Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego

PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO

Dwumiesięcznik 2016 nr 6 (34)

redaktorzy naukowi numeru Sabina Grabowska, Joanna Marszałek-Kawa Komitet redakcyjny Redaktor naczelny Zastępca redaktora naczelnego Sabina Grabowska (Uniwersytet Rzeszowski) Anna Młynarska-Sobaczewska (Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN) Redaktor prowadzący Sekretarze Szymon Gumienik Joanna Juchniewicz (Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie) Radosław Grabowski (Uniwersytet Rzeszowski) Redaktorzy tematyczni Agnieszka Bień-Kacała (Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu): organy władzy publicznej Andrzej Bisztyga (Uniwersytet Zielonogórski): systemy konstytucyjne Marek Chmaj (Szkoła Wyższa Psychologii Społecznej w Warszawie): samorząd terytorialny Krzysztof Eckhardt (Wyższa Szkoła Prawa i Administracji w Przemyślu): systemy praw i wolności Grzegorz Kryszeń (Uniwersytet w Białymstoku): systemy wyborcze Joanna Marszałek-Kawa (Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu): systemy polityczne Sławomir Patyra (Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej w Lublinie): systemy rządów Krzysztof Prokop (Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki i Przedsiębiorczości w Łomży): systemy konstytucyjne Piotr Uziębło (Uniwersytet Gdański): prawo parlamentarne Jacek Zaleśny (Uniwersytet Warszawski): systemy konstytucyjne państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej

Redaktorzy językowi Redaktor statystyczny James H. Satterwhite Agnieszka Jeran Szymon Gumienik Redaktorzy części „Przeglądu Prawa Konstytucyjnego” I. Artykuły: Ryszard Balicki (Uniwersytet Wrocławski), Anna Frankiewicz-Bodynek (Uniwersytet Opolski) II. Sprawozdania, recenzje: Krzysztof Urbaniak (Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu) Małgorzata Lorencka (Uniwersytet Śląski), Marcin Dąbrowski (Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie) III. Glosy: Marcin M. Wiszowaty (Uniwersytet Gdański) Piotr Czarny (Uniwersytet Jagielloński w Krakowie), Tomasz Milej (Uniwersytet Zielonogórski) IV. Kronika naukowa: Przemysław Mijal (Uniwersytet Szczeciński), Jerzy Rychlik (Uczelnia Techniczno-Handlowa im. Heleny Chodkowskiej w Warszawie) Rada naukowa przewodniczący: Wiesław Skrzydło (Polska), członkowie: Rainer Arnold (Niemcy), Yuriy Boshytski (Ukraina) Emilio Castorina (Włochy), Jan Filip (Czechy), Iván Halász (Węgry), Cristina Hermida del Liano (Hiszpania) Tomáš Majerčák (Słowacja), Kostas Mavrias (Grecja), Aliya Orazaliyeva (Kazachstan) Redaktor techniczny Korekta Projekt okładki Paweł Kucypera Zespół Krzysztof Galus Recenzenci „Przeglądu Prawa Konstytucyjnego” prof. h.c.doc. JUDr. Mária Bujňáková, CSc., doc. JUDr. Gabriela Dobrovičová, CSc., prof. nadzw. dr hab. Aldona Domańska, prof. nadzw. dr hab. Krzysztof Grajewski, prof. nadzw. dr hab. Mariusz Jabłoński, prof. dr hab. Jerzy Jaskiernia, doc. JUDr. Mária Kiovská, CSc., prof. nadzw. dr hab. Krzysztok Krysieniel, prof. nadzw. dr hab. Małgorzata Myśliwiec, prof. nadzw. dr hab. Wojciech Orłowski, doc. JUDr. Ladislav Orosz, CSc., prof. nadzw. dr hab. Konrad Składowski, doc. JUDr. Ľudmila Somorová, CSc., mim. prof., prof. nadzw. dr hab. Bogumił Szmulik, prof. nadzw. dr hab. Monika Urbaniak, prof. nadzw. dr hab. Katarzyna Witkowska-Chrzczonowicz Dwumiesięcznik ukazuje się w wersji drukowanej © Copyright by Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek Toruń 2016 ISSN 2082-1212 Wydawnictwo prowadzi sprzedaż wysyłkową: tel./fax 56 648 50 70; e-mail: [email protected] Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, ul. Lubicka 44, 87-100 Toruń tel. 56 664 22 35, 56 660 81 60, e-mail: [email protected], www.marszalek.com.pl Drukarnia nr 2, ul. Warszawska 52, 87-148 Łysomice, tel. 56 678 34 78 CONTENTS

Part I ARTICLES

Adriana Ciancio University of Catania The European Central Bank: Issues of Constitutional Law 13

Joanna Marszałek-Kawa Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń Remarks on The System of State Authorities in the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan of 8 December 1992 35

Ivan Halász Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Silesian University in Opava Radosław Grabowski University of Rzeszów Hungarian understanding of the division of powers 59

Michał Zbigniew Dankowski University of Gdańsk Buenos Aires City as an example of a derived autonomy 79

Krzysztof Urbaniak Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan The Harmonization of the electoral law for elections to the European Parliament. Selected Issues 95

Robert Radek University of Silesia in Katowice Executive power in the scandinavian political systems – the problem of minority cabinet in Norway (selected aspects) 115 4 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Ilton Robl Filho The Federal University of Paraná, University of Passo Fundo Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande of Sul Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution of Brazil and the Problem of its Collision with other Fundamental Rights, particularly personality rights 133

Viktoriya Serzhanova University of Rzeszów The Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic 165

Krzysztof Łokucijewski University of Business in Gdańsk A tale of two UK’s European referendums. Some remarks on British history, politics and the constitution 185

Marieta Czekałowska University of Szczecin Comparative view of the regulations of environmental protection contained in the constitutions of: Kingdom of Spain, Republic of India and Republic of South Africa 205

Marian Grzybowski Jagiellonian University in Kraków Ownership Right – Private vs. Public Aspect 223

Jan Wiktor Tkaczyński Jagiellonen Universität in Krakau Der lange Neuanfang der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit in Polen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 235

Sabina Grabowska University of Rzeszów People’s initiative of putting a bill before the parliament – Polish case 247

Jacek Zaleśny University of Warsaw Amnesty acts in Poland in the 20th century 267 Contents 5 Krzysztof Echkardt University of Law and Public Administration in Rzeszów Mechanisms of curbing statutory power in a situation of political uniformity of the legislative and executive (comments in the light of RP Constitution of 2 April 1997) 283

Agnieszka Bień-Kacała Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Maastricht University Legal status of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces 297

Mariusz Jabłoński University of Wroclaw The authorized entity to perform the constitutional right of public information access – remarks on the grounds of the judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of December 2nd 2015 (SK36/14) 313

Agnieszka Gajda University of Gdańsk Important Amendments in Polish Regulation of Freedom of Assembly 335

Anna Rytel-Warzocha University of Gdańsk State Security and the Constitutionally Protected Human Rights and Freedoms in the Light of the Polish Constitution of 1997 349

Dominik Szczepański University of Rzeszów The reasons of invalidity of votes in elections to voivodeship councils in 2014 in the light of the study of voting papers in the National Archive in Kielce 361

Part II REVIEWS, REPORTS

Krystian Nowak, Kompetencje głowy państwa w zakresie zwierzchnictwa nad siłami zbrojnymi i bezpieczeństwa państwa w polskim prawie konstytucyjnym, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, ISBN: 978-83-7996-283-9, Rzeszów 2016, pp. 302, (review), Bogusław Ulijasz 375 6 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 The National Scientific Conference of the Solicitors’ Professional Self- government The Constitution in a Democratic State, Poznań, 21–22 October 2016, (report), Jan Uniejewski 379

The 3rd International Asian Congress, Toruń, 18–20 May 2016, (report), Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, Natalia Gburzyńska 387

ALPHABETICAL INDEX 2016 391

GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS 400 SPIS TREŚCI

Część I ARTYKUŁY

Adriana Ciancio Uniwersytet Katanii Europejski Bank Centralny: Zagadnienia prawa konstytucyjnego 13

Joanna Marszałek-Kawa Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu Uwagi o systemie organów państwowych w Konstytucji Republiki Uzbekistanu z dnia 8 grudnia 1992 roku 35

Ivan Halász Węgierska Akademia Nauk, Uniwersytet Śląski w Opawie Radosław Grabowski Uniwersytet Rzeszowski Węgierskie rozumienie podziału władzy 59

Michał Zbigniew Dankowski Uniwersytet Gdański Miasto Buenos Aires jako przykład autonomii wtórnej 79

Krzysztof Urbaniak Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu Harmonizacja prawa wyborczego do Parlamentu Europejskiego. Wybrane problemy 95

Robert Radek Uniwersytet Śląski w Katowicach Władza wykonawcza w skandywskich systemach politycznych – problem gabinetu mniejszościowego w Norwegii (wybrane zagadnienia) 115 8 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Ilton Robl Filho Federalny Uniwersytet Paraná, Uniwersytet w Passo Fundo Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet Papieski Uniwersytet Katolicki w Rio Grande Sul Wolność słowa w Konstytucji Federalnej Brazylli i problem jego kolizji z innymi prawami podstawowymi, w szczególności prawami osobistymi 133

Viktoriya Serzhanova Uniwersytet Rzeszowski Konstytucja Naddniestrzańskiej Republiki Mołdawskiej 165

Krzysztof Łokucijewski Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu w Gdańsku Brytyjskie referenda w sprawie członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. Kilka uwag na temat historii, polityki i ustroju 185

Marieta Czekałowska Uniwersytet Szczeciński Analiza porównawcza przepisów dotyczących ochrony środowiska na przykładzie konstytucji: Królestwa Hiszpanii, Republiki Indii i Republiki Południowej Afryki 205

Marian Grzybowski Uniwersytet Jagielloński w Krakowie Własność jako prawo – aspekt prywatny w zestawieniu z publicznym 223

Jan Wiktor Tkaczyński Uniwersytet Jagielloński w Krakowie Długi nowy początek sądownictwa administracyjnego w Polsce po II wojnie światowej 235

Sabina Grabowska Uniwersytet Rzeszowski Inicjatywa ludowa w sprawie uchwalenia ustawy – polski przypadek 247

Jacek Zaleśny Uniwersytet Warszawski Akty amnestyjne w Polsce w XX w. 267 Spis treści 9 Krzysztof Echkardt Wyższa Szkoła Prawa i Administracji w Rzeszowie Mechanizmy powściągania władzy ustawodawczej w sytuacji jednolitości politycznej legislatywy i egzekutywy (uwagi w świetle Konstytucji RP z 2 kwietnia 1997 r.) 283

Agnieszka Bień-Kacała Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Uniwersytet w Maastricht Pozycja prawna Naczelnego Dowódcy Sił Zbrojnych RP 297

Mariusz Jabłoński Uniwersytet Wrocławski Uprawniony do realizacji konstytucyjnego prawa dostępu do informacji publicznej – uwagi na tle postanowienia Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z 2 grudnia 2015 r. (SK 36/14) 313

Agnieszka Gajda Uniwersytet Gdański Najważniejsze zmiany w polskiej regulacji dotyczącej wolności zgromadzeń 335

Anna Rytel-Warzocha Uniwersytet Gdański Bezpieczeństwo państwa oraz konstytucyjna ochrona praw i wolności człowieka w świetle Konstytucji RP z 1997 r. 349

Dominik Szczepański Uniwersytet Rzeszowski Przyczyny nieważności głosów w wyborach do sejmików województw w 2014 r. w świetle badania kart wyborczych w Archiwum Państwowym w Kielcach 361

Część II RECENZJE, SPRAWOZDANIA

Krystian Nowak, Kompetencje głowy państwa w zakresie zwierzchnictwa nad siłami zbrojnymi i bezpieczeństwa państwa w polskim prawie konstytucyjnym, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, ISBN: 978-83-7996-283-9, Rzeszów 2016, ss. 302, (recenzja), Bogusław Ulijasz 375 10 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Ogólnopolska Konferencja Naukowa Izby Radców Prawnych Konstytucja w państwie demokratycznym, Poznań, 21–22 października 2016, (sprawozdanie), Jan Uniejewski 379

III Kongres Azjatycki, Toruń 18–20 maja 2016, (sprawozdanie), Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, Natalia Gburzyńska 387

INDEKS ALFABETYCZNY 2016 391

INFORMACJE DLA AUTORÓW 400 PART I

ARTICLES

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.01 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Adriana Ciancio1

The European Central Bank: Issues of Constitutional Law

Keywords: euro, bank, independence, technocracy, democracy, accountability, parliament, democratic control, legitimation Słowa kluczowe: euro, bank, niezależność, technokracja, demokracja, odpowiedzial- ność, parlament, demokratyczna kontrola, legitymacji

Summary The paper stresses the need to reform the European Central Bank with the aim to strengthen the democratic legitimation of this institution within the particular EU governance system. Indeed, the study argues for more accountability of the ECB before the citizens without giving up independence. The analysis (also conducted from a comparative-law point of view) shows that the objective can be assured fostering a stronger involvement of the Parliament firstly in the procedure for the appointment of the Members of the ECB’s Executive Committee, within a wider reform of the whole EU institutional setup and of the Eurozone’s organization in particular.

Streszczenie

Europejski Bank Centralny: Zagadnienia prawa konstytucyjnego

W artykule podkreśla się potrzebę zreformowania Europejskiego Banku Centralnego w celu wzmocnienia jego demokratycznej legitymizacji w ramach konkretnego systemu zarządzania UE. Badania dowodzą, że EBC powinien wykazać się większą odpowie-

1 The author is an Associate Professor of Constitutional Law at University of Catania (Italy) – Department of Law. E-mail: [email protected]. 14 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 dzialnością przed obywatelami, nie rezygnując przy tym z niezależności. Analiza (rów- nież prowadzona z punktu prawnoporównawczego widzenia) pokazuje, że cel ten można osiągnąć przez większe zaangażowanie Parlamentu przede wszysykim w procedurę mia- nowania członków Komitetu Wykonawczego EBC – w ramach szerszej reformy całego układu instytucjonalnego UE, a organizacji strefy euro w szczególności.

The organization and functioning of that “union in the union”, as the EMU is described within the European Union at large2, state today several issues to Constitutional law scholars. The main one is the existence itself of the Euro, i.e. the peculiar creation of a currency without a State3; or rather without “sovereign” (considering sovereignty as a fundamental feature of the State), despite the fact that the monetary policy is one of the essential features of sovereignty itself4. Actually, it would first be necessary wonder about the meaning itself of sovereignty in the context of the European integration process5, which strongly contributed to separate that concept from the exclusive state reference. For the purposes of this paper, it is however sufficient to remind that when it became necessary to implement acts of substantial sovereignty in order to cope with the financial crisis in Europe, they were not implemented by the States, unable to take the necessary measures to face the sovereign debts6. Indeed,

2 Art. 3.4 TEU. 3 Never happened before, as argued by T. Padoa Schioppa, Presentation, IX, [In:] C. Zilioli, M. Selmayr, La Banca centrale europea, Milan 2007. 4 See, ex multis, A. Predieri, Non di solo euro. Appunti sul trasferimento di poteri al Sistema europeo delle banche centrali e alla Banca centrale europea, “Il diritto dell’Unione Europea” 1998, n. 1, p. 8. 5 See A. Ruggeri, Costituzione, sovranità, diritti fondamentali, in cammino dallo Stato all’Unione europea e ritorno, ovverosia circolazione dei modelli costituzionali e adattamento dei relativi schemi teorici, “federalismi.it” 2016, No. 11. 6 Wider on the topic, G. Pitruzzella, Chi governa la finanza pubblica in Europa?, “Quad. cost.” 2012, No. 1, p. 15. Adriana Ciancio • The European Central Bank: Issues of Constitutional Law 15 the countries which adopted the single currency, even if they formally retain functions of economic governance, are no longer able to act – so to say – “un- conditionally”. In fact they are now limited both by the “Maastricht parame- ters” and by the limits later imposed by the so-called “a latere Treaties”7, including the requirement to keep the budget balanced. Rather, the only effective measures, in terms of more or less direct effects on national economic policies, have been the ones adopted by the European Central Bank8. As well known, it decisively intervened to face the crisis with manoeuvres9, apparently derived only by the aim to preserve price stabili- ty10, in conformity with its binding mandate11, but practically “uncondition- al”, meaning substantially sovereign12, as lastly shown by the implementation of the so-called “Quantitative easing”, consisting of measures with neither un-extendable deadline, nor, in practice, fixed quantitative limits13, so that for these peculiarities they are to be considered “unbounded”. Such initiatives were largely anticipated in Mario Draghi’s famous speech at the Global Investment Conference of London, in 2012, when the President of the ECB declared that, even within the limits of the received mandate,

7 Referring to the Agreements called Euro-plus, Six-Pack, Two-Pack, ESM, and, above all, TSCG, ticieson and functioning of thets, see calledadyy policy seee after the Maastricht Treaty better known asFiscal Compact, see, ex multis, P. Bilancia, La nuova governance dell’Eu- rozona e i “riflessi” sugli ordinamenti nazionali, “federalismi.it” 2012, No. 23, p. 2; F. Donati, Crisi dell’euro, governance economica e democrazia dell’Unione europea, “Il diritto dell’Unione europea” 2013, No. 2, p. 337; e E.C. Raffiotta,Il governo multilivello dell’economia, Bologna 2013, p. 58. 8 See, among others, A. Quadri Curzio, The Greek crisis and the European crisis. How to face them, “Ec. Pol.” 2010, No. 1, p. 3; and M. Fortis, A different tale on Eurozone Debts, “Ec. Pol.” 2012, n. 2, p. 161. 9 As the Ltro (“Long term refinancing operation”), the OMT (“Outright Monetary Transac- tions”) program, and the famous QE (“Quantitative Easing”). On the economiceffects of these means, see U. Triulzi, Le politiche economiche dell’Unione europea, Milan 2016, p. 318, 333. 10 Considered the EMU’s “Grundnorm” by M. Herdegen, Price stability and Budgetary Restraints in the Economic and Monetary Union: the Law as Guardian of Economic Wisdom, ”CLM Review” 1998, No. 9, p. 21. 11 See art. 127 TFEU and art. 2 ECB’s Statute. 12 See G. Magri’, “Vietato dalle leggi” o “imposto dal pericolo”? Le OMT, la normatività della democrazia e la direttività del mercato, [In:] Nuove strategie per lo sviluppo democratico e l’integrazione politica in Europa, ed. A. Ciancio, Rome 2014, p. 569. 13 For the technical details, see U. Triulzi, La Banca Centrale Europea motore dell’integrazione politica, “federalismi.it” 2015, No. 3, p. 2. 16 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 the Central Bank considered itself “ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”, showing already the intention to act, if exceptional circumstances would require, beyond the limits of Union law, even if never overtly without them. As it is known, the ECJ finally confirmed the substantial legitimacy of the “unconventional” measures of monetary policy adopted by the Central Bank, with a decision14 following the preliminary ruling ex art. 267 TEU proposed by the German Constitutional Court which had doubted the compatibility of the OMT Program with the Treaties’ law, as potentially ultra vires15. Beyond the mentioned judicial history, we can outline the issue, which is more interesting for our purpose. Indeed, even not arriving to the conclusion that the true “sovereign” of the euro-zone is the Central Bank itself (“Sover- eign is who decides on the state of exception”16) it is however manifest as in cases of financial crisis the ECB has adopted a leadership position in managing the crisis17, implementing a sort of “substitution” function18, which shows a clear political vocation19.

II.

Here a very interesting issue from a constitutional point of view because within a system that defines itself a representative democracy20 and which includes among its fundamental values democracy and the rule of law21, there is an institution, which implements acts of substantial direction without the traditional boundaries of democratic legitimization. Indeed the ECB is notori- ously a technical body absolutely independent (perhaps the most independent

14 CGE, Dec. of 16 Jun 2015 (C-62/14). 15 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 of 14 Jan 2014. 16 C. Schmitt,Teologia politica, [In:] Le categorie del “politico”. Saggi di teoria politica, eds. G. Miglio, P. Schiera, Bologna 1972, p. 33. 17 In this way U. Triulzi, La Banca Centrale Europea, op.cit., p. 6. 18 A. Giovannelli, Vincoli europei e decisione di bilancio, “Quad. cost.” 2013, No. 4, p. 935. 19 See E.C. Raffiotta,La banca centrale europea tra regole tecniche e vocazione politica. Verso una tecnocrazia europea?, [In:] Nuove strategie, op.cit., p. 617. 20 Art. 10.1 TEU. 21 Art. 2 TEU. Adriana Ciancio • The European Central Bank: Issues of Constitutional Law 17 among the central banks22), even though there exist no real core of European economic governance from which to depend, because, at least formally, economic policies have been retained by the Member States. However, it is clear that the mentioned condition of independence of the Central Bank cannot be put in discussion given the fiduciary nature of the single currency, which does not peg its value to any real datum (for instance, a State’s gold reserves), but rather to markets’ trust, that is all the more given, as price stability is ensured, avoiding recourse to inflationary manoeuvres23. This led to entrust European monetary policy to a banking institution, whose nature is rigorously technical, constituted as a body un- affiliated to and impartial from the needs of the single States, which could occasionally be interested in devaluation processes to re-launch their econ- omies24, so to make it absolutely “unaffected” to the political interferences of the different (and changeable) national Governments and related electoral contingencies. With reference to the European Central Bank, therefore we are once again presented with the dichotomy, not new in the public-law studies, between political legitimization and so to say, technical legitimization, sometimes resolved in terms of the model of Hamiltonian pluralistic democracy. According to this theory, the rules established by the democratically-elected lawmaker can be delegated for their implementation also to politically-unaccountable bodies, provided that they guarantee transparency and are subject to full and effective jurisdictional control25. Indeed, a punctual jurisdictional verification of compliance with the institutional purposes would be sufficient to include within the democratic process functions of substantial political direction exercised by bodies independent from the Governments and as such lacking political

22 See C. Zilioli, M. Selmayr, The European Central Bank: an Independent Specialized Orga- nization of Community Law, “Common Market Law Review” 2000, No. 37, p. 591, that consider the ECB an “Independent Specialized Organization of Community Law” and also a further, new Community, different from the three original Communities and legally equal to them. 23 See T. Padoa Schioppa, Il governo dell’economia, Bologna 1997, p. 81. On the connection between independence of Central Banks and price stability, see M.J.M. Neumann, Central bank independence as a prerequisite of price stability, “European Economics Review” 1991, No. I, p. 79. 24 See A. Predieri, Non di solo euro, op.cit., p. 9. 25 In this direction G. Amato, Intervento, [In:] Le autorità indipendenti nei sistemi istituzionali ed economici ed. A. Predieri, Firenze 1997, p. 309. 18 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 legitimization. In these cases the lack of political control would be compensated by effective jurisdictional control26. Indeed, it would be a legitimization mechanism based on the centrality of the role of the judge which can, perhaps, be considered apt to guarantee a balance among the essential features (democracy, law and authority) of a system of democratic organization and distribution of public power expressed in the State27, but which could also prove insufficient with respect to the EU and its governance, which for many aspects reveals the long-lasting lamentable feature of “a-political” characterization from a euro-unitary point of view, which still today represents an obstacle on the path to integration. Actually, it is known how the mistrust grown in the last years towards the “technocracy” which leads Europe currently represents one of the major factors nurturing the widespread euro-scepticism, which recently manifested itself, among others, in occasion of the last elections for the EU Parliament and that is more and more affirming itself within the single state systems, with the rise of extremist political parties, both conservative and nationalistic, and leftist, as new movements of populist inspira- tion. All these political forces share the aversion towards the integration process and exploit the widespread popular malaise towards the decisions adopted in the traditionally European intergovernmental and/or techno- cratic venues. To regain electors’ trust in the European political project it does not seem sufficient, therefore, the legitimization obtained by the judiciary guarantee of compliance with the purposes established by the superior norms of the system, which are to be considered the Treaties’ provisions, which fix price stability as the almost-exclusively canon of reference of the activity of the Central Bank. Neither appears sufficient the fact that the nomination of the Execu- tive Committee of the ECB and, firstly, of its President are entrusted to the representatives of the Governments28, who sit in the Councils (both Europe- an one for the appointment and the one of the EU for the recommendation), who in order to be Governments of the Union’s Member States, are all dem-

26 D. Siclari, Costituzione e autorità di vigilanza bancaria, Padova 2007, p. 493. 27 See S. Cassese, La fabbrica dello Stato, ovvero i limiti della democrazia, “Quad. cost.” 2004, p. 252. 28 Art. 283 TFEU. Adriana Ciancio • The European Central Bank: Issues of Constitutional Law 19 ocratically legitimized29, even if in different forms because of different government systems. Rather, in the prospect of intensifying the political integration, it is necessary to intervene on the European political legitimization by strengthening iet30, whereas for other aspects, the substantially (inter)governmental character of the current system to nominate the executive Committee would even lead to a weakening of the total degree of independence of the ECB, which then through an appropriate revision of the mechanism of election of its heads, could even amplify in the framework of a wider restructuring of the whole institutional architecture of the EU and of the Eurozone in particular31.

III.

From this point of view it is necessary to asses the possibility to introduce new channels of democratic legitimization of the ECB, preserving, at the same time, its independence through a reform which, in the context of further political integration among the countries taking part (at least) of the Eu- rozone, might re-collocate also the ECB within the more traditional tracks of democratic control. As already argued32, the doubts re-call a similar issue, faced (also) in the Ital- ian system with the introduction of the so-called “Independent Administra- tive Authorities”, invested of the task to regulate so-called “sensitive” administrative sectors, where one could strongly perceive the contraposition between public and private powers, strong organized interests and weak fragmented ones, which require a balanced equilibrium between potentially opposed val- ues33. This was implemented by entrusting important fields of economic-social

29 Art. 10.2, II para. TEU. 30 In the same sense F. Donati, Trattato di Lisbona e democrazia nell’UE, [In:] Nuove strategie, op.cit., p. 290. 31 See A. Ciancio, Quali prospettive per l’integrazione politica in Europa dopo le elezioni?, “federalismi.it” 2014, No. 11. 32 See A. Ciancio, I nodi della governance europea: euro, politica fiscale, bilancio unico dell’Uni- one. Per una nuova legittimazione democratica della BCE, “federalismi.it” 2015, No. 16, p. 11. 33 See, among others, at least, C. Franchini, Le autorità amministrative indipendenti, “Riv. Trim. Dir. Pubbl.” 1988, p. 549; A. Massera, “Autonomia” e “indipendenza” nell’amministrazi- 20 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 activity to so-called “Guarantor” Authorities. They were established to ensure a high degree of independence from the political, economic and bureaucratic powers in order to shield their actions from external influences, coming from centres of both public power and private interest’ groups. For this purpose they are called to inspire their activities according to criteria different form the ones inspiring political-party actions, which are the basis of the administrative apparatus most directly dependent from the Government, making reference for the regulation of the respective fields of action, to the criterion of the objective valuation of interests and needs existing in the sectors themselves to strike a fair balance in the light of rigorous criteria of impartiality, removing the actual interventions from the unidirectional reading by the Government bodies. Here the problem of their regulation, which faces the challenge of recon- ciling the high degree of technicality of these bodies and related competencies, to which it is connected the recalled need of independence from political power, with the establishment of, even indirect, forms of democratic legitimization, which serve to mitigate positions of substantial unaccountability before the electoral body. The result in the Italian system was obtained with the intervention by the Parliament, not only through parliamentary auditions and periodic updates before the Parliament itself (actually contemplated also with respect to the ECB before the EP34), but also including the involvement, even if in ever changing forms, of the political-legislative body in the nomination of the heads of these Authorities35. Conversely, looking at the European framework, the Par- liament is still today involved only in “consultation” in occasion of the appointment of the members of the Executive Committee of the Central Bank36. Along the lines of the Guarantor-authority model, therefore, and in the prospect of a stronger political integration in the context of a EU, it would be necessary to redefine the whole institutional framework of the Union, fur- one dello Stato, [In:] Scritti in onore di M.S. Giannini, Milan 1988, p. 453; N. Longobardi, Le amministrazioni indipendenti, [In:] Scritti per M. Nigro, Milan 1991, p. 175; M. Manetti,Poteri neutrali e Costituzione, Milan 1994; F. Merusi, M. Passaro, Le autorità indipendenti, Bologna 2003; M. Manetti,Le autorità indipendenti, Rome–Bari 2007. 34 Art. 284 TFEU. 35 Wider on this topic, A. Ciancio, Riforma elettorale e ruolo garantistico del Presidente di Assemblea parlamentare: un modello in crisi?, “Dir. Soc.” 1996, No. 3, p. 414. 36 Art. 283 TFEU. Adriana Ciancio • The European Central Bank: Issues of Constitutional Law 21 ther underlining the role of the Parliament37, with a more direct and intense intervention of the representative body also in the nomination of the members of the Executive Committee of the Central Bank. In truth, the desired (re)structuring in a federal sense (at least) of the Eurozone38, with the objective to implement a common budget, create a sole treasurer and establish an autonomous capacity of fiscal action, requires first of all to redefine its whole organizational setup, with a more balanced system of checks and bal- ances among the different institutions39. In particular, it would be necessary to strengthen the Parliament’s role in the appointment of the heads of the ECB, following the path for other purposes inaugurated with the implementation of the single supervision mechanism40 and which with respect to the nomination of the members of the Executive Committee finds some anticipa- tions in the internal regulation of the EP. Art. 122 of the parliamentary Regu- lation, indeed, seems to provide a “strong” reading of the “consultation” provided for by the Treaty, because, beyond the audition of the candidate to the Presidency (and of other members) of the Executive Committee before the relative parliamentary commission, introduces a recommendation of the latter to the Parliament in relation to the approval or rejection of the proposal by the Council. In the second case, it would follow the invitation to the Coun- cil to modify the nomination, with a procedure, therefore, which seems to at- tract to the politically-representative body co-decisional, rather than merely consultative, functions, on the verge of the legislative iter now become ordinary procedure, but which contrary to this one, still does not find regulation in primary European law. Notwithstanding a change of the nomination system of the members of the Executive Committee similar to the one hereby argued for was expressed also in the so-called “Frankfurt Protocol”, stated by the former euro-deputy Andrew Duff with the purpose to elaborate a project of organic reform of the institutional setup of the Eurozone, to be added

37 Recently on the issue A. Ciancio, Democrazia e sovranazionalità: ripensare il Parlamento europeo, “Riv. AIC” 2016, No. 3. 38 See A. Ciancio, Con lo sguardo oltre Lisbona verso gli Stati Uniti d’Europa, [In:] Le elezioni del Parlamento europeo del 2014, ed. B. Caravita, Naples 2015, p. 79. 39 As previously argued in A. Ciancio, How we might recover from the economic and social crisis through European integration deepening, “Przeglad Prawa Konstytucyjnego” 2014, No. 3, p. 161. 40 See A. Pisaneschi, Banca centrale europea, vigilanza bancaria e sovranità degli Stati, “federalismi.it.” 2014, No. 17, p. 9. 22 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 as an attachment to the Lisbon agreement, so to implement the appropriate finalization of the EMU without modifying the Lisbon Treaty. The project, which still has not been approved in the competent institutional venues of the Union, among its dispositions contains the proposal, similar to the one hereby proposed for, to associate the Parliament to the Council in the nomination of the heads of the ECB, even if on recommendation by the Commis- sion (art. 4). The main effect also in this case would be to alleviate the substantial unaccountability of the European Central Bank before the electoral body by intensifying its relation with the Parliament, preserving at the same time its necessary technical competences.

IV.

It is possible to prevent the objection that a parliamentary nomination of the members of the ECB could undermine its independence, already considering the fact that the latter, more than to the appointment mechanisms, seems entrusted to other guarantees, all already present in the current regulation of this institution. Among them it is to be recalled firstly the very technical competence of the Executive Committee’s members and their related incompatibilities, as well as the features of the mandate. Above all it worth to underline the fixed length of eight years, which by itself removes the position from the so called “political cycle” of the EP, even more considering its no-renewability, a feature which shows the effort to exclude any possibility to “contract” or “exchange” the confirmation of the mandate at the Frankfurt Eurotower with the protection of economic interests (solely) of some countries. Besides we should consider the peculiar internal organization of the EP which would seem to exclude that these nominations indulge the (economic) interests of one country or the other or their respective Governments. In- deed the Parliament is the only EU Institution articulated not with respect to the nationalities of the members but in groups formed primarily on the base of political affiliation41. Rather, the political vocation of the groups within

41 A. Ciancio, I gruppi parlamentari. Studio intorno a una manifestazione del pluralismo politico, Milan 2008, p. 70. Adriana Ciancio • The European Central Bank: Issues of Constitutional Law 23 the European parliament42, combined with the other requirement of “trans- nationality”, also necessary for this institution, would favour a choice functional to more-shared strategies, transversally to the interests of the single States and at most compliant with the more general objectives of economic growth at the European and (only consequently) national level, taking from this point of view the meaning of a politically unifying investiture beyond States oppositions. The conclusion, moreover, would be more compelling if it were confirmed the provision of qualified majorities for the nomination of the government bodies of the ECB43, together with the number of six members of the Execu- tive Committee, which makes the Central Bank an institution non-representative of all Member States which adopted the single currency. Actually – as shown by the already-mentioned experience of the Indepen- dent Authorities, even more so if considered from comparative law point of view – the independence appears to be entrusted only minimally to the procedure to select the members of the guarantor bodies44. Rather it is greatly maintained by the technical rules that ensure the impartial exercise of their functions, provided it is ensured by other means the compliance of such des- ignations to effective criteria of competence and professionalism45.

42 S. Baroncelli, I gruppi parlamentari nell’esperienza del Parlamento europeo, [In:] Rap- presentanza politica, gruppi parlamentari, partiti: il contesto europeo, ed. S. Merlini, Turin 2001, p. 11; and A. Ciancio, Partiti politici e gruppi parlamentari nell’ordinamento europeo “Pol. Dir.” 2007, p. 159. 43 Art. 283.2 TFUE. 44 In the U.S.A., for instance, the development of the phenomenon of Independent Regu- latory Commissions. P. Tesauro, Le “Independent Regulatory Commissions”. Organi di controllo dei pubblici servizi negli Stati Uniti, Naples 1966, established to protect relevant public interests, removing them from any kind of pressure by public or private forces, has not prevented to entrust their appointment to the President, even if with the screen of the Senate, exercised either in the form of “advice”, or “consent”. However, the de-politicization of such form of check on public interest services is accomplished through a series of rules, usually contained in the establishing laws of the differentCommissions , aimed at preventing the President from interfering in their activities after the nomination. 45 In this direction goes also the French system of Autorités Administratives Indèpendan- tes, born at the end of WWII, on the example of the North-American precedent, which by the variety of Autorités’ nomination mechanisms conceived (e.g., nomination with ministerial decree or by the Council of Ministers; nominations by the heads of the Higher Courts) sug- 24 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 With specific reference to the central banking institutions, a confirmation can be found in the organization of the Deutsche Bundesbank, which famously offered the model for the ECB itself46. Indeed the German Federal Bank is characterized by the presence of a single administrative body, made up – be- side the President and the Vice President – by six members, appointed by the President of the Republic among people with particular professional competence, four of which are selected by the Bundesrat, even though in agreement with the Federal Government, which is exclusively entrusted the choice of the other members47. Notwithstanding the identification, as the holder of the nomination power, of the Chamber representative of Länder, rather than the Bundestag, because of to the federal structure of that system in connection to the regional articulation of the German banking system48, what is more interesting for this paper is to underline how the inclusion of the Federal Bank in the representative-democratic circuit don’t threat the absolute political neutrality of the Deutsche Bank49. Conversely, after the entry into the SEBC it is gests lawmakers’ almost-total indifference for the chosen nomination mechanism, provided the existence of strict guarantees of protection of independence of such bodies, under the profile of possible nominees, strict incompatibility systems, guarantees of un-transferability and immunity, contained in the establishing laws. See, among others, P. Sabourin, Les autorités administratives indépendantes, “L’Actualité juridique. Droit Admnistratif” 1983, No. 5, p. 275; F. Gazier, Y. Cannac, Etude sur les autorités administratives indépendantes, “Etudes et documents Cons. D’Etat” 1983–1984, No. 35, p. 13; J. Chevallier, Réflexions sur l’institutions des autorités administratives indépendantes, “La semaine juridiques” 1986, No. 30–32, p. 35; C.A. Colliard, G. Timsit, Les autorités administratives indépendantes, Paris 1988. 46 See, ex multis, A. Giovannini, Central Banking in a Monetary Union: Reflections on the Proposed Statute of the European Central Bank, “Occasional Paper” ed. CEPR, 1992, n. 9, p. 10; A. Predieri, Euro, poliarchie democratiche e mercati monetari, Turin 1998, p. 283; J.V. Louis, Le sistème européen de banques centrales: les rapports entre banques centrales nationales et banque centrale européenne, [In:] Mélanges offerts à P. Van Ommeslaghe, Bruxelles 2000, p. 778; C. Hadjiemmanuil, Democracy, supranationality and central bank independence, [In:] Central bank independence, Dordrecht 2001, p. 153. 47 On the German Central Bank’s organization, before and after the entry into the ESCB, see E. Apel, Central Banking Systems Compared. The ECB, the pre-euro Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System, London–New York 2003, p. 15. 48 See R. Bifulco, Bundesbank e Banche centrali dei Länder come modello del Sistema europeo delle Banche centrali, [In:] Europa e Banche centrali, ed. O. Roselli, Naples 2004, p. 75. 49 Considered “a fourth branch of government”, by E. Kennedy, The Bundesbank. Germany’s Central Bank in the International Monetary System, London 1991, p. 3. Indeed, D. Marsch, The Adriana Ciancio • The European Central Bank: Issues of Constitutional Law 25 stronger, because of the further guarantees of impartiality imposed at the Eu- ropean level by both the Treaties and the ECB’s Statute as requirements for being part of the European system of Central Banks50. It equally does not seem contestable the independence of the Bank of Ita- ly51 (sometimes considered in the Italian system the epitome of Independent Authorities52) with respect to the political direction of majority on the issue of (residual) competences of credit control and banking supervision, notwithstanding the ever-lasting strong involvement of the Government in the election of its Governor and, after the chance put forward by law n. 262 of 2005 (art. 19), even on the duration of its mandate, now limited to six years, re- newable only once and revocable, even if only for the reasons (and with guarantees of jurisdictional protection) established by the ESCB Statute. Actual- ly, the independence of the institution lays principally in other guarantees, among which the technical-professional competence of the members of the Directorate, today even committed to comply with the Ethical Code adopted in 2006 that integrates the conduct rules already contained in the Statute of the Bank, establishing the behaviours to adopt in relation to conflict of interests, privacy, external appointments, acceptance of gifts or other goods, in

Bundesbank: the bank that rules Europe, London 1992, p. 57, remember that already in 1956 Konrad Adenauer lamented that “The central bank is totally sovereign in its relationship with the government; it is accountable only towards itself”. On the other hand, S. Ortino, Banca d’Italia e costituzione, Pisa 1979, p. 9, emphasises how, during the debate leading to the approval, in 1957, of the law on the Bundesbank, it was proposed to vest in it, alternatively, either the title of constitutional body or of fourth power. 50 C. Zilioli, M. Selmayr, La Banca centrale europea, op.cit., p. 75, R. Sturm, How independent is the Bundesbank?, “German politics” 1995, o. 4, p. 37, according to which the path of gradual transition towards the common currency coincided with the moment of lowest independence of the German Bank, based on the (merely factual) consideration that it had not originally been consulted about the choice of taking part in the monetary union, but was only later included in the relative decision-making process. 51 F. Zatti,Il ruolo della Banca d’Italia tra Sebc, Bce ed istituzioni politiche nazionali, in Europa e Banche centrali, op.cit., p. 200. Contra, S. Ortino, Banche centrali tra indipendenza ed autonomia, [In:] Banca impresa società, 1986, pp. 356–357. See also T. Padoa Schioppa, The Euro and its Central Bank, Cambridge 2004, p. 32, who argues that the Bank of Italy has become independent after the signature of the Maastricht Treaty. 52 V. Mezzacapo, L’indipendenza della Banca d’Italia, [In:] Mercati e amministrazioni indipendenti, eds. F. Bassi, F. Merusi, Milan 1993, p. 31. 26 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 the respect of the fundamental values of the institution, which are independence and impartiality, together with loyalty and discretion. The example confirms the secondary importance of the nomination mechanisms of some institutions with respect to the main objective of maintaining the conditions of neutrality for the exercise of their functions, avoiding coercions ex parte political, where the “personal”, so to say, guarantees of independence of the ECB, due to the mentioned features of the (non-revocable) mandate of its administrators, are complementary to the other provisions of autonomy, such as the ones already established by the applicable Statute of the Central Bank, both under the financial profile53 and the functional one, related to the possibility to reach its monetary-policy objective in complete autonomy54. For what concerns the so-called institutional autonomy, it likewise seems very high, considering the juridical personality attributed to the ECB55, different from the one of the Union’s, as well as the fact that it is neither subject to instructions, nor to annulment of its acts by other bodies, in particular political ones. Different it has to be considered the jurisdictional control exercisable only by the Court of Justice on the regulations that the Central Bank might adopt, as expression of the wide, also normative autonomy recognized for the accomplish of the ESCB’s tasks56. These regulations – in compliance with the characteristics of the corresponding normative acts of the Union57 – have general character and are directly applicable within the Member States (of the eurozone), but, because of the mentioned independence of the ECB, are adopted by excluding any form of intervention in the formation iter, as well as of control, by political bodies, in particular the Parliament. Therefore, it is entrusted to the judicial control58 the guarantee of the (only) legitimacy of such normative acts59, relative to the ordinary competences of monetary policy.

53 Artt. 28 ss. ECB’s Statute. 54 For the various features of the ECB’s independence, see S. Baroncelli, La banca centrale europea: profili giuridici e istituzionali. Un confronto con il modello americano della Federal Reserve, Firenze 2000, p. 209. 55 Art. 282 n. 3 TFEU and art. 9 St. ECB. 56 Art. 132 TFEU. 57 Art. 288 TFEU. 58 Art. 263 TFEU. 59 Art. 35 ECB’s Statute. Adriana Ciancio • The European Central Bank: Issues of Constitutional Law 27 On the other hand, to the proposal to modify in the sense hereby indicates the nomination system of the heads of the European bank, it does not seem insurmountably opposable either the consideration that a parliamentary designation of the ECB’s Executive Committee Members, mitigating the “institutional” independence, would present an incurable contrast with the principle of absolute autonomy established by the Statute of the ESCB. An indirect proof is provided by the Swedish Central Bank, even if Swe- den – as derogatory Member State – does not yet participate in the monetary union. Indeed, the amendments of the Constitution and of the statutory law relative to the Sveriges Riksbank, for what concerns the compliance with the parameter of legal convergence in view of the adoption of the single curren- cy60, have not substantially altered the relationships between this Bank and the National Parliament, which features a manifest dependence of the former by the latter61, in conformity with the characteristics of that system, characterized by a strong “centrality” of the Parliament62. In particular, we hereby take into consideration the selection procedure of the members of the Directive Council, whose nomination continues to be entrusted to the parliamentary election even after the constitutional reform63. Indeed, in the different Reports on legal convergence published by the ECB64, this fact has not been considered incompatible with the requisites of independence imposed on Nation- al Central Banks as conditions for the entry into the ESCB, contrary to other competences attributed to the Riksdag towards the Riksbank and among them, primarily, the parliamentary control on the operations of earnings distribution, considered contrasting with the principle of financial autonomy65.

60 On the topic E. Paparella, Unione monetaria europea e indipendenza delle Banche centrali. Il caso della Sveriges Riksbank, [In:] Europa e Banche centrali, op.cit., p. 150. 61 “The Riksbank is the central bank of the Realm and an authority under the Riksdag”, Art. 9.12.1 Swedish Constitution (Regeringsformen). 62 D. Arter, The Swedish Riksdag: The Case of a Strong Policy-Influencing Assembly, [In:] Parliaments in Western Europe, ed. P. Norton, London-Portland 1990, p. 120. 63 “The Riksbank shall have a Governing Council comprising eleven members, who shall be elected by the Riksdag”, as laid down by Art. 9.12.2 Swedish Constitution, reformed on this point in 1998. Before, not very dissimilarly, it established that: “The Bank of Sweden is administrated by eight Trustees. Seven of the Trustees are elected by the Riksdag”. 64 Look at the website www.ecb.europa.eu. 65 E. Paparella, op.cit., p. 160. 28 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 V.

The question of the extension of parliamentary intervention in relation to the Central Banks remands to another, not secondary, profile of the issue concerning the democratic legitimization of the ECB. Indeed, the current forms of interaction between the Central Bank and the other European Institutions, even if sometimes accomplish, in a purely factual view, important occasions of evaluation and exhortation of the actions of the ECB, do not appear able to substitute the weakness of democratic control on the activity of the Central Bank, because of the delicate equilibrium reached at the normative level among the bans imposed to guarantee the independence and the permissible inter-institutional relationships66. Indeed, the right of the Council’s President and Commission’s members to participate, with no voting rights, to the meetings of the ECB’s Directive Council, as well as the possibility by the same President of the Council to submit a motion to the delib- eration of the same Directive Council; the invitation directed to the President of the Central Bank to participate to the meetings of the Council “when the latter discusses issues related to the ESCB’s objectives and tasks”; the obligation by the Bank to refer every year to the European Parliament, the Council of ministers, the Commission and the European Council about its own activity; and even the auditions of the ECB’s President and other members of the Executive Committee in the relative parliamentary commissions67 do not determine the rise of an authentic accountability of the Central Bank towards the mentioned bodies and, therefore, as anticipated, do not constitute mechanism for sufficient democratic control upon its activity68, ensuring at most its transparency69, which however is a different principle which must be kept separate from the, just mentioned, one of accountability70. And however, one cannot but perceive that the ECB’s independence, in the above-mentioned different nuances, could not certainly put the Europe-

66 T. Padoa-Schioppa, The Euro, op.cit., p. 32. 67 Art. 284 TFEU. 68 A salso argued by U. Triulzi, Le politiche economiche, op.cit., p. 325. 69 See C. Zilioli, Art. 284, [In:] Commentario breve ai Trattati dell’Unione Europea, eds. F. Pocar, M.C. Baruffi, Padova 2014, p. 1391; and before A. Malatesta,Art. 105–124, [In:] Com- mentario breve ai Trattati della Comunità e dell’Unione Europea, ed. F. Pocar, Padova 2001, p. 528. 70 T. Padoa Schioppa, The Euro, op.cit., p. 32. Adriana Ciancio • The European Central Bank: Issues of Constitutional Law 29 an Bank without the legal order, and that even its whole explication requires fixing judicial rules allowing the Central Bank to pursue with full discretion, but also efficiently, the objectives entrusted to it. In particular, the legal definition of price stability as (primary) reference criterion for the action of the ECB71 ought to allow it to operate autonomously in the accomplishment of its objective, shielded from any external pressure, giving though at the same time the judicial basis for an inter-institutional dialogue that could reconcile the already mentioned independence with other forms of accountability of the Bank in the case it does not reach the objectives established by the norms72. According to this view, one could even introduce some types of inspective control by the Parliament on the ECB, similarly in any case to what specialized scholarship had suggested also in the case of the Bank of Italy73, even if one can doubt that the Parliament possesses the technical competences necessary to adequately carry on the inspections in the sectors of competence of the Bank74. Anyway, providing for (an extension of) parliamentary control on the activities of the European Central Bank75, would establish some forms of accountability76 of the Bank towards the immediately representative body and, by so doing, put in place even virtuous control processes of the public opinion on the whole activities of the Institution77. Indeed, in the context of a system which proclaims itself of representative democracy78 a central issue is the citizens’ possibility to know and inspect

71 Art. 282.2 TFEU. 72 See again T. Padoa Schioppa, The Euro, op.cit., p. 33. Similarly also S. Baroncelli, La Banca centrale europea, op.cit., p. 249. 73 In the same direction, already, F. Capriglione, Intervento pubblico e ordinamento del credito, Milan 1978, p. 161. 74 See S. Ortino, Banca d’Italia, op.cit., p. 411. 75 Already present in embryonic form in the Regulation of the banking single supervi- sory mechanism, see A Pisaneschi, Banca centrale europea, op.cit., p. 7; and S. Antoniazzi, La Banca Centrale Europea tra politica monetaria e vigilanza bancaria, Turin 2013, p. 229. But, on the different meaning expressed by the ECB’s independence in the field comparing with the other one of the monetary policy, see C. Zilioli, Art. 284, op.cit., p. 1393. 76 On the various forms of accountability to which are subject sovranational technical institutions, see G. Cerrina Feroni, Organismi sovranazionali e legittimazione democratica. Spunti per una riflessione, “federalismi.it” 2016, No. 20, p. 7. 77 See T. Padoa Schioppa, The Euro, op.cit., p. 33. 78 Art. 10.1 TEU. 30 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 through the Parliament every step leading to the formation of the will of the decision-making bodies and activate in this way the diffused accountability before the electoral body. Therefore, one could admit the possibility that the Parliament exercises a sort of “institutional attraction” also on the bodies that one wants to maintain independent, through the inspective activity79, to be exercised even through the establishment of dedicated, even temporary, Commissions, in this very case for the control on monetary policy80. The idea to initiate true parliamentary investigations on the activity of the Central Bank and on its compliance with the objectives established by the norms cannot be rejected a priori for fear that through the usual instruments of inspective control, Parliament’s political considerations could overlap to the “technical” ones of the body under verification, as could be concluded by those who cannot escape the impression of an absolute incompatibility between independence and political control81. This conclusion not seems inescapable by solely considering the peculiar regulation of the European Parliament investigations. Indeed, on the one hand the purpose of the investigatory activity is only to allow the Parliament to supervise the correct application of Un- ion law in case of infringements or bad management of the very same. On the other hand, it reaches its conclusions through, at the most, the proposal to adopt a recommendation82, which, belonging to the area of “soft law”, allows the receiving body wide margin of evaluation relative to the an and the quomodo of the implementation of the indications it contains. In this way, the control so exercised on the Central Bank could recall this body to a more effective action or even a more rigorous compliance with its institutional objectives, without substantially undermining its decision-making autonomy, complementing, at the same time, with the ban imposed on it to receive instructions not only by national Governments, but also by the other Union In- stitutions83. Therefore the parliamentary control on the activities of the Bank

79 See D. SICLARI, op.cit., p. 323. 80 Similarly, relating to the Bank of Italy, already A. Predieri, Sistema bancario e istituzioni: un nuovo compito per il Parlamento?, “Città e regioni” 1976, No. 12, p. 10. 81 In this way C. Zilioli, M. Selmayr, La Banca centrale europea, op.cit., p. 100. 82 Art. 198.10, III alinea Reg. PE. 83 Art. 7 ECB’s Statute. Adriana Ciancio • The European Central Bank: Issues of Constitutional Law 31 for alleged deviations from its institutional objectives and/or for lack of accomplishments of the same – which, it is worth mentioning, are implemented with technical tools, producing though effects of very high political significance – would complement the judicial control entrusted to the Court of Justice on the recurrence of the (limited) causes for removal of the Members of the Executive Committee, exercisable for lack of the conditions required for the performance of their duties and for serious misconduct84. Wholly considered, therefore, the suggestion to relax the fundamental unaccountability of the European Central Bank before the electoral body by intensifying its relationship with the Parliament, at the very least “parliamen- tarizing” the nomination of the Members of the ECB’s Executive Committee, would lead to conciliate the “natural” technical connotation of the ECB with a more comprehensive application of democratic principles. And indeed, the proposal so forth presented could even favour the solution to what currently seems a huge paradox, from a political point of view, of the European integration process: i.e. the presence in the EU institutional setup of a body, characterized by a very high independence primarily for effect of the position assumed at the time of its establishment by Germany85, which nowadays shows to consider the very independence of the ECB one of the main obstacles to consent to those further cessations of sovereignty necessary for the completion of the EMU and its transformation into a genuinely political Union.

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Joanna Marszałek-Kawa1

Remarks on The System of State Authorities in the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan of 8 December 1992

Keywords: System of State Authorities, Constitution, the Republic of Uzbekistan, president, parliament, election system Słowa kluczowe: system organów państwowych, konstytucja, Republika Uzbekistanu, prezydent, parlament, system wyborczy

Summary The aim of this article is to present the system of state authorities in the Republic of Uz- bekistan, shaped under the provisions of the existing fundamental law amended in 2014. We will also address the question whether the implemented reform of an institutional character means the adoption of a democratic form of government.

Streszczenie

Uwagi o systemie organów państwowych w Konstytucji Republiki Uzbekistanu z dnia 8 grudnia 1992 roku

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie systemu organów państwowych w Republice Uzbekistanu, ukształtowanego zgodnie z przepisami obowiązującego prawa gruntownie zno- welizowanego w 2014 r. Postaram się również odpowiedzieć na pytanie, czy wdrażane reformy o charakterze instytucjonalnym oznacza wprowadzenie demokratycznej formy rządów.

1 The author is an Associate Professor in Department of Political System RP on the Fac- ulty of Political Sciences and International Studies of the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń. E-mail: [email protected]. 36 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 *

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the governing elites of the newly emerged states in Central and Eastern Europe declared that the political identity of societies would be based on values such as democracy, self-governance, civic virtue, pluralism, respect for human rights, justice and social solidarity. The em- ulation of Western solutions has become the foundation for the construction of new social and political structures. Former Soviet republics from Central Asia imitated the Western world with an intention to supplement their own transformation path2. Their aim was to prepare a multi-stage plan of necessary changes that could secure safe transition from centrally planned economy to free market economy based on new mechanisms and solutions. They sought new solutions that could facilitate effective integration with the global economy. Changes in the economic sphere were designed to be implemented simultaneously with social and democratic reforms. It should be noted that this process is still in progress. The authorities of the Republic of Uzbekistan declare that they will relentlessly pursue democratic reforms and the construction of the civil society. In 2010, President Islam Abduganiyevich Kari- mov indicated the directions of desired changes, which he referred to as the “Uzbek development model.”3 This strategy involves the implementation of further reform towards the “socially oriented free market economy”4. On 8 December 1991, in the village of Viskule in the Białowieża Forest, Belarus, Ukraine and the Russian Federation signed the historic Belavezha Accords, declaring the Soviet Union effectively dissolved5. Under the agree-

2 See also: D. Hiro, Inside Central Asia: A Political and Cultural History of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan, Turkey and Iran, New York 2009, p. 480; D. Dagiev, Regime Transition in Central Asia: Stateness, Nationalism and Political Change in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, New York 2014, p. 252. 3 A. Abduvakhitov, Presidential Election in Uzbekistan, Tashkent 2015, p. 6. 4 General Information about the Republic of Uzbekistan, Tashkent 2014, p. 65. 5 Por. G.R. Capisani, Nowe państwa Azji Środkowej, Warsaw 2004, p. 390; M. Smoleń, M. Lubina, Rozpad ZSRR i jego konsekwencje dla Europy i świata. Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw, Warsaw 2011, p. 425. Joanna Marszałek-Kawa • Remarks on The System of State Authorities... 37 Table 1. The fundamental principles of the „Uzbek model” of transformation

First Priority of economics over politics, which means that economic reform must be free from all principle dogmas, postulates and outdated stereotypes and should not be subject to any ideology

Second The state – the main reformer – must define the main priorities, directions and stages of the principle reform, develop national development programs and consistently implement them

Third The rule of law in all spheres of the society. A democratically adopted constitution and laws must principle be observed by everybody without exception

Holding strong social policy. The introduction of market relations should be accompanied by the Fourth introduction of effective measures to ensure the reliable social protection of the population, espe- principle cially large, low-income families, and people in the retirement age

Fifth Transition to market economy is performed by taking into account the evolution of the objective principle economic laws in consistently, deliberately, and stage by stage

Source: General information, op.cit., p. 65. ment, the USSR ceased to exist as the “subject of international law and geo- political reality.”6 As Martin Malia put it, “the Soviet Union collapsed like a house of cards, because it had always been a house of cards.”7 The USSR was replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent Nations. 15 new states were established as well, with five of them in Central Asia, i.e. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan8. The Republic of Uzbekistan has a very important position in the re- gion9. It covers a vast area of 447,400 sq km10. It is also the most populat- ed country in Central Asia with almost 30 million residents. Uzbekistan

6 A. Kamińska, Stanisław Szuszkiewicz: ZSRR rozpadł się nieoczekiwanie, na polowaniu w puszczy, http://www.polskieradio.pl/75/926/Artykul/495234,Stanislaw-Szuszkiewicz-ZS RR-rozpadl-sie-nieoczekiwanie-na-polowaniu-w-puszczy (1.06.2016). 7 I. Krastev, Europejska dez-integracja: wnioski płynące z rozpadu Związku Radzieckiego, http://www.krytykapolityczna.pl/Opinie/KrastevEuropejskadez-integracjaWnioskiplynace zupadkuZwiazkuRadzieckiego/menuid-183.html (11.06.2016). 8 A. Amanbayeva, The Collision of Islam and Terrorism in Central Asia, “Asian Criminol- ogy” 2009, n. 4, pp. 165–189. 9 See: A.C. Kuchins, J. Mankoff, O. Backes,Central Asia in a Reconnecting Eurasia: Uz- bekistan’s Evolving Foreign Economic and Security Interests, “Center for Strategic & International Studies” 2015, June, p. 56; A. Zamarajewa, Kazachstan–Uzbekistan: rywalizacja o przywództwo w Azji Centralnej, Pułtusk 2007, p. 167. 10 Http://www.panstwo.atlas.edu.pl/uzbekistan.html (5.06.2016). 38 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 is a multiethnic state inhabited by 130 different nationalities. Uzbeks account for almost 83.1% of the population, Russians – 2.6%, Tajiks – 4.8%, Kazakhs – 2.6%, Karakalpaks – 2.2%, Tatars – 0.7%, and Kyrgyz people – 0.9%. Other ethnic groups in Uzbekistan, including, among others, Turk- mens, Ukrainians, Jews, as well as Poles, Germans and Koreans, account for 3.1% of the population of Uzbekistan11. At present, the growing ur- banisation process has led to changes in the social structure and 51% of the society lives in cities.

Diagram 1. The dynamics of the population of the Republic of Uzbekistan

Source: General Information..., p. 59.

As the Constitution of Uzbekistan of 1992 stipulates, “All citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall have equal rights and freedoms, and shall be equal before the law, without discrimination by sex, race, nationality, language, religion, social origin, convictions, individual and social status. Any privileges may be granted solely by the law and shall conform to the principles of social justice” (art. 18). Moreover, under art. 12 of the fundamental law, “In the Republic of Uz- bekistan, public life shall develop on the basis of a diversity of political institutions, ideologies and opinions. No ideology shall be granted the status of

11 General Information, op.cit., p. 58. Joanna Marszałek-Kawa • Remarks on The System of State Authorities... 39 state ideology”12. It should be emphasised here that although the constitution makers do not use the term “secular state”, the clear dissociation from ideology in the country with Muslim traditions may be explained not only as a departure from communist or fascist ideology, but also from the religious one13. Therefore, Uzbekistan is – in accordance with the existing fundamental law – a secular state. Sunni Islam is the leading denomination (92% are Sunnis of the Hanafi school, while 1% are Shia Muslims based near Bukha- ra and Samarkand), followed by 93% of the population. The followers of the Orthodox Church account for almost 4% of the total number of citizens14. Uzbekistan is an important partner in trade and economic exchange especially for the countries of South-East Asia. It is a member of a number of international organisations, such as: UN, UNESCO, WHO, ISO, FAO, and regional ones: the Commonwealth of Independent Nations and the Eurasian Economic Union. Uzbekistan has rich deposits of natural resources, including large beds of 100 various minerals located in 2,900 deposits. The country has the fourth largest gold deposits in the world. Moreover, it holds the sev- enth place when it comes to the amount of uranium and the tenth as regards the size of copper deposits. In Uzbekistan, natural gas and oil are also mined and large deposits of shale gas have been discovered. Large revenues – accounting for about 1/3 of the state budget – are generated by the exploitation of deposits of silver, zinc, lead, wolfram, molybdenum, iron ores, and others15. On 24 March 1990, at the session of the Supreme Council of the Uzbek SSR, the office of the President of the Uzbek SSR was established16. The person appointed for the post was Islam A. Karimov, the former First Secretary

12 Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Tashkent 2014, see: chapter II entitled Democracy, p. 6. 13 S. Kawa, Zasady prawa wyznaniowego Republiki Uzbekistanu, http://www.sawp.org.pl/ index.php/biuletyny/biuletyn-nr-7/67-zasady-prawa-wyznaniowego-republiki-uzbekistanu. html (1.06.2016). 14 Http://www.slideshare.net/PortalPromocjiEksportu/uzbekistan-52755543 (15.06.2016). 15 Http://www.krytykapolityczna.pl/artykuly/swiat/20141105/uzbekistan-czyli- -zapomniane-pieklo (15.06.2016), http://www.slideshare.net/PortalPromocjiEksportu/ uzbekistan-52755543 (15.06.2016). See also. Rosja, Ukraina, Białoruś, Mołdawia, Litwa, Łotwa, Estonia, Gruzja, Azerbejdżan, Armenia, Kirgizja, Turkmenia, Tadżykistan, Uzbekistan, Kazachstan, ed. J. Cichocki, A. Łabuszewska, Warsaw 2001, p. 60. 16 See: Uzbekistan: historia – społeczeństwo – polityka, ed. T. Bodio, Warsaw 2001, p. 536. 40 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SRR. On 18 June 1990, at the second session of the XII Congress of the Supreme Council of the Republic, the Declaration of the Sovereignty of Uzbekistan was adopt- ed17. Finally, on 31 August 1991, at the fourth session of the Supreme Coun- cil, the independence of Uzbekistan was proclaimed. The Declaration of In- dependence was approved in a nationwide referendum by the majority vote of citizens. On 1 September, Uzbeks celebrate the Independence Day18. The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan was adopted on 8 Decem- ber 1992, during the 11th session of the Supreme Council of the Republic19. The system of authority is regulated by the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan and articles of the act on state government at the local level of 2 September 199320. The constitution consists of the preamble and six sections, which include 26 chapters and 128 articles. As A. Ab- duvakhitov notes, 60 out of 128 articles regulate the status of the residents of Uzbekistan21. Under art. 68 of the fundamental law, Uzbekistan “shall consist of regions, districts, cities, towns, settlements, kishlaks and auls, and the sovereign Republic of Karakalpakstan”. Thus, as far as the administrative division is concerned, Uzbekistan is divided into: twelve regions called viloyats (Russian: oblasti): Andijan, Bukhara, Fergana, Jizzakh, Xorazm, Namangam, Navoiy, Qarshi, Samarkand, Guliston, Termez, Tashkent, and Nukuz. Oth- er administrative units include cities, with a separate legal and administrative status granted to Tashkent22. What is important, each change, establishment or dissolution of a territorial unit of the state must be approved by the Oliy Majlis. The fundamental constitutional principle is the principle of the separation of powers (art. 11). The activity of courts is regulated by the Law of the Repub-

17 A. Abduvakhitov, Uzbekistan and its electoral system, Tashkent 2015, p. 6. 18 See. A. Saidov, K. Wojtaszczyk, Konstytucyjne podstawy ustroju Państwa, [In:] Uzbe- kistan: historia-społeczeństwo-polityka, ed. T. Bodio, Warsaw 2001, p. 129. 19 The Constitution Day is celebrated in Uzbekistan on 8 December. 20 For mor details see: Сборник нормативно-правовых актов о деятельности правоохранительных органов, Адолат, Taszkient 2014, p. 504. 21 A. Abduvakhitov, Presidential election, op.cit., p. 10. 22 Http://www.slideshare.net/PortalPromocjiEksportu/uzbekistan-52755543 (15.06.2016), M.P. Pawłowski, Władza w terenie i samorząd terytorialny Republiki Uzbekistanu, htt p://blog. lpig.pl/2014/11/wladza-w-terenie-i-samorzad-terytorialny-republiki-uzbekistanu (15.06.2016). Joanna Marszałek-Kawa • Remarks on The System of State Authorities... 41 Table 2. Administrative and territorial division of Uzbekistan (as of Janu- ary 1, 2014)

Population, Area of the territory, Name of regions thousands thousands sq km

The Republic of Karakalpakstan 1736,50 166,59

regions:

Andijan 2805,50 4,30

Bukhara 1756,40 40,32

Djizzak 1226,80 21,21

Kashkadarya 2895,30 28,57

Navoi 901,10 110,99

Namangan 2504,10 7,44

Samarkand 3445,60 16,77

Surkhondaryo 2308,30 20,10

Syrdarya 763,80 4,28

Tashkent 2725,90 15,25

Fergana 3386,50 6,76

Khorezm 1684,10 6,05

Tashkent city 2352,90 0,34

the Republic of Uzbekistan 30 492,80 448,97

Source: General Information..., p. 57.

lic of Uzbekistan On Courts. The jurisdiction of courts is determined by the nature of the case to be considered. What is important, it is not permitted to establish extraordinary and emergency courts23. Under art. 106 of the fundamental law, the judicial authority is exercised by independent courts24. The judicial system in Uzbekistan consists of: the Constitutional Court of the Re- public of Uzbekistan, The Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan, The Higher Economic Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan, The Supreme court

23 A. Abduvakhitov, Presidential Election, op.cit., p. 19. 24 Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, op.cit., p. 57. 42 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 of the Republic of Karakalpakstan on civil and criminal cases, The Economic Court of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, regional and Tashkent city courts on civil and criminal cases, interdistrict, district and city courts on civil and criminal cases, martial and economic courts (art. 107)25. As art. 108 of the fundamental law stipulates, “The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall hear cases relating to the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and executive authorities. The Constitutional Court shall be elected from political and legal scholars and shall consist of the Chairman, Deputy Chairman and judges of the Constitutional Court including a representative from the Republic of Karakalpakstan [...].” The powers of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan are specified by art. 109 of the constitution, in accordance with which it shall: define the compliance of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, laws of the Re- public of Uzbekistan and resolutions of the chambers of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, decrees of the President of the Republic of Uz- bekistan, enactments of the government and local bodies of state authority, interstate treaties and other obligations of the Republic of Uzbekistan; conform the compliance of the Constitution of the Republic of Karakalpakstan to the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, laws of the Republic of Kar- akalpakstan – to laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan; interpret the norms of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan, as well as hear other cases relating to its competence in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan26.

II.

The Uzbek constitution-makers declare that the nation is the sovereign, because – under art. 7 of the fundamental law – “The people are the only source of state power”27. The nation exercises authority through its representatives chosen in universal elections. Art. 10 of the Constitution specifies that it is the President of the Republic and the Oliy Majlis (the bicameral Parliament

25 Ibidem, p. 57. 26 Ibidem, pp. 58–59. 27 Ibidem, p. 5. Joanna Marszałek-Kawa • Remarks on The System of State Authorities... 43 of the Republic) that act on behalf of the people. “No part of the society, political party, public association, movement or individual shall have the right to act on behalf of the people of Uzbekistan”28. Uzbekistan is an authoritarian presidential republic, in which Islam Kari- mov has held the office of President since 29 December 199129. “The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan is the Head of the State and executive authority in the Republic of Uzbekistan” (art. 89). It should be noted that since Uz- bekistan regained independence, the election law has been modified a number of times. Changes introduced in 2003, 2008, 2012 and 2014 remodelled the election system30. They were supplemented with the amendments to the existing constitution. In October 2010, President Karimov said that “the election system that is an essential component of democratic reforms and of the modernization of the country is constantly developing. Our practice and experience, especially accumulated during the last elections have put the issues of the further democratization of the electoral processes on the top of the agenda”31. According to Akmal Kholmatovich Saidov, I. Karimov’s opponent in the presidential election, professor of law and the head of the Na- tional Centre for Human Rights, the election system in Uzbekistan is based on three principles: first, it respects international standards of human rights and international election laws; second, it applies the best practices of western democracies; third, it takes account of national and historical traditions concerning electoral practices, balancing them with democratic reforms32. It should be pointed out that the amendment to the election law passed at the end of 2011 reduced the presidential term of office from seven to five years. The Uzbek constitution limits presidents of the country to two terms of office. This provision was ignored when the incumbent won a third term in office in December 2007. The current president’s term in office has also been extend-

28 Ibidem, p. 6. 29 www.president.uz (30.05.2016), see also: I. Karimov, Uzbekistan na progu XXI wieku, trans. D. Muszyńska-Wolny, Warsaw 2001, p. 193. 30 For more details see: Законы Республики Узбекистан о выборах, Адолат, Taszkient 2014, p. 320; G.R. Malikova, Presidential elections in the Republic of Uzbekistan: questions and answers, Tashkent 2015, pp. 3–25. 31 A. Abduvakhitov, Presidential Election, op.cit., p. 21. 32 A. Kh. Saidov, International election standards and national legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Tashkent 2014, p. 24. 44 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 ed twice through national constitutional referenda”33. President Islam Kari- mov has clearly won presidential elections four times already: on 29 Decem- ber 1991, he won 87.10% of the votes; on 9 January 2000, he obtained 95.70% of the votes; on 23 December 2007, 90.77% of the voters supported Karimov; in the last election, on 29 March 2015, he received 90.39% of the votes cast34. Under art. 90 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the head of state is elected for the term of five years, with the possibility of being re-elected. A citizen of the Republic of Uzbekistan at the age of 35 or older, who is in full command of the state Uzbek language, and has been the resident on the territory of Uzbekistan for at least 10 years, may be elected the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The President has to comply with the principle of incompatibilitas, which means that the head of state, during his term of office, may not hold any other paid post, serve as deputy of a representative body, or engage in commercial activity. The President enjoys personal immu- nity35. Former Presidents of the Republic of Uzbekistan, upon completion of their term of office, become lifetime senators (art. 97)36. Upon being elected in direct election, the President takes an oath at the sitting of the Legislative Chamber, the content of which is specified in art. 92 of the fundamental law: “«I do solemnly swear to faithfully serve the people of Uzbekistan, to strictly follow the Constitution and laws of the Republic, to guarantee the rights and freedoms of its citizens, and to conscientiously exercise the duties vested on the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan”37. The President of the Republic has a very strong position, determined by his numerous powers, stipulated, among others, in art. 93 of the fundamental law, under which the head of state: guarantees the observance of rights and freedoms of citizens; takes necessary measures on the protection of sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the country; represents the country in international relations; conducts negotiations and signs interna-

33 Http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2820 (30.05.2016). 34 Http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2820 (30.05.2016). For more on presidential election of 2015 see: Election of the President of the Republic Uzbekistan – the Most Important Stage of the Consolidation of National Statehood and Development of Civil Society in the Country, Tashkent 2015, pp. 10–188. 35 Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, op.cit., p. 42. 36 Ibidem, p. 49. 37 Ibidem, p. 43. Joanna Marszałek-Kawa • Remarks on The System of State Authorities... 45 tional treaties and agreements; receives letters of credence and recall from diplomatic and other representatives accredited to him; presents nominees for appointment of diplomatic and other representatives of the Republic of Uzbekistan to foreign states; presents nominees for the top state positions stipulated in the fundamental law; presents for consideration and approval by the chambers of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan a nominee of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Uzbelistan and relieve him of his post in case of resignation, passing the vote of no confidence in Prime Min- ister adopted by the chambers of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbeki- stan or in other cases stipulated by law; approves, upon the nomination of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Uzbekistan, members of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan and relieves them of their posts; appoints and relieves the Procurator-General of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Chairman of the Accounting Chamber of their post with their subsequent approval by the Senate of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbeki- stan; represents to the Senate of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbeki- stan; nominees for the post of Chairman and judges of the Constitutional Court, Chairman and judges of the Supreme Court, Chairman and judges of the Higher Economic Court, the Chairman of the Board of the Cen- tral Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Chairman of the State Com- mittee of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Protection of Nature; appoints and relieve judges of regional, inter-district, district, city, martial and economic courts of their posts; signs and promulgates laws of the Republic of Uz- bekistan; serves as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan; rules on matters of citizenship and granting political asylum; exercises other powers stipulated by the present Constitu- tion and laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan38. The President also has the right to dissolve the parliament in constitutionally specified circumstances, e.g. in case of insuperable disagreements between the two Chambers of the parliament, which puts under threat their normal functioning, or adopting by them decisions contradicting the constitution. The decision of the head of state must be approved by the Constitutional Court. If the head of state dissolves the parliament, the new elections must be held

38 Ibidem, pp. 43–47. 46 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 within three months. The parliament may not be dissolved during the state of emergency (art. 95). As experts indicate, “what is a component of the Uzbek transformation is the personification of politics and the continuity of power. It is characterised by the implementation of its own model of reforms rather than the emula- tion of European patterns”39. On 12 November 2010, Islam Karimow, in his policy statement entitled “The concept of the further deepening of democratisation and the construction of civil society”, he outlined the assumptions of the institutional reform of the state, which provided foundations for changing the existing fundamental law that strengthened the position of the parliament and political parties. As the result of the amendment to the constitution, the government is now appointed on the basis of the parliamentary majority40. The parliament also gained more scrutiny powers, such as a motion of no confidence in the cabinet and the government’s obligation to submit annual reports to the parliament. According to M. Musiał, the changes were first of all aimed at improving the image of Uzbekistan at the international arena. However, they did not have a significant influence on the process of the democratisation of the -ex isting political system, nor did they limit the strong position of the head of state. The parliament, despite being granted new powers, still plays a secondary role and its authority is of a surface character41. As Staniasław Kawa accurately remarks, “the President’s strength helps to maintain balance in the system of clan and family relations, not letting anyone dominate others. It protects the country against separatist tendencies, which arise from complex ethnic relations. The President’s apparatus, which is formally a consultative body, is actually superior to the government in the administrative hierarchy and effectively helps the President to retain absolute power”42.

39 M. Pietruszewski, Republika Uzbekistanu po 1991 r., http://www.psz.pl/118-gospodarka/republika-uzbekistanu-po-1991-roku (30.05.2016). 40 See: art. 98 of Constitition. 41 M. Musiał, Uzbekistan: wstęp do uregulowania problemu sukcesji?, www.new.org.pl/ downloadmagazine.php?f=new_3_4_2011_007 (30.05.2016). 42 S. Kawa, Zasady prawa wyznaniowego Republiki Uzbekistanu, op.cit. Joanna Marszałek-Kawa • Remarks on The System of State Authorities... 47 The Council of Ministers is the supreme organ of state authority in Uz- bekistan43. It is composed of the Prime Minister, his deputies, heads of state commissions, and the chairman of the government of the autonomous Re- public of Karakalpakstan44. Under art. 98 of the fundamental law, the Council of Ministers is responsible for the state’s economic, social, financial and monetary policy, for its development and implementation of programmes of the development of science, culture, education, health, as well as for other spheres of the economic and social life. Moreover, the government controls, coordinates and man- ages the work of state and economic executive bodies. It also guarantees that laws passed by the parliament and decrees, resolutions and ordinances of the President of the Republic are implemented. The Council of Ministers presents to the Legislative Chamber annual reports concerning the most important state matters45. The government is accountable to the parliament and the President of the Republic. Under art. 98 of the fundamental law, a vote of no confidence is passed by the majority of two thirds of the total number accordingly of deputies and members of the Senate. If both chambers pass this motion, the president accepts the resignation of the prime minister and the whole cabinet is automatically dissolved. Then, in accordance with a procedure stipulated by the constitution, the President of the Republic consults a new candidate for the prime minister with the parliamentary majority. However, if the parliament refuses to approve the new nominee twice, the president dissolves the parliament. The Oliy Majlis (transl. Great Assembly) is the bicameral parliament being the supreme legislative body in Uzbekistan46. Its term of powers is five years. The parliament consists of the Senate (the upper house) and the Legislative Chamber (the lower house). There are 100 members of the Senate, with 16 of them being appointed by the president from among authoritative citizens with large practical experience and experts in the field of science, art, literature, manufacture, and other spheres of state and public activity, and 84 members

43 www.gov.uz (30.05.2016). 44 Http://www.slideshare.net/PortalPromocjiEksportu/uzbekistan-52755543 (30.05.2016). 45 Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, op.cit., pp. 49–50. 46 www.parliament.gov.uz (30.05.2016). 48 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 elected by regional and local councils (six representatives of the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan, regions of Uzbekistan and the city of Tashkent). From amongst 150 deputies to the Legislative Chamber, 135 are elected by an absolute majority vote in single-member constituencies to serve 5-year terms. All citizens of Uzbekistan who have reached 18 years of age have the right to elect. Any citizen of Uzbekistan who has reached 25 years of age and has resided on the territory of this country for not less than five years, and is not incapacitated or imprisoned under a final and binding sentence may run for election47. At least 33% of the electorate must turn out in each constituency for the election in that constituency to be valid. If this does not happen, a run- off between the top two candidates is held. This also happens if no candidate receives an absolute majority in the first round.” The remaining 15 seats, due to serious ecological problems of the country, are reserved for the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan in general elections48. The Legislative Chamber exercises its powers in constitutionally specified spheres, and thus: it elects the Speaker and his deputies, as well as chair- men of committees and their deputies, adopts decisions on matters relating to the organisation of its activity and the internal schedule of the chamber, adopts resolutions concerning political, social and economic matters, as well as issues of the domestic and foreign policy of the state, rules matters on the deprivation of immunity the matters on deprivation of immunity a deputy upon the motion submitted by the Procurator General (art.79)49. The exclusive powers of the Senate, in turn, include, among other things, the election of the Chairman of the Senate and his deputies, the election (upon the nomination of the President of the Republic) of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbeki- stan, the Higher Economic Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the ratification of decrees of decrees of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the appointment and relief of diplomats of their posts upon the nomination of the President of the Republic and the Chairman of the Board of the Cen-

47 Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, op.cit., art. 76–78, pp. 24–26. 48 Http://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/Uzbekistan-Ustroj-polityczny;4575646.html (30.05.2016), http://www.eksportuj.pl/artykul/pokaz/id/10778/uzbekistan-ustroj-polityczny-podzial-i-struktura-administracyjna (30.05.2016). 49 Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, op.cit., pp. 29–30. Joanna Marszałek-Kawa • Remarks on The System of State Authorities... 49 tral Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ruling of matters on the deprivation of the immunity of a member of the Senate, the adoption of acts on amnesty upon the nomination of the president, making decisions concerning the internal schedule of the Senate, hearing reports of the Procurator General, the Chairman of the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Protec- tion of Nature, and the Chairman of the Board of the Central Bank of the Re- public of Uzbekistan (art. 80)50. The first sitting of the Legislative Chamber and the Senate are convoked not later than in two months after the elections to the Legislative Chamber and not later than in one month after the formation of the Senate. Sittings of the Legislative Chamber are held during sessions, which are convoked since the first working day of September till the last working day of June of the next year. Sittings of the Senate are convoked by the Chairman as required, but not less often than three times in a year. A quorum required for the adoption of legal acts by the Legislative Chamber and the Senate is the absolute majority of deputies (senators) of the total composition of both chambers. At the adoption of constitutional laws, the presence of at least two thirds of the total number of all deputies and senators is obligatory (art. 81)51. Each chamber of the parliament holds separate sittings. Joint sittings are convoked in constitutionally specified cases, such as, for example, hearing the speech of the President of the Republic on important social or economic matters, or matters concerning the home and foreign policy of the state, or hearing speeches delivered by foreign heads of state, and the “adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, introducing alterations and additions; adoption of the Constitutional laws and laws of the Republic of Uzbeki- stan, introducing alterations and additions; adoption of decision on holding a referendum of the Republic of Uzbekistan and designation the date of its holding; determination of the guidelines of home and foreign policies of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and adoption of strategic state programmes; determination of the structure and powers of the bodies of the legislative, executive and judicial authorities of the Republic of Uzbekistan; [...] approval of the state budget of the Republic of Uzbekistan submitted by the Cabinet of Min-

50 Ibidem, pp. 31–32. 51 Ibidem, pp. 33–33. 50 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 isters of the Republic of Uzbekistan and control over its execution; [...] legislative regulation of the administrative and territorial structure, and alteration of the boundaries of the Republic of Uzbekistan; formation, annulment and renaming of districts, towns, cities and regions, and alteration of their boundaries; [...] ratification of decrees of the President of the Republic of Uz- bekistan on the formation and abolition of ministries, state committees and other bodies of state administration; formation of the Central Election Com- mission of the Republic of Uzbekistan; consideration and approval, upon the nomination of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, of a nominee of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Uzbekistan, as well as hearing and discussing reports of the Prime Minister on urgent issues of social and economic development of the country; election of an Authorized person of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan for human rights and his deputy; consideration of report of the Accounting Chamber of the Republic of Uzbeki- stan; ratification of decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on announcement of condition of war in case of attack on the Republic of Uz- bekistan or necessity of implementation of contractual obligations on mutual defence from aggression; ratification of decrees of the President of the Re- public of Uzbekistan on announcement of general and partial mobilization, introducing, extension and discontinuance of the state of emergency; ratification and denouncement of international treaties; implementation of parliamentary control and other powers stipulated by this Constitution”52. Joint sittings may also be convoked, if both chambers agree, for considering other matters. “The matters on joint conducting by the chambers shall be considered, as a rule, first by the Legislative Chamber and then by the Senate of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan“53. Under art. 83 of the fundamental law, “The right to initiate legislation shall be vested on the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, The Repub- lic of Karakalpakstan through its highest representative body of state authority, deputies of the legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis of the Repub- lic of Uzbekistan, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the Higher Economic Court, the

52 Ibidem, p. 33. 53 Ibidem. Joanna Marszałek-Kawa • Remarks on The System of State Authorities... 51 Procurator-General of the Republic of Uzbekistan and shall be exercised by introducing a bill by the subjects of the right to initiate legislation into the Leg- islative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan”54. The law comes into effect when it is adopted by the Legislative Chamber, approved by the Senate, signed by the President of the Republic and issued in the official publication (art. 84). Conciliatory commissions, composed of members of both chambers, may be formed if there are disagreements between the two chambers concerning the law under consideration. The President of the Republic may return the law with his objections to the Legislative Chamber. In case of the approval of the law by both chambers by the majority of at least two thirds, the president is obliged to sign it within 14 days and promulgate. The Speaker and his deputies supervise the work of the Legislative Cham- ber. The Speaker (and his deputies) is elected by the absolute majority of the total number of deputies in secret ballot. The Speaker (and his deputies) may be recalled before the appointed time by the majority of not less than two thirds of the total number of deputies of the chamber (art. 85). The Chairman and his deputies supervise the work of the Senate. The Chairman is elected by the majority of votes of the total number of senators upon the nomination of the President of the Republic. He may be recalled before the appointed time by the decision adopted by at least two thirds of all senators in secret ballot (art. 86)55. Both the Legislative Chamber and the Senate form standing and extraordinary committees for implementing specific tasks (art. 87). The constitution introduced the principle of incompatibilitas, under which deputies and senators, while exercising their mandate, cannot be engaged in any form of paid activity, except for research and teaching work (art. 88). Members of parliament have the right of immunity, which means that they cannot be brought to criminal responsibility, arrested or be without the consent of the Legisla- tive Chamber and the Senate (art. 88)56. It should be pointed out that the constitution may be altered by law adopted by the majority of not less than two thirds of the total composition of both chambers. The constitution may also be amended by way of a referen-

54 Ibidem, pp. 34–35. 55 Ibidem, pp. 38–39. 56 Ibidem, pp. 40–41. 52 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 dum (art. 127). The parliament may adopt a law on alterations and amendments to the fundamental law not earlier than after six months after the submission of a relevant propos al. Each alteration to the constitution requires broad discussion. Should the Oliy Majlis reject a proposal on the alteration of the Constitution, it may be renewed not earlier than in a year (art. 128)57. On 27 November 2015, the Legislative Chamber, and then a week later – on 4 December 2015 – the Senate, adopted the “Act on the Introduction of Amendments and Supplements to Some Legal Acts of the Republic of Uz- bekistan. Under this act, the Act on the Legislative Chamber of the Great As- sembly (the Oliy Majlis) of the Republic of Uzbekistan” of 12 December 2002 was changed. What is the most important thing is the fact that it changes the content of art. 12 of the existing constitution. In accordance with the adopted regulation, the Legislative Chamber obtained the right to lodge interpel- lations concerning the implementation of state programmes, the execution of the law, as well as in a number of other matters. The right to submit questions to state authorities is also granted to a deputy to the Legislative Cham- ber, who may demand that their representatives justify their actions or explain their position on issues relating to the observance of laws and interests of voters from the constituency from which he was elected and the interests of the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan. A senator may also submit questions concerning interests of a regional character. The detailed conditions of the implementation of the above powers are specified in a number of documents, especially the provisions of the amended regulations of both chambers, i.e. “On Regulations of the Legislative Chamber of Oliy Majlis of the Re- public of Uzbekistan and On regulations of the Senate of Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan”58. Under art. 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “Citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall have the right to participate in the management of public and state affairs, both directly and through representatives. Such participation shall be exercised by way of self-administration, holding referendums and democratic formation of state bodies, as well as development and enhancement of public control over the activity of state bodies”59.

