired, the budget nonetheless represents an 8.7% y-o-y spending increase.

After being caught short during the fall-out from hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Pemex unveiled plans in April 2009 to construct a new 300,000b/d refinery by 2015 to reduce the country’s fuel imports. This would be Pemex’s first greenfield refinery in over 30 years. After heated inter-regional competition for the project, a site for the plant was chosen near the city of El Llano in the central state of Hidalgo in late 2009. According to report in El Financiero newspaper, Pemex and the government of the chosen state

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will contribute US$9.1bn and US$800mn respectively towards the construction of the new refinery. Pemex will also spend US$3bn up to 2014 on expanding the existing Salamanca refinery in Guanajuato state.

Pemex is considering opening a new line of exploration that concentrates on shale gas wells in the northern state of Coahuila, according to remarks made by board member Hector Moreira in August 2010. He said that the new line could reduce the company's growing dependence on natural gas imports. He also stated that the shale exploration effort would include the hiring of private companies.

Pemex announced in 2011 the first tender to allow foreign oil companies to develop six fields in the Magallanes, Carrizo and Santuario blocks. Access to Pemex's data room and the blocks offered in the first licensing round were made available from March 1 to June 24 2011. After pre-qualifications in July, Pemex announced in August that contracts had been awarded to the UK’s Petrofac and Mexico’s APC.

The fields are located in Tabasco state in southern Mexico, and are said to hold proven reserves of 207mn boe, with 3P reserves put at 2.2bn boe, according to Pemex. Pemex believes that the fields have significant growth and profitability potential, because although they are mature, having been extensively exploited in the 1960s, the technical know-how of foreign companies joining the project should provide a significant boost in production at the fields. The blocks currently produce just 13,000b/d each, with output expected to increase to a total of 150,000b/d within three years.

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Latest Developments

Pemex said in late June 2011 that it had asked regulators for permission to form a US$556mn petrochemicals venture with Mexichem in an effort to leverage its production chain and supply the industrial plastics market. The request was filed with the Federal Competition Commission, Mexico's antitrust regulator, Pemex said.

The new company will help boost chlorovinyls production from 24,000 tonnes in the first year to 146,000 tonnes in year two and 217,000 tonnes by year three, with total output expected to eventually reach slightly more than 400,000 tonnes annually, achieving ‘an important improvement in Pemex's financial results,’ the oil company said.

Pemex has said that it expects the country to reduce its gasoline imports by 8% over 2012-2016, according to a Bloomberg report. The reduction in imports is part of a long- term refinery investment programme aimed at increasing the country's self-sufficiency in gasoline production. Although these projects have the potential to significantly reduce imports, a long-term solution to Mexico's fuels deficit will be largely dependent upon a reduction of fuels subsidies, which are expected to cost the country over MXN100bn (US$8.4bn) in 2011.

Pemex has reported a deepwater GoM natural gas discovery in the Cordilleras Mexicanas geological formation. The company said on May 25 2011 that it made the discovery at its Piklis-1 well, located 144km north west of the port of Coatzacoalcos. Pemex says that Piklis-1 struck an estimated 11.3-16.9bn cubic metres equivalent (bcme) of gas and condensate at a total depth of 5,400m and a water depth of 1,928m.

Pemex is to invest US$1.2bn to boost output in the GoM. The investment will be directed towards the purchase of eight offshore oil drilling platforms, which will be leased out. The rigs are expected to start operations by end-2011 and Q112. The company is also planning to spend US$200mn to acquire five land-drilling rigs for operations in southern Mexico.

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In April 2011, Pemex reported an oil and gas discovery close to the Tabasco State city of Comalcalco. The well appears to have been drilled as part of a broader plan to increase production from the country's south-eastern states, which was announced in 2008.

The onshore Pareto-1 well was drilled to a total depth of 7,124m, according to a Pemex press release. The well, located 10km from Comalcalco, encountered oil and gas at a depth of between 6,100m and 7,130m. During testing, the well flowed 3,700b/d of oil and 227,000 cubic metres per day of gas. Pemex said it is currently assessing reserves at the discovery prior to certification. It said that the discovery provided upside potential to several nearby locations that it has already identified as having similar geological conditions.

Pemex has reduced its proven reserves by 1.4% to 13.8bn boe in 2010, the 12th year in a row that reserves have fallen. The decline was attributed to delays in bringing new projects on stream.

Pemex has said that it is looking to buy a 'significant' US refinery, as the company struggles to meet surging Mexican gasoline demand. Speaking to Bloomberg on March 9, Pemex's CEO, Juan José Suárez Coppel, said that the company was evaluating its options and could close a deal by the end of 2011. Although he did not name specific targets, Pemex is likely to be looking at BP's 475,000b/d Texas City refinery and Petróleos de Venezuela (PdVSA)'s US subsidiary Citgo, which owns two US refineries and operates a third.

Pemex has tested gas flows from its first shale-focused exploration well in the north of the country. The Emergente well, in the northern state of Coahuila, test flowed dry gas at a rate of 85,000 cubic metres per day, Pemex's upstream chief Carlos Morales Gil told Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ) on March 8 2011. The well, which targets the Eagle Ford shale play in Mexico's Burgos Basin, has 17 fracturing stages in a 1,372m lateral at a depth of 2,500m, he said. Evaluation of the well is ongoing.

Pemex produced 2.58mn b/d of crude oil in January 2011, according to a report on February 25 2011, its highest crude production volume for eight months. The robust

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output came as the company slashed its drilling programme for 2011, suggesting a rethink of its development plans to stem output decline.

The company said that the output increase was largely the result of stabilisation at the mature Cantarell field, as well as development work at Ku-Maloob-Zaap (KMZ) and other fields. Three-quarters of the firm's current output comes from offshore Gulf of Mexico production, with a further 21% from the 'South Region'. The largest producing fields within the South Region are Samaria-Luna and Bellota-Jujo, according to Pemex's FY2010 annual report.

In October 2010, Pemex announced that it would delay its ultra-deepwater exploration programme in the Perdido area in the GoM until Q211.

In August 2010, the head of CNH said the planned drilling of Pemex’s deepest ever offshore well – Maximino – had been delayed from Q410 until 2011. The official said that Pemex wished to drill the less challenging Tulipau-1 offshore prospect first, in order for the company to familiarise itself with the new ultra-deepwater rig.

In April 2010, Pemex announced plans to drill Mexico's first-ever shale gas well in the state of Coahuila, located along the border with Texas – the site of several major shale plays, including Eagle Ford. Pemex is clearly hoping to duplicate the success of the US in exploiting domestic shale reserves towards boosting natural gas output.

In April 2010, Pemex made a gas discovery with its Labay well in the deepwater GoM. Antonio Escalera, a Pemex exploration manager, characterised the discovery as 'significant' and said that the company would carry out additional drilling in the Lakach area to learn more about its reserve potential. Escalera said that an existing discovery near the Labay well, in the Lakach area of the GoM, had previously indicated possible reserves of 67bcm in the area, but that the most recent find indicated that potential reserves in the area could be between 141.5bcm and 424.5bcm of natural gas.

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Repsol YPF Mexico

Company Analysis Address In common with all IOCs, Repsol YPF dreams of accessing ƒ Repsol YPF Mexico Arquimedes 199-5 Mexico’s huge oil reserves and production potential. Repsol Piso YPF’s enthusiasm is reflected in its successful bid for Mexico’s Col Polanco 11560 Mexico DF first gas service contract. The volumes generated are modest, but ƒ Tel: +52 (55) 254 the company has a foot in the door and successful completion of 6487 ƒ Fax: +52 (55) 254 the project means a better relationship with Pemex that could bear 5822 fruit at a later date. The company may now look at the terms of ƒ www.repsol-ypf.com service contracts available for oil projects with Pemex. If the Gas Production (Gross) planned LNG terminal proceeds, Mexico will become a useful ƒ 0.5bcm (2009e) part of Repsol YPF’s Latin American portfolio. ƒ 0.57bcm (2008) ƒ 0.5bcm (2007) SWOT Analysis Strengths: First IOC participant in upstream gas

Role in planned LNG import infrastructure

Good relationship with state

Weaknesses: Limited gas production potential

No role in upstream or downstream oil

Opportunities: Considerable untapped gas upside potential

Rising domestic energy consumption

Large areas of under-explored territory

Threats: Changes in national energy policy

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Market Position

In October 2003, Repsol YPF bid over US$2.4bn to be the first foreign oil and gas company to explore for and develop hydrocarbons in Mexico since nationalisation in 1938. The firm was awarded an MSC in 2004/2005, one of the only contracts open to foreign investment in Mexico’s energy industry at the time. Under MSCs, private firms are responsible for 100% of the financing of a contract and will be paid for work performed and services rendered. However, the gas produced remains Pemex’s property.

In September 2007, Repsol YPF was awarded a 15-year contract by the Mexican authorities for the supply of LNG to a proposed 4bcm regasification plant in the port of Manzanillo, near the city of Lázaro Cárdenas on Mexico’s central Pacific Coast. Repsol YPF will supply the terminal, which is being constructed by the KMS consortium, from its Camisea project in Peru.

Repsol YPF’s affiliate Gas Natural SDG has been active in Mexico since 1997, and holds gas distribution concessions for nine states, including the capital Mexico DF. The company distributes gas to customers in Nuevo Laredo (Tamaulipas); Saltillo (Coahuila); the Toluca area of Estado de Mexico; the District Capital, Monterrey (Nuevo Leon); the state of Guanajuato and in Bajío Norte, which comprises the states of Aguascalientes, San Luis Potosí and Zacatecas. Gas Natural SDG has an 86.75% holding in Gas Natural Mexico, with Spanish utility Iberdrola owning the remaining interest. Repsol YPF has an approximate 31% shareholding in Gas Natural SDG.