57 Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, op.cit., p. 67. 58 Ensuring the rule of law, “Uzbekistan Today” 2016, No. 5(485), February 5, p. 2. 59 Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, op.cit., art. 32, p. 13. Joanna Marszałek-Kawa • Remarks on The System of State Authorities... 53 What plays a significant role among the institutions of direct democracy is a referendum, which is called on important state matters or on the alteration of the constitution. The referendum on the alteration of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan is of an optional character. Under art. 78 par. 3 and 127 of the constitution, the fundamental law may be altered by a law adopted by at least two thirds of the total number of deputies of the Legislative Chamber and members of the Senate or by a nationwide referendum. The Act of 18 November 1991 “On the Referendum of the Republic of Uz- bekistan”, amended on 30 August 2001, which specifies, among other things, the procedure and principles of holding a nationwide referendum, also says that “decisions adopted by way of a referendum have the highest legal force and may be repealed only by way of a referendum”60. What is important, a referendum is held on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage, in secret ballot (art. 5 of the Act on the Referendum...). All citizens of Uzbekistan who have reached the age of 18 are entitled to take part in a referendum. People who are incapacitated or imprisoned under a final and binding sentence cannot vote in a referendum (art. 6 of the Act on the Referendum...)61. The first referendum was Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to save the unity of the Soviet Union. 93.7% Uzbeks voted for maintaining the status of the Soviet Republic then62. The second nationwide referendum, which was held together with the presidential elected, took place on 29 December 1991. 98.2% of the voters expressed their approval for the adoption of the “Act on the foundations of the state independence of the Republic of Uzbekistan”, adopted on 31 Au- gust 1991 by the Supreme Council of the Uzbek SSR63. The third nationwide referendum in Uzbekistan was held on 26 March 1995. The subject was the three-year extension of the term of office of the president – which was to end in 1997 – until 2000. Finally, according to the published official results, 99.6% of citizens voted for the extension of the term of office of Islam Karimov64.

60 J. Szukalski, R. Żmigrodzki, Instytucja referendum ogólnokrajowego w Uzbekistanie – regulacje prawne i praktyka, “Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne otrzymywało” 2015, No. 2, pp. 71–73; see also: Zakon Nr 417-XII, 1991, art. 1. 61 J. Szukalski, R. Żmigrodzki, op.cit., pp. 71–73; see also: Zakon Nr 417-XII, 1991, art. 1. 62 T. Bodio, T. Mołdawa, Konstytucje państw Azji Centralnej: tradycje i współczesność, Warsaw 2007, s. 488; J. Szukalski, R. Żmigrodzki, op.cit., s. 80. 63 T. Bodio, T. Mołdawa, op.cit., pp. 515–517; J. Szukalski, R. Żmigrodzki, op.cit., p. 80. 64 Ibidem, pp. 501–502; Ibidem, p. 80. 54 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 As Jerzy Szukalski and Radosław Żmigrodzki note, the fourth nationwide referendum in Uzbekistan concerned the extension of the term of office of Islam Karimov until 2007 and the establishment of a bicameral parliament. Approximately 91% of citizens voted for the introduction of the proposed changes. Following the referendum results, a number of important laws were adopted, including the constitutional act of 4 April 2002 “on the Results of the Referendum and Basic Principles of the Organisation of State Authori- ty”. Then, on 2 December 2002, the parliament adopted two constitutional acts, i.e. “On the Senate of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan and On the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbeki- stan”. On 24 April 2003, in turn, the law was adopted “On the Introduction of Amendments and Supplements to the Constitution of the Republic of Uz- bekistan”, which altered the content of chapter five of the constitution in the section concerning the composition and powers of both chambers of the parliament, as well as specified the powers of the president and prime minister in a new way. The act also amended the regulations concerning the activity of local organs of state authority, the judiciary, the election system, and the procedure for the adoption of the fundamental law65.

III.

In the first transformation period, the authorities emphasised that the reforms required a strong government. It was the state that was the main initiator of the introduced changes66. Politics was to respond to challenges connected with the economic development of the state. Both politics and economy are to serve the principal purpose, i.e. the improvement of the living standard and of the level of security in Uzbekistan. Uzbek experts indicate that the economic reform that was conducted – based on the individual transition model – laid stable groundwork for implementing further constitutional changes aimed at strengthening democracy in the country through, among other things, providing favourable conditions for the development of non-govern-

65 Ibidem, pp. 503–505; Ibidem, p. 81. 66 See: A. Khalid, Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR, Ihaca 2015, p. 440. Joanna Marszałek-Kawa • Remarks on The System of State Authorities... 55 ment organisations, transparent state institution, a multi-party system, or private media67. It should be noted here that democratic institutions cannot develop if a constitution does not guarantee that citizens’ rights and freedoms are respected. There is no doubt that the rule of law in the state will be ensured if its parliament has a strong position, especially with regard to its function of scrutiny over the executive branch. However, whether parliamentary work is really valuable and whether citizens’ rights and freedoms are guaranteed does not exclusively depend on the adopted legal solutions. The existing political culture is important as well. In order to answer the question about the degree of the democratisation of state institutions, we need to study thoroughly to what extent specific legal norms have been implemented. When it comes to the importance of the parliament in its relations with the government and the president, we should critically examine how deputies and senators exercise the function of scrutiny over the government’s activity or how they assess the level of the execution of the law. The process of democratisation is subject to evaluation not only at the declarative level, but also in the sphere of the implementation of basic values, such as the freedom of conscience and religion, the freedom of assembly, the freedom before the law, justice, political pluralism, etc. There is no doubt that the Uzbek constitution makers – when amending the existing legal acts – usually do it with respect for international standards, including the sphere of respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen. One cannot ignore Uzebkistan’s achievement in this field; on the other hand – as it was mentioned before – it is extremely important to check the functioning of these new solutions and their observance by the authorities in practice. As President Islam A. Karimov reckons, the global practice shows that “the election system is of the utmost importance for establishing the lawful civil society. This is why we are constantly improving our legislation in accordance with modern requirements”68. It is difficult to disagree with this opinion -in deed. However, if our evaluation of the progress of the democratisation process was limited to the analysis of texts, we would come up with a false picture

67 A. Abduvakhitov, Uzbekistan and Its Electoral, op.cit., pp. 8–9. 68 A. Kh. Saidov, International Election Standards and National Legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Tashkent 2014, p. 37. 56 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 of the reality. It is obvious that we need to develop mechanisms that would enable the construction of democratic structures. On the other hand, it is equally, or even more, important to create wide possibilities for citizens of using these instruments in an unlimited and unrestricted way. Is it possible, however, in Uzbekistan – the country the president of which claims that: “... in our country, there can either be democracy or order. I’m choosing the latter?”69.

Literature

Abduvakhitov A., Presidential Election in Uzbekistan, Tashkent 2015. Abduvakhitov A., Uzbekistan and Its Electoral System, Tashkent 2014. Amanbayeva A., The Collision of Islam and Terrorism in Central Asia, “Asian Criminol- ogy” 2009, No. 4. Bodio T., Mołdawa T., Konstytucje państw Azji Centralnej: tradycje i współczesność, War- saw 2007. Capisani G.R., Nowe państwa Azji Środkowej, Warszawa 2004. Dagiev D., Regime Transition in Central Asia: Stateness, Nationalism and Political Change in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Routledge Advances in Central Asian Studies), New York 2014. Election of the President of the Republic Uzbekistan – the Most Important Stage of the Consolidation of National Statehood and Development of Civil Society in the Coun- try, Tashkent 2015. Ensuring the rule of law, “Uzbekistan Today”, No. 5(485), 5 February 2016. General Information about the Republic of Uzbekistan, Tashkent 2014. Hiro D., Inside Central Asia: A Political and Cultural History of Uzbekistan, Turkmeni- stan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan, Turkey and Iran, New York 2009. Kamińska A., Stanisław Szuszkiewicz: ZSRR rozpadł się nieoczekiwanie, na polowaniu w puszczy, http://www.polskieradio.pl/75/926/Artykul/495234,Stanislaw-Szuszkie- wicz-ZSRR-rozpadl-sie-nieoczekiwanie-na-polowaniu-w-puszczy. Karimov I., Uzbekistan na progu XXI wieku; trans. D. Muszyńska-Wolny, Warszawa 2001. Kawa S., Zasady prawa wyznaniowego Republiki Uzbekistanu, http://www.sawp.org.pl/ biuletyny/nr-7/67-zasady-prawa-wyznaniowego-republiki-uzbekistanu. Khalid A., Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR, Iha- ca 2015.

69 M. Pietruszewski, Republika Uzbekistanu po 1991 r., http://www.psz.pl/118-gospodarka/republika-uzbekistanu-po-1991-roku (10 06 2016). Joanna Marszałek-Kawa • Remarks on The System of State Authorities... 57 Krastev I., Europejska dezintegracja: wnioski płynące z rozpadu Związku Radzieckiego, http://www.krytykapolityczna.pl/Opinie/KrastevEuropejskadez-integracjaWnioski- plynacezupadkuZwiazkuRadzieckiego/menuid-183.html. Kuchins A.C., Mankoff J., Backes O., Central Asia in a Reconnecting Eurasia: Uzbeki- stan’s Evolving Foreign Economic and Security Interests, “Center for Strategic & In- ternational Studies” 2015, June. Malikova G.R., Presidential elections in the Republic of Uzbekistan: questions and answers, Tashkent 2015. Musiał M., Uzbekistan: wstęp do uregulowania problemu sukcesji?, www.new.org.pl/downloadmagazine.php?f=new_3_4_2011_007. Pawłowski M.P., Władza w terenie i samorząd terytorialny Republiki Uzbekistanu, http:// blog.lpig.pl/2014/11/wladza-w-terenie-i-samorzad-terytorialny-republiki-uzbekistanu. Pietruszewski M., Republika Uzbekistanu po 1991 r., http://www.psz.pl/118-gospodarka/ republika-uzbekistanu-po-1991-roku. Rosja, Ukraina, Białoruś, Mołdawia, Litwa, Łotwa, Estonia, Gruzja, Azerbejdżan, Ar- menia, Kirgizja, Turkmenia, Tadżykistan, Uzbekistan, Kazachstan, eds. J. Cichocki, A. Łabuszewska, Warszawa 2001. Saidov A. Kh., International Election Standards and National Legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Tashkent 2014. Saidov A., Wojtaszczyk K., Konstytucyjne podstawy ustroju Państwa, [In:] Uzbekistan: historia-społeczeństwo-polityka, ed. T. Bodio, Warsaw 2001. Smoleń M., Lubina M., Rozpad ZSRR i jego konsekwencje dla Europy i świata. Wspólno- ta Niepodległych Państw, Warsaw 2011. Szukalski J., Żmigrodzki R., Instytucja referendum ogólnokrajowego w Uzbekistanie – regulacje prawne i praktyka, “Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne otrzymywało” 2015, No. 2. Uzbekistan: historia – społeczeństwo – polityka, ed. T. Bodio, Warsaw 2001. Zamarajewa A., Kazachstan–Uzbekistan: rywalizacja o przywództwo w Azji Centralnej, Pułtusk 2007. Законы Республики Узбекистан о выборах, Адолат, Taszkient 2014. Сборник нормативно-правовых актов о деятельности правоохранительных органов, Адолат, Taszkient 2014.

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.03 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Ivan Halász1 Radosław Grabowski2

Hungarian understanding of the division of powers

Keywords: division of powers, Hungary, parliament, government, constitution, president, court Słowa kluczowe: podział władzy, Węgry, parlament, rząd, konstytucja, prezydent, sąd

Summary Hungarian constitutional system has a number of characteristics, including division of power. This is a result atypical evolution of the political system in Hungary after 1989. Most of the countries of Central and Eastern made a thorough reconstruction of the political system in the nineties of the twentieth century, many constitutions were adopted in 1991–1994. Otherwise had done Hungarians, making a 1989 amendment to the Constitution of 1949. and the adoption of a new constitution putting off indefinitely. Completely new Fundamental Law was adopted only in 2011., in force since 1 January 2012. It introduced in the Hungarian constitutional system significant changes, modifying the way the principle the division of powers. The changes seem to be rational, and therefore to be expected that the Hungarian model finds followers.

Streszczenie

Węgierskie rozumienie podziału władzy

System konstytucyjny Węgier posiada szereg cech charakterystycznych, także jeśli chodzi o podział władzy. Jest to skutkiem nietypowego przebiegu ewolucji ustroju, jaką prze-

1 The author is a senior research-fellow in Centre for Social Sciences of Institute for Legal Studies of Hungarian Academy of Sciences and visiting professor, Faculty of Public Policies, Silesian University in Opava. E-mail: [email protected]. 2 The author is an Associate Professor in Institut of Political Science on the Faculty of Sociology and History of University of Rzeszow. E-mail: [email protected]. 60 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 chodziły Węgry po 1989 r. Większość państw Europy Środkowo-wschodniej dokonało gruntownej przebudowy systemu politycznego w latach dziewięćdziesiątych XX w., liczne konstytucje były uchwalane w latach 1991–1994. Inaczej postąpili Węgrzy, dokonu- jąc w 1989 nowelizacji Konstytucji z 1949 r., a uchwalenie nowej konstytucji odkładając na bliżej nieokreśloną przyszłość. Zupełnie nowa Ustawa Zasadnicza została uchwalona dopiero w 2011 r., obowiązuje od 1 stycznia 2012 r. Wprowadziła ona w węgierskim systemie konstytucyjnym istotne zmiany, modyfikując także sposób realizacji zasady po- działu władz. Przeprowadzone zmiany wydają się jednak racjonalne, a zatem należy się spodziewać, że model węgierski znajdzie naśladowców.

The history of the division of powers and liberal Parliamentary system in Hungary dates back to 1848. At that time, under the influence of the March events, the pre-revolutionary Parliament (elected in 1847) adopted a number of laws that dramatically changed the Constitutional order of the State. The Government was obliged to report to the Parliament, which was to be elected in free elections. The new electoral system was based on a majority system and single-mandate constituencies and voting was limited to one round. However, the State still remained a monarchy, and even after the Habsburgs were dethroned in April 1849, there was no proclamation of republic. After the defeat of the revolution, the neo-absolutism period was on, and the Parliamentary life was resumed only in 1860. In the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the bicameral Parliament played a significant role in the functioning of the State and became a symbol of the Hungarian liberalism. Although the then political system created a legal regime close to the modern Parliamentary monarchy, but at the same time, the ruler – as the head of the State – had far wider rights and political opportunities than in our times3. After the fall of the Habsburg State in 1918, two revolutions and one counter-revolution took place, and the functioning of the Parliament was suspend-

3 Magyar alkotmánytörténet, ed. B. Mezey, Budapest, 1996, p. 223. Ivan Halász, Radosław Grabowski • Hungarian understanding of the division... 61 ed. The National Assembly was convened again at the beginning of 19204. This body played an important role in the process of conservative consolidation. Hungary remained a monarchy, but without a king – Admiral Miklós Hor- thy was at the head of the State as its administrator or regent. His position corresponded to the position of a strong president, but it was the Prime Min- ister who ruled day by day. In the interwar period, the authoritarian and dy- nastic tendencies would be constantly strengthening, though the Parliament (since 1927 bicameral again) worked until 1944. In the then Hungarian system, there was no specialized authority to safeguard the Constitutionality of the law, such as a Constitutional court, and the supreme court authority – at the head of the judiciary – were Kuriae (the historical name of the Supreme Court) and the Supreme Administrative Court5. Defeated in the war – Hungary was involved on the side of the so-called Axis countries – and following the fall of the old political system at the turn of 1944 and 1945, there occurred a dramatical Constitutional trans- formation6. The National Assembly, which again became unicameral in 1946, obtained the right to elect the President of the Republic of Hungary. The Prime Minister had still the right to rule the executive. The new people’s democratic Constitution adopted in 1949, inspired by Stalin’s Consti- tution of 1936, rejected the principle of tripartite division of powers, recognizing the principle of power unity7. The original text of this act made the Parliament the supreme authority of the State bodies. Act I of 1972, which amended the entire Constitution completed this definition, indicating that the Parliament is the highest representative authority. In the 1949 Constitu- tion, it was clearly articulated that the Parliament exercises all rights, arising from the sovereignty of the people. It meant a completely different concept than that which had functioned in the Hungarian doctrine of State and law before 1944.

4 In the Hungarian legal terminology, the notion of “general assembly” (nemzetgyűlés) is used to define Parliament elected in breakthrough or crisis circumstances for instance in 1920, 1944 and also in 1947. In other cases the name of “seym” (országgyűlés) is used. 5 This authority came into being in 1896 and was dissolved in 1949. 6 Its most important legal act was Act I of 1946 on Proclamation of the Republic which functioned as the so-called small transitory constitution. 7 Z. Szente, A. Jakab, A. Patyi, G. Sulyok, Országgyűlés, [In:] Az Alkotmány kommentárja I, Budapest, 2009, p. 535. 62 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 II. In the period of political transformations, Hungarian legislator did not formally adopt a new Constitution, but still in the autumn of 1989, they completely changed the legal text from 1949. The changes were so vast, that – in the material terms – it was equal to the introduction of a new Constitution, although its structure still resembled its people’s democratic predecessor. Perhaps this can explain why in the text of the Constitution as amended in 1989, relics of the earlier era are preserved. The characteristic feature of the text of the Constitution, subject to analysis, was the fact that although it contained the principle of the people’s sovereignty, it did not delimitate the principles of power division. After the changes of 1989, the Constitution declared in the first two subparagraphs of Article 19 that the supreme authority of the State power and, at the same time, the highest representative body is the Parliament that, exercising its rights, arising from the principle of the people’s sovereignty, guarantees Constitutional order in the community and establishes the organization of authorities, its directions and implementation modalities. However, contrary to the original text of the Constitution, there was no Statement, saying that the Parliament exercises all the rights, deriving from the sovereignty of the people. The fact that the Parliament was defined as a body of State power meant, however, that it exercises the public authority8. A key element of the text of Constitution revised in 1989 was to define the Parliament as a “supreme representative body of State power”. This definition had its roots in the pre-1989 Constitutional and legal relations and ideological concepts. The amended Constitution – though not fully declar- atively – confirmed the principle of division of powers, which defined the relationship of the individual bodies in the country. Paragraph 2 of the Constitution declared the rule of law, from which specialized literature, and – above all – the Constitutional Court implied the need to divide and mutually control the powers9.

8 Ibidem, pp. 540–541. 9 Compare the decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court 38/1993. (VI. 11.) AB hat., ABH 1993, 256, 261; 41/1993. (VI.30.) ABH 1993, 292, 294; 28/1995. (V.19.) AB hat., ABH 1995, 138, 142. Attention shall be drawn to the decision Pl. 2/2002. (I.25.) AB határozat, ABH 2002, 41, 50–51. Ivan Halász, Radosław Grabowski • Hungarian understanding of the division... 63 Given this approach, the relationship between the main bodies of State power was not seen hierarchically. Hence, the Parliament was not subordinated to any other authority. Its primacy came mainly from the direct legitimation, which up to now has assured it the will of the voters expressed in the elections. In addition, the Parliament has been the only legislative body in Hun- gary. These data allow to present the interpretation, according to which, it is reasonable to use the term “the highest body of State power” in relation to the Parliament. The term “the supreme representative body” means, in turn, that it is a body, representing the whole nation, and not some of its parts, which are separated geographically or in any other manner10. The above-mentioned terminological relics of the former Constitution were repealed by the new Constitution of Hungary, which the President of the Re- public signed on 25th April 2011. It entered into force on 1st January 2012. Up to now, it has been amended five times, but the structure of the State power has not been clearly changed. The most important change, from the point of view of the issues discussed may have been the unequivocal declaration that the Hungarian State functions with the division of powers taken into ac- count11. Such a declaration is at the beginning of the 2011 Constitution, directly after the preamble, in the part which defines the basic principles of the State and the community. The idea of division of powers, formulated in art. C of the general provisions of the Constitution has been specified in later sections on the individual elements of State powers. The chapter on Parliament, in the Constitution part called the State, right at the beginning of subparagraph 1 of Article 1 claims expressly that the Par- liament is the highest representative body in Hungary. We are, therefore, faced with a significantly less complicated and shorter definition than that expressed in the repealed Constitution. According to Art. 9 subparagraph 1, the President of the Republic is the head of the State, which symbolizes the unity of the nation, and at the same time, is to watch over democratic functioning of the State. The provisions of Art.15 to Art. 22 of the Constitution deal with the issues related to the functioning of the Government. It results from Article 165 sub-

10 Z. Szente, A. Jakab, A. Patyi, G. Sulyok, Országgyűlés, op.cit., p. 544. 11 A. Jakab, Az új Alaptörvény keletkezése és gyakorlati következményei, Budapest 2011, p. 187. 64 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 paragraph 1 that the Government is the main executive authority, whose tasks and competences cover all areas of action, which are not reserved for other authorities by the Constitution or other legal norms. The Government is the main public administration body and in the light of law, it is to create public administration bodies. This way of defining the nature and position of the Government is a novelty in the Hungarian Constitutional order and in many directions, it strengthens the position of the body which is already relatively strong. The Government is accountable to the Parliament. At this point, the structure of the Constitution devoted to State bodies shall be recalled. In the first place, the legislature deals with issues related to the Parliament, then, the institution of the people’s vote, further articles relate to the President, the Government and independent regulators. These are followed by chapters on the Constitutional Court, the general judiciary, prosecution, Ombudsman and local self-government. This part of the 2011 Consti- tution is also devoted to the rules of public finances, military, police, security services, as well as extraordinary situations, which, however, from the point of view of the issues in question do not seem to be relevant12. It should be underlined that the legislator has regulated the position of the Hungarian Na- tional Bank, the State Clearing Chamber and the Budget Council in the provisions on public finances. It results from the above description, that the regulations concerning the position of the Government have been placed before the norms concerning the Constitutional Court and other law enforcement bodies. Such a system seems logical, the more so that the Parliament in Art. 24 of the Constitution in its part on the State, stipulated that the Constitutional Court is the main body to safeguard the Constitution. Article 25 is devoted to the general jurisdiction, whose highest authority is Kuria, or else the Supreme Court13. Despite of numerous discussions on this

12 The sequence in the Constitution which had been in force up to 2011 was as follows: the Parliament, the President, the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsmen (at that time they were numerous), State Clearing Chamber and National Bank, Government, armed forces and the police, territorial self-government, Judiciary and Prosecutors’ Offices. 13 In this field, the legislator returned to the terminology from before 1945 – at that time this body was also called Kúria. More: I. Halász, Volebné súdnictvo a nová volebná legislatíva v Maďarsku, [In:] Aktuálne problémy volebného a práva a volebného súdnictva v Slovenskej republike – II. ústavné dni, eds. L. Orosz, T. Majerčák, Košice 2014, pp. 58–67. Ivan Halász, Radosław Grabowski • Hungarian understanding of the division... 65 matter, no separate Supreme Administrative Court was set up, although its tradition dated back to pre-communist Hungary. The independent constitutional position of the prosecutor’s office has not changed, either. The Consti- tution, however, changed drastically the position of ombudsman – the office of independent ombudsman for the protection of personal data was abolished, and in its place a separate autonomous body with similar powers was created. Two ombudsmen, earlier functioning as autonomous (to protect the rights of minorities; to protect the rights of future generations) have been subordinated – despite the fact that they are directly elected by the Parliament – to the general ombudsman. This change was probably related to the general centralizing trend, oc- curring after 2010, which can be noticed mainly in the regulations on local self-governments that after 1989 benefited of high-degree autonomy. In terms of local self-governments, the Constitution is much more laconic than its predecessor. The Constitution stipulates that the task of the local self-government is to handle public matters and to exercise local public authority. Previous constitutional regulations in this field were broader and more precise. Art. 42 of the Constitution after the changes of 1989 stipulated that it relates to democratic and independent handling of public matters and that local public authorities must act in the interest of citizens. Such a clarification is lacking in the current Constitution. The repealed Constitution also mentioned the right of local communities to appoint self-governments, of which the current Constitution says nothing, nor does it use the term of “fundamental rights of local self-governments,” which – according to the Constitu- tion after the changes of 1989 were to be equal. These differences have it that from the point of view of local Government, the Constitution of 2011 means a definite step backwards, without prospects for the future. The position of the political system and the competences of the main constitutional authorities and other bodies in the country is governed, in addition to the Constitution, by Organic Laws which – unlike laws and their amendments – are adopted by a two-thirds majority of members present at the assembly. It is a legal act which, from the point of view of legal force, is placed somewhere between the Constitution and the law. Organic Acts in accordance with the Constitution are applicable only in the case of the President of the Republic, the Constitutional Court, the ombuds- 66 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 man, the Parliament, the electoral law, local Governments, the Hungar- ian National Bank (MNB), the Budget Council. In most cases, such laws were adopted between 2011 and 2012, and thus just after the adoption of the new Constitution.

III.

In the Hungarian political and Constitutional system, as formed in the regime transition period between 1989 and 1990, a clear dominance of Parliament can be discerned along with a really strong position of the Government, particularly the Prime Minister, responsible to the Parliament. The Prime Min- ister, who plays a key role in the executive power and generally in the whole political system, is elected by the Parliament by a majority of votes cast by all members of Parliament at the request of the president, and the president does not appoint them only files the request for their appointment. The president does not have the right to file in the Parliament a request to dismiss the Prime Minister. Ministers are appointed by the President at the request of the Prime Minister. The Parliament can give a vote of no-confidence to the Govern- ment only with reference to the prime minister – thus, in Hungary no-confidence vote cannot be cast to individual ministers. In addition, the request for no-confidence vote to the prime minister must also contain the indication of a candidate, who, in case the vote of no-confidence is adopted will automatically take the vacated position, so we deal with the constructive vote of no-confidence. Generally, in 1990, Hungary took over a number of German chancellor system elements, which did not change, either, in the process of creating the 2011 Constitution. On the contrary, the position of prime minister was in fact – though not formally – strengthened. A key figure in the Government is the prime minister, the cabinet collapses therewith, and the composition of the Council of Ministers cannot be changed without the decision of the prime minister14. The Hungarian Parliament appoints candidates to all crucial functions in the State – the President of the Republic (for 5 years), the judges of the Con- stitutional Court (for 12 years), the President of the Kuria (for 9 years), the

14 A. Körösényi, A magyar politikai rendszer, Budapest 1998, pp. 218–219. Ivan Halász, Radosław Grabowski • Hungarian understanding of the division... 67 chairperson of the National Judicial Office (for 9 years), the General Pros- ecutor (for 9 years), the ombudsman and its two deputies (for 6 years). The abovementioned persons – besides the judges of the Constitutional Court – are elected by the Parliament at the request of the President who, however, has no right to appoint them. As to the President, they appoint the President and Vice President of the Hungarian National Bank and the President of the Budget Council, earlier elected by the Parliament. The President appoints persons to a function or entrusts its fulfilling also at the request of other bodies, but this is not the subject of the paper15. The President also appoints judges to judicial posts at the request of the Chairperson of the National Judicial Of- fice or the President of the Kuria.

IV.

As Hungary has never been a federal state16, the division of power between the centre and the entities of the federation has no application, on the other hand, between 1990 and 2010, a relatively intensive State decentralization took place along with a significant autonomy of local self-governments, and it is interesting that, primarily, communal self-government and not district one. In the 1990s in Hungary, important public corporation authorities also acted as so-called functional self-governments before 1998 which controlled the system of retirement schedule and health schedule. They came into being after 1990 as a result of decentralization trends when the idea of self-government and autonomy was popular. After 2010, this trend was reversed and centralizing trend was strengthened which is still in existence. At the local level, the issue of management was of crucial importance and new districts

15 For instance at the request of the ministers responsible for education, professors are appointed or Chancellors entrusted with the management of universities etc. 16 At this point it needs reminding that the former Hungary existed between 1867 and 1918 within dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy which acted as the Real Union with the joint ruler and three mutual ministries of defense, finances and foreign policy. Apart from that, within the then Hungary, Croatia had a large autonomy with its own Parliament (Sabor) and head (Ban). Compare: Magyar alkotmánytörténet, ed. B. Mezey, Budapest 1996, p. 222, A. Csizmadia, K. Kovács, L. Asztalos, Magyar állam – és jogtörténet. Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest 1990, pp. 378–380. 68 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 were created for this purpose which made up the lowest level of Government administration. Currently, apart from always weakening local and territorial self-governments, directly elected national self-governments at the level of communes districts and country can be also mentioned as public self-government bodies. Thirteen nationalities have also the right – in case of unsuccessful elections to the Parliament – to delegate there their spokesmen. Although, they have no right to vote, but their position is close to that which is taken by the members of Parliament – they have the right to take chair in the Parliament on issues related to the national minorities. Since 1st May 2004, Hungary has been the European Union Member State which has an impact on its position and potential. Most financial resources, which the State is capable of investing into its rebuilding and development, comes from the EU budget. The impact of this supra-national organization, which seems to be the largest and the most integrated community of democratic States in the world, is significant, however, with the sovereignty of the associated States being maintained. An impact of EU may be also noticed while creating the Constitution and at the process of adopting some organic laws. The authorities of EU and of other pan-European organizations, first of all of Venice Commission, acting at the Council of Europe – watched very thoroughly constitutional changes in Hungary introduced after 2010. Their interest must have had quite a few reasons, amongst which, the most important must have been the fact that besides the Constitution of Finland of 1999 the Hungarian Constitution was the only one voted by the European Union Member State. Theoretically, such a membership should not have any impact on the national process of Constitution creation, but as it turned out, in reality, such an impact – although limited – existed, however17. Ideological differences within EU had crucial importance along with the compromise course of the whole process of Constitution drawing up in Hungary. Most doubtful were the issues related to the regulation of media operation together with the fourth amendment to the Constitution which modified very deeply the functioning of the Judiciary in Hungary.

17 N. Chronowski, Az Alaptörvény a többszintű európai alkotmányosság hálójában, [In:] Alkotmányozás és alkotmányjogi változások Európában és Magyarországon, eds. F. Gárdos-Orosz, Z. Szente, Budapest 2014, pp. 109–130. Ivan Halász, Radosław Grabowski • Hungarian understanding of the division... 69 In the 1990s, the Parliamentary system with elements of chancellor model was shaped in Hungary. The dominance of the Parliament in the system corresponded both to the then trends in Europe, as well as, to Hungarian public law traditions. The post transformation Hungarian model created at the time had a few specific features and strong and stable position of the Gov- ernment18 was the most distinct. Theoretically, it facilitated efficient governing, but in the case of organic laws – requiring the majority of two thirds of votes to be adopted – it gave relatively strong position to the opposition. Fur- thermore, the Prime Minister had no right to submit a request for the Par- liament to be dissolved. In turn, the political system was characterized by large fragmentation of political forces. Although, apparently it seemed not to be as strong as in other States of the Visehrad Group, there occurred a strong polariza- tion of the political scene, according to specialized politological literature on mutual relationship between the law-making and executive authorities, Hungary was between two models and they were closer to dualism. There occurred a structure mainly dualistic but generally speaking, the State was for an intermediary model19. Thus, the gradual transfer towards the majority model, currently in force, did not start in 2010, but many years earlier. It needs mentioning that the President of the Republic plays an insignificant role as the executive authority in Hungary. Generally speaking, they have much fewer powers than the Presidents of other States (at least within the Visehrad Group), as well as nearly all presidents of the neighbouring countries. Thus, in practice, they have a very insignificant influence on the works of the executive authorities. We have mentioned earlier the tasks and positions of the Parliament, the Government and the president within the Hungarian Constitutional system. Hungary is also characterized by the lacking balance between individual authorities which results primarily from the dominating position of the Parlia-

18 In the period after the transformation the Hungarian opposition did not succeed in causing the collapse of the then Government or any change of the Government – it happened only within movements inside government coalition as a consequence of death or renounce- ment of the Prime Minister. 19 A. Körösényi, A magyar politikai op.cit., p. 368. 70 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 ment which the President cannot compensate or balance. The latter obtains their power in consequence of election by the Parliament. If a party which creates the Government or coalition has a decisive majority in the Parliament and can discipline its members of Parliament then, the Prime Minister and their Government rules the entirety of matters in the State through the intermediary of the Parliament. Although all judges of the Constitutional Court are still elected by the Parliament without a cooperation of the remaining Constitutional authorities, but in 1990s the only real counterweight for the strong Parliament was the Constitutional Court. The authority which came into being in 1989 and started its works in the following year operated very actively, mainly in the first ten years of the Hungarian transformation, whereby in the later period it also maintained its strength and prestige20. After 2010, a gradual process of weakening the position of the Constitu- tional Court was initiated. First, it lost its competence in financial and budget matters, and then, the principles for the election of judges were changed. Earlier, a special Parliamentary group suggested candidates for Constitu- tional Court judges, and according to the parity established, the Govern- ment and opposition were represented. After the Constitutional changes, the composition of the group is not made according to the parity, but each fraction is represented in proportion to its political force. As a result since 2010, the Government coalition – which up to 2015 had had also Constitu- tional majority – need not seek a consensus or at least agreement with the opposition on distribution of places in the Constitutional Court. Besides, the judges receive their mandate for 12 years without any right to reelect them. Before the Constitutional changes, the president of the Constitution- al Court was elected by judges from amongst them, currently they are elected by the Parliament. The adoption of the new Constitution and the Law on the competences of the Constitutional Court meant a further narrow- ing this authority. As an instance, we can indicate the abolition of the right to use generally available actio popularis and constitutional complaints became the main object of interest of the Court.

20 More on its functioning compare: I. Halász, Maďarský ústavný súd a jeho metamorfózy po roku 1989, “Právník” 2015, No. 7, pp. 560–570. Ivan Halász, Radosław Grabowski • Hungarian understanding of the division... 71 V.

The executive power in Hungary is formally and actually in the hands of the Government. After 2010, the number of ministries was reduced, currently, there are eight ministries in the State, some of which have the nature of the so-called superministries. The Cabinet of the Prime Minister is also incorporated into the Government whose head has had the function of a minister since 2014. Large ministries mostly integrate few classical ministries – for instance the competence of the ministry of human resources incorporates education, culture, social matters, sports, etc. Individual Government depart- ments are ruled by secretaries of State, who have also deputies. Never before have there been in Hungary so few ministries compared to the high number of secretaries of States as today. Ministries and secretaries of State may be members of Parliament, but there is no such requirement.

VI.

The lawmaking authority and system-making authority in Hungary belongs to the competence of Parliament which is traditionally named the National Assembly. Since 2014, following the new legal provisions, Hungarian Parlia- ment has had 199 members21, which compared to the former number of members of Parliament (i.e. 386) makes up a significant reduction. Furthermore, in the Parliament, 13 representatives of national minorities have the right to sit, although without the right to vote. The National Assembly has the right to dissolve itself and in two cases it may be dissolved by the President of the Republic22. In both cases, the President must at the same time call new elections whereby, before their calling the President is obliged to get the opinion of the Prime Minister, the Chairperson of the Parliament and chairpersons of the individual political fractions, however, this opinion is not binding thereto.

21 106 deputies are elected to the Parliament in one round in single mandate constituencies on a majority principle. There are also 93 deputies elected from party lists of candidates who are elected by proportional system voting. 22 This may take place when the Parliament has not elected the candidate suggested within 40 days from the request being submitted and when the Parliament is not capable to approve the state budget for the year up to 31st March of a given budget year. 72 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 In Hungary, the President has the right of the law-making initiative along with the Government, a Parliamentary group or individual Members of Par- liament whereby, it refers also to the request for the adoption of a New Con- stitution or its amendment.

VII.

The manner of appointing the Constitutional Court has been mentioned earlier. Currently, it counts 15 members who are selected by the National Assem- bly for 12 years at the request of a special parliamentary group by the majority of two-thirds of votes of all Members of Parliament. Hungarian Constitu- tional Court had large competences from the moment of its creation which since 2010 have been partially limited. For instance, the abstractive control of norms may be initiated exclusively by the Government, one fourth of the Members of Parliament, the chairperson of the Kúria, General Prosecutor or Ombudsman. The actio popularis which existed earlier was cancelled. Nation- als or other entities can address the Court with the request to review given norms within the constitutional complaint, however, they must prove their factual interest or justify in another way the engagement in a given matter. The Constitutional Court has also the right of cassation i.e. may quash a legal norm contradictory to the Constitution. The judicial system in Hungary is composed of district courts, administrative courts and labour courts (in the first instance), general courts, regional appeal courts. The highest judicial authority is Kúria. The judges are appointed by the President of the Republic, whereby a person who, apart from fulfilment of other requirements, is 30 years old – may become a judge. The first appointment takes place for 3 year period, the subsequent ones for an indefinite period of time. The competition proceedings related to judge positions are drawn up pursuant to the Law No. CLXII of 2011 on the position and remuneration terms for judges by the chairperson of the National Judicial Office or by the Chair- person of the Kúria, when speaking of the judges. In both cases, the recruit- ment commission of a given court draws up a list of given candidates, whereby the Chairpersons have the right to change the sequence of candidates on a given list, which in turn, requires the consent of the National Judicial Office. Ivan Halász, Radosław Grabowski • Hungarian understanding of the division... 73 At this point, it needs underlining, that as a result of adopting a new Con- stitution, the system of management of the judiciary went through the largest change, besides the terminology. After 2011, the all-State Council of the Judiciary which safeguard the self-governments ceased to exist and the earlier mentioned National Office of Judicial System was appointed, whose task was to manage the administration of the system of justice through the intermediary of the chairperson. This process is supervised by the National Ju- dicial Council composed of the chairperson (who is ex officio the President of Kuria) and 14 elected judges. The Parliament, at the request of the Presi- dent of the Republic, elects the Chairperson of the National Office of Judi- cial System – similarly as in the case of Kuria, by a majority of two-thirds of all votes for a period of nine years. It is a relatively long mandate as it covers over two tenures of office of the National Assembly. The Chairperson of the Office in the case of the first appointment indicates to the judges the place of their work and has the right to decide on their shifting, being guided by the necessity to equalize the burden of work between individual courts. Pursu- ant to the fourth amendment to the Constitution, the head of the office had also the right to transfer cases to other competent courts, but the Parliament repealed this right among other things, under the impact of pressure of international and European authorities – in the fifth amendment to the Consti- tution. The post of the Chairperson of the National Office of Judicial System has thus large significance in the realities of Hungarian Judiciary. Despite of the fact, that this issue has been considered many times – up till now – after 2011, no separated Supreme Administrative Court has been created. The Administrative Judiciary of first instance, related to the Labour Court, functions at the level of district. The appellate court is in this case the General Court with no separate administrative judiciary but a special administrative colleges for a given case. It appears similar in the case of Kuria, where three person self-government adjudicating panel acts which reviews the decisions issued by the self Government. This process is similar to the control of the Constitutionality, of legal norms being in conformance, which is performed by the Constitutional Court. To end this issue, it needs adding that in Hungary, even during recent Constitutional changes, the subordination of the Prosecutor’s Office and to the Government was not decided and the Pros- ecutor General functions as an independent authority representing public 74 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 prosecution in penal cases. The Prosecutor General is elected for 9 years and the election takes place from amongst prosecutors by the National Assembly by a majority of two-thirds of votes.

VIII.

The highest Supervising Office in Hungary is the Highest Clearing Cham- ber. The Constitution defines it as a financial and economic authority of the Parliament as it supervises the implementation of the central budget adopted by the Parliament, the entire management in the State, trading in the national property and the use of resources coming into the state budget. The operation of the Chamber consists in controlling the legality, efficiency and pur- posefulness of administrative operations and it informs the Parliament about the outcomes in annual reports. The Chairperson of the Chamber is elected by the Parliament by a majority of two thirds of votes for a period of 12 years. A relatively new authority shall be also mentioned. As a result of the recent Constitutional change and the global economic and financial crisis, it gained a completely new importance. The Budget Council, in its original form, was created in 200823. It was appointed as a consultation body which could issue opinions which were not binding for the National Assembly. The situation has radically changed after the new Constitution was voted which in the part related to the public finances introduced the notion of State indebtedness threshold. In the light of subparagraph 4 of Article 36, the Parliament must not approve such a Budget Bill which in its outcome would cause the State indebtedness to exceed one half of the whole national product. As long as the value of the indebtedness exceeds the mentioned border, only such Budget Bill which intends to reduce the indebtedness may be voted. Fulfilling of these provisions is to be guaranteed by the Budget Council, equipped in new rights which is defined by the 2011 Constitution as an authority to support the lawmaking activity of the Parliament and to control the legitimacy of the central budget. Currently, it has at its disposal the right of veto – or speaking more precisely – an initial consent in the process of adopt-

23 Compare the law No. LXXV of 2008 on thrifty national economy and budget responsibility. Ivan Halász, Radosław Grabowski • Hungarian understanding of the division... 75 ing Budget Bill. These issues have a crucial importance for the functioning of the political system and, according to some Constitution experts, this possibility is controversial as if no budget is approved by 31st March of the budget year, the President of the Republic may dissolve the Parliament. Thus, the Budget Council may have an important impact on the exercising of the people’s sovereignty principle. This authority in the current shape has been functioning pursuant to the Constitution and law No. CXCIV of 2011 on the economic stability of Hungary. It is composed of the chairperson appointed for 6 years by the President of the Republic and chairpersons of the Hungarian National Bank and the Highest Clearance Chamber.

IX.

The Hungarian National Bank (MNB) is the central bank of the State, responsible for the monetary policy and supervising the whole financial system. That is why the State financial supervision over banks and other financial entities has been integrated with the structure of MNB. The President and Vice Pres- ident of MNB are appointed by the President of the Republic for 6 years. The President is obliged to file in the Parliament the annual report. The request for appointing together with candidates for the President and Vice Presidents of the central bank is transferred by the Prime Minister to the President. The function of the President or Vice President of MNB may be fulfilled at a maximum of two tenures of office.

To sum up, it needs claiming, that adopting the new Constitution did not mean a formal change of the State regime. No semi-presidential system was produced, which was suggested by the critics, while working on the new Con- stitution, but on principle, the hitherto division of powers in the State was maintained. The most important change was probably the strengthening of the position of the Budget Council. The regime position of crucial Constitu- tional authorities was not changed. Before 2011, the strongest counterweight 76 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 for the Government – which however, had the support of the Parliament majority – was the strong Constitutional Court. It was partially, but not excessively weakened and modified by its personal composition. The fact of limiting a few competences of a very strong Constitutional Court would not mean a breach in the balance of the Constitutional regime, if we omitted the fact, that it had been until then, the only counterweight for the Parliament. By the same, we can assume that this change together with other partial regime modifications – explicitly interfered into the system of division of powers in the negative sense. Paradoxically, this happened, when in the Consti- tution – otherwise than before 2010 – the principle of division of powers was openly declared24. Within the judiciary, the most important change was the creation of the National Judicial Office equipped with crucial competences. The autonomy of local self-governments was significantly narrowed and the State administration strengthened. The mutual relations between the Parliament, the Govern- ment and the President did not change in an important manner, but we may presume, that the trend of strengthening the position of the Prime Minister is still being continued, among other things, by the introduction of the constructive non-confidence vote and the prevailing position of the Government. The ministers are closely related to the Government as their fate is, first of all, in the hands of the Government and not the Parliament. Besides, as András Szalai claimed, after 2010, the phenomenon of actual although not formal gradual Parliament transfer under the control of the Government can be noticed25. The largest changes from the point of view of power philosophy took place in the period from 1990 to 2011. According to a well known Hungarian political scientist András Körösényi, who claimed that already in 2006 tiny changes were transformed into a trend. As the matter of fact, these changes were not direct but they always indicated their direction: the aspect of power division was gradually losing its impetus and the aspects of active management26

24 A. Szalai, A hatalommegosztás átalakulása 2010 után, [In:] Alkotmányozás és alkot- mányjogi változások Európában és Magyarországon, eds. F. Gárdos-Orosz, Z. Szente, Budapest 2014, p. 281. 25 A. Szalai, A hatalommegosztás, op.cit., p. 267. 26 A. Körösényi, Mozgékony patthelyzet, [In:] Túlterhelt demokrácia. Alkotmányos és demokratikus alapszerkezetünk, Budapest 2006, p. 20. Ivan Halász, Radosław Grabowski • Hungarian understanding of the division... 77 were at the top as the most important, which in the political practice meant a strengthening of the Government to the detriment of the Parliament. It is evident, that the changes which took place are also related to changes within the party system and the management of political parties. They became more professional but, at the same time, more centralized and strong leaders appeared at their head. The trend which was initiated on the turn of millennia and ended after 2010 is called by the political science the process of policy presidentialization, however within the Constitutional law in Hungary, this notion shall not be treated verbally, but as a metaphor or possibly analogy. According to Körösényi, already cited, presidentialization means a change in the accented power systems and in the style of policy or a change in the log- ic of competition in the political scene. Changes took part in three spheres. First, the executive power was strengthened together with the position of the Prime Minister. The process of slow increase in the importance of Prime Minister was started gradually and the Prime Minister got separated from its party background which guarantees them the Parliamentary majority. The so called party power is gradually replaced by the power of the Prime Minis- ter who to a lesser and lesser degree is a prisoner of the party oligarchy. The third change is the personalization and Americanization of the political scene competition27. The changes mentioned were initiated on the turn of millennia and they were, first of all, in the political plane, not in the constitutional legal plane, which does not reduce their importance. The election success of the coalition of FIDESZ parties and Christian Democrats by a majority of two thirds in 2010 when the winners were given the chance to introduce the Constitutional changes according to a model accepted thereby, only strengthened and made more real this trend. In the Government appointed since that time, there are fewer and fewer party activists and the experts start to prevail, mainly related directly to the Prime Minister. The communication got much more significance in the policy which is more personalized than in the past. The natural position of the Prime Minister – who at the same time is the President of the strongest party – is supported not only by his fraction in the Parliament but also by the exceptional discipline in this fraction whose maintenance has

27 Ibidem, s. 26–27. 78 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 a key significance for the functioning of the current system. This means that as far as the successful party under the leadership of the Prime Minister has the support of the majority of the Parliament and the Prime Minister within his camp can keep up effective discipline, in the current power exercise system being in force a strong politician has no need to introduce a semi-presidential system nor any other which would formally strengthen the executive power.

Literature

Chronowski N., Az Alaptörvény a többszintű európai alkotmányosság hálójában, [In:] Alkotmányozás és alkotmányjogi változások Európában és Magyarországon, eds. F. Gárdos-Orosz, Z. Szente, Budapest 2014. Csizmadia A., Kovács K., Asztalos L., Magyar állam – és jogtörténet. Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest 1990. Halász I., Creation and Characteristics of the new Fundamental Law of Hungary, “The Lawyer Quarterly” 2011, Vol. 1. No. 2, http://www.ilaw.cas.cz/tlq/index.php/tlq/article/view/9. Halász I., Maďarský ústavný súd a jeho metamorfózy po roku 1989, “Právník” 2015, No. 7. Halász I., Volebné súdnictvo a nová volebná legislatíva v Maďarsku, [In:] Aktuálne prob- lémy volebného a práva a volebného súdnictva v Slovenskej republike – II. ústavné dni, red. L. Orosz, T. Majerčák, Košice 2014. Jakab A., Az új Alaptörvény keletkezése és gyakorlati következményei, Budapest 2011. Körösényi A., A magyar politikai rendszer, Budapest 1998. Körösényi A., Mozgékony patthelyzet, [In:] Túlterhelt demokrácia. Alkotmányos és demokratikus alapszerkezetünk, Budapest 2006. Magyar alkotmánytörténet, ed. B. Mezey, Budapest 1996. Popławska E., Halász I., Prawo wyborcze na urząd prezydenta na Węgrzech, [In:] Prawo wyborcze na urząd prezydenta w państwach europejskich, eds. S. Grabowska, R. Grabowski, Warszawa 2007. Szalai A., A hatalommegosztás átalakulása 2010 után, [In:] Alkotmányozás és alkotmány- jogi változások Európában és Magyarországon, eds. F. Gárdos-Orosz, Z. Szente, Bu- dapest, 2014. Szente Z., Jakab A., Patyi A., Sulyok G., Országgyűlés, [In:] Az Alkotmány kommentár- ja I, Budapest 2009. The Basic Law of Hungary. First Commentary. eds.: L. Csink, B. Schanda, A. Varga, Dub- lin 2011, http://www.eui.eu/Documents/General/DebatingtheHungarianConstitu- tion/TheBasicLawofHungary.pdf. Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.04 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Michał Zbigniew Dankowski1

Buenos Aires City as an example of a derived autonomy

Keywords: autonomy, Buenos Aires, Argentina, amendment, capital, province Słowa kluczowe: autonomia, Buenos Aires, Argentyna, reforma konstytucyjna, stolica, prowincja

Summary A several years ago the Argentinean legal doctrine has developed a characteristic concepts to defer the autonomies of its provinces with the status of Buenos Aires City. It is considered that provinces have an originative autonomy, while Buenos Aires City a derived autonomy. The difference is related to the origin of both autonomies. It also entail the power limits of both autonomous authorities. The borders of the power of the provinces are wider than of the capital city, however its autonomy is also wide enough, more than in any other capital in Latin America. As a result of 1994 amendment of Argentin- ean Constitution, Buenos Aires City has obtained autonomy and a unique status among Argentinean administrative entities.

Streszczenie

Miasto Buenos Aires jako przykład autonomii wtórnej

Kilkanaście lat temu w argentyńskiej doktrynie prawnej pojawiło się rozróżnienie typów autonomii charakterystycznych dla tamtejszego ustroju państwowego. Wyróżniono autono- mię pierwotną prowincji oraz autonomię wtórną nadaną Miastu Buenos Aires. Rozróżnienie wynika z genezy, a także z zakresu władzy wyznaczonego dla obu typów autonomii. Grani-

1 The author has a PhD in Law, he is a Lecturer in Roman Philology Institute of the University of Gdańsk. E-mail: [email protected]. 80 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 ce władzy prowincji są zakreślone szerzej niż dla miasta stołecznego, jednakże i Miasto Bu- enos Aires posiada szeroki zakres autonomii, większy niż jakakolwiek inna stolica Amery- ki Łacińskiej. Na skutek reformy konstytucyjnej z 1994 r., Miasto Buenos Aires otrzymało szeroką autonomię i unikatowy status pośród argentyńskich jednostek administracyjnych.

In the Argentinean legal doctrine there appears a concept of originative autonomy, which is characteristic for the provinces which integrate the Argen- tinean Federation, as well as a concept of derived autonomy, which is a result of the art. 129 of Argentinean Constitution legal norm, setting the Buenos Aires City as an autonomous city. The regime of Buenos Aires City raises permanent controversy among both lawyers and politicians. A city which has always stood out in the region, both when it comes to population potential, as well as economic and political life, today is not only the capital of a federal state, but also an autonomous unit within the state. The regime of the city had showed attributes of autonomy since the Constitution in 1853 was established or even earlier. However, until the 1994 amendment to the Constitution was approved, the autonomy of Buenos Aires has not been standardized de jure. This way the existing status was sanctioned, but the political and legal disputes concerning the identity of the political system of the city were not solved. The constitutional reform itself was a result of the Olivos Pact, signed by the then governing liberal President Carlos Menem, who wished to be re-elected, and former President Raúl Alfonsín, leader of the largest opposition party center-left UCR2. Histo- ry came full circle, as the autonomy of the capital city has become a political compromise between the opposing political forces of the Peronists and the Socialists, as previously in the 19th century a political arrangement between the Unitarianists and the Federalists became the recognition of Buenos Ai- res City as capital of Argentina.

2 J. Saborido, L. de Privitellio, Breve historia de la Argentina, Madrid 2006, p. 488. Michał Z. Dankowski • Buenos Aires City as an Example of a Derived Autonomy 81 II.

The territorial autonomy regime does not have a specific pattern, because it was not formed on a basis of a previously created theoretical model. Therefore, autonomy is a variable and dynamic concept, which continues to develop in legal and political theory. As rightly pointed out by Jan Iwanek, the existing constitutional solutions and legal practice allow to describe the characteristics of contemporary autonomies3. This distinctive model of autonomy could be called originative autonomy, i.e. one for which relevant legislation was developed and adapted, as opposed to derived autonomy imposed by previously established laws. Autonomous regions in Europe derive their origins primarily from historical traditions. Centuries have shaped societies not strong enough to re- sist usually more powerful neighbors, but sufficiently different to retain their own language or dialect, culture and customs. In medieval and early modern era, these differences were sometimes highlighted by privileges granted by the rulers of the stronger side. Autonomies of European territories were also often a consequence of geographical location, and once again there is a need for a stronger neighbor for security reasons, but with aspirations of self-government on their own land. Therefore, today the consolidation of the idea of territorial autonomy is dictated by the needs of cultivation of distinct cultural values developed in a specific area, while the main elements of the autonomous space are mentioned4: The territory set by political and administrative boundaries; The population, mostly those who are residing in the territory for several generations; The institution of public life that integrates the population inhabiting in the autonomous territory (religious, cultural, educational, health, sports, etc.); The main entities of economic life, which enable the people living and social maintenance, as a place of work; Strengthening the heritage of the past, as a result of cultural and civilizational activity. In this way, Europe, which has a diversified substructure of civilizations and culture, does not possess any “artificial” derived autonomies nowadays,

3 J. Iwanek, Pojęcie autonomii terytorialnej we współczesnej przestrzeni demokratycznej, [In:] Autonomia terytorialna w perspektywie europejskiej, t. I: Teoria – Historia, eds. M. Doma- gała, J. Iwanek, Toruń 2014, p. 10. 4 A. Chodubski, Istota i uwarunkowania kształtowania współczesnej europejskiej autonomii terytorialnej, [In:] Autonomia terytorialna w perspektywie, op.cit., p. 34. 82 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 arising solely from political considerations, with no tradition dating back at least several centuries and no differences in culture and language in relation with the sovereign. There are a few examples of autonomies currently existing in Europe: the so-called historical countries in United Kingdom, autonomous regions in Italy, Autonomous Communities, which are covering the entire territory of the Kingdom of Spain, Mount Athos in Greece, Aland Islands in Finland or the islands of Azores and Madera in Portu- gal. All of the abovementioned territories have autonomous historical traditions, and some of them are distinguished by a specific geographical location (islands). It can therefore be assumed that the European autonomies have a originative character. However in Europe there is no practice of establishing autonomous cities, although in the past autonomous cities with limited sovereignty were created (sometimes with their closest surroundings), such as: Gdańsk (twice), Cracow, Klaipeda, Trieste, West Berlin. Nevertheless their genesis was only political (without any permanent cultural or civilizational distinctions), and derived usually as a compromise settlement of international conflicts, and their nature was temporary. Nowadays the only example of autonomous cities existing in Europe (politically) are Spanish enclaves on African coast (geographically) – Ceuta and Melilla. The problem of autonomy is shaped in a different manner in the Ameri- cas, where apart from distant from the mainland, with a distinct civilization and culture, Chilean islands: Easter Island and Juan Fernández Archipel- ago, there are no autonomous territories with similar characteristic to Eu- ropean ones. This takes place mainly due to historical reasons and distinctive colonial past on both continents. The provinces of Argentina can also be considered as an exception to this rule, as they possess an autonomous character (including the authorization to act as independent entities in international law), but not expressly articulated in the Argentinean Consti- tution. The Argentinean legal doctrine grants the provinces an originative autonomy status, because the Constitution merely sanctioned the pre-existing legal personality of the provinces. This is because the Argentinian provinces hold all the power not delegated exclusively to the federal authorities5. Therefore the provinces determined the shape of the state regime and the

5 Art. 121, Constitución de la Nación Argentina. Michał Z. Dankowski • Buenos Aires City as an Example of a Derived Autonomy 83 competence of the federal government, and not vice versa, hence their originative nature of autonomy. Other major nations in the Americas (United States, Mexico, Brazil, Vene- zuela), despite the fact that they are federations, and their states have broad authority in the implementation of internal policies6, have their political nature clearly different from European autonomies. The federal districts of Mexico7 or Washington are not fully autonomous, as at the moment they do not have the characteristics of a city autonomy, being only separated capitals of federal states, United States of Mexico and United States of America, respectively. At the same time the two federal districts of the largest countries in South Amer- ica have been provided with the powers that grant them the characteristics of autonomies. The autonomy of Brasilia was related to the movement of the capital of Brazil from Rio de Janeiro: the movement required the alignment of the new city laws with the laws of Brazilian states, in order to strengthen the position of the capital in a federal state, which meant giving it an originative autonomy. Inasmuch the matter of granting autonomy to Buenos Aires City was a laborious and lengthy process, which caused political unrest since the beginning of the independent Argentinean statehood. Traditionally, the territorial administration is used to be formed by the following authorities: federal, which covers the entire country, provincial, which is limited by borders of each province, and municipal, covering with its range territorial administrative units belonging to the province8. The Argentinean legal doctrine discusses the idea whether municipalities have only an autar-

6 Work is also underway on the creation of regional autonomies in Peru, and the region of the Atlantic Coast (Costa Atlántica) in Nicaragua also was given the right to autonomy. 7 In January 2016, the Mexican Parliament decided to initiate the procedure to reform the status of the city to introduce autonomy. Until the adoption of a constitution for Mexico City, which will determine the shape of the autonomous government, territorial organization and the authorities, existing legal regulations are applied, according to which Mexico City as the Federal District is the seat of government of the United States of Mexico and seat of government for the city of Mexico. For more information about the existing regime of Mexico City and the debate related to the reform of the Federal District, see: J. Hurtado González, A. Arellano Ríos, La Ciudad de México y el Distrito Federal: Un análisis político-constitucional, “Estudios Constitucionales” 2009, Año 7, No. 2, pp. 207–239. 8 In the Provence of Buenos Aires these are called partidos, in the rest of the country – municipios. 84 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 kic character, i.e. they are attached to self-administration, or autonomic character, which entitles them to establish legal norms for themselves, under the authority transmitted by a higher order9. It seems that the dispute is purely technical and nomenclatural, because in many cases both terms – autarky and autonomy are used interchangeably and are not mutually exclusive (municipalities also constitute legal acts, which themselves are subject to). How- ever, there are voices that situate municipalities as autarkic organisms, below the level of autonomy, in the hierarchy of administrative units10. Hence, it became necessary for raising the importance of Buenos Aires City from other municipalities, to define it as an autonomous city. In this way another grade appeared in Argentinean territorial hierarchy and now four levels of territorial authority can be distinguished: federal, provincial, municipal and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires)11.

III.

To understand the importance of the decision of granting autonomy to Bue- nos Aires City, an outline of the history of administrative and constitutional regime of the capital of Argentina must be presented. Only knowledge of the origins of the case allows for the gravity of the situation to be visible. In the colonial era Buenos Aires became the largest city and also the most important port of the Spanish east coast of South America. However until 1776 it was located on the edge of a vast Viceroyalty of Peru, with the capital in Lima. It was the reforms of Charles III that finally led to the isolation of the southern part of Peru and a creation of a new Viceroyalty of La Plata, with Buenos Aires as a capital. The city quickly gained importance, becom-

9 A. Gordillo, Tratado de derecho administrativo y obras selectas: parte general, Buenos Aires 2013, pp. XIV-12–13. 10 A.B. Bianchi, El enigma jurídico de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, “Revista Ar- gentina de Régimen de la Administración Pública” 1997, No. 222, p. 5. It seems that the only difference, to distinguish autarkic organism from autonomies, it is the power of legal norms, which they constitute. Autonomies have the ability of establishing higher order legal norms then in the case of autarkic units. 11 A.M. Hernández, Federalismo, autonomía municipal y ciudad de Buenos Aires en la reforma constitucional de 1994, Buenos Aires 1997, p. 196. Michał Z. Dankowski • Buenos Aires City as an Example of a Derived Autonomy 85 ing the seat of an intendancy – an administrative unit, introduced in Spain and its colonies during the Bourbon Reforms12. As a result of the Enlight- enment ideas, the Napoleonic Wars and the local aspirations of the Creoles striving for political independence, the society of the Viceroyalty of La Plata decided to break away from the European metropolis (1810) and to create an independent state (1816), originally called United Provinces of La Plata and later Argentina. From the very beginning two concepts of government for the newly established state collided among politicians from the La Plata. There was little doubt as to the republican character of the new state. However part of the decision-makers were in favor of a strong centralized power, which center would be – of course – Buenos Aires, while their opponents have seen the future of the state as a union of autonomous provinces, loosely connected, leaving to the federal authorities only the issues of international affairs and perhaps military. Soon the first became to be known as Unitarianists, while the others gain the title of Federalists. The proponents of decentralization of power were mainly recruited from the provincial elites, which have become a part of the new state, while the major bastion of the Unitarianists was the rapid- ly growing metropolis on the Atlantic coast. As a result of civil wars, which lasted more than three decades, finally a partial compromise on the future shape of the political regime of Argentina was achieved. The state had to be a federation, but with wide-ranging powers of the federal authorities, which resided in the capital. In 1853 a federalist Constitution of the Argentine Confederation (Consti- tución de la Confederación Argentina) was introduced, which having been several times reformed is in force to this day. Until then, the Buenos Aires City remained under the direct administration of the homonym Province. The art. 3 of the Constitution proclaimed that the seat of the authorities in charge of the Federal Government will be in Buenos Aires City, which was determined at the same time the capital of the Confederation by a special law13. During the 1850s decade the rivalry between the Unitarianists associated with Buenos Aires Province and the Federalists from other provinces gained momentum

12 J. Saborido, L. de Privitellio, op.cit., pp. 11–12. 13 Art. 3, Constitución de la Confederación Argentina, [In:] A. Sampay, Las constituciones de la Argentina (1810/1972), Buenos Aires 1975, p. 358. 86 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 again, which had its impact on the issue of the capital14. As a result of a short secession of Buenos Aires City, the capital of the state was moved temporarily to the city of Paraná in the Entre Ríos Province. The reason for this fact was that so far the city was under the authority and jurisdiction of Buenos Aires Province, which drew tangible benefits from it, primarily economic. The city authorities, as well as the other provinces sought at all costs to remove the city, that was to be the seat of the federal government, from the influence of Buenos Aires Province, which had developed above the rest in every political and economic aspect. Therefore only a few years after the introduction of the Constitution, the regulation of the state capital has been reformed. In 186015 it was given the wording in force to this day: “The authorities in charge of the Federal Government shall reside in the city to be declared Capital of the Re- public by a special law of Congress, once settled the cession of the territory to be federalized by one or more provincial legislatures.”16 This way, a possibility of transferring the capital to another place in the country has been opened, in case Buenos Aires Province did not want to cede (federalize) the territory of Buenos Aires City. By modifying the article referring to the capital, a real opportunity to become a permanent transfer of the federal capital to another city appeared. Then it was suggested that it could be the city of Rosario, located in Santa Fe Province – bastion of the Federalists. Buenos Aires Province did not want to give up the jurisdiction over its largest city so easily, especially that an era of Argentinean Presidents tend- ing toward the Unitarianists has begun. Due to the Constitution regulation, the Congress had the ability to transfer the capital outside Buenos Aires City at any time. On the other hand, the city authorities have sought to became independent from the Buenos Aires Province. Issues that remained debatable were primarily those of customs, supremacy over the port and the presence of the federal government within the city17. This way, Buenos Ai- res City became a natural ally of the other provinces in the struggle against

14 J. Lynch, R. Cortés Conde, E. Gallo, D. Rock, J.C. Torre, L. De Riz, Historia de la Argentina, Barcelona 2001, pp. 40–41. 15 For more about the constitutional reform of 1860, see: A. Sampay, op.cit., pp. 381–426. 16 Art. 3, Constitución de la Nación Argentina. 17 For more about the reasons of the Revolutuon of 1880, see: H. Sábato, Buenos Aires en armas. La revolución de 1880, Buenos Aires 2008. Michał Z. Dankowski • Buenos Aires City as an Example of a Derived Autonomy 87 the hegemony of Buenos Aires Province. The situation remained suspended until 1880, when under the 1029 Act the official status of state capital was finally given to Buenos Aires City18. Until then, the city was only the seat of the federal authorities. Under the new regulation the Buenos Aires City was removed from the jurisdiction of Buenos Aires Province (a new provincial capital was moved to the newly created city of La Plata, approx. 60 km south of the existing) and it became the capital of the federation (Federal Capital) with a special regime. Since then, until 1994, Buenos Aires City as the capital of Argentina has remained under the direct jurisdiction of the federal government. In 1972 a decree in a form of an Organic Law on the municipality of Bue- nos Aires City came into force, establishing the institutional organization of the capital as a state public legal entity (persona jurídica pública estatal) and regulated the powers of its government and the city administration19. Echoes of the federalization of the territory of Buenos Aires City remained alive even decades after the event. For more than a century, competences of the federal institutions had sometimes duplicated the responsibilities of the provincial institutions. The disputes concerning the limitation of power relevant the authorities still returned. The matter was finally organized in 1986. Buenos Aires Province established a law under which it obliged the federal authorities to return the territory, which was federalized in 1880 or create from it a new separate province20. Supporters of the capital transfer primarily raised the argument of cutting off the federal authorities from the influence of the most important financial lobby, which was to have decisive impact on state policy. The following year, the National Congress acceded to the law issued by the Buenos Aires Province, and established 23512 Act, which assumed that Buenos Aires City will remain the capital of the state, until the creation of a new province within the limits of the then Federal Capital21. Fi- nally, there has been no transfer of capital beyond the borders of Buenos Aires

18 Art. 1, Ley No. 1.029. (Registro Nacional de 1880, p. 301) For commentary, see: A.E. Sampay, op.cit., pp. 430–431. 19 Ley Orgánica No. 19.987 (Boletín Oficial del 06 de diciembre de 1972, No. 22560, p. 2). 20 L.H. Limanski, Las consecuencias jurídicas do no ser una provincia, “Lecciones y Ensayos” 2014, No. 92, pp. 19–20. 21 Art. 6, Ley No. 23.512 (Boletín Oficial del 12 de junio de 1987, No. 26157). 88 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 City, despite the fact that the choice of location – the city of Viedma and its surroundings, on the border of Buenos Aires Province and Río Negro Prov- ince – was previously made. The capital case still remained, however, not resolved until 1994.

IV.

In the last constitutional amendment art. 129 was added, which finally settled the structure of the capital, giving it almost analogous powers to ones held by Argentine provinces. Under this law, Buenos Aires became an autonomous city and has changed its official name. Since that moment the Auton- omous City of Buenos Aires (Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires) appeared in place of the Federal Capital (Capital Federal). The Constitution gives the city an autonomous system of government, with its own legislative and jurisdiction power. The Chief of Government (Jefe de Gobierno) is elected directly by the citizens of Buenos Aires City. The Nation- al Congress was empowered to entitle the citizens of the city, through their elected representatives, to set up the organizational status of their institutions. Art. 129 also indicated that a separate law will protect the interests of the state, at a time when Buenos Aires City is the capital of Argentina22. As it turned out, this record had been very important in another stage of the struggle for power over the capital. This way, an entity absent so far in the Argentinean legal system was established. The legal doctrine called the new regime as “an autonomous city”, “a city-state” adding sometimes “at a provincial level”, “an autarkic entity”, “a semiprovince”, “a city with a unique legal status”, “an autonomous district in an intermediate situation between a municipality and a province”, “an entity sui generis”, “a public legal person with a necessity of existence”, “a federalized municipality”,“a constitutionally federalized city”23. All of these seem to be at least partly correct, although most of the new legal character of Bue-

22 Art. 129, Constitución de la Nación Argentina. 23 M.G. Abalos, Buenos Aires luego de la reforma: ¿Nuevo sujeto del Federalismo?, [In:] In- stituciones de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, eds. G.J. Bidart Campos, A. Gil Domínguez, Buenos Aires 2008, p. 8. Michał Z. Dankowski • Buenos Aires City as an Example of a Derived Autonomy 89 nos Aires City reflects the statement that it has a status equivalent to a province 24, not being one of them at the same time. As a result of the constitutional reform, Buenos Aires City received a number of powers, exclusive for the provinces so far. By virtue of the powers conferred by the amendment to the Constitution of 1994, Buenos Aires City has been enabled to enact their own constitution, to be like the provincial ones. This way the first time in the history the city received its own constitution, which was enacted in 1996. The Constitution of Buenos Aires City has designated institutions of legislative, executive and judicial authority. The executive power are wielded by the Chief of Government (Jefe de Gobierno), appointed by means of free elections. His term of office is four years. Broad scope of powers of the Chief of Govern- ment are designated in art. 104 of the Constitution of Buenos Aires City25. Ten ministers depend on him, standing at the head of the most important fields: estate; justice and security; health; education; urban development and transportation; culture; human development and habitat; environment and public space; modernization, innovation and technology; government. The Chief of Government replaced the Major (Intendente), who exercised the executive power and was nominated directly by the President of the State since 1880. This way the executive power in Buenos Aires City passed from the jurisdiction of the federal authorities into direct possession of the citizens, who elect their Chief of Government in direct elections. The legislative power is exercised by the Buenos Aires City Legislature (Legislatura de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires). A unicameral assembly brings together 60 deputies elected for four years in direct elections. The head of the Legislature consists of a President (Presidencia) and three Vice-Pres- idents (Vicepresidencia). The President’s office is always held by the Deputy Chief of Government of Buenos Aires City. His main task is to supervise the debates. He possesses the right to vote only in cases of a tie. The Legislature performs its works by Commissions (Comisiones) and Special Councils (Jun- tas Especiales). Its main task is to “make laws, resolutions and declarations

24 R.G. Ferreyra, Autonomía y sistema de gobierno. Sobre la necesidad, oportunidad y conve- niencia de un nuevo momento constituyente en la Ciudad, La Ley 2006-F, 1093, p. 2. 25 Art. 104, Constitución de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires. 90 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 to give effect to the exercise of the rights, duties and guarantees established in the National Constitution”26 Buenos Aires City judiciary power is performed by the High Court of Jus- tice (Tribunal Superior de Justicia), the Judicial Council (Consejo de la Magis- tratura), and other courts established by law and the Public Ministry27. There are several forms of jurisdiction in the territory of the city: federal courts with jurisdiction for federal matters; national courts with jurisdiction in affairs of various ordinary matters (civil, criminal, commercial and labor); and, finally, the city courts mentioned above. The city carries out its public functions in a decentralized way. Since 2007 the city has been divided into 15 Communes (Comunas), which perform administrative functions. They replaced the previously active Centers of Com- munal Management and Participation (Centros de Gestión y Participación Comunal). The Communes are responsible for planning, execution and control. Their function is to perform certain activities of public administration (not exclusive for the City Government), social services, cultural events and social training28. Why such a separate province has not been created from the former Fed- eral Capital? As it was mentioned before, there are some differences between the rights which the provinces possess, and those that have been granted to the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. First of all, the autonomy of the city is designated by the National Congress, while the limits of the autonomy of the provinces have been directly sanctioned in the National Con- stitution. The autonomy of the city is determined primarily by the 24.588 Act, commonly called the Cafiero Act, named after its creator – then Sen- ator of Buenos Aires Province. It guarantees the national interest in Bue- nos Aires City. By the virtue of the Cafiero Act the city police sovereignty was left to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Thus, in contrast to Buenos- Ai res City, the provinces have their own police. Moreover, the city has a small range of the judiciary in the criminal field – only in cases of offenses, while crimes remain under the jurisdiction of federal authorities. Those authorities also have control over the seaport of Buenos Aires – the largest and

26 Art. 80, ibidem. 27 Art. 107, ibidem. 28 Art. 127–131, ibidem. Michał Z. Dankowski • Buenos Aires City as an Example of a Derived Autonomy 91 most important in Argentina, as well as the transport and some public services, which take place in the capital; finally they also control the Register of Real Estate29. From the very beginning The Cafiero Act, which limits the autonomy of the capital, raised controversy among politicians, lawyers, as well as regular citizens of the city. It seems to be another installment of the rivalry between the Buenos Aires Province, Buenos Aires City and federal authorities. Art. 8 of Cafiero Act, which referred to the scope of exercise of judicial power by the City courts, was considered unconstitutional in June 2016 by the Argentinean Constitutional Court30, which proves clearly the controversy of the Act. Due to the above reasons, the Argentinean legal doctrine adopted the theory that the autonomy of Buenos Aires City is derived, while the provincial autonomy is originative31. In this way Buenos Aires City has a limited autonomy in relation to the provincial autonomy. The autonomy of the capital is determined by the art. 129 of the National Constitution and there is where are designated its borders.

This year marks the bicentenary of the independence of Argentina. For two centuries, at the edge of the world a valiant and brave nation was being formed. However this nation often could not come to terms when it came to internal policies. This became the cause of many disasters in the form of civil wars, coups, dictatorships, economic crises. The unique status of Buenos Aires City, the capital, the largest and most important city, is finally the result of a political compromise, sought for two hundred years, with echoes of the Unitarianists vs. Federalists struggle still alive. From a legal point of view, Buenos Aires City became the only federal city in gained autonomy, which no other city in Argentina has. A thesis can be put forward, that this is an intermediate state between the large originative autonomy, which is held by the provinces, and

29 Ley 24.588 (Boletín Oficial del 30 de noviembre de 1995, No. 28282, p. 1). 30 “Diario Judicial” del 28 de junio de 2016 http://www.diariojudicial.com/nota/75503 (24.10.2016). 31 G. Badeni G., Reforma constitucional e instituciones politicas, Buenos Aires 1994, pp. 449–450. 92 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 the power, which is in disposition of ordinaries autarkic municipalities32. This way, Buenos Aires City has its own specific institutional arrangements, mod- elled on the provincial regimes, becoming a city legally emancipated to a level unmatched by any other territorial unit which is not a province, i. e. other municipalities. It is rightly referred to as a derived autonomy, granted by the National Constitution (its 1994 reform). This means that the capital has the decisive power of all legal prerogatives that are not directly reserved for federal authorities and classified as a national interest. Those extensive powers, which the Argentinean capital is enjoying today, are the result of a still growing political culture in a modern state of law and are a good omen for the future political development towards a democratic state of law.

Literature

Abalos M.G., Buenos Aires luego de la reforma: ¿Nuevo sujeto del Federalismo?, [In:] In- stituciones de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, eds. Bidart Campos G.J., Gil Domínguez A., Buenos Aires 2008. Badeni G., Reforma constitucional e instituciones politicas, Buenos Aires 1994. Bianchi A.B., El enigma jurídico de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, “Revista Ar- gentina de Régimen de la Administración Pública” 1997, No. 222. Chodubski A., Istota i uwarunkowania kształtowania współczesnej europejskiej autonomii terytorialnej, [In:] Autonomia terytorialna w perspektywie europejskiej, t. I: Teoria – Historia, red. M. Domagała, J. Iwanek, Toruń 2014. Ferreyra R.G., Autonomía y sistema de gobierno. Sobre la necesidad, oportunidad y con- veniencia de un nuevo momento constituyente en la Ciudad, La Ley 2006-F, 1093. Gordillo A., Tratado de derecho administrativo y obras selectas: parte general, Buenos Aires 2013. Hernández A.M., Federalismo, autonomía municipal y ciudad de Buenos Aires en la reforma constitucional de 1994, Buenos Aires 1997. Hurtado González J., Arellano Ríos A., La Ciudad de México y el Distrito Federal: Un análisis político-constitucional, “Estudios Constitucionales” 2009, Año 7, No. 2. Iwanek J., Pojęcie autonomii terytorialnej we współczesnej przestrzeni demokratycznej, [In:] Autonomia terytorialna w perspektywie europejskiej, t. I: Teoria – Historia, red. M. Domagała, J. Iwanek, Toruń 2014.

32 A.B. Bianchi, op.cit., pp. 5–7. Michał Z. Dankowski • Buenos Aires City as an Example of a Derived Autonomy 93 Limanski L.H., Las consecuencias jurídicas do no ser una provincia, “Lecciones y Ensay- os” 2014, No. 92. Lynch J., Cortés Conde R., Gallo E., Rock D., Torre J.C., De Riz L., Historia de la Argen- tina, Barcelona 2001. Sábato H., Buenos Aires en armas. La revolución de 1880, Buenos Aires 2008. Saborido J, Privitellio L. de, Breve historia de la Argentina, Madrid 2006. Sampay A., Las constituciones de la Argentina (1810/1972), Buenos Aires 1975.

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.05 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Krzysztof Urbaniak1

The Harmonization of the electoral law for elections to the European Parliament. Selected Issues

Keywords: Elections to trhe European Parliament, electoral law, common principles, harmonization Słowa kluczowe: wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego, prawo wyborcze, zasady wspólne, harmonizacja

Summary The European Parliament is the only parliamentary assembly of supranational character in the world, which is not composed of members of national parliaments but elected by direct suffrage. When in 1976 the Council of Ministers of the European Community decided to introduce direct universal suffrage, the elaboration of a uniform electoral procedure common to all Mem- ber States was expected to happen in the near future. Until the act was ready Member States could apply their own electoral procedures, whereas the community law regulated only essential matters, necessary to hold the elections in the Community. Obstacles which contributed to problems with the establishment of a uniform electoral system for elections to the Europe- an Parliament in the entire European Union led to the adoption of “common principles” of the European Parliament electoral procedures in 2002. Since 2002 several proposals for the modification of the electoral law have been made in each term of the European Parliament, aiming at its harmonisation. The aim of the article is to evaluate whether currently it is possible to modify the election system to the European Parliament, which would go further than the provisions of 2002 and whether it would improve the uniformity of applied electoral procedures.

1 Theauthor is a PhD of Political Science in Department of Political Systems of the Faculty of Political Science and Journalism of University of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan. E-mail: [email protected]. 96 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Streszczenie

Harmonizacja prawa wyborczego do Parlamentu Europejskiego. Wybrane problemy

Parlament Europejski jest jedynym na świecie zgromadzeniem parlamentarnym o charakterze ponadnarodowym, które nie składa się z przedstawicieli parlamentów narodowych, lecz wybierany jest w bezpośrednim głosowaniu. Gdy w 1976 roku Rada Ministrów Wspólnoty Europejskiej decydowała o wprowadzeniu powszechnych i bezpośrednich wyborów, prze- widywano opracowanie w nieodległej perspektywie jednolitej procedury wyborczej, wspól- nej dla wszystkich państw członkowskich. Do czasu przygotowania tego aktu państwa mo- gły stosować swoje własne procedury wyborcze, natomiast prawo wspólnotowe regulowało tylko niezbędne zagadnienia, konieczne dla przeprowadzenia wyborów w całej Wspólnocie. Trudności z doprowadzeniem do uchwalenia jednolitego systemu wyborczego do Parlamentu Europejskiego w całej Unii Europejskiej, spowodowały, że w 2002 roku postanowiono przy- jąć common principles prawa wyborczego do PE. Od roku 2002, w każdej kadencji Parlamen- tu Europejskiego pojawiają się propozycje reform prawa wyborczego zmierzających do daleko idącej harmonizacji. Przedmiotem niniejszego artykułu jest ocena czy obecnie możliwe jest zreformowanie systemu wyborczego do Parlamentu Europejskiego, która szła by dalej niż postanowienia z roku 2002 i zwiększała jednolitość stosowanych procedur wyborczych.

The European Parliament is the only parliamentary assembly of supranational character in the world, which is not composed of members of national parliaments but elected by direct suffrage. At the very beginning, since its establishment in 1951, it was composed of deputies delegated by national parliaments. Since 1979 the Parliament has been elected by direct universal suffrage. The introduction of the principle of election of members to the European Parlia- ment by direct universal suffrage was to be related to the adoption of a uniform election procedure in the Community. The traditions of the application of the election law, especially the issue of the application of the proportional or majority electoral system well-established in particular states are the obstacles that affected the agreement on a uniform electoral system. Krzysztof Urbaniak • The Harmonization of the electoral law for elections... 97 When in 1976 the Council of Ministers of the European Community decided to introduce direct universal suffrage, the elaboration of a uniform electoral procedure common to all Member States was expected to happen in the near future2. Until the act was ready Member States could apply their own electoral procedures, whereas the community law regulated only essential matters, necessary to hold the elections in the Community. Obstacles which contributed to problems with the establishment of a uniform electoral system for elections to the European Parliament in the entire European Union led to the adoption of common principles of the European Parliament electoral procedures in 20023. This has undoubtedly been a major step towards the harmonisation of electoral procedures, but the majority of regulations on how to hold the elections remained the Member States’ area of responsibility4. Since 2002 several proposals for the modification of the electoral law have been made in each term of the European Parliament, aiming at its harmonisation. The analysis of the submitted projects shows that the idea of standardisation of an electoral procedure is not considered possible to be introduced. The aim of the article is to evaluate whether currently it is possible to modify the election system to the European Parliament, which would go further than the provisions of 2002 and whether it would improve the uniformity of applied electoral procedures.

II.

The 1976 Act on the election of the members to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage5 and the provisions of internal laws of Member States

2 Council Decision 76/787/EWWiS, EWG, Euratom (OJ L 278, 8.10.1976). 3 Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom (OJ L 283, 21.10.2002). 4 M. Rulka, Ewolucja sposobu wyboru członków Parlamentu Europejskiego w prawie Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2016, p. 174 ff.; R. Trzaskowski R., J. Popielawska,How European are the European Elections? The European Parliament’s Long Struggle for a Direct and Universal Suffrage Conducted According to a Uniform Electoral Procedure, [In:] Elections to the European Parliament as a Challenge for Democracy, European Integration and Democracy Series, Vol. 2, eds. E. Kużelewska, D. Kloza, Warszawa-Białystok 2013, p. 33 ff.; K. Urbaniak,2010 proposal for a modification of the electoral system for elections to the European Parliament, “Studies of Economic and Social Processes”, Środa Wlkp. 2011, p. 59. 5 Council Decision 76/787/EWWiS, EWG, Euratom (OJ L 278, 8.10.1976). 98 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 were the fundamental legislations for the elections to the European Parlia- ment held between 1979 and 1999. The 1979 version of the Act regulated the most fundamental principles of the community electoral law, which had to be respected in the electoral procedures of Member States6. Just like the Treaty establishing the European Community, it provided that members of the European Parliament are elected by direct universal suffrage (art.1), defined the five-year parliamentary term and fixed the date of the first session following the elections (art. 3). The Act also regulated the elections dates, stating that the elections shall be held on the date and at the time specified by each Member State, and this date shall fall within the same period fixed by the Council, starting on a Thursday morning and ending on the following Sunday7. Votes could be counted only after closing polling stations in the last Member State where elections were held (art. 9). The Act allowed the relation of the seat of the member of the European Parliament with the seat in the national parliament (art. 5) but also provided a list of offices covered by the principle of incompatibilitas8 (art. 6). The Parliament was responsible for verifying the elections by taking note of the results declared officially by Member States (art.11). Article 12 of the Act referred to the issue of a vacancy and stated that each Member State shall fill any seat which falls vacant9. The Act confirmed the European Parliament’s duty to elaborate a draft Act on a uniform electoral procedure, which was to be a foundation for the decisions of the Council of Ministers. Until the entry into force of these uniform regulations, other electoral procedures, not covered by the Act, were to be regulated by internal regulations of Member States (art. 7).

6 See more: L. Bardi, The Harmonisation of European Electoral Law, [In:] Political Strat- egies and Electoral Reforms: Origins of Voting Systems in Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries, ed. S. Noiret, Baden-Baden, 1990, 503–528; M. Rulka, Ewolucja sposobu wyboru..., p. 53 ff. 7 Elections in some EU states are traditionally held on Thursday (e.g. Great Britain), on Friday (Ireland), on Friday and Saturday (Czech Republic). 8 The principle ofincompatibilitas included inter alia: the office of a member of the government of a Member State, the European Commission, the Court of Justice, Court of Auditors and the employment in institutions of the European Union. 9 S. Gebethner, K. Urbaniak, Przyszły system wyborczy do Parlamentu Europejskiego w świetle prawa wspólnotowego i analizy prawnoporównawczej, “Przegląd Legislacyjny” 2003, No. 1, p. 13 ff.; E. Dydak,Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego. Zasady i wyniki głosowania, Warszawa 2003, pp. 33–34. Krzysztof Urbaniak • The Harmonization of the electoral law for elections... 99 When assessing the 1976 Act it must be clearly stated that the adopted regulations were aimed at direct universal suffrage. In the course of preparatory works it was not possible to elaborate at least partial uniform electoral principles. The dispute over the choice of the proportional system as applicable in all states resulted in the 1979 elections held based on internal electoral laws of individual Member States10. The 1976 Act regulated the electoral process only to a minimum extent11.

III.

Successive efforts aiming at the harmonisation of the electoral procedure, made by the European Parliament of three terms (1979–1984 – report of J. Seitlinger12, 1984–1989 – report of R. Bocklet13, 1989–1994 – report of K. de Gucht14), did not bring expected results15. The Members of the European Par- liament from Great Britain were the main opponents of the successive propo- sitions and strongly opposed the adoption of the proportional representation system. The lack of consensus in such matters as the active and passive right to vote, the structure of constituencies or the methods of seat allocation, was also the cause of failure16.

10 The Legislation of Direct Elections to the European Parliament, eds. V. Herman, M. Hag- ger, Gower 1980, passim. 11 D. Millar, European Election Procedures, [In:] Direct Elections to the European Parliament, ed. J. Lodge, Palgrave Macmillan 1986, pp. 35–36. 12 See: European Parliament Working document 1–988/81 of 26 February 1982 (Report drawn on behalf of the Political Affairs Committeeon “ a draft uniform electoral procedure for the election of Members of the European Parliament”, Rapporteur: Mr. J. Seitlinger). 13 G. De Vires, La procedure électorale uniforme du Parlement européen: un pas pour rap- procher l’Europe des citoyens, “Revue du Marché Commun et de l’Union Européenne” 1996, No. 399, pp. 417–421. 14 De Gucht Report, adopted 10 October 1991, OJ C 280, 28.10.1991; De Gucht Report, adopted 10 March 1993, OJ C 115, 26.4.1993. 15 See more: G. Anastassopoulos, The debate on the system of electing the members of the European parliament: from a uniform procedure to the common principles of treaties, Brussels 2002; D. Rudkowski, Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego – problem system wyborczego, [In:] Parlamenty a integracja europejska, eds. M. Kruk, E. Popławska, Warszawa2002, pp. 89–99. 16 See: T. Kownacki, Parlament Europejski w perspektywie prac nad jednolitą ordynacją wyborczą. Wybrane problemy, “Przegląd Europejski” 2000, No. 1, p. 75; M. Rulka, J. Zbieranek, 100 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Only in the late 90’s it became possible to reach a consensus regarding the elaboration of common principles of community electoral law (report of G. Anastassopoulos)17. This was possible due to the gradually evolving harmonisation of national electoral laws, and mainly due to the introduction of the proportional representation system to the European Parliament in Great Britain18. Nevertheless, the whole process of discussions and negotiations, which led to the elaboration of the awaited compromise, lasted four years. On 15 June 2002 the European Parliament adopted a legislative resolution which, by qualified majority, accepted the Council of the European Union’s draft Decision on the modification of the Act, established by the Decision of the Council on 20 September 1976, concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage19. The Council ar- rived at a final decision on 23 September 200220. The most important change proposed by the 2002 amendment was the introduction of the principle of proportionality21, which was not envisaged by the 1976 Act, to the catalogue of electoral principles applicable to the elections to the European Parliament. At the same time, the system of the single transferable vote (STV) was allowed as an alternative. The STV system’s

W kierunku jednolitego aktu? System prawa wyborczego do Parlamentu Europejskiego, [In:] W stronę europejskiego demos? Polskie wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego w 2009 roku w perspektywie porównawczej, eds. J. Kucharczyk, A. Łada, Warszawa 2010, pp. 120–123; M. Rulka, Ewolucja sposobu wyboru..., p. 85 ff. 17 OJ C 292, 21.9.1998 (Anastassopoulos Report). 18 European Parliamentary Elections Act 1999, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/1/enacted (2.10.2016); D. Butler, M. Westlake, British Politics and European Elections 1999, Macmillan 2000, p. 31; E. Dydak, Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskieg..., p. 57 i nast.; G. Ganz, European Parliamentary Elections Act 1999: the constitutional issues, “Amicus Curiae” 1999, No. 18, pp. 4–8; The European Parliamentary Elections Bill, House of Commons, Research Paper 98/102, http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/ RP98–102 (2.10.2016). 19 Doc. PE 319.164. 20 Council Decision 2002/772/WE, Euratom (OJ L 283, 21.10.2002). 21 The principle of proportional representation means that the number of seats won by a party or group of candidates is proportionate to the number of votes received. See.: M. Rulka, Zasada proporcjonalności w wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego, “Przegląd Prawa Publicznego” 2011, No. 3, p. 17 ff.; B. Michalak, A. Sokala,Leksykon prawa wyborczego i systemów wyborczych, Wolters Kluwer 2010, p. 111; J. Buczkowski, Podstawowe zasady prawa wyborczego III Rzeczypospolitej, Lublin 1998, p. 326 ff. Krzysztof Urbaniak • The Harmonization of the electoral law for elections... 101 effects resemble the effects of the proportional representation system at the most22. Just as in the original 1976 version of the Act, after the 2002 amendment, the fundamental principles of the elections to the European Parliament were mentioned and also the principles of free and secret elections (art. 1, sec. 3) were added to the principles of universality and direct election23. Howev- er, the Council did not agree to add the principle of equality proposed by the Parliament24. The Act also legitimised the possibility to introduce the system of preferential voting, also known as the open list system. Voters here have the possibility of changing the order in which candidates are presented on the lists by marking their preferences – pointing the candidate who should take a seat first25. The 1976/2002 Act fixed the admissible election threshold, which, on the Member State national level, cannot exceed 5 percent of cast votes (art. 3) 26. It eliminates the possibility to establish an electoral clause at the level of a con- stituency27. In the light of this provision it is unacceptable to increase the 5 percent threshold level also in the case of coalitions of political parties. After many years of discussions and quarrels the Act brought a solution to the problematic aspects of the structure of constituencies. The

22 B. Michalak, A. Sokala, Leksykon prawa wyborczego..., pp. 142–146; S. Gebethner, Komentarz do Aktu z 1976 r. (w brzmieniu z 2002 r.) dotyczącego wyborów członków Parlamentu Europejskiego w powszechnych wyborach bezpośrednich, “Przegląd Legislacyjny” 2003, No. 1; see more on STV: M. Gallagher, The Political Consequences of the Electoral System in the Republic of Ireland, “Electoral Studies” 1986, No. 3, p. 253 ff.; A. Żukowski,Systemy wyborcze – wprowadzenie, Olsztyn 1997, pp. 56–58. 23 On the principle of confidentiality and the principle of free elections, see: B. Bana- szak, Prawo wyborcze obywateli, Warszawa 1996, pp. 19–20; G. Kruszeń, Standardy prawne wolnych wyborów parlamentarnych, Białystok 2007, J. Buczkowski, Istota i gwarancje „wolnych wyborów”, Przemyśl 1998. 24 S. Gebethner, Komentarz do Aktu z 1976 r. (w brzmieniu z 2002 r.)..., p. 206; D. Farrell, R. Scully, Electing the European Parliament: How Uniform are “Uniform” Electoral Systems?, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 2005, No. 5, p. 969 ff. 25 This system traditionally used in Poland in the elections to the Sejm, as well as election of municipal councils in cities who are also city districts, county councils and regional assemblies. See more: M. Chmaj, W. Skrzydło, System wyborczy w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Wolters Kluwer 2011. 26 The threshold refers to the votes cast in the elections. Usually in the electoral law the threshold is set in regard to the number of valid votes cast in elections. 27 Otherwise S. Gebethner, Komentarz do Aktu z 1976 r. (w brzmieniu z 2002 r.)..., p. 205. 102 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 1998 proposal made by the Parliament was aimed at assuming that only states of less than 20 million inhabitants could, as a whole, form one constituency, whereas states having more than 20 million inhabitants would be divided into electoral districts28. Such idea faced criticism from many states29. Finally the Council of the European Union decided that constituencies may be created in all Member States in order to hold elections to the European Parliament. The division into electoral districts cannot however violate the essence of a proportional representation system (Art. 2). It is not recommended therefore to create small electoral constituencies because in such constituencies the result of the elections may bring a distorted image of the essence of proportional representation30. In the light of the provision regarding the structure of constituencies, each state may represent one constituency. Another new solution is to include in the 1976/2002 Act the provisions allowing Member States to fix limits on funds allocated by the candidates to finance the electoral campaign to the European Parliament (art. 4). The amendment did not change the five-year term of the European Parliament (art. 5). The elections take place on the last year of the term in all Member States at the same time, but not on the same day. A particular day or days are specified in Member States, according to national provisions, on the same week, within four days, starting on a Thursday morning and ending on the following Sunday (art. 1, sec.1). Since the first direct universal suffrage in 1979, the elections always take place in June. The European Parlia- ment tried, by a Resolution of 1998, to move the date to May, which is the period before school holidays and summer holidays31. The Council refused to accept the proposal. The provisions regarding the political and legal status of the member of the European Parliament did not change considerably in 2002. The principle of the free mandate remained. According to Art. 6, section 1 of the 1976/2002 Act, members of the European Parliament are not bound by any instructions and cannot get the imperative mandate. They represent the whole subject of

28 K. Urbaniak, 2010 proposal for a modification..., p. 63. 29 See: E. Dydak, Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego..., s. 73. 30 See: S. Gebethner, Komentarz do Aktu z 1976 r. (w brzmieniu z 2002 r.)..., p. 206. 31 OJ C 292, 21.9.1998 (Anastassopoulos Report), p. 6. Krzysztof Urbaniak • The Harmonization of the electoral law for elections... 103 sovereignty, and not only their electors. They are not bound by any orders of electors and cannot be revoked by the electors. A free mandate is recognised by the majority of contemporary representation theories and is a standard institution in democratic countries32. The 2002 Act extended the principle of incompatibilitas of the office of a member of the European Parliament with other functions and posts in the European Union and in Member States. (art. 7 of the Act)33. The most spectacular solution was to establish a prohibition of relation of a mandate of a member of the European Parliament with the mandate of the national parliament. In addition, a clause was introduced, under which each Member State may extend the rules of incompatibilitas at a national level. The principles of election procedure, which are not regulated in the Act of 1976/2002, are regulated by the internal rules in each Member State.

32 See: E. Dydak, Status członków Parlamentu Europejskiego w prawie wspólnotowym, [In:] Konstytucja – wybory – partie, eds. A. Materska-Sosnowska, K. Urbaniak, Warszawa 2013, p. 197 ff.; J. Szymanek,Reprezentacja i mandat parlamentarny, Warszawa 2013, p. 336 ff. 33 According to this article the office of a member of the European Parliament shall be incompatible with that of: –– member of the government of a Member State, –– member of the Commission of the European Communities, –– Judge, Advocate-General or Registrar of the Court of Justice of the European Com- munities or of the Court of First Instance, –– member of the Board of Directors of the European Central Bank, –– member of the Court of Auditors of the European Communities, –– Ombudsman of the European Communities, –– member of the Economic and Social Committee of the European Community and of the European Atomic Energy Community, –– member of committees or other bodies set up pursuant to the Treaties establishing the European Community and the European Atomic Energy Community for the purposes of managing the Communities’ funds or carrying out a permanent direct administrative task, –– member of the Board of Directors, Management Committee or staff of the European Investment Bank, –– active official or servant of the institutions of the European Communities or of the specialised bodies attached to them or of the European Central Bank. In the 2002 amendment the principle of incompatibilitas applied also to judges of the Court of First Instance, members of the Board of Directors of the European Central Bank, and the Ombudsman. 104 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 IV.

As has frequently been the case in the institutional development of the EU, the Act of 2002 was more about catching up with and codifying reality than about imposing a new set of obligations that requires Members States to make substantial changes34. The main part of the regulation, including in particular, the provisions related to the distribution of seats among the political parties, remained in the hands of Member States. The European Union States avail themselves of the freedom to adjust the electoral procedure to the Europe- an Parliament (see Table 1) granted to them by the 2002 Act. Analyzing the electoral principles in the Member States, one can identify a number of differences between the systems to be noted in four main features: the electoral formula, district magnitude, threshold and ballot structure. These are the basic factors which influence the shape of the representation in the Europe- an Parliament. With reference to the electoral formula, one can notice two levels of differences – the distinction between the Single Transferable Vote (STV) and lists systems. Within the lists system, the highest average allocation methods are used (d’Hondt, Sainte-Laguë and modified Sainte-Laguë) along with the largest remainder method (Hare, Hagenbach-Bischoff, Droop). The structure of constituencies also makes up important differences. In six Member States, there are constituencies of regional character. Some Mem- ber States make the right to participate in the distribution of seats dependent on having got a certain level of voters’ support – the threshold (12 states). The abovementioned factors, i.e. the electoral formula, the structure of constituencies/district magnitude and the electoral threshold have a major impact on the extent of the principle of proportionality implementation35. An- other important factor to differentiate the electoral systems in the individual states is the possibility to have preferential voting. In most states, the voters have the right to express their own personal preferences and indicate the candidate who in their opinion, should take over the seat of a given party in the first place. In turn, in nine states, closed lists are applied (no preferential vote). The application of any of the abovementioned systems affects to a large

34 D. Farrell, R. Scully, Electing the European Parliament..., p. 970. 35 Ibidem, p. 971; M. Rulka, Zasada proporcjonalności... Krzysztof Urbaniak • The Harmonization of the electoral law for elections... 105 extent the scope of influence the voters can have on the personal representation in the European Parliament. Apart from differences, with regard to the mechanisms which influence the political representation in the European Parliament, one can also indicate other differences related to the electoral procedure in individual states. The most spectacular differences result from the traditional electoral law. Thus, they concern, for instance, the minimum age for the right to stand for the election and the day on which elections are held. The minimum age to stand for elections is 18 years in most Member States, except for Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia (21 years), Romania (23 years) along with Italy and Greece (25 years). In turn, elections are held in various states, according to the established tradition, respectively, on Thursday (the Netherlands, UK), on Friday (Ireland, the Czech Republic), on Saturday (e.g. Latvia, Slovakia and Malta) or Sunday (most states). The latter factor seems difficult to be made uniform36. Only the main differences in the electoral systems to the European Par- liament in force in the individual Member States have been abovementioned. The differences in the rules for candidates nomination for the election, those of campaigning, the access to electronic media and election campaign financing have been omitted although they are not less important. All the abovementioned factors lead to the conclusion that, in practice, the European Par- liament elections take place based on 28 different electoral systems.

The differences in electoral systems of individual states, as outlined above, had it that in the subsequent terms of office of the European Parliament, following the introduction of the 2002 Act, attempts were undertaken to harmo-

36 See more on electoral systems to the European Parliament: J. Outly, The Electoral System for Elections to the European Parlament: A Comparison of the Orginal and the Newly Admitted Countries, “Contemporary European Studies” 2007, No. 1, pp. 5–21; D. Farrell, R. Scully, Electing the European Parliament..., W. Sokół, Systemy wyborcze do Parlamentu Europejskiego: mechanizmy i konsekwencje polityczne, [In:] Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego. Prawne, polityczne i społeczne, eds. A. Sokala, B. Michalak, A. Frydrych, R. Zych Toruń 2009. 106 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 nize the electoral procedures through the introduction of common solutions in some areas of electoral law. These attempts proved to be a failure. Howev- er, it is worth having a look at suggestions made in this regard37. The most far-reaching draft of changes was presented in 201038. The proposals submitted included quite a few far-reaching changes in the EU electoral law to the European Parliament, in force since 2002. These changes were to help to stop the trend of declining voter turnout in the short term39, and to strengthen the representative function of the EP and to prepare the institutional base to create the European electorate in the long run40. The proposals of reform presented in the Parliament related to various elements of the electoral law. Analyzing the proposed reforms, one can indicate nine main proposals for changes. The first proposal related to the mandatory division of the constituencies in the Member States with a population of over 20 million. In the light of the proposal, the basis to create constituencies were to be regions. The mandatory creation of constituencies in the Member States with a population over 20 million was to foster a better representation in the Parliament of the interests, concerning the inhabitants of various regions. The introduction of the division of constituencies is also to guarantee more ties between Parliament Members and their constituency41. The second proposal assumed the imposition on the Member States of a mandatory duty to establish such electoral procedures as to ensure

37 M. Rulka, Ewolucja sposobu wyboru..., p. 205 ff. 38 Draft Report on a proposal for a modification of the Act concerning the election of the Mem- bers of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976 (Rapporteur: A. Duff), Committee on Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament, 12.04.2010; K. Urbaniak, 2010 proposal for a modification of the electoral... 39 M. Rulka, Próby reformowania procedury wyborczej do Parlamentu Europejskiego na po- ziomie unijnym, “Wspólnoty Europejskie” 2010, No. 2, p. 8. 40 Andrew Duff on Electoral reform, European Parliament News, www.europarl.europa.eu (10.12.2011); S. Hix, S. Hagemann, Could Changing the Electoral Rules Fix European Parliament Elections?, “Politique Européenne” 2009, No. 28. 41 Draft Report on a proposal for a modification... A. Gostyńska, Reforma procedury wyborczej do Parlamentu Europejskiego, “Biuletyn – Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych”, No. 113(721), 3 September 2010; S. Hix, S. Hagemann, Could Changing the Electoral Rules..., pp. 31–33. Krzysztof Urbaniak • The Harmonization of the electoral law for elections... 107 to voters preferential voting for those on lists. The introduction of such a system was to increase the voters’ influence on the composition of the EP. Another proposal advocated for the distribution of the European Par- liament seats 12 months before each election, in the case this is justified by demographic data presented by Eurostat. This change was intended to ensure a fair representation of EU nationals in the EP and to de-politi- cise the issue42. Another proposal was very controversial. It advocated the idea of an additional constituency, covering the whole territory of the European Union which was to serve to promote European political parties. Supranational lists would need to include candidates from at least one third of Member States, at the same time, respecting gender balance. 25 deputies were to be elected in such a constituency. The EU nationals would have the right to cast two votes: one for the national or regional list, and the other for a candidate from the EU list. Voting in the EU constituency was to be based on the system of preferential voting through the semi-open list system (whereby votes are cast for the party lists or for individual candidates on a given list). Mandates were to be distributed among individual lists, according to the Sainte-Laguë’s method43. The proposal was met by the Member States with great reserve, as it breached the principle of state representation in the Eu- ropean Parliament. The proposal to make a EU constituency would involve the need to establish at the EU level an electoral body with the main task to coordinate and conduct elections from European lists, as well as, to ver- ify the election results in the constituency. The electoral body was to be composed of the representatives of the Parliament, the Commission and the Member States44. Other two proposals of changes related to the elections schedule to the EP, common to the Member States. Moving the date of the elections from June to May was proposed along with the suggestion to have the elections on two days: every time on Saturday and Sunday. The rationale for the earlier elections was that June is in many Member States the period of summer break, which results in a lower voter turnout during elections. Limiting the elections

42 K. Urbaniak, 2010 proposal for a modification of the electoral..., p. 66. 43 Ibidem; R. Trzaskowski R., J. Popielawska, How European..., p. 36. 44 Draft Report on a proposal for a modification... 108 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 to two days resulted, in turn, from a critical assessment of excessively long electoral period (4 days)45. The last proposal advocated an age reduction and harmonization of active and passive voting rights in the elections to EP. The project was for lowering the active voting rights to the age of 16, and the passive voting rights to 18. Currently, in all Member States, the national obtains the right to vote the moment they are 18. Only in Austria, is it sufficient to be 16. In turn, only in 12 states an EU national, who is 18 may candidate to the European Parliament. In other states, a higher age is required46. As we have already mentioned, the proposals failed to gain the Member States’ acceptance and the 2002 Act was not modified. Their acceptance would result, in most cases, in fundamental changes in the Member States’ electoral system to the European Parliament. The introduction of preferential voting would impose on 9 states which apply the system of closed lists, changing their systems (Estonia, France, Greece, Spain, Germany, Portugal, Romania, Hungary, United Kingdom). The situation is similar with regard to the establishment of mandatory constituencies. Current- ly, 20 states constitute one constituency. As to the right to vote, only 12 states grant it to those at the age of 18. Similarly with the idea of establishing uniform days to vote. The introduction of mandatory voting on Saturdays and Sundays would make some states withdraw from the vote on traditionally accepted days. All these arguments underlay the skeptical approach of the Member States to the proposals and the work on the reform has not been completed47. In the current Parliament’s term of office (2014–2019) another work on the harmonization of election procedures was undertaken. However, the Eu- ropean Parliament, mindful of the experience of the previous term of office, is currently working on the harmonization of procedures that do not have political significance, nor do they directly relate to the shape of parliamentary representation nor to the established traditional principles of electoral law in the Member States. The problems under debates relate, among other things, to selected elements of electoral campaigning, the principles of

45 Ibidem. 46 K. Urbaniak, 2010 proposal for a modification of the electoral..., p. 67. 47 M. Rulka, Ewolucja sposobu wyboru..., p. 233. Krzysztof Urbaniak • The Harmonization of the electoral law for elections... 109 choosing and nominating candidates and the rules and deadlines for drawing up lists of voters48.

VI.

The work on the harmonization of the electoral law for the European Parliament opened the discussion on the nature of the elections to the EP and whether any further harmonization of the electoral procedures is possible, and if so, whether it will contribute to a further nationals’ trust in the European Parliament insti- tutions49. It turned out that the field of compromise in case of electoral law harmonization is insignificant. The skeptical approach of the Member States to the harmonization of EU electoral law to the EP arises from the fact that European democracies are attached to their traditional elections. It also turned out that the Member States are trying to keep, through internal electoral procedures (election constituencies, electoral threshold, voting principles) at least a minimum impact on the shape of the representation in the European Parliament. One must also bear in mind the fact that the harmonization of electoral procedures is also under the influence of the scale factor. 6 to 96 members are elected in the elections to the European Parliament in the individual Member States. This fact alone puts into question the chance to create uniform rules for the elections. It should be emphasized that the most important element to block any changes of the electoral law to the European Parliament in the Union results from the fact that the 1976/2002 Act has the status of primary law and its change requires the approval and ratification by all the Member States. This factor has it that in the near future, any significant harmonization of the electoral law to the European Parliament, important elements of law, influencing the election results included, is inimaginable. Although, it is possible to harmonize some secondary elements of the electoral law, but it is difficult to dream about the real harmonization of laws so as to unify the electoral procedures.

48 Reform of the electoral law of the EU, European Parliament resolution of 11 Novem- ber 2015 on the reform of the electoral law of the European Union (2015/2035(INL)), P8_TA(2015)0395, European Parliament 2014–2019 – http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015-0395+0+DOC+PDF+V0// EN (2.10.2016). 49 A. Gostyńska, Reforma procedury wyborczej... 110 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Table 1. Current Electoral Practices in Member States

Eligibity to Number Day of Consti- Country stand for Electoral system of seats elections tuencies elections

Austria 18 Sunday 18 PR with preferential vote, 4% threshold 1 D’Hondt

Belgium 21 Sunday 21 PR with preferential vote, D’Hondt 4

Bulgaria 17 Sunday 21 PR with preferential vote, 1 Hare-Niemeyer

Croatia 11 Sunday 18 PR with preferential vote 1

Cyprus 6 Sunday 25 PR with preferential vote, Hare 1

Czech 21 Friday– 21 PR with preferential vote, 5% threshold 1 Republic –Saturday D’Hondt

Denmark 13 18 PR with preferential vote, 1 D’Hondt

Estonia 6 Sunday 21 PR with closed lists, D’Hondt 1

France 74 Sunday 23 PR with closed lists, D’Hondt 8

Finland Sunday 18 PR with preferential vote, D’Hondt 1

Germany 96 Sunday 18 PR with closed lists, 5% threshold 1 Sainte-Laguë

Greece 21 Sunday 25 PR with closed lists, 5% threshold 1 Droop

Hungary 21 Sunday 18 PR with preferential vote, 5% threshold 1 D’Hondt

Ireland 11 Friday 21 PR – STV 4

Italy 73 Saturday/ 25 PR with preferential vote 5 Sunday

Latvia 8 Saturday 21 PR preferential vote, 5% threshold 1 Sainte-Laguë

Lithuania 11 Sunday 21 PR preferential vote, 5% threshold 1 Hagenbach- Bischoff

Luxemburg 6 Sunday 18 PR with vote-splitting, 1 Hagenbach-Bischoff

Malta 6 Saturday 18 PR –STV, Droop 1 Krzysztof Urbaniak • The Harmonization of the electoral law for elections... 111

Eligibity to Number Day of Consti- Country stand for Electoral system of seats elections tuencies elections

Netherlands 26 Thursday 18 PR with preferential vote 1

Portugal 21 Sunday 18 PR with closed lists, D’Hondt 1

Poland 51 Sunday 21 PR with preferential vote 13 (1)

Romania 32 Sunday 23 PR with closed lists, D’Hondt 1

Slovakia 13 Saturday 21 PR with preferential vote 5% threshold 1 Hagenbach-Bischoff

Slovenia 8 Sunday 18 PR with preferential vote, D’Hondt 1

Spain 54 Sunday 18 PR with closed lists, D’Hondt

Sweden 20 Sunday 18 PR with preferential vote, 4% threshold 1 Modified Sainte-Laguë

United 73 Thursday 18 PR with closed lists (but Northern 11+1 Kingdom Ireland: STV)

Source: Report on a proposal for a modification of the Act concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976 (2009/2134(INI)), Rapporteur: Andrew Duff, A7-0176/2011, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament, 28.04.2011, pp. 62–70.

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Anastassopoulos, G., The debate on the system of electing the members of the European parliament: from a uniform procedure to the common principles of treaties, Brussels 2002. Banaszak B., Prawo wyborcze obywateli, Warszawa 1996. Bardi L., The Harmonisation of European Electoral Law, [In:] Political Strategies and Elec- toral Reforms: Origins of Voting Systems in Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries, ed. S. Noiret, Baden-Baden 1990. Buczkowski J., Istota i gwarancje „wolnych wyborów”, Przemyśl 1998. Butler D., Westlake M., British Politics and European Elections 1999, Macmillan 2000. Chmaj M., Skrzydło W., System wyborczy w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Wolters Kluwer 2011. De Vires G., La procedure électorale uniforme du Parlement européen: un pas pour rap- procher l’Europe des citoyens, “Revue du Marché Commun et de l’Union Européenne” 1996, No. 399. Dydak E., Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego. Zasady i wyniki głosowania, Warsza- wa 2003. 112 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Farrell D., Scully R., Electing the European Parliament: How Uniform are ‘Uniform’ Elec- toral Systems?, ”Journal of Common Market Studies” 2005, No. 5. Gebethner S., Komentarz do Aktu z 1976 r. (w brzmieniu z 2002 r.) dotyczącego wyborów członków Parlamentu Europejskiego w powszechnych wyborach bezpośrednich, “Prze- gląd Legislacyjny” 2003, No. 1. Gebethner S., Urbaniak K., Przyszły system wyborczy do Parlamentu Europejskiego w świ- etle prawa wspólnotowego i analizy prawnoporównawczej, “Przegląd Legislacyjny” 2003, o. 1. Gostyńska A., Reforma procedury wyborczej do Parlamentu Europejskiego, “Biuletyn Pol- skiego Instytutu Spraw Międzynarodowych”, No. 113(721), 3 September 2010. Ganz G., European Parliamentary Elections Act 1999: the constitutional issues, “Amic- us Curiae” 1999, No. 18. Grzelak A., Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego w prawie Unii Europejskiej, ”Zeszyty Ośrodka Informacji i Dokumentacji Europejskiej”, Parlament Europejski. Wybrane zagadnienia,Warszawa 2004. The Legislation of Direct Elections to the European Parliament, eds. V. Herman, M. Hag- ger, Gower 1980Hix S., Hagemann S., Could Changing the Electoral Rules Fix Euro- pean Parliament Elections?, “Politique Européenne” 2009, No. 28. Jackiewicz A., Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego jako wybory drugiej kategorii (second-order elections). Uwagi na temat przyczyn, konsekwencji oraz prób przeciwdziała- nia niskiej frekwencji wyborczej, “Przegląd Sejmowy” 2014, No. 2. Kownacki T., Parlament Europejski w perspektywie prac nad jednolitą ordynacją wyborczą. Wybrane problemy, “Przegląd Europejski” 2000, No. 1. Millar D., European Election Procedures, [In:] Direct Elections to the European Parlia- ment, ed. J. Lodge, Palgrave Macmillan 1986. Outly J., The Electoral System for Elections to the European Parlament: A Comparison of the Original and the Newly Admitted Countries, “Contemporary European Studies” 2007, No. 1. Rudkowski D., Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego – problem system wyborczego, [In:] Parlamenty a integracja europejska, eds. M. Kruk, E. Popławska, Warszawa 2002. Rulka M., Ewolucja sposobu wyboru członków Parlamentu Europejskiego w prawie Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2016. Rulka M., Próby reformowania procedury wyborczej do Parlamentu Europejskiego na pozi- omie unijnym, “Wspólnoty Europejskie” 2010, No. 2. Rulka M., Regulacja wyborów do Parlamentu Europejskiego w prawie Unii Europejsk- iej, “Studia Wyborcze” 2013, No. 16. Rulka M., Zasada proporcjonalności w wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego, “Przegląd Prawa Publicznego” 2011, No. 3. Krzysztof Urbaniak • The Harmonization of the electoral law for elections... 113 Rulka M., Zbieranek J., W kierunku jednolitego aktu? System prawa wyborczego do Par- lamentu Europejskiego, [In:] W stronę europejskiego demos? Polskie wybory do Parla- mentu Europejskiego w 2009 roku w perspektywie porównawczej, eds. J. Kucharczyk, A. Łada, Warszawa 2010. Sokół W., Systemy wyborcze do Parlamentu Europejskiego: mechanizmy i konsekwencje polityczne, [In:] Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego. Prawne, polityczne i społec- zne aspekty wyborów, eds. A. Sokala, B. Michalak, A. Frydrych, R. Zych, Toruń 2010. Szymanek J., Reprezentacja i mandat parlamentarny, Warszawa 2013. Trzaskowski R., Popielawska J., How European are the European Elections? The European Parliament’s Long Struggle for a Direct and Universal Suffrage Conducted According to a Uniform Electoral Procedure, [In:] Elections to the European Parliament as a Chal- lenge for Democracy, Vol. 2, eds. E. Kużelewska, D. Kloza, Warszawa–Białystok 2013. Urbaniak K., 2010 proposal for a modification of the electoral system for elections to the European Parliament, “Studies of Economic and Social Processes”, Środa Wlkp. 2011.

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.06 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Robert Radek1

Executive power in the scandinavian political systems – the problem of minority cabinet in Norway (selected aspects)

Keywords: executive power, Scandinavian parliamentary systems, minority cabinet, government, political party, Norway Słowa kluczowe: władza wykonawcza, skandynawskie systemy parlamentarne, gabinet mniejszościowy, rząd, partia polityczna, Norwegia

Summary The article is devoted to the characteristics of the minority cabinet in the Scandinavian political systems and especially in Norway and its influence on political regime. Some interesting aspects has been chosen to illustrate the problem of minority government in Nor- way. Author explains normative and non-normative systemic factors that influenced the formation of the government cabinets without a sufficient majority in the parliament. The main thesis is that creation of minority governments is closely associated with the evolution of the party system and can be understood as a norm of political life in Scandinavia.

Streszczenie

Władza wykonawcza w skandynawskich systemach politycznych – problem gabinetu mniejszościowego w Norwegii (wybrane zagadnienia)

Artykuł poświęcony jest charakterystyce rządów mniejszościowych w skandynawskich systemach politycznych, w tym zwłaszcza w Norwegii i ich wpływu na reżim polityczny. Kilka

1 The author is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Systems of Highly Developed States of the Institute of Political Science and Journalism, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Silesia in Katowice. Mail: [email protected]. 116 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 ciekawych aspektów zostało wybranych celem zilustrowania problemu istnienia rządu mniej- szościowego w Norwegii. Autor wyjaśnia, normatywne i nienormatywne czynniki systemowe, które wpłynęły na tworzenie gabinetów rządowych bez wystarczającej większości w parlamencie. Główną tezą jest, że tworzenie rządów mniejszościowych jest ściśle związane z rozwojem systemu partyjnego i może być rozumiane jako norma w życiu politycznym Skandynawii.

A parliamentary system is known as a system of government in which the members of a legislative body try to determine the formation of the cabinet (the executive) and in which any majority of the legislature at almost any time may vote the cabinet out of office. But is this statement always true? In many states and under many circumstances it seems completely different. In the following article it is planned to present some selected problems of minority governments that are characteristic element of executive power in Scandinavian political systems. In many parliamentary systems, legislative majorities have instruments at their disposal (such as no-confidence votes and investiture votes) they may use to control the composition of the government and government policy. However it should be remembered that the application of the majority principle to parliamentary responsibility is not altogether strightforward. In many parliamentary regimes cabinets must at various junctures produce legislative majorities in order to perform their constitutional functions. Firstly, parliamentary governments ought to be able to win a vote of confidence. This type of vote can come in three forms according to their origins. Vote of confidence may be demanded by the government itself (usually any time the government it wants) or by the opposition (example of Spanish regulation), or it may be required by the constitution (particularly likely at the time when a new government first presents itself to the legislature). This necessity of winning vote of confidence is very often called by experts a viability requirement, because if such voting ends negatively, the government simply vanishes2.

2 K. Strøm, Minority Government and Majority Rule, Cambridge University Press 2010, p. 5. Robert Radek • Executive power in the scandinavian political systems 117 Secondly, constitutional functions of government are also very often connected with effectiveness, so it is obvious the goverrnments must be both via- ble and effective. Such conditions are fullfilled by legislative coalitions which consist of the political parties from which the members of the governments are drawn. In colation-theoretic parlance, the assumption are that the coalitions over policy and office are identical and that they can be identified as the parties holding cabinet portfolios3. Situation of majority government is much more complicated than we can consider and that issue must be explained more precisely. Par- ties without cabinet portfolios may well support the government on confidence votes, legislative bills or both. This situation happens very often with parties not in the portfolio coalition participating in the legislative coalition for most of the time. Sometimes even parties not represented in the cabinet may receive some office payoffs, like for example subcabinet offices, legislative chairmanship or different appointments in the public sphere. However, parties in the portfolio coalition are likely to be members of the legislative coalition almost all the time and members of governing parties are particularly unwilling to get away with frequent de- partures from the fold on votes of confidence. In that case coalitions over policy may well be larger than colations over portfolios, and viability coalitions may differ from effectiveness coalitions. These facts describe the crucial issue of minority government, which is always a kind of expectation to form a majority government4. A minority government or cabinet, is most often characterized by experts as a cabinet formed in a parliamentary system when a political party or coalition of parties does not have a majority of overall seats in the parliament. It is sworn into office, with or without the formal support of other parties, to enable a government to be formed. Under such a government, legislation can only be passed with the support of enough other members of the legislature to provide a majority, encouraging multi-partisanship. However, majority or minority governments do not altogether exhaust the set of possible cabinet solutions. A further possibility is non-partisan solution, such as a caretaker or business administration.

3 Ibidem. 4 Ibidem, s. 6. 118 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 It should be remembered that many minority and some majority governments are precisely caretaker governments, however such distinguishing characteristic is not as important as nonpartisanship position of such cabinet. In the literature many authors very often concentrate on single-party and coalition governments, and claim that they form under distinct conditions: single-party government in majority situations, when one party itself controls a majority of the legislature and coalition government in minority situations, when no party is so in power. In parliamentary democracies both minority and nonpartisan governments are treated as a kind of deviation. Nonpartisan governments violate the most fundamental norm, that of party government5. Minority governments violate the expectation that executive and legislative coalitions are the same coalitions and it is extremely difficult to say what would cause such distinction between them. Why would any party agree to support the government legislatively if it gets no portfolios in exchange? Also quite interesting scientifically is finding the answer to the question why the opposition, by definition a majority coalition in parliament in that case, does not create the government and take the spoils of office for itself. These facts- in dicate that minority government is a counterintuitive phenomenon in the world of parliamentary democracies, where the expectation of majority government is conventionally understood as an axiom. Any occurrence of minority government therefore seems to threaten the entire edifice of de- ductive coalition theory. Given the counterintuitive nature of minority governments, the question is whether they can be as easily dismissed as nonpartisan administration6. Minority governments constitute over one third of all cabinets formed in parliaments without single party majority in Western Europe after World War II. Indeed, minority governments constitute the default cabinet solution in certain countries (e.g. Denmark, Norway, Sweden). Although their average duration may be somewhat smaller than that of majority coalitions, casual observation of the rather successful performance of certain countries with frequent

5 See for example the following works: G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge University Press 1976; R. Rose, The Problem of Party Government, London 1974. 6 K. Strøm, Minority..., p. 8. Robert Radek • Executive power in the scandinavian political systems 119 minority solutions over long periods of time suffices to demonstrate that -mi nority governments are sensible governing alternatives to majority coalitions7. It is important to underline that no region has experienced minority governments more frequently than Scandinavia. In sharp contrast with Finland and Iceland, the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Sweden and Norway have had minority governments for more than two-thirds of the post-World War II period. In Denmark, minority governments have been in office for more than four-fifths of that period8. The Nordic countries comprise one of the most stable regions in the world of parliamentary democracies, All states in this region adopted parlimentary system of government and were fully democratised in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century. Each country managed to develop distinctive parliamentary models, for example Denmark, Sweden and Norway, as parliamentary monarchies, have relied extensively on minority governments while Fin- land and Ireland rather implemented majority coalition cabinets9. One of the crucial factors is that the Nordic countries possess a long parliamentary history, for example Iceland’s Althingi operated as a consultative assembly from the year 930 until 1800, when it was abolished. During the first quarter of the twentieth century all of the Nordic countries were fully democratised, and also an universal suffrage for parliamentary elections was introduced in this period. Additionally, voting rights were also extended to women. All of these countries have for many decades operated a parliamentary form of government: Den- mark from 1901 and Finland and Sweden from 1917. The other two countries had such systems prior to their independence. Norway’s first parliamentary cabinet was formed in 1884, and Iceland’s first was formed in 1904. This move to parliamentarism can be seen as a democratisation of executive power, as control over the cabinet shifted from an unelected monarch to an elected parliament10.

7 T. Kalandrakis, Minority Governments: Ideology and Office, Boston Seminar 2002, p. 3 http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/4754/kalandrakis.pdf (15.11.2016). 8 B.E. Rasch, Why Minority Governments? Executive-Legislative Relations in the Nordic Countries, [In:] Parliamentary Governments in the Nordic Countries at the Crossroads: Coping with Challenges from Europeanisation and Presidentialisation, eds. T. Persson, M. Wiberg, Stockholm 2011, p. 41. 9 T. Persson, M.Wiberg, The Nordic Model of Parliamentary Government and its Challenges, [In:] Parliamentary Governments, op.cit., p. 17. 10 Ibidem, p. 42. 120 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 All of the Nordic parliaments today are unicameral, though until recently (the summer of 2009), the Norwegian Storting did partly function in a bicameral manner in the legislative and controlling spheres. After each election, Norwegian legislators divided themselves into two sections − the Odelsting and the Lagting − to handle non-financial legislation. Iceland Althing had a similar quasi-bicameral system until 1991. Denmark and Sweden abolished their upper houses in 1953 and 1969, respectively11. Another fundamental factor influencing governmental specifics of Scan- dinavian countries is connected with electoral systems. In the Nordic region proportional representation has got a very long history. The first usage of pro- potional system in the region was in Finland in 1906, when the unicameral, partly autonomous Eduskunta was established. By the year of 1920, propo- tional represetnation had replaced single-member constituency systems in almost every country with the exception of Iceland12. It should be noted that the current Nordic parliaments use quite similar party-list systems of representation and only the Finnish system has anomalous features. Although Finland has no adjustment seats, the level of proportionality is still only slightly lower than in the other Nordic countries. Part of the reason for this level of proportionality is that the average multi-member district is quite large. With respect to proportionality, Sweden and Denmark generally perform well. On some occasions, deviations13 from proportionality have been extremely low. In most countries, there are significant differences in proportionality between elections, even though the institutional framework is constant. Also the size of the Nordic legislatures mainly reflects population figures. Swe- den, however, has a much larger parliament than one would expect, but this anomal is an inheritance from the bicameral era. The single chamber Riksdag has almost as many seats as the previous first and second chambers combined14.

11 M. Grzybowski, Systemy konstytucyjne państw skandynawskich, Warszawa 2011, p. 58. 12 B. Grofman, A. Lijphart, The Evolution of Electoral and Party Systems in the Nordic Countries, New York: 2002. 13 About deviations in the political systems see analysis in the following work: Wpływ deformacji wyborczych na systemy polityczne, red. J. Iwanek, Toruń 2014. 14 B.E. Rasch, Why Minority..., pp. 42–43. Robert Radek • Executive power in the scandinavian political systems 121 II.

According to collected data in Denmark, Sweden and Norway there have been more minority than majority cabinets (77, 76 and 62 percent of total governments, respectively). Most of the minority governments in all three countries have been single-party cabinets rather than coalitions. Denmark, however, has also had a substantial number of minority coalitions. Iceland, in contrast to the Scandinavian countries, has a history of majority coalitions; minority governments have been few and short-lived. The pattern in Finland is more mixed. Finland had minority governments before the World War II, but majority coalitions have been the norm since the 1940s. Scandinavia differs from Finland and Iceland15. In many respects, the polities of the Nordic countries are very similar, and some of the differences clearly have no impact on government formation. One possible research strategy is to attempt to locate causal factors that are shared by the Scandinavian countries but not by the entire Nordic region. As mentioned above, it is also worth noting that some of the countries over time have slid from minority to majority governments (Finland) or vice versa (Sweden). Additionally, Norway has had long periods of majority parliamentarism, for instance from 1945 until 1961 and after the 2005 and 2009 elections. It also must be stated that constitutional frameworks have been relatively stable over time in all countries, so it is really difficult to trace the occurrence of minority governments back to differences in constitutional details. Instead, the most likely explanation for the Nordic patterns of government formation is the nature of party systems in the region16. Before analysing the nature of party systems in Scandinavian states it is crucial to present one of the fundamental clues proposed by V. Herman and J. Pope17. They did not confirm previous traditional analysis, according to which minority governments was explained as the result of party fragmentation and polarisation. Sometimes it was also pointed to the gradual development of a multi-party legislature and a reluctance to enter coalitions as the main

15 Ibidem, p. 45. 16 Ibidem, p. 47. 17 See more: V. Herman, J. Pope, Minority Governments In Western Democracies, “British Journal of Political Science” 1973, Vol. 3. 122 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 background for the formation of minority government. Herman and Pope demonstrated that minority governments were more common than previously assumed and suggested a variety of reasons for this phenomenon. Firstly, a substantial proportion of the minority governments they studied were caretaker administrations. These governments typically came to power as a result of some sort of crisis and were deliberatively established for only a short period of time. Secondly, some minority governments took office because one or more coalition partners withdrew from majority coalitions. Thirdly, a few minority governments came to office because elections that usually provided one party with a legislative majority surprisingly ended with no party winning a majority of seats (and, typically, a new election was held soon thereaf- ter). Fourthly, minority cabinets arose because extreme parties on either side of the political spectrum were not credible, reliable, formal coalition partners for parties closer to the centre. Fifthly, and probably most interesting in this context, some minority cabinets were formed in situations in which one of the parties fell only a few seats short of a legislative majority. Often in such cases, the dominant party formed a one-party minority government and usually did so with the formal support of one of the smaller parties18. Moving to description of party systems and its influence on governemnt formation in Scandinavia it is important to stress that all of the analysed countries have had multi-party systems at least since the beginning of twentieth century. Of course there are many important differences among the countries in this respect, and marked changes in the number and relative size of the parties have occurred over time. It is worth to take a closer look at party systems in Norway, to illustrate aspects mentioned above. Until the early 1970s Norway had one of the most stable party systems in Western Europe and similar in format to Swedish and Danish. The origin of this system is dated for 1880s and emerged around 1920 into a system called ‘the Scandinavian five-party model’. There were also defined six dimentions of political cleavage, determined by economic, geographical and cultural circumstances. The class cleavage and the sectoral urban-ru- ral cleavage were determined by economic conflicts in the labour market and the commodity market, respectively. Second, territorial cleavage between phe-

18 B.E. Rasch, Why Minority..., p. 48. Robert Radek • Executive power in the scandinavian political systems 123 riphery and center party overlapped with additional three cultural cleavages: a socio-cultural conflict between two different versions of the Norvegian language: a moral conflict focused in large part on the abuse of alkohol and articulated teetotalist movement, and a religious conflict over the doctrines and organization of the Lutheran state chuch and its role in social life. These cleavages influenced Norwegian politics and developed its party system. The major division, however, not only in shaping electoral preferences, but also in terms of government alternatives, has been along the left-right axis, between socialists (a dominant Labour Party called ‘Arbeiderpartiet’ and smaller Communist Party called ‘Norges Kommunistiske Parti’) and non-socialists (the Conserva- tists called ‘Høyre’, the Liberals, called ‘Venstre’ and the agrarian Centre Party, called ‘Senterpartiet’)19. Obviously, such model has been changing during the following decades. There were many deviations from this first model20. In 1933 for instance Christian People’s Party evoluated from religious fracion of Liber- als. After the onset of the Cold War the Communist Party gradually faded into oblivion and finally lost its parliamentary representation in 1961. Through the 1960s Norway had one of the most stable party systems in Western Europe. The question of Norwegian membership in the European Community during the first EC referendum in 1972 also influenced the party system by generating conflict between political parties. Norway began to experience more party system fragmentation and volatility than at any time since the 1920s. As the result the previously dominating Liberals was split into two parties – one supporting the idea of integration, and second being against a closer cooperation throught this structure21. After the early 1970s about one out of three voters changed partisanship from one election to the next, as compared to the 1960s when the corresponding figure was about one out of four. In the 1993 Storting election, individual volatility reached almost 44 per cent, a proportion that was virtually unchanged in 1997 and 200122.

19 H.M. Narud, K. Strøm, Norway: A Fragile Coalition Order, [In:] Coalition Governments in Western Europe, eds. W.C. Müller, K. Strøm, Oxford University Press 2006, p. 159. 20 See more about the evolution of party system in Norway: M. Grzybowski, Norwegia. Zarys systemu ustrojowego, Kraków 2015, pp. 64–86. 21 See more about changes in the Norwegian party system – ibidem, p. 160. 22 H.M. Narud, K. Strøm, Norway: Virtual Parliamentarism, [In:] Delegation and Ac- countability in Parliamentary Democracies, eds. K. Strøm, W.C. Müller, T. Bergman, Oxford University Press 2006, p. 526. 124 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Evolution of the post-war Norwegian party system could be described as a change from unipolar, through a bipolar, to a multipolar format. The history of this development is summerized by experts, as follows: 1. Social Democratic Predominance: 1945–1961. In this period the Labour Party enjoyed a predominat position and four consecutive elections yielded outright parliamentary majorities and a single-party Labour governments. The party system was at this time unipolar and socialist parties jointly obtained 51 per cent of the popular vote in all elections. The centre parties like for instance Liberals, the Centre Party and Christian People’s Party was gathering about 29 per cent and the rest – 20 per cent of voters – were supporting the Conservatives. It is crucial to remember that only marginal electoral shift occured from one election to another. 2. Bipolar Stability: 1961–1972. The 1961 emergence of the Socialist Peo- ple’s Party caused some erosion of Labour’s support, while the non-socialist parties gained in strenght and cohesion. There was also a slight increase of the legislative parties. Till the 1970s electoral volatility re- maided low and socialist and non-socialist blocs were extremely even- ly balanced and minority Labour governments alternated with bourgeois coalitions. 3. Bipolar Fragmentation: 1972–1990. The European Community referendum in 1972 began a strong change in the party system. It is clear if compare the effective number of parties that increased from 3,2 in 1969 to 4,1 in 1973. From the mid 1970s on, a massive shift could be observed in favour of the parties of the right: the Conservatives with Progress Party, popularly reffered to as ’the swing to the right’. This situation corresponded with a decline in support for Labour and the parties of the Centre. The highest suport for Conservatives was in the early 1980s, from which they have gradually lost their popularity. The Progress Party has experienced even greater and less predictable volatility, but have gone on particular successes in the elections in 1989 and 1997. 4. Multipolar Fragmentation from 1990. The legacy of the political up- heaval started in 1970s has been substancially weakened Labour Par- ty, signficant new parties on the extreme left and right, a resurgence Robert Radek • Executive power in the scandinavian political systems 125 of the right and a simultaneous atrophy of the non-socialist centre. The fragmentation, volatility and some polarisation was a visible longer term party system trend23. At the electoral level, increased competition between tthe parties visibly reflected in the increased number of floating voters. After the early 1970s about one-third electors shifted position from one election to the next, as compared to the 1960s when the corresponding figure was one-fourth. In the Storting elections of the 1990s, gross individual volatility has reached almost 45 per cent24. According to analysis of Kaare Strøm and Hanne Marthe Narrud Norwe- gian parties, both those on the Left and those on the right, traditionally had strong mass membership organizations. For many years about fifteen per cent of the electorate were dues-paying members, according to reports from party headquarters. In some smaller parties, particularly the Centre Party, the ratio of members to voters has at times been as high as one in three. However, national election surveys indicate that during the 1990s party membership de- clined to around 10–11 per cent. In such parties as the Labour Party and the Liberals, it had the late 1990s come closer to 5 per cent than to double digits. According to the parties’ own records, the Labour Party and the Conserva- tives (the two largest membership organizations) both lost about one-third of their gross membership figures between 1993 and 1999, whereas the smaller parties all suffered somewhat smaller losses25.

III.

The party system and election rules are important factors that influence cabinet position in Norway and other modern democracies. Also quite crucial is cabinet formation to understand rules regulating executive power in Norway. Formally, the Norwegian Constitution of 1814, which is currently the oldest living codified constitution in Europe and indeed second only to that of the United States in the democratic world, gives the King wide discretion to ap-

23 H.M. Narud, K. Strøm, Norway: A Fragile Coalition..., pp. 160–161. 24 Ibidem, p. 163. 25 H.M. Narud, K. Strøm, Norway: Virtual..., p. 526. 126 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 point the members of the cabinet (formally known as the King’s Council). In practice, however, the King has exerted no influence on the composition of any cabinet since 1928, and it is questionable whether he could constitutionally exercise any such authority today. In reality, when he formally calls upon someone to form a new government, the King always follows the advice of the leaders of the parliamentary parties. In practice, the choice of a Prime Minis- ter-designate has rarely been difficult. The use of informateurs has no codified place in the Norwegian Constitution, and the practice has been rare indeed. In the postwar period, there is only one notable case. In the difficult cabinet crisis of 1971, when a bourgeois majority coalition had just broken down over the EC issue and the Prime Minister’s conduct in this area, the King formally gave the President of the Storting, Conservative Bernt Ingvaldsen, the mandate of investigating the opportunities for another non-socialist coalition. It was obvious that the role of Ingvaldsen, a senior, right-wing, and somewhat formal member of his party, was purely that of an informateur. At any rate, his efforts failed for no fault of his own, and the informateur institution has never again been used. But on the other hand if the recent trend toward party system fragmentation and coalition fluidity continues, however, it is not inconceivable that a stronger tradition of informateurship may develop26. Because of the lack of formal rules and mechanisms, Norwegian government formation is best described as ‘free-style bargaining’. One of the most fundamental procedural rule is called ‘negative parliamentarism’, that is, the rule that governments can be invested and sustained as long as there is no ex- plicite majority vote of opposition in Parliament. Norwegian parliamentary procedure contains several more or less formal rules that contribute to this practice. The following rules are: 1. There is no formal vote of investiture, and governments are assumed to have the confidence of the Storting until the opposite has been demonstrated. 2. The Prime Minister is neither formally nor by convention expected to hand in his (or her) resignation at the end of a parliamentary term or on any other formal occasion (e.g. the accession to the throne of a new King).

26 Ibidem, p. 532. Robert Radek • Executive power in the scandinavian political systems 127 3. Moreover, the prevailing interpretation of confidence and no-confidence votes is permissive and allows the cabinet to remain in office under circumstances in which it might otherwise have to design27.

Table 1. Governments in Norway from 1945 to 2016

Prime Type of the No. Cabinet Took office Left office Party(s) Minister government

Gerhardsen’s 25 June 1945 4 November Einar Gerhard- Labour, Conse- minority First Cabinet 1945 sen rvative, Liberal, coalition 1 Agrarian, Communist

Gerhardsen’s 5 November 18 November Einar Gerhard- Labour single-party 2 Second Cabinet 1945 1951 sen majority

Torp’s 9 November 21 January Oscar Torp Labour single-party 3 Cabinet 1951 1955 majority

Gerhardsen’s 22 January 27 August 1963 Einar Gerhard- Labour single-party 4 Third Cabinet 1955 sen minority

Lyng’s 28 August 1963 24 September John Lyng Conservative, minority Cabinet 1963 Centre, Chri- coalition 5 stian Democra- tic, Liberal

Gerhardsen’s 25 September 11 October Einar Gerhard- Labour single-party 6 Fourth Cabinet 1963 1965 sen minority

Borten’s 12 October 16 March 1971 Per Borten Conservative, majority Cabinet 1965 Liberal, Centre, coalition Christian (1965–1969) 7 Democratic minority coalition (1969–1971)

Bratteli’s 17 March 1971 16 October Trygve Bratteli Labour single-party 8 First Cabinet 1972 minority

Korvald’s 17 October 11 October Lars Korvald Centre, Chri- minority 9 Cabinet 1972 1973 stian Democra- coalition tic, Liberal

Bratteli’s 12 October 14January 1976 Trygve Bratteli Labour single-party 10 Second Cabinet 1973 minority

27 Ibidem, p. 533 and further. 128 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6

Prime Type of the No. Cabinet Took office Left office Party(s) Minister government

Nordli’s 15 January 3 February Odvar Nordli Labour single-party 11 Cabinet 1976 1981 minority

Brundtland’s 4 February 13 October Gro Harlem Labour single-party 12 First Cabinet 1981 1981 Brundtland minority

Willoch’s 14 October 7 June 1983 Kåre Willoch Conservative single-party 13 First Cabinet 1981 minority

Willoch’s 8 June 1983 8 May 1986 Kåre Willoch Conservative, majority Second Cabinet Christian coalition 14 Democratic, Centre

Brundtland’s 9 May 1986 15 October Gro Harlem Labour single-party 15 Second Cabinet 1989 Brundtland minority

Syse’s 16 October 2 November Jan P. Syse Conservative, minority Cabinet 1989 1990 Christian coalition 16 Democratic, Centre

Brundtland’s 3 November 24 October Gro Harlem Labour single-party 17 Third Cabinet 1990 1996 Brundtland minority

Jagland’s 25 October 16 October Thorbjørn Labour single-party 18 Cabinet 1996 1997 Jagland minority

Bondevik’s 17 October 16 March 2000 Kjell Magne Christian Demo- minority 19 First Cabinet 1997 Bondevik cratic, Centre, coalition Liberal

Stoltenberg’s 17 March 2000 18 October Jens Stolten- Labour single-party 20 First Cabinet 2001 berg minority

Bondevik’s 19 October 16 October Kjell Magne Conservative, minority 21 Second Cabinet 2001 2005 Bondevik Christian Demo- coalition cratic, Liberal

Stoltenberg’s 17 October 15 October Jens Stolten- Labour, Socialist majority 22 Second Cabinet 2005 2013 berg Left, Centre coalition

Solberg’s 16 October incumbent Erna Solberg Conservative, minority 23 Cabinet 2013 Progress Party coalition

Source: Own study based on information from M. Grzybowski, Norwegia. Zarys..., pp. 182, 186, 194; M. Grzybowski, Systemy konstytucyjne państw skandynawskich, Warszawa 2011, p. 161; H.M. Narud, K. Strøm, Norway: A Fragile Coalition Order, [In:] Coalition Governments in Western Europe, eds. W.C. Müller, K. Strøm, Oxford University Press 2006, p. 171; K. Strøm, Minority Government and Majority Rule, Cambridge University Press 2010, pp. 196–197. Robert Radek • Executive power in the scandinavian political systems 129 It is stressed in the literature that the fluidity and informality of the Nor- wegian Constitution has a permissive impact on coalition bargaining. Spe- cifically, it has favoured the formation of numerically weak governments. Norway is one of the world’s leaders in the frequency of minority governments, especially from the 1970s onwards. Till 1961, the Labour Party dom- inated Norwegian elections, and the country experienced stable, single-party, majority governments. The 1961 election, however, deprived the Labour Party of a parliamentary majority, which it has never again recaptured. After that severe change, Norwegian cabinets have more often been ‘undersized’, and coalitions have been less common than single-party cabinets. Moreo- ver, in most cases in which (non-socialist) coalitions have formed, the coalition-building process has stopped short of a majority. Even in these cases, then, some ‘coalition avoidance’ has taken place. While this record no doubt has multiple causes, part of the explanation surely lies in the permissive institutional rules concerning government formation and confidence. From the first postwar election in 1945 till now, there have been twenty-four cabinets: fourteen single-party administrations and ten coalitions. Five cabinets included parties that collectively controlled a majority of the seats in the Storting (around 20% of the post-war cabintes), whereas nineteen (around 80% of the post-war cabinets) were minority cabinets. Most of these relied on ad hoc parliamentary support. While the composition and size of Nor- wegian governments have changed substantially over the postwar period, other patterns of cabinet formation have almost remained stable. Howev- er there has been no peacetime coalition between Socialist and non-socialist parties for many years but this rule has been changed after election in 2005 when a wide majority colation was formed. In fact, the Norwegian La- bour Party was for many post-war decades the only major social democratic party in Western Europe that tried not to enter a cabinet coalition with any bourgeois party. Labour has eschewed coalitions not only with non-socialist parties, but also with the smaller parties to its left. This tactic finally collapsed and we face now some new tendencies in the cabinet formation in Norway at the beginning of twenty-first century28. Firstly, it must be stated the increse of further ‘erosion’ of electorates of main Norwegian parties, so none of the parties can aspire to form a homog-

28 Ibidem. 130 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 enous majority government. Secondly, in the cabinet formation process there were vanished two crucial barriers which were stable for many years before. One was a habit not to create government coalition between Labours and center parties and another was including into government coalition a party that for many years was treated as an anti-system protest party (Progress Party). Thirdly, some new ideas connected with supporting government were invented (for example a model of external support of government instead of joining a formal coalition)29. In conclusion minority governments in Norway should not always be criticised. The strong position of parliament means that parties in opposition have considerable decision-making clout. In this case the participation in government is not necessary to gain influence and as a result a minority governments become more likey At the turn of twentieth and twenty-first century the slight evolution of government formation may be noticed, but it is not a kind of unexpected revolution. There are no visible preffered parties that can legitimize its mandate to form a stable majority government. More coalition governments are more possible and this fact reflects the changes in the party system and transfer of electoral preferences. Analisys showed also a kind of balance between maintance of majority coalition governments and minority coalition governments in Norwegian politics. The last observation confirms that a role and impact of minority cabinets in Norway is still alive and actual and can be treated as a norm in spite of changes in the party system that also can be noticed.

Literature

Grofman B., Lijphart A., The Evolution of Electoral and Party Systems in the Nordic Coun- tries, New York 2002. Grzybowski M., Norwegia. Zarys systemu ustrojowego, Kraków 2015. Grzybowski M., Systemy konstytucyjne państw skandynawskich, Warszawa 2011. Herman V., Pope J., Minority Governments in Western Democracies, “British Journal of Political Science” 1973, Vol. 3.

29 M. Grzybowski, Norwegia..., pp. 193–194. Robert Radek • Executive power in the scandinavian political systems 131 Kalandrakis T., Minority Governments: Ideology and Office, Boston Seminar 2002, http:// politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/4754/kalandrakis.pdf. Narud H.M., Strøm K., Norway: A Fragile Coalition Order, [In:] Coalition Governments in Western Europe, eds. W.C. Müller, K. Strøm, Oxford 2006. Narud H.M., Strøm K., Norway: Virtual Parliamentarism, [In:] Delegation and Account- ability in Parliamentary Democracies, eds. K. Strøm, W.C. Müller, T. Bergman, Ox- ford 2006. Parliamentary Governments in the Nordic Countries at the Crossroads: Coping with Chal- lenges from Europeanisation and Presidentialisation, eds. T. Persson, M. Wiberg, Stockholm 2011. Persson T., Wiberg M., The Nordic Model of Parliamentary Government and its Challeng- es, [In:] Parliamentary Governments in the Nordic Countries at the Crossroads: Cop- ing with Challenges from Europeanisation and Presidentialisation, eds. T. Persson, M. Wiberg, Stockholm 2011. Rasch B.E., Why Minority Governments? Executive-Legislative Relations in the Nordic Countries, [In:] Parliamentary Governments in the Nordic Countries at the Crossroads: Coping with Challenges from Europeanisation and Presidentialisation, eds. T. Pers- son, M. Wiberg, Stockholm 2011. Rose R., The Problem of Party Government, London 1974. Sartori G., Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge 1976. Strøm K., Minority Government and Majority Rule, Cambridge 2010. Wpływ deformacji wyborczych na systemy polityczne, red. J. Iwanek, Toruń 2014.

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.07 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Ilton Robl Filho1 Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet2

Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution of Brazil and the Problem of its Collision with other Fundamental Rights, particularly personality rights

Keywords: Democratic Rule of Law, Freedom of Speech, Fundamental Rights, Colli- sion, Balancing Słowa kluczowe: demokratyczne państwo prawa, wolności słowa, prawa podstawowe, kolizja, równoważenie

Summary The fundamental right to freedom of speech is a central element of the rule of law in a democratic state that constantly collides with other fundamental rights. Both in court decisions and in legal literature there is a significant discussion on the limits of the freedom of speech, mainly concerning its collision with other fundamental rights, particularly personality rights. This debate has become very strong in Bra- zilian constitutional case law, mainly in the Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tri- bunal Federal), but also in other constitutional systems and even in the domain of international law. Based on the decisions of the Brazilian Supreme Court and those of the US Supreme Court and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, this paper aims to discuss some criteria that may guide Courts when balancing freedom of speech and other fundamental rights.

1 Doctor of Law (UFPR) and post-Doctor of Law (PUCRS), Associate Professor of UFPR and UPF and lawyer. 2 PhD and post-Doctor of Law (F.M.U.-München), Professor of PUCRS and Appeals Court judge. 134 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Streszczenie

Wolność słowa w Konstytucji Federalnej Brazylii i problem jego kolizji z innymi prawami podstawowymi, w szczególności prawami osobistymi

Podstawowe prawo do wolności słowa jest głównym elementem praworządności w pańs- twie demokratycznym, które nieustannie zderza się z innymi prawami podstawowymi. Zarówno w orzecznictwie sądowym, jak i doktrynie, trwa dyskusja o granicach wolności słowa, dotycząca przede wszystkim jego kolizji z innymi prawami podstawowymi, w szc- zególności prawami osobistymi. Debata ta stała się bardzo intensywna w związku z bra- zylijskim orzecznictwem konstytucjnym, głównie Federalnego Sądu Najwyższego (Supre- mo Tribunal Federal), ale także w innych systemach konstytucyjnych, a nawet w prawie międzynarodowym. Na podstawie decyzji Sądu Najwyższego Brazylii, a także Sądu Na- jwyższego USA i niemieckiego Federalnego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, opracowanie to ma na celu przybliżenie pewnych kryteriów, którymi mogą kierować się sądy przy or- zekaniu o wolności słowa i innych prawach podstawowych.

The discussion on freedom of speech in general and freedom of the press in particular is one of the most stimulating and complex topics of constitutional law as well as universal and regional international law of contemporary human rights. In Brazil this debate was further emphasized due to the Supreme Court’s decision – with the opinion issued by High Court Justice Carlos Britto – in ADPF [Claim of Non-compliance with a Fun- damental Prescription] No. 130/DF, to not consider “incorporated” Law No. 5,250 (1967), usually known as “Press Law”, by the 1988 Federal Con- stitution (hereafter only BFC = Brazilian Federal Constitution), highlight- ing the prohibition – mentioned by the author of the opinion –of regulating the aforementioned freedoms, arguing that freedom of speech is almost absolute as only the limitations expressly established by the BFC, in particular the prohibition of anonymity, the right to later compensation and the right of reply, are applicable. Ilton R. Filho, Ingo W. Sarlet • Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution... 135 By that decision, a regulatory void at the level of ordinary legislation in the domain of the freedom of speech was created to a greater or lesser extent3, without prejudice to some partial regulation, for instance the right to reply in electoral disputes and currently in other social communication media, in accordance with Law No. 13,188/2015, leaving most questions to be examined by the judiciary. In turn, magistrates in general have proven to be strong advocates of the freedom of speech, particularly freedom of the press or, in the broadest sense, media freedom, suggesting even – in spite of the well-known controversy on the subject – that also in Brazil one can support (at least in the view of the Bra- zilian Federal Supreme Court – hereafter only BFSC) a preferred position of the freedom of speech in the broader context of fundamental rights and guarantees. In this context, our purpose is to situate the issue of the restraints on freedom of speech in a democratic state, as enshrined in the BFC, without intending to exhaust the range of issues raised by this matter, given its diversity, heterogeneity and complexity, without prejudice to its repercussion on the criminal, administrative and civil spheres, to mention only the most current legal cases. In short, although prioritizing the Bra- zilian constitutional perspective, our aim here is to use some examples from foreign law (emphasizing the USA and to a lesser extent Germany) and to explore the way in which the BFSC has dealt with the issue and the criteria applied to the solution of such conflicts, including a critical reflexive analysis that may contribute to the advancement of the discussion in Brazil. Thus, after a brief analysis of the position and content of freedom of speech in a democratic state, with emphasis on the BFC (2), we will discuss the restraints on freedom of speech, in particular the so-called collisions with other fundamental rights and the criteria adopted for their solution (3), which will be followed, at the end, by some conclusions (4).

3 This problem, in particular the discussion on the constitutional provision regulating the social communication media, its modes of implementation and its various aspects will not be developed here. 136 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 II.

Although there are some common elements, a trend that appears to be irre- versible, at least considering the strong proximity of Western European, An- glo-Saxon and Latin American legal traditions and cultures, there is no universally valid and correct answer to the content and restraints on freedom of speech in general and to the way of solving the collision between freedom of speech and the so-called personality rights, for instance right to privacy, image and honor. In relation to these rights, a prominent position is given to honor, image and privacy, but also to the collision with other constitutional rights, such as – and this is becoming increasingly emblematic – religious freedom, protection of children and adolescents, as well as internal and external public security – in this respect, suffice it to point out the problems of organized crime and terrorism. Thus, in order to make the subject easier to understand and to illustrate with examples the lack of uniformity in the treatment of the matter, we start with three cases taken from real-life situations which are related to that conflict involving decisions made by the Supreme Courts (operating as constitutional courts in each case) of the three countries selected for the purposes of this article. Case 1. The Governor of Bavaria (Federal Republic of Germany) was depicted as a pig in several comic strips of a magazine with strong political lean- ings and funded by a left-wing party. In these drawings the politician is seen having sex with a sow wearing a court gown. The purpose of the pictures is to report supposedly promiscuous activities between politicians and members of the judiciary4. Case 2. Making it quite clear that the information in this story was not true, a US pornographic magazine published a fictional interview with a religious leader, an advocate of traditional Christian family values, stating that this personality had had his first sexual intercourse with his mother5.

4 Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfGE) 75, 369 1 BvR 313/85 Strauß caricature-decision, 1987. 5 U.S. Supreme Court (U.S.SupC). Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 1988. Ilton R. Filho, Ingo W. Sarlet • Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution... 137 Case 3. In Brazil the author of a work of historical revisionism was convicted of racism for denying the Holocaust which resulted in the genocide committed against the Jewish people by the German National-Socialist regime during World War II, and the decision was affirmed by the BFSC6. At first glance, it can be seen that, even considering the need for a distinction concerning the content and form of the dissemination of the respective messages as well as taking into account the differences in the format of each particular legal system and the peculiarities of each legal tradition as far as freedom of speech and its restraints are concerned, in all summarily described cases it is possible to detect a frontal collision between freedom of speech and other constitutional rights and values. Even if the three cases discuss public issues par excellence, the first case discusses the core of the democratic state’s structure and contains clear criticism of a political nature including the separation of powers and their respective image. The second case involves an attack, using sharp irony and even shocking content, on the conservative discourse about family and sexuality. The third case, in turn, deals with the issue of whether that book amounts to so-called hate speech and whether it involves a relativization of the constitutional requirement of strict legality in criminal cases. At first sight it is clear that although the decisions have several elements in common, the three cases differ in many respects. Regarding the first case, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court (henceforth only GFCC) ruled: a) that this is a case of artistic freedom, according to art. 5 (3) of the German Federal Basic Law (henceforth only GFBL), which, however, is directly related to freedom of speech; b) that even viewing cartoons as a genre which par excellence uses exaggeration and that public figures are constant targets of social criticism, the drawings in the German magazine Konkret attacked the State of Bavaria’s President as a person, violating his dignity, and c) that in this specific case the caricature no longer contained criticism as such, but was basically designed to humiliate and expose the former State President of Bavaria, amounting to what the GFCC called a Schmähkritik, no longer protected under the freedom of speech clause. Thus

6 Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF). Habeas corpus n. 82.424/RS. Opinion by Justice Moreira Alves, 2004. 138 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 the trial court’s decision to convict of defamation, establishing the payment of a fine, was maintained, and the first court of appeal’s legal decision to ac- quit was overturned. When judging case number two, the US Supreme Court (henceforth only SC), in the famous case Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, gave preference to artistic freedom and freedom of speech. It should be noted that Jerry Falwell, a leading religious authority and US public figure, sued the pornographic magazine Hustler and its editor Larry Flynt for attacking his privacy, for defamation and for intentional offensive and harmful behavior and the inflic- tion of moral distress. Larry Flynt was sentenced to pecuniary civil compensation for the violation of the religious and psychic integrity of Jerry Falwell. But the SC overturned the decision of the lower courts arguing that a) freedom of expression is essential to the free flow of ideas and thoughts on issues of public interest and that b) this freedom, in addition to being an individual right, guarantees access to the truth and society’s vitality. Besides this, the Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell case is part of the tradition built by the SC in the course of the 20th century ensuring that freedom of speech main- tains a preferred position among other constitutional rights and guarantees7.

III.

In view of the above considerations and collated examples, it appears that the manner of dealing with and solving the main problem of the text, namely, solving collisions (conflicts) between freedom of speech and other fundamental rights and/or constitutionally protected interests, is indeed very diverse, which also has to do with the position, function and scope granted to freedom of speech in each legal and constitutional order, either due to positive constitutional law in constitutional texts or by the hierarchy under the Fed- eral Constitution legislator’s work, but also, and especially, by the courts and, in particular, the courts protecting the constitution. Under the 1988 Federal Constitution, freedom of speech (or communica- tive freedoms) was the object of a more detailed regulation, corresponding, at

7 On the history of the freedom of speech in North America, see, C.R. Sunstein, Democ- racy and the problem of free speech, New York 1995, p. 4. Ilton R. Filho, Ingo W. Sarlet • Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution... 139 least according to the constitutional text, to the level of recognition and protection compatible with an authentic democratic state. In this context and still in a preliminary stage, it must be observed that, under the prevailing doctrine and jurisprudence, including the Supreme Court, we decided to use the generic term freedom of speech, as a concept that encompasses both the free expression of thought, under Arti- cles 5, item IV of the Constitution, and the other dimensions of freedom of speech. Freedom of speech, therefore, as Jónatas Machado suggested, will be here treated as a kind of “mother-right”8, contradicting a fragmented approach which part of the specialized literature tends to establish between the freedom of communication and of speech9. Thus, the various fundamental prerogatives linked to freedom of speech will be analyzed not as a mere conglomerate, but as interrelated parts of a general concept, which calls for a systematic and integrated approach, preserving, however, the peculiarities of each specific fundamental right10, which will be considered in subsequent developments, when, after a general part on freedom of speech, the most relevant aspects of each freedom (right) in particular will be examined. These differences, however, do not preclude the consideration, which is presupposed in this article, of the premise adopted by the Supreme Court and the dominant Brazilian doctrine (which in this respect is closer to the US than to Germany) on the inclusion of freedom of speech (and freedom of the media) in a uniform regime. Obviously, in relation to other freedoms placed in the general context of freedom of speech, as in the case of freedom of teaching and research, freedom of assembly and demonstration, artistic freedom and religious freedom, the BCF itself sets guidelines and even specific restraints that in this case must be observed. However, these will not be studied here.

8 See J.E.M., Machado, Liberdade de expressão: dimensões constitucionais da esfera pública no sistema social, Coimbra 2002, p. 370. 9 See, for example, the path trodden in the case of Brazilian literature, by E. Farias, Liber- dade de expressão e comunicação: teoria e proteção constitucional, São Paulo 2004, especially p. 52, although it is necessary to record that the author also supports a broad scope of protection of both freedoms, presenting a detailed range of legal prerogatives covered by them. 10 See Art. 5, Meinungsfreiheit, Pressefreiheit u.a. [In:] Stern-Becker, Grundrechte-Kom- mentar, Köln 2010, p. 530. 140 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Yet, as regards the role of freedom of speech in the democratic rule of law it is widely acknowledged to be one of the most precious fundamental rights and corresponds to one of the oldest human needs. Hence it is integrated into the rights expressed in the constitution from the first modern phase of constitutionalism11. Just as freedom of speech and thought build their main foundations (and objectives) on the dignity of the human person, in relation to autonomy and the free development of individual personality, this freedom is also related, in a social and political dimension, to the conditions and the guarantee of democracy and political pluralism, ensuring a kind of free market of ideas and assuming, in this sense, a quality of a political right with a clearly transindividual dimension12, as freedom of speech and its respective restraints essentially operate in the sphere of communication and social life relations. Thus, although here there is no reason to further explore this issue, the Court notes that the relationship between democracy and freedom of speech is a mutual constraint and assumes a complementary dialectical and dynamic character, because democracy as a rule means more freedom of speech and vice-versa (more freedom of speech indicates more democracy), not excluding, on the other hand, the fact that exercising the right of freedom of speech can pose risks to democracy and the exercise of democracy might possibly impair freedom of speech13. As regards the scope of protection, freedom of speech as a fundamental right encompasses a diverse set of situations, basically covering a number of freedoms (faculties) with spiritual content, including non-verbal expressions, such as musical expression, communication through arts and others14. Free- dom of speech consists, more precisely, of the freedom to express opinions,

11 See, P.G. G. Branco, Liberdades, [In:] Mendes G.F., Branco P.G. G., Curso de direito constitucional, 6ª ed., São Paulo 2011, p. 296. 12 In this sense, see, pars pro toto, J.E.M. Machado, op.cit., p. 237, who attaches to freedom of speech essentially an instrumental character, therefore, it is not an end in itself. 13 From this perspective, see, F. Michelman, Relações entre democracia e liberdade de ex- pressão: discussão de alguns argumentos, [In:] Direitos fundamentais, informática e comunicação, eds. I.W. Sarlet, Porto Alegre 2007, p. 49. 14 See L. Michael, M. Morlok, Grundrechte, Baden-Baden 2008, p. 126 e, no direito bra- sileiro, P.G. G. Branco, op.cit., p. 297. Ilton R. Filho, Ingo W. Sarlet • Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution... 141 namely judgments about facts, ideas, opinions of third parties, etc.15 Thus, it is freedom of opinion which is at the basis of all modes of freedom of speech16, including the concept of opinion (which, in the BFC language was ultimately equated to the concept of thought) and adopted in a broad and inclusive manner, embracing, just to make it clearer, manifestations about facts and not only value judgments17. It should be added that besides protecting the content, i.e. the object of expression, the means of expression are broadly, openly and in- clusively protected, as in the case of electronic communication18. An elastic understanding of the scope of protection runs up against some controversial issues, as for instance the denial of historical facts or even as far as the existence of the duty of producing the evidence that will change the outcome is concerned, as well as with regard to so-called crimes of opinion, since, in such cases, there have been great controversies regarding their inclusion within the sphere of protecting freedom of speech), which refers to the problem of the sphere of protection and the restraints of freedom of speech, which will be the object of attention in the next segment (3 below). In relation to its condition as a fundamental right, it should still be recalled at this conceptual stage that freedom of speech in its various manifestations encompasses both the right (faculty) of a person to express and not to express themselves or even not to inform themselves19. Thus, first and foremost, freedom of speech assumes the essential condition of the right to defense (negative right), operating as the person’s right not to be hindered in expressing and/ or disclosing their ideas and opinions, although without prejudice to a cor-

15 See V. Epping, Grundrechte, 3rd ed., Berlin-Heidelberg-New York 2007, p. 86. 16 According to J.A. da. Silva, Curso de direito constitucional positive, 28th ed. rev. and updated. São Paulo 2007, p. 241, the freedom of opinion “summarizes the freedom of thought itself in its various forms of expression. That is why the doctrine calls it a primary freedom and starting point of others. It is an individual freedom to adopt the intellectual attitude of one’s choice: either an intimate thought, or a public position taken; freedom to think and say what one believes to be true.” For the author, by adhering to a broad concept, freedom of opinion “is externalized by the exercise of freedom of communication, religion, intellectual, artistic, scientific, cultural expression and transmission and reception of knowledge” ibidem, p. 243. 17 See, L. Michael, M. Morlok, op.cit., p. 128. 18 See J.J.G. Canotilho, V. Moreira, Constituição da República portuguesa anotada, 4th ed., Coimbra 2007, p. 572, adopting a broader conception in the sphere of protection of freedom of speech. 19 See, P.G. G. Branco, op.cit., p. 298. 142 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 relative positive dimension, since freedom of speech implies a right to access the means of expression, which does not necessarily mean free direct access to social means of communication20, although this component has also become increasingly important at various times (in the Brazilian case, for example, the access of political parties to the media for the purpose of disseminating their programs, candidates, etc.), which is seen with greater interest because of the objective dimension of freedom of speech. Indeed, also in relation to freedom of speech, it has been verified that it presents a dual subjective and objective dimension, namely, operating both as an individual subjective right (and even collective, depending on the particular case), of a negative nature (implying negative rights), or, depending on the particular case, involving subjective rights to benefits.. These, in turn, are strongly linked to the objective dimension, which requires duties of protection supplied by the state, partly fulfilled by the issuance of procedural norms and, on the other hand, also realized by the creation and regulation of institutions (entities) which protect and promote rights. As to the duties of the state, at the constitutional level there is the Social Communication Council (Art. 224, FC), which will not be thematized here, and such duties are also binding on judicial institutions, ensuring not only the proper consideration of rights and interests that are at stake, specifically in the realm of relations between private individuals, but also controlling the constitutionality of state acts which interfere with freedom of speech. Indeed, the role of the judiciary in this context, exercising the duty to protect, is particularly important, complex and controversial in the context of conflicts between freedom of speech and other fundamental rights, in besides the judicial review of constitutionality when rights are restrained by state agencies, which will be discussed in a moment.

IV.