Strategy

Repsol YPF’s proposals cover the development of non-associated gas reserves and related infrastructure on the Reynosa-Monterrey block in the Burgos Basin over a 20- year period under the MSC programme. Covering 2,000sq km, the Reynosa-Monterrey Block is the largest of seven Burgos Basin blocks tendered under the MSC process. In 2008, production from the block peaked at 0.57bcm.

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Latest Developments

In September 2009, the KMS consortium signed a deal allocating US$701mn for its proposed LNG terminal at Manzanillo. The allocation of funds to the project means that Repsol YPF’s deal to supply the terminal has now taken a step closer to realisation.

In July 2008, Gas Natural SDG agreed to sell a 15% stake in Gas Natural México to financial firm Sinca Inbursa. The Carlos Slim-controlled company will pay EUR47mn (US$74.2mn) for the stake after due diligence is completed and the deal meets regulatory approvals. The transaction will reduce Gas Natural’s stake in its Mexican subsidiary to 71.75%. Iberdrola holds the remaining 13.25% stake.

September 2007 saw the CFE award Repsol a contract to supply Manzanillo (Lázaro Cárdenas). Repsol’s offer was the sole bid received following a tender for the supply of 0.83bcm per year from 2011, rising to 5.2bcm from 2015. According to a CFE spokesperson, Repsol’s offer was attractively priced, at three cents below the base price, which was set at 91% of Henry Hub. Repsol has said that it will ship LNG from the Camisea field in Peru. Bolivia was tipped as the original supplier at the time of the project’s conception in mid-2000s. The plant is expected to enter production in 2011. LNG from Manzanillo will be used to supply power to Guadalajara and other west- central regions.

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Shell – Summary

In October 2006, Shell Mexico completed the US$370mn LNG regasification and storage terminal at Altamira on the east coast (Shell 75%, Total 25%). In September 2003, the company won a 15-year contract to supply 5.2bcm per annum of gas to fuel power plants in north-eastern Mexico. The contract was followed with an LNG supply deal signed in October 2004 with Sempra Energy. Under the 20-year contract, Shell will supply Sempra’s Costa Azul facility in Baja California with half of its LNG capacity, which is set at a maximum of 10.3Mcm/d (10.3bcm, 7.5mn tpa). The Costa Azul LNG terminal came onstream in May 2008. Roughly half of the plant’s output is taken by customers in Western Mexico, with the other half exported to the US.

Chevron – Summary

In April 2008, Chevron submitted proposals to exploit Mexico’s hydrocarbon reserves. Its plans involve deepwater GoM exploration and tapping into gas deposits neglected by Pemex. Whether its proposals bear fruit remains to be seen, but Chevron does have significant deepwater drilling expertise.

In October 2003, Chevron unveiled plans to construct a US$650mn floating LNG receiving terminal located 13km off the coast of Baja California, serving both the Mexican and US markets. However, the company has since scrapped these plans, owing to lower US gas demand and prices. The terminal was to process 14.5bcm of gas per annum, with an initial capacity of around 7.25bcm.

Petróleo Brasileiro – Summary

In November 2003, Brazilian state energy company Petrobras submitted two successful bids for the Cuervito and Fronterizo gas blocks as part of the MSC programme. Together with Japan’s Teikoku Oil and local firm D&S Petroleum, Petrobras won a 15-year contract to operate both blocks. The partners will drill a total of around 100 wells on Cuervito with an aim to increase annual production to a minimum of 0.35bcm. Petrobras expects investment in the two concessions to reach US$525mn over the next 15 years, with its share to total around US$236mn.

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Total – Summary

French oil major Total signed an agreement with Shell in early 2004, agreeing to take a 25% stake in the Altamira LNG import terminal and gas supply project. The deal was Total’s first investment in an LNG re-gasification terminal.

Sinopec – Summary

In February 2009, Chinese state-run company Sinopec unsuccessfully bid for two large drilling contracts in the Chicontepec Basin, according to documents published by the Mexican government. Sinopec’s bid makes it the first integrated foreign oil company to tender for a contract in Mexico since the government voted in favour of reforms to the country’s oil sector in October 2008, which gave Pemex the ability to hire foreign companies to assist it in oil exploration and development.

Despite Pemex’s monopoly over Mexican reserves and output, Sinopec could be considering long-term investment in the country, perhaps with the hope of gaining future access to Mexico’s reserves.

Others – Summary

In May 2008, North America-focused pipeline operator TransCanada was awarded a contract to build, own and operate (BOO) the Guadalajara natural gas pipeline. The 310km Guadalajara pipeline will transport 5.1bcm from the Manzanillo LNG terminal to Guadalajara. Mexico’s state utility CFE has agreed to a 25-year purchase agreement for the entire capacity of the pipeline. The estimated cost of the pipeline is US$320mn, according to TransCanada’s press release. Construction was due to start in 2010, with completion scheduled for March 2011.