Due to its relevance to democracy and political pluralism, freedom of speech – at least according to a significant doctrine in Brazil and in the United States – takes on a kind of preferred position when resolving conflicts with other con-

20 See J.J.G. Canotilho, V. Moreira, op.cit, pp. 572–573. Ilton R. Filho, Ingo W. Sarlet • Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution... 143 stitutional principles and fundamental rights21. Although it is stated that, in Brazil, the theory of preferred position is adopted, as enshrined by the Su- preme Court on the occasion of ADPF No. 130, this theory is generally tim- idly applied22, and, on the other hand, it is not recognized by the majority in n Germany and, generally, in Europe, where freedom of speech does not assume a prior preferred position in the fundamental rights architecture. Anyhow, even if it is accepted (an aspect about which particular skepticism is shown considering the peculiarities of the Brazilian positive constitutional law), the doctrine of the preferred position is not a matter of attributing to freedom of speech (in any of its particular manifestations) the condition of a right that is completely immune to any restraint and restriction, nor of establishing a kind of prior hierarchy among the constitutional norms Thus, when it comes to a preferred position, one seeks to recognize freedom of speech in a position of advantage in the case of conflicts with other fundamental rights with regard to the hierarchy of conflicting positions in this specific case23. Thus, by solving a possible conflict between freedom of speech and other individual and collective fundamental rights, one cannot fail to consider the proportionality requirements and other criteria applicable to such situations, which one sees practiced even by the BFSC in some situations. But before dealing with this aspect, it is worthwhile recalling the distinction between expressly established constitutional restraints, such as the prohibition of anonymity (art. 5, IV, BFC) and the prohibition of censorship (art. 5, IX, and 220, § 2, BFC) as well as, somehow, part of the right to reply (art. 5. V, BFC) and the right to compensation for a disproportionate violation of personality rights not supported by the Constitution (art. 5, X, BFC). Indirect restraints should also not be disregarded, in the sense of being expressly authorized by the BFC and implemented by the legislator (legal reserves) – in this

21 See, in Brazilian doctrine, L.R. Barroso, Colisão entre liberdade de expressão e direitos da personalidade. Critérios de ponderação. Interpretação constitucionalmente adequada do Código Civil e da Lei de Imprensa, “Revista latino americana de estudos constitucionais” Belo Hori- zonte: Del Rey, 2005, nº. 5. 22 R.L.-F. Koatz, As liberdades de expressão e de imprensa na jurisprudência do STF, [In:] Direitos fundamentais no Supremo Tribunal Federal: balanço e crítica, eds. D. Sarmento, I.W. Sarlet, Rio de Janeiro 2011, p. 402. 23 On this topic, see an important contribution made by J.H. Weingartner Neto, Pri- vacidade e liberdade de imprensa. Uma pauta de justificação penal, Porto Alegre 2002, p. 147. 144 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 case, non-existent in the context of freedom of speech in the BFC – and the restraints implicitly authorized by the BFC. These questions are specifically related to problems of conflict between fundamental rights and the imposition of restrictions due to the need to harmonize the fullest possible exercise of freedom of speech with the enjoyment and protection of other fundamental constitutional rights, prerogatives and powers. Since this text focuses on conflicts between freedom of speech and other rights, the prohibitions of anonymity and censorship, as well as the rights to reply and to compensation will be briefly addressed insofar as they are related to the central theme. With regard to censorship, the BFC, in Art. 5, IX, in the context of free expression of intellectual, artistic, scientific and communications activities, establishes a categorical prohibition, repeated in Art. 220, § 2, BFC according to which “any kind of political, ideological and artistic censorship is forbidden.” It is known that the prohibition of censorship is to such a point relevant to freedom of speech that, according to Jónatas Machado, “freedom of the press is, historically, freedom against prior censorship.”24 In turn, the prohibition of censorship does not waive a definition of what censorship is, even to distinguish between situations in the light of the legal and constitutional system. In a first approach, since the notion of censorship is widely shared, the censorship that might be considered entirely and in any case absolutely forbidden by the BFC, consists, according to Jónatas Machado’s teaching of the prior restriction of freedom of speech made by the administrative authority that results in forbidding the dissemination (publication) of a given con- tent25. On the question whether other prior interventions (e.g. established due to the protection of other fundamental rights in the event of a collision between these and freedom of speech) fall within the notion of censorship and to what extent they may be (or not) constitutionally legitimate, there is a heated debate and what prevails is the view that in order to ensure the protection of freedom of speech, the prohibition of censorship and license must be understood in a broad sense. Thus, this prohibition includes not

24 See, J.E.M. Machado, op.cit., p. 487. 25 Ibidem, pp. 486–487. Ilton R. Filho, Ingo W. Sarlet • Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution... 145 just the typical administrative censorship, but also other hypotheses of prohibition or restraint of freedom of expression and free circulation of information and ideas26. This is observed, for example (here in the Brazilian case), when the Su- preme Court, analyzing the constitutionality of the rule contained in articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code, in the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality [ADI] No. 4815, after a Public Hearing with the participation of major public and private institutions, politicians, lawyers and writers on 21.11.201327, performed an interpretation according to the Constitution by saying that it is “unenforceable to demand the consent of a person about whom a biogra- phy is written, regarding literary or audiovisual biographical works, and it is likewise unnecessary to obtain the authorization of people who are portrayed as supporting characters (or their families in the case of deceased persons).” Nevertheless, although it is necessary to have a broad interpretation of censorship to protect freedom of speech, it is important to distinguish between censorship and other restriction mechanisms (which may, according to the particular case, be constitutionally justified), which is needed even to preserve the characteristics of each form of freedom of speech and even not to assign an absolute character to freedom of speech. Moreover, although the prohibition of censorship is a rule and not a principle, it is an open (undetermined)

26 See, E. Farias, op.cit., p. 188. 27 The following were heard at the Public Hearing: a) Federal Prosecutor’s Office (Odim Brandão Ferreira), b) Brazilian Academy of Letters (Ana Maria Machado), c) Brazilian Asso- ciation of Constitutionalist Democrats (Roberto Dias), d) Brazilian Union of Writers (Alaor Barbosa dos Santos), e) Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (José Murilo de Carvalho), f) Brazilian Association of Independent Television Producers (Leo Wojdojdyslawski), g) Representatives of the Copyright Committee of the Bar Association – Sectional São Paulo (Silmara Chinelato), h) Open Word Institute (Patricia Blanco), i) Newton Lima (Congress- man), j) Interstate Union of Audiovisual Industry (Claudio Lins de Vasconcelos), k) Ronaldo Caiado (Congressman), l) Marcos Rogerio (Congressman), m) National Association of Book Publishers (Sonia da Cruz Machado de Moraes), n) Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute (Ivar Alberto Martins Harmann), o) Ministry of Culture (Renato de Andrade Lessa) p) Associação Eduardo Banks (Ralph Anzolin Lichote), q) Council of Social Communication of the National Congress (Ronaldo Lemos), r) São Paulo Press Association (Sergio Redó) s) John Ribeiro Moraes (lawyer) and t) the Brazilian Bar Association (Marcus Vinicius Furtado Coelho) See Supremo Tribuna Federal, Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade nº 4815, Opinion by Justice Carmen Lucia, 2016, pp. 13–22. 146 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 concept which needs to be filled with content. In any case, as Daniel Sarmento points out, an important general guideline to be observed is that restrictions on freedom of speech are permissible only in very exceptional cases, when the protection of rights or other comparative legal interests are involved, since the general rule, which is inferred from the BFC, is that possible abuse and inju- ries to rights must later be punished and compensated28. The example of unauthorized biographies, in turn, reveals the Supreme Court’s position aiming to control the constitutional legitimacy of legal rules enacted hierarchically by law under the Federal Constitution based on the pa- rameters of freedom of speech, as shown in the decision made in ADI [Direct Action of Unconstitutionality] No. 4,81529. Furthermore, at least as can be inferred from most of the opinions, that decision states that freedom of speech occupies a conditioned preferred position in the context of the constitutional system, but it does not dispense with critical appraisal and a certain acceptance when it conflicts with other fundamental rights and constitutional hierarchy of principles, which can be found also in the case of Supreme Court Justice Carmen Lucia’s opinion. However, despite the relevant and even paradigmatic decisions established in ADPF No. 130 and ADI No. 4815, the complexity of issues relating to freedom of speech, press and information, because of different demands and collisions between these fundamental rights and other constitutional rights and values, so far no full adaptation has been produced for the Supreme Court’s

28 See in D. Sarmento, Comentários ao artigo 5º, IV, CF, [In:] J.J. G. Canotilho, G.F. Mendes, I.W. Sarlet, L.L. Streck, Comentários à Constituição Federal de 1988, São Paulo 2013, pp. 252–258. 29 “The object of questioning formulated in face of such constitutional principles and the validity of the widely utilized civil rules in court as legal reasoning for prohibiting decisions on biographies, what one has as core of the judicial inquiry in this decision for which an answer is requested is: a) the constitutional principles are of founding centrality in the current Brazilian legal system and determine the interpretation of the legislation hierarchically under the Fed- eral Constitution norms, including, therefore, those that compose the laws of the civil code; b) it is extracted from a first reading that civil rules configure a protection framework of some fundamental rights, constitutionally protected (right to privacy in particular), formulating prohibitive content rules in horizontal relationship (horizontal dimension of fundamental rights applied to and to be respected in civil relations); c) the general prohibition of civil rules does not make an exception, in its framing, biographical works in normative reference made to the person or their family” (Supremo Tribunal Federal, Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade n. 4815, 2016, p. 24). Ilton R. Filho, Ingo W. Sarlet • Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution... 147 interpretation. Therefore it is worth mentioning a few other decisions for il- lustrative purposes. For example, in Writ of Prevention No. 17,091 the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES), by alleging violation of binding precedent No. 1030, sought to overturn the decision which determined the publication of reports on credit analysis concessions between 2008 and March 2011, which information had been requested by Folha da Manhã S.A. Due to the confidentiality of financial institutions’ operations and the judgment of ADPF No. 130, Supreme Court Justice Le- wandowksi partially upheld the provisional remedy in order to allow access to reports after BNDES had removed all confidential information from those documents31. The absence of safe criteria or standard interpretation of the collision of freedom of expression with other constitutional rights is clear in the different positions about the in the same legal proceedings. For example, in the Writ of Prevention interim No. 19,464, the National Association of News- papers (ANJ) applied to the Supreme Court, also alleging infringement of the decision made in ADPF No. 130. In this case, the daily newspaper of the region (Diário da Região, São José do Rio Preto, São Paulo) reported on the Tamburutaca operation of the Federal Police. As the news stories had been published with information from passages obtained through telephone interception of in camera proceedings, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office -re quested the indictment of the reporter for the crime defined in art. 10 of Law No. 9,296/1996. Although the police investigation concluded that the conduct had been non-offensive, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office requested the legal disclosure of the journalist’s and newspaper’s phone records, and this claim was upheld by the First Level Federal Court and the 3rd Region Federal Court. The Nation- al Association of Newspapers’ dispute in the sense that ADPF No. 130 established the state’s inability to restrict freedom of the press and, consequently, to confront a source’s secrecy was accepted by the Supreme Court’s presiden-

30 “The decision made by a fractional body of a court that, although it does not explicitly declare the unconstitutionality of a law or a normative act of government, rejects its bearing, in whole or in part, violates the plenary reserve clause (BFC, Art. 97).”. 31 Supremo Tribunal Federal, Reclamação n. 17091, Justice Ricardo Lewandowski, 2014. 148 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 cy during the court recess period by Justice Lewandowski32. It should also be noted that after the opinion issued by the Attorney General’s Office, the rapporteur of that claim, High Court Justice Dias Toffoli, revoked the provisional remedy previously granted, based on the legal reasoning that freedom of the press is not a justification for criminal conduct33. The collated examples demonstrate that the need to assess the constitutionality of intervention in freedom of speech, in large measure, concerns restrictions which are not directly authorized by the BFC as they result and are required because of the sufficient and simultaneous protection of other fundamental rights, which may be in collision with freedom of the press. Moreover, the view that freedom of speech, including freedom of information and press (social communication), is also not absolute and finds restraints in the exercise of other fundamental rights and the safeguarding, even in the objective dimension (via the state protection duties), of other legal and constitutional prerogatives and powers, is hardly ever challenged in contemporary constitutional law and even in the sphere of international human rights law. On the other hand, there is still an intense controversy about what these restraints are, as well as about how and to what extent one can intervene in freedom of speech, and it represents one of the major challenges to the legislator and to other judicial bodies, as these take responsibility for the analysis of intervention in a specific case and in the sphere of abstract judicial review and legality, as shown in the examples highlighted in the first part of this article, which are representative of US, German and Brazilian court decisions. In this context and according to the precise and timely summary by Dan- iel Sarmento, despite the position taken by Supreme Court Justice Carlos Ayres Britto in the decision made in ADPF No. 130, when he claimed that no legal limit could be imposed on freedom of speech, since the existing restrictions would only be those already enshrined in the Constitution, and the Judiciary’s duty was merely to make the relevant considerations in case of conflict with other rights, Supreme Court Justice Gilmar Ferreira Mendes,

32 Supremo Tribunal Federal, Reclamação n. 19464, Opinion by Justice Ricardo Lewan- doski, 2015. 33 Supremo Tribunal Federal, Reclamação n. 19464, Opinion by Justice Dias Toffoli, 2015. Ilton R. Filho, Ingo W. Sarlet • Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution... 149 in his opinion in Extraordinary Appeal No. 511,961/SP, noted that restrictions on freedom of speech trough legislation are permissible, provided that they aim at promoting other valuesand equally relevant constitutional interests and respect the principle of proportionality34. In fact, even if they are exceptional, the legislative restrictions, which are not expressly authorized need to be brought back to what is established in the BFC as they are based on the protection of other relevant constitutional prerogatives and cannot be rejected, at least not immediately, on the reasoning that these are always constitutionally illegitimate. In turn, national, foreign and international practices have shown, in the case of restrictions imposed by court decisions, that they usually intend to solve conflicts in particular cases and seek to promote practical concor- dance (harmonization) between conflicting rights and principles, always applying the notion of restraints of fundamental rights and the criteria resulting therefrom with special observance of the criteria of proportionality and protection of the essential core of the rights concerned. An example of particular relevance in the context of freedom of speech is the practice of so-called hate speech or incitement to hatred35. Here, with respect to the Brazilian tradition, freedom of speech is subject to restraints because of the human dignity of all persons and groups affected when it is used to disseminate messages with discriminatory content aimed at inciting hatred and even violence. In this sense, the Supreme Court considered the famous but no less controversial case of Ellwanger, collated in the introduction, in which the possibility was assessed of, even in the face of freedom of speech, condemning authors whose works reveal anti-Semitic contents for committing the crime of racism36.

34 See D. Sarmento, Comentários ao artigo 5º..., pp. 252–258. 35 About the topic see, among others, D. Sarmento, A liberdade de expressão e o problema do “hate speech”, [In:] D. Sarmento, Livres e iguais. Estudos de direito constitucional, Rio de Janeiro 2006, pp. 207–262, as well as the specialized monograph by S.M. Pflug,Liberdade de expressão e discurso do ódio. São Paulo 2009. 36 See Supremo Tribunal Federal, Habeas Corpus n. 82.424/RS, 2004, a petition filed by a defendant in criminal proceedings in which he was being accused of the crime of racism due to the fact of having published books containing provocative expressions of hatred against Jews, in addition to attempting to discredit the occurrence of the genocide committed against the Jewish people (Holocaust) during World War II. 150 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 In a more recent decision known as the Marijuana March37, by examining the occurrence of criminal offense by virtue of the fact that freedom of speech (collectively, through assembly and manifestation) had been used to seek, through public awareness, the decriminalization of the use of soft drugs for personal consumption, the Supreme Court rejected its characterization as a condoning of crime, considering such a manifestation as covered by freedom of speech, assembly and demonstration and that public demonstrations in favor of decriminalization of a given behavior should not be confounded with incitement to commit such an act, which, in turn, would indeed involve a case of hate speech or incitement to crime not covered by freedom of speech. However, whereas in relation to the hate speech and events of clearly anti-discriminatory nature (which, moreover, lack justification and identification) it is found – except, of course, a controversy over when in fact such manifestations do occur – that there is substantial consensus to admit stronger restrictions on freedom of speech, other cases in which freedom of speech comes into conflict with fundamental rights of third parties and other constitutional individual and collective rights present legal situations that are more complex and difficult to solve. Among the most common situations which have already led to extensive court cases in Brazil and abroad, including recourse to the action of Inter- national Tribunals, are the prohibition of pornographic demonstrations and cultural and artistic events or expressions when considered offensive to morals (decency), good customs and even to the dignity of the human person and third party personality rights (right to privacy or publicity right). General clauses such as morals (decency) and good customs are extremely dangerous to justify restrictions on freedom of speech (except regarding age-appropriate indications, as a recommendation to parents of children and adolescents). On the other hand, usually the fact that the dignity of the human person, as a principle and fundamental right, is not questioned, and the disproportionate affection of rights of third parties, especially when it comes to personality rights (right to privacy or publicity right), must always be considered by balancing it in the light of the circumstances of each case.

37 See Supremo Tribunal Federal, Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental n. 187, Opinion by Justice Celso Mello, 2011. Ilton R. Filho, Ingo W. Sarlet • Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution... 151 By evaluating the Supreme Court’s case law in this context, it appears that this has generally been properly deferential to freedom of speech, allowing interventions under exceptional and usually constitutionally justified circumstances, which does not mean the impossibility of questioning the appropriateness of some court decisions or critically analyzing the reasons for such decisions, including the existence or not of a uniform, consistent and coherent position by the Supreme Court on the matter, in particular with regard to the rationality and the procedure of balancing and assessing the constitutional legitimacy of any restrictive interventions. It seems obvious that an observation of the everyday exercise of freedom of speech and even the ensemble of Supreme Court’s decisions does not to allow a superficial reading about an almost absolute preference, or even accepting only direct restraints expressly imposed by the BFC. Moreover, it is clear that the individual cases demonstrate the need for dogmatic refinement and emphasize the need to establish legal and case law criteria for the exercise of these freedoms, in harmony with other fundamental rights, without disregarding the central role that freedom of speech occupies in a democratic state. Thus, both Claim No. 17,091, which is about the confidentiality of data belonging to financial institutions, and Claim No. 19,464, which deals with the discussion of the confidentiality of journalistic sources, which have already been presented, are representative of some dilemmas concerning freedom of speech. In fact, the attempt to fix a limitation to freedom of speech and thought is currently on the agenda of the Supreme Court in Extraordinary Appeal No. 662,055. It should be recalled in this context that the BFSC in 08/27/2015, recognized the General Repercussion in the litigation involving an animal protection society and a legal entity of private law responsible for organizing a major rodeo in the interior of São Paulo. Taking advantage of the freedom of speech, the protection society organized campaigns on the internet, publishing messages such as “Those who sponsor and support rodeos also torture the animal”, urging citizens to send e-mails so that event sponsors could reconsider granting financial support38. In short, this association denounced

38 See Supremo Tribunal Federal, Repercussão Geral no Recurso Extraordinário n. 662.055, Opinion by Justice Roberto Barroso, 2015. 152 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 the allegedly cruel treatment to which animals were subjected in rodeo practices and at a famous festival in the interior of São Paulo. In turn, the event organizer asserted that false information about the treatment of animals had been presented and that no ill-treatment of animals had occurred. The plaintiff argued that instead of festivals organized by the company, e-mails with photographs of American rodeos had been sent, and it also stated that freedom of speech was used abusively with violation of the right to cultural expression, honor and image, and, additionally, that the abusive use had negative impacts on the local economy39. The state trial court judge granted prohibitory injunction for protection of rights to honor and image, but the decision was partially overturned by the court of justice of the state of São Paulo for the purpose of a) transcribing a note on the filing of a petition on their site, b) removing the festival’s name organized by the plaintiff from the list of festivals that practice mistreatment of animals, and not being allowed to c) mention the festival sponsors. Con- cerning the disposition of the case, it was considered partially applicable at the first level of jurisdiction, having been partially reversed by the Court of the State of São Paulo. Thus, the animal protection society was condemned to pay compensation for moral damages in the amount of R$ 10,000.00 (ten thousand reais) and to remove from the materials and the site information which states that the event in São Paulo inflicts cruelty on animals, not being allowed to mention the rodeo sponsors or to contact them to discourage the support. Finally, if there is non-compliance with the agreed upon obligations, the animal protection society will be sanctioned with a daily fine of R $ 5,000.00 (five thousand reais)40. The collated case shows the delicate balance between freedom of speech and other fundamental rights and constitutional prerogatives (environmental protection and prohibition of cruelty to animals, besides cultural rights). While it can be stated that the manifestos of the animal protection society may tarnish the honor and dignity of those affected, in addition to affecting their proprietary interest, it is also true that freedom of

39 Supremo Tribunal Federal, Repercussão Geral no Recurso Extraordinário n. 662.055, 2015, pp. 4–5. 40 Supremo Tribunal Federal, Repercussão Geral no Recurso Extraordinário n. 662.055, 2015, pp. 8–9. Ilton R. Filho, Ingo W. Sarlet • Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution... 153 speech cannot be vacated in favor of protecting other fundamental rights. On the other hand, one must remember that what is essentially at stake concerns the discussion about the existence of unconstitutional damage to the image and property, and especially the calibration of the amount of compensation that will be able to promote an adequate recovery of the injured personality rights, but on the other hand, the fundamental right to compensation cannot be handled disproportionately, with an excessive impact on the freedom of speech. It should be noted, moreover, that in Extraordinary Appeal No. 662,055 a prohibitory injunction was attributed to protect the event organizer and its sponsors. In this context, it can be said that while emergency injunc- tions are a necessary and natural consequence of the right to a due process involving a rapid proceeding in order to achieve its goal, the granting of an emergency injunction for the protection of personality or publicity rights with a restraint on freedom of speech must be an action taken with extreme caution and only in exceptional cases, when the prohibitive injunction is shown to be indispensable to prevent a serious violation of conflicting fundamental rights, particularly when it results in clear violation of human dignity. It should be recalled, still on this issue, that, in that judgment, the Su- preme Court, by unanimous vote in the virtual plenary, showed that it will set the restraints for the exercise of freedoms of speech and thought, which is evident in the passage transcribed here: The constitutional issue in question consists of defining the restraints of freedom of speech, even if exercising it may result in relevant commercial damage as well as of setting param- eters to identify cases in which the publication should be prohibited and/or the declarant sentenced to pay compensation for moral damages or other legal consequences that may be legitimately imposed41. With this decision we can see that the Supreme Court has mitigated the guidance given by the author of the opinion on ADPF No. 130 (Supreme Court Justice Carlos Britto), accepting, at least in principle, other restrictive interventions in the freedom of speech apart from those expressly established by the BFC.

41 Supremo Tribunal Federal, Repercussão Geral no Recurso Extraordinário nº. 662.055, 2015, p. 14. 154 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 However, even though freedom of speech (including the free expression of thought) has not been subject to an explicit legal reservation, any imposition of restrictions should be, first and foremost and as a rule, disseminated by democratically legitimized legislators and always in compliance with the criteria of proportionality and protection of the essential core of communi- cative fundamental rights. Along these lines, it is important – as part of an appropriate construction and understanding of the weighting criteria in cases of conflicts between freedom of speech and other crucial constitutional rights – that an interpretive vector lies in understanding the need for an equilibrium in the interpretation of freedom of speech on the basis of liberal (freedom of speech as a right of a person regardless of its consequences and the role played by this freedom in the community), democratic (freedom of speech as a condition for democracy and pluralism) and Republican values (use of freedom of speech in order to obtain and disseminate information and manifestations on the public sphere and people who work in public service). Such political and legal traditions cannot be separated and occupy a prominent place in the rela- tional assessment of freedom of speech in the constitutional architecture of a democratic state. Despite the significance of these vectors, it must be agreed that they are open and make it difficult to concretely control the boundaries between freedom of speech and conflicting rights and principles. Thus, there is no way to dispense with a judgment of proportionality and/or reasonableness when strictly necessary, but especially it is necessary to take into account relevant criteria which are already widely recognized and, even not dismissing a legal rationality in particular, have served as a relatively safe and substantial consensual guide, such as the prohibition of the so-called “hate speech” and discrimination, as well as the prohibition of obvious and serious offenses to human dignity and personality rights which are related to them. Moreover, any prohibitory injunction is to maintain an exceptional character and be managed only when actually necessary to protect fundamental rights or other constitutional rights from offense that is so serious that the absence of an emergency injunction could lead to irreparable damage. As a possible example of the misuse of freedom of speech, subject to the use of the exceptional prohibitory injunction, one can mention the brutal viola- Ilton R. Filho, Ingo W. Sarlet • Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution... 155 tion of intimacy, privacy, image and honor for the dissemination of false information in the famous case of Escola Base in São Paulo. In March 1994, the school’s owners and a couple of parents were accused of systematically promoting sexual violence on the children at that private school). There were said to be orgies with children in sex rituals with drugs use. Nothing was proved, but the moral and material damages to the defendants were so intense that they resulted in serious threats to their personal and even to their families’ integrity42. Nevertheless it must be emphasized that the example now collated reveals how exceptional are situations in which, in principle, emergency injunction is properly applicable. Added (and even as a supplement) to the criteria mentioned above, it can be mentioned that other guidelines may be added to the existing ones. One of them concerns the dissemination of untrue information intentionally or with gross negligence, a situation in which the theory of actual malice would be applied, which would be necessary to consider such a situation a misuse of freedom of speech. If such a theory, which was highlighted in the case of New York Times vs. Sullivan43, is open to criticism as to what may be conceived as an exaggerated position with regards to freedom of speech, it is also true that building a robust civil, critical, and democratic society presupposes access to information and the dissemination of information, which would be significantly impaired if small mistakes about factual content would justify the award of compensations or even other consequences. Moreover, one must keep in mind that the use of freedom of speech for fictional and artistic situations, even if acidic and with potential damage to the image and honor of individuals, should be in principle accepted44. In this sense, as Jónatas Machado correctly points out, “satirical speech and carica-

42 Supremo Tribunal Federal, Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental n. 130, Opinion by Justice Carlos Ayres Britto, 2009, pp. 256–258. 43 See U.S. Supreme Court, New York Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 376, 1964, pp. 254–305. 44 About the relationship between artistic freedom and freedom of speech, presenting and reflecting on artistic movements and controversial situations of collision with other values and constitutional prerogatives, see A.S. Kurzweg, Live art and the audience: toward the speaker-focused freedom of speech, “Harvard Civil Rights – Civil Liberties Law Review” 1999, Vol. 32, pp. 438–485. 156 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 ture have been used since ancient times as instruments of social criticism, thus having a solid pedigree.”45 It is noteworthy to recall the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Hustler Magazine Inc. vs. Falwell, and the – in our opinion erroneous decision by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht regarding the caricature in Konkret magazine, both of which cases have already been briefly described. The formulation of criticism against a Christian authority, albeit in bad taste and based on acknowledged fictions in Hustler magazine, does not hinder the protection of freedom of speech, as well as the formulation of cartoons denouncing spuri- ous relations between the Executive and the Judicial Power in a German member-state are – in contrast with the decision of the German Supreme Court – included within the sphere of protection of freedom of speech (in this case, also artistic freedom) especially as they refer to public personalities and the subjects dealt with are issues of public interest and essential to a democratic state. Re- garding the case of Hustler magazine, the express recognition that this is fiction clearly built as criticism of hegemonic social and religious views clearly shows the use of freedom of speech in a relevant subject. Moreover, it should be noted that when the information is obtained by unlawful means its disclosure is usually also considered inadmissible46. It is important to keep in mind that according to the Brazilian positive constitutional law, the inviolability of the home is a fundamental right and only in the event of disaster, flagrante delicto, giving help or, during the day, by court order may one enter therein without the consent of the owner or resident (art. 5, XI, BFC). The same occurs in cases of inviolability of correspondence, telegraph- ic communications, data and telephone confidentiality. The latter can be broken only by court order, in the cases and in the manner prescribed by the law for the purposes of criminal investigation or criminal procedural fact-finding (art. 5, XII, BFC), and it also expressly provided that evidence obtained through illicit means is unacceptable in the proceedings (art. 5, LVI, BFC)47.

45 J.E.M. Machado, op.cit., p. 824. 46 L.R. Barroso, op.cit., p. 327. 47 About fundamental and human rights that protect intimacy, privacy, home, and the impossibility of obtaining and using illegal evidence, see N.J. Giacomolli, O devido processo penal: abordagem conforme a Constituição Federal e o Pacto de São José da Costa Rica, 2 ed. São Paulo 2015. Ilton R. Filho, Ingo W. Sarlet • Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution... 157 One must not forget also art. 17 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and art. 11, 2, of the American Convention on Human Rights (ratified by Bra- zil in 1992), which forbid arbitrary, abusive and illegal interference in private life, home, family life and correspondence. An especially complex topic is safeguarding the confidentiality of the source of information in accordance with the provisions of art. 5, XIV, BFC, an in- novative constitutional provision, but which may, depending on the case, be in conflict with the impossibility of using evidence and information obtained illegally. This situation is even more dramatic when the manner in which the information was obtained is a criminal offense. First, the right to safeguard the confidentiality of the source is an essential guarantee for the proper exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press, ensuring the necessary journalists independence in relation to state authorities and in face of the newspaper publishing company itself, besides establishing a structure of trust by citizens in presenting important information to the community through the press48. Thus, as long as the journalist and the communication mechanism do not operate jointly with the source to obtain illicit information, it is not possible consider them criminally or civilly liable for using information obtained illicitly by the source, especially if it deals with a public issue of relevant social interest. In this situation, the criteria of the nature of the fact and the existence of public interest prevail over the protection against information obtained illicitly. On the other hand, the constitutionally established autonomy for the benefit of journalists and society on the confidentiality of the source does not hinder the attempt to obtain compensation for presenting false facts disseminated by the journalistic source49. Precisely in this context, particularly in the field of freedom of speech in its aspects of social communication (journalism), the figure of pursuance of legitimate interests becomes important, excluding the criminal liability of the journalist, a topic that, despite its relevance, cannot be addressed here, although it is closely connected to the problems that we have discussed in this article50.

48 H. Masnatta,Hábeas data y secreto de las fuentes de información periodística, [In:] Nuevos derechos a la informacion, ed. H. Chumbita, Buenos Aires 1999, pp. 24–25. 49 See W. Steinmetz, Comentários ao artigo 5º, XIV, CF, [In:] J.J. G. Canotilho, G.F. Mendes, I.W. Sarlet, L.L. Streck, Comentários à Constituição Federal de 1988, São Paulo 2013, p. 300. 50 See J.H. Weingartner Neto, op.cit. 158 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Even the publication or dissemination of public facts obtained lawfully by the press can very seriously damage the honor, image and dignity of people, but as a rule freedom of speech should prevail in such a way that only in exceptional cases restrictions are legally legitimate. It is a presumption in favor of freedom of speech, which may be removed if it is demonstrated that the disclosure of such information intensively affronts other fundamental rights. Based on what was mentioned above, we cannot agree, for example, with the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court (1975) in Cox Broadcasting vs. Cohn, which considered: i) lawful the publication of news stories with the identity of rape victims and ii) unconstitutional the state law that prohibited the disclosure of names of rape victims51. The situation of rape, besides the physical damage, has profound moral and psychic consequences on the victims. Therefore, the publication of rape victims’ names, although available in public archives, only increases the non-material damage. On the basis of the analysis of this particular situation, it should be considered that the right to privacy and the protection of dignity may prevail and rebut the protection of the publication of public information by the press, when i) the conflict with those personal rights is intense and ii) if the information presented is not of public interest, because, if no other reason pertains, there is no legitimate public interest in knowing the names of people raped in a certain place, and, on the other hand, it is of public interest to be aware of the occurrence of rapes (their investigation), the most frequent places where they occur, the conviction rate of the accused, the measures of prevention, among other information. In addition, the non-disclosure of the victims’ names and other personal identification data do not inhibit the access to information that can actually be of public interest.

51 “The State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, impose sanctions on the accurate publication of a rape victim’s name obtained from judicial records that are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and that themselves are open to public inspection. Here, under circumstances where appellant reporter based his televised report upon notes taken during court proceedings and obtained the rape victim’s name from official court documents open to public inspection, the protection of freedom of the press provided by the First and Fourteenth Amendments bars Georgia from making appellants’ broadcast the basis of civil liability in a cause of action for invasion of privacy that penalizes pure expression -- the content of a publication” (U.S. Supreme Court, Cox Broadcasting vs. Cohn, 420, 1975, p. 470). Ilton R. Filho, Ingo W. Sarlet • Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution... 159 On the other hand, regarding discourses which deny notorious facts and in their utterance exercise so-called hate speech against a social, ethnic, religious or racial group, it is known that there are different legal traditions and different views on these phenomena. In this context, the diffi- culty in understanding the historical events, which not infrequently allow multiple interpretations, is not disregarded. On the other hand, it is unde- niable that in the case of the Holocaust, which caused the death of millions of Jews during World War II52, as well as other widely documented situations (for example, victims of Stalinist and Maoist totalitarianism), it is correct – in our opinion – to assert that theses that deny such facts, especially if accompanied by value judgments in favor of historical events that have occurred, cannot deserve protection based on freedom of speech, so that the Brazilian Supreme Court’s decision in the famous case of Ellwanger presented above was correct. Apropos of this issue, here we mention the existence of another legal tradition, according to which it is not possible to civilly and criminally punish people who disseminate rejection speech or who affirm the existence of highly derogatory characteristics of another social group53. In Branden- burg vs. Ohio the American Supreme Court declared that hate speech and racist speeches are covered by freedom of speech and freedom of the press. In this case, it was stated that a leader of the Ku Klux Klan, by presenting racist speeches against blacks and Jews during television stories, did not commit any unlawful act, as his act would be sustained by the principle of freedom of speech54. Just as the economic market has flaws that prevent

52 Ti should be noted that tehere are intense academic discussions in the historical context of the Holocaust; see L. Bilsky, The judge and the historian: holocaust transnational litigation as a new model, “History and Memory” 2012, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 117–156. On the other hand, it is not possible to deny the systematic racial and cultural Nazi persecution of the Jews, and especially the death of millions of people. 53 On the other hand, for a position saying that hate speech is not covered by freedom of speech, see J. Waldron, The harm in hate speech, Cambridge 2012. 54 This was the U.S. Supreme Cout’s decision: “Appellant, a Ku Klux Klan leader, was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for ‘advocat[ing] the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform’ and for ‘voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines 160 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 its proper performance and impose interventions and restraints on economic agents, the so-called free market of ideas, despite being a relevant regulative ideal which advocates public and social criticism through public debate as an antidote to the oppressive and hateful speeches, it should be restricted in exceptional situations, such as hate speech. This does not mean to defend the ideology of political correctness and public execra- tion of social debates which are not under its umbrella, but it means re- pudiating discriminatory speeches or those which are motivated by hatred and sectarianism55. Another usual parameter for measuring the restraints on freedom of speech in cases of conflict with personal rights is the social position occupied by a particular person. As regards the rights to honor and image, one has to immediately distinguish cases involving public personalities, as in the case of famous artists, politicians and other people whose activity and behavior in the public sphere make them different from other persons, also ensuring different levels of personality protection depending on the particular case of who is affected by the exercise of freedom of speech and how they are affected. For this reason, in situations of (legitimate) public interest in information about someone’s actions and private life, and especially, when the holder of personality rights, right to privacy or publicity rights themselves have already voluntarily exposed their private life, a lower level of protection – but not suppression! – of honor, image, private and intimate life and a larger space for freedom of information and speech are justified. of criminal syndicalism.’ Neither the indictment nor the trial judge’s instructions refined the statute’s definition of the crime in terms of mere advocacy not distinguished from incitement to imminent lawless action. Held: Since the statute, by its words and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action, it falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Freedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, overruled” (U.S. Supreme Court, Brandenburg vs. Ohio, 395, 1969, p. 444). 55 About political correctness and freedom of expression, see J.E.M. Machado, op.cit., pp. 845–846. Ilton R. Filho, Ingo W. Sarlet • Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution... 161 V.

State restrictions on freedom of speech in its diverse dimensions represent a strong restraint to the enjoyment of those rights and the structure of the democratic state itself. In the event of a conflict between freedom of speech (always taken here in its broadest sense) and personality rights (intimacy, privacy, hon- or and image) and even the dignity of the human person itself, the above suggested guidelines establish relevant criteria for the appropriate judicial balancing in each case. Thus, the truth of the fact is a matter that needs to be taken into account in a democratic society, but this criterion must be reconciled with the doctrine of actual malice and the established protection of fictional and artistic discourses even if these conflict with the personality, right to privacy and publicity rights. Still, discourses aiming at violating the factual truth with the purpose of at attacking social, ethnic, religious and political groups as a rule are not protected by freedom of speech when they involve hate speech or imply obvious discrimination and, additionally, violate the dignity of the human person. In turn, the lawfulness of the means used in obtaining information is central, but the confidentiality of journalistic sources allows the publication of illegal information provided that this contributes to the democratic discussion and that there is no involvement of the press and journalists in obtaining illegal information. On the other hand, the protection of the rights to honor, image and privacy of public or “famous” figures is generally guaranteed in a less intense way; the more prominent the public figure, the less intense are their rights to protection. Furthermore the location and nature of the fact, as well as the existence of public interest, are important elements and require ensuring freedom of speech more effectively. Finally, the prohibitive injunction, in exceptional cases of prevalence of personality rights, right to privacy and publicity rights, might be considered, but requires higher argumentative skills of judges, as re- pressive protection remains the guarantee of freedom of speech. 162 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Literature

Barroso L.R., Colisão entre liberdade de expressão e direitos da personalidade. Critéri- os de ponderação. Interpretação constitucionalmente adequada do Código Civil e da Lei de Imprensa, “Revista latino americana de estudos constitucionais” 2005, No. 5. Bilsky L., The judge and the historian: holocaust transnational litigation as a new model, “History and Memory” 2012, Vol. 24, No. 2. Branco P.G.G., Liberdades, [In:] G.F. Mendes, P.G.G. Branco, Curso de direito constitucional, 6th ed., São Paulo 2011. Canotilho J.J.G., Moreira, V., Constituição da República portuguesa anotada, 4th ed., Co- imbra 2007. Epping V., Grundrechte, 3rd ed., Berlin–Heidelberg–New York 2007. Farias E., Liberdade de expressão e comunicação: teoria e proteção constitucional, São Paulo 2004. Fechner F., Art. 5, Meinungsfreiheit, Pressefreiheit u.a. [In:] Stern-Becker, Grundrech- te-Kommentar, Köln 2010. Giacomolli N.J., O devido processo penal: abordagem conforme a Constituição Federal e o Pacto de São José da Costa Rica, 2 ed. São Paulo 2015. Koatz R.L.-F., As liberdades de expressão e de imprensa na jurisprudência do STF, [In:] Direitos fundamentais no Supremo Tribunal Federal: balanço e crítica, eds. D. Sar- mento, I.W. Sarlet, Rio de Janeiro 2011. Kurzweg A.S., Live art and the audience: toward the speaker-focused freedom of speech, “Harvard Civil Rights – Civil Liberties Law Review” 1999, Vol. 32. Machado J.E.M., Liberdade de expressão: dimensões constitucionais da esfera pública no sistema social, Coimbra 2002. Masnatta H., Hábeas data y secreto de las fuentes de información periodística, [In:] Nuevos derechos a la informacion, ed. H. Chumbita, Buenos Aires 1999. Michael L., Morlok M., Grundrechte, Baden-Baden 2008. Michelman, F., Relações entre democracia e liberdade de expressão: discussão de alguns argumentos, [In:] Direitos fundamentais, informática e comunicação, eds. I.W. Sar- let, Porto Alegre 2007. Pflug, S.M. Liberdade de expressão e discurso do ódio, São Paulo 2009. Sarmento D., A liberdade de expressão e o problema do “hate speech”, [In:] D. Sarmento, Livres e iguais. Estudos de direito constitucional, Rio de Janeiro 2006. Sarmento D., Comentários ao artigo 5º, IV, CF, [In:] J.J. G. Canotilho, G.F. Mendes, I.W. Sarlet, L.L. Streck, Comentários à Constituição Federal de 1988, São Paulo 2013 Silva, J.A. da., Curso de direito constitucional positive, 28th ed. rev. and updated. São Pau- lo 2007. Ilton R. Filho, Ingo W. Sarlet • Freedom of Speech in the Federal Constitution... 163 Steinmetz W., Comentários ao artigo 5º, XIV, CF, [In:] J.J. G. Canotilho, G.F. Mendes, I.W. Sarlet, L.L. Streck, Comentários à Constituição Federal de 1988, São Paulo 2013. Sunstein C.R., Democracy and the problem of free speech, New York 1995. Waldron J., The harm in hate speech, Cambridge 2012. Weingartner Neto J.H., Privacidade e liberdade de imprensa. Uma pauta de justificação penal, Porto Alegre 2002.

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.08 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Viktoriya Serzhanova1

The Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic

Keywords: basic law, the binding constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Repub- lic, government and politics, the form of government, fundamental principles of the constitution, basic rights and freedoms, the system of state authorities Słowa kluczowe: ustawa zasadnicza, obowiązująca Konstytucja Naddniestrzańskiej Re- publiki Mołdawskiej, ustrój polityczny, forma rządu, naczelne zasady konstytucyjne, podstawowe prawa i wolności, system organów państwowych

Summary The legal status of the independent Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, which in 1990 seceded from Moldavia being then a part of the USSR, still remains unclear. Although over a quarter of the century has passed since its creation, it is still a de facto state, for it has not been recognized by the international community. In the lights of the international law Transnistria is treated as a Moldavian autonomous region of a special status. The hereby paper is the next publication out of the series, undertaken within the wider research over Transnistria’s legal status. It comprises the fragmentary results of the further research phase, which aims at analysing its binding basic law and the assumptions of its constitutional system. The subject of the work is the shape and content of the independent Transnistria’s constitution of 1995, which has been revised several times and is still in force. The results of this research contributes to more precise determination of the region’s legal status.

1 Theauthor is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political System of Euro- pean States of the Faculty of Law and Administration of the University of Rzeszow. E-mail: [email protected]. 166 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Streszczenie

Konstytucja Naddniestrzańskiej Republiki Mołdawskiej

Status prawny niepodległej Naddniestrzańskiej Republiki Mołdawskiej, która w 1990 roku dokonała secesji od Mołdawii, będącej wówczas jeszcze w składzie ZSRR, wciąż pozostaje niejasny. Mimo że od chwili jej powstania minęło już ponad ćwierć wieku, jest państwem faktycznym, gdyż dotąd nie zostało uznane przez społeczność między- narodową. W świetle prawa międzynarodowego Naddniestrze jest traktowane jako jednostka autonomiczna Mołdawii o statusie specjalnym. Niniejsze opracowanie stanowi kolejną publikację z serii szerzej zakrojonych badań nad statusem prawnym Nad- dniestrza. Zawiera cząstkowe wyniki ich następnego etapu, mającego na celu analizę obecnie obowiązującej naddniestrzańskiej ustawy zasadniczej i założeń systemu konstytucyjnego. Przedmiotem opracowania jest kształt i treść konstytucji niepodległego Naddniestrza z 1995 roku, która była wielokrotnie nowelizowana i obowiązuje do dziś. Wyniki tych badań stanowią przyczynek umożliwiający bardziej precyzyjne określe- nie statusu prawnego regionu.

The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (also called Transnistria, Transd- niester, Trans-Dniestr or Transdniestria) is an unrecognized state created in 1990 as a result of the secession from the Moldavian Soviet Social- ist Republic, being then a part of the Soviet Union. This region had never had any tradition of statehood and for centuries has been a source of conflicts between the neighbouring countries. Since Transnistria declared its independence on 2 September 1990 and effectively seceded almost a year later, there has been no homogeneous opinion concerning the statehood and legal status of this region in the doctrine2. During over a quarter of

2 For more detailed digressions see: V. Serzhanova, The First Constitution of the Prid- nestrovian Moldavian Republic of 1991, “Annales Universitatis Apulensis, Series Jurisprudentia” 2016, No. 19; also in Polish: idem, Geneza ustrojowa ziem naddniestrzańskich, “Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego” 2016, No. 5; idem, Powstanie Naddniestrzańskiej Republiki Mołdawskiej Viktoriya Serzhanova • The Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian... 167 the century Transnistria has remained a de facto state or a quasi-state, unrecognized by the international community. In the lights of the international law it is formally an autonomous region of a special status within the borders of the Republic of Moldova, while from the perspective of the theory of state and the constitutional law it undoubtedly possesses all the attributes of statehood3. Not wishing to sink into the doctrinal arguments concerning the legal status of this state creature here, the fact of its existence does not rise any doubts. Independently of lack of its recognition by the international community, the Republic’s authorities endeavour to control its territory and organize the state according to all the principles for the purpose of its correct and effective functioning. The process of creating the Pridnestrovian Molda- i jego implikacje, “Studia Europejskie” 2016, No. 4; idem, Obowiązująca Konstytucja Naddni- estrzańskiej Republiki Mołdawskiej, “Studia Prawa Publicznego” 2016. 3 On the problems of Transnistria in different dimensions in the Russian literaturę see: Н.В. Бабилунга, Б.Г. Бомешко, П.М. Шорников, Государственность Приднестровья: история и современность, Тирасполь 2007; Н.В. Бабилунга, С.И. Берил, Б.Г. Бомешко, И.Н. Галинский, Е.М. Губогло, В.Р. Окушко, П.М. Шорников, Феномен Приднестровья, Тирасполь 2003; В.А. Балала, Становление и развитие государственности Приднестровья, Тирасполь 2001; Бессарабский вопрос и образование Приднестровской Молдавской Республики, ed. В.Н. Яковлев, Тирасполь 1993; Г.С. Брусалинская, Органы законодательной и исполнительной власти Приднестровской Молдавской Республики на современном этапе, Москва 2007; А.В. Девятков, Международно-политические последствия «Де- факто государственности» Приднестровья, “Вестник Тюменского государственного университета” 2014, № 2, pp. 51–56; А.Н. Сквозников, Феномен непризнанных и частично признанных государств и особенности их правосубъектности, “Вестник Самарской гуманитарной академии. Серия: Право” 2011, № 2, pp. 3–12. In the Polish doctrine it is also worth reaching for: A. Gil, Naddniestrzańska Republika Mołdawska jako element przestrzeni politycznej Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, Lublin 2005, passim; M. Kosienkowski, Federacja Rosyjska wobec Naddniestrza, an editorial series: Analizy Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, t. 21, eds. J. Kłoczowski, A. Gil, Lublin 2009, passim; idem, Naddniestrzańska Republika Mołdaw- ska: determinanty przetrwania, Toruń 2010, passim; idem, Ukraina wobec Naddniestrza, seria wydawnicza: Analizy Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, t. 27, eds. J. Kłoczowski, A. Gil, Lublin 2009, passim; J. Solak, Mołdawia – republika na trzy pęknięta: historyczno-społeczny, militarny i geopolityczny wymiar „zamrożonego konfliktu” o Naddniestrze, Toruń 2009; idem, Konsekwencje zamrożonego konfliktu o Naddniestrze dla bezpieczeństwa europejskiego, an annex to “Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Obrony Narodowej”, Warszawa 2010; R. Czachor, Niepodległe, nieuznawane. Perspektywy rozwiązania problemu statusu nieuznawanych republik na obszarze postradzieckim, “Stosunki Międzynarodowe” 2011, No. 69–70. 168 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 vian Republic, its constitution and the whole system of government and politics is undoubtedly a very interesting issue in the field of the theory of state and the constitutional law. The hereby paper is another publication in the series intended within the wider research over Transnistria’s legal status. It contains the results of the next research phase and is devoted to the binding basic law of the independent state at the Transnistria lands adopted in 1995. The subject of the research comprises the analysis of the shape and the exegesis of the content of this act, which in its turn allows to determine the primary assumptions of the constitutional and political system of the newly created state under its rule, their further evolution, the system of the presently binding solutions and, moreover, enables to estimate their efficiency and sensitivity for the independent state’s functioning. In consequence, the results of this research stage contribute to establishing more reliable conclusions concerning both the present constitutional system and form of government in Transn- istria, as well as to more homogeneous and clearer determining of its legal status in the further research phases.

II.

The binding Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic was adopted in the referendum on 24 December 19954. It was amended many times, twice extendedly revised and till now has been in force5. In its prima-

4 It is worth underlining that it was supported by 82 per cent of the population participating in the voting. 5 The Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, signed by the President on 17 January 1996 and since then having been in force, is available in the Russian language – Конституция Приднестровской Молдавской Республики (принята на всенародном референдуме 24 декабря 1995 г., подписана Президентом Приднестровской Молдавской Республики 17 января 1996 г.) – in the electronic collection of Transnistria’s legal acts at the address: http://www.vspmr.org/legislation/constitution/; in the consolidated version made on 25 June 2016 it is published on: http://president.gospmr.ru/ru/news/konstituci- ya-pridnestrovskoy-moldavskoy-respubliki. The hitherto changes to the basic law took place eight times by means of adopting the following constitutional laws amending or supplying the Constitution: No. 128 of 15 December 1998, No. 310 of 30 June 2000, No. 94 of 4 July 2001, No. 593 of 13 July 2005, No. 1 of 20 February 2006, No. 94 of 4 July 2011, No. 127 of Viktoriya Serzhanova • The Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian... 169 ry version the basic law of 1995 established the rule of a parliamentary-presidential republic (in other words semi-presidential or mixed) with the distinct pro-presidential inclination6. The President’s position was very strong, for he was the main pillar of the executive power. He was a de facto head of Government and therefore he was equipped with a wide range of competences in the field of his relations with other authorities within the executive power, which contained, among others: completing the Government on the arrangement with the parliament and after receiving its consent, introducing changes into its composition, dismissing its members from their positions. The head of state was the chief of the system of government administration authorities, managed the state’s internal policy, was the Commander-in-Chief of the Military Forces, undertook actions for the benefit of providing public order, civil security and state system. He was elected in the universal suffrage, by the absolute majority of votes, with over 50 per cent attendance of the entitled to vote, for the period of a five-years-term, with the possibility of one re-election.

19 May 2016 and No. 144 of 2 June 2016. The amendments adopted in 2000 and 2011 were the extended revisions of the essential parts of the Constitution, containing the system of the supreme state authorities, mainly the head of state in it, and widely also the legislative and executive powers. The remaining amendments were mostly of a fragmentary character and were sometimes connected only with the new text edition of some provisions, as well as their supplementation. 6 Deep and complex analysis of the binding Transnistria’s basic law and its evolution till 2007 from the constitutional law perspective is made by G.S. Brusalinska in her doctoral thesis titled The Authorities of the Legislative and Executive Power of the Pridnestrovian Molda- vian Republic on the Present Stage, prepared under the scientific tutorship of S.А. Аvаkyan, Moscow 2007. An extended summary dedicated to the dissertation in the Russian language: Г.С. Брусалинская, Органы законодательной и исполнительной власти Приднестровской Молдавской Республики на современном этапе, Автореферат диссертации на соискание ученой степени кандидата юридических наук has been published and is available at the address http://www.law.edu.ru/book/book.asp?bookID=1268862 (30.08.2016), see: p. 14 & further. It is also worth reaching for other works of this author: Конституция ПМР – основа Приднестровской государственности, Доклад на научно-практической конференции, посвященной десятилетию Конституции ПМР, “Общественная мысль Приднестро- вья” 2006, No. 2; eadem, Приднестровский конституционализм: преемственность и соответствие международным стандартам, Сборник докладов ПГУ им. Т.Г Шевченко Тирасполь 2006, passim. 170 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 The legislative power was exercised by a bicameral parliament called the Supreme Council, which consisted of 67 deputies and was divided into the Legislative Chamber and the Chamber of Representatives. The judicial power was dual and was exercised by two types of courts: common and arbitrary. Although the Constitution, aside other forms of property, also introduced private ownership, it provided exclusive possession of land and all the natural resources for the state. In 2000, on the initiative of the President in office Igor Smirnov, a large- scale revision of the Constitution was started7. The authors of the reform intended to proceed in the direction of the presidential form of government and strengthening the President’s position even more, among others by formally introducing the presidential system, reducing the number of parliamentary deputies to 43 and liquidating bicameralism. Creation of the institution of Vice-President was also anticipated, as well as founding the Constitution- al Court. The reformers wished to liquidate the restrictions in the number of the terms of office possible to be exercised by the head of state, too. The -rel ative amendments were introduced to the basic law on 30 June 2000 by the Constitutional Law No. 310 on Implementing Amendments and Supplements to the Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic8. As a result of the constitutional reform of 2000 the Government (Rus- sian: Правительство) of the Republic was replaced by the Cabinet of Minis-

7 The idea of a wide constitutional revision appeared in the context of the ending in 2001 term of office of the then President. In the Transnistria and Russian doctrines one can find an opinion that it was caused by the wish to change the provisions limiting the number of the Pres- ident’s terms of office possible to exercise and introducing the regulations extending the powers of the head of state Igor Smirnov, which were already wide enough. See: Г.С. Брусалинская, Органы законодательной..., pp. 14–15; also С. Маркедонов, Приднестровье: как выйти из конституционных тупиков?, “Информационный сайт политических комментариев ПОЛИТКОМ.RU”, http://politcom.ru/9160.html (30.08.2016). 8 The text of the Constitutional Law No. 310, which extendedly revised the basic law of Transnistria, in the Russian language – Конституционный закон ПМР от 30 июня 2000 года № 310-КЗИД «О внесении изменений и дополнений в конституцию Приднестровской Молдавской Республики» is available in the electronic collection of Transnistria’s legal acts: http://www.vspmr.org/legislation/laws/konstitutsionnie-zakoni-pridnestrovskoy-moldavskoy-respubliki/konstitutsionniy-zakon-pmr-ot-30-iyunya-2000-goda-310-kzid-o-vnesenii- izmeneniy-i-dopolneniy-v-konstitutsiyu-pmr-gazeta-pridnestrovje-ot-12-iyulya-2000-goda- 13-iyulya-2000-goda-132–133.html (30.08.2016). Viktoriya Serzhanova • The Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian... 171 ters (Russian: Кабинет Министров), which was supposed to be a President’s opinion-making body and which range of independence on the resort level and in decision-making on the matters under their concern was increased, while the decisions taken by the Cabinet of Ministers were submit to the Pres- ident’s consent by way of his decrees (Russian: указ)9. Along with coming into force of the abovementioned Constitutional Law the form of government more resembling a presidential version was introduced, which changed the procedure of appointing the state authorities and the system of relations between them. According to those provisions the Pres- ident could form executive authorities by himself, without receiving an obligatory approval of the parliament, as it used to be before. On the other hand the Supreme Council got a right to start a procedure and take a decision on the dismissal of the supreme state officials (not only the President, but also the members of Government, the Prosecutor of the PMR, etc.), while the President lost his right to put a matter of the vote of non-confidence for the Supreme Council and its dissolution to referendum, which in that situation seemed to support the power stabilization. Moreover, the Security Council acting at the President was liquidated. The year 2009 brought a deep constitutional crises in Transnistria. On 15 April the Supreme Council submitted and adopted in the first reading a draft of a law amending the Constitution, which among others provided for the liquidation of the Vice-President’s post and a change in the governmental structures (the Government was to be appointed instead of the Cabinet of Ministers). Under the pressure of the campaign started by the President against the actions of the parliament, on 27 May 2009 the draft’s authors and initiators withdrew it from the Supreme Council. In response to the deputies’ activities, in order to elaborate a new edition of the Consti- tution, the President appointed a commission which consisted mainly of the representatives of the executive power. Therefore the majority of the deputies’ proposals were repealed. The final version of the President’s draft was ready before October. Ac- cording to its assumptions the Supreme Council was supposed to be replaced

9 In G. Brusalińska’s estimation the activity of the Government in the period before the reform appeared to be more effective than the one of the later Cabinet of Ministers. See: Г.С. Брусалинская, Органы законодательной..., pp. 24–25. 172 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 by a bicameral State Assembly; the upper chamber was to be nominated by the President; the executive power was to be exercised by the Govern- ment appointed by the President, who could dismiss the lower chamber in case it did not approve the candidate for the President of the Govern- ment; the system of self-government authorities was intended to be liquidated and the President was to nominate the heads of the local administration authorities; the judges of the Supreme Arbitration Court and the Constitutional Court were to be appointed by the upper chamber of the parliament on the President’s motion; some of the citizens’ rights guarantees were to be limited, especially the right to private property; after the draft would come into force all the supreme state authorities, except the President, were to be dismissed. The draft explicitly proved a dangerous direction of dictatorship which was chosen and intended to be realized by the head of state. However, on 18 November 2009 the Supreme Council unanimously rejected the President’s draft and decided to create a commission on the equality basis, consisting of the representatives of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, which would prepare a consensual draft of the constitutional revision. The commission started its activity on 25 February and on 10 March the draft of the law amending the Constitution was published on the parliamentary web-site. On lodging it to the parliamentary debate and subjecting it to the legislative procedure, during which a series of changes were introduced, on 4 July 2011 the Supreme Council adopted the Constitutional Law No. 94 on Implementing Amendments and Supplements to the Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic10. The Law introduced a very extended reform of the state authorities, connected mainly with the executive power. With very slight changes implemented in May and June 2016 the basic law has been in force till today.

10 The text of the Constitutional Law No. 94 in the Russian language – Конституционный закон от 4 июля 2011 года № 94-КЗИД-V «О внесении изменений и дополнений в конституцию Приднестровской Молдавской Республики» is available in the electronic collection of Transnistria’s legal acts at the address: http://www.vspmr.org/legislation/laws/ konstitutsionnie-zakoni-pridnestrovskoy-moldavskoy-respubliki/konstitutsionniy-zakon- pmr-ot-4-iyulya-2011-goda-94-kzid-v-o-vnesenii-izmeneniy-i-dopolneniy-v-konstitutsiyu- pmr-saz-11-27.html (30.08.2016). Viktoriya Serzhanova • The Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian... 173 III.

In the binding sounding the Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic of 1995 consists of the preamble and 121 articles systematized in 5 chapters. The general systematics of this act resembles the structures of the constitutions of contemporary democratic states11, because at the very beginning it determines the catalogue of the fundamental constitutional principles, further it contains a vast chapter dedicated to human rights and freedoms, in its later parts it norms the system of the supreme state authorities: the head of state first, then the parliament and the government, next it regulates self-government, judicial power, constitutionality control, state defence and security, legal protection and financial system, at the end it settles the provisions concerning constitutional amendments and the transitional ones. This systematics is also characterized by the fact that the constitutional legislator has chosen liberal doctrines as a base for its construction, which expose the role of an individual in the state and in consequence it has placed an extended catalogue of rights and freedoms at the beginning, just after the fundamental constitutional principles, while the provisions devoted to functioning of the state authorities (government and self-government administration) have been situated in its further chapters, which aims at underlining their easement in relation to the individual. The detailed systematics presents in the following way: Chapter I: The Fun- damentals of the Constitutional System (art. 1–15); Chapter II: Rights, Free- doms and Guarantees of a Man and the Citizen (art. 16–52); Chapter III: The Fundamentals of the State Governing – Part 1 The Development of the Funda- mentals of the Constitutional System (art. 53–58), Part 2 The President of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (art. 59–66), Part 3 The Supreme Coun- cil of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (art. 67–76), Part 3–1 The Gov-

11 According to Maria Kruk-Jarosz, the systematics of the constitution is one of the keys to the essence and axiology of government and politics. On a more detailed and very apposite digression over the problem see: M. Kruk-Jarosz, Nowe idee konstytucyjne, [In:] Prawa czło- wieka – społeczeństwo obywatelskie – państwo demokratyczne. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Pawłowi Sarneckiemu, eds. P. Tuleja, M. Florczak-Wątor, S. Kubas, Warszawa 2010, p. 61. See also: P. Sarnecki, Systematyka konstytucji, [In:] Charakter i struktura norm konstytucji, ed. J. Trzciński, Warszawa 1997, pp. 20–34. 174 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 ernment of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (art. 76–1–76–8), Part 4 The Local State Administration and the Local Self-Government (art. 77–79), Part 5 The Judicial Power (art. 80–91), Part 6 The Supervision over the Precise and Uniform Application of the Constitutional Laws of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (art. 92), Part 7Defence, Security and Legal Protection Activity (art. 93–95), Part 8 Financial and Budgetary System (art. 96–100); Chapter IV Amending the Constitution (art. 101–106); and Chapter V Tran- sitional Norms and Provisions (art. 1–7). The systematics of the Constitution seems to be rather arranged and clear. One may only have stipulations regarding the formulation of some titles, like e.g. of the chapter II “Rights, Freedoms and Guarantees of a Man and the Citizen” (Russian: Права, свободы, обязанности и гарантии человека и гражданина). Its linguistic edition is not very successful, because it assumes a concept of “guarantees of a man and the citizen”, which is not correct and does not exist in the doctrine. Probably, the constitutional legislator meant “the guarantees of the rights and freedoms of a man and the citizen” and wishing to avoid tautology formulated a not very correct linguistically and legally edition of the title. To my mind the title “Rights, Freedoms and Duties of a Man and the Citizen and Their Guarantees” (Russian: Права, свободы и обязанности человека и гражданина и их гарантии) would be much better. The title of Chapter III “The Fundamentals of the State Governing” (Russian: Основы государственного управления) also seems to be fail. In my opinion the title “The Form of Government” (Russian: Форма государственного управления) would be more successful, because: firstly, the fundamentals of the constitutional system are already regulated in chapter I; secondly, this is the main subject of this systematization unit of the act; and lastly, it is correct as to the used nomenclature. On the other hand, this chapter contains a separate unit (part I “The Development of the Fundamentals of the Consti- tutional System”), in which the constitutional legislator expands the content of the basic principles determined in chapter I. I am convinced that putting these provisions in the appropriate place of chapter I would be more rational, purposeful and justified. The names and numbers of the main systematization units also seem to be an original feature characterizing this constitution. Usually, the main units are called “parts” and are numerated by the Roman numbers, while subordi- Viktoriya Serzhanova • The Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian... 175 nate units are “chapters” numerated by the Arabic numerals. In case of this act the choice is contrary: the main unit is “a chapter” (Russian: раздел), and the subordinate one is “a part” (Russian: глава). Moreover, the solution concerning the numerating of the last chapter V “Transitional Norms and Pro- visions” also seems rather interesting. It contains seven last articles put not in the continuous numeration regarding the previous provisions (from 107 to 113), but they are numbered from the very beginning (1 to 7).

IV.

Presently, after the revision of 2011, the basic law of Transnistria introduces the catalogue of the fundamental principles of the constitutional system, among which the following may be found: the principle of a sovereign, independent and democratic legal state; the principle of the sovereignty of the people exercising power both directly (through participating in elections and referenda) and indirectly (through the public authorities and self-government institutions); the principle of the supreme power, direct application and obligation to observe the constitution; the principle of equality and respect for the rights; the principle of a laic state, as well as the equality and independency of religious associations; the principle of the priority of human rights and freedoms in relation to other values. There has also been introduced the principle of the separation of powers into their three segments: legislative, executive and judicial, functioning independently and possessing their own autonomous competences. Among the principles it is also worth mentioning the one relating to the foreign policy, which ought to be based on respecting state sovereignty and equality, non-application of force, peaceful solving of disputes and non-interference into the internal affairs of other states, as well as recognizing the rules and norms of the international law to be the base of relations with other states. A special attention in the context of the protection of Transnistria’s sovereignty and independency should be paid to the principle of prohibition to seize the power on the territory of the Republic, which is considered to be a felony against the nation. Creating the state Military Forc- es for the purpose of protecting its sovereignty and independency is an essential element of this principle, enabling to realize it. 176 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Some of the basic rights, such as: the right to Transnistria’s citizenship and the right to private property being under special state protection, aside all the natural resources, which – under the next principle – belong exclusively to the state, have been raised to the rank of the fundamental constitutional principles. Moreover, among the provisions being the basics of the constitutional system there is the principle of the equality of three official languages: Moldavian, Russian and Ukrainian. The state symbols have also been established (the flag, coat of arms, anthem and capital), as well as the administration division of the country. Among the principle which can be interpreted from the other provisions of the basic law there is undoubtedly the principle of the presidential republic, which by this means determines the form of government, though only formally. The Constitution guarantees a vast catalogue of rights and freedoms both for men and the citizens. They are the supreme value for the society and state, which is obliged to protect them. They are inalienable and appurtenant to everybody from birth, which is an important principle connected with the interpretation of the basic rights and freedoms on the grounds of Transnis- tria’s Constitution. Among other essential principles in this area there are: the principle of the equality of rights and freedoms regardless of sex, race, nationality, language, religion, social origin, convictions, individual and social status, as well as the principle of social justice. The Constitution determines the fundamentals of restricting some of the rights in cases provided by law for the purpose of protecting the state security, public order, morality and people’s health, as well as the rights of other individuals. Among the constitutional conditions of such restrictions there are: the state of war and the state of emergency. Implementing restrictions of rights and freedoms may take place only if their limits and time of application are established. The Constitution indirectly also establishes the catalogue of absolute rights, among which there are: the right to the citizenship; the right to life; prohibition to use torture or other cruel, inhuman or insult- ing treatment and punishment, as well as submitting to medical and other experiments without consent; the right to court; presumption of innocence; the right not to testify against oneself or a close person; the right to access to public information; the right to social security; the right to health protection; the right to live in the safe environment; the right to education; the right Viktoriya Serzhanova • The Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian... 177 to domicile; the right to preserve one’s national belonging, use one’s own language and choose the language of communication; the freedom of artistic, scientific and technical activity. A special attention in the context of absolute rights should be paid to a definite contradiction of the constitutional provisions in the scope of the right to life. Despite its absolute character, the constitution provides a possibility of using the capital punishment on the basis of law, at least till it is liquidated. The remaining rights and freedoms are not of the absolute character, therefore they may be restricted. In the catalogue of such rights there are: the right to property; personal freedom and inviolability; the right to privacy; the freedom of movement and choosing a place to reside; the freedom of thought, speech and convictions; the freedom of expression; the right to information; the prohibition of using censorship; the right to participate in social life and take decisions on state affairs; electoral rights; freedom of assembly and association; the right to work, choose profession and other employee’s rights; the prohibition of compulsory work. Moreover the Constitution determines the catalogue of duties, among which there are: the duty to observe the constitution and laws; the duty to respect rights, freedoms, honour and dignity of other people; the duty to protect the state; the duty to take care of the natural environment; the duty to preserve Transnistria’s national heritage, both cultural and spiritual; the duty to pay taxes and local dues; the duty of parents to take care of their minor children and of the adult children to take care of their parents unable to employment. Transnistria’s Constitution is also characterized by an interesting feature, which is a vast, detailed and enumerative determining of the catalogue of the state functions12. Among the most important of them there are: creation and protection of the environment; health care; providing the system of social care and employment; the development of science, culture and sport; providing the internal policy; creating and guaranteeing the financial system functioning; ensuring economic development; forming a customs system; providing the functioning of internal and foreign trade; creating the conditions for the uniform transport and communication system; guaran-

12 About the functions in the Constitution of Transnistria see also: Г.С. Брусалинская, Органы законодательной..., pp. 14–15. 178 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 teeing the activity of the agricultural sector; preserving and rational usage of natural resources; providing the state defence and security; fulfilling the activity on legal protection and ensuring the lawfulness, rights and freedoms, property and public order preservation, fighting delinquency; determining the status and protection of the state borders; providing the activities of justice authorities. The system of state authorities has been constructed on the basis of the separation of powers principle. It comprises: the President of the Republic as the head of state, functioning within the executive authorities and situated on the first place in the Constitution, who is elected in a universal suffrage for a five-year term of office; a unicameral parliament, called the Supreme Council, being an exclusive legislative authority, which consists of 43 deputies elected for the period of five years; the Government of the Republic, being the basic pillar of the dually constructed executive power, with its own President at the head; the system of local authorities of government administration and self-government; the system of independent authorities of judicial power exercised by the Constitutional Court, criminal, civil, administrative and arbitrary courts, with the Supreme Court and the Arbitrary Court being at the head. As far as the form of government is concerned, the Constitution distinct- ly determines it as presidential13. However, a deeper analysis of the constitutional provisions, which regulate the competences and relations between the supreme state authorities, shows that, in spite of the aspirations of the Presi- dent being in office during the constitutional reform, the revision of 2011 returned to the solutions more resembling a semi-presidential system, though with a strong pro-president inclination. This thesis is proved at least by the fact, that the executive power is exercised by the Government with its Pres- ident as a head, in other words the President of the Republic is not the chief of the Government, for it has its own “prime-minister”. Therefore the executive power is not concentrated in the hands of one authority – the President of the Republic, to whom the Government is subordinated, being his administration, as it usually is in classical presidential systems. The executive power is exercised by a separate collegial authority, which has its own head.

13 Ibidem, p. 14. Viktoriya Serzhanova • The Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian... 179 Formally the President of the Republic does not exercise the executive power, but fulfils the function of the head of state. He is entitled to play a part of an arbiter in the conflicts arisen between other state authorities. Moreover, he is equipped with his own administration, independent from the Govern- ment. In practice, the President does function within the executive power indeed, and possesses a rather wide range of competences in his relations with the Government, for he appoints and dismisses it, but he can do it only on the basis of an agreement with the parliament and after receiving its approval. And though in case of taking a vote of non-confidence to the Government by the Supreme Council the President may dismiss it, but does not have to, if the parliament takes the same decision once again within three months, then he is obliged either to dismiss it or to dissolve the Council. Another feature which proves a strong position of the President is that he may preside over the Government sessions, but this solution does not prejudge on joining of these two elements of the executive power into one. Lack of direct Government’s political responsibility before the President is also a feature characteristic for the mixed form, for it is responsible before the parliament, which may initiate its dismissal. The President possesses a series of other very important competences in his relations with the legislative power (legislative initiative, veto, a right to dissolve the parliament) and judicial authorities (appointing judges), but it proves nothing more than his strong position and a kind of an original version of the semi-presidential system presently developing in Transnistria, not a classical presidential formula14. Although at a first glance it may seem, that the mechanisms provided by Trans- nistria Constitution are far from being perfect and even to some extent fail, the practice of its functioning on a certain stage of the state’s developing political system, especially during the constitutional crisis, showed their correctness. On

14 The classical version of the presidential form of government which originated and has developed in the USA is deeply discussed in the monograph by R. Małajny, Amerykański precydencjalizm, Warszawa 2012, passim. It is also worth reaching for the work of J. Wiatr, Parlamentaryzm czy prezydencjalizm: stary spór i nowe doświadczenia państw posocjalistycznych, [In:] Myśl polityczna od historii do współczesności, eds. B. Stoczewska, M. Jaskólski, Kraków 2000, pp. 521–531. On the presidential form of government see also: W. Żebrowski, Teoria współczesnych systemów politycznych, Olsztyn 2015, pp. 125–133, 178–198. 180 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 the other hand, one ought not to forget that usually a direction of the evolution of such a semi-presidential system, like of any other one, is largely determined by its practical functioning, as well as the leader’s personality and charism. De- fault the tradition of democratic ruling, Transnistria unfortunately heads for authoritarian governing which also shape a certain culture and political regime. Transnistria’s Constitution of 1995 ought to be regarded as a rigid one15, since the procedure of its amending is more complicated and differs from the one used in case of laws. It is obstructed by several instruments, such as: the subjects equipped with the right to initiate constitutional law drafts are different, there oblige time restrictions, as well as changing some provisions is limited, the necessary majority to take decisions is higher, too. The right to submit a draft of the constitutional amendments belongs to: one third of the constitutional number of deputies, the President of the Re- public and at least 15 000 citizens able to vote. It cannot be lodged during the state of war or a state of emergency. The constitution provides two procedures of introducing amendments: adopting by the Supreme Council and through a referendum. The parliamentary procedure consists of three read- ings; the second reading cannot take place earlier than in two months after the first one, while the third reading can be set in at least one month interval after the second one. This means that the constitution cannot be changed in an extremely accelerated procedure, though the terms do not seem to be long enough. The provisions on the fundamentals of the constitutional system, citizens’ rights and duties, as well as on amending the basic law may be changed only in a referendum. Submitting amendments to the referendum needs a support of at least two thirds of the constitutional number of deputies. Its date may be established not earlier that in two months after the relative parliamentary resolution is taken. Voting over the draft law on the constitutional amendments in the Supreme Council needs a support of at least two thirds of the constitutional number of deputies. The President ratifies and publishes the amendments to the basic law not later than within seven days. The law comes into force not earlier that in one month after its adoption. However, obstructed in such a way procedure of implementing changes to the Constitution has not contributed to its larger stability, nor has it pro-

15 See also: Г.С. Брусалинская, Органы законодательной..., pp. 18–19. Viktoriya Serzhanova • The Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian... 181 tected it from numerous amendments during its over twenty-five-year period of being in force. This, in turn, proves the thesis that stability and time durability of the basic law are largely influenced by a high level of political and legal culture of the society.

The analysis of the binding Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Re- public of 1995 shows, that despite lack of a statehood tradition the constitutional legislator intended to construct an act thoroughly and based it on the liberal doctrines. Disregarding its disadvantages, its formal construction may be estimated positively. It seems to meet the basic requirements of a democratic legal state and shows such an intention of the constitutional legislator and, at the same time, a chosen direction of the state’s evolution. The basic law contains a series of democratic constitutional principles, much attention is paid to the status of an individual and his rights and freedoms. However, the decree of its declaratory character still seems to be rather high, for the guarantees and legal instruments of their protection do not function correctly enough. The authors of the analyzed constitution attempted to base its text relating to the mechanisms of functioning of the public authorities on the checked for- mulas and models. Nonetheless, the contradiction between the constitutional legislator’s intention to introduce a presidential form of government and actually determined methods of its functioning seems to be its disadvantage. The situation is complicated even more because of the fact that Transnistria’s constitutional practice is characterized by lack of the fixed democratic patterns in the society, as well as distinct aspirations of the authorities holding the power to usurp it and act ultra vires limited by the binding law, which is a natural feature of the power phenomenon in general. Therefore, this option seems to be better and safer for the state, because introducing the presidential form of government could cause the strengthening of the authoritarian tendencies and even a threat of a dictatorship. As the experience of political systems in other states show, a strong position of the president gives a better chance for the country to function correctly in the period of systematic transformation only in such societies which are used to permanent democratic stand- 182 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 ards. Otherwise, it arises dictatorial tendencies. The practice of functioning of Transnistria’s basic law and constitutional system, especially a large number of the implemented amendments, show that this act is not based on any stable systematic tradition and is not a durable value joining the society yet.

Literature

Бабилунга Н.В., Бомешко Б.Г., Шорников П.М., Государственность Приднестро- вья: история и современность, Тирасполь 2007. Бабилунга Н.В., Берил С.И., Бомешко Б.Г., Галинский И.Н., Губогло Е.М., Окушко В.Р., Шорников П.М., Феномен Приднестровья, Тирасполь 2003. Балала В.А., Становление и развитие государственности Приднестровья, Тирас- поль 2001. Бессарабский вопрос и образование Приднестровской Молдавской Республики, ed. В.Н. Яковлев, Тирасполь 1993 Брусалинская Г.С., Конституция ПМР – основа Приднестровской государствен- ности, Доклад на научно-практической конференции, посвященной десяти- летию Конституции ПМР, “Общественная мысль Приднестровья” 2006, №2. Брусалинская Г.С., Органы законодательной и исполнительной власти Придне- стровской Молдавской Республики на современном этапе, Москва 2007. Брусалинская Г.С., Приднестровский конституционализм: преемственность и соответствие международным стандартам, “Сборник докладов ПГУ им. Т. Г Шевченко”, Тирасполь 2006. Czachor R., Niepodległe, nieuznawane. Perspektywy rozwiązania problemu statusu nieuznawanych republik na obszarze postradzieckim, “Stosunki Międzynarodowe” 2011, No. 69–70. Девятков А.В., Международно-политические последствия «Де-факто государствен- ности» Приднестровья, “Вестник Тюменского государственного университе- та” 2014, No. 2. Gil A., Naddniestrzańska Republika Mołdawska jako element przestrzeni politycznej Eu- ropy Środkowo-Wschodniej, Lublin 2005. Kosienkowski M., Federacja Rosyjska wobec Naddniestrza, seria wydawnicza: Analizy In- stytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, Vol. 21, eds. J. Kłoczowski, A. Gil, Lublin 2009. Kosienkowski M., Naddniestrzańska Republika Mołdawska: determinanty przetrwania, Toruń 2010. Kosienkowski M., Ukraina wobec Naddniestrza, Analizy Instytutu Europy Środ- kowo-Wschodniej, t. 27, eds. J. Kłoczowski, A. Gil, Lublin 2009. Viktoriya Serzhanova • The Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian... 183 Kruk-Jarosz M., Nowe idee konstytucyjne, [In:] Prawa człowieka – społeczeństwo obywatelskie – państwo demokratyczne. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Pawłowi Sarneckiemu, eds. P. Tuleja, M. Florczak-Wątor, S. Kubas, Warszawa 2010. Małajny R., Amerykański precydencjalizm, Warszawa 2012. Маркедонов С., Приднестровье: как выйти из конституционных тупиков?, “Ин- формационный сайт политических комментариев ПОЛИТКОМ.RU”, http:// politcom.ru/9160.html. Sarnecki P., Systematyka konstytucji, [In:] Charakter i struktura norm konstytucji, ed. J. Trzciński, Warszawa 1997. Serzhanova V., Geneza ustrojowa ziem naddniestrzańskich, “Przegląd Prawa Konstytu- cyjnego 2016, No. 5. Serzhanova V., The First Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic of 1991, “Annales Universitatis Apulensis, Series Jurisprudentia” 2016, No. 19. Serzhanova V., Powstanie Naddniestrzańskiej Republiki Mołdawskiej i jego implikacje, “Studia Europejskie” 2016, No. 4. Serzhanova V., Obowiązująca Konstytucja Naddniestrzańskiej Republiki Mołdawskiej, “Studia Prawa Publicznego” 2016. Сквозников А.Н., Феномен непризнанных и частично признанных государств и особенности их правосубъектности, “Вестник Самарской гуманитарной академии. Серия: Право” 2011, No. 2. Solak J., Konsekwencje zamrożonego konfliktu o Naddniestrze dla bezpieczeństwa europejskiego, a supplement to “Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Obrony Narodowej”, Warsza- wa 2010. Solak J., Mołdawia – republika na trzy pęknięta: historyczno-społeczny, militarny i geopolityczny wymiar „zamrożonego konfliktu” o Naddniestrze, Toruń 2009. Wiatr J., Parlamentaryzm czy prezydencjalizm: stary spór i nowe doświadczenia państw posocjalistycznych, [In:] Myśl polityczna od historii do współczesności, eds. B. Stocze- wska, M. Jaskólski, Kraków 2000. Żebrowski W., Teoria współczesnych systemów politycznych, Olsztyn 2015.

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.09 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Krzysztof Łokucijewski1

A tale of two UK’s European referendums. Some remarks on British history, politics and the constitution

Keywords: EU referendum, Britain, European Union, Brexit, constitution, parliament, government. Słowa kluczowe: Wielka Brytania, Unia Europejska, referendum, Brexit, brytyjska konstytucja, parlament i rząd

Summary The two European referendums of 1975 and 2016 are examined in their historical, political and constitutional context. The paper provides a short account of United Kingdom’s accession and participation in the European Union. The uneasy relationship with the EU is shown, with reference to political process of negotiating Britain’s position in the Union. Some political, economic and cultural factors that have shaped British attitudes towards European integration are analysed. A legislative framework for both referendums is described and the dynamics of pre-referendum debates and campaigns are discussed. The political implications of ‘Leave’ vote (in favour of Brexit) are indicated. Finally, certain constitutional and legal issues surrounding UK withdrawal from the EU are considered, also in the context of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.

Streszczenie Brytyjskie referenda w sprawie członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. Kilka uwag na temat historii, polityki i ustroju

Referendum w sprawie pozostania lub opuszczenia Unii Europejskiej, przeprowadzone 23 czerwca 2016 r., okazało się być przełomowym momentem w historii brytyjskie-

1 The author is an assistant professor in the Institute of Law and Security Sciences Faculty of Finance and Management Uniwersity of Business in Gdańsk. E-mail: [email protected]. 186 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 go państwa. Po ponad 40 latach członkostwa w instytucjach integracji europejskiej Bry- tania rozpoczyna zupełnie nowy rozdział zarówno w relacjach ze swoimi europejskimi partnerami, jak też w kształtowaniu własnego porządku prawnego. Artykuł przedstawia kontekst historyczny oraz uwarunkowania polityczno-prawne, które sprawiły, że dru- gie referendum unijne przyniosło zupełnie inny wynik niż to pierwsze, z 1975 r. Dyna- mika procesów integracji europejskiej miała kluczowy wpływ na wydarzenia na scenie politycznej Zjednoczonego Królestwa, a te z kolei generowały określone zmiany w systemie ustrojowo-prawnym. Omówione zostały pokrótce przekształcenia legislacyjne, które warunkowały przeprowadzenie obu referendów, kampanie referendalne i towarzyszące im debaty oraz implikacje konstytucyjne wynikające ze specyfiki brytyjskiego ustroju.

The United Kingdom has been part of the European Union, or its predecessor the European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market), for over 40 years2. This section briefly describes the British road to the EEC and the political turbulence connected with the first few years of UK’s European integration and in particular with the 1975 EEC referendum. In the aftermath of World War II six countries of Western Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) decided to initiate the process of economic integration, first in the form of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, and then establishing the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community in 1957. The UK chose to stay out, for a combination of factors including the special relationship with the United States and the Commonwealth, along with a sense of retaining a global power position, not to be compromised by close ties to new European institutions.

2 There is a long line of analysis regarding the UK’s relationships with the EEC/EU, see e.g. A. Geddes, Britain and the European Union, Basingstoke–New York 2013; A.S. Bidwell, Dzieje Wielkiej Brytanii w XX wieku, Warszawa 2008, pp. 238–247; The Europeanization of British Politics, eds. I. Bache, A. Jordan, Basingstoke–New York 2006; K. Robbins, Zmierzch wielkiego mocarstwa: Wielka Brytania w latach 1870–1992, Wrocław 2000, pp. 305–312, 441–453; U. Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common Market, London 1973. Krzysztof Łokucijewski • A tale of two UK’s European referendums 187 However, by the early 1960s it became evident that Britain was lagging behind the EEC countries in economic growth and prosperity. Consequent- ly, the Conservative Government of Harold Macmillan and then the Labour Cabinet of Harold Wilson attempted to join the Common Market. Both Brit- ish applications were vetoed, in 1963 and 1967 respectively, by French president Charles de Gaulle. After he departed the political scene British membership was finally secured under the Conservative Government of Edward Heath in 1973. There is a long history of the two largest political parties – Conservatives and Labour – being divided on the question of European integration3. In particular, postwar Labour leaders, who were committed to the policies of nation- alisation and generally wide state intervention in the economy, were opposed to Europe because they were afraid that it would prevent the achievement of social democracy goals in Britain. However, under the leadership of H. Wil- son in the mid-1960s the Labour Party reversed its position, provided essential British and Commonwealth interests are safeguarded. In the 1970 general election Labour lost to the Conservatives and soon became highly critical of the British terms of entry negotiated by E. Heath with the EEC.H. Wilson, as Leader of the Opposition, promised to renegotiate those terms if Labour was returned to power. Labour was also calling, along with Conservative eurosceptics, for a consultative referendum before entry. On the other hand, the Conservative Government supported parliamentary approval of the EEC membership rather than public approval via a referendum. Therefore, the European Communities Act was enacted in 1972 by British Parliament, receiving Royal Assent on 17 October. As a result the UK, together with Ireland and Denmark, became a new member of the EEC on 1 January 1973, during its first enlargement which increased its membership from six to nine. The Conservatives lost power the following year and H. Wilson became the Prime Minister of a Labour Government. The general election of 28 February 1974 gave Labour fewer votes but more seats in the House of Com- mons than the Conservatives and brought a hung parliament and a minority Labour Government. H. Wilson was then returned to power in the next election on 10 October 1974, but only with a majority of three.

3 C. Gifford,The Making of Eurosceptic Britain, Farnham/Surrey–Burlington/Vermont 2014. 188 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Both Labour’s 1974 election manifestos promised a renegotiation of the UK’s terms of membership of the EEC, to be followed by a national referendum to determine if the new terms had been approved by the electorate4. Having won the elections the Labour Government started negotiations, ask- ing other EEC leaders for various concessions for the UK, regarding e.g. the Common Agricultural Policy, the UK contribution to the EEC Budget, and regional and industrial policies. The position of the Government included the possibility of a withdrawal from the EEC if the renegotiation was unacceptable. The referendum was deemed binding on the Government but not Parliament. As Edward Short, the Leader of the Commons, phrased it: “This referendum is wholly consistent with parliamentary sovereignty. The Govern- ment will be bound by its result, but Parliament, of course, cannot be bound by it. Although one would not expect hon. Members to go against the wishes of the people, they will remain free to do so”5. Having concluded the negotiations its results and continued EEC membership were approved by the Cabinet in March 1975 and in April in the House of Commons, by 396 to 170. Consequently, the European Referendum Bill was introduced, passed and received Royal Assent on 8 May, which paved the way for the first nationwide referendum in British history. Characteristically, most pro-EEC politicians opposed the referendum while those who wanted to leave the Common Market generally supported it. Mar- garet Thatcher, the newly elected leader of the Conservative Party and a strong advocate of Britain remaining within the EEC, called the referendum “a de- vice of dictators and demagogues”6. For the referendum campaign the normal convention of collective responsibility was suspended and individual Cabinet members were allowed to campaign on different sides, with seven of the 23 members opposing continued EEC membership. However, the leadership of all main political parties supported a ‘Yes’ vote, as well as almost all national newspapers and the business

4 For a comprehensive overview of a renegotiation process and the 1975 Referendum see e.g. V. Miller, The 1974–75 UK Renegotiation of EEC Membership and Referendum, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 7253, 13 July 2015. See also V. Bogdanor,The New British Constitution, Oxford 2009. 5 V. Miller, op.cit., p. 7. 6 Quoted in V. Miller, op.cit., p. 20. Krzysztof Łokucijewski • A tale of two UK’s European referendums 189 community. Two sides of the campaign debate were represented by Britain in Europe versus the National Referendum Campaign, the latter comprising right-wing Conservatives, left-wing Labour politicians and some nationalist regional parties. The referendum took place on 5 June 1975 and voters were asked the following question: “Do you think the United Kingdom should stay in the Eu- ropean Community (the Common Market)?” The outcome validated the Brit- ish membership by a margin of two to one. With the registered electorate of more than 40 million and the turnout of almost 65%, more than 67% of the votes were cast in favour of continuing EEC membership. However, the outcome of the referendum, as professor Vernon Bogdan- or put it, “did not reflect enthusiasm for Europe. It stemmed rather from two other factors. The first was fear of the economic consequences if Britain remained outside. Britain was then the sick man of Europe. [...] The Continent by contrast seemed to be thriving and to have found the secret of economic progress7.” The other factor was fear of extremism, as a ‘No’ vote came to be associated with the radical Left or Right, anti-establishment, xenophobic and protectionist.

II.

The 1975 referendum vote looked decisive but it did not settle ‘the Europe Question’ in British politics. Major political parties remained divided on the issues of further integration. Generally speaking, hostility towards Europe- an integration was associated with the left of the Labour Party and the right of the Conservative Party. Once again under the leadership of Michael Foot in the early 1980s the Labour Party reversed its position and committed itself to withdrawing from the EEC. The European controversies greatly contributed to the split in the Labour Party and the formation of the Social Demo- cratic Party in 1981. More moderate standing of successive Labour leaders led to a role reversal with the Conservatives by the late 1980s, when Labour grew more pro-European while the Tories became far more Eurosceptic.

7 V. Bogdanor, Europe and the Sovereignty of the People, “The Political Quarterly” 2016, Vol. 87, No. 3, pp. 348–349. 190 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Almost from the beginning Britain was an awkward member of the EEC and then the EU, with often uneasy and strained relationships with Europe- an partners8. M. Thatcher’s lasting battle about Britain’s budget contribution to secure a sizeable rebate, the opt-outs from the single currency (monetary union) and some social policy legislation stemming from the Social Chapter plus the forced exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism under John Major’s premiership, keeping Britain outside Schengen Area, or most recently Da- vid Cameron’s European referendum initiative, along with frequently emphasised fear of European super state with federal structure – these are just a few examples that shaped the ongoing ‘tug-of-war’ between the UK and its European partners. This uneasy approach towards the EEC and later the EU was reflected in popular attitudes among British people, who were consistently much less supportive of further integration than the European average9. Additionally, for most of the past 40 years the European issue was not highly prominent for the general public, as “outside elite political debate only rarely has the EU been perceived as the most pressing of issues on the political agenda. [...] Conse- quently, there has been little serious and sustained debate concerning the relative pros and cons of the UK’s experience of membership10”. During the time of British membership the EEC and now EU has grown from 9 to 28 members. Its scope and purpose has shifted dramatically. New legislation, including several European treaties, has radically altered relationships within the Union. The European institutions have become powerful entities shaping law and policy. All these changes could not have been predicted by those who voted in the 1975 Referendum and under the circumstances required approval by plebiscite. Over the same period of time British political scene has also undergone profound changes, including those regarding European integration. There has been a rising Euroscepticism, particularly within the Conservative Party, epitomized

8 See e.g. A. Menon, R. Minto, D. Wincott,Introduction: The UK and the European Union, “The Political Quarterly” 2016, Vol. 87, No. 2, pp. 174–175; D. Kenealy,How did we get here? Brief history of Britain’s membership of the EU, [In:] Britain’s Decision: Facts and Impartial Analysis for the EU referendum on 23 June 2016, eds. C. Jeffery, R. Perman, Edinburgh 2016, pp. 13–16. 9 A. Menon et al, op.cit., p. 175. 10 Ibidem, pp. 174–175. Krzysztof Łokucijewski • A tale of two UK’s European referendums 191 by the famous M. Thatcher’s Bruges Speech in 1988. It was coupled with the rise of openly anti-European political parties, first the relatively unsuccessful Referendum Party led by James Goldsmith in the mid-1990s and then the UK Independence Party (UKIP) under Nigel Farage, whose political programme was centred on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. At the same time Tory Eurosceptics began to talk openly of EU exit. The leadership of the Conserva- tive Party under David Cameron (2005–2016) had to respond to those nationalist sentiments. Therefore, it would seem almost inevitable that the question of European referendum returned to the national agenda, as it did in the 2010s. D. Cameron committed the Conservative party to holding a referendum on the British membership of the EU in his speech at Bloomberg’s London headquarters on 23 January 201311. The Conservative Party was under additional pressure because of the rising popularity of UKIP in the European Parliament elections on 22 May 2014. UKIP came first receiving 26.77% of the votes and winning 24 of 73 UK’s seats (up from 13 in 2009), ahead of 20 Labour and 19 Conservative seats12. It was the first time in more than a hundred years that a party other than the Conservatives or Labour had won a national election. Furthermore, UKIP received nearly four million votes in the May 2015 general election, representing 12.6% of the electorate (up from 3.1% in the previous election of 2010), even though it translated into only one parliamentary seat. The growing strength of UKIP seemed to threaten the electoral position of many Conservative Members of Parliament. Moreover, UKIP’s anti-EU message had strong appeal at grassroots level of the Conservative Party. As far as other major parties were concerned, Labour was opposed to a referendum before the general election but then moved to support it, while the Lib- eral Democrats and the Scottish National Party were against it. Apart from political considerations there were also new legislative requirements introduced in the European Union Act 2011. Under sections 2, 3 and 6 of the EUA a referendum is to be held, together with an Act of Parliament, to authorise any treaty replacing or amending the existing EU Treaties and certain other ‘trigger’ events (i.e. decisions enumerated in section 6)13.

11 Https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg (10.10.2016). 12 Http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-uk-2014. html (10.10.2016). 13 Http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/12/contents (10.10.2016). 192 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 The 2015 pre-election Manifesto of the ruling (in coalition with the Lib- eral Democrats) Conservative Party promised real change in the relationship with the EU, including an in-out referendum by the end of 2017, after a renegotiation of Britain’s position in the Union14. And the unexpected Conser- vatives victory in the general election on 7 May 2015 turned this manifesto pledge into governmental policy. Initially, the need for a treaty change was emphasised, but the European partners proved to be ready only for a less formal arrangement. D. Cameron presented his reform agenda to the Europe- an Council on 25–26 June 2015 and after a period of discussion and negotiations at various levels a new settlement for the UK in the EU was agreed at the later Council meeting on 18 to 19 February 201615. The British Government was seeking reform in the four broad areas which were described as competitiveness (reduction of administrative burden), sovereignty (a stronger position of national parliaments and exemption from the principle of ‘ever closer union’), social security (welfare benefits encouraging EU citizens to seek work in the UK to be reduced) and economic governance (protecting non-Eurozone countries from discrimination)16. D. Cameron secured Britain the so-called special status within the EU which included the following arrangements: the UK is not committed to further political integration; a so-called red-card mechanism shall be implemented, allowing 55% of national parliaments to effectively block a Commission legislative proposal; the UK will take full part in the single market but will remain outside the Eurozone and also will not be required to fund Eurozone

14 Https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/manifesto2015/ConservativeManifesto2015. pdf, pp. 72–73 (10.10.2016). 15 For an account of the UK-EU negotiations and the content of the agreement see e.g. L. Cram, Cameron’s negotiation: What has been agreed? What difference will it make? What will change in a ‘reformed’ Europe? [In:] Britain’s Decision:, op.cit., pp. 38–42; A. Lang et al., EU Referendum: summary and analysis of the new Settlement for the UK in the EU, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 7524, 26 May 2016; V. Miller,EU reform negotiations: what’s going on?, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 7311, 5 January 2016. 16 D. Cameron’s statement in Lisbon on 4 September 2015; full text at https://www.gov. uk/government/speeches/migration-and-eu-reform-pm-statement-in-lisbon (10.10.2016). The UK’s negotiating position was further detailed in a letter to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, on 10 November 2015 see https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ system/uploads/attachment_data/file/475679/Donald_Tusk_letter.pdf (10.10.2016). Krzysztof Łokucijewski • A tale of two UK’s European referendums 193 bailouts; migrant workers in the UK will not be prevented to send child benefit money home, as the Conservative Manifesto pledged, but instead payments will be linked to the cost of living in the countries where the children live; migrant workers may not be able to claim welfare payments from the beginning of their stay in the UK, but instead will gradually obtain the right to such benefits, depending on the length of their residence – this solution to be applied only under an ‘emergency brake’ rule. The new settlement was due to enter into force as soon as the UK Govern- ment would notify that the electorate voted in a referendum in favour of the UK to remain a member of the EU. And the agreement was expected to be implemented accordingly by the relevant EU institutions and then to be incorporated into the Treaties at the time of their next revision. D. Cameron pledged to press for his country to leave the EU if he did not get suitable concessions, but with the new settlement achieved he was able to campaign for the UK to stay in the EU. Nevertheless, the Eurosceptic critics of the agreement claimed that the new status was unconvincing and because the settlement was not written into a treaty it only represented a temporary compromise unlikely to be sustainable17. Also, it fell far short of satisfying demands of a growing number of Conservative MPs who favoured a solution that would help limit the number of citizens from other EU member states coming to the UK. And most polls at the time of negotiations indicated that a majority of the Conservative membership was pro-Brexit18. Only a few days after finalizing the EU agreement the British Government produced a policy paper, under the telling title “The best of both worlds: the United Kingdom’s special status in a reformed European Union”. The paper explained the new British status within the EU and was introduced by the Prime Minister, who stated that “leaving Europe would threaten our economic and our national security. [...] My recommendation is clear: I believe every family, household, business, community and nation within our Unit-

17 This state of mind was well summarised by the legendary comedian John Cleese in one of his tweets just before the referendum day: “If I thought there was any chance of major reform in the EU, I’d vote to stay in. But there isn’t. Sad.” See https://twitter.com/johncleese (10.10.2016). 18 A. Menon et al, op.cit., p. 176. ‘Brexit’ is a shorthand for ‘British exit’ – the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. 194 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 ed Kingdom will be stronger, safer and better off by remaining inside this reformed European Union”19.

III.

During the negotiations with the EU two other processes were initiated. First, the European Union Referendum Bill was being proceeded in Parliament, and secondly, the pro- and anti-EU membership campaigns began in Octo- ber 2015. The EU Referendum Bill was introduced in the House of Commons on 28 May 201520. It had a Second Reading on 9 June and was read the Third time and passed on 7 September. It was then proceeded in the House of Lords between 8 September and 1 December, and returned to the Commons with amendments. After some parliamentary Ping Pong between the two Cham- bers it was finally passed on 14 December21. The Act received Royal Assent on 17 December 2015 and was brought into force on 1 February 2016. A legislative framework for referendums held in the UK has been provided by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. However, each referendum still requires primary legislation to set more specific provisions. The European Union Referendum Act 2015 deals with the franchise and conduct of the referendum and also the rules of the campaign. Some of the most debated issues regarded the franchise, the timing and the wording of the question. As far as the electorate was concerned the regular provisions for a UK Parliamentary general election were slightly modified, allowing Members

19 Https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/502291/54284_EU_Series_No.1_Web_Accessible.pdf, p. 6 (10.10.2016). 20 The Conservative Party published a draft of the Bill as early as in May 2013. For an overview of the parliamentary debate and the regulatory context of the proposed legislation see e.g. P.J. Birkinshaw, A. Biondi, Introduction [In:] Britain Alone! The Implications and Consequences of United Kingdom Exit from the EU, eds. P.J. Birkinshaw, A. Biondi, Biggleswade/Bedfordshire 2016; E. Uberoi, European Union Referendum Bill 2015–16, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 07212, 3 June 2015. 21 For the content of the Act see http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/36/contents/enacted (10.10.2016). The detailed legislative procedure is presented at http://services. parliament.uk/bills/2015–16/europeanunionreferendum/stages.html (10.10.2016). Krzysztof Łokucijewski • A tale of two UK’s European referendums 195 of the House of Lords and Commonwealth and Irish Republic citizens in Gibraltar to vote. Citizens from the EU countries resident in the UK, apart from Ireland, Cyprus and Malta, were not eligible to cast a vote. Generally British, Irish and Commonwealth citizens who were over 18 and resident in the UK were qualified to vote. Also were UK nationals living abroad who had been on the electoral register in the UK in the last 15 years. And the age of voting was not lowered from 18 to 16 as in Scotland’s independence referendum in 2014. The initial wording of the question in the Bill “Should the United King- dom remain a member of the European Union?” was consulted with the Elec- toral Commission, which recommended its change to a more neutral wording, not favouring the status quo. It was then agreed to change it to: “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?”. The Prime Minister was authorised to appoint the referendum day and on 20 February 2016 it was announced by D. Cameron that the referendum would be held on 23 June 201622. Government ministers received the freedom to campaign against the Government pro-EU stance and were allowed a free vote instead of following the normal convention of collective responsibility.

22 There is already an extensive and quickly growing literature on various aspects of the 2016 referendum. A comprehensive bibliography has been provided by the House of Commons Library in its briefing papers, which are available for download at http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk (10.10.2016), see e.g. Reading list on UK-EU relations 2013–16: reform, renegotiation, withdrawal, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 07220, 24 June 2016 andBrexit reading list: legal and constitutional issues, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 7220, 10 October 2016; see also E. Uberoi, European Union Referendum 2016, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 7639, 29 June 2016. Several issues of academic journals largely dedicated its contents to the subject of the referendum, e.g. “The Political Quarterly” 2016, Vol. 87, Nos. 2–3, “European Public Law” 2016, Vol. 22, Issue 1. There are also various academic and legal websites with plentiful in-depth analysis of the pre-referendum debate and campaign and post-referendum constitutional and legislative challenges and political repercussions, e.g. UK Constitutional Law Association Blog – https://ukconstitutionallaw. org/blog (10.10.2016), The University College London Constitution Unit – https://www. ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit (10.10.2016), Centre on Constitutional Change – http://www. centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk (10.10.2016), Brick Court Chambers – https://brexit.law (10.10.2016), The Conversation – http://theconversation.com/uk/topics/eu-referendum-5556 (10.10.2016). 196 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 The pro-EU campaign was led by Britain Stronger in Europe, while Vote Leave was advocating a departure from the EU. Generally speaking, most of Labour MPs and the leaderships of the Liberal Democrats, SNP, Plaid Cym- ru (Wales) and Sinn Fein (Northern Ireland) supported continued membership, along with about half of Conservative MPs. The official Government position was in favour of ‘Remain’, but still five (out of 24) Cabinet ministers and some veteran Tory politicians campaigned for ‘Leave’. UKIP, running its own campaign, was firmly for UK withdrawal from the EU and so was Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party. Big business was, with a few exception, supporting ‘Remain’ option, as a more stable and predictable solution23. The national media were split, with much of the highly influential popular press in favour of Brexit24. Characteristically, ‘Brexit’ and not ‘Bremain’ dominat- ed the language of the debate. Given the limited space of this paper I must largely leave out of consideration specific issues of the pre-referendum debate. However, certain ob- servations on a more general level can be made about the character of the campaign. First, it took only around four months to consider a decision of such complexity and paramount importance for both current and future generations living in the UK. It was a much shorter period of time than, for instance, two years of campaign before the Scottish independence referendum of 2014. Secondly, the standard of the debate was widely criticized as insufficient to enable the electorate to make an informed choice on the day of decision. As Jan Eichhorn of the University of Edinburgh characterized it, “the quality of debates during this referendum have to be evaluated as appalling – irrespective of which side of the argument oneself may have been. There is no need for a repetition of the numerous claims and counter- claims that have been made which were massive exaggerations at best and objectively false at worst25. Moreover, warnings from respected academics and economists as to the costs of Brexit were rejected and the word ‘expert’

23 Cf. e.g. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887 (10.10.2016). 24 For an interesting analysis of some aspects of the issue see J. Seaton, Brexit and the Media, “The Political Quarterly” 2016, Vol. 87, No.3. 25 Http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/blog/brexit-reflections-dpart-note-brexit (10.10.2016). Dr J. Eichhorn was writing on behalf of the d|part think tank committed to research and public debate on the topic of political participation. Krzysztof Łokucijewski • A tale of two UK’s European referendums 197 began to circulate as a term of abuse. Significantly, a group of over 250 academics signed an open letter published on the Telegraph website on 14 June, in which they criticised campaigners on both sides of the debate for the deliberate misinformation, to the extent that it might threaten democratic legitimacy of the referendum vote26. And finally, the fundamental character of the forthcoming decision was such that uncertainty was in the nature of it. Even the experts differed on the impact of potential Brexit, with only partial information available. The economic implications of leaving the EU were simply unknown, as they would depend not only on internal circumstances but also on the reaction of Euro- pean partners and global environment. As David Bell, Professor of Econom- ics at the University of Stirling, put it: “A recurrent theme has been the lack of ‘facts’ to help voters decide. The problem with the future is that there are no ‘facts, just predictions’”27. He also reminds the reader that economic fore- casts are prone to error. Adding insult to injury, the campaign came to a sudden halt only a week before the referendum date, when the Labour MP Jo Cox was shot and killed in her constituency. She was the first sitting MP to be killed since 1990, when a Conservative politician Ian Gow was assassinated by the IRA. Jo Cox was a vocal supporter of the ‘Remain’ side while the perpetrator of this crime is believed to have had far-right sympathies along with a history of psychiat- ric problems. Campaigning was suspended as a gesture of respect and it resumed three days later. So far as the referendum debate is concerned the Government provided several policy papers and analyses on EU membership on a number of issues, including the immediate and long-term economic consequences of either retaining EU membership or leaving the EU and possible models for the UK’s relationships outside the EU28. However, as far as specific effects were evaluated only educated guesses could be made, and they were quick-

26 Http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2016/06/13/letters-both-remain-and-leave- are-propagating-falsehoods-at-publ (10.10.2016). 27 Http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/blog/david-bell-problem-future- there-are-no-facts-just-predictions (10.10.2016). 28 Https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/eu-referendum/about (10.10.2016). For a potential impact of Brexit see also Britain’s Decision:, op.cit. 198 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 ly overcome in the debate by what some commentators called a plebiscite on immigration29. Generally two issues took centre stage in the ‘Leave’ campaign – sovereignty and aforementioned immigration, which reflected major concerns of the electorate, with more emphasis on economic arguments in the ‘Remain’ campaign. Many voters felt the frustrations and threats stemming from globalisa- tion and the influx of immigrants, factors which they perceived as affecting levels of employment, standards in public services and also resulting in wage restraint and cheap housing shortages. The Eurozone and refugee crises also had some impact on the tone and content of the debate. And popular disaf- fection with mainstream political institutions and a profound mistrust of politicians were taking its toll. From the 2015 general election to May 2016 most of opinion polls indicated that more people supported ‘Remain’ than ‘Leave’. But the polls conducted in June often showed ‘Leave’ option in the lead and just before the referendum both campaigns were running neck and neck30.

IV.

The Electoral Commission declared the final result of only the third nationwide referendum in UK history at 7:15 AM on 24 June31. The UK has decided

29 Cf. e.g. http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/europe/2016/06/eu-referendum-uk-politics-ugly-160618174233645.html (10.10.2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36573220 (10.10.2016), http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/16/europe/brexit-britain-immigration-referendum/index.html (10.10.2016). 30 For the results of public opinion polls regarding ‘Leave’ and ‘Remain’ preferences see e.g. https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive.aspx?page=2 (10.10.2016); V. Miller, EU reform negotiations..., pp. 34–35. And for British views on European integration in a wider historical context see e.g. J. Curtice, A Question of Culture or Economics? Public Attitudes to the European Union in Britain, “The Political Quarterly” 2016, Vol. 87, No. 2; A. Henderson et al.,England, Englishness and Brexit, “The Political Quarterly” 2016, Vol. 87, No. 2; http://theconversation.com/ polling-history-40-years-of-british-views-on-in-or-out-of-europe-61250 (10.10.2016). 31 For full details of the result see http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/upcoming-elections-and-referendums/ eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information (10.10.2016). Krzysztof Łokucijewski • A tale of two UK’s European referendums 199 to leave the EU by 51.9% (17.410.742 votes) to 48.1% (16.141.241). The ‘Leave’ side won the majority of votes in England (53.4%) and Wales (52.5%), while the ‘Remain’ option prevailed in Scotland (62.0%) and Northern Ireland (55.8%). Only one out of nine English regions – London – voted for ‘Remain’ (59.9%). The turnout, at 72.2%, was the highest in a UK-wide vote since the 1992 general election, and generally higher in the Leave areas. On 23 June 2016 the residents of Britain exercised their democratic rights of territorial and political self-determination. And the outcome was described as “Black Friday for one half of England, Independence Day for the other half32.” V. Bogdanor, an authority on British constitutional and political history, summarized the results as “a recall. The referendum was a genu- ine grass-roots insurgency, a revolt from below. Such revolts are very rare in British politics. Indeed, perhaps the only similar revolt from below took place as long ago as 1922”33. The ‘Leave’ vote on 23 June has already had and will undoubtedly have far-reaching constitutional, legal, political, economic, and social consequences for everyone involved. It has also quickly raised many essential questions of constitutional and political nature34. On the morning of 24 June, shortly after the results were declared, D. Cam- eron announced his intention to resign the office of Prime Minister. There- sa May, the Home Secretary in his Cabinet and a ‘Remain’ supporter in the campaign, became the new Prime Minister on 13 July, in charge of taking

32 T.G. Ash, Professor of European Studies in the University of Oxford, on the day after the referendum commented its result under a telling titleAs an English European, this is the biggest defeat of my political life; see https://www.theguardian.com/politics/commentis- free/2016/jun/24/lifelong-english-european-the-biggest-defeat-of-my-political-life-timo- thy-garton-ash-brexit (10.10.2016). 33 V. Bogdanor, Europe..., p. 350. 34 The referendum outcome and its consequences have already been the subject of a great deal of comment in books, government papers, journal articles, and academic blogs – see the footnote 21; also cf. P. Bowers et al., Brexit: some legal and constitutional issues and alternatives to EU membership, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 07214, 28 July 2016; R. Gordon, R. Moffatt, Brexit: The Immediate Legal Consequences, London 2016; P.A. Joseph, Brexit: a view from afar, UK Constitutional Law Blog – available at https://ukconstitutionallaw. org (10.10.2016); Brexit: impact across policy areas, ed. V. Miller, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 07213, 26 August 2016;Parliament and the Rule of Law in the Context of Brexit, The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law Briefing Paper, London 2016. 200 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Britain out of the EU. She famously declared that “Brexit means Brexit” and in early October promised to trigger Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which will begin the withdrawal negotiations, before the end of March 2017. At the same time ‘Remain’ supporters called for a second referendum to be held on a future withdrawal agreement. This call took the form a Private Member’s Bill, presented to Parliament on 6 July 2016 by Geraint Davies, Labour MP. The Bill has been scheduled for nd2 reading on 21 Octo- ber 2016. Also, a petition signed by more than four million people called the Government “to implement a rule that if the remain or leave vote is less than 60% based a turnout less than 75% there should be another referendum35.” The issue was debated in Parliament on 5 September and the Government’s response was approved, when it declared that the EU Referendum Act 2015 did not set a threshold for the result or for minimum turnout and the decision taken by over 33 million people in one of the biggest democratic exercises in British history must be respected36. There have been major concerns and uncertainties associated with an extremely challenging negotiations process with the EU and revision of the enormous legacy of EU laws and policies, as the UK’s relationship with the EU has had implications for most aspects of British life. There is a large number of highly conflicting issues to be determined in negotiations, with EU leaders not necessarily sympathetic to the British cause, as for fear of creating further precedents they may want to demonstrate that secession is costly. And there is no precedent for a seceding country as no member state had ever held a referendum and then left the EU37. There are different models of

35 Https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/131215 (10.10.2016). It was the most signed Government petition since the institution was introduced in 2011. Interestingly, the petition was set up by a Brexit supporter ahead of the referendum, see http://www.independent.co.uk/ news/uk/politics/brexit-government-rejects-eu-referendum-petition-latest-a7128306.html (10.10.2016). 36 Https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/131215 (10.10.2016). 37 Under very different circumstances Greenland, as autonomous part of Denmark, staged a referendum on 23 February 1982 in which 53% of its participants voted ‘No’ to the question whether it should stay in the EC, and consequently left the Community in 1985, after 12 years of membership and almost 3 years of negotiations. The turnout was 74,9% and the number of voters did not exceed twenty-four thousand; cf. http://english.eu.dk/en/faq/ faq/greenland (10.10.2016). Krzysztof Łokucijewski • A tale of two UK’s European referendums 201 the EU co-operation with various countries, for example in the form of the European Economic Area. They have embraced the ideas of a single market or a free trade zone to accommodate the differences in interests and attitudes towards more integration. However the British dilemma to retain full access to the EU single market and at the same time to restrict free movement of people from the EU is not compatible with the fundamental principles of Europe- an integration and does not seem to be approved by other European leaders. While there are too many unknowns to be certain of anything in future negotiations, it can be assumed without exaggeration that tasks that lie ahead are simply daunting. But until Britain completes the process of withdrawal from the European Union, it remains subject to all of its EU obligations and will continue to abide by EU treaties and laws, but already without taking part in any EU internal decision-making. Also, the new settlement for the UK in the EU, negotiated a few months earlier by D. Cameron at the level of the European Council, will not come into effect. And one thing seems to be certain – there is no ‘business as usual’ after the British vote. As far as the relationships between the Government in Westminster and the devolved territories of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are concerned, the contrasting referendum outcomes in England and Scotland may exacerbate tensions in the Britain’s territorial constitution and could lead to the break-up of the country38. Nicola Sturgeon, the leader of the SNP and Scotland’s First Minister, did not rule out a second Scottish independence referendum as it would be “democratically unacceptable” for Scotland to be taken out of the EU despite voting to ‘Remain’39. She also declared the need for Scotland and London to be involved in Brexit negotiations and eventually for a constitutional arrangement to secure some kind of referendum opt-out for both regions. Another constitutional implication of the referendum is a debate regarding who – the Government under Royal Prerogative powers or Parliament – should ultimately decide the timing and procedure of the European Council notification under Article 50 of TEU and what should be the role of Parliament

38 For a potential impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland see e.g. J. Tonge, The Impact of Withdrawal from the European Union upon Northern Ireland, “The Political Quarterly” 2016, Vol. 87, No. 3. 39 Cf. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887 (10.10.2016). 202 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 in triggering the process and in the negotiations. The issue was raised, for instance, in a report by the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitu- tion, in which it was claimed that “it would be constitutionally inappropriate, not to mention setting a disturbing precedent, for the Executive to act on an advisory referendum without explicit parliamentary approval – particularly one with such significant long-term consequences. The Government should not trigger Article 50 without consulting Parliament. [...] In our representative democracy, it is constitutionally appropriate that Parliament should take the decision to act following the referendum. This means that Parliament should play a central role in the decision to trigger the Article 50 process, in the subsequent negotiation process, and in approving or otherwise the final terms under which the UK leaves the EU40.” Because the position of the Government did not conform with this view the appropriate judicial review proceedings have been implemented to challenge the Government’s ability to trigger Ar- ticle 50 without first obtaining authority by an Act of Parliament. But it must be said that either way the referendum result is not legally binding and in accordance with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty Parliament still has to pass relevant laws that will enable Britain to terminate its membership of the EU, including the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972. The concept of parliamentary sovereignty had been firmly entrenched in British constitutional doctrine and practice. But it was challenged legally upon entering the European Economic Community in 1973, after the adoption of the European Communities Act 1972, which invoked the principle of the supremacy of European law. Then, the change in sovereignty came about through political process, with the principle of the sovereignty of the people which was introduced in 1975 with the EEC referendum. The 2016 referendum has influenced the UK’s constitutional landscape in yet another way. It showed the conflict between principles of direct and representative democracy. The will of the people, as manifested through the referendum, contradicted the preferences of Members of Parliament. As V. Bog-

40 The invoking of Article 50, The House of Lords Paper 44, 2016, pp. 8–9. Cf. also P. Bowen, Parliament or Prime Minister: who can start the process of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU under Article 50 TEU?, London 2016; Leaving the EU: Parliament’s Role in the Process, The House of Lords Library Note, 2016; V. Miller, A. Lang, Brexit: how does the Article 50 process work?, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 7551, 30 June 2016. Krzysztof Łokucijewski • A tale of two UK’s European referendums 203 danor observes, “the Commons is required, perhaps for the first time in its history, to follow a policy [to leave the EU – K.Ł.] to which around three quarters of MPs are opposed. The sovereignty of Parliament is now to be con- strained— not legally, of course, but for all practical purposes—not by Brus- sels but by the people”41.

Literature

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41 V. Bogdanor, Europe..., p. 350. 204 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Britain’s Decision: Facts and Impartial Analysis for the EU referendum on 23 June 2016, eds. C. Jeffery, R. Perman, Edinburgh 2016. Joseph P.A., Brexit: a view from afar, UK Constitutional Law Blog, https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/. Kitzinger U., Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common Market, Lon- don 1973. Lang A. et al., EU Referendum: summary and analysis of the new Settlement for the UK in the EU, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 7524, 26 May 2016. Leaving the EU: Parliament’s Role in the Process, The House of Lords Library Note, 2016. Menon A., Minto R., Wincott D., Introduction: The UK and the European Union, “The Political Quarterly” 2016, Vol. 87, No. 2. Miller V., The 1974–75 UK Renegotiation of EEC Membership and Referendum, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 7253, 13 July 2015. Miller V., EU reform negotiations: what’s going on?, The House of Commons Library Brief- ing Paper CBP 7311, 5 January 2016. Miller V., Lang A., Brexit: how does the Article 50 process work?, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 7551, 30 June 2016. Brexit: impact across policy areas, ed. V. Miller, The House of Commons Library Brief- ing Paper CBP 07213, 26 August 2016 Parliament and the Rule of Law in the Context of Brexit, The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law Briefing Paper, London 2016. Reading list on UK-EU relations 2013–16: reform, renegotiation, withdrawal, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 07220, 24 June 2016. Robbins K., Zmierzch wielkiego mocarstwa: Wielka Brytania w latach 1870–1992, Wrocław 2000. Seaton J., Brexit and the Media, “The Political Quarterly” 2016, Vol. 87, No. 3. The invoking of Article 50, The House of Lords Paper 44, 2016. Tonge J., The Impact of Withdrawal from the European Union upon Northern Ireland, “The Political Quarterly” 2016, Vol. 87, No. 3. Uberoi E., European Union Referendum Bill 2015–16, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 07212, 3 June 2015. Uberoi E., European Union Referendum 2016, The House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP 7639, 29 June 2016. Wellings B., Vines E., Populism and Sovereignty: The EU Act and the In-Out Referendum, 2010–2015, “Parliamentary Affairs” 2016, Vol. 69, Issue 2. Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.10 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Marieta Czekałowska1

Comparative view of the regulations of environmental protection contained in the constitutions of: Kingdom of Spain, Republic of India and Republic of South Africa

Keywords: constitution, environmental protection, subjective law, horizontal activity of individual rights Słowa kluczowe: konstytucja, ochrona środowiska, prawo podmiotowe, horyzontalne działanie praw jednostki

Summary The aim of this article is to present regulations connected with environmental protection on examples three constitutions: Kingdom of Spain, Republic of India and Repub- lic of the South Africa. The aspect of this research is to analyze abovementioned regulations in the context of duties connecting with environmental protection. It is also significant aspect indicated the possibility of constitute the subjective rights to the use of environment and asserting rights directly from culprit pollution in horizontal activity. In this article, considering derives from editorial construction and taxonomy discussing provisions contained in above basic laws. Furthermore, on selected examples from judicature and doctrine had been presented a stance in order to define, which of these constitutional regulations are obliged to protect rights’ properly in cases of environmental protection.

1 The author is a doctoral student in the Department of Constitutional Law and Euro- pean Integration at the Faculty of Law and Administration, University of Szczecin. E-mail: [email protected]. 206 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Streszczenie

Analiza porównawcza przepisów dotyczących ochrony środowiska na przykładzie konstytucji: Królestwa Hiszpanii, Republiki Indii i Republiki Południowej Afryki

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie regulacji dotyczących ochrony środowi- ska na przykładzie trzech konstytucji: Królestwa Hiszpanii, Republiki Indii i Republiki Południowej Afryki. Przedmiotem badań jest analiza tych przepisów w kontekście obo- wiązków związanych z przestrzeganiem stanu środowiska. Istotna jawi się również kwe- stia możliwości powołania się na prawo obywatelskie do ochrony środowiska oraz spo- sobność dochodzenia tego prawa wprost od sprawcy zanieczyszczenia w tzw. wymiarze horyzontalnym. Na kanwie niniejszych rozważań odniesiono się również do konstrukcji redakcyjnych omawianych przepisów, ich usystematyzowania w powyższych ustawach zasadniczych. Ponadto, na wybranych przykładach z orzecznictwa i doktryny dokonano oceny w zakresie wskazania, które z omawianych regulacji konstytucyjnych należy- cie zabezpieczają prawa z tytułu naruszenia stanu środowiska.

Selection of articles from Constitutions of the Kingdom of Spain, Republic of India, Republic of South Africa in the context of comparative analysis of environmental regulations contained in them, is not random. The selection was influenced by, above all, willingness to examine the constitutional regulations by their assertion in environmental protection. What adds the flavour is the fact that the countries are located on different continents and vary regarding culture, politics, and society. In these states, constitution is the most supreme law. Other legal regulations, which are lower and which are non- congruent with the supreme norms may not be applied by courts. It is quite interesting to discuss the constitutional provisions from the country representative democratic governance (Spain), the former colony of the British Common- wealth received as common law system (India) or mixed law system consisted of civil and common law characterised in South Africa. At the same time, Marieta Czekałowska • Comparative view of the regulations of environmental... 207 the countries fight with environmental control problems head-to-head. The pollution problem is global and independent from geographical location or politics. However, based on present research it is important how despite these differences the enforcement rights of environmental protection are influenced by constitutional regulations. The overview of these regulations aims at answering the question if laws deriving from the violation of the environmental control can be claimed based on the constitutional regulations or on the basis of their co-usage along with other regulations made by ordinary law. It is also connected with other subject concerning the regulations of aforementioned constitutions provide subjective rights to the use of environment, including the right to demand a quality environment, i.e. healthy (sanitary), safe. Here a doubt arises if this right may be eligible for each subject or the burden of responsibility for environmental pollution disposal rests exclusively within competence of the public authorities? Finally, the systematic of the aforementioned basic laws is important. In other words, how these regulations are situated in constitutions by editorial and how it influences their interpretation. I consider whether are they defined as guiding principle as a duty of realization by State by attainment of social and economic goals, or classified as a fundamental right. In this respect selected examples of Spanish, Indian, and South African jurisdiction were referred to. The problem presented in this case concerns whether the constitutional doctrine and jurisdiction of those countries heads towards the holistic approach by considering environmental control regulations in substantial, as well as functional relation with other regulations deriving rights and freedoms (i.e. right to life, right to health). In therein article, the connotation of environmental control issues with subjective rights, such as right of property and freedom of free enterprise, were omitted. Thereby, there were no mentioned collisions about relation between public and individual interest.

II.

The Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain (hereinafter: the Spanish Consti- tution) was adopted by both houses of the Cortes Generales on 31st October 208 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 1978, adopted by the Nation in the referendum on 6th December 1978 (and sanctioned by the King of Spain on 27th December 1978)2. The shape of the constitution was influenced by the political-systemic situation connected with the restoration of democratic government in Spain in the middle of 1970’s after General Franco’s nearly 40-year-long dictatorship. In 1992 the Spanish Constitution was amended, but there were not introduced new environmental provisions. Legislative construction of Spanish Constitution reminiscents the shape of the most European Constitutions. Environmental control provisions are located in the article 45 (in Chapter 3 “Principles governing Eco- nomic and Social Policy”, in Title 1 “Basic laws and duties”): 1. “Everyone has the right to use the environment proper for unit’s development, as well as they has the duty to preserve it. 2. The public authorities ensure that natural resources are rationally used for protection and the quality of life improvement and preservation and restoration of the environment by relying on the essential collective solidarity. 3. Those, who break the resolution defined in the previous paragraph will be subject to criminal or, in justified cases, administrative responsibility; at the same time they are obliged to repair the damages”3. The editorial constitutional systematics may introduce justified doubts connected with an interpretation of the provisions. These rules were situated among the economical-social policies and not basic rights (of personal nature) despite the name of the title, which literally may have been applied that they really are. Following the systematic of the aforementioned constitution it should be said that the laws stemming from the article 45 (section 1 and 2) are guidelines for the legislative and public authorities and inter- pretative postulate for courts. Therefore, subjective rights cannot be inferred from them. In the Spanish Constitution there is no regulation allowing ad- dressing claims connecting with environmental protection, on the bodies governed by private law (in so-called horizontal relationships). They are only guiding principles upon which the subject cannot be ensured to have specific permissions. For the public authorities they are guide to setting the

2 Konstytucja Hiszpanii z dnia 27 grudnia 1978 r. znowelizowana 27 sierpnia 1992r., trans. & introduction T. Mołdawa, Warszawa 2008, p. 15. 3 Ibidem, pp. 42–43. Marieta Czekałowska • Comparative view of the regulations of environmental... 209 objectives and directions for the country. As a matter of fact, those laws are made by ordinary law4. This means that any claims in that matter can be investigated on the basis of regulations of statutory ranking. Constitution- al guiding resolutions can be the basis to the control of constitutionality of acts and regulations but only from the side public authorities and not private parties (vertical operation). The environment may only be applied before ordinary courts5. In section 3 abovementioned article of the Spanish constitution is stated about sanctions resulting from a breach of the environmental condition. Bearing a responsibility within this scope is raised to a constitutional level. It is clear, that the construction of these regulations thereof is highly reminiscent to the one contained in the Polish basic law. There is a visible lack of constitutional law defining the range and form of the right to the environment. It is proved by the constitutional judgment, which emphasised that the “environment is essentially an anthropocentric and relative concept”6. The concept of environment should be not only involve elements of environment such as air, water, soil but also their interaction themselves7. These days, irrespective from that, the importance of preserving the environmental protection requirements is also stressed on the doctrine, as well as judicature, in the context of maintaining social-economical balance. Conversely stance appeared before enter Spain to the Eu- ropean Union in 1984. The weak position of article was then very visible. The Constitutional Court declared that “prohibitions on the carrying out of mining activities due to environmental provisions” may not take a higher place as a economic development8.

4 M. Mazurkiewicz, Regulacja ochrony środowiska w Polsce, “Ochrona środowiska Prawo i Polityka” 1997, No. 2, p. 5, T. Gizbert-Studnicki, A Grabowski, Normy programowe w konstytucji, [In:] Charakter i struktura norm konstytucji, ed. J. Trzciński, Warszawa 1997, p. 97. 5 A. Garciá-Ureta, I. Lasagabaster, Environmental Governance in Spain, [In:] Environmental Protection in Multilayered Systems. Comparative Lessons from the Water Sector, eds. M. Alberton, F. Palermo, Leiden- Boston 2012, pp. 113–114. 6 Judgment of The Constitutional Court of Spain on 26 June 1995, 102/95 http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/Resolucion/Show/2956 (6.10.2016). 7 M. Campins Eutja, L. Casado, J.E. Nieto Moreno, A. Pigrau Solé, I. Pont Castejón, Environmental law in Spain, The Netherlands 2011, p. 30. 8 A. Garciá-Ureta, I. Lasagabaster, Environmental Governance in Spain, [In:] Environmental Protection..., p. 115. 210 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Spain is characterised by a complex administrative system consisting from municipalities (country and city communities) creating provinces which in turn consist from autonomous regions9. Executing the environment control rules and introducing mechanisms counteracting the degradation of the environment basically lies in the autonomous regions’ field of competence. The efficiency in executing these laws depends on the development of autonomous regions. For example, Catalonia (wealthy region) is more advanced in this process. In case of this rule, public authorities neither make specific decisions nor settle disputes. It can be said that the independent regions along with imposed competences take over great responsibility and control in effective accomplishments of the tasks related to the protection and improvement of the environment10. The Constitutional Court held that the configuration of competence on environmental issues “shared by the national government and the autonomous regions, has an initial static, objective element as a environment per se, and a further dynamic, functional element, which is the protection of the environment”11. As it was mentioned before, the laws in the fields of environment protection based on the Spanish Constitution cannot be defined as subjective. Still remains precedent the case investigated by the European Court of Human Rights in the claim Lopez Ostra vs the Spain in which environmental pollution was identified as a factor influencing people’s peace in such a manner, that it violates their right to respect for private and family life12. In turn, in the claim Moreno Gomez vs the Spain13, the same Court held that disturbing the peace with noises made by nightclubs should be understood as the violation of the right to respect for home. In both decision it was indicated that

9 Konstytucja Hiszpanii z dnia 27, op.cit., p. 5. 10 A. Lenschow, Transformation in European environmental governance, [In:] The Trans- formation of Governance in the European Union, eds. B. Kohler- Koch, R. Eising, London & New York 1999, p. 54. 11 Judgment of The Constitutional Court of Spain on 26 June 1995, 102/95 http:// hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/Resolucion/Show/2956 (6.10.2016). 12 H. Müllerova, Ochrona środowiska a Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, “Ochrona Środowiska – Prawo i Polityka” 2010, No. 1, p. 39. 13 Https://santiagosinruido.wordpress.com/jurisprudencia-europea-caso-moreno- gomez-de-valencia (9.10.2016). Marieta Czekałowska • Comparative view of the regulations of environmental... 211 the laws of the complainants should be secured under the article 8 of the Con- vention of the Human Rights. The fact that in the Spanish Constitution they are state postulates, and not formed subjective rights, does not mean that they have no legitimacy. They represent certain rules and articulate both optimising warrants aiming at achieving specific objectives and values referring to the environmental protection. So they regard burdens and duties sustained and executed by the public authorities who are obliged to maintain the optimal state of the environment to provide safety of life conditions.

III.

Similar text systematic of the constitution locating the environmental regulations can be found in the Constitution of the Republic of India (hereinafter: the Indian Constitution) adopted by on 26th November 1949 (enter into force on 26th January 1950)14. It is one of the longest national constitutions. Its shape was influenced by the political system of Great Britain15. Environ- mental regulations were introduced into the aforementioned constitution in the 42nd amendment on 29th August 1976. The above regulations contained in Part IV titled “Directive Principles of State Policy” (hereinafter: DPSP) in article 48a: “The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country”. In Part IVa titled “Fundamental Duties” in article 51 a (g) followed: “It shall be the duty of every citizen of India to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures”16. Basically, the environmental provisions are both principles of state policy. The environment protect and preserve the nature has been guaranteed under DPSP, which are not directly enforceable17. DPSP are represented by the authorities responsible for protecting environment. “Fundamental

14 Https://india.gov.in/sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.pdf (10.10.2016). 15 C.M. Abraham, Environmental Jurisprudence in India, Hague 1999, p. 14. 16 Https://india.gov.in/sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.pdf (10.10.2016). 17 J. Razzaque, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, Hague 2004, p. 70. 212 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Duties” are embodied in a Part IVa, so it seems that they are elaborated on indicated regulations in Part IV. An obligation of an individual with regard to observing environmental provisions is – as in Spanish Constitution – also included. These two articles should be interpreted jointly and severally in order to recognize fundamental rights contained in the Indian Constitution and also in regulations executed by the Parliament and the State legislature. India is a federal State in which authority is divided between federal bodies and states. The federal Parliament’s legislative competences include exemplary issues such as nuclear energy, mining. State legislatures govern water sup- ply, and fishing matters. Shared competences (between federal and state) occur in a nature conservation18. The influence of harmful factors polluting the environment is, without a doubt, a priority of India’s state authorities. According to the newest data, 13 Indian cities are on the list of 20 most polluted placed on the world with the capital of India taking the first place. High concentrations of air pollution kill over 10,000 people on the city each year19. The reason for that is the strat- ification of the society which cannot deal with the scale of the pollution, bad financial situation of the regions which cannot afford cutting edge equipment allowing precise measurements of air quality standards. The Indian Consti- tution handled devolution of power to the local authorities, which is not an effective, because of limited financial, administrative measures20. The legal system reliance on the judicial precedent borrowing from the common law system. In case law dominates a view that the environment should be classified as a factor defining healthy life of a man and as a condition necessary to provide. The perfect example is the stress put on the right to clean water which is the manifestation of the right to healthy environment and which should be interpreted with the right to live. In Narmada Bachao Andolan vs Union of India and Ors21. the Supreme Court of India held that

18 S. Sharma, Governing Environment: Federal Perspective from India and Canada, New- castle 2016, p. 29. 19 Http://naukawpolsce.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news,408838,who-co-czwarty-zgon-zwi- azany-z-zanieczyszczeniem-srodowiska.html (4.10.2016). 20 S. Chandra Das, The Financial System in India. Markets, Instruments, Institutions, Services and Regulations, Delhi 2015, p. 385. 21 R. Madhav, Context for water sector & water law reforms in India, [In:] Water Law for the Twenty- First Century, National & International Aspects of Water Law Reform in India, eds. Marieta Czekałowska • Comparative view of the regulations of environmental... 213 “water is the basic need for the survival of human beings and is part of the right to life [...]”. Therefore, the quality of environment is in relation with the state of human health, which in turn is an element of life. It seems reasonable to say that the right to live implies the right to health. Environment protection considered as a common, national good. The proofs are included in the cases: Subhash Kumar vs State of Bihar22, Damodhar Rao vs Special Officer, Munici- pal Corporation Hyderabad23, Charan Lal Sahu Etc. vs Union Of India24, where right to environment should be guaranteed under article 21, because – as it held – environmental pollution is a violation of the fundamental right to life. It should be pointed out that the right to life (article 21) is articulated among fundamental rights. It reads as follows “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”. The editorial design of the regulation above shows that it belongs to so-called negative rights which aim to protect defined goods of entity, in this case the environment. At the same time, the norm of the law derived from this regulation forbids specific action violating goods valuable for this entity25. In my opinion, despite the adopted case-law, only from the duty to take care of the environment the horizontal effect cannot be derived. I consider that making a claim against the subject obliged to suffer damage in relation to the deterioration of the environment is not possible, even the right to a healthy environment is strongly emphasized in jurisdiction. DPSP are only principle guidance and cannot have been considered as fundamental rights. Furthermore, the jurisdiction went one step ahead and showed that each noise inconvenience in the surrounding area disrupting the normal functioning in case of refer to both its limit values and the specific space and time conditions, should be read as a right to livelihood. The Supreme Court held that: “Anyone who wishes to live in peace, comfort, and quiet with-

P. Cullet, A.G. Gualtieri, R. Madhav, U. Ramanathan, Abindgon 2010, p. 120. 22 Judgement of The Supreme Court of India on 9th January 1991 https://indiankanoon. org/doc/1646284 (7.10.2016). 23 Judgement of Andra Pradesh High Court on 20th January 1987 http://www.nlsenlaw. org/urban-poor-and-the-law/national-legal-framework/supreme-court-cases-2/t-damodar- rao-v-special-officer-municipal-corporation-hyderabad-air-1987-andhra-pra-171 (9.10.2016). 24 Judgment of The Supreme Court of India on 22th December 1989 https://indiankanoon. org/doc/299215 (9.10.2016). 25 M. Florczak- Wątor, Horyzontalny wymiar praw konstytucyjnych, Kraków 2014, pp. 30–31. 214 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 in his house has a right to prevent the noise as pollutant reaching him [...]. How and when a nuisance created by noise becomes actionable has to be answered by reference to its degree and the surrounding circumstances including the place and the time ”26. In my opinion, this statement raises controversy because even subjective, individual feeling relating to the environmental inconvenience is taken under protection. Another remarkable court ruling states that the right to life has a very wide interpretation and its range must be related to the rights to private and family life stated that it is visible correlation “of the right of peaceful, comfortable environment”. Some authors said it is clearly connection to state on the right to pollution free environment27. With the exemplary rulings in the view, it can be concluded that the environment, according to the Indian constitutional jurisdiction, is a “particular value”. From the analysis of selected constitutional rulings it can be concluded that they precede legislation (or replaces the lack of). I would point out that the examples above lead to the conclusion about decentralisation of judicial power28 which issues decisions as a counter to the guiding principles of constitutional resolutions and the systematic editorial of the regulations itself. Furthermore, it is clear, that the judicial authority investigating the issues is set as not equal position to the executive and legislative authorities. The examples above prove that, it is set above the other two authorities. In India, it is visible to put much attention on balanced development. However, the term of balanced development does not appear directly in legal acts – neither the Constitution nor acts29. In another matter the Supreme court decided in case Vellore Citizen Welfare Forum vs Union of India that the balanced development [...] is part of the Indian nature conservation legislation finding its constitutional legality in provisions of the articles 21, 47, 48a, and 51 a(g)30. This has been clearly demonstrated in another statement

26 A. Venkat, Environmental Law and Policy, New Delhi 2011, p. 60. 27 Ibidem. 28 The evaluation of a conformity of legal acts with the constitution is a competence of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. 29 Z. Bukowski, Zrównoważony rozwój w systemie prawa, Toruń 2009, p. 432. 30 Judgement of The Supreme Court of India on 28th August 1996 http://legalsutra.com/ tag/vellore-citizens-welfare-forum-v-union-of-india (9.10.2016). Marieta Czekałowska • Comparative view of the regulations of environmental... 215 Sachidanand Pandey vs State of West Benga31, in which Court indicated saying that any disputes of ecological background should be settled in accordance to the article 48a. It is visible that the court deems possibility to live in healthy environment as necessary for every man to function. An extremely important element of the implemented policy is, without doubt, the development of solutions which move toward efficient fight with environment pollution. It is important for India because the scale of excess over the acceptable amounts in air in big cities means that very radical steps should be taken. The fact that Indian legal system is based on the common law may be an efficient solution to ensure the stability and predictability of law, because of the fact that courts have the power to recognize follies32. In my opinion, the recognised by jurisdiction establishment of entitie’s right to life and health protection caused by the environment protection does not conflict with the discussed regulations literally contained in the Constitution. What is more important, the environmental control presents as State’s obligation and this State, by carrying out duties, protects the entity by referring its right to other rights and freedoms.

IV.

The South African Constitution (adopted by on th8 May 1996, enter into force on 4th of February 1997)33 introduced a right to the environment in the provisions contained in Chapter 2 “Bill of Rights”, article 24 (“Environ- ment”) as follows: “Everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being and b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation ii) promote conservation and iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable

31 Judgement of The Supreme Court of India on 11th February 1987 http://www.the-laws. com/Encyclopedia/Browse/Case?CaseId=007891961000 (9.10.2016). 32 S. Elias, Legal Research, How to Find and Understand the Law, California 2009, pp. 8–9. 33 Konstytucja Republiki Południowej Afryki z dnia 8 maja 1996 r., trans. A. Wojtyczek- Bonnand, trans. & introduction K. Wojtyczek, Warszawa 2006, p. 16. 216 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 economic and social development”34. The characteristic of the Constitution of South Africa is the recognition of not only subjectivity entities and persons but also cultural, religious, and linguistic communities. It is in line with the African tradition which sees unit as a part of defined community. Worthy of mention among the characteristics is the recognition of horizontal actions of human rights. It is a distinctive feature as such clear indication cannot be seen in the regulations of the Constitutions discussed earlier on35. At this point a doubt arises how should “every” be interpreted; should it refer only to natural persons or should it also consider legal persons, associations, and units? The term of subjective right assumed a creation relationship consisted of at least four elements: 1) legal beneficiary, 2) entity responsible for realization that particular right, 3) legal duties defined attitude from the responsible entity in behalf of entity of legal beneficiary and 4) the group of presumptions depended on actualisation this duty36. According to constitutional literal context, it seems that the environment (as well as its protection) is defined as good which must be taken care of, but there is not alleged as subjective right. The article 8 section 237 appears to prejudge the acceptation of a model of the direct action of the constitutional laws by the South African legislator. Howev- er, it is not used in the judicial practice at all. In that respect, this provision is interpreted in the light of other constitutional provisions which consist of indirect horizontal action of the constitutional laws38. The constitutional law is binding for the entity (imposes obligations on it) but is used only when it is realised in legislation or case law39. For that reason the court first research- es if the specific law is realised in legislation; if not – is it realised in case law and even if this is not confirmed – the case law is developed, creating a rule realising this law. In the doctrine it is indicated that in a situation where the

34 Ibidem, pp. 57–58. 35 Ibidem, p. 19. 36 K. Wojtyczek, Granice ingerencji ustawodawczej w sferę praw człowieka w Konstytucji RP, Kraków 1999, p. 20. 37 A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and nature of any duty imposed by the right. 38 M. Florczak- Wątor, op.cit., p. 126. 39 Article 8 section 3 of The South African Constitution. Marieta Czekałowska • Comparative view of the regulations of environmental... 217 case law does not give the entity a legal basis to exercise its rights before the court, such basis should be created by the court by appropriate case law de- velopment40. The Constitution of South Africa stresses the co-operation of the authorities on every level. South Africa is a federal State. The central legislature is a prior before provincial legislature, if is it necessary to realize some constitutional values41, exemplary environmental issues. To conceive environmental law effectively, it has been enacted numerous provincial and local stat- ues. It has been clearly clarified by the Constitutional Court in Government of the Republic of South Africa vs Grootboom followed: “reasonable legislative ant other measures should be read as being mutually supportive to the extent that the duty to protect environment can only be realized if the statutory environmental law framework is supported and implemented by plans, policies and programmes”42. On the regional level the first international legal act recognising man’s right to the environment was African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981 which stated in the article 24 that “All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development”43. In the Charter the right to the environment was formulated in the collective categories and not in individual categories (as it occurs in constitutional provisions.) For this purpose the African Commission on Hu- man and Peoples’ Rights formulating recommendations for States Parties and to interpreting provisions and African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights upholding the laws provided in the Charter, enforcing its provisions and acting as judge and advisor were founded. The African Court (adopted on 1998 by the gathering of Heads of State and Government of Organisation of African Unity) was founded to follow the state of environment. On the African continent there is also second act on the international basis in force, i.e. the Af- rican Convention on Nature and Natural Resources Conservation of 11th July

40 M. Florczak- Wątor, op.cit., p. 126. 41 Konstytucja Republiki Południowej Afryki, op.cit., p. 43. 42 Judgment of The Constitutional Court of South Africa on 17th December 1999 https:// www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2006/government-republic-south-africa-ors-v-grootboom-ors- 2000–11-bclr-1169-cc (10.10.2016). 43 K. Urbańska, Prawo podmiotowe do dobrego środowiska w prawie międzynarodowym i polskim, Poznań 2015, p. 136. 218 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 200344. Furthermore, the South Africa enacted in 1998 National Environment Management Act (hereinafter: NEMA), a document describing a number of environmental control requirements. Although courts are obliged to enforce framework law like NEMA, this act is indispensable for the implementation of constitutional environmental provisions. NEMA stresses the importance of co-operation between the competent institutions in the context of proper implementation of environmental control regulations. The environmental principle is support the sustainable development45. This act also presents the harmonious institutions of environmental cases that will implement of environmental protection properly46. In BP Southern African Ltd vs MEC for Ag- riculture, Conservation, Environment & Land Affairs case, High Court47 observed that [...] “ecologically sustainable development and the use of natural resources are to be promoted with justifiable economic and social development”48. In the latter case, The Constitutional Court confirmed in Fuel Re- tailers Association of Southern Africa vs Director – General: Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province and Oths: “the idea of sustainability reflects a concern equity between generations”49. The next matter is the fact that the pollution indicator is comparably high as in India. The environment rights are interpreted as a measure to fight with poverty50. There is inside the South Africa’s borders the problem with access to drinking water is visible. In a case Residents of Bon Vista Mansions vs Southern Metropolitan Local Council, held that it municipality constituted

44 K. Urbańska, op.cit., p. 137. 45 Compedium of South African Environmental Legislation, eds. M. Van der Linde, L. Feris, Pretoria 2010, p. 502. 46 Ibidem, p. 503. 47 In practice, the Constitutional affairs belongs to the higher courts and the Supreme Court of Appeals. The courts can recognise any Constitutional affairs with the exception of the affairs which can be recognised only by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court confirms statements verifying invalidity due to unconstitutionality. 48 Judgment of The South African High Court on 31th March 2004 http://www.saflii. org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2004/18.html (9.10.2016). 49 Judgment of The Constitutional Court in South Africa on th7 June 2007 http://www. saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2007/13.html (10.10.2016). 50 Y.L. Bouthillier, M.A. Cohen, J.J. Gonzalez Marquez, A. Mumma, S. Smith, Poverty Alleviation and Environmental Law, Cheltenham, Northampton 2012, pp. 3–4. Marieta Czekałowska • Comparative view of the regulations of environmental... 219 “a breach of the State’s duty to respect the right of access to water”51. There- fore, it is no wonder that the legislation addresses the legal solutions improving the system of human rights protection in the context of nature preservation. In South Africa (as well as the whole African continent) we have to deal with a distinctive jurisdictional procedure. For an effective, as well as efficient, execution of the constitutional environmental control regulations (in relation to health and life protection) other regional and nationwide regulations are co-executed. This is mostly the result of the South African legal system being based on a mixed system joining the tradition of continental system, common law, and local African customary law52. It can be said that the rights safeguard guarantee is threefold. On the first part by the constitutional regulations (based on environmental issues which are not sufficient autonomously), second – by an established legislation, and third – by the continental customary law, which is strongly developed in Africa.

Referring to the environmental control regulations on the basis of Spanish, In- dian, and South African Constitutions it should be emphasised strongly that environmental control issues play a significant role. These states are aware of an impact of the human activity on the environment and an influence of the environment on the human health and life. Including the environmental provisions in the Spanish constitution indicate that they are qualified as the social rights. These rights, in principle, constitute rather postulates to a realisation of which a concerned state should pursue, instead of reconstructing a subjective right on their basis. Pursuant to these rights, a possibility to require a realisation of the qualifications is limited. An extend of their realisation depends on a financial condition of the bodies appropriate for adhering to the environment condition. An entity may only demand to take actions by the public authorities which are aimed at materialising these rights.

51 Judgment of The South African High Court (no information about date), in September 2001 http://www.righttowater.info/rights-in-practice/legal-approach-case-studies/enforcing- the-right-to-water-south-africa-2 (9.10.2016). 52 Konstytucja Republiki Południowej Afryki, op.cit., pp. 23–24. 220 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Referring to the selected above examples from the Indian judicature it should be stressed that much attention was devoted to the relations between the laws of environmental control and life and health protection. In the Hin- du judicial practice are frequently mentioned referrals to the other freedoms and rights within a context of the environmental protection. But, the right to life may have not been a basis to make claims for environmental protection as in the pollution cases. Both in Spain, and in India ensuring the environmental protection is a public task. DPSP are realized and guided by the government of India. The public authorities are obliged to undertake actions that are aimed at protecting citizens against the environmental threads. As it has been mentioned above, this obligation is a kind of a political declaration in nature. The indicated regulations are in the support of healthy environment and, what is distinctive (as opposed to the indicated constitutions) also taking care of other living species. Looking at the regulations and the existing legal system in the Constitu- tion of South Africa it can be concluded that in terms of effective complying with environmental control requirements it reflects needs and expectations of those using the environment. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa on a subject of pursuing rights related to a violation of the environmental protection assumes a model of the direct horizontal application of the constitutional rights. It means a basis for a claim constitutes a statutory, not a constitutional provision. A direct application of the constitution may take place in the situations, when rights connected with environment included in the constitutional provisions are precisely determined. In the above basic law, such an indication cannot be found. Nevertheless, it seems that this model due to the statutory terms and values which lie at the basis of the constitutional rights, can contribute to a more active observance of the law within a scope of the environmental protection. Noteworthy is the particularly important role of judicial authority which is manifested by realising the law in case of the inability to rely on it. In view of this considering, it is difficult to decisively determine unambigu- ously which of regulations above countries are effective for environmental rights. However, in order to achieve the effective usage of pollution free environment not only granting rights to exercise rights basing on them, but also developing efficient mechanisms to counteract the environment deterioration should be sufficient. Marieta Czekałowska • Comparative view of the regulations of environmental... 221 Literature

Abraham C.M., Environmental Jurisprudence in India, Hague 1999. Bouthillier Y.L., Cohen M.A., Gonzalez Marquez J.J., Mumma A., Smith S., Poverty Al- leviation and Environmental Law, Cheltenham, Northampton 2012. Bukowski Z., Zrównoważony rozwój w systemie prawa, Toruń 2009. Campins Eutja M., Casado L., Nieto Moreno J.E., Pigrau Solè A., Pont Castejón I., Envi- ronmental law in Spain, The Netherlands 2011. Chandra Das S., The Financial System in India. Markets, Instruments, Institutions, Ser- vices and Regulations, Delhi 2015. Charakter i struktura norm konstytucji, ed. J. Trzciński, Warszawa 1997. Elias S., Legal Research, How to Find and Understand the Law, California 2009. Environmental Protection in Multilayered Systems. Comparative Lessons from the Water Sector, eds. M. Alberton, F. Palermo, Leiden- Boston 2012. Florczak- Wątor M., Horyzontalny wymiar praw konstytucyjnych, Kraków 2014. Garciá- Ureta A., Lasagabaster I., Environmental Governance in Spain, [In:] Environmen- tal Protection in Multilayered Systems. Comparative Lessons from the Water Sector, eds. M. Alberton, F. Palermo, Leiden- Boston 2012. Gizbert- Studnicki T., Grabowski A., Normy programowe w konstytucji, [In:] Charakter i struktura norm konstytucji, ed. J. Trzciński, Warszawa 1997. Konstytucja Hiszpanii z dnia 27 grudnia 1978 r., znowelizowana 27 sierpnia 1992, trans. & introduction T. Mołdawa, Warszawa 2008. Konstytucja Republiki Południowej Afryki z dnia 8 maja 1996 r., trans. A. Wojtyczek- Bonnand, trans. & introduction K. Wojtyczek, Warszawa 2006. Lenschow A., Transformation in European environmental governance, [In:] The Transfor- mation of Governance in the European Union, eds. B. Kohler- Koch, R. Eising, Lon- don & New York 1999. Madhav R., Context for water sector & water law reforms in India, [In:] Water Law for the Twenty- First Century, National & International Aspects of Water Law Reform in India, eds. P. Cullet, A.G. Gualtieri, R. Madhav, U. Ramanathan, Abindgon 2010. Mazurkiewicz M., Regulacja ochrony środowiska w Polsce, “Ochrona środowiska Prawo i Polityka” 1997, No. 2. Müllerova H., Ochrona środowiska a Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, “Ochrona Środowiska Prawo i Polityka” 2010, No. 1. Razzaque J., Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, Hague 2004. Sharma S., Governing Environment: Federal Perspective from India and Canada, New- castle 2016. 222 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 The Transformation of Governance in the European Union, eds. B. Kohler- Koch, R. Eis- ing, London & New York 1999. Urbańska K., Prawo podmiotowe do dobrego środowiska w prawie międzynarodowym i polskim, Poznań 2015. Van der Linde M., Feris L., Compedium of South African Environmental Legislation, Pre- toria 2010. Venkat A., Environmental Law and Policy, New Delhi 2011. Water Law for the Twenty- First Century, National & International Aspects of Water Law Reform in India, eds. P. Cullet, A.G. Gualtieri, R. Madhav, U. Ramanathan, Abind- gon 2010. Wojtyczek K., Granice ingerencji ustawodawczej w sferę praw człowieka w Konstytuc- ji RP, Kraków 1999. Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.11 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Marian Grzybowski1

Ownership Right – Private vs. Public Aspect

Keywords: ownership substace, constitutional freedoms and rights, public law, private law, ownership (property), community coexistence, exclusiveness of exploration, expropiation Słowa kluczowe: istota własności, konstytucyjne wolności i prawa, prawo publiczne, prawo prywatne, własność, współżycie społeczne, wyłączność korzystania, wywłaszczenie

Summary Ownership is considered, predominatly, to be a legal notion. But it has also some cono- tations in the frame of economics, philosophy and sociology. In the doctrine of law there were framed numerous and slightly different definitions of ownership. Most of them, however, emphasise the dominant role of the owner’s unlimited and exclusive power over a thing (or value) as well as his (her) dominat role to explore possibilities of legal and factual disposal. The Constitution of Poland of 1997 deals with the ownership (property) rights twice: in article 21 (within the basic constitutional regulations) and, even more detaily, in article 64 (1–3), in Chapter II of the Constitution, dealing with the civil fredoms and rights of entity. The central issue under the author’s consideration should be framed in a question: to which extend the limitations pointed in article 31(3) of the Constitution may define exploration of the owner’s rights and powers protected by the Constitution, in particular; by its provisions framed in its articles 21 and 64?

1 The author is a professor in the Departament of Comparative Constitutional Law the Faculty of Law and Administration of Jagiellonian University in Krakow. E-mail: marian. [email protected]. 224 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Streszczenie

Własność jako prawo – aspekt prywatny w zestawieniu z publicznym

Własność funkcjonuje jako pojęcie prawne. Posiada nadto określone konotacje w sferze ekonomii, w filozofii i socjologii. W doktrynie prawnej podjęto szereg prób definiowania własności. Wszystkie be mała ujęcia akcentują, obok zróżnicowań, wyłączność właści- ciela w korzystaniu z rzeczy lub wartości stanowiących przedmiot własności ora z dys- ponowania nimi. Konstytucja RP z 1997 r. odnosi się do własności w art. 21 (w grupie unormowań wy- znaczających zasady ustroju państwa) oraz w art. 64 ust. 1–3 (w rozdziale II, odnoszą- cym się do wolności, praw i obowiązków człowieka i obywatela). Autor rozważa w pracy kwestię: czy i w jakim zakresie na możliwość korzystania r rzeczy (wartości niematerial- nej) przez właściciela rzutują ograniczenia w korzystaniu z wolności i praw konstytucyjnych, przewidziane w art. 31 ust. 3 Konstytucji RP?

In legal discourse, both in the past and nowadays, ownership is considered to be such a notion, and a legal institution at the same time, towards which a broad spectrum of views is presented, as well as differing definitions are proposed. It is both a legal and economic notion, and what’s more – subject of interest of philosophy and sociology2. According to J. Bentham, the idea of property right comes down to expectation that an owner (owners) is entitled to take benefits from their property, where this expectation is sanctioned by the system of legal norms in force; it becomes therefore ‘the creature of law’3.

2 K. Lorenz, M. Volf, Allgemeiner Teil des bürgerlichenRechts, 9th edition, München 2004, pp. 251–252; J. Lehmann, Schherschaft und Socialbindung, Berlin 2004, pp. 39–40, W. Pańko, Własność jako kategoria ekonomiczna a prawo własności, ‘Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis’, No. 609, Prawo, Wrocław 1983, pp. 153–155; M. Kaczmarczyk, Wstęp do socjologicznej teorii własności, Warszawa 2006, pp. 186–187; G. Radbruch, Filozofia prawa, Warszawa 2009, pp. 144–145. 3 J. Bentham wrote: ‘We shall find that there is no such thing as natural property; it is entirely the creature of law. Property is nothing more than the basis of a certain expectation...’, Marian Grzybowski • Ownership Right – Private vs. Public Aspect 225 In the doctrine of law there were framed numerous notions of ownership right, emphasising different aspects (features) of this institution. In the 19th century F.C. v. Savigny defined property right as ‘unlimited and exclusive power of a person over a thing’4. B. Windscheid, however, emphasising the dominant role of an owner, accepted the fact that the property right, precisely: the owner’s power, may be limited by statutory restrictions established in favour of other entities (private or public)5. G. Hartmann emphasised even more that the property right as a right is assigned to particular entities within a community; thus it can result in limitations introduced by the community and in its favour6. The Czech civil lawyer of the interwar period, Antonin Randa7, stressed out that the property right means a legal power of ‘direct and non-limited dealing with a thing’. The Polish civil lawyer, A. Stelmachowski, emphasised that in fact such a power is not unlimited; as it is a part of a legal system which protects it and at the same time defines its frames8. On the basis of Article 544 of the Napoleonic Code (widely considered as the first modern codification of laws, which defined the property right in- ac cordance with ideas of the Enlightenment”9 property is the right of enjoying and disposing of things in the most absolute manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by the laws or statutes’10. This approach emphasised on the one hand priority given to the owner’s rights, on the other hand however it accepted the possibility of statutory (or systemic) limitations of enjoying such rights. Those limitations could have been introduced, in accordance

J. Bentham, Theory of Legislation, Vol. 1, p. 145. 4 F.C. v. Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, Bd I, p. 367. 5 B. Windscheid, Th. Kipp,Lehrbuch de Pandektenrechts, Band I, ed. 9, pp. 856–861. 6 G. Hartmann, Rechte an eigener Sache. “Untersuchungen zur Lehre von Eigentrecht” 1879, Vol. 17, pp. 130–131. 7 A. Randa, Právo vlastnicke dla nakovského práva v systematyckém porádku, Praha 1922, pp. 1–3. 8 A. Stelmachowski, [In:] System Prawa Prywatnego, 2nd ed., Vol. 3, ed. T. Dybowski, Warszawa 2007, p. 229. 9 K. Zaradkiewicz, Instytucjonalizacja wolności majątkowej(Koncepcja prawa podstawowego własności i jej urzeczywistnienie w prawie prywatnym), Warszawa 2013, p. 38. 10 Translation by E. Buczalski, Kodeksy cywilne obowiązujące na Ziemiach Centralnych Polski włącznie z Kodeksem zobowiązań, Warszawa 1936, p. 310. 226 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 with dominating in the 18th and 19th centuries Roman theory of property right, only ‘in points’ and only by explicit statutory rules11. Starting with the 1850s. the idea of unlimited scope of the ownership rights (taken from the Roman law) was superseded by the idea of a ‘relatively absolute’ right. It was the German civil code of 1896 which stated in § 903 that ‘the owner of a thing may, to the extent that a statute or third-party rights do not conflict with this, deal with the thing at his discretion’. The Italian civil code of 1942 empowered the owner to use as well as dispose of a thing at their discretion, nevertheless – in accordance with obligations resulting to the owner from the legal order. The code of the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 1992 provided that the owner has the right to use a thing with the exclusion of other persons; he/she cannot however violate rights of other persons, limitations provided by a statute, as well as customary law (Art. 5:1,2 of the civil code of the Netherlands). So-called German concept of the ownership right, adopted in Europe in the 20th century, provides for that the ownership right is not unlimited; the legal order encompasses frames outside which the power (a set of an owner’s powers) of an owner is not protected by the law12. There should be at the same time a distinction made – what was emphasised by Jan Wasilkowski in 1963 – between ‘restrictions of the exclusiveness scope which results directly from a statute, and limitations resulting from subjective rights of third parties to a thing’13. It is symptomatic that the German concept of the property right was not introduced in the expected legislation, i.e. in the German civil code (particularly in § 903 of the code)14. It is however in Art. 140 of the Polish civil code of 1964. It provides for that ‘within the limits specified by statute and the principles of community coexistence the owner may, to the exclusion of other persons, use the thing in conformity with the social and economic purpose of his right, in particular he may collect profits and other proceeds from the thing.

11 See: Z. Kędzia, Geneza praw człowieka i obywatela, [In:] Prawa i obowiązki obywateli. Wybór źródeł. Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk 1978. 12 A. Wasilewski, Administracja wobec prawa własności nieruchomości gruntowych. Rozważa- nia z zakresu prawa administracyjnego, “Zeszyty Naukowe UJ. Prace Prawnicze” 1972, Vol. 54. 13 J. Wasilkowski, Zarys prawa rzeczowego, Warszawa 1963, p. 74. 14 A. Wasilewski, Administracja wobec własności..., p. 17. Marian Grzybowski • Ownership Right – Private vs. Public Aspect 227 He may dispose of the thing within the same limits’15. Thereby the property right is shaped by statutory defined legal order; an additional determinant of the scope and mean of using a thing are (quite generally defined) principles of community coexistence.

II.

Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997 at least three times deals with ownership (property right). Firstly, it refers to ownership in Chap- ter I ‘The Republic’ which concerns basic principles of the state. Article 21 should be considered as a systemic guarantee. The Constitution provides for that ‘The Republic of Poland shall protect ownership and the right of succession’ (point 1), and ‘Expropriation may be allowed solely for public purposes and for just compensation’ (point 2). By such regulation the constitutional legislator guarantees protection of property right (its integrity) and at the same time allows the possibility to take it away (expropriation). As well the constitutional legislator limits such possibility to cases related to public purpose, to which – in such cases – priority is given before the protection of property. Furthermore, it provides the obligation to pay ‘just compensation’ to the expropriated person16. Secondly, Polish constitution refers to ‘the right to ownership’ in Art. 64 points 1–3 in Chapter II, regarding ‘The Freedoms, Rights and Obligations of Person and Citizens’, which guarantees constitutional status and protection of the ‘right to ownership’. Relevant regulation can be found in subchapter ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Freedoms and Rights’ and it is placed at the beginning of regulations in the aforementioned subchapter, what indicates the intention of providing this regulation with vital importance within the abovementioned group of freedoms and rights.

15 The criterion of principles of community coexistence for the first time appeared in works on the Polish civil code draft in 1957. See: K. Zaradkiewicz,Instytucjonalizacja wolności majątkowej..., p. 44, footnote 210. 16 It can be assumes that the purpose of a compensation is preservation of property economic value in the expropriated person’s assets, with the change of its form (but preserving its value). See: T. Woś, Wywłaszczenie nieruchomości i ich zwrot, 5th ed., Warszawa 2011, p. 43. 228 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 In Art. 64 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which consists of three parts, the most important are, from the point of view of the constitutional status of ‘the right to ownership’, points 1 and 3 of Art. 64. Article 64 point 1 guarantees to everyone (grants on an abstract level) ‘the right to ownership’, other property rights and, what’s more – the right of succession. Ar- ticle 64 point 3 refers to crucial – from the point of view of correlation: private law-public law – question of constitutional conditions for acceptability for ownership limitations. This regulation provides particularly for that the right to ownership may only be limited by means of a statute and only to the extent that it (i.e. the statute) does not violate ‘the substance of the right’. The aforementioned regulation involves three remarks. Firstly, the Con- stitution allows execution of ownership (the right to ownership) limitations. Secondly, it introduces an absolute formal requirement that possible limitation be executed by means of a statute (i.e. on the basis of a general normative act issued by the legislative power). Furthermore, the constitutional lawmaker requires that the scope of limitations executed by means of a statute does not reach a sphere which is considered by the constitutional lawmaker as ‘the substance of the property’ (its core). Incidentally to those remarks comes a reflection, that the constitutional lawmaker provided the public authorities, precisely speaking – the legislative power (the Sejm and the Senate) together with the authority of executive power (which is the President of the Republic of Poland), with a constitutional authorisation to (possible) determination of ownership limitations (let keep to the literal wording of Art. 64 point 3 of the Constitution). It depends on these authorities whether statutory limitations of ownership will be introduced, as well as what will be their scope and character. The limit to the dis- cretionary powers, which results ex lege fundamentale is the constitutional prohibition of violating the substance of ownership (the notion was not defined by the constitutional lawmaker)17. The characteristic feature of statutory limitations of ownership is that they shall remain in the present legal order. Their elimination or expiration results in the fact that ownership returns to its previous extent, and the owner

17 According to K. Zaradkiewicz, and this view should be agreed to, the substance of the constitutional ownership right involves its exclusiveness (within the scope of using a thing or other object of property), as well as unlimited duration of the owner’ rights. Marian Grzybowski • Ownership Right – Private vs. Public Aspect 229 recovers the possibility of executing their authority as the owner within the scope which was previously unavailable. This is the consequence of the principle of entireness and absolute nature of the ownership right (Absolutheit). The Polish civil code does not directly indicate the owner’s discretion in executing their prerogatives. Neither does it make a distinction between the freedom of disposing a thing (or other object of property) and the owner’s exclusiveness, which is characteristic of other codifications. Walerian Pańko emphasised in his works that the owner’s exclusive- ness18 shall not be considered as total nowadays; participation of other entities (including public authorities) is possible in executing owner’s rights towards property (or other objects, including those of intangible character, of the property right).

III.

Constitutions of contemporary states, by providing guarantees of property protection to private entities (also: other entities), in the first place secure the durability of this property right as a constitutional (basic) right of individu- als19. Particularly, the aim is to keep the existing legal status. The constitutional guarantee, as well as on a statutory level – a guarantee provided by the civil law (the civil code), involves all partial rights resulting from the ownership, and aiming at their execution prerogatives of the owner20. The Constitution as well as statutes protect the present status of matters. Polish Constitutional Tribunal related this guarantee

18 This exclusiveness (which is characteristic of ownership and other absolute rights) involves: a) in general – unlawfulness of intervention of third parties within the scope of protected subjective ownership right, b) third parties do not have any influence on disposing a given tangible or intangible asset, c) granting the owner legal claim in order to protect property before factual violation (including those made by public authority). See: W. Pańko, O prawie własności I jego współczesnych funkcjach, Katowice 1984, pp. 14–16. 19 It is therefore a guarantee of a certain status of an individual’s right (Rechtsstellungsga- rantie, Individualrechtsgarantie). See also rulings of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal: ruling of 15th December 2004, K 2/04 (OTK ZU Nr 11/A/2004, poz. 17) and ruling of 10th July 2012, P 15/12 (OTK ZU Nr 7/A/2012, poz. 77). 20 K. Zaradkiewicz, op.cit., p. 222 (with references to judicature of the German Federal Constitutional Court). 230 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 to the rule of protection of acquired rights. The aforementioned rule involves prohibition of depriving individuals (citizens) of subjective rights (and their prospects), as well as restricting those rights to the extent where the substance of the right is violated. The legislator is entitled to limit the acquired right, however on two fundamental conditions. Firstly, limitation cannot involve – in the case of the property right – depravation of prerogatives which constitute the substance of the right. Secondly, limitation of the property right may be introduced only to the extent which is necessary (i.e. obeying the principle of proportionality) for the reason of significant public interest, with full compensation (equivalence) of lost profits21. The concept of expropriation is a deviation from guarantee of the permanent character of the property right; the guarantee of its durability is replaced by the guarantee of its value. Nevertheless, when a significant public purpose, because of which the property was taken from the owner (expropriation), proves to be no longer in effect, the guarantee of durability of the property right comes to its place22. According to judicature of Polish Constitutional Tribunal, in such conditions the expropriated real estate should be given back23. Referring to Art. 21 point 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 the Constitutional Tribu- nal adjudicated that ‘if ... a public purpose for which a real property was expropriated is not executed or the expropriated real estate is not necessary to this public purpose, then there is neither constitutional legitimacy of an intervention in a private property, nor legal basis (reason) for acquisition of the property right by a public entity’24.

21 See rulling of Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 30th November 1988, K 1/88. 22 See in German literature, e.g.: H.I.Papir, [In:] Grundgesetz. Komentar, Band II, eds. Th. Maunz, G. Dürig, München 2010, pp. 23–24, in Polish literature: K. Zaradkiewicz,Ins - tytucjonalne ..., pp. 226–227. 23 See, e.g. rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3rd April 2008, K6/05 and of 24th October 2001, 3K/01. 24 At the same time (in the judgement of 13th December 2012, P 12/11) the Constitutional Tribunal made a reservation that ‘Article 21 point 2 of the Constitution shall not be considered as a basis for a constitutional right for restitution of real estates which were expropriated in a procedure which met constitutional standard set for expropriation’. The above concerned the case in which the primary public purpose of expropriation was replaced by another public purpose. See as well T. Woś, Wywłaszczenie..., pp. 62–63. Marian Grzybowski • Ownership Right – Private vs. Public Aspect 231 The motive of statutory limitations of the ownership right (which cause that the property right is not of an absolute character, notwithstanding its durability and the scope of the owner’s prerogatives) is the general interest: protection of a welfare of all the citizens or a numerous group of citizens (e.g. a territorial community)25. A typical kind of limitations of the ownership right to real estates, which are motivated by questions related to public social interest, are limitations introduced by statutes which concern spatial planning and construction law26. Another group of statutory provisions concerns natural environment protection. In the Constitution of the Republic of Poland the admissibility of statutory limitations in exercising the owner’s prerogatives (meaning: the ownership right) is confirmed in Art. 31 point 3 of the Constitution [which belongs to general provisions of chapter II (The Freedoms, Rights and Obligations of Persons and Citizens)]. Furthermore, Art. 64 point 3 of the Constitution confirms a possibility of introducing such a restriction (caused by a public interest) towards the property right. The substance of accepted restrictions, within frames of Art. 31 point 3, is exclusion of execution of some owner’s rights and (or) limitation of their scope. On the background of Polish constitutional provisions, i.e. Art. 31 point 3 (which defines general premises and limits of that statutory restrictions in exercising constitutional freedoms and rights) and Art. 64 point 3 of the Con- stitution (which allows the possibility of freedoms limitation by means of statutes), an interpretation controversy arose. A question was asked: does Art. 64 point 3 as lex specialis exclude the application of legi generali, i.e. Art. 31 point 3? When ruling on that matter, Polish Constitutional Tribunal (consequently from 1999 to the present times) adopted the position that Art. 31 point 3 should be applied regardless of Art. 64 point 3. Those provisions do not mutually exclude themselves, particularly because of the fact that Art. 64 point 3 does not indicate a catalogue of constitutional values, attainment of which justifies the limitation of exercising ownership rights. Article 64 point 3 limits itself to: a) indication of a statutory form of ownership limitations; b) statement that the

25 See ruling of Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 28th May 1991, K 1/91 (OTK 1991, poz. 4). 26 Judgement of Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 7th February 2001, K 27/00 (OTK ZU Nr 2/2001, poz. 29). 232 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 abovementioned limitations cannot be of an excessive character, particularly that they shall not violate (destroy) the substance of the ownership right27. Article 31 point 3, as lex generalis (a provision which refers to all constitutional freedoms and rights), indicate two additional obligatory requirements for the possibility of ownership limitations. It specifies constitutional values (directly related to a public interest: the state’s safety, public order, environment protection, health care, and public morality protection), within the scope of which, as well as for protection of which limitations of constitutional rights, including the property right, can be introduced. Co-application of Art. 31 point 3 (which is generally motivated by protection of a society’s interest) and Art. 64 point 3 (which correlates with the constitutional guarantee of ownership and other property rights, as well as their protection) constitutes an example of interference of public law and private law elements (considering prevailing quantitatively and functionally ‘set’ of civil law claims aiming at ownership right protection)28.

Literature

Bentham J., Theory of Legislation, Vol. 1, Boston 1840. Garlicki L., Przesłanki ograniczania konstytucyjnych praw i wolności (na tle orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego), “Państwo i Prawo” 2001, Issue 10. Hartmann G., Rechte an eigener Sache. “Untersuchungen zur Lehre von Eigentrecht” 1879, Vol. 17. Kaczmarczyk M., Wstęp do socjologicznej teorii własności, Warszawa 2006. Kędzia Z., Geneza praw człowieka i obywatela, [In:] Prawa i obowiązki obywateli. Wybór źródeł, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk 1978.

27 See rulings of Polish Constitutional Tribunal, e.g.: of 22nd February 1999, K23/98 (OTK ZU Nr 2/1999, poz. 25; of 16th October 2007, K 28/06 (OTK ZU Nr 9/A/2007, poz. 104; 18th March 2010, K 8/08 (OTK ZU Nr 3/A/2010, poz. 23). 28 See M. Wyrzykowski, Granice praw i wolności – granice władzy, [In:] Obywatel – jego wolności i prawa, ed. B. Oliwa-Radzikowska, Warszawa 1998, pp. 52–54; L. Garlicki, Przesłanki ograniczania konstytucyjnych praw i wolności (na tle orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego), “Państwo i Prawo” 2001, Issue 10, pp. 7–8. Regardless, it is worth mentioning that also the premise of ‘protection of freedoms and rights of other persons’ (prima facie: aiming at individual interest protection) which can be noticed e.g. in so called neighbouring law, similarly aims at ensuring consonant community coexistence, which is related to public interest. Marian Grzybowski • Ownership Right – Private vs. Public Aspect 233 Kodeksy cywilne obowiązujące na Ziemiach Centralnych Polski włącznie z Kodeksem zobowiązań, trans. E. Buczalski, Warszawa 1936. Lehmann J., Schherschaft und Socialbindung, Berlin 2004. Lorenz K., Volf M., Allgemeiner Teil des bürgerlichenRechts, 9th edition, München 2004. Pańko W., O prawie własności I jego współczesnych funkcjach, Katowice 1984. Pańko W., Własność jako kategoria ekonomiczna a prawo własności, Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis, No. 609, Prawo, Wrocław 1983. Papir H.I., [In:] Grundgesetz. Komentar, Band II, eds. Th. Maunz, G. Dürig, München 2010. Radbruch G., Filozofia prawa, Warszawa 2009. Randa A., Právo vlastnicke dla nakovského práva v systematyckém porádku, Praha 1922. Stelmachowski A., [In:] System Prawa Prywatnego, 2nd ed., Vol. 3, ed. T. Dybowski, Warszawa 2007. Wasilewski A., Administracja wobec prawa własności nieruchomości gruntowych. Ro- zważania z zakresu prawa administracyjnego, “Zeszyty Naukowe UJ. Prace Prawnicze” 1972, Vol. 54. Wasilkowski J., Zarys prawa rzeczowego, Warszawa 1963. Windscheid B., Kipp Th., Lehrbuch de Pandektenrechts, Band I, ed. 9. Woś T., Wywłaszczenie nieruchomości i ich zwrot, 5th ed., Warszawa 2011. Wyrzykowski M., Granice praw i wolności – granice władzy, [In:] Obywatel – jego wol- ności i prawa, ed. B. Oliwa-Radzikowska, Warszawa 1998. Zaradkiewicz K., Instytucjonalizacja wolności majątkowej(Koncepcja prawa podstawowego własności i jej urzeczywistnienie w prawie prywatnym), Warszawa 2013.

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.12 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Jan Wiktor Tkaczyński1

Der lange Neuanfang der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit in Polen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg

Keywords: history of administrative jurisdiction Słowa kluczowe: historia sądownictwo administracyjnego

Summary

The long new beginning of administrative jurisdiction in the post-World War II Poland

It’s hard to deny that the history of administrative jurisdiction in Poland attests the dramatic fate the country faced in the twentieth century. It is the only country in Europe which, through deliberate actions of the German occupant, suffered the loss of its entire decree archives. Similar were personnel losses: following the end of the war only 37% of all justices and prosecutors from before the war returned to work. The most serious blow, however, to the idea of the revival of the administrative jurisdiction in Po- land, came from the communists’ complete rejection of such type of jurisdiction. It was considered irreconcilable with the then propagated doctrine of socialist legitimacy, according to which a conflict between the administration of the state, realising the will of the working people, was eo ipso impossible. It was, therefore, a departure from the previous understanding of law, according to which the role of administration was to guard the legal rights of every individual. Restitution of administrative jurisdiction (initially of a quite limited scope) at the dawn of the communist rule in Poland was therefore an

1 The author is a professor in the Institute of European Studies Faculty of International and Political Jagiellonian University in Krakow. E-mail: [email protected]. 236 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 exception in all of the then Ostblock. The gradual development from that moment onwards of the Polish administrative jurisdiction, and also an increase in popular awareness of individual rights, are best testified by the statistical data. If in 1980, the first year of the restored administrative jurisdiction, 2,470 cases were submitted to court, in 2015 there were as many as 83,529 cases.

Streszczenie

Długi nowy początek sądownictwa administracyjnego w Polsce po II wojnie światowej

Trudno nie przyznać, że również historia sądownictwa administracyjnego w Polsce po- świadcza dramatyczne losy polskiego państwa w XX stuleciu. Jako jedyne bowiem w Eu- ropie może się ono poskarżyć na utratę w wyniku celowej działalności okupanta niemieckiego całości swojego archiwum orzeczniczego. Nie inaczej jest z poważnymi stratami ludzkimi: po zakończeniu działań wojennych zgłosiło się do pracy zaledwie 37% wszystkich sędziów i prokuratorów z przed wybuchu wojny. Najpoważniejszy cios idei przywró- cenia sądownictwa administracyjnego w Polsce zadało jednak odrzucenie przez komu- nistów w ogóle takiego typu sądownictwa, uznanego za nie do pogodzenia z ówcześnie głoszoną doktryną socjalistycznej praworządności. Według niej konflikt między admi- nistracją państwa urzeczywistniającą wolę ludu pracującego a obywatelem nie był eo ipso możliwy. Tym samym oznaczało to odejście od dotychczasowego rozumienia prawa, we- dług którego zadaniem administracji było strzec praw podmiotowych każdej jednostki. Restytucja sądownictwa administracyjnego (początkowo w dość ograniczonym zakresie) u schyłku panowania komunistów w Polsce była zatem ewenementem w całym ówczesnym Ostblocku. Stopniowy rozwój od tego momentu polskiego sądownictwa administracyjnego, ale i zarazem wzrost świadomości społecznej w zakresie przysługują- cych jednostkom praw poświadczają jednakże najlepiej dane statystyczne. Jeśli bowiem w 1980 r. (w pierwszym roku działalności przywróconego sądownictwa administracyjnego) wniesiono 2.470 spraw, to w 2015 r. było ich już 83.529.