In February 2010, US gas-focused independent El Paso sold its interest in a pipeline and compression business in Mexico to Sempra Pipelines & Storage, a unit of Sempra Energy, in a deal worth US$300mn. The deal includes El Paso's 50% interest in a JV with Pemex, which holds various pipeline assets in northern Mexico and a 100%-owned pipeline that starts at the Arizona border.

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European midstream players Vopak and Enagás have agreed to buy the Altamira liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal on Mexico's east coast for an undisclosed sum. The firms will buy 100% of the shares in the terminal from its current owners, Shell (50%), Total (25%) and Mitsui (25%), according to a Enagás press release. Following the deal, the terminal will be owned by a JV of Vopak (60%) and Enagás (40%), which will exercise management control jointly. The JV expected to take over operatorship of the facility in Q311.

Service Companies

Weatherford In February 2009, Pemex awarded US services major Weatherford was awarded a US$646mn contract to drill 500 wells at the Chicontepec oil field. The Weatherford de Mexico unit reportedly beat off competition from six other companies, including Halliburton, Schlumberger and Baker Hughes, for the contract, which starts in April 2009 and runs through 2012, according to a filing with the Mexican stock exchange. The opening up of Mexico’s oil field service segment to foreign investment represents a significant new market for the -based driller.

Schlumberger In March 2009, Pemex awarded a US$687mn Chicontepec drilling contract to a consortium led by Paris-based Schlumberger. Schlumberger and its local partner Drillers Technology de Mexico began drilling 500 wells in the field in April of that year. The contract runs through to June 2012.

Others Another major international service company, Halliburton, entered the Chicontepec Basin in July 2009, after winning a US$159mn 170-well drilling contract. The three- year contract started in mid-August 2009 and will involve four drilling rigs.

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Oil And Gas Outlook: Long-Term Forecasts

Regional Oil Demand

The rate of oil demand growth in the Latin America region is predicted to slow beyond 2015, with Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela remaining the region’s largest consumers. Overall oil consumption for the region is forecast to grow by 7.9%. Trinidad and Tobago is set to see the strongest rate of growth over the period at 28%, followed by Ecuador with 22% growth and Brazil at 11%. Venezuela and Mexico are set to see the slowest rates of growth over the period at just 5%

Table: Latin America Oil Consumption (000b/d)

Country 2013f 2014f 2015f 2016f 2017f 2018f 2019f 2020f

Argentina 681.86 702.32 716.36 727.11 734.38 741.72 749.14 756.63

Bolivia 65.79 67.11 68.45 69.82 71.22 72.64 74.10 75.58

Brazil 2,953.38 3,041.98 3,118.03 3,195.98 3,275.88 3,341.40 3,408.23 3,476.39

Chile 326.86 330.00 332.79 336.51 339.30 343.94 347.66 353.24

Colombia 315.65 323.54 331.63 339.92 348.42 357.13 366.06 375.21

Ecuador 228.28 237.41 246.90 256.78 267.05 277.73 288.84 300.40

Mexico 2,293.84 2,328.25 2,351.53 2,375.05 2,398.80 2,422.79 2,447.02 2,471.49

Peru 207.53 213.75 218.03 222.39 226.84 231.37 236.00 240.72

Trinidad 45.89 48.19 50.60 53.13 55.78 58.57 61.50 64.58

Venezuela 768.90 776.66 784.51 792.43 800.51 808.60 816.68 824.85

BMI universe 7,887.99 8,069.22 8,218.84 8,369.12 8,518.18 8,655.91 8,795.23 8,939.08

Other LatAm 1,218.59 1,224.69 1,230.81 1,236.96 1,243.15 1,249.36 1,255.61 1,261.89

Regional total 9,106.58 9,293.90 9,449.65 9,606.08 9,761.33 9,905.27 10,050.8 10,200.9

f = forecast. Source: All forecasts: BMI.

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Regional Oil Supply

A 16% gain in Latin American regional oil production during the 2015-2020 period is achieved in spite of significant declines in countries such as Argentina and Bolivia (- 10%), Mexico and Trinidad (-16.0% and -12%), and Ecuador (-13%). The region’s overall output growth over the latter half of the decade will be driven by Brazil’s expected 41% output growth, 29% growth in Venezuela and 13% growth in Colombia, making the region a net exporter.