Um den Beginn der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit nach 1945 in Polen zu beschreiben, lassen wir am besten zuerst einige Kriegszerstörungsdaten zu Wort kommen. Nach der Niederschlagung des Warschauer Aufstandes von 1944 Jan W. Tkaczyński • Der lange Neuanfang der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit... 237 und der Vertreibung der überlebenden Zivilbevölkerung aus der Stadt hatte die deutsche Wehrmacht begonnen, bei gleichzeitigem teilnahmslosem Zu- schauen der Russen vom anderen Weichselufer, die Stadt systematisch zu zer- stören. Am 3. November 1944 wurde das Archiv der Neuen Aktenstücke in Brand gesetzt. Den Flamen fielen damals zum Opfer u.a. die Archivsamm- lungen des Obersten Verwaltungsgerichtshofes (Najwyższy Trybunał Admi- nistracyjny, NTA) (ca. 100.000 Aktenstücke) sowie des Verwaltungsgerichtes für Invaliden (Inwalidzki Sąd Administracyjny, ISA) (11.370 Aktenstücke)2. Die archivierten 17 Jahre der NTA-Arbeit und vier Jahre der ISA-Tätigkeits- arbeit waren damit unwiederbringlich verloren gegangen. Kein anderes Land Europas hat den Verlust seines kompletten Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeitsar- chivs im Krieg zu beklagen. Mit den materiellen Zerstörungen gehen die menschlichen Verluste ein- her. Nach dem Krieg haben sich lediglich 37% aller Richter und Staatsanwäl- te aus der Vorkriegszeit wieder zur Arbeit gemeldet3. Jedoch weder jene noch andere Zerstörungen und Verluste haben über das Schicksal der Verwaltungs- gerichtsbarkeit im neuen, durch die Kommunisten seit dem Ende des Krie- ges mit der Hilfe von sowjetischen Bajonetten regierten Polen entschieden. Die Idee einer Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit, welche eine feste Institution des demokratischen Rechtsstaates darstellt, wurde mit dem zwangsimportier- ten sowjetischen Muster eines Staates der Volksdemokratie als schlichtweg nicht vereinbar anerkannt. Nach der neuen aufoktroyierten Staatsdoktrin, in der die Staatsverwaltung den Willen vom Volk der Arbeiter und Bauern verwirklicht, wurde ein potenzieller Interessenkonflikt zwischen dem Bür- ger und dem Staat eo ipso nicht für möglich gehalten. Diese neue Lösung be- deutete zugleich einen Abgang vom bisherigen Rechtsverständnis, nach dem

2 J. Stojanowski, Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, [In:] Straty archiwów i bibliotek warszawskich w zakresie rękopiśmiennych źródeł historycznych, Hrsg. K. Konarski, Warszawa 1956, Bd. II, pp. 278–281 und 324–327. Die erstgenannte Zahl kann als geschätzte angegeben werden, weil die Archivinventur nach den Verlusten gleich zu Beginn des Krieges (ca. 5.000 Aktenstücke) sowie nach der im unbekannten Ausmaß von der deutschen Besatzungsmacht durchgeführten Aussonderung einige Aktenstücke sowie deren Umlagerung (seither gelten sie als verschollen) nach Lötzen in Ostpreußen bis zum Ausbruch des Aufstandes am 1. August 1944 nicht abgeschlossen wurden. 3 J. Malec, D. Malec, Historia administracji i myśli administracyjnej, 2. Aufl. Kraków 2003, p. 246. 238 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 das subjektive Recht des Einzelnen zu bewachen, die Aufgabe der Verwal- tungsgerichte sein sollte4. Wenn wir dem neuen ideologischen Gerüst dieser Konzeption noch ge- nauer nachgehen wollen, kommen wir nicht umhin, feststellen zu müssen, dass sein wahrer Grund rein politischer Natur war. Die Verwaltungsgerichts- barkeit als Institution des ancien régime gesehen, wurde von einigen als nicht dem Zeitgeist gerecht eingestuft. Außerdem hat man behauptet, dass diese Art von obsoleter (wie man meinte) Gerichtskontrolle die Effektivität sowie die Leistungsfähigkeit der Verwaltung unnötigerweise hemmen wird, wäh- renddessen die Zeit drängte, das Land wiederaufzubauen. Denn es wurden Bedenken geäußert, dass die junge und unerfahrene Volksverwaltung von der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit in ihrem Handeln gelähmt wird. Das alles in allem würde also dazu führen, dass sich die Gestaltung der erwünschten Ver- hältnisse maßgeblich verzögern würde. Besonders gefährlich scheint jedoch dabei eine damals vertretene Meinung, dass die Realisierung der Staatsauf- gaben durch die Verwaltung zu wichtig sei, um sie bloß aus der Perspektive ihrer Konformität zu beurteilen. Unabhängig von der ideologisch motivierten Auseinandersetzung um das Sein oder Nichtsein der Nachkriegsverwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit hat man wei- terhin an ihrer (Wieder)Einführung festgehalten. Zumindest offiziell. Dies belegt die Ankündigung im Art. 26 der „Kleinen“ Verfassung vom 19. Feb- ruar 19475, in der man nachlesen kann: „Besonderes Gesetz legt das Proze- dere und das Sachgebiet der zuständigen Organe über die Rechtsprechung von Konformität der Verwaltungsentscheidungen im Bereich der öffentlichen Verwaltung fest“. Auch in einem anderen Gesetz vom 9. Januar 1947 über die Einstufungsgrundsätze von der Besoldungsordnung der Richter im allge- meinen und im Verwaltungsgerichtswesen6 ist nicht nur die Rede von Rich- tern der Verwaltungsgerichte, sondern es wird sogar der Name vom Obers- ten Verwaltungsgerichtshof (NTA) im § 1 des Gesetzes wortgenau angegeben.

4 M. Jaroszyński, Nowe aspekty zagadnienia kontroli administracji, „Państwo i Prawo“ 1950, Issue 4, pp. 95–117. 5 Ustawa Konstytucyjna z 19 lutego 1947 o ustroju i zakresie działania najważniejszych organów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Dz.U. RP Nr 18, pos. 71). 6 Ustawa z 9 stycznia 1947 o zasadach zaszeregowania do grup uposażenia sędziów w sądownictwie powszechnym i administracyjnym (Dz.U. RP Nr 10, pos. 44). Jan W. Tkaczyński • Der lange Neuanfang der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit... 239 Als die neue Verfassung vom 22. Juli 1952 allerdings verkündet wurde7, fand man im Verfassungstext dennoch kein einziges Wort über die Verwaltungs- gerichtsbarkeit. Das offizielle Schweigen über die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit ist keineswegs gleichzusetzen mit einem Mangel an diesbezüglichen Diskussio- nen in Polen8. Besonders fieberhaft konnte man jedoch erst nach 1956 dieses Thema diskutieren. Das politische Tauwetter jener Jahre hat es möglich gemacht, eine Initiative zur Reaktivierung der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit zu organisieren9. Am 17. Dezember 1956 wurde beim Justizministerium ein Ausschuss einberufen, dessen Aufgabe es war, den entsprechenden Ge- setzentwurf zu erarbeiten. Dies geschah im Eiltempo, sodass die endgülti- ge Fassung des Entwurfs das Datum vom 31. Dezember 1957 trägt. Da dem gesamten Projekt die nötige politische Unterstützung doch verweigert wurde, hat man den Entwurf ad acta gelegt10. Es soll am Rande unterstrichen werden, dass dieser Entwurf von 1945 bis zum Jahr 1977 das einzige kom- plett ausgearbeitete Projekt der Wiedereinführung von der Verwaltungsge- richtsbarkeit in Polen darstellte11. Es sind noch zwei weitere Dekaden vergangen, damit in einem schleppen- den Tempo die Arbeiten über die Einführung von der Verwaltungsgerichtsbar- keit wiederaufgenommen werden konnten. Nach drei Jahren der Beratungen und 40 Jahren seit der letzten Verhandlungen des Obersten Verwaltungsge- richtshofes wurde mit dem Gesetz über Hauptverwaltungsgericht (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny, NSA) vom 31. Januar 1980 das polnische Verwaltungs-

7 Konstytucja Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej uchwalona przez Sejm Ustawodawczy 22 lipca 1952 (Dz.U. PRL Nr 33, pos. 232). 8 J. Paliwoda, Nadzór ogólny prokuratury a sądownictwo administracyjne, „Nowe Prawo“ 1960, Nr 1, pp. 33–49 (gegen die Einführung von der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit) sowie E. Iserzon, Fundamentum regnorum, „Nowe Prawo“ 1960, Nr. 2, pp. 155–170 (dafür). 9 M. Wyrzykowski, Sądownictwo administracyjne w PRL, Warszawa 1983, p. 34. 10 S. Gajewski, Próba reaktywacji sądownictwa administracyjnego w latach 1956–1959 (wokół projektu ustawy – Prawo o sądach administracyjnych z 1958 roku), „Studia Iuridica“ 2014, Nr. 58, pp. 83–94. 11 J. Zimmermann, Z dziejów nauki prawa administracyjnego i nauki o samorządzie terytorialnym. Marian Zimmermann (1901–1969), „Samorząd Terytorialny“ 1993, Nr. 1–2, pp. 125–135. Dort auch der Textentwurf: Projekt ustawy o sądownictwie administracyjnym z 1958 r., pp. 108–124. 240 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 tribunal ins Leben (wieder)gerufen12. Da bis dahin Verwaltungsstreitigkei- ten von den ordentlichen Gerichte entschieden wurden, musste folglich das NSA-Gesetz mit umfangreichen Änderungen im Verwaltungsverfahrensge- setzbuch einhergehen. Das neu eingesetzte Verwaltungsgericht unterschied sich vom alten so- wohl was den Namen angeht, als auch in Bezug auf eigene, eher bescheide- ne Zuständigkeit. Nur eins war bei beiden Gerichten gleichgeblieben: sie waren die Gerichte der ersten und zugleich der letzten Instanz. Als Novum muss dagegen angesehen werden, dass der neue Verwaltungsgerichtshof außer seinem Hauptsitz in Warschau zusätzlich (Art. 1 Abs. 2 und 3 NSA) die auswär- tigen (lokalen) Vertretungen in Danzig, Kattowitz, Krakau, Posen und Bres- lau hatte13. Das sollte den Rechtsmäßigkeitsschein wecken, das Gericht stehe jedem Bürger nahe. Dass das NSA-Gericht von seinem von der Staatsmacht unabhängigen Vorgänger doch entfernt war, bestätigt die Aufsicht des Obers- ten Gerichts über seine Rechtsprechung (Art. 5 NSA). Auch die enumerative Aufzählung der Sachgebiete (II. Kapitel NSA), die dem NSA-Gericht unter- lagen, beweist das Gegenteil. Die kritische Bewertung des NSA-Gerichts in der Einrichtungsphase muss insofern revidiert werden, als man dieses mit einer Bresche in der Mauer des kommunistischen Einheitsstaates vergleicht. Denn nach und nach drängte in die dumpfe Atmosphäre jener Jahren über sie ein frischer Wind hinein. Der Wind erwies sich im Jahr 1989 bekanntlich von der historischen Trag- weite und fegte nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion die aufoktroy- ierte Staatsdoktrin aus. Schon am 24. Mai 1990 wurde die enumerative Zu- ständigkeitsaufzählung durch die Generalklausel ersetzt14. Fünf Jahre später, am 11. Mai 1995 wurde das Gesetz über das Hauptverwaltungsgericht grund- sätzlich neu geschrieben15. Die Krönung des Reformprozesses stellt allerdings

12 Ustawa z 31 stycznia 1980 o Naczelnym Sądzie Administracyjnym oraz o zmianie ustawy – Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego (Dz.U. PRL Nr 4, pos. 8). 13 § 3 Rozporządzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwości z 25 lutego 1981 w sprawie struktury organizacyjnej Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego oraz ustalenia siedzib, właściwości i organizacji ośrodków zamiejscowych tego sądu (Dz.U. PRL Nr 5, pos. 21). 14 Ustawa z 24 maja 1990 o zmianie ustawy – Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego (Dz.U. RP Nr 34, pos. 201). 15 Ustawa z 11 maja 1995 o Naczelnym Sądzie Administracyjnym (Dz.U. RP Nr 74, pos. 368). Jan W. Tkaczyński • Der lange Neuanfang der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit... 241 erst die Realisierung der Verfassungsankündigung dar, nicht nur ein zweitinstanzliches Verfahren im Verwaltungsgerichtswesen zu etablieren16, sondern es neu einzurichten. Dies geschah auf dem Wege von drei Gesetzen, die allesamt nach dem Inkrafttreten am 1. Januar 2004 die neue Ära in der Ver- waltungsgerichtsbarkeit Polens eröffnet haben. Die drei erwähnten Gesetze sind die folgenden: (1) vom 25. Juli 2002 über Verwaltungsgerichtverfassungs- recht17 (2) vom 30. August 2002 über Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht18 und vom 30. August 2002 über Ausführungsvorschriften zum Verwaltungsgerichtver- fassungsrecht und Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht19. Wie schon oben angeführt, stellt die polnische Verwaltungsgerichtsbar- keit gegenwärtig eine zweitinstanzliche Verfahrensstruktur dar. In der ersten Instanz werden daher die Rechtssachen vom Wojewodschaftsverwaltungs- gericht (Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny, WSA) entschieden, dagegen in der zweiten Instanz vom Hauptverwaltungsgericht (Naczelny Sąd Administ- racyjny, NSA), welches zugleich die allgemeine Aufsicht über die Wojewod- schaftsverwaltungsgerichte ausübt. Obgleich die zweitinstanzliche Verfah- rensstruktur ein Abbild des Gesetzgeberswillens ist und demnach als das Recht des Bürgers auf ein zweitinstanzliches Gerichtswesen darstellt, stieß die jetzige Lösung dennoch auf fundierte Kritik20. Es wird moniert, dass der Streitpartei zwar das Recht in Berufung zu gehen zusteht, ihre Kassationsbe- schwerde kann jedoch entweder vom Hauptverwaltungsgericht abgewiesen oder, falls ihr stattgegeben wird, an das zuständige Wojewodschaftsgericht zurückgewiesen werden. Mit anderen Worte darf das NSA das WSA-Urteil nicht ändern, wenn schon, dann es lediglich aufheben und die Sache zur er- neuten Entscheidung an die erste Instanz zurückweisen. Zweifelsohne bedeutet ein solch konstruiertes Verfahren eine Prozessverlängerung, die nur

16 Art. 175 Abs. 1, Art. 176 Abs. 1 und Art. 184 der Verfassung vom 2. April 1997 (Dz.U. RP Nr 78, pos. 483). 17 Ustawa z 25 lipca 2002 – Prawo o ustroju sądów administracyjnych, [In:] Dz.U. RP Nr 153, pos. 1269. 18 Ustawa z 30 sierpnia 2002 – Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi (Dz.U. RP Nr 153, pos. 1270). 19 Ustawa z 30 sierpnia 2002 – Przepisy wprowadzające ustawę – Prawo o ustroju sądów administracyjnych i ustawę – Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi (Dz.U. RP Nr 153, pos. 1271). 20 Zuletzt bei: Jan Zimmermann, Prawo administracyjne, 7. Aufl., Warszawa 2016, p. 503. 242 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 wenig (wenn überhaupt) auf dem Weg einer Beschwerde über Prozessver- schleppung gemildert wird21. Es verläuft nicht anders mit dem Verbotreformatio in peius, welches dem Gericht der zweiten Instanz nicht erlaubt, die gerichtliche Entscheidung zu Ungunsten des Rechtsmittelführers zu fällen (Art. 134 § 2 des Verwaltungs- verfahrensrechts). Die Einführung einer solchen Rechtsinstitution in die jetzige Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit Polens muss hier nicht nur als irrig bezeichnet werden, sondern auch als offensichtlich in Kollision stehende mit den Struk- turgrundprinzipien und Funktionen des Verwaltungsverfahrensrechts sowie mit dem Urteilsfindungsmechanismus vom Verwaltungsgericht22. Denn das obige Verbot schränkt das freie Ermessenprinzip des Gerichts ein und beschneidet seine grundlegende Funktion, d.h. die Eliminierung der rechts- widrigen Entscheidungen aus dem Rechtsverkehr. Es müssen dabei Beden- ken geltend gemacht werden, dass das Verwaltungsgericht, welches nicht sachbezogen urteilt, sondern lediglich die Verwaltungshandlungen überwa- cht, weder Rechte noch Pflichten von jemanden festlegen darf. Folglich kann das Gericht auch die Rechtslage von jemandem nicht verschlechtern. Außer- dem muss darauf hingewiesen werden, dass die Bestimmung innerhalb des Verwaltungsrechts der Terminus „zu Ungunsten“ auf ernste Probleme stoßt. Die verwaltungsrechtlichen Verhältnisse sind alles anderes als genau bemess- bar, und daher ist die Festlegung in einem konkreten Fall, was für die eine bzw. die andere Partei mehr oder weniger (un)günstig bedeutet, ist gutmög- lich nicht realisierbar. Und schließlich die Regelung der Generalklausel im Verwaltungsverfah- rensrecht. Diese wurde, wie an früherer Stelle geschrieben, gleich nach dem politischen Umbruch 1990 eingeführt. Obschon die Generalklausel nicht ex- pressis verbis in den entsprechenden Gesetzen genannt wird, kann man die Annahme ihrer Existenz als berechtigt ansehen. Dies erfolgt aufgrund der ge- räumigen und sehr allgemein formulierten Aufzählung der Arten des Ver- waltungshandelns, die der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit unterliegen (Art. 3

21 Ustawa z 17 czerwca 2004 o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki (Dz.U. RP Nr 179, pos. 1843). 22 T. Woś, Mechanizm orzekania przez sąd administracyjny, [In:] Postępowanie sądowoad- ministracyjne, 7. Aufl., hrsg. T. Woś, Warszawa 2015, pp. 273–277. Jan W. Tkaczyński • Der lange Neuanfang der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit... 243 und 4 des Verwaltungsverfahrensrechts). Auch deshalb, weil dagegen die auf- gestellte enumerative Aufzählung von Ausnahmen (Art. 5) sehr bescheiden ausfällt. Trotzdem, eben diese Kategorie sorgt für den Diskussionszündstoff. Der genannte Artikel listet drei Arten von Sachen auf, die als dem inneren Kompetenzbereich der Verwaltung angehörenden nicht der Verwaltungsge- richtsbarkeit unterliegen. Das sind: a) Handlungen auf der Organisationse- bene zwischen den Organen der öffentlichen Verwaltung (Art. 5 Pkt. 1), b) typische Diensthandlungen (Art. 5 Pkt. 2) sowie Stellenverweigerungen und -berufungen im öffentlichem Dienst (Art. 5 Pkt. 3). Der Kern des dargelegten Streits lässt sich als die Frage beschreiben, ob die letztgenannte Regelung per analogiam auch in nichtöffentlichen Betrie- ben ihre Anwendung findet? Da das geltende Recht darauf keine Antwort liefert, muss diese Lücke erst mit Hilfe der Rechtsprechung ausgefüllt werden. Keine Probleme dagegen vermittelt eine Lücke im Verwaltungsverfah- rensrecht den Verwaltungsgerichten, dass diese Gerichte im Kompetenzbe- reich der anderen Gerichte nicht zuständig sind. Es ist jedoch offensichtlich, dass das Verfassungsgebot des Art. 177, welches diese Materie regelt, absolute Klarheit schafft. Bei all diesen Erwägungen ist es unerlässlich abschließend danach zu fragen, welchem Rechtsschutzkonzept die polnische Rechtsprechung folgt(e) sowie welches Verständnis bei der Definition des subjektiven öffentlichen Rechts zugrun- degelegt wurde (wird)? Wenn wir auf die Ziele der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit eingehen, können wir nicht umhin festzustellen, dass es sich hier vor allem um den Schutz eines bestimmten Wertekatalogs handelt. Dies führt folgerichtig dazu, dass die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit so konstruiert wird, dass sie dem konkreten Werteschutz am besten dienlich sein kann, natürlich aus der Sicht dieses Wertes definiert als das Schutzobjekt. Dem klassischen Model folgend, lässt sich daher sagen, dass das Verwaltungsgericht nur dann tätig sein darf, wenn ihm ein An- trag einer Person vorliegt (nemo iudex sine actore), deren subjektives Recht auf dem Weg einer Verwaltungsentscheidung verletzt wurde. Diese Lösung, die ihren Niederschlag im Art. 49 des Vorkriegsgesetzes über den Obersten Verwaltungs- gerichtshof (NTA n.F.)23 gefunden hat, hat jedoch zur Folge, dass das Recht einen

23 Rozporządzenie Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej z 27 października 1932 o Najwyższym Trybunale Administracyjnym (Dz.U. RP Nr 94, pos. 806). 244 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 solchen Antrag zu stellen, bezüglich des Personenkreises eingeschränkt wird, der über die bestimmte Prozessführungsbefugnis verfügt. Anders dagegen verläuft es im Fall des Rechtschutzobjekts, wo jede Per- son (actio popularis) befugt wird, einen Antrag zu stellen. Hier reicht im All- gemeinen die Annahme aus, dass die Rechtsverletzung stattgefunden hatte. Das Verwaltungsgericht wird dabei nicht gebunden, ausschließlich über die konkrete Rechtsverletzung, sondern über den gesamten Rechtsakt zu befin- den. Mehr noch, ihn im Falle seiner festgestellten Rechtswidrigkeit aufzuhe- ben. Dieser Konstruktion folgte die polnische Rechtsprechung nach (Wieder) Einsetzung des Verwaltungsgerichtshofs im Jahre 1980. Man pries (politisch) zum damaligen Zeitpunkt, dass eben diese Lösung deshalb eine Krönung der Gesetzmäßigkeit der Volksrepublik verkörpere, weil sie das gesamte höher als das detaillierte Rechtsbefinden stellt24. Obgleich diese Konstruktion ein – keineswegs makelloses – Politikum darstellt, müssen wir unbefangen zuge- ben, dass sie den Verwaltungsgerichten mehr Spielraum als eben das bloße Schutzprinzip des subjektiven öffentlichen Rechts gestattet. Da es jedoch unbestreitbar bleibt, dass jede der beiden genannten Rechts- konstruktionen über Vorteile verfügt, versucht man heutzutage immer häufi- ger, die zwei aufgelisteten Kompetenzbereiche zu vereinen. Das Verwaltungs- gericht hätte demnach als Aufgabe zum einen das subjektive öffentliche Recht und zum anderen die objektive öffentliche Rechtsordnung zu schützen. Dass das Schutzobjekt in der gegenwärtigen polnischen Verwaltungsgerichtsbar- keit die objektive öffentliche Rechtsordnung darstellt, beweist zweifelsfrei Art. 1 § 2 sowie Art. 145 § 1 des Gesetzes vom 25. Juli 2002 über Verwaltungsge- richtverfassungsrecht25 und Art. 134 § 1 des Gesetzes vom 30. August 2002 über Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht26. Dennoch ist festzustellen, dass das Verständnis von einem solchen Schutz- objekt nur für die Urteilsverkündungsphase maßgebend ist. Zwar misst man verständlicherweise dieser Phase eine Schlüsselrolle bei, es ist aber zugleich auf-

24 M. Maciołek, O publicznym prawie podmiotowym, „Samorząd Terytorialny“ 1992, Nr. 1–2, p. 13. 25 Ustawa z 25 lipca 2002 – Prawo o ustroju sądów administracyjnych (Dz.U. RP Nr 153, pos. 1269). 26 Ustawa z 30 sierpnia 2002 – Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi (Dz.U. RP Nr 153, pos. 1270). Jan W. Tkaczyński • Der lange Neuanfang der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit... 245 grund von Art. 50 § 1 des gerade erwähnten Gesetzes vom 30. August 2002 nicht zu übersehen, dass antragsberechtigt jeder einzelne ist, dessen rechtliches Inter- esse daran liegt, die Aufhebung bzw. die Erklärung der Nichtigkeit des Verwal- tungsaktes zu erwirken. Das führt letztlich dazu, dass in der Anfechtungsphase das Schutzobjekt vom Antragsteller subjektiv anvisiert wird, in der Urteilsver- kündungsphase dagegen die objektive öffentliche Rechtsordnung als Schutz- objekt zur Geltung kommt. Dies berechtigt die Behauptung aufzustellen, dass man von zweierlei Objekten, leider jedoch nicht vom komplementären Schutz- objekt in der heutigen polnischen Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit sprechen darf27. Zum Schluss können hier natürlich keine statistischen Daten fehlen. Sie be- legen eindrucksvoll (wenngleich mit einem bitteren Beigeschmack), wie not- wendig die erneute Einsetzung der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit in Polen ist (war). Nichts beweist das besser, als die Zahl der eingereichten Anträge beim Hauptverwaltungsgericht28:

Jahr 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

eingereicht 2.470 13.170 12.504 39.741 65.054 62.909 64.619 83.529

Sie bezeugt zugleich, wie mühselig der Aufbau eines Rechtsstaates in Po- len nach dem politischen Umbruch von 1989 ist. Denn andersherum kann man die rasant steigenden Zahlen von eingereichten Anträgen nicht erklä- ren. Sie spiegeln jedoch wider, und das ist die gute Nachricht – wenn man so pointiert schreiben darf, ein wachsendes Rechtsbewusstsein der Bürger und bestätigt somit die These, dass es dabei (leider) keinen Abkürzungsweg gibt.

Literaturverzeichnis

Gajewski S., Próba reaktywacji sądownictwa administracyjnego w latach 1956–1959 (wokół projektu ustawy – Prawo o sądach administracyjnych z 1958 roku), „Studia Iuridica“ 2014, Nr. 58.

27 J. Zimmermann, Prawo administracyjne... p. 471. 28 Die statistischen Jahresdaten sind der NSA-Webseite zu entnehmen: http://bip.nsa. gov.pl/index.php/bip/BIP/Statystyka (10.10.2016). 246 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Iserzon E., Fundamentum regnorum, „Nowe Prawo“ 1960, Nr. 2. Izdebski H., Historia administracji, 5. Aufl., Warszawa 2001 Jaroszyński M., Nowe aspekty zagadnienia kontroli administracji, „Państwo i Prawo“ 1950, Issue 4. Jaworski W.L., Nauka prawa administracyjnego, Warszawa 1924. Jellinek G., Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3. Aufl., Berlin 1929. Kelsen H., Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, 2. Aufl., Tübingen 1929. Komarnicki W., Ustrój państwowy Polski współczesnej. Geneza i system, Wilno 1937. Langrod J.S., Zagadnienia wybrane z praktyki administracyjnej, Kraków 1938. Langrod J.S., Zarys sądownictwa administracyjnego ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem sądownictwa administracyjnego w Polsce, Warszawa 1925. Maciołek M., O publicznym prawie podmiotowym, „Samorząd Terytorialny“ 1992, Nr. 1–2. Malec D., Der Oberste Verwaltungsgerichtshof und seine Rechtsprechung in den Jahren 1922 – 1939, [In:] Rechtsprechung in Osteuropa. Studien zum 19. und frühen 20. Jahr- hundert, Hrsg. Z. Pokrovac, Frankfurt a. Main 2012. Malec J., Malec D., Historia administracji i myśli administracyjnej, 2. Aufl., Kraków 2003. Mayer O., Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht, 2. Aufl., Berlin 1917. Paliwoda J., Nadzór ogólny prokuratury a sądownictwo administracyjne, „Nowe Prawo“ 1960, Nr. 1. Stojanowski J., Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, [In:] Straty archiwów i bibliotek warszawskich w zakresie rękopiśmiennych źródeł historycznych, Hrsg. K. Konarski, Warszawa 1956. Witkowski W., Historia administracji w Polsce 1764–1989, Warszawa 2007. Woś T., Mechanizm orzekania przez sąd administracyjny, [In:] Postępowanie sądowoad- ministracyjne, 7. Aufl., Hrsg. T. Woś, Warszawa 2015. Wyrzykowski M., Sądownictwo administracyjne w PRL, Warszawa 1983. Zimmermann J., Prawo administracyjne, 7. Aufl., Warszawa 2016. Zimmermann J., Z dziejów nauki prawa administracyjnego i nauki o samorządzie terytorialnym. Marian Zimmermann (1901–1969), „Samorząd Terytorialny“ 1993, Nr. 1–2. Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.13 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Sabina Grabowska1

People’s initiative of putting a bill before the parliament – Polish case

Keywords: people’s initiative, direct democracies, Poland Słowa kluczowe: inicjatywa ludowa, demokracja bezpośrednia, Polska

Summary The Polish law provides for two types of people’s initiative. One type is a people’s initiative of putting a bill before the parliament as provided for in Art. 118 subpar. 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the Act dated 24 June 1999 on the use of a legislative initiative by citizens. The second type is a people’s initiative of putting forward a motion to hold a legislative referendum regulated by the Act dated 14 March 2003 on holding a national referendum. The legislature did not provide for, however, a people’s initiative for the purpose of amending the constitution or its abrogation. The subject of this paper is the institution of a people’s initiative of putting a bill before the parliament.

Streszczenie

Inicjatywa ludowa w sprawie uchwalenia ustawy – polski przypadek

Polskie prawo ogólnokrajowe przewiduje dwa rodzaje inicjatywy ludowej. Jest to inicjatywa ludowa w sprawie złożenia ludowego projektu ustawy w parlamencie przewidziana art. 118 ust. 2 Konstytucji RP i ustawą z dnia 24 czerwca 1999 r. o wykonywaniu inicjatywy ustawodawczej przez obywateli. Drugim rodzajem jest inicjatywa ludowa w sprawie złożenia wniosku o przeprowadzenie referendum ustawodawczego uregulowana usta- wą z dnia 14 marca 2003 r. o referendum ogólnokrajowym. Ustawodawca nie uwzględnił

1 The author is an Associate Professor in Institut of Political Science on the Faculty of Sociology and History of University of Rzeszow. E-mail: [email protected]. 248 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 jednak inicjatywy ludowej w sprawie zmiany konstytucji lub jej abrogacji. Tematem niniejszego opracowania będzie instytucja inicjatywy ludowej o zasięgu ogólnokrajowym.

The people’s legislative initiative appeared in Polish law when the new Con- stitution of the Republic of Poland was passed. As provided for in Article 118 subparagraph 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the right of legislative initiative is vested in a group of at least one hundred thousand citizens holding complete electoral rights, and the mode of procedure in this matter is to be framed in a bill. In order to make it possible for the citizens to use this right, the Sejm enacted the Act on the use of an initiative. It does not regulate the principles, but the mode of procedure governing the use of a legislative initiative2. As mentioned before, according to the Polish regulations, a legislative initiative, may be put forward by a group of at least one hundred thousand citizens holding active electoral rights (Art. 2 of the Act on using an initiative). While working on the new Polish constitution in the constitutional commission it was stated that the number of one hundred thousand signatures was too high, and that it would be difficult to gather the signatures. It was also argued that this number is much too small and that the Sejm would be inundated by numerous citizens’ draft bills3. In practice, it took the committee only three weeks to gather almost two hundred thousand signatures supporting the first people’s draft bill on preserving the national character of the strategic natural resources of the country. On 14 September 1999 the Speak-

2 W. Skrzydło, Władza ustawodawcza w Konstytucji RP, [In:] Ustrój konstytucyjny Rze- czypospolitej Polskiej, ed. R. Mojak, Społeczeństwa – demokracje – konstytucje, Vol. X, Lublin 2000, p. 170; S. Grabowska, Geneza i ewolucja inicjatywy ludowej w Europie, “Gubernaculum et Administratio” 2001, p. 169 et al.; P. Uziębło, Inicjatywa ustawodawcza obywateli w Polsce na tle rozwiązań ustrojowych państw obcych, Warszawa 2006, p. 25. 3 J. Jaskiernia, Zasady demokratycznego państwa prawnego w sejmowym postępowaniu ustawodawczym, Warszawa 1999, p. 400. Sabina Grabowska • People’s initiative of putting a bill before the parliament... 249 er of the Sejm received notification of the formation of the committee, and a draft bill was submitted on 4 October by the representative of the committee, together with the requisite number of signatures4. As one can see, it was not a problem to raise the statutory number of signatures. The fears that the Sejm would get a countless number of citizens’ draft bills were also ground- less. So far it has not happened and, as the practice shows, there is little like- lihood of that. For a group of citizens to be able to put forward a legislative initiative, a legislative initiative committee has to be formed. Such a committee is formed by at least fifteen Polish citizens holding active electoral rights, who are among the first to support a given draft bill.. When joining the committee, they make a written declaration giving their full name, address and PE- SEL Personal Identity Number (Art. 5 of the Act on using an initiative). The tasks of the committee include: preparing a draft bill, disseminating it, conducting a promotion campaign, as well as organising actions of raising signatures of the citizens supporting the bill5. In order to improve its activities, the committee has a representative and his deputy. They act on behalf and in favour of the committee. After having gathered one thousand signatures of the citizens supporting the draft bill, the representative notifies the Speaker of the Sejm of the formation of the com- mittee6. Upon formal acceptance of this notification by the Speaker of the Sejm, the people’s legislative initiative committee acquires a legal personality. After this fact has been published in a domestic daily newspaper, and after the address of the initiative organisers and a location where the draft bill would be accessible for inspection have been made public, the action of raising signatures can be started (Art. 6, 7 of the Act on using an initiative). The question arises as to how this first thousand signatures can be attained in a legal way, if the committee acquires the right to gather them only upon

4 The first reading took place during Session No. 64 of the Sejm, on 18th November 1999, and the bill was not passed until after almost two years, i.e., during Session No. 112 of the Sejm, on 6th July 2001 (Official Gazette No. 97, item 1051). 5 M. Jabłoński, Obywatelskie prawo inicjatywy ustawodawczej, [In:] Prawa i wolności obywatelskie w Konstytucji RP, eds. B. Banaszak, A. Preisner, Warszawa 2002, p. 652. 6 These signatures constitute a part of the requisite number of 100 thousand signatures of the citizens supporting the draft bill. 250 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 getting from the Speaker of the Sejm a decision on the acceptance of the notification?7 One solution to this problem can be to apply the interpretation of the law pursuant to which the collection of the first thousand signatures can be conducted without giving notice to the Speaker of the Sejm. Thus, the provision of Article 6 subparagraph 1 of the Act on using an initiative is a special arrangement with regard to Article 6 Subparagraph 4 of the same Act, i.e. the one taking precedence over it8. The people’s legislative initiative committee is dissolved three months from the date of completion of the legislative procedure, after a decision by the Speaker of the Sejm refusing to let the draft bill take its course, or following a positive ruling by the Supreme Court on an appeal of the committee against a refusal of the Speaker of the Sejm to allow the draft bill to take its course. The committee is also dissolved when its representative does not submit a draft bill to the Speaker of the Sejm within three months, and when the representative submits a financial statement to the Minister of Finances after the lapse of the time limit of three months (Art. 18 of the Act on using an initiative). In Article 18 of the Act the Legislature omitted two cases in which the committee is dissolved. Thus, the committee should be dissolved in the event that the Speaker of the Sejm rejects a bill, and when the Supreme Court issues an order dismissing the complaint of the representative against the rejection of the bill by the Speaker of the Sejm (Art. 11 of the Act on using an initiative). Moreover, in Art. 18 subpar. 1 pt. 2 we have to do with a mistake of the Leg- islature as regards the order of the Supreme Court. This provision states that the committee is dissolved three months from the date of an order by the Su- preme Court dismissing the appeal of the refusal of the Speaker of the Sejm to let the draft bill take its course. By dismissing this decision the Supreme Court imposes an obligation on the Speaker of the Sejm to refer this draft bill to the Sejm. The first reading takes place within three months from the date of giving the order. The representative of the committee takes part in the discussion on the people’s draft bill in the Sejm. So how can the representative take part in the works of the Sejm, if within the same time-limit of three

7 This problem was mentioned by Deputy J. Madej during the discussion on the amendments of the Senate, but his comments were not taken into consideration. 8 P. Winczorek, Obywatele wnoszą projekt ustawy, “Rzeczpospolita”, No. 196, 23 October 1999. Sabina Grabowska • People’s initiative of putting a bill before the parliament... 251 months the committee is dissolved? Maybe, the Legislature meant an order of the Supreme Court dismissing an appeal (and not the appealed-against decision) against the decision of the Speaker of the Sejm on refusing to make the draft bill take its course. In this case, the dissolution of the legislative initiative committee would be sensible9.

II.

In Poland a people’s initiative cannot refer to the matters reserved in the Con- stitution for other subjects holding a right of a legislative initiative (Art. 3 of the Act on using an initiative). Article 221 of the Constitution stipulates that the right of a legislative initiative within the following acts: a budget one, on interim budget, on contracting a public debt, and on furnishing financial guar- anties by the State is vested only in the Cabinet. As regards the relations between the Republic of Poland and other churches and religious unions than the Catholic Church, pursuant to Art. 25 subpar. 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the right of legislative initiative has been vested only in the Cabinet, excluding at the same time the possibility of a people’s legislative initiative. The fact of allowing a people’s initiative with regard to putting forward a draft bill expressing consent to the ratification of an international agreement (Art. 90 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland) may arouse some doubts. We should agree with the opinion of M. Jabłoński, who asserts that “the cause of this uncertainty lies in the granting of exclusive powers to the Sejm for making a decision in the matter of choosing the course of making such consent. This is because this competence would indicate that the right of putting forward a draft bill is vested only in this authority”10. By failing in Art. 235 subpar. 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Po- land to define a group of citizens as one of the subjects allowed to put forward a draft bill on amending the Constitution, the Legislature excluded the possibility of a people’s constitutional initiative. In this indirect way he defined

9 S. Grabowska, Inicjatywa ustawodawcza obywateli, “Studia z prawa wyznaniowego” 2001, No. 2, p. 157. 10 M. Jabłoński, Obywatelskie prawo inicjatywy..., pp. 651–652. 252 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 a people’s legislative initiative in terms of a so-called ordinary initiative, relating only to acts11. It seems unjustified to deliberate as to whether a group of citizens can submit draft bylaws of the Sejm or Senate by way of a people’s initiative12. The right to put forward draft bylaws of the Sejm and Senate does not belong to the matter of a people’s initiative. These bylaws are internal regulations of these Houses adopted in the form of a resolution. A people’s initiative pertains only to those legal acts, i.e. laws, which relate to ordinary national legislation.

III.

In accordance with the Polish regulations, a representative of a legislative initiative committee, after having collected one thousand signatures of the citizens supporting a draft bill, notifies the Speaker of the Sejm of the formation of the committee and of the intent to put a people’s draft bill before the Sejm. Such a notification, apart from the thousand signatures, contains the full name of the committee, its address, the personal data of the committee members, the personal data of the representative and his deputy and the draft bill together with the explanatory statement. Such an explanatory statement should contain: an explanation of the need and purpose for passing such a bill; social, economic, financial implications and legal consequences; the sources of financing the bill; differences between the current and proposed regulatory environment; a declaration of the compliance of the people’s draft bill with the law of the European Union; and proposals of basic implementation acts. It should also present the results of the consultations carried out and give information about the presented variants and opinions in the event that the obligation to seek such opinions results from the provisions of the act (Art. 31 subpar. 2 and 3 of the Bylaws of the Sejm)13. Failure to provide

11 See also the Reasons of the Resolution of the Constitutional Tribunal dated 27th September 1994. 12 P. Uziębło, Ustawa z 1999 roku o wykonywaniu inicjatywy ustawodawczej przez obywateli, “Przegląd Sejmowy” 2000, No. 4, p. 52. 13 Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 30 lipca 1992 r. Regulamin Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (M.P. Nr 26, poz. 185). Sabina Grabowska • People’s initiative of putting a bill before the parliament... 253 any of these requirements may be recognised as a mistake and thus the notification may be returned for supplementing. The preparation of a draft bill by the people’s initiative committee may cause some problems in form because of the lack of professional preparation and access to the necessary data and information14. We should concur with the opinion of P. Uziębło, who considered as controversial the the rejection by the Sejm of the amendment passed by the Sen- ate aimed at making it possible for a representative of a committee to demand assistance from the State administrative agencies in determining the predicted financial implications of the adoption of a bill15. A people’s initiative committee can report only one draft bill. When the initiators aim at passing an amendment to binding regulations, one committee may report several draft bills. If different draft bills, unrelated to one another, are to be reported, then it is necessary to form two or more legislative initiative committees, which can, however, be composed of the same people16. If the report does not contain any mistakes, the Speaker of the Sejm determines within fourteen days after it is submitted whether it is to be accepted or not. A decision to accept the report is immediately conveyed to the representative of the committee. As of the day the decision by the Speaker of the Sejm is communicated, the contents of the draft bill can no longer be changed (Art. 6 subpar. 1–4 of the Act on using an initiative). After completing the action of gathering signatures, the representative of the committee lodges a motion to institute a legislative process by the Sejm. He includes with it the people’s draft bill in its unchanged form together with one hundred thousand signatures and the information included in the report submitted to the Speaker of the Sejm. This means that the draft bill lodged with the Speaker of the Sejm should meet the requirements defined in the Constitution and the Bylaws of the Sejm (Art. 118 supar. 3 of the Constitu- tion of the Republic of Poland, Art. 34 subpar. 2 of the Bylaws of the Sejm).

14 M. Kruk, Prawo inicjatywy ustawodawczej w nowej Konstytucji RP, “Przegląd Sejmowy” 1998, No. 2, p. 26. 15 P. Uziębło, Ustawa z 1999 roku o wykonywaniu inicjatywy ..., p. 53. 16 B. Szepietowska, W sprawie wykonywania inicjatywy ustawodawczej przez obywateli (art. 118 ust. 2 konstytucji), “Biuletyn Ekspertyzy i Opinie Prawne” 2000, No. 3, pp. 56–57. 254 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 IV.

In accordance with the Act on using an initiative, the Speaker of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland is the authority necessary to institute a procedure connected with a people’s initiative for submitting a draft bill. He decides whether or not to accept a notification of the formation of a committee. In the event that the Speaker of the Sejm finds formal defects in a notification, such as, for example, the absence of the personal data of committee members, he sets a fourteen-day period for removing the defects. If the representative fails to do that, the Speaker refuses to accept the notification. Upon lodging a draft bill by the representative, the Speaker of the Sejm refers it to the Sejm. If it is found that the contents of the bill or explanatory statement has been changed, he will refuse to accept the draft bill (Art. 10 subpar. 3, Art. 11 subpar. 1 of the Act on using an initiative). Moreover, in case of justified doubts as to the validity of the signatures collected, the Speaker may apply to the State Electoral Commission in order to determine the number of correctly affixed signatures within fourteen days after submitting the draft. If, as a result of the verification of signatures -car ried out by the State Electoral commission, it turns out within twenty-one days that the number of signatures is less than the statutory number, the Speaker of the Sejm will refuse to allow the draft bill take its course17. The Speaker of the Sejm has fourteen days -- from submitting the report or from submitting a draft bill together with signatures, or from receiving a finding of the State Electoral Commission -- to make his determination In case a refusal to allow the matter to move forward, the representative of the committee has a right to appeal against this decision to the Supreme Court within fourteen days from the date of receiving the decision with its reasons.

The people’s initiative committee may start a promotional campaign for a draft bill in Poland and the process of collecting signatures of citizens sup-

17 P. Sarnecki, Wprowadzenie Konstytucji w życie, [In:] Wejście w życie nowej Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, ed. Z. Witkowski, Toruń 1998, p. 17. Sabina Grabowska • People’s initiative of putting a bill before the parliament... 255 porting the draft bill after publishing the acquisition of a legal personality by the committee, the address of the committee, and the location where the draft bill will be available for inspection in a daily newspaper having a nationwide circulation18. Promotion campaigns and processes for collecting signatures are governed by the relevant electoral regulations for the Sejm of the Republic of Po- land and the Senate of the Republic of Poland, which define the principles of conducting election campaigns (Art. 85–93, to the exclusion of Art. 94, of the Electoral Regulations)19. At places where signatures are collected, the draft bill must be made accessible for inspection. A citizen gives his support for the draft bill by putting his signature on a list whose form was determined by the Prime Minis- ter by way of an ordinance after obtaining the opinion of the State Electoral Commission20. Each page of the list must be identified by the name of the committee and the title of the draft bill for which a citizen gives his support. Citizens express their support for the draft bill by putting their signatures under the draft, giving their full name, address of residence and PESEL Per- sonal Identifier. These signatures are placed on an appropriate list. It is not possible to withdraw this support once it has been given for a draft bill (Art. 9 of the Act on using an initiative). After having collected the requisite number of signatures, the representative of the committee should report the draft bill to the Speaker of the Sejm together with the list of the signatures of the citizens supporting the draft no later than three months from the date of receiving the decision to accept the notification of the committee formation,. If all the activities have been conducted in accordance with the Act, the Speaker of the Sejm sends it up for the first reading, at the same time notifying this fact to the representative of the committee (Art. 10 of the Act on using an initiative).

18 S. Grabowska, Inicjatywa ludowa w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, “Rzeszowskie Zeszyty Naukowe” 2001, t. 30, p. 181. 19 Ustawa z dnia 12 kwietnia 2001 r. Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Dz.U. Nr 46, poz. 499 ze zm.). 20 Rozporządzenie Prezesa Rady Ministrów z 28 września 1999 r. w sprawie ustalenia wzoru obywateli, którzy udzielają poparcia projektowi ustawy stanowiącej przedmiot inicjatywy ustawodawczej (Dz.U. Nr 79, poz. 893). 256 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 VI.

In Poland, the Supreme Court reviews complaints lodged by the representative of the committee in connection with decisions given by the Speaker of the Sejm which are adverse to the people’s initiative committee. Complaints are considered during a non-litigious procedure, in seven-person composition, within 30 days after being submitted21. The Supreme Court decides about upholding or denying a complaint of the representative against a refusal by the Speaker of the Sejm to accept the notification. If the complaint of the representative is upheld, the Speaker of the Sejm is obliged to accept the notification of the committee formation. If the complaint is rejected, the committee is dissolved. The Supreme Court also decides about upholding or denying an appeal of the representative against a refusal by the Speaker of the Sejm to accept the people’s draft bill. By issuing a decision upholding the appeal, the Court imposes an obligation upon the Speaker of the Sejm to accept the draft. By rejecting the appeal, the Court closes any further legislative way for the draft bill. There is one more case in which the Supreme Court decides in the matter of a people’s initiative. This is when the representative of the committee appeals against a decision of the Speaker of the Sejm refusing to allow the draft bill take its course. The Supreme Court may uphold this appeal or not. When the Court upholds the complaint of the representative, the Speaker of the Sejm sends the draft bill for the first reading in the Sejm; if not, the people’s draft bill fails. Decisions of the Supreme Court are final, which means that no right of appeal is granted. A question arises as to why complaints of the representative are brought to the Supreme Court, and not to the Constitutional Tribunal? The representative of the committee cannot appeal against decisions of the Speaker of the Sejm to the Constitutional Tribunal because Article 188 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland defines precisely all the matters in which the Tri- bunal can decide. The scope of the competences of the Constitutional Tribu- nal cannot be extended nor limited by way of an ordinary law. But the legislature, defining the scope of the duties of the Supreme Court, left a “wicket gate” in the form of Art. 183 subpar. 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of

21 Ustawa z 23 listopada 2002 r. o Sądzie Najwyższym (Dz.U. Nr 240, poz. 2052). Sabina Grabowska • People’s initiative of putting a bill before the parliament... 257 Poland22. Owing to this, the number of its functions can be increase by an ordinary law. The Supreme Courts examines electoral petitions, determines the validity of elections, the validity of an MP’s or senator’s election, and the validity of a referendum. Thus, it seems logical that the legislature should entrust this body with the power to rule on complaints lodged by the representative of a people’s legislative initiative committee against decisions of the Speaker of the Sejm.

VII.

In Poland the first reading of a draft bill takes place during a session of the Sejm within three months from the day the draft bill is submitted to the Speak- er of the Sejm, or from a decision of the Supreme Court (Art. 13 of the Act on using an initiative). The mere fact of submitting the draft bell to the Sejm for consideration does not end the legislative procedure. The second part of the process is only fragmentarily regulated by the Act. Art. 14 of the Act on using an initiative provides that a representative of the committee take part in the deliberations on the draft bill in the Sejm and the Senate on the basis defined in the bylaws of both the houses. To be able to apply this provision in practice, the bylaws of the Sejm and Senate should be amended. This amendment would concern the participation of a representative of a committee in sessions of the Sejm, Senate and commissions, and the scope of his rights and obligations (e.g. his presence at the meetings, taking the floor in the Sejm and Senate, introducing motions, making it possibile and determining the means of bringing forward amendments, and enabling a draft bill to be withdrawn before the second reading is completed). Art. 14 does not specify clearly whether a representative of a committee may withdraw a people’s draft bill. The opinion of M. Jabłoński that “a person representing a people’s initiative committee, under the powers granted by this committee and on the basis of the binding regulations, has a right to withdraw a draft bill, especially in a situation when it comes to substantial changes in its contents” seems to be correct23. Owing to such powers, it is pos-

22 “The Supreme Court also performs other activities as defined [...] in bills”. 23 M. Jabłoński, Obywatelskie prawo inicjatywy ..., p. 661. 258 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 sible for a people’s initiative committee, through its representative, to supervise the legislative work on the draft bill. In a situation when the final text of a bill departs in a significant way from the text of the draft submitted through the people’s initiative, a representative may prevent the adoption of this legal act by withdrawing it. A different opinion is proclaimed by P. Uziębło, who states that the right of the representative of a committee to withdraw a draft bill “Would wreck [...] an enormous social effort with the entire procedure of preparing a draft bill and submitting it to the Speaker of the Sejm”24. In consequence, such an opinion makes it impossible for the organisers of a people’s initiative to have any influence on its further fate after having submitted the draft to the Speaker of the Sejm. A draft bill introduced by a group of citizens in Poland enjoys certain preferences. Pursuant to Art. 3 subpar. 3 of the Act on using an initiative, a draft bill for which the legislative procedure is not completed before the expiry of the Sejm’s term of office shall be considered by the Sejm of the next session within a period of no longer than six months from the first session of the newly-elected Sejm, without the necessity of its resubmission. So, just as with the Italian and Spanish legislatures, the Polish version also abolished the principle of discontinuation with regard to the people’s draft bill25. Apart from this, contrary to the situation with other draft bills, the Sejm conducts the first reading of a draft bill introduced by citizens within 3 months from the date this draft is submitted to the Speaker of the Sejm. It always takes place during a plenary session of the Sejm, whereas in case of other draft bills the first reading may take place at forums of the Sejm commissions. The financial records of a people’s legislative initiative are open to public in Poland. A committee covers all the expenditures connected with the activity conducted, and it may derive funds for this purpose from public collections, for example (Art. 15 of the Act on using an initiative)26. The financial resources of a committee cannot come from the budget of the state, from state enterprises and organisational units, from the budget of territorial self-government units, communal unions and other communal legal entities, or from

24 P. Uziębło, Ustawa z 1999 roku o wykonywaniu inicjatywy..., p. 65. 25 L. Garlicki writes about the principle of discontinuing the work of the parliament, idem, Zasada dyskontynuacji prac parlamentarnych, “Studia Iuridica” 1995, No. 28, p. 45 et al. 26 The principles and procedure of raising funds are defined by the Act. Sabina Grabowska • People’s initiative of putting a bill before the parliament... 259 enterprises with the participation of the State Treasury, territorial self-government units, communal unions and other communal legal entities. These limitations refer to funds coming from: physical persons not registered in the territory of Poland, excluding the Polish citizens residing abroad, registered foreigners and legal persons without a seat in the territory of Poland, legal persons with the participation of foreign subjects and other subjects having the capacity to enter into legal transactions, but without a seat in the territory of Poland. A committee cannot be financed by foreign diplomatic missions, consular offices, special missions and international organisations or other agencies holding diplomatic immunity on a contract basis (Art. 16 of the Act on using an initiative). The representative of a committee must submit a financial statement regarding the way and sources of gathering the means for its activity to the Minister of Finances within three months from the submission of a draft bill with the Speaker of the Sejm, from a decision by the Supreme Court regarding the appeal of the representative against the refusal by the Speaker of the Sejm to allow the draft bill to take its course, or from the prior dissolution of the committee. A sample statement is determined by the Minister of Financ- es by way of an ordinance27. The representative publishes the statement in a daily newspaper having a nationwide circulation. If the receipts were higher than the expenditures, the representative transfers the surplus to charity. He is obliged to keep the financial records of the committee for 12 months.

VIII.

After a period of over five years during which the Act of using a people’s legislative initiative has been binding in Poland, it is clearly evident that the Sejm is not in danger of being inundated (as it was feared during the debate on the draft bill on an initiative) by a huge number of people’s proposals. It may be said that the situation is quite the opposite. In comparison to the statistics in other countries, the number of people’s initiatives is not small. The initiators

27 Rozporządzenie Ministra Finansów z 27 sierpnia 2001 r. w sprawie wzoru sprawozdania o źródłach pozyskiwania funduszy na cele inicjatywy ustawodawczej wykonywanej przez obywateli oraz szczegółowego zakresu zawartych w nim informacji (Dz.U. Nr 94, poz. 1036). 260 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 of draft bills are usually various interest groups -- from teachers and old-age pensioners to nurses and the unemployed. So far political parties have not engaged very much in promoting people’s legislative initiatives. Owing to this circumstance there is still a chance for people’s initiatives to remain initiatives of groups of citizens, and not of political parties, as is the case in Italy, for example. This will have a favourable effect on the attitude of the parliament to draft bills of this type.

IX.

When analysing the institution of a people’s initiative for passing a bill in Po- land the following conclusions can be drawn. The Polish legislature prescribed a term of three months for collecting the requisite number of signatures. In my opinion, it should be longer: this period should amount to at least six months, just like, for example, in Italy or Spain. An interesting solution to the problem of collecting signatures has been provided for by the Austrian legislature. The entire action of collecting signatures through a people’s initiative is prepared and carried out by the local agencies entitled to do this, and not by the initiators of a people’s initiative. In connection with this, the term for collecting the requisite number of signatures is eight days. Before the term for signature collection is set by the Minis- ter of Internal Affairs, the initiators of a people’s initiative have time to prepare a promotional campaign28. It is an interesting solution, and, in my opinion, better than the others. It is always easier for citizens to mobilise and put their signatures within a strictly appointed and short period. Such a solution, however, is possible only when state agencies assist the organisers of an initiative in the action of raising signatures, because it requires large financial resources and a significant number of people to be involved, as well as an appropriate number of premises where it will be possible for people to actually sign. The organisers of an initiative are not able to organise and conduct everything in such a short time and in such a way by themselves.

28 Art. 41 ust. 2 Federalnej Ustawy Konstytucyjnej Republiki Austrii z dnia 1 paździer- nika 1920 r., tłum. i wstęp P. Czarny i B. Naleziński, Warszawa 2004, § 7–8 Volksbegehrengesetz 27.06.1973 (BGBl. Nr 344/1973). Sabina Grabowska • People’s initiative of putting a bill before the parliament... 261 The Polish legislature did not provide for an obligatory certification by a civil servant (e.g. in a gmina office) of the signatures placed under a people’s motion for a bill. Such verification is only carried out upon a motion of the Speak- er of the Sejm in case of justified doubts. Such verification is important, also because it gives certainty as to the correctness and number of the affixed signatures even before lodging the proposal with the Speaker of the Sejm. An amendment of this rule by the Polish legislature seems well founded. An important modification of the parliamentary procedure with regard to a people’s draft bill is found in the abolition of the principle of discontinuing. Owing to preferences of this type, the effort of the initiators of a people’s initiative and the will of a large group of citizens will not be undone in a situation when the legislative work on the people’s draft bill is not completed before the expiry of the term of office or the parliament dissolution. Another interesting regulation accompanying the work on a people’s draft bill in parliament is seen in the obligation to always conduct the first reading of the draft during a plenary session of the parliament. Moreover, the Polish legislature imposed the obligation of conducting the first reading of a people’s draft bill in the parliament within a deadline of three months from the date of the effective submission of a people’s draft bill to the Speaker of the Sejm. Owing to such arrangements, the initiators of a people’s initiative are certain that the people’s draft bill will not “sit” in the parliament for an indefinite period of time. The mechanism for settling financial matters connected with a people’s initiative for adopting a bill also deserves notice. In Poland the provisions of the Act allow for the possibility of obtaining funds for covering the expenditures connected with a people’s initiative by means of public collections. But the group of subjects which may finance a people’s initiative is limited. More- over, the Polish organisers of a people’s initiative must document their expenditures by submitting a financial statement of their activity. A characteristic feature of the Polish law regulating the institution of a people’s initiative is in the penal provisions (Art. 19–20 of the Act on using an initiative). It is a good solution, because the provisions regulate the matters connected with a people’s initiative. Owing to this, there is no need to “adjust” the provisions of other laws to the provisions of the Act on using an initiative. The specific character of the matters connected with a people’s ini- 262 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 tiative does not always make it possible to interpret other provisions in such a way that the interpretation would cover the matters connected with a people’s legislative initiative. Two models of legal regulations can be distinguished in European countries as regards the institution of a people’s initiative for presenting a draft bill in the parliament. The first model can be found in Italy and in Poland. The -leg islature put all the matters connected with the organisation of a people’s initiative into the hands of its organisers, starting with the formation of an initiative committee through the action of raising signatures to financing. The state agencies cannot assist the initiators of a people’s draft bill in any way. The second model occurs in Spain and Austria, where the state helps, to a different degree, in the organisation of a people’s initiative. In Spain the state agencies reimburses the expenses connected with the organisation of an initiative, but only when the organisers succeed in putting a draft bill before the parliament. In Austria, on the other hand, the local governments conduct the entire action of collecting signatures supporting a people’s motion for putting a draft bill before the parliament. The solution in which the state helps its citizens take advantage of the forms of direct democracy seems justified. Apart from the above-mentioned forms of assisting the organisers of a people’s initiative, we could also offer some help, for example, in the preparation of a declaration about the financial effects of its implementation, in establishing sources of financing in the event that a draft bill charges the state budget, or in the preparation of a declaration about whether a people’s draft bill is consistent with the law of the Euro- pean Union. Citizens do not have the organisational, financial and legal back- up facilities at their disposal as do the state agencies. With such support, the organisation of a people’s initiative would be carried out in a more efficient way. People’s draft bills would have a chance for better preparation, and thus the legislative process could be conducted faster. At present the institution of a people’s initiative is not a frequently-used form of direct democracy, but an tendency can increasingly be noticed for citizens to exhibit an interest in state affairs. This tendency is manifested by an increase in the number of the reported people’s legislative initiatives. There are several reasons for this state of affairs. A lack of interest on the part of the citizens, or their lack of understanding of the substance of the pro- Sabina Grabowska • People’s initiative of putting a bill before the parliament... 263 posals submitted -- as well as distrust towards the authority agencies -- may be some reasons for the infrequent use of this form of direct democracy. The lack of assistence from state agencies during the preparation of a people’s draft bill and during the organisation of promotion campaign or action of raising signatures may be considered to be another reason. Activity on the part of other subjects holding the right to initiate a legislative initiative that pays attention to any and all signals from citizens regarding the need for adopting new (or amending already-existing) legal regulations may have an influence on the low number of people’s legislative initiatives. Another reason could be, as rightfully noticed by M. Jabłoński, the fact that the parliament is not obliged to complete the legislative procedure for adopting a people’s draft bill. The proposers of people’s initiatives do not have any influence on the final contents of the law adopted upon the people’s motion, and they do not possess any legal remedies to influence the work of the legislative agencies29. Unfortunately, to a large extent people’s draft bills are not converted into specific laws. They are rejected by the representative bodies, or the completion of their legislative process is postponed because of political implications of adopting such a law. Draft bills are also rejected in cases when the members of the parliament find mistakes during the work on a people’s draft bill which are significant enough to make the enforcement of such a bill almost impossible: e.g. inconsistency with already existing laws, unclear way of financing any matters resulting from the bill or, finally, inaccurate vocabulary. When the parliament does not adopt a people’s draft bill, it must take into consideration the effects that such rejection may cause. Prolongation of the legislative process may turn out to be a paradoxically better way out for the parliament. By introducing amendments to the draft bill the members of the parliament lay themselves open to criticism (e.g., by the opposition) that the adopted law departs significantly from the contents of the draft bill submitted through a people’s initiative. A real “Solomonic” way out of such a situation was found by the members of the Polish parliament. After the successful submission of the draft bill on the Foundation of National Education to the Speaker of the Sejm, the Sejm

29 M. Jabłoński, Obywatelskie prawo inicjatywy ustawodawczej, ..., pp. 664–665. 264 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 adopted the law on the Common Scholarship Fund30, without introducing practically any significant amendments31. This new law was almost identical in wording with the contents of the people’s draft bill. Upon adoption, the law was handed over to the Senate, which lodged a motion for rejecting the law because, among other things, it contained numerous substantial mistakes, in- consistencies with the binding law and inaccurate vocabulary32. The citizens realise their superior authority through their representatives and directly, thanks to the institutions of direct democracy. If the parliament regularly performs its duties in this way, this practice may cause people to doubt in democracy as a form of authority. It may also cause a decrease in confidence in state institutions, the efficiency of the institutions of direct democracy, and the meaning of their existence.

Literature

Garlicki L., Zasada dyskontynuacji prac parlamentarnych, “Studia Iuridica” 1995, No. 28 Grabowska S., Geneza i ewolucja inicjatywy ludowej w Europie, “Gubernaculum et Ad- ministratio” 2001. Grabowska S., Inicjatywa ludowa w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, “Rzeszowskie Zeszyty Nau- kowe” 2001, t. 30. Grabowska S., Inicjatywa ustawodawcza obywateli, “Studia z prawa wyznaniowego” 2001, No. 2. Jabłoński M., Obywatelskie prawo inicjatywy ustawodawczej, [In:] Prawa i wolności obywatelskie w Konstytucji RP, eds. B. Banaszak, A. Preisner, Warszawa 2002. Jaskiernia J., Zasady demokratycznego państwa prawnego w sejmowym postępowaniu ustawodawczym, Warszawa 1999. Kruk M., Prawo inicjatywy ustawodawczej w nowej Konstytucji RP, “Przegląd Sejmowy” 1998, No. 2. Sarnecki P., Wprowadzenie Konstytucji w życie, [In:] Wejście w życie nowej Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, ed. Z. Witkowski, Toruń 1998. Skrzydło W., Władza ustawodawcza w Konstytucji RP, [In:] Ustrój konstytucyjny Rzec- zypospolitej Polskiej, ed. R. Mojak, Społeczeństwa – demokracje – konstytucje, T. X, Lublin 2000.

30 Druki sejmowe Nr 1816, 2397, 2524, 3162, 3162-A. 31 Ustawa z dnia 27 lipca 2001 r. o Powszechnym Funduszu Stypendialnym. 32 Druki senackie Nr 771, 771A, 771Z. Sabina Grabowska • People’s initiative of putting a bill before the parliament... 265 Szepietowska B., W sprawie wykonywania inicjatywy ustawodawczej przez obywateli (art. 118 ust. 2 konstytucji), “Biuletyn Ekspertyzy i Opinie Prawne” 2000, No. 3 (39). Uziębło P., Inicjatywa ustawodawcza obywateli w Polsce na tle rozwiązań ustrojowych państw obcych, Warszawa 2006. Uziębło P., Ustawa z 1999 roku o wykonywaniu inicjatywy ustawodawczej przez obywateli, “Przegląd Sejmowy” 2000, No. 4. Wieczorek P., Obywatele wnoszą projekt ustawy, “Rzeczpospolita”, No. 196, 23 October 1999.

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.14 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Jacek Zaleśny1

Amnesty acts in Poland in the 20th century

Keywords: Poland, 20th century, parliament, amnesty Słowa kluczowe: Polska, XX wiek, parlament, amnestia

Summary The subject of the analysis refers to amnesty acts in Poland in the 20th century. A thesis is posed in the paper that in principle they take place at the moments which are politically important for the Republic of Poland, the aim of which is to establish them in the social consciousness. Typically, they are the acts of the parliament. The Polish doctrine of law clearly presents a separate character of amnesty acts in reference to the court ver- dicts. They are an expression of the will of the parliament, independent of the court’s judgment, according to which amnesty should be carried out.

Streszczenie

Akty amnestyjne w Polsce w XX w.

Przedmiotem analizy uczyniono problematykę aktów amnestyjnych podejmo- wanych w XX w. w Polsce. W pracy stawia się tezę, że co do zasady zapadają one w momentach istotnych politycznie dla Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, w celu ich utrwalenia w świadomości społecznej i typowo są aktami parlamentu. W polskiej doktrynie prawa wyraźnie zaznacza się odrębność aktów amnestyjnych wobec wyroków sądów. W żadnym zakresie nie mogą one podważać wyroków sądów,

1 Theauthor is a Habilitated Doctor in Department of Political Systems of the Institute of Political Sciences Faculty of Political Science and International Studies of the University of Warsaw. E-mail: [email protected]. 268 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 ingerować w niezależność władzy sądzenia. Są wyrazem woli parlamentu, nieza- leżnej od wyroku sądu, że w danych okolicznościach politycznych amnestia po- winna być przeprowadzona.

Although, in principle, a law is an act regulating social relations which are to appear in the future, there are categories of laws which are known to have retrospective effects determining the legal consequences of events to occur in the future. This type of features are characteristic of amnesty laws. In reference to the etymology of the notion “amnesty” (in Greek, ἀμνηστία amnēstía means not remembering, oblivion), they are to be the basis to forget and for- give criminal acts which happened in the past. After Poland regained independence in 1918, the power of amnesty be- longed to the Provisional Chief of State until the law was passed by the Leg- islative Seym on 20 February 1919 on entrusting Józef Piłsudski with the office of the Chief of State2. He held it by virtue of a decree of the Regency Council from 14 November 1918 on dissolving the Regency Council and passing the Highest State Power to the commander-in-chief of the Polish army, Józef Piłsudski3. When the constitutional provisorium came into life in 1919, the power of amnesty was passed to the Legislative Seym. Although in the resolution from 20 February 1919 the law maker did not use the concept of “amnesty”, the latter could be undertaken by the parliament due to its general and abstract character4. The requirement that amnesty could be undertaken exclusively via a parliamentary act, as not causing any political controversy, was kept in the Constitution from 17 March 19215.

2 Journal of Laws of the Polish State. No. 19, item 226. 3 Journal of Laws of the Polish State. No. 17, item 39. 4 K. Kaczmarczyk-Kłak, Prawo łaski w okresie prowizorium konstytucyjnego w latach 1918–1922, [In:] Ustroje. Historia i współczesność. Polska –Europa – Ameryka Łacińska. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana profesorowi Jackowi Czajowskiemu, eds. M. Grzybowski, G. Kuca, P. Mikuli, Kraków 2013, p. 227. 5 W. Komarnicki, Polskie prawo polityczne (geneza i system), Warszawa 2008, p. 497. Jacek Zaleśny • Amnesty acts in Poland in the 20th century 269 In accordance with its art. 47, amnesty could be granted only by way of a law. By virtue of the constitutional law from 2 August 1926, the right to undertake amnesty acts was also given to the President. When the Seym and the Senate were dissolved, in case of an urgent state need, the latter could issue them by way of ordinances with the force of the law. The Seym could also authorize the President (by way of a law) to issue an ordinance with the force of a law, at the time and with the scope indicated in the law, except the change of the Constitution, and this also included the competence to undertake amnesty acts. It was just on the basis of that regulation that on 17 March 1932 the Seym authorized the President to issue ordinances with the force of a law until the nearest session of the Seym was called6, and the President issued an ordinance on amnesty on 1 October 19327. In accordance with art. 69 item 2 of the constitutional act from 23 April 1935, amnesty required a legislative act. It could be undertaken by the parliament by way of a law or by the President by way of a decree. The President used this competence on 2 September 1939 undertaking a decree on amnesty8. In the inter-war period amnesty was carried out nineteen times9. Its territorial scope varied and so did the motives to undertake it and the scope of effect. Besides amnesty including the whole territory of the state, territorially limited amnesties were undertaken10. Amnesties realized directly after Poland regained independence were significant in their political consequences. Their principal aim was to change the legal consequences of the decisions made in the legal systems of the partitioning powers and, therefore, to limit the effect of those systems on the social relations taking place in revived Poland and to cut off from the effect of the partitioning past. This also served to restore the rights to those Poles who had stood against the partitioning powers and had been for that reason prosecuted11.

6 Journal of Laws, No. 22, item 165. 7 The ordinance of the President of the Republic of Poland from 1 October 1932 on amnesty following the introduction of the Polish uniform penal code and the misdemeanor law from 1 September 1932, Journal of Laws No. 91, item 782. 8 Journal of Laws No. 87, item 553. 9 J. Bednarzak, Amnestia, Warszawa 1965, p. 44. 10 For example, the law from 14 May 1920 on amnesty in the former Prussian district, Journal of Laws No. 42 item 252. 11 J. Bednarzak, op.cit., p. 63. 270 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Amnesty was proclaimed, for example, for the following reasons: tax ab- olition12; commemorating the convocation of the Legislative Seym of united and independent Poland13; regaining the areas of the Republic of Poland which had been included in the Prussian state14; commemorating the affiliation of Upper Silesia in Poland15; passing the March Constitution16; recognition of Poland’s eastern areas17; the 10th anniversary of Poland regaining independence18; implementation of the criminal code and the law on mis- demeanor19; implementation of the constitutional acts from 24 April 193520. Against the background of amnesty acts between the world wars, of far-reaching political importance was the presidential decree on amnesty from 2 September 1939. In the face of the threat to the state’s existence, the President forgot and forgave numerous offences and crimes committed before 31 August 1939. In People’s Poland amnesty was not directly based in constitutional regulations. The first amnesty was proclaimed on 2 August 1945 – by way of a decree – by the Council of Ministers and approved of by the Presiding Board of the National Council21. The government acted on the grounds of the law

12 Decree of the Chief of State from 7 February 1919 on amnesty for violating the regulations on direct taxes, administrative fees and the tax on inheritance and donations in the areas of the former Russian partitioning zone, Journal of Laws of the Polish State. No. 14, item 191. 13 Decree of the Chief of State from 8 February 1919 on amnesty, Journal of Laws of the Polish State. No. 16, item 219. 14 The law from 14 May 1920 on granting amnesty in the former Prussian district, Journal of Laws No. 42, item 252. 15 The law from 10 March 1921 on amnesty, Journal of Laws No. 29, item 163. 16 The law from 24 May 1921 on amnesty following the passing of the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Poland from 17 March 1921, Journal of Laws No. 42, item 261. 17 The law from 6 July 1923on amnesty following the recognitions of the borders of the Republic of Poland, Journal of Laws No. 70, item 555. 18 The law from 22 June 1928 on amnesty following the 10th anniversary of the Polish State regaining independence, Journal of Laws No. 70, item 641. 19 The ordinance of the President of the Republic of Poland from 1 October 1932 on amnesty following the introduction of the Polish uniform penal code and the misdemeanor law from 1 September 1932, Journal of Laws No. 91, item 782. 20 The law from 2 January 1936 on amnesty Journal of Laws No. 1, item 1); the outbreak of the war (a decree of the President of the Republic of Poland from 2 September 1939 on amnesty, Journal of Laws No. 87, item 553). 21 Journal of Laws No. 28, item172. Jacek Zaleśny • Amnesty acts in Poland in the 20th century 271 from 3 January 1945 on the procedure of issuing decrees with the force of law22. The purpose of the amnesty was to commemorate the day of the re- birth of Poland on the anniversary of the establishment of the Polish Com- mittee of National Liberation and the fact of the creation of the Government of National Unity. It mostly comprised people sentenced for political reasons. For example, the following crimes were forgotten and forgiven: crimes referred to in art. 1 and 8 on the protection of the state if the offender left the association and returned to normal life or they did it within a month after the decree on amnesty came into force; crimes laid down in art.4 letter a) of the decree on the protection of the State if the perpetrator voluntarily gave up to the authorities responsible for public safety the weapons, ammunition, explosives or other objects they were in possession of which could bring universal danger, or they did this within a month after this decree came into life; crimes laid down in art. 115–120 of the criminal code of the Polish Army if the perpetrator came to the disposal of the competent authority. Additionally, in matters within the competences of military courts and in cases concerning the crimes committed for political reasons – even if they did not belong to the competences of those courts, punishments of freedom limitation up to 5 years; punishments decreed for the crimes laid down in art. 113–120 of the criminal code of the Polish Army, regardless of the degree of penalty and referral to the criminal division decreed as the principal punishment, were forgiven and so were the punishments deferred in accordance with art. 65 or mitigated in accordance with art. 55 of the criminal code of the Polish Army, regardless of their degree. Death penalty or life sentence were changed for the punishment of 5 years of freedom deprivation. At the same time the decree contained a developed catalogue of exclusions from amnesty. The latter did not include, for example, people who did not give up their weapons after Poland’s liberation; who committed crimes under the competences of special criminal courts; who committed offences laid down in the law from 6 May 1945 on excluding the Polish hostile elements from the society23; who falsified or circulated money and securities (art. 175 to 177 of the criminal code); who – after Poland was liberated from the German occu-

22 Journal of Laws No. 1, item 1. 23 Journal of Laws No. 17, item 96. 272 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 pation – committed the offence laid down in art. 287 to 290 of the criminal code and offences against the State’s treasury, local governments and institutions of public law, state-owned and self-governing enterprises or any organizations acting with the share of the finances of the State’s Treasury or making use of its guarantees or financial aid if the offence was committed by an officer of the state’s office or a person in service of one of the aforementioned institutions; who perpetrated the seizure of somebody else’s movable property (art. 257 of the criminal code); who perpetrated the appropriation of entrusted movable assets (art. 262 § 2 of the criminal code); if entrusting this property was a consequence of events connected with the war; who committed crimes laid down in the decree of the Polish Committee of National Lib- eration from 12 December 1944 on combating secret alcohol production24; who committed crimes laid down in art. 11, 12 and 14 of the decree of the Polish Committee of National Liberation from 25 October 1944 on combating speculations and war usury25; who were professional criminals or habit- ual criminals or who the regulations on return to crime were applicable to. The goal similar to that of the decree from 2 August 1945 accompanied the Legislative Seym undertaking of the law on amnesty on 22 February 194726. It symbolized transfer from the state of the temporary nature of the political state to the state of political stability. Its purpose was to commemorate the opening of the Legislative Seym and the election of the President of the Re- public of Poland as well as enable all citizens to take part in the rebuilding of democratic People’s Poland (the original wording). Amnesty was an attempt to relieve the social tension connected with anti-communist guerrilla movement and stabilize the legal situation, the return to the everyday functioning of its former and present members as well as those who supported the anti-communist guerrilla movement. The dynamics of political changes did not leave any illusions as to no effectiveness of the actions undertaken and it promoted resignation, which was supposed to be supported by amnesty. For this reason, the law on amnesty forgot and forgave, for example, the following offences: 1) participation in a criminal association or agreement; crimes committed within such an association or agreement by their members, partici-

24 Journal of Laws No. 15, item 85. 25 Journal of Laws No. 9, item 49 with amendments. 26 Journal of Laws No. 20, item 78. Jacek Zaleśny • Amnesty acts in Poland in the 20th century 273 pants or people providing help to them; 2) crimes laid down in art. 4, 10 and 23 of the decree from 13 June 1946 on crimes which were particularly dangerous in the period of rebuilding the State27. On 20 July 1950 the Seym passed a law on lifting the sanctions and restrictions towards the citizens who had proclaimed their affiliation with the Ger- man nationality28. In view of the contribution of work made to the rebuilding of the state by the majority of citizens who – under the pressure of the Ger- man occupant – had proclaimed their affiliation with the German nationality, and considering the strengthening of people’s authority enabled – on the sixth anniversary of the rebuilding of Poland – to lift the sanctions and restrictions existing towards those citizens in their use of full civil rights. For this reason, no proceedings were initiated against the Polish citizens who, between 1 September 1939 and 9 May 1945, declared their affiliation with the German nationality or any nationality privileged by the occupant or those who declared the German origin. If the proceedings had been initiated, they were discontinued. Penalties adjudged in his area were forgiven, including those that had not been executed or executed only in part as well as the proclaimed loss of public rights and civil honorable rights. The regulations of the law on lifting the sanctions were not applicable towards the people who had committed a crime laid down in a decree from 31 August 1944 on punishments for the fascist-Nazi criminals, those who were guilty of cruelty to the civil population and prisoners and those who were traitors of the Polish Nation29. The constitution from 22 July 1952 did not undertake the subject of amnesty. Therefore, in the period when the former was in force, it was justifi- ably accepted that amnesty could be determined by the Seym by way of a law while in the period between the sessions – the Council of State issuing a decree with the force of law. In the Polish People’s Republic amnesty acts were undertaken above all on the occasion of important political events: the passing of the Constitu- tion of the Polish People’s Republic on 22 July 195230; the twentieth anniver-

27 Journal of Laws No. 30, item 192. 28 Journal of Laws No. 29, item 270. 29 Journal of Laws from 1946 No. 69, item 377 with amendments. 30 The law from 22 November 1952 on amnesty, Journal of Laws No. 46, item 309. 274 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 sary of People’s Poland31; the twenty fifth anniversary of People’s Poland32; the thirtieth anniversary of People’s Poland – considering the successful realization of the program of the society’s socialist changes and the social and economic development of the country, a permanent increase of social discipline and an improved state of public security and order, with a simultaneous increase of the legal consciousness and culture of the citizens (the original wording)33; lifting the martial law, considering the progressing normalization of social life, with the aim to create the conditions for the citizens who – for political reasons or unintentionally – violated the public order to get actively involved in the life of the country and to create the basis for earlier release due to the age and personal conditions of the perpetrators of certain crimes (the original wording)34; the fortieth anniversary of People’s Poland35. In People’s Poland amnesty most frequently comprised perpetrators of common crimes. However, the political inspirations of amnesty were sometimes important. For example, one of the goals of the law from 27 April 2956 on amnesty36 was to enable the political emigrants whose political or social activity was treated in the law of People’s Poland as criminal to return to homeland and get involved in the work of the Polish Nation. The following crimes committed before 15 April 1956 were forgotten and forgiven: crimes carrying the penalty of freedom deprivation up to 5 years laid down in chapters I and II of the decree from 13 June 1946 on crimes that were particularly dangerous in the period of rebuilding the State37, in the decree from 5 August 1949 on the protection of the freedom of conscience and religion38, in art. 100 § 2 of the penal code from 1932, in the decree from 26 October 1949 on the protection of state and office secrets39, in art. 90 and 91 item 1 of the law from 4

31 Decree from 20 July 196, Journal of Laws No. 27, item 174. 32 Decree from 21 July 1969on amnesty, Journal of Laws No. 21, item 151. 33 The law from 18 July 1974, Journal of Laws No. 27, item 159; Similar presumptions guided the law from 19 July 1977 on amnesty, Journal of Laws No. 24, item 102. 34 The law from 21 July 1983 on amnesty, Journal of Laws No. 39, item 177. 35 The law from 21 July 1984 on amnesty, Journal of Laws No. 36, item 192. 36 Journal of Laws No. 11, item 57. 37 Journal of Laws No. 30, item 192 with amendments. 38 Journal of Laws No. 45, item 334. 39 Journal of Laws No. 55, item 437. Jacek Zaleśny • Amnesty acts in Poland in the 20th century 275 February 1950 on general military service40, in art. 30 of the decree from 23 March 1956 on the protection of state borders41, in chapter XVII and art. 152 of the Criminal Code of the Polish Army. Amnesty was also applied towards, for example, acts penalized by the former Special Commission for Combat- ing Economic Abuse and Sabotage. Regulations concerning amnesty were not included in the provisional constitutional acts from 1989 and the 1990’s. They were not laid down in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland from 2 April 1997. There is no doubt that – due to its normative character – amnesty can be undertaken by the parliament. The word “amnesty” is used by the legislator in such acts as the Code of criminal proceedings from 6 June 199742 or the law from 24 May 2004 on the National Criminal Registry Act43. As different from the period between the world wars and the period of Peo- ple’s Republic, it was only in 1989 that the Seym of the 3rd Republic of Poland passed (twice) the laws on the consequences of amnesty. Undertaking the act on forgiving and forgetting certain crimes and offences on 28 May 198944, the Seym took into consideration the progressing process of normalization of social life, which was expressed by the national agreement and the will to create conditions for the citizens who – for political reasons – had violated the legal order enabling active participation in the political life of the country (the original wording). The other law passed in 1989 was the law from 7 December 1989 on amnesty45. A specific act, with the anti-amnesty consequences, was the law from 31 May 1996 on excluding certain laws on amnesty and abolition towards the perpetrators of some crimes which had not been prosecuted in the years 1944–1989 for political reasons46. On its basis, the regulations of laws and decrees providing for amnesty or abolition and issued before 7 De- cember 1989 were not applied towards the perpetrators of acts spoken about in art. 108 § 2 of the criminal code.

40 Journal of Laws No. 5, item 46. 41 Journal of Laws No. 9, item 51. 42 Journal of Laws No. 89, item 555 with amendments. 43 Journal of Laws from 2012, item 654 with amendments. 44 Journal of Laws No. 34, item 179. 45 Journal of Laws No.64, item 390. 46 Journal of Laws No. 89, item 400. 276 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 In the Polish tradition, amnesty is a form of grace. It occurs in special political circumstances when the political aim requires that crimes be not prosecuted. Its point of reference includes actions against the state’s existing political system and political relations, a deep political distur- bance, the need to seek national reconciliation and social peace or par- doning the guilt and forgetting the acts perpetrated by people convicted in political cases47. Amnesty is also sometimes conditioned by pragmatic reasons, for example a need to relieve the overcrowding of penal institutions following excessive repressiveness of law. This reason played a significant role in People’s Poland. In the legal situation binding at present, amnesty is undertaken exclusively in the form of a law. The Seym and the Senate pass it according to the procedure of a so-called ordinary law. The amnesty law is an act establishing law not only for formal reasons, due to the form of the law, but also due to its content. As a normative act, it contains general and abstract norms. It is not directed to a concrete person (a concrete convict) but to a definite category of (convicted) people who are not individually marked and who possess the feature spoken about by the legislator48. The law is applicable to each such person, independently of specific conditions. It should be emphasized that amnesty is a sovereign act – an expression of the political will of the parliament. Considering the normative character of the amnesty law, the Seym can freely establish the categories of forbidden acts included within it, depending on what specific goal is to be reached by undertaking a concrete amnesty act. Establishing the subject of amnesty, i.e. the circle of convicts comprised within it, the legislator most frequently indicated the types of crimes, the kinds or degree of the punishments adjudged which are either abolished or shortened. Amnesty acts also sometimes include the regulations excluding definite categories of forbidden acts49. The Polish practice is also familiar with granting the organs using the regulations of law a decision to include a given person within the benefits of amnesty. In accordance with the regulations of the decree from 19 July 1977 on

47 Cf. K. Holy, Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne wobec amnestii, Warszawa 2015, p. 23. 48 P. Daniluk, Amnestia i jej konstytucyjne uwarunkowania, “Przegląd Sejmowy” 2014, No. 3, pp. 44–45. 49 P. Rogoziński, Instytucja ułaskawienia w prawie polskim, Warszawa 2009, p. 91. Jacek Zaleśny • Amnesty acts in Poland in the 20th century 277 amnesty50, if special circumstances occurred, the Public Prosecutor General – in agreement with the Minister of Justice – could discontinue the proceedings connected with the offence carrying a more severe penalty than that in the amnesty act, not higher, however, than 10 years of freedom deprivation. On the other hand, in accordance with art. 5 of the law from 21 July 1983 on amnesty51, in particularly justified cases the Supreme Court – on the motion of the Public Prosecutor General, could discontinue the proceedings referring to a crime included with the law on amnesty even if the circumstances of the cases indicated that the penalty of more than 3 years’ freedom deprivation should be adjudged, a crime laid down in chapter XIX of the criminal code (except the crime referred to in art. 134 and 135) and another crime committed before the day when martial law was lifted, or the valid punishment for such a crime should be forgiven. A similar regulation was included in the law from 17 July 1986 on special proceedings towards the perpetrators of certain offences52. The purpose of the amnesty law should be determined in the reasons to a draft of the amnesty law and it should be rational since in accordance with the settled jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal, an irrational legal norm does not satisfy the standard of proper legislation and, as such, it loses the binding capability. A typical amnesty act in the Polish practice of the 20th century includes amnesty and abolition regulations. Like amnesty, abolition is a general act aimed at a definite category of people who are not individually marked. While amnesty comprises annulment or mitigation of the consequences of conviction, abolition consists in forgetting and forgiving the perpetrator’s act, prohibiting the initiation of criminal proceedings or ordering abandonment of criminal proceedings. The stage of the proceedings has no significance for its application. It can be undertaken at any stage, i.e. both during the preparatory proceedings and within the frameworks of jurisdiction proceedings until the validation of the sentence. Amnesty can be applied since the moment the sentence is validated. For example, abolition accompanied the introduction of martial law in 1981 and it was aimed at enabling the citizens who – for

50 Journal of Laws No. 241, item 102. 51 Journal of Laws No. 39, item 177 with amendments. 52 Journal of Laws No. 26, item 126. 278 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 political reasons, in the context of social conflicts or unintentionally – broke the legal order to get involved in active participation in developing the country’s economic life and in strengthening the social order as well as with the aim to secure the conditions promoting the national agreement and contin- uation of socialist changes of the social life (the original wording)53. Amnesty has an objective character. It indicates forbidden acts included within its scope. These are, in principle, crimes but also misdemeanors, tax crimes, tax offences or disciplinary tort. From the point of view of the essence of amnesty, it is of no importance whether the legislator enumerates (in articles) forbidden acts (delicta enumerate) or defines the types of forbidden acts where amnesty is applicable (delicta denominate). The objective character of amnesty is not undermined by the exclusion of certain categories of people or the exclusion of certain categories of crimes. The objective, and not subjective, character of amnesty follows from the goal it is supposed to achieve. Due to the achievement of the effect of amnesty it can also exclude definite categories of people. The objective character of amnesty, characteristic of the legal norm, is connected with its another feature, namely universality. Am- nesty criteria are always of general nature. They do not refer to individual features of convicts included within amnesty. Everybody who will satisfy the feature spoken about in the amnesty act is included within it. On the other hand, abolition regulations are directed at people fulfilling amnesty criteria who have not been yet convicted in a valid way. What follows from its social and legal essence, amnesty is not subject to cancellation. This means that the Seym is not competent to derogate the regulations of the amnesty law and restore the legal and factual state from before it came into life. It is not competent to “reverse” the individual consequences of amnesty. At the same time, the amnesty law itself can contain the so-called conditional regulations when social protection or special prevention require it54. The Seym is competent to provide for the annulment of the applied consequences of amnesty towards the category of people who commit an undesirable act, e.g. having taken advantage of amnesty, they commit a crime of

53 Decree from 12 December 1981 on forgiving and forgetting certain crimes and offences, Journal of Laws No. 29, item 158. 54 P. Rogoziński, op.cit., p. 93. Jacek Zaleśny • Amnesty acts in Poland in the 20th century 279 the same kind. Such an exception from the rule of irrevocability of amnesty follows from the aim for which amnesty is carried out and as such is rational. Amnesty, on the other hand, cannot promote recurrence of crimes. Conditional regulations were, for example, included in the amnesty act from 27 April 1956. It stipulated that if within two years after the law came into life the perpetrator of the crime subject to amnesty committed a new crime for the same reasons or a crime belonging to the same kind for which they had been sentenced to freedom deprivation, then amnesty was not applied in relation to the previously committed crime and the decision on the application of amnesty was annulled. By virtue of the decree on amnesty from 19 July 1977, if the perpetrator of a crime (including a tax offence) who took, within two years after the amnesty decree came into life, advantage of amnesty committed a new intentional crime for which the sentence of freedom deprivation had been passed, then the previous decision on the application of amnesty was annulled and the forgiven or reduced penalties were subject to execution in the degree they had been adjudged while the discontinued proceedings were undertaken anew. Another legal construction protecting from recidivism was applied in the regulations of the amnesty law from 22 Febru- ary 1947. In accordance with it, in case a person who benefited from amnesty committed a new crime of the same kind within two years since the amnesty law came into life, the court administering the punishment for the crime could not adjudge a punishment lower than the double lowest statutory degree of the punishment fixed for a given crime, without, however, exceeding the statutory limit of a given kind of crime. Irrevocability of amnesty should be distinguished from its conditional character. The legislator can make the application of amnesty dependent on the perpetrator fulfilling the act of a definite condition, e.g. ceasing to hide themselves. For example, in accordance with art. 7 of the decree from 19 July 1977 on amnesty, the organ applying amnesty could place an obligation on the person towards whom it had remitted the penalty or discontinued the proceedings to undertake – within no longer than 2 months since the date amnesty was applied – a permanent paid job, to realize the duty weighing on the perpetrator to provide for a living of another person, to repair the damage done by the crime wholly or in part, to refrain from staying in definite environ- ments or places or to any other suitable behaviour. In this way the legislator 280 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 had the organ using amnesty execute it in the way which contributed to the consciousness of its beneficial effect and the need to achieve the educational goals of legal regulations55. At the same time, amnesty conditions must be clearly settled in the law so that their realization will not depend on the opinion of the organ applying the law. As mentioned above, within this scope, the regulations of the decree from 19 July 1977 on amnesty or the law from 21 July 1983 on amnesty, which allowed the organ applying the law to include the subjects that were not enumerated in the amnesty act within amnesty are problematic. At the same time, in consideration of the fact that the objective regulations allowed for the development, and not limitation, of the set of entities included within amnesty, although they are optimal from the point of view of the principle of the exclusivity of the law, they are not subject to constitutional disqualification. In the Polish law, the principle of irrevocability of amnesty is connected with the principle of the person included within amnesty being unable to give it up. The declaration of the perpetrator of an act subject to amnesty on re- signing from amnesty does not bring any legal consequences. In the light of the studied amnesty acts as well as in the light of the Pol- ish doctrine and practice, amnesty does not refer to the fact of the crime. It does not introduce a change in the aspect of the judicial assessment of the perpetrator’s act. It was carried out by the court and – within the frameworks of the division of powers – it is not subject to correction by other authorities. Amnesty does not annihilate the very fact of the crime and neither does it interfere into its legal assessment made by the court. A valid sentence of the court does undergo any change. Undertaking amnesty, the parliament does not make an assessment of the court’s decision and it does not control the latter’s activity. Thus, it does not violate the rule of the judicial administration of justice56. Pro futuro, on the other hand, it does change its consequence within the scope of the punishment by annulling or limiting the latter. It does not bring retrospective consequences, i.e. it does not change the past legal assessment of a forbidden act and it does not comprise the penalties executed before it came into force. That is the reason why the legislator

55 J. Bednarzak, J. Lewiński, J. Mikos, W. Tomczyk, Dekret o amnestii z dnia 19 lipca 1977 r. Komentarz, Warszawa 1977, p. 8. 56 P. Daniluk, op.cit., p. 63. Jacek Zaleśny • Amnesty acts in Poland in the 20th century 281 gave up the execution of the punishment for the committed crime or limited the punishment because – independently of the court’s negative assessment of the committed crime – this is its political decision. Non-interference of the amnesty act into the courts’ decisions is also applicable to the abolition norms of the amnesty act. They do not annul the legal assessment of the criminal act, either. However, they annul its consequences concerning the punishment. If the preparatory or court proceedings took place and the perpetrator has not been convicted yet, the criminal proceedings can be discontinued on the basis of abolition norms. This is not discontinuation of the proceedings due to the fact that a forbidden act was not stated but due to the will of the legislator to be so. At the same time, however, typically, the person included within abolition has at their disposal a legal measure to claim their innocence. The accused person or the suspect can submit an application to the organ which gave the decision to have the case examined by the court. In case an application is submitted for the court to examine the matter, the proceedings follows on general basis. If the guilt of the crime is ascertained, the court does not discontinue the proceedings but – depending on the circumstances – frees the perpetrator from the punishment or applies amnesty for the administered punishment. If the abolition regulations are applied, the fact of committing the crime is also confirmed in the regulations of amnesty laws by virtue of which an obligatory or facultative decision is made on the foreclosure of the tools of the crime, objects coming from the crime or the property the possession of which is forbidden57. Summing up, amnesty acts in Poland in the 20th century played a significant role, both politically and in the sphere of the adopted penal policy. They were frequently applied and they comprised big groups of people. They had a special importance in People’s Poland. In the situation of a lack of places in penal institutions, they were a key measure to solve the problem. For this reason they were cyclical and included big groups of people. The Polish legal doctrine clearly emphasizes the normative character of amnesty acts. That is the reason why they are carried out by way of a law and they are clearly distinguished from pardon, which is an individual act and as such is not undertaken by the parliament.

57 J. Bednarzak, op.cit., s. 98. 282 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Litereture

Bednarzak J., Amnestia, Warszawa 1965. Bednarzak J., Lewiński J., Mikos J., Tomczyk W., Dekret o amnestii z dnia 19 lipca 1977 r. Komentarz, Warszawa 1977. Daniluk P., Amnestia i jej konstytucyjne uwarunkowania, “Przegląd Sejmowy” 2014, No. 3. Holy K., Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne wobec amnestii, Warszawa 2015. Kaczmarczyk-Kłak K., Prawo łaski w okresie prowizorium konstytucyjnego w latach 1918– 1922, [In:] Ustroje. Historia i współczesność. Polska –Europa – Ameryka Łacińska. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana profesorowi Jackowi Czajowskiemu, eds. M. Grzy- bowski, G. Kuca, P. Mikuli, Kraków 2013. Rogoziński P., Instytucja ułaskawienia w prawie polskim, Warszawa 2009. Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.15 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Krzysztof Eckhardt1

Mechanisms of curbing statutory power in a situation of political uniformity of the legislative and executive (comments in the light of RP Constitution of 2 April 1997)

Keywords: separation of powers, impediment of statutory power, Constitutional Tribunal Słowa kluczowe: podział władzy, hamowanie władzy ustawodawczej, Trybunał Konstytucyjny Summary In a situation of uniformity of President’s political orientation, of parliamentary majority which means the government, statutory veto motivated by a difference in a substantial evaluation of acts ceases to operate. In such a situation a task to curb the legislative must reside exclusively in the judiciary, thus in particular in the Constitutional Tribunal. In order to fulfil this task effectively the constitutional tribunal must be free from an allegation that its jurisdiction is motivated by anything else than compatibility with the constitution. From this point of view a way in which judges of the Tribunal are appointed has the key meaning. The issue consists in how to free the composition of the Tribunal from the political system existing in parliament. Streszczenie Mechanizmy powściągania władzy ustawodawczej w sytuacji jednolitości politycznej legislatywy i egzekutywy (uwagi w świetle Konstytucji RP z 2 kwietnia 1997 r.)

W sytuacji jednolitości orientacji politycznej Prezydenta, większości parlamentarnej a co za tym idzie rządu, weto ustawodawcze motywowane różnicą w ocenie merytorycznej ustaw prze-

1 The author is an Associate Professor in Department of Constitutional Law and International Rela- tions University of Law and Public Administration in Rzeszów. E-mail: [email protected]. 284 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 staje działać. W takiej sytuacji zadanie powściągania legislatywy spoczywać musi wyłącznie na władzy sądowniczej, w szczególności zaś na Trybunale Konstytucyjnym. Po to aby zadanie to spełniać efektywnie sąd konstytucyjny musi być wolny od zarzutu, iż jego orzecznictwo jest motywowane czymkolwiek innym niż zgodnością z konstytucją. Z tego punktu widzenia, kluczowe znaczenie ma sposób w jaki sędziowie Trybunału są powoływani. Chodzi o to jak uwolnić skład Trybunału od układu politycznego istniejącego w parlamencie.

Separation of powers cannot exist without at least their relative balance2, which means that “it is not appropriate allowing to subject the remaining powers to domination of one power, nor the more of two remaining powers”3. How- ever, balance need not mean every time complete equality4. In Polish constitutional law, beginning from the Constitution of 3rd May through the March Constitution, Small Constitution from 1947 to Small Constitution from 1992 supremacy of the legislative was underlined. Such is (not necessarily good5) Polish structural tradition. At the present time despite unambiguous expression in the Constitution of the rule of balance of powers, a thesis on certain permanent superiority of the legislative also predominates6 (though opinions also appear that in this case we have to do with not really relevant opinion7,

2 R.M. Małajny, Zasada podziału władzy a system rządów parlamentarnych, “Państwo i Prawo” 2009, Issue 12, p. 22. 3 Z. Witkowski, Zasada podziału władzy i równoważenia się władz, [In:] Prawo konstytucyjne, eds. Z. Witkowski, A. Bień-Kacała, Toruń 2015, p. 99. 4 R.M. Małajny, Idea rozdziału władzy państwowej i jej interpretacje, “Przegląd Sejmowy” 2009, No. 1, p. 105. 5 Ibidem, p. 105. 6 See e.g. L. Garlicki, Komentarz do tytułu rozdziału IV Konstytucji, [In:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Vol. I, ed. L. Garlicki, Warsaw 1999, p. 3; J. Jaskiernia, Parlamentaryzm III RP. Aksjologia konstytucyjna a dylematy praktyki konstytucyjnej, [In:] Par- lamentarny system rządów. Teoria i praktyka, eds. T. Mołdawa, J. Szymanek, M. Mistygacz, Warsaw 2012, p. 121; K. Complak, Komentarz do art. 10, [In:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, ed. M. Haczkowska, Warsaw 2014, p. 23; W. Skrzydło, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Warsaw 2013, p. 24. 7 M. Pach, P. Tuleja, Komentarz do art. 10, [In:] Konstytucja. Komentarz, Vol. I, eds. M. Safian, L. Bosek, Warsaw 2016, p. 345. Krzysztof Eckhardt • Mechanisms of curbing statutory power in a situation... 285 “which responds admittedly to Polish state traditions but may cause doubts concerning consequences with which the legislator developed the rule expressed in art. 10 of the RP Constitution”8. Superiority of the legislative is considered to be a natural consequence of the democratic character of the state9. It also results from the belief that structural functions performed by various authorities make them unequal because one cannot speak about equality of power, which creates the law and this, which is bound by this law and has the duty to apply it10. In Poland Sejm still has the statutory monopoly not having a competi- tor in a form of law-making by the legislative of statutory power11. In the doctrine superiority of the legislative, in particular of Sejm, is moreover connected with an exclusive role which the legislator appointed to an act in the field of human rights12 (the principle of separation of powers itself is seen as a structural guarantee of respecting the rights of an individu- al13), particular allegiance to the constitutional rule of authority of people, the representative of which except Senate is first of all just Sejm14 and with that the rule of political pluralism can find its practical expression only in the legislative15.

8 R. Piotrowski, Zasada podziału władz w Konstytucji RP, “Przegląd Sejmowy” 2007, No. 4, p. 118. 9 See P. Sarnecki, Komentarz do art. 1, [In:] Komentarz do Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, ed. L. Garlicki Warsaw 1995, p. 10. 10 See J. Ciemniewski, Podział władz w demokratycznym państwie prawnym, [In:] „Mała Konstytucja” w procesie przemian ustrojowych w Polsce, ed. M. Kruk, Warsaw 1993, p. 27; W. So- kolewicz, Rozdzielone, lecz czy równe? Legislatywa i egzekutywa w Małej Konstytucji z 1992 r., “Przegląd Sejmowy” 1993, No. 1, p. 33. 11 See J. Szymanek, Elementy racjonalizacji w konstrukcji parlamentarnego systemu rządów: analiza rozwiązań zawartych w Konstytucji RP, [In:] Parlamentarny system rządów..., p. 155. 12 See ibidem and J. Kuciński, Legislatywa, egzekutywa, judykatywa. Konstytucyjne instytucje i mechanizmy służące równowadze władz w polskim systemie trójpodziału, Warsaw 2010, p. 64. 13 E.g. B. Constant had in mind mainly protection of freedom of an individual formulating his concept of five coordinated powers, see A. Sylwestrzak, Teorie podziału władz i podział władz w Konstytucji RP z 1997 r., “Studia Bałtyckie. Administracja”, Vol. II, Koszalin 1998, pp. 175–177. 14 A. Dana, Istota podziału i równowagi władz w polskim konstytucjonalizmie, “DOCTRI- NA. Studia Społeczno-Polityczne” 2009, No. 6, p. 65. 15 See e.g. P. Sarnecki, Komentarz do art. 1, op.cit., p. 10. 286 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Confidence in superiority of the legislative, makes particularly essential a question on limitation to which it should be subjected, and precisely on limits of power of the majority, which as R. Piotrowski notices accurately “constitutes a basic dilemma of the constitutionalism”16. Monteskiusz was sure that the legislative body would become despotic if it was not curbed “since it could confer itself all possible authority, it would annihilate all other authorities”17. According to his theory the executive was to have “the ability to disturb” the legislative and its instrument was to be the power of veto. Two other “brakes” for the legislative was to divide it into two chambers and entrust the executive the right to convene and dissolve parliament18. The Constitution of 2 April 1997 refers to the same mechanisms of curbing the legislative by the executive. They consists of shortening of the parliamentary term and refusal to sign an act passed by parliament19. The legislative is not endangered to other far reaching interferences from the side of the executive20. Application of both these instruments considered as classic institutions being “basic symptoms of the balance of powers”21 belongs to the President’s competencies22.

16 R. Piotrowski, Zasada podziału władz w... p. 113. 17 Monteskiusz, O duchu praw, Warsaw 1957, p. 241. 18 See e.g. A. Pułło, „Podział władzy”. Aktualne problemy w doktrynie, prawie i współczesnej dyskusji konstytucyjnej w Polsce “Przegląd Sejmowy” 1993, No. 3, pp. 18–19; O jedno rozumienie podziału władz w nauce prawa konstytucyjnego, “Państwo i Prawo” 1983, Issue 6, p. 39; P. Mikuli, Zasada podziału władz a ustrój brytyjski, Warsaw 2006, pp. 24–25; G. Kuca, Zasada podziału władzy w Konstytucji RP z 1997 r., Warszawa 2014, pp. 39–40. 19 Discussed in detail by J. Kucinski, Legislatywa, egzekutywa, ..., pp. 288–318. 20 See M. Kruk, System rządów w Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 2 kwietnia 1997 roku, [In:] Ustrój polityczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w nowej Konstytucji z 2 kwietnia 1997 roku, eds. W. Skrzydło, R. Mojak, Lublin 1998, p. 47. 21 P. Sarnecki, Funkcje i struktura parlamentu według nowej Konstytucji, “Państwo i Prawo” 1997, Issue 11–12, p. 34. 22 In the doctrine using by President the right to shorten the parliament term, as well as use of statutory veto is also considered (and sometimes exclusively) as performance, resulting from art. 126 of the Constitution, function of political arbitration – see e.g. T. Włodek, Insty- tucja rozwiązania parlamentu w polskim prawione konstytucyjnym, Warsaw 2009, pp. 194–201, or W. Skrzydło, Organy władzy wykonawczej w Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, [In:] Prob- lemy stosowania Konstytucji Polski i Ukrainy, eds. M. Granat, J. Sobczak, Lublin 2004, p. 47. Such formulation has a decisive meaning in research of motives directing President using his competences but from the point of view of the effect which is curbing the legislative has the Krzysztof Eckhardt • Mechanisms of curbing statutory power in a situation... 287 The construction adopted by the Constitution of 2 April 1997 leaves to Pres- ident a little range of freedom in the scope of a decision to shorten the term of Sejm. G. Kuca writes rightly that its role is limited to performing “a sentence” on Sejm23. The Constitution specifies just two situations when shortening of the term may take place and both are in essence the consequence of maintaining representatives24. Adopting such a solution renders that the basic instrument of curbing the legislative by the executive which is to balance their role in the legislative procedure is statutory veto25. Veto is not a co-participation of President in passing an act but a possibility of external interference into functioning of the legislative bodies. President is only a negative (co)-legislator, not (co-)creating the act26. Such understanding of President’s authorities connected with the final stage of the legislative process is supported by a systemic interpretation of art. 10 and art. 95 of the Constitution, and also the fact that the final decision on the destiny of an act is always made by Sejm not President27. Effectiveness of statutory veto is decided first of all by the fact by what -ma jority it could be rejected. It is simultaneously one of basic factors appointing a position of head of state towards Parliament. During work of the Con- stitutional Commission of the National Assembly its standpoint concerning conditions of re-passing of the act changed several times. In a draft of 5 June 1996 only absolute majority was proposed, in a version of 6 November 1996 2/3, and finally 3/5 majority was accepted (it seems that these doubts could be connected with the system of political powers before and after presiden- secondary meaning. It’s worth indicating that in drafts of changes in the RP Constitution, which occurred in years 1997–2013 it was quite often proposed that President should cease to be an agency of executive acquiring a particular structural position outside the separation of powers – see R. Chruściak, Problematyka zasady podziału władz w projektach i propozycjach zmian w Konstytucji RP (1997–2013), “Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze” Vol. XXXI, 2014, pp. 71–82. 23 G. Kuca, Zasada podziału ..., p. 203. 24 J. Kuciński, Legislatywa, egzekutywa, ..., p. 312. 25 See J. Szymanek, Elementy racjonalizacji..., p. 149. 26 P. Sarnecki, Weto ustawodawcze Prezydenta RP wobec ustaw konstytucyjnych, [In:] Studia nad prawem konstytucyjnym., eds. J. Trzciński, B. Banaszak, “A U W Prawo” CCLVII, Wrocław 1997, p. 214. 27 Other arguments are indicated in Udział organów władzy wykonawczej w procesie stanowienia ustaw, Przemyśl 2000, pp. 116–117. 288 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 tial election28). After over ten years of binding force of the Constitution on breakthrough of 2009/2010 there appeared proposals of further decreasing the threshold to dismiss President’s veto from 3/5 to absolute majority29. In Polish political conditions it has the fundamental meaning because dismissal of veto usually requires entering into an agreement in Sejm going beyond the limit of separation into the government and opposition. Generally one may indicate the following reasons, which cause that Pres- ident uses veto: differences in a political orientation between President and the parliamentary majority leading to differences in a substantial evaluation of acts; an allegation of unconstitutionality of provisions of the act presented to be signed; errors of a formal and editorial character; own tactics of a person holding the Presidency, unconnected directly with political parliamentary game. From the point of view of relations between the legislative and executive the first of the mentioned reasons has basic meaning. In a situation of uniformity of President’s political orientation, of the parliamentary majority and which means the government, such a prerequisite of applying veto does obviously not occur. It depends on results of parliamentary and Presidential election in the effect of which the executive can function as actually one-subjective, politically identic with the parliamentary majority30. Presidential veto as a curbing instrument ceases to operate because the same governing party or coalition of parties decides about a real functioning of both agencies of the legislative and executive power. Formally separated powers belong to the same source “formulating state decisions (or their drafts), i.e. political parties”31. Curbing by President actions of parliament loses its grounds in large measure since both agencies realise the same political programme.

28 D. Górecki’s opinion – see Wpływ polskich tradycji ustrojowych na współczesne rozwią- zania konstytucyjne, [In:] Konstytucyjne systemy rządów, ed. M. Domagała, Warsaw 1997, p. 29 or H. Suchocka, Zasada równowagi i hamowania władz publicznych w Konstytucji. Wybrane zagadnienia, [In:] Gospodarka. Administracja. Samorząd, eds. H. Olszewski, B. Popowska, Poznań 1997, p. 495. 29 See J. Kuciński, Legislatywa, egzekutywa ..., p. 305. 30 R. Piotrowski, Zasada podziału..., pp. 116–117; identically A. Dana, Istota podziału i równowagi...., p. 67. 31 J. Wawrzyniak, Zasada podziału władzy a problem nadużywania władzy, [In:] Państwo, prawo, gospodarka, ed. A. Goryńska, Warsaw 2016, p. 103. Krzysztof Eckhardt • Mechanisms of curbing statutory power in a situation... 289 In such a situation a task of curbing the legislative must rest exclusively on the judiciary, in particular on the Constitutional Tribunal acting on initiative of other subjects than President and the Council of Ministers32. Judicial control over constitutionality is “an intentionally created anti-majority tool, i.e. based on the constitution a way to limit ruling of the majority performed by parliament or – in some cases – by means of mechanisms of direct democracy”33. Its duty is first of all curbing unconstitutional legislative activity of the parliamentary majority. The majority so essential that it is able to pass acts but which does not have such superiority to change the basic law. Foregoing experience from the period of 3rd Republic indicates that acquiring the majority of votes in Sejm sufficient to change the constitution is extremely difficult. Political powers having superiority in parliament must move in the structural frames existing at the moment of assuming authority, which is guarded by the Tribunal. In order to fulfil this task effectively the constitutional tribunal has to be free from an allegation that its jurisdiction is motivated by anything else but constitutionality. From this point of view a way in which judges of the Tribunal are appointed has the key meaning. The issue consists in how to free the composition of the Tribunal from the political system existing in parliament. Experience of last year indicates that negative practice in this scope has not only disap- peared but escalates. Political powers having the majority in parliament force their candidates to become judges of the Tribunal. This problem existed also before passing the binding Constitution and was not solved by it34. The Constitution expresses the rule of monopoly of Sejm in casting posts of judges of the constitutional tribunal. This rule is the subject of multiannual doctrinal discussion in which any uniform standpoint has not

32 In the doctrine as an element of the system of structural impediments including relations between the judiciary and the executive is also pointed out adjudgment by the State Tribunal on constitutional liability of representatives and senators. However it causes serious doubts. Firstly because of the scope of this liability, secondly because of the course in which an MP is to be brought before the Tribunal – more K. Eckhardt, Problem regulacji zakresu podmiotowego odpowiedzialności konstytucyjnej – uwagi porządkujące, [In:] Państwo demokratyczne, prawne i socjalne, eds. M. Grzybowski, P. Tuleja, Kraków 2014, pp. 526–527. 33 W. Sadurski, Prawo przed sądem. Studium sądownictwa konstytucyjnego w postkomuni- stycznych państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, Warsaw 2008, p. 57. 34 H. Suchocka, Zasada równowagi i hamowania ..., p. 503. 290 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 been elaborated so far. Supporters of maintaining the general mechanism of election of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal exclusively by Sejm35 indicate first of all arguments resulting from the essence of functions performed by the Tribunal. Its judicial decisions influence legislation and forming of political decisions. “Thus Parliament is made dependent on decisions of the tribunal and entrusting it authority to appoint judges of the tribunal recompenses it in certain sense”36. Simultaneously this solution ensures the constitutional tribunal legitimacy resulting from election by the representative body37. Currently the majority of European states adopted a model of separation of competencies to appoint judges of the constitutional tribunal between agencies representing the legislative and executive, and sometimes even the judicia- ry38. Despite that I support a view that in Polish conditions exclusive authority of Sejm to elect judges of the Constitutional Tribunal should be maintained, mainly because of “power of possessed and conferred democratic legitimacy and the fact of influence of the Constitutional Tribunal on legislation”39. While maintaining foregoing rules of election of the RP Senate, there is not any reason that Sejm would share these competences with it in any way. In- stead results of applying a mixed system with participation of two or three powers “are difficult to be anticipated”40. On the one hand it would be a system assuming co-operation of various subjects, which was usually difficult in the history of 3rd Republic, on the other hand with political uniformity of the executive and the parliamentary majority it would not exclude disadvantages of the binding procedure.

35 B. Banaszak, Odpowiedź na Ankietę konstytucyjną, [In:] Ankieta konstytucyjna, eds. B. Banaszak, J. Zbieranek, Warsaw 2011, p. 38; A. Szmyt, Odpowiedź na Ankietę konstytucyjną, [In:] Ankieta..., p. 134; M. Zubik, Odpowiedź na Ankietę konstytucyjną, [In:] Ankieta..., p. 143. 36 L. Garlicki, Sądownictwo konstytucyjne w Europie Zachodniej, Warsaw 1987, p. 97. 37 M. Zubik, Status prawny sędziego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, Warsaw 2011, p. 86. 38 See ibidem, p. 48; D. Rousseau, Sądownictwo konstytucyjne w Europie, Warsaw 1999, pp. 41–42; M. Granat, Sądowa kontrola konstytucyjności prawa w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, Warsaw 2003, pp. 130–131. 39 A. Szmyt, Odpowiedź na Ankietę..., p. 134. 40 M. Granat, Trybunał Konstytucyjny. Osiągnięcie czy zadanie? [In:] Trzecia władza. Sądy i Trybunały w Polsce. Materiały L Ogólnopolskiego Zjazdu Katedr i Zakładów Prawa Kon- stytucyjnego Gdynia 24–26 kwietnia 2008 roku, ed. A. Szmyt, Gdańsk 2008, pp. 36–38. p. 40. Krzysztof Eckhardt • Mechanisms of curbing statutory power in a situation... 291 Obviously “it would be an illusion to assume that Sejm would not be led by political grounds while making these personal decisions. It is somehow »calculated« in the parliamentary course of casting posts in CT”41. I support a view that it would be desirable to introduce a requirement of the qualified majority of 2/3 votes, which would force parliament to look for candidates supported not only by governing powers42. In my opinion this requirement should be applied at the level of the Constitution, despite concerns referring to a possibility of impediments in the Tribunal’s work resulting from vacates in its composition43. At least a chance would be created to limit undesirable effects of the political mechanism of electing CT judges. A place of the Constitutional Tribunal in the system of separation of powers (sometimes considered as “disproportionate”44) is seen more often through a prism of a phenomenon of the so-called judicial activism which escalates “a conflict between a will of the nation expressed by the legislative and evaluation of legal acts made by the Tribunal being emanation of this will”45. In relations with this as R. Małajny notes, opinions are disseminated that the

41 L. Garlicki, Komentarz do art. 194 Konstytucji, [In:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, T. IV, ed. L. Garlicki, Warsaw 2005, p. 6. 42 Such a solution were supported among others B. Banaszak, Opinia prawna na temat przedstawionego przez Prezydenta RP projektu ustawy o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym (druk nr 1590), Biuro Analiz Sejmowych, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/rexdomk7.nsf/Opdodr?Open- Page&nr=1590, pp. 9–10, pp. 12–13 (17.11.2016) and also Odpowiedź na Ankietę ..., p. 38; L. Garlicki, Komentarz do art. 194..., p. 6; W. Sokolewicz, Status prawny sędziego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, [In:] Księga XX –lecia orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, ed. M. Zubik, Warsaw 2006, pp. 172–173; Z. Czeszejko-Sochacki, Sądownictwo konstytucyjne w Polsce na tle porównawczym, Warsaw 2003, pp. 126–127; P. Policastro, Odpowiedź na Ankietę konstytucyjną, [In:] Ankieta..., p. 100; A. Szmyt, Odpowiedź na Ankietę...p. 134; M. Safjan,Ewolucja funkcji i zadań Trybunału Konstytucyjnego – próba spojrzenia w przyszłość, [In:] Księga XXV-lecia Try- bunału Konstytucyjnego. Ewolucja funkcji i zadań Trybunału Konstytucyjnego – założenia a ich praktyczna realizacja, Warsaw 2010, p. 40; K. Wojtyczek, Sądownictwo konstytucyjne w Polsce. Wybrane zagadnienia, Warsaw 2013, p. 96. 43 See M. Granat, Trybunał Konstytucyjny. Osiągniecie czy ..., p. 40; K. Skotnicki, Odpo- wiedź na Ankietę konstytucyjną, [In:] Ankieta..., p. 114; L. Garlicki, Ewolucja funkcji i zadań Trybunału Konstytucyjnego (dwadzieścia pięć tez na dwudziestopięciolecie), [In:] Księga XXV- -lecia Trybunału..., p. 11. 44 K. Complak, Komentarz do art. 10..., p. 23. 45 R. Małajny, Legitymacja sądownictwa konstytucyjnego, “Państwo i Prawo” 2015, Is- sue 10, pp. 5–21. 292 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Tribunal’s judgements should be subject to a possible refusal by parliament by the qualified majority of votes. “An allegation of corporatism is sometimes made to the judiciary understood as exorbitant care of their interests. Aver- sion to all external criticism is also pointed out.”46 On the other hand the judicial activism is considered as an inevitable phenomenon resulting from se- mantic features of the contemporary legal language but this activism “because it opposes to a will of the parliamentary majority, should have, as far as it is possible, determined functions and limits”47, and problem does not consist in that courts are activistic, but because they use their activism wrongly48. There are presented various proposals aimed to serve control over the judicial activism, external supervision over the Tribunal and internal control, resulting from the rules of its functioning49. In my opinion all of them deserve attention and constitute an excellent plane for further discussions, they have as the base an original issue of the system of appointing judges. Summing up one can state not only that assumed by the Constitution of 2 April 1997 instruments of balancing the legislative in a situation of uniformity of President’s political orientation and of the parliamentary majority may turn to be ineffective but also that in the frame of the mechanism of separation of powers it is difficult to point out a method which would be able to help. Even when one assumes a possibility of change of the constitution. Going beyond the idea of separation of powers, maybe a balancing instrument of the executive could be referendum performed on citizens’ initiative, mainly if it had a character of citizens’ veto towards an act already passed by parliament. In this way it could become a way of dominative control of electors over the legislative. A necessary condition to fulfil this role by referendum would be releasing a decision on announcing it on consent of one or the other house, and thus novelisation of art. 125 of the Constitution. An extreme solution would be admission of a possibility to dismiss the whole composition of parliament in a way of referendum. However, such mechanism would be compatible with the rule of sovereignty of the nation, it would not be in a di-

46 Ibidem. 47 L. Morawski, Zasada trójpodziału władzy. Trybunał Konstytucyjny i aktywizm sędziowski, “Przegląd Sejmowy” 2009, No. 4, p. 59. 48 Ibidem, p. 69. 49 Ibidem pp. 70–73. Krzysztof Eckhardt • Mechanisms of curbing statutory power in a situation... 293 rect contradiction with a representative form of government but with a great probability its application could be destructive for the state. A. Esmein wrote accurately that it would be the most certain tool “to cause concern and the deepest cause destroying confidence to deliberating assemblies”50.

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Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.16 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Agnieszka Bień-Kacała1

Legal status of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces

Keywords: the Commander-in-Chief, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, headship Słowa kluczowe: Naczelny Dowódca Sił Zbrojnych, Siły Zbrojne Rzeczypospolitej Pol- skiej, zwierzchnictwo

Summary This article concerns the legal status of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces (Naczelny Dowódca Sił Zbrojnych). This is one of the most significant state -or gans for security that is nominated for a time of war. The main elements of his legal status were defined in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and elaborated in the statutory regulation. Pursuant to these documents this organ is subordinate to the Head of State and his functioning is defined during a war. His basic competences em- brace commanding of the Polish Armed Forces together with ensuring the co-operation of the subordinated forces with their allied counterparts in planning and conducting the military operations. He bears the constitutional responsibility for the violation of the Constitution and the statute. Nevertheless, this regulation is neither comprehensive nor holistic. The reason of this is the fact that some of its components require various rules of interpretation (e.g. neutrality concerning the political issues), whereas the other have not been regulated at all (e.g. the demands in respect to the candidates). For these reasons it was demanded to specify the legal status of the Command- er-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces.

1 The author is an Associate Professor in Department of Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law and Administration of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń and Maastricht Uni- versity. E-mail: [email protected]. 298 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Streszczenie

Pozycja prawna Naczelnego Dowódcy Sił Zbrojnych RP

Artykuł dotyczy pozycji prawnej Naczelnego Dowódcy Sił Zbrojnych. Jest to jeden z kluczowych dla bezpieczeństwa organ państwowy mianowany na czas wojny. Główne elementy pozycji prawnej tego organu zostały wskazane w Konstytucji RP oraz dopre- cyzowane w regulacji ustawowej. Jest to więc organ podległy głowie państwa, którego funkcjonowanie aktualizuje się w czasie wojny. Do jego podstawowych kompetencji należy dowodzenie Siłami Zbrojnymi RP oraz zapewnienie współdziałania podległych sił z siłami sojuszniczymi w planowaniu i prowadzeniu działań wojennych. Ponosi od- powiedzialność konstytucyjną za naruszenie konstytucji i ustawy. Niemniej jednak nie jest to regulacja kompleksowa i całościowa. Niektóre z cech wymagają bowiem zasto- sowania rozmaitych reguł wykładniczych (np. neutralność w sprawach politycznych), inne zaś nie zostały uregulowane w ogóle (np. wymagania w stosunku do kandyda- ta). W tym stanie rzeczy wysunięty został postulat w zakresie wyraźnego określenia pozycji prawnej NDSZ.

The position of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces (hereinafter ‘the NDSZ’) is not often analyzed in the context of constitutional and legal research. It is usually classified as potential because pursuant to Art. 134 Para. 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997, the NDSZ is nominated by the Polish President exclusively for the duration of the war. In order to make it happen the request of the Prime Minister is necessary. The Head of State can recall the NDSZ from his post in the same manner. In accordance with the further regulation, the competences of the NDSZ as well as the rules concerning his subordination to the constitutional authorities of the Republic of Poland are regulated by the statute. Moreover, this state authority bears the constitutional responsibility for violation of the Constitu- tion and the statutes. Thus, the basic characteristics of the NDSZ come directly from the constitutional lawmaker and specify the legal position of this Agnieszka Bień-Kacała • Legal status of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish... 299 state organ. Among them the following features can be selected: the NDSZ’s subordination to the constitutional organs of the Republic of Poland and the necessity to ascribe the competences to him. This makes it possible to consider the NDSZ as an “authority” specified by the Constitution. He is a subject appointed to a post for a defined special time, he is not a body characterised by the stable term of office and bears the responsibility of a political nature before the authorities involved in his appointment as well as constitutional liability before the Tribunal of State. Additionally, further characteristics could be reconstructed from the Basic Law, such as the requirement of political neutrality of the NDSZ and his civil subordination and democratic control (Art. 26), necessity of co-operation in the process of nominating the NDSZ and during fulfilling his duties (Preamble, Art. 134), as well as necessity of taking into account the efficiency of the activities of public institutions (Preamble). Undoubtedly, the NDSZ is an essential element of the Polish political system. This article will analyse the abovementioned basic characteristics making the legal status of the NDSZ.

II.

First of all it should be established whether the NDSZ fulfils the criteria (could be classified as) of a state authority. Traditionally, the following features decide about such a status: 1. the organizational separation (including specification of the various competences, function, structure and the institutional structure of the organ in the legal regulations); 2. assigning a range of competences (which should be strictly connected with the legally established functions of the organ); 3. legal personality (legal existence separate from the state); 4. ability to undertake ruling actions (resulting in a one-sided change of the legal standing of the addressees, causing widespread effects as well as a capacity to take non-ruling measures) and 5. specific rules of functioning (according to which the specific activity of the authorities (organs) is undertaken, e.g. the rule of law)2. Denotation of these features in the Constitution provides a basis for distinguishing categories of the constitutional state authori-

2 J. Trzciński, Pojęcie konstytucyjnego organu państwa socjalistycznego, Warszawa 1974, pp. 58–119. 300 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 ties. However, indicating an authority only by its name is not enough for the purpose of legal analysis. The conditions which shall be met by a subject to be classified as a state -au thority could be also reconstructed from the Constitutional Tribunal judgement of 26 March 19983. These are the following: a direct reference to the subject; identification him by the name; specifying his term of serving the duties; description of the way of his nomination; the organizational separation; clearly pronounced conferral of power as well as determining the relationship among this organ and other state authorities. The abovementioned requirements, and at least one of them, shall come directly from the legal regulations. According to the doctrinal terminology, state authorities shall be distinguished by executing of state power which has been given by the Nation4. The term “state authority” shall be identified with an “organ of the state power”. The conjunction of Art. 1, Art. 4 and Art. 10 of the Polish Constitution explains that the separation of powers has its source of power in the sovereign. It is generally accepted in the doctrine that Art. 10 is not closed in character. According to this assumption, there may function other organs, which have been entrusted with fulfilling a sector of state activities (The Commis- sioner for Citizens’ Rights, The National Council of Radio Broadcasting and Television, The National Council of the Judiciary). The Constitution names these organs by specifying at least the scope of their functions and formulating outlines of their legal positions. A state organ, on the other hand, shall be identified with the subjects subordinated to public authorities (e.g. administrative authority) and with the independent organs nominated (founded) under a statute (The Commissioner for Children’s Rights). Undoubtedly, in case of the NDSZ some of the elements pointed out in the doctrine and the jurisdiction were defined in the Constitution. Howev- er, the statutory regulation will be crucial when it comes to his competences exercised using ruling or non-ruling methods as well as the principle of subordination to the authorities of Poland. Taking into account the last con-

3 Sygn. akt K 17/98; R. Balicki, Glosa do wyroku Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 26 maja 1998 r. (sygn. akt K 17/98), “Przegląd Sejmowy” 1998, No. 4, p. 159. 4 More about the definitions A. Bień-Kacała, Z. Witkowski,O potrzebie redefinicji terminu „organ państwa”, [In:] W służbie dobru wspólnemu. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Januszowi Trzcińskiemu, eds. R. Balicki, M. Masternak-Kubiak, Warszawa 2012, pp. 404–410. Agnieszka Bień-Kacała • Legal status of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish... 301 clusion it becomes clear that the subject of interest shall not be considered in terms of independence. Because his subordination is a constitutional requirement, only details of such dependency shall be anticipated by the legislator. Thus, the legal status of the NDSZ has been regulated by the Consti- tution. Taking into account the subordinate feature, it may be assumed that this subject is a state organ.

III.

In respect to the legal position details of the NDSZ it should be noted that there are no requirements referring to this institution either on constitutional or statutory level. It seems to be partially justified by the special relationship of trust between the NDSZ and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (President) as well as by the subordination category. In this case an introduction of the objective requirements (such as Polish citizenship, education, military rank, experience or age) could lead to a significant limitation of the candidates for this position (subordinate to the Head of State) in extreme circumstances of wartime. On the other hand, failure to identify the requirements can lead to the politicization of the organ and to the threat of making significant defence decisions by a person having no adequate preparation and experience. Undoubtedly, situation of this kind could muscle in on the security of the state and the safety of the citizens. Currently the necessity of appointing a member of the armed forces on the interested position could be only indirectly concluded5. Thus, if the commander of this formation is concerned, he should be included in its composition. According to the current legal status a spectrum of qualifications required for a candidate for the professional soldier is stipulated the Act of 11 September 2003 on Professional Military Service6. The document states inter alia that a soldier professional shall be a person with the Polish citizenship, of good repute, whose loyalty to the Polish Republic is not in doubt, having appropriate qualifications and physical and mental ability to perform pro-

5 W. Sokolewicz, Wojsko i Konstytucja, Warszawa 2015, p. 184. 6 Art. 2 and 5 of the Act of 11 September 2003 on Professional Military Service (Dz.U. 2016, poz. 1726). 302 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 fessional military service. With regards to the constitutional regulation, the Polish citizenship requirement could be interpreted from the duty of loyalty to the Republic of Poland and concern for the common good (Art. 82 of the Constitution) as well as the duty to defend the Homeland (Art. 85 of the Constitution), which solely concern the Polish citizens. Pursuant to Art. 26 it could be concluded that a candidate shall remain neutral in respect to political matters, which can be certainly understood as prohibition of belonging to a political party. It seems that the lack of clearly specified requirements is a form of short- coming of the current legal situation. However, there are some constitutional and statutory elements enabling to reconstruct the desired characteristics of a candidate for the NDSZ position. Therefore, a precise statutory solution introduced in this scope is recommended.

IV.

It must be noticed that the organ is not appointed for a specific term of office. Moreover, his tenure is not related to the one of the Head of State or the Prime Minister either. However, it does not mean that the NDSZ is always present among the state authorities. It should be recalled that he is appointed for the wartime. In the peacetime his post is not filled and he does not fulfil the functions and competences ascribed to him. While in the office, he can be also replaced. Therefore, his post is not permanent. Appointment of the NDSZ is obligatory. The President does so on request of the Prime Minister. The recall of this subject should take place in the same manner7. It must be emphasized that the Head of State is essentially bound with the abovementioned request8. However, in the situation of lack of the recall motion, it is assumed that in case of exigency the President can act in- dependently9. The issues of a possibility of appointing another person on the

7 W. Skrzydło, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Warszawa 2013, p. 175. 8 B. Banaszak, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Warszawa 2009, pp. 668–669. 9 L. Wiśniewski, Stany nadzwyczajne w projekcie nowej Konstytucji RP, [In:] Prawa czło- wieka w sytuacjach nadzwyczajnych ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem prawa i praktyki polskiej, Agnieszka Bień-Kacała • Legal status of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish... 303 post and no appointing him at all despite the motion of Prime Minister also remain open. Naturally, in these cases the possible constitutional responsibility of the President may be considered. Nevertheless, this reveals the lack of a mechanism eliminating the results of a possible war crisis. Every nominating capability conducted in co-operation with the other political subject, in a situation of a serious threat to the Republic of Poland, can jeopardise operational (e.g. defensive) effectiveness. Taking this into account, an introduction of an automatic appointment to the NDSZ position could be considered, with the assumption of the possibility of a personal change during his term of office. With regards to the appointment of the NDSZ and the rules on his subordination to the constitutional organs of the Republic of Poland, the notion of “war” rises doubts10. In order to dispel them, at least partially, a specific arrangement was stipulated in Art. 4a (4a) of the Act of 21 November 1967 on Universal Obligation to Defend the Republic of Poland11. Pursuant to this article, in case of necessity to defend the state the President decides, on the motion of the Council of Ministers, on a day in which the period of war starts on the Polish territory. In the same way he decides on a day in which this period ends. Although this solution has already been regulated by the notions of state of war and martial law, it makes the whole situation more transparent. Moreover, Art. 17 of the Act of 29 August 2002 on the Polish Armed Forc- es Supreme Commander’s competence and his subordination to the state’s constitutional authorities12 specifies accurately a moment, in which the NDSZ takes control over the forces subordinate to him. As a rule, this happens when he becomes appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland. However, the Head of State can specify other date of assuming command, which must seems to be beneficial. The solution conducted ahead of the crisis, where the NDSZ is appointed beforehand seems to be also well-founded because then the subject is able to prepare himself to the implementation of the tasks he has been entrusted with. This approach can be found in Arts 5 and 5a of the Act on Universal Obligation to Defend the Republic of Poland. ed. T. Jasudowicz, Toruń 1997, p. 154. 10 More about this M. Sumański, Pojęcie „czas wojny” oraz problemy wynikające z jego niedo- określoności w polskim systemie prawnym, “Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe” 2014, No. II, pp. 95–109. 11 Dz.U. 2016, poz. 1534. 12 Dz.U. 2016, poz. 851. 304 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 According to these provisions, the President, being the Supreme Command- er of the Armed Forces, appoints a person to the NDSZ post, on request of the Prime Minister. This person prepares himself to the implementation of duties resulting from the NDSZ competences. This preparation encompasses especially participation in strategic games and defence exercises, planning to use the Armed Forces to defend the country and preparing military command system of the Armed Forces. However, in the abovementioned statutory regulations the reasons justi- fying the replacement of the NDSZ were not depicted, even such as a court’s conviction for a criminal offence, certain age or serious health complications. Thus, the statutory regulations should be supplemented in this scope.

The NDSZ’s competences shall be connected first and foremost with the aims of the Armed Forces identified in Art. 26 of the Constitution, namely with safeguarding independence of the state and its territorial integrity as well as ensuring the security and inviolability of its borders13. Nevertheless, the Con- stitution does not specify the duties of the NDSZ. However, the basic NDSZ’s competences are determined in Art. 16 of the Act on Martial Law. The most fundamental one is commanding the Armed Forces and other organisational entities that are subordinate to him in accordance with the national plans of using the Armed Forces to defend the state. It should be mainly focused on repelling an armed attack on the territory of the Republic of Poland and shall ensure the co-operation in planning and conducting war operations between the Armed Forces subordinate to him with the allied forces. The Su- preme Commander also specifies the needs of the Armed Forces in scope of supporting them by a non-military part of the state’s defence system. More- over, he appoints the military organs entrusted with the implementation of the tasks provided by the state and local governments in scope of the direct warfare and specifies their duties and competences.

13 With respect to the Armed Forces’ duties W.J. Wołpiuk, Siły zbrojne w regulacjach Kon- stytucji RP, Warszawa 1998, pp. 81–82 and A. Bień-Kacała, Siły Zbrojne RP – próba identyfikacji współczesnego celu funkcjonowania, [In:] Uniwersalny i regionalny wymiar ochrony praw człowie- ka. Nowe wyzwania – nowe rozwiązania, t. 2, ed. J. Jaskiernia, Warszawa 2014, pp. 394–404. Agnieszka Bień-Kacała • Legal status of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish... 305 The Act on Martial Law also indicates the request-driven competences of the NDSZ. According to Art. 10 (2) (5) and Art. 10 (2) (6) the President, on request of the NDSZ confirms the plans of the operational use of the Armed Forces and accepts the specified territories of the Republic of Poland as the spheres of direct military activities. He also puts forward a motion to the government regarding determination of the rules of operation of public authorities in the area of direct warfare. Additionally, Art. 76 of the Act on Univer- sal Obligation to Defend the Republic of Poland specifies the competences of the NDSZ concerning promotion to a higher rank during the mobilization and the wartime. Undoubtedly, it may be said that at this point the authoritative competences of the organ at stake emerge. Nevertheless, the scope of independence and autonomy of their execution is strictly limited. On one hand, the NDSZ is a subject to civil and democratic control as a member of the Armed Forces (Art. 26 of the Constitution), and on the other hand he is subordinate to the constitutional organs (Art. 134 Para 4). Without any doubt, this has a significant influence on performing competences by this organ. Additionally, it should be borne in mind that the construction of subordination to the organs of the Republic of Poland requires the co-operation in appointing the NDSZ and during executing by him the duties he has been entrusted with (Pream- ble, Art. 134)14. This might lead, especially during the wartime, to a collision with the value of the efficiency in the work of public bodies (Preamble).

VI.

The constitutional category of subordination was evaluated in the Act of 29 August 2002 on the Martial law and the Competences of the Command- er-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Rules of his Subordination to the Constitutional Authorities of the Republic of Poland. However, this statutory regulation is very limited. It was predicted in Art. 16 that the NDSZ is de-

14 More about this A. Bień-Kacała, M. Serowaniec, Dyrektywa współdziałania egzekutywy w świetle Konstytucji RP z 1997 r. Kilka przypadków z dziedziny spraw zagranicznych i bezpie- czeństwa państwa, [In:] Promĕny dĕlby moci. Dĕlba moci v ústavním systému České republiky a Polské republiky, eds. J. Jirásek a Z. Witkowski, Olomouc 2015, pp. 129–149. 306 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 pendent on the President. Thus, the constitutional subordination to the authorities was solely limited to the Head of State. However, this solution should be assessed positively due to the operational efficiency of public institutions in a specific crisis situation. This narrowly comprehended relationship of subordination should be based on the special relationship of trust between the parties. It should not lead to the politicisation of the NDSZ, mainly due to the political neutrality within the Armed Forces themselves. The problems might potentially arise in respect to the appointment competence, shared by the President and the Prime Minister. It follows from Art. 134 Para. 4 of the Constitution that the initiative in this field is at the discretion of the Prime Minister. This method is sometimes perceived as non-functional. The reason of this opinion lies in the fact that the co-operation may be very difficult during the wartime and might even lead to lack of possibility of appointing the NDSZ. All the more so, since the given creation mechanism may be also related to the NDSZ’s political accountability to the Prime Minister or the Head of State. In practice this may lead to imposing the relation of subordination of the NDSZ to the Premier. The concept of subordination of the NDSZ to the constitutional organs also encompasses the relationship of supremacy, leadership as well as civil and democratic control over the Armed Forces. It entails a large number of political organs involved. This situation may cause an impression of disorder or even a chaotic relation within the overall process. As an example, the Chief’s of the General Staff supportive function to the President that is equal in the chain of command to the NDSZ’s and the Operational Commander’s duties does not simplify the process of managing and leading during the wartime. All the more so that in accordance with Art. 5 of the Act on 14 December 1995 on the Office of the Minister of National -De fence, the Operational Commander and the General Commander of branches of the Armed Forces as well as the Chief of the General Staff remain accountable to the Minister of National Defence. Additionally, the situation becomes more complicated by the fact that, as the Supreme Commander, the President appoints the Chief of General Staff and the commanders of branches of the Armed Forces. These acts require the countersignature of the Prime Minister but the Minister of National Defence has no impact on filling the posts subordinate to him. Therefore, the reflection upon there Agnieszka Bień-Kacała • Legal status of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish... 307 lationships among the key organs and subjects ensuring the security of the Republic of Poland is necessary, especially in the spirit of efficiency of the public institutions. It should be also noticed that the function of the Presi- dent as the guarantor of the continuity of the state may justify the discount- ing of the Minister of National Defence regarding his supreme command of the Armed Forces, barring in mind the NDSZ’s competences. In this respect the statutory role of the President during the war has been specified. Pursuant to Art. 4a (4b) of the Act of 21 November 1967 on Universal Ob- ligation to Defend the Republic of Poland, the President, co-operating with the Council of Ministers, controls the state’s defence in the moment of appointment of the NDSZ and after assuming command by him. From this moment the supremacy over the Armed Forces passes to a lower and at the same time more definite level of relationship between the organs. At the same time the civil structures become flattened, which might be rated rather positively. During the legislative process it was stressed that this measure is acceptable pursuant to Art. 228 Para 3 of the Constitution stating statutory regulations for the principles for activity by organs of public authority in a period requiring extraordinary measures. However, it may seem that changes in this scope cannot lead to abolition of the constitutional role of the organs. Therefore, exercising defence by the Head of State should not abolish the constitutional role in this field devoted to the government but it requires the co-operation of the organs. This line of reasoning is strengthened by the fact that the government is an organ responsible for the domestic and foreign policy of the Polish Republic and it is presumed to have competence in respect to the state policy. Therefore, the statutory definition of the relationship between the NDSZ and the Head of State does not solve the problems, in terms of simplifying the system, which may arise in practice, especially in the period of cohabitation. Taking the abovementioned regulations into account, even defining subordination itself is hard. Thus, the main de lege ferenda postulate is a limitation of the number of subjects (of the relationship) in respect to the supremacy, commanding and leading the Armed Forces as well as the correlation with the subject of subordination. It should be emphasised that within the overall process the superior values are the efficiency of public bodies, the security of the state and its citizens and the defence of the Republic of Poland. 308 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 VII.

With regards to the NDSZ, two kinds of responsibilities can be established. The first one concerns the issues connected to the execution of his duties and the relations with the organs participating in appointing the NDSZ (therefore: the President and the Prime Minister). Because the reasons of the recall have not be predicted on either constitutional or statutory level, this type of responsibility may be compared to the political responsibility. Thus, if the NDSZ’s activities are not compatible with the political approach of the Presi- dent or the Prime Minister, the organ of interest may be dismissed. This form of responsibility also refers to the specific relationship of trust towards the NDSZ, especially from the Head of State. The constitutional responsibility, on the other hand, is bound with committing a constitutional delict15. The definition of this notion is included in Art. 3 of the Act of 26 March 1982 on the Tribunal of State16. Accord- ing to this provision the constitutional responsibility regards activities of the persons listed in the Act, including the NDSZ. Consequently, a constitutional delict means individual acts and omissions that take place in connection with the occupied positions (acts beyond the range of the competence committed on no legal grounds, but possible because of the occupied position) or within the frames of holding an office (acts within the competence, but violating the law)17. These acts are official, committed while -per forming a function or holding an office. Accountability includes culpable actions and omissions, both intentional and unintentional18. The resolution of the Tribunal of State (June 10, 1998 – TS ZP-1/98) is essential in connection with the interpretation of the term “culpability”. According to the res-

15 A. Bień-Kacała, Trybunał Stanu, [In:] Prawo konstytucyjne, eds. Z. Witkowski, A. Bień-Kacała, Toruń 2015, pp. 533–535 and A. Bień-Kacała, The Tribinal of State and constitutional accountability in Poland, “Annales Universitatis Apulensis, Series Jurisprudentia” 2014, No. 17, pp. 18–19. 16 Dz.U. Nr 101, poz. 925. 17 B. Naleziński, Trybunał Stanu, [In:] Prawo konstytucyjne RP, ed. P. Sarnecki, Warszawa 1999, p. 366. 18 M. Filar, Niektóre węzłowe problemy orzecznictwa Trybunału Stanu III Rzeczypospolitej, [In:] Ze sztandarem prawa przez świat, eds. R. Tokarczyk, K. Motyka, Zakamycze 2002, pp. 60–68. Agnieszka Bień-Kacała • Legal status of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish... 309 olution, constitutional accountability applies to the persons listed in the Act on the Tribunal of State who violate the Constitution or other act (statute), both intentionally and unintentionally. Having no intention to violate the Constitution or an act/statute, they commit such a violation as a result of lack of caution required in given circumstances, even though they predicted or, exercising reasonable care, could have predicted the possibility of committing the violation. The discussed category of acts has to consist in violation of the Constitu- tion or an act/statute. It does not apply to a penal act due to the fact that violation of such an act results in criminal accountability and not in constitutional accountability. A constitutional delict may also take on a form of violation of lawmaking acts equal in normative rank to an act/statute or taking precedence over it. Such an accountability is also permissible in connection with violation of customary international law19. It is assumed that violation of the law of lower rank (e.g. regulation, resolution or order) does not result in constitutional accountability. Thus the constitutional delict is perceived formal- ly20. Negative consequences of the law violation are not required to enforce accountability. The violation itself is sufficient. In respect to the NDSZ, the constitutional responsibility shall regard the activities or omissions related to the statutory competences of this organ. An example might be an omission to command the Armed Forces or commanding these forces for the purposes other than defending the state. A constitutional delict might also be a failure to ensure co-operation of the subordinate Armed Forces with the allied forces in planning and conducting military operations. Legal emplacement of this organ, could possibly cause a violation of the constitutional rules of subordination to the state authorities, political neutrality or the conducted actions that are incompatible with the duties of the Armed Forces in scope of protection of the state independence and the integrity of its territory as well as ensuring the security and inviolability of its borders. Of course, this listing is only exemplary.

19 Sokolewicz W., Artykuł 156. Uwaga 14, [In:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, t. 1, ed. L. Garlicki, Warszawa 2001, p. 8. 20 K. Działocha, T. Zalasiński, Artykuł 198, [In:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, t. 5, ed. L. Garlicki, Warszawa 2007, p. 2. 310 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 VIII.

In the conclusion it should be emphasized that the NDSZ is a constitutional state organ. The main elements of the legal position of this body were determined in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and further elaborated in the statutory regulation. Nevertheless, this is not a complex and comprehensive regulation. Some of the points require the application of various interpretational rules (such as political neutrality), whereas the other have not been regulated at all (e.g. requirements that must be met by a candidate and the reasons for the recall). Therefore, the clear determination of the legal position of the NDSZ is demanded.

Literature

Balicki R., Glosa do wyroku Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 26 maja 1998 r. (sygn. akt K 17/98), “Przegląd Sejmowy” 1998, No. 4. Banaszak B., Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Warszawa 2009. Bień-Kacała A., Serowaniec M., Dyrektywa współdziałania egzekutywy w świetle Kon- stytucji RP z 1997 r. Kilka przypadków z dziedziny spraw zagranicznych i bezpieczeńst- wa państwa, [In:] Promĕny dĕlby moci. Dĕlba moci v ústavním systému České republiky a Polské republiky, eds. J. Jirásek a Z. Witkowski, Olomouc 2015. Bień-Kacała A., Siły Zbrojne RP – próba identyfikacji współczesnego celu funkcjonowania, [In:] Uniwersalny i regionalny wymiar ochrony praw człowieka. Nowe wyzwania – nowe rozwiązania, t. 2, ed. J. Jaskiernia, Warszawa 2014. Bień-Kacała A., The Tribinal of State and constitutional accountability in Poland, “An- nales Universitatis Apulensis, Series Jurisprudentia” 2014, No. 17. Bień-Kacała A., Trybunał Stanu, [In:] Prawo konstytucyjne, eds. Z. Witkowski, A. Bień-Ka- cała, Toruń 2015. Bień-Kacała A., Witkowski Z., O potrzebie redefinicji terminu „organ państwa”, [In:] W służbie dobru wspólnemu. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Januszo- wi Trzcińskiemu, eds. R. Balicki, M. Masternak-Kubiak, Warszawa 2012. Działocha K., Zalasiński T., Artykuł 198, [In:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Ko- mentarz, t. 5, ed. L. Garlicki, Warszawa 2007. Filar M., Niektóre węzłowe problemy orzecznictwa Trybunału Stanu III Rzeczypospolitej, [In:] Ze sztandarem prawa przez świat, eds. R. Tokarczyk, K. Motyka, Zakamycze 2002. Naleziński B., Trybunał Stanu, [In:] Prawo konstytucyjne RP, ed. P. Sarnecki, Warsza- wa 1999. Agnieszka Bień-Kacała • Legal status of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish... 311 Skrzydło W., Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Warszawa 2013. Sokolewicz W., Artykuł 156. Uwaga 14, [In:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Ko- mentarz, t. 1, ed. L. Garlicki, Warszawa 2001. Sokolewicz W., Wojsko i Konstytucja, Warszawa 2015. Sumański M., Pojęcie „czas wojny” oraz problemy wynikające z jego niedookreśloności w polskim systemie prawnym, “Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe” 2014, No. II. Trzciński J., Pojęcie konstytucyjnego organu państwa socjalistycznego, Warszawa 1974. Wiśniewski L., Stany nadzwyczajne w projekcie nowej Konstytucji RP, [In:] Prawa człow- ieka w sytuacjach nadzwyczajnych ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem prawa i praktyki polskiej, ed. T. Jasudowicz, Toruń 1997. Wołpiuk W.J., Siły zbrojne w regulacjach Konstytucji RP, Warszawa 1998.

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.17 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Mariusz Jabłoński1

The authorized entity to perform the constitutional right of public information access – remarks on the grounds of the judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of December 2nd 2015 (SK36/14)

Keywords: public information, access to public information, the constitutional right of access to public information, be entitled to exercise the right of access to public information; entitled to lodge a constitutional complaint Słowa kluczowe: informacja publiczna, dostęp do informacji publicznej, konstytucyjne prawo dostępu do informacji publicznej, uprawniony do realizacji prawa dostępu do informacji publicznej; uprawniony do wniesienia skargi konstytucyjnej Summary The analysis contained in the subject matter article focuses on two linked matters, which is the detailed description of the entitled one to perfom the constiutional right to access public information and the evaluation of the judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of December 2nd (SK 36/14), in which it claimed that the constitutional protection of the right to access public information (article 61 of the Polish Constitution) is exclusively reserved for the benefit of citizens. Streszczenie Uprawniony do realizacji konstytucyjnego prawa dostępu do informacji publicznej – uwagi na tle postanowienia Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z 2 grudnia 2015 r. (SK 36/14)

Analiza zawarta w przedmiotowym artykule koncentruje się na dwóch powiązanych ze sobą zagadnieniach, tzn. sprecyzowaniu uprawnionego do realizacji konstytucyjnego prawa dostępu

1 The author is a Professor in Department of Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law, Ad- ministration and Economic Uniwersity of Wroclaw. E-mail: [email protected]. 314 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 do informacji publicznej oraz ocenie postanowienia Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z 2 grudnia 2015 r. (SK 36/14), w którym stwierdził on, że konstytucyjna ochrona prawa dostępu do informacji publicznej (art. 61 Konstytucji RP) zastrzeżona jest wyłącznie na rzecz obywateli.

On December 2nd 2015 the Constitutional Tribunal issued a judgement in which in 2015, it dismissed the proceedings in terms of the constitutional complaint filed by one of the existing associations in Poland, claiming in its complaint the discrepancy of art. 4 sec. 1 of the Access to Public Information Act of September 6th 2001 (later referred to as: a.p.i.a.)2, with the content of art. 61 sec. 1 and 2 of the Polish Constitution of April 2nd 19973. Leaving aside the analysis of the actual state – the situation concerned the acknowledgement of a deputy as obliged to release public information on the basis of a.p.i.a.4 – I would like to focus on the by the Tribunal’s presented manner of materialization of the authorized one to perform the constitutional right guaranteed within in the content of art. 61 of the Polish Constitution, and consequently – also a legitimate one to file a constitutional complaint concerning his security. In its regulation, the Constitutional Tribunal claimed that the “right to access public information was secured in art. 61 of the Constitution for the benefit of the

2 The Access to Public Information Act of September 6th 2001, J.L. 2015 No. 2058 with changes. 3 The Polish Constitution of April 2nd 1997, J.L. No. 78, item 483 with changes. 4 It would be worth here, to raise that in art. 61 sec. 1 of the Polish Constitution, a person performing a public function is directly pointed as the one, from whom it is possible to efficiently request information. A matter, which definitely requires a deeper analysis is, whether it is about a constitutionally defined source (different than those, that were pointed in sec. 2 art. 61), or whether reference is made directly about the obliged one to share particular information. Administrative courts stated that a member of Parliament “is not an entity performing public authority”, he cannot be equated with entities performing public tasks, he is not included in public administration, which leads to the conclusion that the performance of a member of Parliament is not subject to cognition of administrative courts (compare: Ruling of the Re- gional Administrative Court of Warsaw of November 29th 2013, SO/Wa 92/13 and the Ruling of the National Administrative Court of February 14th 2014, I OZ 91/14). Mariusz Jabłoński • The authorized entity to perform the constitutional right... 315 citizens. This regulation [...] does not have a coincidental meaning. The close connection to the right to obtain information about authorities and people performing public funtions with the rule of the sovereignety of the nation and voting rights for public authorities held only by Polish citizens should be noticed [...]. The right of public information access, reserved only for citizens, is perceived as an instrument enabling the use of remaining, reserved rights for the group, political rights, for example voting rights. It does not mean that the legislator cannot exceed the personal scope of this right for all interested entities, although the provision of the Constitution fully performs its liability function, pointing minimal standard of protection of the citizens’ political rights. Therefore, the Tribunal states that the constitutional right of public information access is reserved only for “citizens” being natural persons, holding a Polish citizenship. This means that an association does not have the right to file a constitutional complaint, concerning this law”5. Such a statement seems to be in line with the one, which was presented during works of the Constitutional Commission of the National Assembly, where it was underlined, from one side “in reference to human rights in the Constitution we utilize two motions: the first one being the “citizen”, when we mean a Polish citizen. The second motion “each” is utilized in reference to a human being”6, whereas on the other side – directly towards the constitutional right defined in art. 61 of the Polish Constitution: “Each word [...] was thoroughly deliberated. The personal scope of this provision has been limited to citizens, as not everyone possesses the right to obtain information about the performance of public authorities in our country. Such a right is exclusively reserved for citizens. The subject matter information [...] cannot be full as there are some requirements of state and economical secrets, as the determined requirements to conduct state activities, which do not allow for full transparency of the public administration’s actions”7. It should also be underlined that despite different suggestions claimed during the works of the Commision by social entities8, it was determined that the law contained in art. 61 of the Constitution, lying within the

5 A judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of December 2015, SK 6/14. 6 Bulletin of the Constitutional Commission of the National Assembly, 1994, No. XII, p. 80. 7 Bulletin of the Constitutional Commission of the National Assembly 1995, No. XVI, Warsaw 1995, p. 59. 8 About this subject, cf.: T. R. Aleksandrowicz, Komentarz do ustawy o dostępie do informacji publicznej, Warszawa 2008, p. 122. 316 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 part of regulations grouping freedom and political rights, due to its character, should be limited for the benefit of a Polish citizen. That is why it was not -de cided to name the entitled one as “everybody” or “each person”. The quoted arguments and facts seem to be clear, legible and also sufficient to claim that the statement of the Constitutional Tribunal is logical and it fully reflects the specificity of defining the personal scope of the constitutional complaint and what is linked to it, the materialization of the legitimate one to demand granting protection based on the constitutionally defined personal right9, who is only the Polish citizen in case of access to public information10. Despite such a clear documented statement it is necessary to point some arguments, the analysis of which will enable a different grasp of defining who is entitled to perform the constitutional right to access public information, as well as the way of identifying the holder to quote the content of article 61 of the Constitution, in the scope of performing the constitutional complaint (art. 79 of the Polish Constitution), and the same way to apply for effective protection of this personal right.

II.

In the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal (SK 36/14) it was explicitly confirmed that the entitled one to perform, and also protect the law – through performance with the constitutional complaint – is only a natural person being at the same time a Polish citizen. People being foreigners and also oth-

9 Cf.: M. Kłopocka-Jasińska, R. Balicki, Zakres podmiotowy skargi konstytucyjnej – wybrane problemy, [In:] Skarga konstytucyjna. Zagadnienia teorii i praktyki, ed. K. Urbaniak, Poznań 2015, p. 39 et seq.; K. Urbaniak, Model polskiej skargi konstytucyjnej na tle porównawczym, cf. p. 28 et seq.; S. Jarosz-Żukowska, Prawo do skargi konstytucyjnej – stan obecny i postulaty de lege ferenda, [In:] Realizacja i ochrona konstytucyjnych wolności i praw jednostki w polskim porządku prawnym, ed. M. Jabłoński, Wrocław 2014, p. 829 and p. 829 et seq. 10 L. Garlicki, who commented chapter II of the Polish Constitution of April 2nd 1997 and underlined that: “freedoms and rights were distinguished, the subject of which can be each person, from the freedoms and rights which are restricted solely for Polish citizens. This distinction is justified by the terminology of each of the provisions of chapter II, as they usually utilize the notions “each”, “every”, “nobody” which excludes their reference only to the situation of citizens, L. Garlicki, Rozdział II Wolności, prawa i obowiązki człowieka i obywatela, [In:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, T. III, ed. L. Garlicki, Warszawa 2003, p. 6. Mariusz Jabłoński • The authorized entity to perform the constitutional right... 317 er legal entities, legal persons and other organizational entities with no legal personality do not possess such a right. While analyzing the content of art. 61 of the Polish Constitution, we come to the conclusions that it contains a personal right which defines: –– very narrowly the entitled one (a citizen), –– broadly (a public authority entity, people performing public functions, professional or business organization bodies and other people and organizational entities in the scope in which they perform public authority tasks, as well as manage municipal property or assets of the Treasury) obliged (section 1), –– sources (documents, sessions), –– ways of performance (access to documents and access to sessions of collegial organs arising from general elections linked to the possibility to record voice or video – section 2), –– rules and premises of its limitation (statutory limitations based on the following premises: protection of freedoms and rights of other people andbusiness entities, as well as public order, safety or an important economic interest – section 3), –– distinction of the informative duty performance by particular obliged ones – in this case representative organs that are: the Polish Senate and Sejm – section 4)11. The analysis of content of the solutions expressed in art. 61 of the Consti- tution does not create an explicit base enabling to name the right contained therein as a right of public informationaccess. Generally, it enables the statement that some rights were contained therein, which can be performed jointly or separately by the entitled one. The following ones are: –– the right to obtain information about the performance of public authority organs, –– the right to obtain information about the performance of people hold- ingpublic functions, –– the right to obtain information about the performance of economic and vocational self-governments, and other people and organizational

11 M. Jabłoński, Udostępnianie informacji publicznej w formie wglądu do dokumentu, Wrocław 2013, p. 27 et seq. 318 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 entities in the scope in which they perform public authority tasks as well as manage municipal property or Treasury. Taking into account the aforementioned, it is not surprising that in the first commenting works to this article of the Polish Constitution we do not find the motion of “distinctive right to inform about the performance of public authority organs12 – state and municipal ones and also people performing public functions13, or the “right of information about the performance of public authority organs as well as people performing public functions”14. In practice, only the passing of a bill about the access to public information enables to form the practice and identification of the right to access public information with the right contained in art. 61 of the Constitution. It should alsobe assumed that the statutory extension of the entitled one to perform the right to access public information (art. 2 sec. 1 a.p.i.a.) was a consequence of acceptance by the legislator that the essence of this right requires the guarantee of its performance not only for a Polish citizen. Taking into account the rule of public life openness, transparency and clarity of the state, its organs and people performing public functions, omitting of legal persons, and even wider different kinds of social organizations, whose statutory aim is the control of performance relevance of public institutions, is linked to the necessity of further extension of the notion of the entitled one and to eliminate the necessity to point by each interested entity – in terms of performance of this law – the legal or factual interest (art. 2 sec. 2 a.p.i.a.). Taking into account the fact that on the grounds of current regulations of the Polish Constitution of April 2nd 1997 there are no negative premises eliminating the admissibility of the statutory extension of the personal scope of law, which is mentioned in its article 61, a statutory definition of the entitled one is fully justified and desired15.

12 I. Lipowicz, Komentarz do art. 61 Konstytucji, [In:] Konstytucje Rzeczypospolitej oraz komentarz do Konstytucji RP z 1997 roku, ed. J. Boć, Wrocław 1998, p. 115. 13 P. Winczorek, Komentarz do Konstytucji RP z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r., Warszawa 2000, p. 83. 14 W. Skrzydło, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. Komentarz, Zakamycze 1998, p. 57. 15 M. Bernaczyk, Obowiązek bezwnioskowego udostępniania informacji publicznej, War- szawa 2008, pp. 46–50. Mariusz Jabłoński • The authorized entity to perform the constitutional right... 319 Also, in the jurisdiction it is confirmed that the notion “each” should be understood as “natural persons, legal persons and organizational entities without the legal capacity, for example social organizations”16. Taking into account the aforementioned, it seems justified to divide the constitutional right to obtain information about the performance of state organs, other entities and public persons from the statutory right to access public information, which would consequently be equal to the full approval of the statement expressed in the content of the regulation of the Constitution- al Tribunal of December 2nd 2015. However, it should be mentioned that in the Polish Constitution of April 2nd 1997, we observe a diversity of categories of the entitled one not only due to the use of notions “citizen” and “human being – each”, but what can have a significant meaning, the legislator also uses amaterialization of the notion “Polish citizen”17. Obviously, we can assume that the reference of the legislator to the adjective “Polish” together with the notion “citizen” is performed only to underline a specific category of freedoms and political rights, which is being justified by the constitutional point of view that the superior authority belongs to the sovereign (the Nation) has clear justification, while clarifying that the power does not belong to everyone but only to Polish citizens. On the other hand, if we assume that the reference to the notion “citizen” is generally identified only with the entitled one, who is the Polish citizen, the division in the Polish Con- stitution of liberties and human rights and liberties and rights of a “citi-

16 Obviously in case of legal persons and other entities, there needs to be relevant representation, see: judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of September 19th 2007, I OSK 1680/06. A matter which raises doubts is whether the entitled one needs to identify himself with legal capacity. The problem generally does not arise on the Surface of non-request sharing of public information. Access thereto is granted to everyone, with no exceptions. Discrepan- cies in literature in terms of the statement, standing for the necessity to possess legal capacity (M. Bar, A. Piskorz-Ryń) and contrary (M. Bar, A. Piskorz-Ryń) was presented in the work of A. Kowalska, Wymóg formalny opatrzenia wniosku o udzielenie informacji publicznej podpisem a status postępowania w sprawie udzielenia tej informacji, Przegląd Prawa Publicznego, 2012, No. 10, pp. 44–45. 17 M. Jabłoński, Problem zdefiniowania podmiotu wolności i praw w Konstytucji RP – wybrane zagadnienia, [In:] Konieczne i pożądane zmiany Konstytucji RP z 2 kwietnia 1997 roku, eds. B. Banaszak, M. Jabłoński, Wrocław 2010, p. 225 et seq. 320 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 zen” and “Polish citizen”, can rise justified interpretation doubts, similar to those which characterized the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic remaining in force and being current up to October 17th 1997. What is more, there may be justified doubts if the notion “citizen” was identified during the works of the Con- stitutional Commission of the National Assembly with citizens of these countries that were the signatories of particular agreements, binding for the Republic of Poland18. Taking the aforementioned into consideration, it is worth mentioning that Poland is bound by a range of provisions of international agreements, from which the obligation to access information arises, together with access to public information19, not only by a person who is liked to a particular country

18 M. Jabłoński, Zasada zróżnicowania zakresu realizacji konstytucyjnych wolności i praw jednostki w oparciu o kryterium obywatelstwa polskiego, [In:] Wolności i prawa jednostki w Kon- stytucji RP, T. I Idee i zasady przewodnie konstytucyjnej regulacji wolności i praw jednostki w RP, ed. M. Jabłoński, Warszawa 2010, pp. 537–539. 19 M. Bernaczyk, Funkcja prawa do informacji w polskim porządku prawnym, [In:] Re- alizacja i ochrona konstytucyjnych wolności i praw jednostki w polskim porządku prawnym, ed. M. Jabłoński, Wrocław 2014, p. 371 et seq.; idem, Prawo do informacji w Polsce i na świecie, Warszawa 2014, p. 83 et seq. It also needs to be underlined that in the European Union, in 1993, based on a decision of the Council concerning public access to documents (Council Decision No. 93/731 of December 20th), a document register was established, to which all interested ones had access. The exclusion of a particular document could only be performed through a decision. In 1994 a similar decision was performed by the Council which concerned public access to its documents (Council Decision No. 94/90 of February 8th 1994). Council Regulation No. 1049/2001, despite entering into force in June 2001 was started to be utilized since December 2001. The provisions of the regulation supplement the internal regulations of the institution: Council Decision 2004/338/WE, Commission Decision 2001/937 and article 97 of the regulations of the European Parliament. The informative status of an entity was determined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In art. 11 thereof, it is clearly underlined that everyone has the right to freedom of expression ,which includes the freedom to possessing views and receiving and forwarding information and ideas without the interference of public authorities and regardless to national borders. Regardless of the approval of this fundamental right of the entity, the Chart guarantees the Union citizen and also every other human being and legal entity, residing or conducting business registered in a Member State, the right to access information concerning the European Parliament, The Council and Commission (art. 42). The Chart also guarantees the freedom of the media and their pluralism (art. 11 sec. 2). In this provision, the possibility to perform the right to access information by legal persons, whose performance aims to obtain and share information, is confirmed. Mariusz Jabłoński • The authorized entity to perform the constitutional right... 321 through a citizen bond but also any other one, including the one by a legal person or entities with no legal personality. Assuming that the reference to the notion “citizen” in the Polish Consti- tution is consequent and coherent, we generally challenge the equality of personal protection at least in the scope of social security (article 67 of the Polish Constitution), the specificity of which does not solely rely on the citizenship20, criteria, but mutual obligations which occur between the entity (secured one) and the state (the securing one). Moreover, taking into account the fact that the entitled one to perform constitutional rights such as the freedom of meetings (art. 57 of the Constitution), freedom of association (art. 58 of the Con- stitution), freedom to conduct business (art. 20 and 22 of the Constitution), freedom of media together with the freedom to express opinions and obtain, and distribute information (guaranteed by the ban of implementing preven- tive censorship – art. 14 together with art. 54 of the Polish Constitution)21 and rights, that is the right to file petitions, complaints and motions (art. 63 of the Polish Constitution)22, the right to obtain information about the condition and environmental protection (art. 74 section 3 of the Polish Consti- tution)23, or even the right of ownership (art. 64 of the Polish Constitution) is everyone, not only the citizens, but also foreigners, and other legal enti- ties24 – it is hard to justify that its full performance will be possible without

20 This took place during the works on the content of art. 67 of the Polish Constitution, cf.: R. Wieruszewski, Pozycja ustrojowa cudzoziemca, azylanta i uchodźcy – założenia konstrukcyjne i praktyka prawna, [In:] Wolność i prawa jednostki oraz ich gwarancje w praktyce, ed. L. Wiśniewski, Warszawa 2006, p. 26 et seq. 21 J. Sobczak, Prawo prasowe. Komentarz (komentarz do art. 1), System informacji prawnej LEX 2008; M. Sakowska-Baryła, Dostęp do informacji publicznej a ochrona danych osobowych, Wrocław 2014, p. 22 et seq. 22 Teoretyczne i praktyczne aspekty realizacji prawa petycji, eds. R. Balicki, M. Jabłoński, Wrocław 2015, with specific regard to work of M. Masternak-Kubiak and P. Kuczma,Prawo petycji jako prawo podmiotowe (aspekt podmiotowy i przedmiotowy), p. 267 et seq. and M. Ber- naczyka, Uprawniony i zobowiązany. Redefinicja czy konkretyzacja, p. 389 et seq. 23 B. Rakoczy, Ustawa o udostępnianiu informacji o środowisku i jego ochronie, udziale społeczeństwa w ochronie środowiska oraz o ocenach oddziaływania na środowisko. Komentarz, LexisNexis 2010. 24 As it was underlined by judge P. Tuleja in his separate statement to the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of December 2nd 2015: “Everyone” in the Constitution may also mean a legal person, as long as the content of each freedom or constitutional right determines that 322 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 the simultaneous warranty to the beneficiaries equivalent protection to access public information. As it was noticed by the Constitutional Tribunal “article 61 of the Polish Constitution concerning the right to information contains in its content the right to request information about the functioning of public institutions, mainly the institution of public authorities. It relates to information concerning current proceedings within one institution and delegated tasks, the process of their performance and investments or organized tenders”25. In this statement, it not only clearly underlines the political character of this right, which is being performed on many surfaces of the current activity of various entities, on the economic and social surface directly relating to rules defining the functioning in Poland of the social market economy rule, assuming cooperation of social partners, who are not only natural persons being Polish citizens. Without access to information being in the possession of relevant organs and public institutions (including entities performing public tasks and managing communal assets or Treasury) the performance of the aforementioned freedoms and rights can become only partial (for example in the scope of planning to start developing business in the situation of lack of information concerning current expenses of public resources, similarly to the scope of information concerning the managing of public assets, or the way of managing public affairs in a wide scope of meaning), which consequently weakens the concept of constitutional protection of freedom and rights of an entity understood as an entirety instead of a sum of separate and autonomous warranties26. In this place, the performance of this right is possible also by legal persons. A classic example is the right of property protection, expressed in article 61 section 1 of the Constitution, which refers to natural and legal persons. Additionally, it needs to be mentioned that the object of constitutional rights can also be a subject, which is not a natural, nor a legal person. An example thereof is an ordinary association being subject of the freedom to associate, expressed in article 58 section 1 of the Constitution. The scope of the notion “each” is jointly determined by the content of each constitutional right, its manner of performance and function, which this right performed in the Constitution”. 25 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of March 20th 2006, K 17/05. 26 At the same time, it is worth mentioning that democracy needs to be immanently linked to the existence of the warranty of transparency of public life, identified with the existence of real openness and transparence warranties of the functioning of the state apparatus and all related people thereof, who perform a public function. This openness and transparency in practice, has to ensure the possibility to firstly obtain information and then (potentially) ob- Mariusz Jabłoński • The authorized entity to perform the constitutional right... 323 it seems worth underlining that the Constitutional Tribunal itself defined “civil society” as a “society of free, aware, active and dedicated citizens in public affairs”, who can organize themselves “in various organizational structures”. Referring to the constitutional warranties of action and organizing freedom, the Tribunal stated that “the frames of the civil society are contained in provisions of art. 11–13 of the Constitution, with special consideration of art. 12”, underlining the role of not only political parties but also other structures of public life27. Bearing in mind the aforementioned, it seems that the introduction of a rigid criteria of Polish citizenship in terms of the identification of the entitled one according to the content of article 61 section 1 of the Polish Constitution has no further justification – of course, except the legible but doubtful linguistic interpretation – and it seems to defy the fundamental right to obtain information about the public organs’ performance and people performing public functions. Moreover, it doubtfully varies the rights of not only those natural persons, that do not hold such citizenship, but also other legal entities, that would like to efficiently and fully perform the above mentioned constitutional freedoms and rights. In case of foreigners and other legal entities, this information may have the same meaning in the scope of functioning, developing and planning their tasks. Assuming an explicit division of freedoms and rights, that can be performed by the citizen and common ones, which everybody can rely on, requires the reference to the matter of the addressee of the law – in this case the right to access public information – can be a legal person or an organizational entity with no legal capacity. The most part of state constitutions directly point at the addressee of guaranteed rights and freedoms, who is a human being and a citizen. Generally, only as an exception we can observe a solution, where we see particular pointing of other entities (generally for example: Germany – article 19 of the Polish Constitution, tain knowledge not only about the subject, which is the subject of the performance of different organs, but the identification of results of each kind of settlements (and also lack thereof). This warranty may not only be restricted for the benefit of a citizen. 27 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of May 27th 2003, OTK ZU Nr 5/A/2003, item 14, which is confirmed in literature concerning constitutional law, cf.: A. Łabno,Partie polityczne a proces kształtowania się społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Rozważania na tle sytuacji w Polsce w latach 1989–2002, [In:] Prawne aspekty funkcjonowania partii politycznych w pań- stwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, eds. A. Domańska, K. Skotnicki, Łódź 2003, p. 38. 324 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 or Portugal – art. 12 sec. 2, particular: for example Poland – art. 70 sec. 5). The constitutional realization of the addressee’s freedoms and rights generally does not tolerate appeals to the notions “each human being”, “every person”. It usually relies on the following notions: “every human” or “every person”. It is usually based on the use of the following notions “citizen, each, everybody, nobody”. The problems of interpretation thereof lead to the establishment of doubts if the addressees of constitutional freedoms and rights are solely natural persons or also legal persons, and other entities – organizational bodies with no legal capacity? Within the scope of this matter, there are several statements presented. The first one excludes the possibility to rely on constitutional freedoms and rights of a human being and citizen by legal persons and other private law bodies. In the justification thereof, it is underlined that the entities have a solely institutional character, their functioning relies on distinct rules of law, that also influence relevant procedures and mechanisms of the protection of their rights. The second group of views rather focuses on the statements according to which the possibility of relying on guaranteed freedoms and rights by legal persons (organizational entities with no legal capacity) is acknowledged, having regard to the protection of natural persons establishing or being included within those legal entities. De facto the entity (or a group thereof) is protected instead of a legal person as a separate legal entity. In a wider scope it is assumed that other than natural persons of private law may, with no exceptions, use individual constitutional rights, provided that it does not arise directly therefrom,that they may only be performed by a human being28 (for example the right of life, freedom of conscience, freedom of creative work or personal data protection)29.