Table: Latin America Oil Production (000b/d)

Country 2013f 2014f 2015f 2016f 2017f 2018f 2019f 2020f

Argentina 743.50 728.63 714.05 699.78 685.78 672.06 658.62 645.45

Bolivia 60.00 59.00 58.00 56.00 55.00 54.00 53.00 52.00

Brazil 2,733.70 3,137.20 3,652.20 4,058.20 4,465.20 4,686.20 4,950.20 5,135.20

Chile 7.30 6.40 5.70 5.00 4.50 3.80 3.00 2.50

Colombia 1,110.73 1,189.86 1,219.53 1,333.28 1,392.62 1,456.91 1,387.67 1,372.84

Ecuador 500.00 495.00 485.00 480.00 470.00 450.00 430.00 420.00

Mexico 2,871.27 2,821.84 2,749.19 2,655.22 2,565.01 2,478.41 2,395.27 2,315.46

Peru 240.00 285.00 300.00 305.00 298.90 292.92 287.06 281.32

Trinidad 135.00 132.00 130.00 127.00 124.00 121.00 119.00 115.00

Venezuela 2,650.00 2,800.00 3,100.00 3,590.00 3,850.00 4,000.00 4,000.00 4,000.00

BMI universe 11,052 11,655 12,414 13,309 13,911 14,215 14,284 14,340

Other LatAm 99 104 109 115 121 127 133 140

Regional total 11,151 11,759 12,523 13,424 14,032 14,342 14,417 14,479

f = forecast. Source: All forecasts: BMI.

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Regional Refining Capacity

Growth in oil refining capacity for the Latin America region is forecast at 3.7% between 2015 and 2020, with several countries not expected to boost crude processing capability. Brazil is the wild card, as expansion plans are now very significant. With the country’s rapid crude production growth, it is reasonable to expect some substantial investment in new processing capability towards the end of the forecast period.

Table: Latin America Oil Refining Capacity (000b/d)

Country 2013f 2014f 2015f 2016f 2017f 2018f 2019f 2020f

Argentina 631.18 631.18 631.18 631.18 631.18 631.18 631.18 631.18

Bolivia 41.20 41.20 41.20 41.20 41.20 41.20 41.20 41.20

Brazil 2,389.79 2,689.79 2,989.79 2,989.79 3,139.79 3,289.79 3,289.79 3,289.79

Chile 300.00 300.00 300.00 300.00 300.00 300.00 300.00 300.00

Colombia 345.85 345.85 345.85 345.85 345.85 345.85 345.85 345.85

Ecuador 175.00 175.00 175.00 175.00 175.00 175.00 175.00 175.00

Mexico 1,540.00 1,540.00 1,540.00 1,540.00 1,540.00 1,540.00 1,540.00 1,540.00

Peru 193.10 193.10 221.10 231.10 231.10 231.10 231.10 231.10

Trinidad 215.00 215.00 215.00 215.00 215.00 215.00 215.00 215.00

Venezuela 1,303.00 1,385.00 1,385.00 1,385.00 1,385.00 1,385.00 1,385.00 1,385.00

BMI universe 7,134.12 7,516.12 7,844.12 7,854.12 8,004.12 8,154.12 8,154.12 8,154.12 Netherlands Antilles/Aruba 555.00 555.00 555.00 555.00 555.00 555.00 555.00 555.00

Regional total 7,689.12 8,071.12 8,399.12 8,409.12 8,559.12 8,709.12 8,709.12 8,709.12

f = forecast. Source: All forecasts: BMI.

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Regional Gas Demand

The Latin America region’s forecast 25% gas demand growth in 2015-2020 represents a slight deceleration from the 2010-2015 trend, but still represents a substantial increase in consumption. Leading the way in absolute terms is Peru, which will see gas consumption rise nearly 50% between 2015 and 2020. Mexico will also grow quickly, but from a higher base, with a forecast 29% gain.

Table: Latin America Gas Consumption (bcm)

Country 2013f 2014f 2015f 2016f 2017f 2018f 2019f 2020f

Argentina 47.95 49.86 51.86 53.93 56.09 58.33 60.67 63.09

Bolivia 3.37 3.51 3.65 3.80 3.95 4.11 4.27 4.44

Brazil 33.22 35.21 37.32 39.37 41.54 43.62 45.80 48.09

Chile 5.67 6.24 6.86 7.32 7.68 8.05 8.46 8.88

Colombia 9.82 10.11 10.42 10.73 11.05 11.38 11.72 12.08

Ecuador 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.75

Mexico 66.81 69.45 74.73 79.12 82.64 87.03 92.31 96.71

Peru 4.98 5.47 5.97 6.47 7.19 7.69 8.19 8.52

Trinidad 23.29 23.87 24.59 25.32 26.59 27.92 29.31 30.78

Venezuela 28.62 29.76 30.96 32.19 33.16 33.82 34.50 35.19

Regional total 224.55 234.32 247.17 259.08 270.68 282.74 295.99 308.52

f = forecast. Source: All forecasts: BMI.

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Regional Gas Supply

A production increase of 18% is forecast for the Latin America region in 2015-2020, representing a slowdown compared with the 2010-2015 period. Brazil, Venezuela and Peru are expected to lead the way, with growth of 62%, 33%, and 25.0% respectively. Chile and Ecuador are the only countries in the region expected to see production decline.

Table: Latin America Gas Production (bcm)

Country 2013f 2014f 2015f 2016f 2017f 2018f 2019f 2020f

Argentina 37.50 38.00 38.00 39.00 38.00 40.00 41.00 40.00

Bolivia 16.00 16.70 17.00 17.50 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.50

Brazil 19.60 20.60 22.60 23.60 26.60 28.60 33.60 36.60

Chile 0.90 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.70 0.70

Colombia 11.00 11.50 12.00 13.00 13.00 15.00 15.00 15.00

Ecuador 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.75

Mexico 53.32 53.77 54.22 54.68 55.14 55.60 56.07 56.54

Peru 11.00 11.50 12.00 12.40 13.00 13.50 14.00 15.00

Trinidad 44.20 45.00 47.00 47.00 48.00 50.00 50.00 52.00

Venezuela 26.50 28.00 33.00 34.00 36.00 37.00 42.00 44.00

Regional total 220.85 226.70 237.45 242.79 249.28 259.18 271.13 279.09

f = forecast. Source: All forecasts: BMI.

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Methodology And Risks To Forecasts

In terms of oil and gas supply, as well as refining capacity, the projections are wherever possible based on known development projects, committed investment plans or stated government/company intentions. A significant element of risk is clearly associated with these forecasts, as project timing is critical to volume delivery. Our assumptions also take into account some third-party estimates, such as those provided by the US-based Energy Information Administration (EIA), the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and certain consultants’ reports that are in the public domain. Reserves projections reflect production and depletion trends, expected exploration activity and historic reserves replacement levels.

We have assumed flat oil and gas prices throughout the extended forecast period, but continue to provide sensitivity analysis based on higher and lower price scenarios. Investment levels and production/reserves trends will of course be influenced by energy prices. Oil demand has provide itself to be less sensitive to pricing than expected, but will still have some bearing on consumption trends. Otherwise, we have assumed a slowing of GDP growth for all countries beyond our core forecast period (to 2015) and a further easing of demand trends to reflect energy-saving efforts and fuels substitution away from hydrocarbons. Where available, government and third-party projections of oil and gas demand have been used to cross check our own assumptions.

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Glossary Of Terms

AOR Additional Oil Recovery KCTS Kazakh Caspian Transport System APA Awards for Predefined Areas km kilometres API American Petroleum Institute LAB Linear Alkyl Benzene bbl barrel LDPE low density polypropylene bcm billion cubic metres LNG liquefied natural gas b/d barrels per day LPG liquefied petroleum gas bn billion m metres boe barrels of oil equivalent mcm thousand cubic metres BTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Mcm mn cubic metres BTU British Thermal Unit MEA Middle East and Africa Capex capital expenditure mn million CBM coal bed methane MoU Memorandum of Understanding CEE Central and Eastern Europe mt metric tonne CPC Caspian Pipeline Consortium MW megawatts CSG coal seam gas na not available/ applicable DoE US Department of Energy NGL natural gas liquids EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction & Develpt NOC national oil company EEZ exclusive economic zone OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development e/f estimate/forecast OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries EIA US Energy Information Administration PE polyethylene EM emerging markets PP polypropylene EOR enhanced oil recovery PSA production sharing agreement E&P exploration and production PSC production sharing contract EPSA exploration and production sharing agreement q-o-q quarter-on-quarter FID final investment decision R&D research and development FDI foreign direct investment R/P reserves/production FEED front end engineering & design RPR reserves to production ratio FPSO floating production, storage & offloading SGI strategic gas initiative FTA free trade agreement SoI Statement of Intent FTZ free trade zone SPA Sale and Purchase Agreement GDP gross domestic product SPR Strategic Petroleum Reserve G&G geological and geophysical t/d tonnes per day GoM Gulf of Mexico tcm trillion cubic metres GS geological survey toe tonnes of oil equivalent GTL gas-to-liquids conversion tpa tonnes per annum GW gigawatts TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights GWh gigawatt hours trn trillion HDPE high density polyethylene T&T Trinidad and Tobago HoA Heads of Agreement TTPC Trans-Tunisian Pipeline Company IEA International Energy Agency TWh terawatt hours IGCC Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle UAE United Arab Emirates IOC international oil company USGS US Geological Survey IPI Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline WAGP West African Gas Pipeline IPO initial public offering WIPO World Intellectual Property Organisation JOC joint operating company WTI West Texas Intermediate JPDA Joint Petroleum Development Area WTO World Trade Organisation

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AOR Additional Oil Recovery KCTS Kazakh Caspian Transport System

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Oil And Gas Ratings: Revised Methodology

Introduction

BMI has revised the methodology of its Oil & Gas Business Environment Ratings. Our approach has been threefold. First, we have disaggregated the upstream (oil/gas E&P) and downstream (oil refining and marketing, gas processing and distribution), enabling us to take a more nuanced approach to analysing the potential within each segment, and the different risks along the value chain. Second, we have identified objective indicators that may serve as proxies for issues/trends that were previously evaluated on a subjective basis. Finally, we have used BMI’s proprietary Country Risk Ratings (CRR) in a more refined manner in order to ensure that only those risks most relevant to the industry have been included. Overall, the new ratings system – which is now integrated with those of all 16 industries covered by BMI – offers an industry-leading insight into the prospects/risks for companies across the globe.

Ratings Overview

Conceptually, the new ratings system is organised in a manner that enables us clearly to present the comparative strengths and weaknesses of each state. As before, the headline Oil & Gas BER is the principal rating. However, the differentiation of Upstream/Downstream and the articulation of the elements that comprise each segment enable more sophisticated conclusions to be drawn, and also facilitate the use of the ratings by clients, who will have varying levels of exposure and risk appetite for their operations.

Oil & Gas Business Environment Rating: This is the overall rating, which comprises 50% Upstream BER and 50% Downstream BER:

Upstream Oil & Gas Business Environment Rating: This is the overall Upstream rating which is composed of limits/risks (see below);

Downstream Oil & Gas Business Environment Rating: This is the overall Downstream rating which comprises limits/risks (see below).

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Both the Upstream BER and Downstream BER are composed of Limits/Risks sub- ratings, which themselves comprise industry-specific and broader Country Risk components:

Limits of Potential Returns: Evaluates the sector’s size and growth potential in each state, and also broader industry/state characteristics that may inhibit its development;

Risks to Realisation of those Returns: Evaluates both Industry-specific dangers and those emanating from the state’s political/economic profile that call into question the likelihood of expected returns being realised over the assessed time period.

Table: BMI Oil And Gas Business Environment Ratings: Structure

Component Details

Oil & Gas Business Environment Rating Overall rating

- Upstream BER 50% of O&G BER

-- Limits of Potential Returns - 70% of Upstream BER

--- Upstream Market -- 75% of Limits

--- Country Structure -- 25% of Limits

-- Risks to Realisation of Potential Returns - 30% of Upstream BER

--- Industry Risks -- 65% of Risks

--- Country Risks -- 35% of Risks

- Downstream BER 50% of O&G BER

-- Limits of Potential Returns - 70% of Downstream BER

--- Upstream Market -- 75% of Limits

--- Country Structure -- 25% of Limits

-- Risks to Realisation of Potential Returns - 30% of Downstream BER

--- Industry Risks -- 60% of Risks

--- Country Risks -- 40% of Risks

Source: BMI

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Indicators

The following indicators have been used. Overall, the rating uses three subjectively measured indicators, and 41 separate indicators/datasets.

Table: BMI Oil And Gas Business Environment Upstream Ratings: Methodology

Indicator Rationale

Upstream BER: Limits to potential returns

Upstream Market

Resource base

- Proven oil reserves (mn bbl) Indicators used to denote total market potential. High values are given better scores.

- Proven gas reserves (bcm)

Growth outlook

Indicators used as proxies for BMI’s market assumptions, with strong growth accorded - Oil production growth (2010-2015) higher scores.

- Gas production growth (2010-2015)

Market maturity

Indicator used to denote whether industries are frontier/emerging/developed or mature - Oil reserves/ production markets. Low existing exploitation in relation to potential is accorded higher scores.

- Gas reserves/ production

- Current oil production vs. peak

- Current gas production vs. peak

Country structure

Indicator used to denote opportunity for foreign NOCs/IOCs/Independents. Low state State ownership of assets, % ownership scores higher.

Indicator used to denote market competitiveness. Presence (and large number) of non- Number of non-state companies state companies scores higher.

Upstream BER: Risks to potential returns

Industry Risks

Subjective evaluation of government policy towards sector against BMI-defined criteria. Licensing terms Protectionist states are marked down.

Subjective evaluation of government industry orientation. Protectionist states are Privatisation trend marked down.

Country Risk

Rating from BMI’s CRR. It evaluates the constraints imposed by power, transport & Physical Infrastructure communications infrastructure.

Rating from BMI’s CRR It evaluates the risk of a sharp change in the broad direction of Long Term Policy Continuity Risk government policy.

Rating from BMI’s CRR. It evaluates the government’s ability to enforce its will within Rule of Law the state.

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Table: BMI Oil And Gas Business Environment Upstream Ratings: Methodology

Indicator Rationale

Rating from BMI’s CRR, to denote risk of additional illegal costs/possibility of opacity in Corruption tendering/business operations affecting companies’ ability to compete.

Source: BMI

Table: BMI Oil And Gas Business Environment Downstream Ratings: Methodology

Indicator Rationale

Downstream BER: Limits to potential returns

Downstream Market

Market

Indicator denotes existing domestic oil processing capacity. High capacity is considered - Refining capacity (000b/d) beneficial.

Indicator denotes size of domestic oil/gas market. High values are accorded better - Oil demand (000b/d) scores.

- Gas demand (bcm)

- Retail outlets/1,000 people Indicator denotes fuels retail market penetration; low penetration scores highly.

Growth outlook

Indicators used as proxies for BMI’s market assumptions, with strong growth accorded - Oil demand growth (2010-2015) higher scores.

- Gas demand growth (2010-2015)

- Refining capacity growth (2010-2015)

Import dependence

- Refining capacity vs. oil demand, % Indicators denote reliance on imported oil products and natural gas. Greater self- (2010-2015) sufficiency is accorded higher scores.

- Gas demand vs. gas supply, % (2010- 2015)

Country structure

Indicator used to denote opportunity for foreign NOCs/IOCs/Independents. Low state State ownership of assets, % ownership scores higher.

Indicator used to denote market competitiveness. Presence (and large number) of non- No. of non-state companies state companies scores higher.

Data from BMI’s CR team. Indicators used as proxies for overall market size and future Population, mn potential.

Nominal GDP, US$bn

GDP per capita, US$

Downstream BER: Risks to potential returns

Industry Risks

Subjective evaluation of government policy towards sector against BMI-defined criteria. Regulation Bureaucratic/intrusive states are marked down.

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Table: BMI Oil And Gas Business Environment Downstream Ratings: Methodology

Indicator Rationale

Subjective evaluation of government industry orientation. Protectionist states are Privatisation trend marked down.

Country Risk

Rating from BMI’s CRR. It evaluates the risk of a sharp change in the broad direction of Short Term Policy Continuity Risk government policy.

Rating from BMI’s CRR. It evaluates the vulnerability to external economic shock, the Short Term Economic External Risk typical trigger of recession in Emerging Markets.

Rating from BMI’s CRR. It evaluates the current trajectory of growth and the state’s Short Term Economic Growth Risk position in the economic cycle.

Rating from BMI’s CRR. It evaluates the government’s ability to enforce its will within Rule of Law the state.

Rating from BMI’s CRR, to denote risk of additional illegal costs/possibility of opacity in Legal Framework tendering/business operations affecting companies’ ability to compete.

Rating from BMI’s CRR. It evaluates the constraints imposed by power, transport & Physical Infrastructure communications infrastructure.

Source: BMI

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BMI Methodology

How We Generate Our Industry Forecasts

BMI’s industry forecasts are generated using the best-practice techniques of time-series modelling. The precise form of time-series model we use varies from industry to industry, in each case being determined, as per standard practice, by the prevailing features of the industry data being examined. For example, data for some industries may be particularly prone to seasonality, meaning seasonal trends. In other industries, there may be pronounced non-linearity, whereby large recessions, for example, may occur more frequently than cyclical booms.

Our approach varies from industry to industry. Common to our analysis of every industry, however, is the use of vector autoregressions. Vector autoregressions allow us to forecast a variable using more than the variable’s own history as explanatory information. For example, when forecasting oil prices, we can include information about oil consumption, supply and capacity.

When forecasting for some of our industry sub-component variables, however, using a variable’s own history is often the most desirable method of analysis. Such single- variable analysis is called univariate modelling. We use the most common and versatile form of univariate models: the autoregressive moving average model (ARMA).

In some cases, ARMA techniques are inappropriate because there is insufficient historic data or data quality is poor. In such cases, we use either traditional decomposition methods or smoothing methods as a basis for analysis and forecasting.

It must be remembered that human intervention plays a necessary and desirable part of all our industry forecasting techniques. Intimate knowledge of the data and industry ensures we spot structural breaks, anomalous data, turning points and seasonal features where a purely mechanical forecasting process would not.

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Energy Industry

There are a number of principal criteria that drive our forecasts for each Energy indicator.

Energy supply Supply of crude oil, natural gas, refined oil products and electrical power is determined largely by investment levels, available capacity, plant utilisation rates and national policy. We therefore examine:

ƒ national energy policy, stated output goals and investment levels,

ƒ company-specific capacity data, output targets and capital expenditures, using national, regional and multinational company sources,

ƒ international quotas, guidelines and projections, such as OPEC, IEA, US Energy Information Administration (EIA),

Energy consumption A mixture of methods is used to generate demand forecasts, applied as appropriate to each individual country:

ƒ underlying economic (GDP) growth for individual countries/regions, sourced from BMI published estimates. Historic relationships between GDP growth and energy demand growth at an individual country are analysed and used as the basis for predicting levels of consumption,

ƒ government projections for oil, gas and electricity demand,

ƒ third party agency projections for regional demand, such as IEA, EIA, OPEC.

ƒ extrapolation of capacity expansion forecasts, based on company- or state-specific investment levels.

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Cross Checks

Whenever possible, we compare government and/or third party agency projections with the declared spending and capacity expansion plans of the companies operating in each individual country. Where there are discrepancies, we use company-specific data as physical spending patterns to ultimately determine capacity and supply capability. Similarly, we compare capacity expansion plans and demand projections to check the energy balance of each country. Where the data suggest imports or exports, we check that necessary capacity exists or that the required investment in infrastructure is taking place.

Sources

Sources include those international bodies mentioned above, such as OPEC, IEA, and EIA, as well as local energy ministries, official company information, and international and national news agencies.

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