28 J. Trzciński, Zakres podmiotowy skargi konstytucyjnej, [In:] Skarga konstytucyjna, ed. J. Trzciński, Warszawa 2000, p. 52 et seq. In the judgment of June 8th 1999, SK 12/98, the Tri- bunal underlined that this kind of solution “is not only an intention to strengthen the position of legal persons, but a pursuit to intensify the protection of entities, that basically constitute a legal person (in case of corporation legal persons), or they utilize its performance (in case of company legal persons). A part of the rights and freedoms constitutionally guaranteed to natural persons, by its definition, can be performed through other entities, created thereby, and granting a constitutional complain to them does not aim to strengthen the position such natural persons”. 29 P. Czarny, Konstytucyjne podstawy prawnej regulacji stosunków prywatnoprawnych w Polsce (na tle koncepcji oddziaływania praw konstytucyjnych oraz obowiązku ochrony tych praw Mariusz Jabłoński • The authorized entity to perform the constitutional right... 325 It is also worth mentioning the interpretational doubts accompanying the recognition that particular public law entities (and particularly public pro- viders) are entitled to appear with a constitutional complaint concerning the protection of constitutional freedoms and rights. 30As it is underlined in academic literature – recently – The Constitutional Tribunal modified its previous, rigorous statement, according to which such entities have absolutely no legitimacy to file a constitutional complaint31. As it is pointed in academic literature – “It is relevant to expect from a final guarantor of rights and free- przez państwo, [In:] Oddziaływanie współczesnych konstytucji na stosunki między podmiotami prywatnymi, Kraków 2015, p. 171 et seq.; and also works contained in the book called: Sądy i trybunały wobec problemu horyzontalnego działania praw jednostki, ed. M. Florczak-Wątor, Kraków 2015. 30 P. Tuleja, Skarga konstytucyjna w Polsce – dziesięć lat doświadczeń, Przegląd Legisla- cyjny 2007, No. 3(61), p. 29 et seq.; A. Krzywoń, Zdolność skargowa publicznych podmiotów gospodarczych w postępowaniu przed Trybunałem Konstytucyjnym, “Państwo i Prawo” 2014, No. 11, p. 32 et seq. 31 It mainly concerns the judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of December 20th 2007, SK 67/05 in which it referred to two criteria: estate: “The crucial [...] element diversifying the position of private entities from “state and other public institutions” is the material base of the performed business activity, and the acknowledgement of estate criteria as a base to distinguish public economic entities – whose activity is based on public estate – from private business entities, whose activity is based on personal estate, it is fully justified” and also in the functional criteria “in reference to the definition of a public entrepreneur contained in European Union legal acts (The Commission Directive 89/723/EEC of June 25th 1980 of financial transparency inside particular entrepreneurships, EU Journal of Laws L 195 of July 19th 1980, p. 35 et seq. the Commission Directive 2006/111/WE of November 16th 2006 of financial transparency among Member States and public business entrepreneurships, and also in terms of financial transparency inside particular entrepreneurships, EU Journal of Laws L 318 of November 17th 2006, p. 17 et seq.) and repeated in the act of September 22nd 2006 concerning financial transparency of some business entities (Journal of Laws, No. 191, item 1411). However, in the judgement of December 18th 2013, TS 13/12 in which the Tribunal States “Public business entities may use the constitutional rights and means of protection related to it only if they are in the same situation as natural persons and other legal persons, and the questioned legal act refers to them on identical rules, on which it could refer to those entities. In such situations, due to the fact that public business entities remain in the same subordinate relation towards a particular public authority organ, as it happens in case of other (“non-public”) legal persons, they may have an active legitimacy to file a constitutional claim [...]. Such a potential possibility of being an entity of constitutional freedoms and rights – and what refers to it – the initiator of constitutional control in a complaint mode, is each time subject to Tribunal verification, that evaluates if a particular entity is the beneficiary of a right, the infringement of which it alleges. 326 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 doms and at the same time, a warrior of the Constitution, to a more flexible attitude towards the matter of entitlement to issue a constitutional complaint, which is actually the only means of enabling an entity to directly formulate a request to eliminate unconstitutional provisions from the legal system”32. In practice it should be assumed that currently, the entitled one to perform constitutional freedoms and rights of the entity, including that from the content of a particular law the admissibility of its performance by a natural person, being not only a human being and/or citizen does not arise –which is almost never pointed in the Polish Constitution – also other legal entities, which are legal persons and other organizational entities with no such capacity. Even more significant – from the point of precisely determining the entitled one to perform the constitutional right to access information – becomes the fact that the statement of the Constitutional Tribunal, expressed in the regulation of December 2nd 2015, seems to lie in contradiction towards the previous settlement of the Tribunal, where the organ of legal constitutional control stated that “[...] contained therein (that is in article 61 section 1 of the Polish Constitution – NdA) subjective right can be personally performed by a citizen as it can be realized through the press. From it, it arises that a constitutional complaint leading to the protection of the right of information applies to each citizen and the “press” in general, not a particular press organ33. What is more, the assumption of limited efficiency to rely on the constitutional right to access public information solely by a Polish citizen is at variance with the practice of direct utilization of article 61 section 1 in current case law, also before the period of entering into force of the act of access to public information. It seems worth mentioning that in 1999, the Supreme Administrative Court of Poland settled that “the citizen’s right to obtain information of this subject is stated by the Polish Constitution in art. 61 section 1 stating, among others, that “A citizen has the right to obtain information about the performance of the performance of public authorities and persons performing public functions [...] Such tasks are also performed by the press according to article 1 of the Press Law Act of January 26th 1984 [...] The press may require, according

32 M. Kłopocka-Jasińska, R. Balicki, op.cit., p. 78. 33 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 13th September 2000, SK 4/00. Mariusz Jabłoński • The authorized entity to perform the constitutional right... 327 to art. 4 sec. 1 and 3 of the Press Law Act, to share its information as long as it is not subject to protection, mainly due to the provisions of The Act on Protection of Secret Information of January 22nd 1999 [...] and other provisions. Limitations to access such information also have a substantial, as well as a personal character34. No less important was the settlement in which the Supreme Administrative Court of Poland, referring to the previous statement of the Supreme Court35, stated that constitutional freedom the press (art. 14) and the right to access public information (art. 61), rely on the transparency of public life rule36. In another settlement, the Supreme Administrative Court of Poland stated that “during the determination of scopes of entities obliged to share information to the press and the scope of its rights, the following regulations should be utilized: art. 7–8, art. 10, art. 14, art. 54 and art. 61 of the Polish Consti- tution. They define the notion of public authority organs in a wide manner, including the legislative, executive and judicial authority. Ensuring the freedom of the press and its role as mass media authorize to obtain information about the performance of authority organs, understood in that way and entities performing tasks of public authority. The right to obtain information also includes the access to documents of such organs. The guarantees of freedom of the press are strictly linked to the transparency of public life rule performed in accordance with the right of the citizen to obtain information about the performance of public authority organs in the functional point of view. Also, article 1 of the Press Law refers to it and it states that the press – according to the Constitution – utilizes the freedom of speech and it realizes the rights of citizen to their reliable informing, transparency of public life, control and social criticism”37.

34 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of June 24th 1999, II SA 686/99. 35 Judgement of the Supreme Court of January 11th 1996, III ARN 57/95, where it was underlined that it is even admissible, without infringement of article 14 section 6 of Press Law, to publish information and data concerning the private sphere of life without the permission of a person, if this is directly linked to his public performance, not all statutorily limitations of press freedom (including the right of information) can be interpreted in a wider manner as it infringes the right of citizens to obtain relevant information and the rule of transparency of public life. 36 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of October 5th 2000, II SA 414/00. 37 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of September 9th 2001, II SA 172/01. 328 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 It is necessary to recall the settlements of the Supreme Administrative Court of Poland, in which it confirmed that “before entering into force of the act of Access to public information of September 6th 2001 [...] the provision of art. 61 sect. 2 of the Polish Constitution can be a sole base to require providing information about the performance of municipal authorities”, and what goes with it, is the sharing or originals of the municipal council’s resolutions38. Taking into account the aforementioned, there may be some doubts, whether the statement of the Constitutional Tribunal is consequent and actually the only entitled one is the natural person being at the same a Polish citizen. Previous practice – including the one of the Constitutional Tribunal – seems to confirm a contrary statement, according to which the entitled one is not only a natural person being a Polish citizen, and also another widely defined entity of law, in this case the entity conducting press activity or narrower “a press organ”. Taking into account the personal scope of this notion – ex- actly in the context of identifying the press through the scope of understanding the conducting of press activity39 – the notion of the entitled one seems

38 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of January 30th 2002, II SA 717/01. 39 “Analyzing the content of article 2 section2 point 1 of Press Law, it seems worth noticing that the legislator, while defining press in this provision, was aware of the fact that the technical progress in terms of creating and sharing periodic publications is extremely rapid and technical possibilities, in which the press may be established, are difficult to be predicted or guessed. That is why, it stated that “press is also all existing mass media and all which will be established due to technical development”. So, the broadcast through Internet, if it fulfills the rules determined in article 7 section1 point of Press Law is press and the time interval in which it appears, determines if this is a journal, according to article 7 section 2 point 2 of Press Law or a magazine, according to article 7 section 2 point 2 of Press Law [...]. In this situation it is indisputable that journals and magazines, through appearing in an online broadcast do not lose the features of a press title even if the internet broadcast is accompanied by a message perpetuated on paper, printed, constituting another, electronic form in the online system, as well as when this broadcast only exist in an electronical manner online, but only appears periodically, fulfilling the requirements, which are mentioned in article 7 section 2 of Press Law – judgement of the Supreme Court of December 15th 2010, III KK 250/10 “According to article 7 section 2 point 1 of Press Law “it also includes groups of people and particular people performing journalistic activity, where a journalist is a person who edits, develops or prepares press materials, remaining employed by a press office or performing such activity for the benefit and on behalf of the press office” – compare judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of February 4th 2016, I OSK 881/15. Mariusz Jabłoński • The authorized entity to perform the constitutional right... 329 to be identified in a completely different manner, than it happens in the De- cember’s regulation of the Constitutional Tribunal.

III.

It seems worth noticing, that an implication of the statement contained in the regulation of the Constitutional Tribunal (SK 36/14) can be the development of a rather particular practice to evaluate claims to share public information by a group of legally obliged ones. If – as it was stated by the Constitutional Tribunal – the entitled one to the performance of the constitution law is solely a Polish citizen, then all claims filed by other entities, such as: foreigners, legal persons, organizational entities with no legal capacity of the exclusive base on the content of article 61 of the Polish Constitution, can be treated by the obliged ones to share public information as vitiated due to lack of legitimacy to admit relying by those entities on the substantial constitution law. In practice, after the regulation of the Constitutional Tribunal – it is necessary to distinguish law to directly rely on the constitutional right to access public information, granted to the Polish citizen from relying on law determined in acts, in this case the so called universal right to access public information. In such a recognition, a claim filed by entities other than Polish citizens shall rely on the provisions of the act to access public information of September 6th 2001. Other entities, than Polish citizens, are not entitled to efficiently rely on the right, which is determined in art. 61 of the Polish Constitution. A statement, that only a Polish citizen can rely on the right to access public information can also lead to the limitation of possibilities of a foreigner entering the collegiate sessions of public authority organs, arising from general elections, also if he represents the press or narrowly “a press organ”. If he relies on art. 61 sec. 3 of the Constitution, instead of provisions of art. 17–18 a.p.i.a., it shall result of his removal from the session. In practice, it also appears that such a person (here, a widely understood journalist) not holding a Polish citizenship is not entitled to register during these sessions, as a.p.i.a. does not directly precise such a right. Finally, what seems inevitable, taking into account significant dedication of non-governmental organizations functioning as various kinds of associ- 330 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 ations, we should expect weakening of conducted works initiating and controlling the functioning of the public sphere of the state (public activity). Ac- knowledgement, that no constitutional protection is granted to them, leads to weakening the constitutional group of informative rights of an entity, the performance of which aims to ensure each interested one the possibility to obtain and share information about the performance of public authority organs and persons performing public functions, consequently not only to guarantee a real character of transparency and openness of the state performance and the clarity thereof, containing obviously the representatives selected40, but serve to deepen democracy and the rule of civil society. Therefore – as judge P. Tuleja, I believe that the entitled one to perform the right to access publish information is not only a group of Polish citizens, grouped in other legal forms of activity (for example legal person – association)41 – but I pro- pose the evaluation of another, wider point of view on the problem of the entitled one to perform the right contained in art. 61 of the Constitution and the acknowledgement that it is everyone, also a natural person, legal person and an organizational entity with no legal capacity. I feel that that from the directive of settling interpretational doubts in a way that strengthens the constitutional protection of freedoms and rights (article 5 of the Polish Constitution) the need arises to define a large scope of the entitled one to use the law determined in the content of article 61 of the Polish Constitution. The essence of this law, which is the request to receive information about the performance of organs, public institutions and also people performing public functions is in no case linked with the exclusivity defined by the criteria of citizenship. Consequently, the possibility to act with a constitutional complaint in the scope of protecting this right, should also not be restricted exclusively for the benefit of Polish citizens. I believe that if not only citizens are granted a constitutional protection of a range of freedoms and rights, whose performance is immanently linked to the necessity of obtaining information (including public information), then it is

40 About the concept of the so called “open government” cf.: M. Bernaczyk, P. Kuczma, Jawność działania władz publicznych jako zasada ustroju Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, [In:] Koniecz- ne i pożądane zmiany Konstytucji RP z 2 kwietnia 1997 roku, eds. B. Banaszak, M. Jabłoński, Wrocław 2010, p. 206 et seq. 41 A separate statement of the Constitutional Tribunal judge P. Tuleja in the case concerning SK 36/14, op.cit. Mariusz Jabłoński • The authorized entity to perform the constitutional right... 331 irrational to seek to limit particular constitutional informative rights, which jointly create a full entirety. Performing their law – here, access to public information only on the basis of statutory arrangements – through a particular entity of law, not only citizens but also foreigners, are deprived of relevant constitutional protection (the rule of direct utilization of constitutional regulations)42, and also the possibility to use the constitutional complaint. I also fully agree with the view expressed by judge P. Tuleja, that in a situation, in which the “constitutional claim is filed by a legal person (for example an association), the Tribunal acknowledges that it lies within the personal scope of art. 61 section 1 of the Constitution. If a constitutional complaint was filed by a citizen, for example a member of an association, the constitutional complaint would be inadmissible due to a different reason. Such a citizen would not possess the final statement, mentioned in arti. 79 sec. 1 of the Constitution as the addressee thereof is an association”43. Finally, it is worth mentioning that constitutional rights shall only serve an entity as a warranty, protecting from extensive or illegal interference of the state and other public entities (including those acting on behalf of public officials)44. Obtaining public information, within the right to access public information is crucial not only to protect Polish citizens, but also all legal entities, who – of course with taking into account the essence of each freedom and right – can prove that such protection does not apply for them.

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Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.18 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Agnieszka Gajda1

Important Amendments in Polish Regulation of Freedom of Assembly

Keywords: freedom of assembly, Assembly Act of 2015, spontaneous assembly, cyclical assemblies Słowa kluczowe: wolność zgromadzeń, Prawo o zgromadzeniach z 2015r., zgromadzenia spontaniczne, zgromadzenia cykliczne

Summary After the period of transformation in Poland, it was obvious that there is a huge need to secure freedom of assembly to polish nation. The Assembly Act of 1990 was established in result of efforts to reestablish the freedom of assembly, completely lost by Poles after Second World War. This act was constituted an important symbol of regained freedom, and was sufficient to exercise the freedom of assembly in the initial period of rebuilding democracy in our country. After some time, it began to require more and more changes. It ceased to comply with the growing demands of a developing social society. The amendments of Assembly Act was among others the consequence of the sentence of European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg and Polish Constitutional Tribunal. On 14th of October 2015 the new Assemblies Act was set into force. In this article the Author analyses several significant changes in respect to the rules of organization and course of the assembly introduced in new law and tries to answer the question if that changes should be evaluated positively. The paper contains also an analyze of the newest amendments of law on public assembly, which has been adopted on 13th December 2016 by Pol- ish Sejm. MP’s have proposed among other to implement new kind of assembly called

1 The author is an assistant professor in the Department of Constitutional Law and Political Institutions Faculty of Law and Administration of University of Gdańsk. E-mail: [email protected]. 336 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 “cyclical”. Polish President Andrzej Duda filled the motion to Constitutional Tribunal in order to examine its compliance with Constitution.

Streszczenie

Najważniejsze zmiany w polskiej regulacji dotyczącej wolności zgromadzeń

Regulacja prawna odnosząca się do konstytucyjnej wolności zgromadzeń w ostatnich latach była przedmiotem krytyki nie tylko wśród społeczeństwa ale również przedstawicieli doktryny. Wielokrotnie nowelizowana ustawa nie wypełniała standardów stawianych państwu demokratycznemu przede wszystkim w zakresie dopuszczalnych ograniczeń oraz procedury notyfikacyjnej. Orzecznictwo polskiego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego jak również Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka skłoniło polskiego ustawodaw- cę do pracy nad nową regulacją prawną. W 2015 roku prace te zostały zwieńczone uch- waleniem nowej ustawy prawo o zgromadzeniach. Analiza i ocena zawartych w niej ro- związań prawnych jest przedmiotem niniejszego opracowania. Autorka przedstawiła również założenia zmiany ustawy uchwalone przez parlament 13 grudnia 2016 r.

Following the process of transformation in Polish political system, there was a generally expressed conviction that freedom of assembly should be one of the most important aspects of democratisation of social life in Poland2. This freedom by itself, safeguards other rights, not to mention free expression in the democratic society, or right to free elections. European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) many times declared that freedom of assembly constitutes an important kind of expression and pillar for freedom of speech3. Assemblies may serve to many purposes, including the expression of diverse, unpopular or minority opinions. Legal guarantees of that freedom of are crucial for creating a tolerant and pluralistic society in which groups with different beliefs,

2 P. Suski, Zgromadzenia i imprezy masowe, Warszawa 2007, s. 66 – 74; A. Wróbel, Wol- ność zgromadzania się, [In:] Konstytucyjne wolności i prawa w Polsce, t. III, Wolności i prawa polityczne, ed. W. Skrzydło, Kraków 2002, p. 10; P. Czarny, B. Naleziński, Wolność zgromadzeń, Warszawa 1998, pp. 17–19. 3 ECHR, Patyi and others v. Hungary, 7.10.2008, No. 5529/05, par. 37. Agnieszka Gajda • Important Amendments in Polish Regulation of Freedom... 337 practices or policies can coexist peacefully together4. As a fundamental right, freedom of assembly should insofar as possible, be enjoyed without states regulative interference. Under Polish Constitution there is only a general regulation. According to article 57 of above mentioned fundamental act the freedom of peaceful assembly and participation in such assemblies shall be ensured to everyone. Limitations upon such freedoms may be imposed by statute. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal (TK) on numerous occasions emphasised great meaning of freedom of assembly for the establishment of modern state of law standard. Implementation of freedom of assembly ensure the effectiveness of social communication and it is fundamental for the dialogue between a society and the public authority. It is of particular importance not only for a single person but also for the whole nation5. In spite of the development of modern technologies enabling direct communication, specified but not limited to In- ternet, freedom of assembly still remains one of the most important ways of individuals participation in the public and political life. Its basic advantage is the power to gather many people in one place and one time6. Article 57 of Polish Constitution resembles article 11 of the European Con- vention on Human Rights. As guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention, everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests (§ 1). No. restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Arti- cle shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the adminis-

4 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, Warsaw/Strasbourg 2010, p. 15. 5 Judgment of TK, 18.09.2014, sygn. K 44/12 (Dz.U. 2014, poz. 1327), called also “TK, K 44/12”; Judgment of TK, 28.06.2000, sygn. K 34/99 (Dz.U. 2000, Nr 53, poz. 649), called also: “TK, K 34/99”; Judgment TK, 10.11.2004, sygn. KP 1/04 (M.P. 2004, Nr 48, poz. 826). 6 J. Juchniewicz, M. Kazimierczuk, Wolności i prawa polityczne w Konstytucji RP z 1997 r., [In:] Wolności i prawa człowieka w Konstytucji Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, ed. M. Chmaj, Warszawa 2009, p. 119; W. Studziński, Wolność zgromadzeń i stowarzyszania się, [In:] Prawa i wolności I i II generacji, eds. A. Florczak, B. Bolechow, Toruń 2006, p. 179. 338 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 tration of the State (§ 2). European Court of Human Rights expressed conviction that Article 11 of the Convention requires only such interferences with the exercise of the freedom of assembly which are “necessary in a democratic society”. It also should not be forgotten that the exceptions set out in Arti- cle 11 have to be construed strictly7. Freedom of assembly like other rights and freedoms set forth in the Polish Constitution can be limited only by law. The general principles of that limits are specified in article 31. The Polish authorities are not allowed to decide freely about the matters and the scope of restrictions. According to article 31.3. any limitation upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights may be imposed only by statute, and only when necessary in a democratic state for the protection of its security or public order, or to protect the natural environment, health or public morals, or the freedoms and rights of other persons. Such limitations shall not violate the essence of freedoms and rights. It should be noted that legislator is obliged to respect some universally recognized general standards of these limitations. There is also a duty to respect standards of proportionality. That means that there is an obligation to choose only such measures which are necessary to achieve the aim of these limitation and to use only such measures which are onerous to the least possible extent for the individuals. The other requirement is that freedom of peaceful assembly should be enjoyed equally by everyone. That means, for example, that the relevant authorities must not discriminate against any individual or group on any ground. The limitations of freedom of assembly according to Article 57 of Polish Constitu- tion have to respect all constitutional requirements imposed also in the provisions of the Article 31.3., as it has been already mentioned above8. As it was said, after the period of transformation, it was obvious that there is a huge need to secure freedom of assembly to polish nation. After the declaration of martial law in 1981 the law9 and the practice of the authorities provided many restrictions for assemblies10. The Assembly Act of 1990 was established in result of efforts to reestablish the freedom of assembly, completely

7 ECHR, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30.01.1998, No. 133/1996/752/951, par. 45–46. 8 Wyrok TK, K 34/99. 9 Decree of martial law, 13.12.1981 (Dz.U. 1981, Nr 29, poz. 154), art. 13. 10 P. Czarny, B. Naleziński, op.cit., p. 41. Agnieszka Gajda • Important Amendments in Polish Regulation of Freedom... 339 lost by Poles after Second World War. This act was constituted an important symbol of regained freedom, and was sufficient to exercise the freedom of -as sembly in the initial period of rebuilding democracy in our country. After some time, it began to require more and more changes. It ceased to comply with the growing demands of a developing social society. The amendments of Assembly Act was among others the consequence of the sentence of Euro- pean Court of Human Rights in Strasburg (ECHR) of 2007 in the case of To- masz Bączkowski and others v. Poland11. ECHR considered that Warsaw authority violated in 2005 the European Convention on Human Rights by the refusal to grant permission for a march and meetings to protest against ho- mophobia called in Poland “Equality Parade”. The President of Warsaw prohibited that assembly for the reasons of public safety. He prohibited also another sixteen assemblies, which were supposed to be organized in the same time as “Equality Parade”. This case gave the ECHR an opportunity to rule among others on the time-limits for issuing decisions concerning the exercise of freedom of assembly. The main issue in described case was the cancellation of an unlawful refusal to authorise demonstrations, delivered after the date on which the demonstrations had been scheduled. The applicants com- plained of the absence of a remedy which would have enabled them to obtain a final decision before the date on which their events were scheduled. The ECHR considered that it was important for the effective enjoyment of freedom of assembly that the applicable laws provided for reasonable time-limits within which the State authorities should act when giving relevant decisions. The applicable laws clearly set out the time-limits within which the applicants were to submit their requests for authorisation. In contrast, the authorities were not obliged by any legally binding time frame to give their final decisions before the planned date of the demonstration. The Court was therefore not persuaded that the remedies available to the applicants in the present case, all of them being of a post-hoc character, could provide adequate redress in respect of the alleged violations of the Convention. It therefore concluded that there had been a violation of Article 13of Convention12. In aftermath of this case the Polish Assembly Act was changed but still was the subject of court’s control. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal found the

11 ECHR, Bączkowski and others v. Poland, 3.05.2007, No. 1543/06. 12 Ibidem. 340 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 changes as insufficient and unconstitutional13. The Tribunal has refered to the organization of so called parallel assemblies. That are at least two assemblies organized at the same time and even partly in the same place. The Assem- bly Act introduced the general prohibition of such assemblies. The Tribunal ruled that such a prohibition was inadmissible and the procedure of prohibition was unclear and unfair. The prohibition of a public assembly solely on the basis that it is due to take place at the same time and location as another public assembly will likely be a disproportionate response where both can be reasonably accommodated. The principle of non-discrimination requires further, that assemblies in comparable circumstances do not face differential levels of restriction. The prohibition should be used only in exceptional cases. On 14th of October 2015 the new Assemblies Act was set into force. This act replaced previously applicable Assembly Act of 1990. The new law introduced several significant changes in respect to the rules of organization and course of the assembly. Primarily there is a significant difference between a current and former definition of assembly. In the previous act only the meeting of at least 15 people could be defined as an assembly. Now, under the Act of 2015, there is not such a requirement. According to Article 3.1. the assembly is defined as a gathering of people in open space, which is accessible to many unspecified individuals in one certain place convened in order to hold a public debate or to express jointly their position. So far, the assembly of less than 15 people was not a subject of legal regulation. The Polish Constitutional Tribu- nal found this regulation as unconstitutional. It was said, that law does not need to specify the minimum number of participants in the demonstration to exercise standards of democratic state ruled by law. That is why the new law does not contain these numbers in the definition of public assembly. Nowa- days, there is also a definition of spontaneous assembly which can be organize in case of a sudden, unexpected and impossible to predict event connected with public live when its organization in another time would be pointless or insignificant from the point of view of the public debate. That kind of assembly is a new institution in polish law14. Such an assembly would only occure in circumstances where the legally established deadline cannot be met. The

13 TK, K 44/12. 14 A. Bodnar, M. Ziółkowski, Zgromadzenia spontaniczne, “Państwo i Prawo” 2008, Issue 5, p. 31. Agnieszka Gajda • Important Amendments in Polish Regulation of Freedom... 341 authorities should always protect and facilitate any spontaneous assembly so long as it is peaceful in nature. The provisions of the Act of 2015 do not apply to assemblies organized by public authorities or that are held within the activities of the Catholic Church, other Churches, and religious unions. There are also some limitations for people who want to organize or take part in the assembly. According to article 4 the right to arrange an assembly is granted solely to natural persons with full capacity to legal acts. In the previous act that right was wider and included also legal persons, other organizations, as well as groups of persons. Since 2012 the participation in assembly has been prohibited for people who carry weapons, explosive materials, pyrotechnic materials, hazardous fire materials or other dangerous tools with them. This provision did not change after 2015. In comparison to the previous Assembly Act, the procedure of notification has been simplified. The organizer is entitled to notify the intention of organization an assembly in many forms for example in written or verbal form, by fax or via electronic communication (for example via e-mail). The organizer is obliged to notify the municipality authority no later than 6 but no earlier than 30 days before the scheduled date of the assembly. Under Pol- ish law the municipality council is able to specify locations where if an assembly does take place it does not require notification. The situation is different if the organizer is sure that planned assembly does not create the traffic hindrances. Then he is able to choose the special, more simplified procedure described in the provisions of Assembly Act. The established procedure requires only the notification of planned assembly to a competent crisis management center no later than 2 days before the planned date of the assembly. In this procedure there is no possibility to issue a prohibition order against the assembly. However, the representative of the municipality authority has the power to solve all kind of assemblies during its course if it endangers the life or health of people or property of considerable value, pose a risk to security or order of traffic on public roads or violates the provisions of Assembly Act or criminal law. The representative of the municipality authority is able to use this power only if the leader of the assembly after being warned about the need to resolve the assembly, does not act so. Despite dynamic development of forms of contact between people and public authorities and forms of criticism like television, press or Internet, the 342 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 need to ensure freedom of assembly is still current. It should be treated as an effective instrument of exercising political pressure and influencing the decisions of government15. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal stated that the free assembly fulfill a very important role of early – warning mechanism. It shows the representative bodies and the public potential and existing sources of tension and allows early reaction and even changes in directions of state policy. The similar position expressed the European Court of Human Rights. In the opinion of this Court the meaning of an assembly would be significantly lower if it is organized when the social issue has already lost its meaning in the current political debate. Freedom of peaceful assembly loses its meaning if people cannot use it in the right time. As a result of long theoretical discussion, polish legislator introduced into the polish law a new institution. In case of a sudden, unexpected and impossible to predict event connected with public live there is a possibility to organize a spontaneous assembly. This kind of assembly does not have to be previously notified. This exception in the Act of 2015 is justified by the fact that this kind of assembly would lose the sense or would be negligible from the point of view of the public debate if it will not be organized immediately. As an example it could be necessary because of the controversial political statement, unexpected foreign guest’s visit or passing a new law, etc. Therefore, this new regulation regarding to the spontaneous assembly met with such an enthusiastic reception in Poland even if it met some restrictions. First of all such assembly cannot collide with other assembly organized in accordance with the standard procedures. It also could be resolved by Police among others in case of colliding with previously notified assembly. It also should be noted, that the new Polish Assembly Act introduces a significant change in the appeal procedure in case of an issue a prohibition order against assembly. According to a current act competent local authority is able to pass a prohibition order against assembly no later than 96 hours before its scheduled date. This prohibition order is acceptable in cases when the purpose or fact of holding of that assembly is breaking the provisions of the Act or violates criminal law. The municipality council shall prohibit a public assembly also if its course may pose a threat to the life or health of individuals or to property of considerable value. The organizer may appeal against

15 Ibidem, p. 40. Agnieszka Gajda • Important Amendments in Polish Regulation of Freedom... 343 this prohibition order to the district court within 24 hours of the receipt of the decision. There is also a possibility to appeal against the decision of the district court, taken within the next 24 hours, to the Court of Appeal. The regulation in the new Assembly Act strictly defined, short deadlines for appeal and courts’ consideration to guarantee the resolution of proceedings before the date of the planned assembly. This significant change in the law solves many important and practical problems. According to the previous Assem- bly Act the Voivode was the authority competent ratione loci to examine appeals against prohibition orders against the assembly. After his negative decision there was a possibility to appeal to the administrative court. The whole appeal proceedings were very difficult and long. The assembly notification proceedings shall be conducted by competent municipality. In some cases, when the assembly is going to be organized on the territory of at least two municipalities, all authorities are competent to conduct the procedure. The new regulation referes also to assemblies organized by two or more organizers at the same time, in places or walking routes which are identical or partially colliding. They can take place, if their performance does not endanger life or health of persons or property to a large extent. If there is no certainty that it will be succeed the primacy would have that assembly which notification was provided earlier. In this case the municipal authority immediately calls to the organizers of these later notified assembly by phone or by means of electronic communication, to order them to change the place or time of assembly. The municipal authority may also conduct an administrative hearing to agree on changes in location or time of assembly. If during the administrative hearing, the organizers of assemblies are not able to agree on an appropriate place or time, the authority would ask them to choose the place or time of assembly in accordance with the order of notification of their assemblies. It should be stressed that the authority in case of restrictions imposed on the time, place or manner of an assembly is obliged to offer some reasonable alternatives. There is no doubt that new solutions provided by the Assembly Act of 2015 should be evaluated positively. They are intended to create more effective conditions for exercising one of the fundamental human freedoms – freedom of assembly. It was also very important to create the balance between freedom of peacefully assembles and the need to maintain law and public order. The 344 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 notification process seems to be inoffensive and not excessively bureaucratic. The period of notice is not to long but still secures adequate time for the relevant municipality authorities to make the necessary plans and prepara- tions to satisfy their positive obligations. The possibility of appeal to an independent court in case of prohibition of assembly should be also positively assessed. The primary responsibility of the state is to put in place adequate mechanisms and procedures to ensure that the freedom is enjoyed and not subject to undue bureaucratic regulation. It was achieved in new Assembly Act. Even polish ombudsman is enthusiastic about this adopted law16. Often, however, it is not the letter of law that is of an essence but its implementation. Just after this publication was given to print, on 15th of November 2016 there was new draft statutory regulation submitted by members of Parlia- ment to the Sejm, on amendment of law on public assembly. MP’s proposed among other to implement new kind of assembly called “cyclical”. New draft has been adopted by the Sejm on 13th December 2016 on 32nd meeting of the Sejm. That facts caused necessity to supplement this article. Amended regulation was supposed to enter into force 14 days after official publication, however Polish President Andrzej Duda filled the motion to Constitutional Tribunal in order to examine its compliance with Constitution. It should be emphasized, that all opinions presented herein were based on available legal sources, and might become irrelevant, since legislation process including Tribu- nals assessment is still ongoing. Historical experience in Poland bring safety of assembly participants to a high level. During past regime of Marxists polish nation paid many times a high price in a blood of men and women, determined to manifest their beliefs by means of public gathering. It should be also buried in a mind that ca- sualties among demonstrators were not only caused by armed forces but also by civil entities incited by the state authorities. Regarding security as a priority, must lead to necessary restrictions of a discussed freedom. Pursuit to secure peace during assemblies, has its legal grounds in the Constitution, which allows in art. 31 to restrict rights and freedoms when it is necessary in a democratic state to ensure public safety and order or freedom of other people. Cri- teria of public safety and order has become a legal basis of assembly prohibition in a vast majority of administration decisions, issued in respect of that

16 See: https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/nowe-prawo-o-zgromadzeniach (9.11.2016). Agnieszka Gajda • Important Amendments in Polish Regulation of Freedom... 345 matter. In most of them basic reason was necessity to avoid collision of public gatherings, and potential clashes in a result of that. For that reason, the issue of priority of gatherings was vividly discussed in constitutional law doctrine in Poland. In recent amendment of art 12 of law on public assembly, there was a ne criteria added to gatherings priority assessment. According to the new provision, when there are two or more notifications of assembly organization submitted to competent authority, and they are planned to take place even partially in the same place or time, in particular in a distance not further than 100 m from each other, and there is no possibility to avoid a threat to life or health or property in a significant amount, about priority of choice of place and time of assembly it should be decided taking under consideration the sequence of submissions. It is worth to emphasize, that according to above mentioned statutory provision related to the distance must be assessed in conjunction with impossibility to provide security to life or health or property in a significant amount. It seems to be obvious that organization of counter demonstrations cannot be totally excluded, since such a restriction would be contrary to the principle of necessity in a democratic state. Regarding freedom of assembly as belonging to the family of freedoms of expression this situation might be compared to a verbal exchange of thoughts, which is allowed to a very far extent. It is worth to notice also that organization of an assembly even when there is a threat of violence from opponent demonstrators is also allowed, under condition that distance of 100 meters between them will be kept. This should be sufficient for police forces to secure necessary minimum of public safety. In particular given distance should provide sufficient time to apply security measures like tear gas or provide water cannon’s assistance. As it was already mentioned, the novelty in polish law will by cyclic assemblies. This institution is highly criticized by the political opposition of current government. According to new art. 26 a1. assemblies might be regarded as cyclic if they are organized by the same organizer in the same place or in the same route, at least 4 times a year, according to given time schedule; or at least annually during state or national holiday, and such annual assemblies took place at least during last 3 years – not necessarily in a legal form of public assembly, and their purpose was to honor important events in polish history. To obtain a status of a cyclic assembly, the organizer must submit a mo- 346 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 tion to voivode, and receive his consent given in a form of an administration act. What might be regarded as controversial under principle of legal equity, this type of assemblies requires different procedure of organization. Firstly, to organize cyclic assembly, the organizer must submit the motion not later than 7 days before first of the planned cycle public gatherings. It is mandatory to provide a number, and a time schedule of the assemblies, as well as justify their purpose. Secondly assemblies might take place only after administrative consent of voivode, to organize them for maximum period of 3 years. Decision in that matter should be issued not later than 5 days before first of the planned cycle public gatherings. Voivode shall publish on the public information web bulletin, an information about place and time of cyclic assemblies, as well as informs executive of municipality on territory of which the public gathering shall take place. Thirdly, when voivode has issued a decision on consent to hold cyclic assembly, in time and place where other public gathering was supposed to take place, the municipalities executive shall issue a prohibitive decision in respect to this other one. Such an administrative act must be issued within 24 hours since receiving information from voivode. If municipality executive shall not perform its duties, voivode is entitled to issue a substitute order. Fourthly, voivode issues a decision on withdrawal of consent for cyclic assembly, when organizer issued such a motion, or a cyclic assembly did not take place at least two times according to previously provided schedule, unless it happened because of reasons independent from organizer. The new regulation gives clear priority to cyclic assemblies, which prevail over regular assemblies, and spontaneous assemblies. As to the last ones, its participants are not allowed to disrupt cyclic assemblies. The objections of the governments opposition should be treated conser- vatively. Argument that cyclic assembly will be used only by governing party to organize Smoleńsk catastrophe anniversary is exaggerated. There are plenty of other assemblies which can also obtain such a status, not to mention Independence day, Labor Holiday, EU Accession Holiday or 3 May Con- stitution Anniversary. It must be considered in details whether current social situation in Poland and EU justifies treating honoring assemblies in a different way than the others. Since Poland as well as other EU states must struggle for their identity and stay against current clash of civilizations clearly visible thru terrorists activity in a Western Europe, there is some ratio in creating Agnieszka Gajda • Important Amendments in Polish Regulation of Freedom... 347 such a difference. All anniversaries are great occasion to manifest unity of the nation and its cultural heritage, which must be currently defended. Although in general such an idea might be worth to be supported, procedural regulations given in the amendment can be described as unnecessary even to achieve above described purpose. In particular solution of the assemblies collision with prejudice to rights to regular assembly demonstrators shall be assessed negatively. That fact was a main ground of Presidential motion to the Constitutional Tribunal, which from that point of view seems to be necessary and justified. Hopefully The Tribunals judgement shall waive all above mentioned doubts.

Literature

Bodnar A., Ziółkowski M., Zgromadzenia spontaniczne, “Państwo i Prawo” 2008, Issue 5. Czarny P., Naleziński B., Wolność zgromadzeń, Warszawa 1998. Juchniewicz J., Kazimierczuk M., Wolności i prawa polityczne w Konstytucji RP z 1997 r., [In:] Wolności i prawa człowieka w Konstytucji Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, ed. M. Ch- maj, Warszawa 2009. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, Warsaw–Strasbourg 2010. Suski P., Zgromadzenia i imprezy masowe, Warszawa 2007. Studziński W., Wolność zgromadzeń i stowarzyszania się [In:] Prawa i wolności I i II generacji, eds. A. Florczak, B. Bolechow, Toruń 2006 Wróbel A., Wolność zgromadzania się, [In:] Konstytucyjne wolności i prawa w Polsce, t. III, Wolności i prawa polityczne, ed. W. Skrzydło, Kraków 2002.

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.19 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Anna Rytel-Warzocha1

State Security and the Constitutionally Protected Human Rights and Freedoms in the Light of the Polish Constitution of 1997

Keywords: terrorism, terrorist attack, state security, human rights and freedoms, right to life, civil aircraf Słowa kluczowe: terroryzm, atak terrorystyczny, bezpieczeństwo państwa, prawa i wol- ności człowieka, prawo do ochrony życia, cywilny statek powietrzny

Summary Ensuring the security of the state is one of the primary responsibilities of its authorities, which can take a number of legal measures for that purpose. In this context, however, a question can be asked whether the protection of a value such as the security of the state can justify the limitation of human rights and freedoms and, if so, how deep such state’s interference in constitutionally protected rights and freedoms can be. In particular, can the basic human right – the right to life be scarified for the protection of the state security? The conflict between these values has been illustrated by the amendment of the Polish Aviation law adopted in 2004. It allowed under certain conditions to shoot down a civil aircraft with passengers on board. The regulation was subject to the constitutional review conducted by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and was declared unconstitutional. However, the emergence of new forms of terrorism and the escalation of this phenomenon in Europe, which characterizes the beginning of the twenty-first century, cause that the problem still remains valid.

1 Theauthor is a PhD of Law in the Department of Constitutional Law and Political Insti- tutions Faculty of Law and Administration of University of Gdańsk. E-mail: [email protected]. 350 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Streszczenie

Bezpieczeństwo państwa oraz konstytucyjna ochrona praw i wolności człowieka w świetle Konstytucji RP z 1997 r.

Zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa państwu należy do podstawowych obowiązków jego orga- nów, które mogą w tym celu podejmować szereg środków prawnych. W tym kontekście zadać jednak można pytanie czy dla ochrony wartości jaką jest bezpieczeństwo państwa mogą zostać ograniczone prawa i wolności jednostki, a jeżeli tak, to jak daleko może się- gać ingerencja państwa w tym zakresie. Czy można ograniczyć podstawowe prawo czło- wieka – prawo do ochrony życia dla ochrony bezpieczeństwa państwa? Konflikt między tymi wartościami ilustruje polska regulacja, jaką w 2004 r. wprowadzono do prawa lot- niczego, pozwalająca w określonych przypadkach zestrzelić samolot cywilny z pasaże- rami na pokładzie. Regulacja ta stała się przedmiotem orzeczenia Trybunału Konsty- tucyjnego, który uznał ją za niekonstytucyjną. Niemniej jednak pojawienie się nowych form terroryzmu oraz eskalacja tego zjawiska w Europie, która charakteryzuje początek XXI w. sprawia, że problem pozostaje wciąż aktualny.

The “security” is a multidimensional concept that refers to many areas of public life. It is referred to when talking about, for example, security of mass gatherings, environmental security, security of cultural goods, food security as well as human security. However, the notion of “security” is primarily associated with the state and in that context the protection of the “state security” is the basic responsibility of state authorities. The claim that state security equals the security of the people usually is dtrue, but there is a small number of cases in which these values can be in conflict. The problem that appears then is how far the state can interfere the constitutional rights and freedoms of an individual in order to protect the security of the state. The further question that can be asked is if it is possible to restrict the basic human right – the right to life in order to protect such value as the security of the state. All these issues have become particularly important and relevant in the face of the need to combat terrorism and look for the appropriate legal tool to achieve that aim. Anna Rytel-Warzocha • State Security and the Constitutionally Protected... 351 There is no one legal definition of “state security” in Polish law, but the notion is used by the Constitution of 19972 in several contexts. Art. 5 provides that the Republic of Poland shall safeguard the security of the citizens, art. 26 provides that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland shall ensure the security and inviolability of its border, art. 31 allows for imposing limitation upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights when it is necessary in a democratic state for the protection of its security or public order, art. 45 provides the exceptions to the public nature of hearings before a court if it is necessary because of the state security, art. 53 p. 5 provides that the freedom to publicly expressed religion may be limited if it is necessary for the defense of the state security, art. 61 p. 3 provides the same in reference to the right to obtain information on the activities of organs of public authority as well as persons discharging public functions, art. 74 provides that public authorities shall pursue policies ensuring the ecological security of current and future generations, art. 126 p. 2 provides that the President of the Republic shall endure the security of the state and according to art. 130 shall take the oath in which he/she swear to safeguard the security of the state, art. 135 establishes the National Security Council as the advisory organ to the President of the Republic regarding internal and external security of the state, art. 146 p. 4 provides that the Council of Ministers shall, in particular, secure the internal and external security of the state, and finally, art. 230 provides that in case of threads to the security of citizens, the President of the Republic may, on request of the Council of Ministers, introduce a state of emergency. However, the concept of “state security” has been defined by the Polish doctrine of constitutional law3. According to B. Banaszak, the security of the state is equal to the security of citizens referred to in art. 5 of the Constitution because the concept of “state” can be understood as the synonym of the collective of citizens creating that state4. P. Sarnecki points out that “state security” is an

2 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland adopted on 2 April 1997, published in the Official Journal of Laws 1997, No. 78, item 483. 3 The views of the Polish doctrine on the concept of the “state security” have been gathered and Publisher, see J. Jaraczewski, Bezpieczeństwo państwa jako wartość chroniona w konstytucji RP, [In:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w pierwszych dekadach XXI wieku wobec wyzwań politycznych, gospodarczych, technologicznych i społecznych, ed. S. Biernat, Warszawa 2013, p. 63 and next. 4 B. Banaszak, Konstytucja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Warszawa 2009, p. 177. 352 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 undefined concept which content must be clarified in the individual cases of the application of art. 31 par. 3 of the Constitution5. On the other hand, J. Karp points out that state security is “a condition in which there is no thread to the existence of the state and its democratic system. The security of the state includes within its scope a directive to take care of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and defense potential, even if there is no threat from other states or terrorist”6. Another approach has been presented by W. Wołpiuk, who indicates that art. 5 of the Constitution expresses the legislator’s decision to establish “state security” a value superior to the protection of the freedoms and rights of an individual and its security, which allows for a breach in their protection. State security is associated with the notion of the common good and therefore the state cannot be considered as a separate being completely detached from the needs and interests of citizens. Therefore, the state and its security shall have priority over the protection of human rights and freedoms which in certain circumstances can be limited. W. Wołpiuk recognizes security as a kind of meta-value, pointing to the impossibility of implementing the essential qualities and values of a democratic state ruled by law without enduring the adequate state security7. The conflict between the two values – the state security and a constitutionally protected right or freedom – can take a very practical dimension. Such conflict that concerns the most fundamental right to life can be illustrated by the regulation introduced to the Polish Aviation Law8 which caused a lot of controversy and was subject to the constitutional review conducted by the Constitutional Tribunal. The controversial art. 122a was introduced to the Aviation Law by the act of 2 July 2004 amending the Act on state border pro- tection9 and stated that “If state security demands it and air defense authority

5 P. Sarnecki, Uwagi do art. 31, [In:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, T. IV, ed. L. Garlicki, Warszawa 2005, p. 38. 6 J. Karp, Bezpieczeństwo państwa, [In:] Konstytucja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz encyklopedyczny, eds. W. Skrzydło, S. Grabowska, R. Grabowski, Warszawa 2009, p. 108 and next. 7 W.J. Wołpiuk, Bezpieczeństwo państwa i pojęcia pokrewne. Aspekty konstytucyjnoprawne, [In:] Krytyka prawa. Niezależne studia nad prawem. Vol. II: Bezpieczeństwo, ed. W. Sokolewicz, Warszawa 2010, p. 181 and next. 8 The Act of 3 July 2002 – Aviation Law, consolidated text the Official Journal of Laws 2006, No. 100, item 696, with later amendments. 9 The Act of 2 July 2004 on the amendment of the Act on state border protection and some other statutes, published in the Official Journal of Laws 2004, No. 172, item 1805. Anna Rytel-Warzocha • State Security and the Constitutionally Protected... 353 decides, having considered in particular the information from states air traffic control authority, that a civilian aircraft is being used unlawfully, and in particular in a terrorist attack, the aircraft may be destroyed in accordance with the regulations laid out in the Act of 12 October 1990 on state border protec- tion10”. The initiative to adopt the above regulation came from the Ministry of National Defense and it was clearly inspired by the events of 11 September 2001 in America when terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and Pen- tagon from the air. However, before discussing the origins, detailed content and the effects of the Polish regulation, the international context concerning the legal bases as well as the “practice” of shooting down civilian aircrafts should be briefly presented. Despite the fact that there have been no such incidents in Poland, what is happening in the world today is also reflected in the Polish law and internal constitutional situation. In the twentieth century the international law generally prohibited the use of weapons against civilian aircrafts. In practice, however, the acts of such unlawful interference happened. The reasons were different and in many cases the issue of the responsibility has never been solved. It was significant that the firing side usually recognized the accidents as a result of a mistake while the injured side as a deliberate act of terror. Since 1926 there have been eight- een such cases in different part of the world, but four of them can be briefly presented as an example. On 27 June 1955, a civil aircraft Lockheed L-149 of the Israeli line El-Al was shot down by Bulgaria near Petricz and 58 people lost their lives. The plane was flying from London to TelAviv and while trying to bypass the storm in the air corridor over Yugoslavia it entered by mistake Bulgarian airspace. It was established later that the mistake was caused by the lightening which disrupted the operation of radio compass. Initially, Bulgaria defended itself by accusing the Israeli pilots that they illegally invad- ed its airspace. In the end, the authorities admitted that the attack was started too hastily without a proper warning and decided to pay compensations to victims’ families. Bulgaria has never officially recognized its responsibility, however, the International Court of Justice in the proceedings initiated by Is- rael expressed the opinion that in the light of international law there was no reason to use weapon by Bulgaria. On 1 September 1983 an aircraft of South

10 The Act of 13 October 1990 on the state border protection, published in the Official Journal of Laws 1990, No. 78, item 461, with later amendments. 354 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Korean lines Korean Air flying from Anchorage to Seul was shot down by the USSR near Sakhalin, which caused the death of 269 people on board. On 3 July 1988 the US cruiser “Vincennes” shot down the aircraft Airbus A300 B2– 203 of the Iranian Airlines Iran Air flying from southern Iran to Dubai while it was over the Iranian waters of Persian Gulf in a standard air corridor. The Americans claimed that they confused the Airbus with the F-14, however, the Congress did not agree to pay compensations to victims as it recognized that the US did not exceed international law as the accident happened during the Iran-Iraq war and the USS Vincennes before firing rockets tried to establish radio contact with the Airbus. On the other hand, the Iranian government declared the attack a deliberate act of barbarism and aggression. The last notorious incident occurred on 17 November 2014 when the Boing 777 of Ma- laysia Airlines flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was shot down in Donetsk region in Ukraine and 298 persons were killed. The issue of responsibility for this accident is still open11. The above incidents (in particular one from 1983) raised the need to adopt legal instruments in order to eliminate the incidents of shooting down civilian aircrafts. On 10 May 1984 the Protocol relating to an amendment to the Chicago Convention of 1944 on International Civil Aviation was signed in Montreal12 which introduced art. 3 bis providing that “the contracting states recognize that every state must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception, the lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered”. It is interesting that in the course of the debate on protecting the safety of civil aircrafts during the session of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) the problem of potential conflict between two values – the respect for territorial sovereignty and security on one hand and the protection of life and personal

11 About the incidents of shooting down military and civil aircrafts see: A. Ważny,Ze - strzelenie samolotu cywilnego typu renegade w ocenie TK, “Edukacja Prawnicza” 2009, No. 10 (109); M. Żylicz, Zestrzelenie cywilnego statku powietrznego jako delikt prawa międzynarodowego, “Państwo i Prawo” 2009, Issue 6, p. 24 and next. 12 The Protocol entered into force on 1 October 1998 and has been ratified by 152 parties, including Poland which ratified it in 1999. Konwencja o zwalczaniu bezprawnych czynów skierowanych przeciwko bezpieczeństwu lotnictwa cywilnego, sporządzona w Montrealu dnia 23 września 1971 r., published in the Official Journal of Laws 1976, No. 8, item 37; 2006, No. 48, item 348. Anna Rytel-Warzocha • State Security and the Constitutionally Protected... 355 security of innocent people onboard on the other – appeared. The delegations represented different approaches from emphasizing the need of absolute prohibition of the use of weapons against civil aircrafts to expressing concerns that such prohibition would encourage the unlawful use of such aircrafts and opinions that some exceptions to the ban were necessary. The situation changed after the events of 11 September 2001 when civil aircrafts were used as flying bombs in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the USA and led to death of almost 3,500 people. That started the new era of terrorism characterized not only by the appearance of new forms of terrorism endangering the global security but also the escalation of this phenomenon, particularly in Europe13. All this started the discussion, also in Poland, on the implementation of legal measures that would allow to effectively respond to the thread of terrorism, including the thread of using civil aircrafts to attack from the air14. As a result, on 2 June 2004 the above mentioned amendment introducing art. 122 a to the Aviation Law was adopted at the initiative of the government. The new law provided that a plane that crossed the Polish border or was flying in the Polish airspace without permission, could be asked to leave the Polish airspace, change direction or altitude of the flight or land at the appointed airport. After warning shots such plane could be also forced to land by the Polish Air Force and in case of further non-compliance with the subpoenas – destroyed. In Janu- ary 2005 the Council of Ministers adopted a regulation specifying the procedures in case of the need to shoot down the plane hijacked by terrorists that could pose a threat. The decision about whether to force the plane to land or shoot was to be taken by the Minister of Defense or the Commander of the Polish Air Force. It should be emphasized that in the light of this regulation, as well as art. 18b of the Act on state border protection, it was also acceptable to shoot down a civilian aircraft with passengers and crew on board as a reaction to the so-called “act of unlawful interference in civil aviation” (commonly called the “hijack” or “abduction” of the aircraft by third parties) also made in order to use the aircraft as a tool of a terrorist attack from the air. How-

13 Zob. M. Glanc, Glosa do wyroku TK z dnia 30 września 2008 r., Sygn akt 44/07, “Gdań- skie Studia Prawnicze – Przegląd Orzecznictwa” 2010, No. 2, p. 215 and next. 14 A. Ważny, op.cit.; see also: Uzasadnienie rządowego projektu ustawy, the Sejm Doku- ment No. 2523. 356 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 ever, Poland is not the only state that introduced the above regulation. Simi- lar provisions were also adopted in Germany in 2005 or in Russia in 2006. In Germany they caused a lot controversy and were questioned before the Fed- eral Constitutional Tribunal which found them unconstitutional. The issue of using weapon by the state against a civil aircraft is particularly controversial because it involves a conflict between the right of the state to use force in certain circumstances in order ensure security of the state and its obligation to respect the fundamental rights of every human being – the right to life and the right to safety. These rights have been clearly expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and then confirmed in the acts of the Council of Europe and the European Union. Art. 30 of the Polish Constitution provides that the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens are based on the inherent and inalienable dignity of the person which shall be inviolable. The respect and protection thereof shall be the obligation of public authorities. All these became an argument that the use of weapons against civil aircraft with passengers on board shall be not permitted as it violates the fundamental constitutional standards of a democratic state. Accepting such way of thinking, the First President of the Supreme Court referred to the Constitutional Tribunal with a request to review the constitutionality of art. 122a of the Aviation Law, particularly to check its compliance with art. 2, art. 26, art. 30, art. 31 p. 3 and art. 38 of the Constitution. He pointed out that the destruction of a civil aircraft was associated with causing death of people onboard, therefore, the order issued by the Minister of National Defense would de facto mean deliberate killing of people who were not aggressors. The right to life, protected by the Constitution, is not absolute, however, its limitation in case of conflict with other legally protected values must respect the principles of proportionality, appropriateness and subsidi- arity of legal regulation according to art. 31 par. 3 of the Constitution. It was also pointed out that art. 122a of the Aviation law made a general reference to the abstract concept of “state security” and art. 18b of the Law on the state border protection to the concept of “security reasons”. The reference was also made to the concepts of “terrorist attack” and “illegal activities” which were unspecified and, above all, did not indicate the type of goods or values that could be protected at the expense of the lives of passengers onboard. Such reg- Anna Rytel-Warzocha • State Security and the Constitutionally Protected... 357 ulation did not fit the standards of the proportional principle and, moreover, was opposed to an absolute obligation to respect human dignity. On 30 September 2008, the Constitutional Tribunal decided on the unconstitutionality of art. 122a of the Aviation law as it violated the requirements of a democratic state ruled by law15. The Tribunal pointed out that there was an insurmountable barrier in the interference of the state in its citizens’ rights and freedoms and also the terrorism should be fought with respect for individual rights. What is more, the constitutional guarantees of human rights become particularly important in a crisis situation and art. 122a, under the banner of the fight against terrorism, allowed for intentional homicide. Delib- erate killing cannot be a part of war against terrorism, even if it aims to protect other lives. The principle of respect for the inherent and inalienable dignity of the human is considered the most important constitutional value in a democratic state ruled by law. As it has been rightly pointed out by the Tribunal, the man should be treated by public authorities as a free and autonomous entity, having full right to shape his behavior. No exceptions to this rule are acceptable because it has an absolute character. The Tribunal had no doubt that the application of the above mentioned provision of the Aviation law would result in depersonification and reification of passengers on board of the aircraft classified as renegade. The law in question was also considered to violate the right to life guaranteed by art. 38 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Tribunal indicated that the content of the constitutional protection of human life is twofold. On one hand, it has been formulated in a positive way and requires the state to do everything possible to enable the realization of the right to life by all persons. On the other hand, it can be perceived in a negative way, which means, that the state should refrain from any actions that could violate that right. Providing state authorities with the right of the deliberate deprivation of life in the name of its protection would be de facto the negation of the essence of this right.

15 The decision of the Constitutional Tribunal of 30 September 2008, Case No. K 44/07. See also: M. Glanc, op.cit., J. Kulesza, Glosa do wyroku TK z dnia 30 września 2008 r., K 44/07, “Państwo i Prawo” 2009, Issue 9, p. 122 and next; F. Ludwin, Glosa do wyroku TK z 30.09.2008 r. K 44/07, “Przegląd Prawniczy Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego” 2011, No. 1–2, p. 287 and next. 358 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Art. 122a of the Aviation law was also found incompatible with the principle of a democratic state ruled by law expressed in art. 2 of the Constitution, in particular because it was not sufficiently specified. The Tribunal pointed out that while determining the conditions allowing to shoot down a civil aircraft with passengers onboard the legislator used concepts, such as “national security”, “activities contrary to the law” or “terrorist attack”, which did not have a legal definition and were differently interpreted by the doctrine. This could lead to excessive freedom in determining the substantive scope of the challenged provision. As a result of the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal, art. 122a of the Aviation law lost its binding force at the moment of the publication of the judgment in the Official Journal of Laws. However, there is still legal possibility to shoot down a civil aircraft according to provisions specified in art. 18b of the Law on the state border protection. According to art. 18b par. 2c in connection to par. 2a, in the event of failure to comply with any of the calls and com- mands, the foreign civil aircraft can be destroyed by shooting down if there are no people onboard or there are only terrorist. Such solution is theoretically rational, although in practice the ability to shoot down such aircraft is supposed to be very limited, because the entity authorized to make such decision – the Operational Commander of the Armed Forces – will be rarely able to establish with certainty that there are no third parties apart from terrorist on board. Especially during a terrorist attack there is a high risk of mistake. The experts also point out that the above regulation may also have a negative result, as it will provide an additional incentive for potential assassins to take hos- tages on board, as well as terrorists may deliberately mislead the security authorities that there are other persons on board. As a result, this provision has a great chance not to have any practical application. It should be also noticed that the representatives of the Polish Army have pos- tulated changes to the law. They have found the current legal regulations relating to, among others, defense against terrorist threats from the air insufficient and have proposed the adoption of a comprehensive law on the Polish air defense. The working draft was prepared by the Operational Command of the Armed Forces. At the meeting of the parliamentary defense committee the Operational Com- mander of the Armed Forces pointed out that the condition of the air defense in Poland greatly hampers the tasks of the minister of national defense to undertake actions aimed to secure facilities and populations against terrorist threats from the Anna Rytel-Warzocha • State Security and the Constitutionally Protected... 359 air. He has emphasized the urgent need to adopt legislation regulating the issues of the air defense of the country as there is no possibility to response to asymmet- ric threats from the air at the moment. The current legislation also does not refer to potential cases of a terrorist attack which would use a plane hijacked just after taking off from a Polish airport so has not crossed the state border. “Preliminary draft” of law on the air defenses of Poland was commissioned by the Ministry of National Defense. In May 2014 the Council of Ministers also started to work on the amendment of the law on state borders protection and the law on the general duty to defend the Republic of Poland16. The aim of the regulation was to introduce legislation regulating to, inter alia, the decision-making process of warning shots and warning about the destruction of the aircraft in the Polish airspace17. However, these legislative works stopped after the parliamentary elections in Autumn 2015 which were lost by the then ruling party. Nevertheless, as a conclusion it should be pointed out that the problem of the relation between the two values – the state security and the constitutionally protected right to life is still current. So far, the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland has clearly stated that it is unacceptable in the light of standards applied in a democratic state ruled by law to deliberately sacrifice the lives of innocent individual people in order to protect the common good. However, the new wave of terrorism that has affected Europe and World at the beginning of XXIst century allows to expect that the problem can appear again in a critical situation in which the above mentioned conflict willde facto mean the need to make a choice between the protection of the right to life of an individual and the protection of lives of many people.

Literature

Banaszak B., Konstytucja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Warszawa 2009. Glanc M., Glosa do wyroku TK z dnia 30 września 2008 r., Sygn akt 44/07, “Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze – Przegląd Orzecznictwa” 2010, No. 2.

16 Law of 21 November 1967 on the general duty to defend the Republic of Poland, published in the Official Journal of Laws 1967, No. 44, item 220, with later amendments. 17 See: http://bip.kprm.gov.pl/kpr/form/r1349,Zalozenia-projektu-ustawy-o-zmianie- ustawy-o-ochronie-granicy-panstwowej-oraz-us.html (14.10.2016). 360 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Jaraczewski J., Bezpieczeństwo państwa jako wartość chroniona w konstytucji RP, [In:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w pierwszych dekadach XXI wieku wobec wy- zwań politycznych, gospodarczych, technologicznych i społecznych, ed. S. Biernat, Warszawa 2013. Karp J., Bezpieczeństwo państwa, [In:] Konstytucja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz encyklopedyczny, eds. W. Skrzydło, S. Grabowska, R. Grabowski, Warszawa 2009. Kulesza J., Glosa do wyroku TK z dnia 30 września 2008 r., K 44/07, “Państwo i Prawo” 2009, Issue 9. Ludwin F., Glosa do wyroku TK z 30.09.2008 r. K 44/07, “Przegląd Prawniczy Uniwer- sytetu Warszawskiego” 2011, No. 1–2. Sarnecki P., Uwagi do art. 31, [In:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, T. IV, ed. L. Garlicki, Warszawa 2005. Ważny A., Zestrzelenie samolotu cywilnego typu renegade w ocenie TK, “Edukacja Prawnicza” 2009, No. 10 (109) Wołpiuk W.J., Bezpieczeństwo państwa i pojęcia pokrewne. Aspekty konstytucyjnoprawne, [In:] Krytyka prawa. Niezależne studia nad prawem. Vol. II: Bezpieczeństwo, ed. W. Sokolewicz, Warszawa 2010. Żylicz M., Zestrzelenie cywilnego statku powietrznego jako delikt prawa międzynarodowe- go, “Państwo i Prawo” 2009, Issue 6. Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.20 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Dominik Szczepański1

The reasons of invalidity of votes in elections to voivodeship councils in 2014 in the light of the study of voting papers in the National Archive in Kielce

Keywords: spoilt votes, municipal elections, voivodeship council, voting papers study Słowa kluczowe: głosy nieważne, wybory samorządowe, sejmik wojewódzki, badanie kart wyborczych

Summary The aim of the article is to present results of the study done on voting papers in the Na- tional Archive in Kielce, that concerns the phenomenon and reasons of spoilt votes in the elections to voivodeship councils in 2014. 29 electoral districts that included: 10 districts from the Lesser Poland voivodeship, 7 from the Lublin voivodeship, 6 from Sub- carpathian voivodeship and 6 from the Holy Cross voivodeship, were subjected to a detailed analysis. Apart from exact indication of the reasons for spoilt votes in elections to voivodeship councils themselves a detailed classification of those votes was done by dividing them into votes with excessive “x” signs, empty votes, votes with other signs than “x”, votes with multiple “x” signs and strikethroughs, protest votes and the so-called different votes. On this basis a description of regional differentiation of those votes was made. The whole study was done within the framework of the research project “Your vote, your choice”, realized by Stefan Batory Foundation in collaboration with the National Elector- al Office, the National Election Commission and the Head Office of the State Archives.

1 The author is a PhD in Institut of Political Science of the Faculty of Sociology and History of University of Rzeszow. E-mail: [email protected]. 362 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Streszczenie

Przyczyny nieważności głosów w wyborach do sejmików województw w 2014 r. w świetle badania kart wyborczych w Archiwum Państwowym w Kielcach

Celem artykuły było przedstawienie wyników z przeprowadzonego badania kart wyborczych w Archiwum Państwowym w Kielcach dotyczącego zjawiska i przyczyn gło- sów nieważnych w wyborach do sejmików województw w 2014 r. Szczegółowej analizie poddano 29 obwodów wyborczych, na które złożyły się: 10 obwodów wyborczych z wo- jewództwa małopolskiego, 7 z województwa lubelskiego, 6 z województwa podkarpac- kiego i 6 z województwa świętokrzyskiego. Oprócz szczegółowego wskazania samych powodów nieważności głosów w wyborach do sejmików województw dokonano szczegółowej klasyfikacji tychże głosów z ich po- działem na głosy z nadmiarowymi znakami „x”, głosy puste, głosy stanowiące inny znak niż „x”, głosy z wieloma znakami „x” i przekreśleniami, głosy protestu i tzw. głosy różne. Na tej podstawie dokonano charakterystyki zróżnicowania terytorialnego tych głosów. Całość badania realizowana była w ramach projektu badawczego pt. „Masz Głos, Masz Wybór” zrealizowanego przez Fundację im. Stefana Batorego we współpracy z Krajo- wym Biurem Wyborczym, Państwową Komisją Wyborczą oraz Naczelną Dyrekcją Ar- chiwów Państwowych.

The municipal elections held in 2014 raised a series of controversies because of at least several mutually correlated factors. Firstly, the system of electronic counting of votes developed by Nabino company failed, which significantly prolonged the time of waiting for the announcement of the official results by the National Election Commission2.

2 A direct consequence of the prolonged time of waiting for the election results was resignation of almost all judges of the National Election Commission from the office. This situation also lead to arising by Polish President Bronisław Komorowski the issue of stabilizing personal and organisational situation of the Commission; introduction of terms of office of Dominik Szczepański • The Reasons of Invalidity of Votes in Elections... 363 Secondly, there appeared a quite significant discrepancy between exit poll results, given by IPSOS, and eventually election results, due to which a large number of commentators of the political scene, as well as party leaders argued about “doctored” or “distorted” elections or “irregularities”, “malpractice” and “unreliability” of counting the votes. This discrepancy concerned in particular Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Peasants Party), which noted significantly higher social support in elections to voivodeship councils than it was expected in surveys. Thirdly, after municipal elections in 2014 attention was paid to the relatively high percentage of spoilt votes, which amounted nearly 2,5 million votes, so almost 18% of all the votes casted. As pointed by Adam Gendźwiłł “some commentators related this increase with the change of voting papers, namely their booklet structure”. Which in consequence could contribute to misleading the citizens who came to ballot box to cast votes3. A source of additional confusion that appeared in relation to the analysis of municipal election results in 2014 was the fact of not providing by PWK (Na- tional Election Commission) protocols with information about the reasons of spoilt votes as well as their detailed classification. This situation resulted directly from the Election Code that had been in force since 2011, in which the previous duty to provide, detailed information concerning the reasons of spoilt votes in protocols of Precinct Election Commissions was withdrawn, due to which it was not possible to compare these proportions with municipal election results from previous years. The previously mentioned imponderabilia contributed in 2015 to initiation of the research project “Your vote, your choice”, realised by the Stefan Batory Foundation in collaboration with the National Electoral Office, the National Election Commission and the Head Office of the State Archives. Its originators were 13 experts – political scientists, sociologists and lawyers from the area of electoral issues, who represented academic centres from Warsaw, Cracow, Torun and Wroclaw. Among the most important assumptions, that laid the foundation of this project, was getting answers for the following questions: what were the reasons of the high ratio of spoilt votes casted during munici- the judges as well as the Commission members, strengthening position of the Commission Head as well as updating the Election Code. 3 A. Gendźwiłł, Skąd się biorą głosy nieważne w wyborach do sejmików województw?, “Studia socjologiczne” 2015, No. 4, p. 54. 364 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 pal elections in 2014? What influence on the final result of the elections had the new sort of voting papers in a form of a booklet? What actions should be undertaken in future to avoid similar situation? For the needs of the abovementioned research a special procedure was assumed, according to which election papers from randomly chosen sample of 1000 polling stations from all of 27 435 polling stations in Poland and then 100 electoral districts were chosen at random, that provided material for a detailed study. The following analysis comprise only a fragmentary sample of all-Poland study of election papers, which was done in the National Archive in Kielce 5–9 October 2015. Altogether, 29 electoral districts from Lublin, Lesser Po- land, Subcarpathian and Holy Cross voivodeships were subjected to the study. The body of experts consisted of the employees of the Department of Politi- cal Science at the University of Rzeszow: prof. dr hab. Radosław Grabowski, prof. dr hab. Sabina Grabowska, dr Tomasz Koziełło and dr Dominik Szcze- pański, supported by students associated in Kołe Naukowe Politologów (Aca- demic Circle of Political Science) of the University of Rzeszow: Dominik Bo- ratyn, Karol Piękoś, Jacek Sułuja and Damian Wicherek4. The basis for presenting the results of the studies done comprised documents from the National Archive in Kielce, as well as reports prepared by experts from the Stefan Bathory Foundation.

II.

Before one can discuss conclusions of the research on causes of the appearance of spoilt votes during the municipal elections of 2014 based on the analysis of ballots from the National Archives in Kielce, it is important to explain the meaning of what is understood as a spoilt vote5.

4 A. Gendźwiłł, M. Cześnik, J. Flis, J. Haman, A. Materska-Sosnowska, B. Michalak, P. Pietrzyk, J. Zbieranek, Nieważne głosy, ważny problem. Wyniki badania kart do głosowania z wyborów do sejmików województw 2014, Warszawa 2016, p. 13. The document is available also on the website of the foundation: http://www.batory.org.pl/aktualnosci/prezentacja_rapor- tu_niewazne_glosy_wazny_problem (15.11.2016). 5 P. Śleszyński, Hipotezy głosów nieważnych w wyborach powszechnych po 1989 r., “Prze- strzeń społeczna” 2015, No. 2, pp. 60–90. Dominik Szczepański • The Reasons of Invalidity of Votes in Elections... 365 Previous rules of carrying out elections in Poland untill the end of 2010 were regulated by various legal instruments, starting with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland from 2 April 1997, and followed by multitudinous laws and regulations6. They were passed at various times, were often amended, which resulted in limiting their readability and made the whole electoral system inconsequent7. It is worth to agree with Andrzej Stelmach that after 1989 we faced three periods of evolution of the voting systems. Those were: 1) the period of searching (1989–1991); 2) the period of alternate stabilization (1993– 1997–2001), and 3) the period of concentration (2005–2007)8. Only when the Election Code was enacted on 5 January 2011, the methods and conditions of carrying out each of the elections separately was comprehensively regulat- ed9. As the source literature points out, the adoption of the single normative act did not entail broader reflection or a deeper analysis of the effective regulations but only led to complication of the foregoing solutions from the previous regulations in one document with simultaneous complementation and modification of the effectual procedures10.

6 Generally, there were separate legal acts. Elections to the Sejm and the Senate of the Republic of Poland were regulated by the Act of 12 April 2001: Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Journal of Laws 2007, No. 190, item 1360 as amended; presidential elections were regulated by the Act of 27 September 1990 o wyborze Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Journal of Laws 2010, No. 72, item 467 as amended; local self-government elections were regulated by the Act of 16 July 1998: Ordynacja wyborcza do rad gmin, rad powiatów i sejmików województw, Journal of Laws 2010, No. 176, item 1190 as amended and by the Act of 20 June 2002: o bezpośrednim wyborze wójta, burmistrza i prezydenta miasta, Journal of Laws 2010, No. 176, item 1191. On the other hand, elections to the European Parliament were carried out in accordance to the Act of 23 January 2004: Ordynacja wyborcza do Parlamentu Europejskiego, “Journal of Laws” 2004, No. 25, item 219 as amended. 7 As Andrzej Antoszewski pointed out: “in every country that carries out elections, there is a need for a system of rules that extensively regulates the right to active and passive participation in those elections, a method of converting the votes into mandates, and control over the correctness of electoral proceeding”. The totality of cited norms is generally called the electoral system. Idem, System polityczny RP, Warszawa 2012. 8 A. Stelmach, Zmiany prawa wyborczego w Polsce a legitymizacja władzy, [In:] Prawo wyborcze i wybory. Doświadczenia dwudziestu lat procesów demokratyzacyjnych w Polsce, ed. A. Stelmach, Poznań 2010, p. 9 and next. 9 The Act of 5 January 2011 – Election Code, Journal of Laws 2011, No. 21 item 112. 10 D. Sieklucki, Praktyczne konsekwencje zmian samorządowego systemu wyborczego w Ko- deksie wyborczym – uwagi i refleksje na tle wyborów z 2014 roku, “Polityka i Społeczeństwo” 2015, 366 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Not aspiring in this text to analyze the electoral system of local governments, I would like to concentrate on the phenomenon of spoilt votes and on the major reasons why they appear. The scale of this process is highly diversified, and depends on the type of election. As Arkadiusz Ptak pointed out, after the elections to local governments in 2010, the phenomenon of spoilt votes began to be used as one of the political games11. The electoral system functioning untill 2010 in a clear and articulated way specified in what situations we could say that a vote is spoilt. During the city council elections, where usually the majority or quasi-proportionality rule was applied, a vote was considered to be spoilt if on the ballot one wrote “x” next to the names of more candidates than there were to be chosen in a given district, and where there was no “x” written on the ballot next to any of the candidates” names. In other local government elections, where the elections were carried out in accordance with the proportionality rule, a vote was considered to be spoilt if on the ballot there was “x” next to the names of more than one candidate from different lists of candidates, and where there was no “x” written next to any of the candidates” names from the list. Addi- tionally, a vote was considered to be spoilt if the “x” was written next to the name of a candidate who was removed from the list after lists of candidates had been printed. As it was previously mentioned, in the Act of 2011 (The Election Code), the issue of specifying what was considered to be a spoilt vote was omitted. Only as a result of the events connected with the local governments elections of 2014, the Election Code was amended. The prime conclusion included in the Opinion on Amendments to the Act – the Election Code (901) was to “indicate in the protocols prepared by election boards the reasons why given votes were treated as spoilt”12. Thereupon, there was an agreement that there was a need to introduce regulations which obliged election boards to write in their election protocols next to the number of spoilt votes, the reasons why the

No. 3, pp. 83–84; K. Skotnicki, Przebieg prac nad kodeksem wyborczym, [In:] Kodeks wyborczy. Wstępna ocena, ed. K. Skotnicki, Warszawa 2011, p. 33. 11 A. Ptak, Głosy nieważne w elekcjach samorządowych, “Preferencje Polityczne” 2012, No. 4, p. 58. 12 Opinia do ustawy o zmianie ustawy – Kodeks wyborczy (druk nr 901), Warszawa 25.05.2015, p. 2. Dominik Szczepański • The Reasons of Invalidity of Votes in Elections... 367 votes were considered to be spoilt. In the amended Act in chapter 5 concerning the methods of voting and the requirements for validity of a vote, it was stated that a vote is spoilt if on the ballot one wrote “x” in the square on the left next to the name of more than one candidate from different lists of candidates, and where there was no “x” written next to the name of any of the candidates. Moreover, a vote is considered to be spoilt if there is “x” written in the square next to the name of a candidate whose registration has been annulled.

III.

Focusing on the results of the research on the ballots from the voting district elections it is necessary to point out that in 29 voting districts that were analyzed, there was over 2000 spoilt votes in total. According to the protocols of precinct election boards, there was 2336 spoilt votes, however, according to the research, there were only 2188 spoilt votes. The indicated ratio which in total amounted to 148 votes varied from province to province. In Lublin Province, the protocols from the precinct election boards showed 521 spoilt votes, but the research found only 489. In the Lesser Poland voivodeship the protocols stated that there were 900 spoilt votes, while the research found 871. Next, in the Subcarpathian voivodeship according to the precinct election boards there were 342 spoilt votes, while the researched found 337. The ratio of spoilt votes in the Holy Cross voivodeship according to the protocols of the precinct election boards was 573, and according to the calculations of the researchers, there were 82 spoilt votes less, so in total there were 491 spoilt votes. The data is presented in detail in Table 1. The most interesting research problem was to find the reason behind such a big number of spoilt votes in the analyzed voting districts. Of course, determining the reason why votes were spoilt did not give us reliable information about the intention of the voter. As the authors of the final report about the Polish-nationwide ballot examination pointed out, it was generally assumed that blank ballots were an act of intentional non-voting, and were treated as a manifestation of the alienation of the citizens, who, not knowing who to vote for, submitted ballots with the surplus of marked squares, which was either a result of a mistake made by a voter or of the incorrect information a voter 368 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Table 1. The number of spoilt votes in the studied provinces

Studied Number of examined Number of spoilt votes Number of spoilt votes voivodeship voting districts according to the research according to PWK protocol

Lublin 7 489 521

Lesser Poland 10 871 900

Subcarpathian 6 337 342

Holy Cross 6 491 573

TOTAL: 29 2188 2336

Source: own elaboration based on the analysis of the material from the precinct election boards submitted to the National Archives in Kielce. received about the methods of voting13. From the example presented above it was difficult to univocally determine what were target intentions of voters and what obstacles voters faced that prevented them from successful and correct way of expressing them. In the past, there were many cases of intentional spoilt voting by writing on the ballot various comments or notes. Other examples of such behavior were for example: not checking any of the candidates’ names, crossing out names or crossing out the whole list of candidates14. When it comes to voting techniques in Poland, it is worth pointing out that we have a rather strict method of voting that relies on picking one of the candidates by writing “x” in the square next to his or her name. In reality, one could note creativity in the way the voters vote, namely, in writing symbols different than “x”. Even though the intention was clear, in the official context it was often considered to be a spoilt vote. Due to this fact, within the framework of the “Your Vote, Your Choice” program the spoilt votes were classified in detail. In such a way the following were distinguished: ballots with multiple crosses – ballots that had multiple crosses only in the squares (i.e. voting for multiple candidates); empty ballots – it is a type of ballots where the voter decided not to write “x” or any other symbol next to the name of any of the candidates; other symbol – writ-

13 A. Gendźwiłł, M. Cześnik, J. Flis, J. Haman, A. Materska-Sosnowska, B. Michalak, P. Pietrzyk, J. Zbieranek, Nieważne głosy,..., pp. 63–64. 14 Ibidem, p. 64. Dominik Szczepański • The Reasons of Invalidity of Votes in Elections... 369 Table 2. Reasons behind the invalidity of votes from provincial elections of 2014 in the light of research on ballots in the National Archives in Kielce

Studied Multiple Blank Other Ballot with multiple symbols in Protest Other voivodeship crosses ballots symbol the squares or with crossing outs ballots

Lublin 231 236 11 7 4 -

Lesser Poland 367 472 18 2 7 5

Subcarpathian 148 171 5 4 9 -

Holy Cross 324 145 13 - 3 6

1070 1024 47 13 23 11 TOTAL: 2188

Source: Own elaboration based on the analysis of the material from the precinct election boards submitted to the National Archives in Kielce. ing other, so called illicit symbols (other than “x”); ballots with multiple symbols in the squares or ballots with crossing outs – writing on the ballot multiple crosses or other symbols in the squares or other places that often express creativity of voters (comments, doodles); other – this category is understood as more than one reason of invalidity of a vote (i.e. multiple symbols other than “x” written in the squares or in other places), and the so called protest ballots – ballots that have one or more names crossed out, or even the whole list of candidates is crossed out, or comments and drawings that tend to indicate an act of protest15. From the research of ballots from the National Archives in Kielce it could be concluded that the biggest number of spoilt votes was connected with writing multiple crosses on the ballot and with submitting empty ballots, and there was a visibly smaller number of ballots with different symbols, multiple symbols in the square or outside it, and crossing outs, other ballots and protest ballots. Noting the territorial diversity of submitting spoilt votes (see Table 2), it is necessary to point out that most of them could be found in Lesser Poland voivodeship, where there were 472 empty ballots, 367 multiple “x” ballots, 18 ballots with other symbol than “x”, 7 ballots with multiple “x” and crossing outs, 6 protest

15 Ibidem. 370 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 ballots and 2 so called other ballots. The second when it comes to the number of spoilt votes is the Holy Cross voivodeship, where there were 145 empty ballots, and almost twice as many ballots with multiple crosses (324), and also 13 ballots with other symbols, 6 protest ballots and 3 ballots with multiple symbols in the squares and outside them or with crossing outs. On the other hand, in Lublin voivodeship there was a small difference between the number of ballots with multiple crosses and empty ballots. The ratio was 231 to 236, and here it is necessary to point out that in the analyzed voting districts from the area there were no protest ballots. However, there were 11 ballots classified as other symbol, 7 other ballots and 4 ballots with multiple symbols in the square or outside it and with crossing outs. On the other hand, in the Subcarpathian voivodeship there were 148 ballots with multiple crosses, 171 ballots, 9 classified as ballots with multiple symbols in the square or outside it and with crossing outs, 6 belonging to other symbol category, and 4 other ballots. The research of the ballots from this province did not find any protest ballots.

IV.

The conclusion that emerges from the study of 29 precinct election boards com- plies with the thesis presented by the experts from the Stefan Batory Foundation, according to which one of the two most important reasons of the invalidity of votes in the provincial assembly elections of 2014 was writing more than one “x” symbols on the ballots in the squares next to the names of candidates from various lists16. The number of such ballots was as many as 1070. The second important reason of invalidity of votes, similarly like in the elections of 2006 and 2010, was submitting blank ballots, which meant the lack of choosing a candidate. In the case of analyzed provinces, the number of empty ballots was 1024. In the case of other reasons for invalidity of votes which are classified as a symbol other than “x”, ballots with multiple symbols in the squares or with crossing outs, other ballots treated as more than one reason of invalidity, e.g. multiple symbols other than “x” written in the squares or outside them, and the protest votes distinguished by, for example crossing out the name or the whole list of candidates, there had only a very small influence on the growth of the total number of spoilt votes.

16 Ibidem, p. 85 and next. Dominik Szczepański • The Reasons of Invalidity of Votes in Elections... 371 Focusing on the two biggest reasons of invalidity of votes from the provincial assembly elections of 2014, one could come up with a few important conclusions. Firstly, the citizens participating in the voting wrote “x” on every list, and as the research showed, at least a few “x” symbols on the same list. It was caused by the lack of sufficient information concerning the voting techniques or confusing voting instructions provided by the National Elec- tion Commission, or it was conscious and intentional act of the voter, who in such a way wanted to show that he or she participates in the voting process with the intention of submitting a spoilt vote. Secondly, because of such a great number of blank ballots it was difficult to make a synthetic and substantive analysis since the empty ballots turned out to be material that had a lot of unknown factors. On that basis, one could only form hypothesis relating for example to the tradition of voting. The citizens who put their ballots into the ballot box presented the interest only in the organs elected directly in their town. Generally, those were: president, vogt, mayor, less often the city council, town council and powiat council. The provincial assembly was in the last place. It was mostly caused by the lack of interest and understanding of the role and duties of the organ, and treating it as a distant and shady institution. Third, submitting spoilt votes could also function as an act of disapproba- tion of the current polity, the politicians themselves and their parties, showing disappointment of social, political and economic situation of the country, or could be caused by discontent connected with the situation present in the town the voters live. Regardless of the reasons mentioned here concerning spoilt votes, it would be difficult to start divagations concerning intentional and unintentional voting behaviors of citizens, which in accordance with their mood, personal political beliefs and many other factors, eventually influenced them to participate in voting.

Literature

Antoszewski A., System polityczny RP, Warszawa 2012. Gendźwiłł A., Skąd się biorą głosy nieważne w wyborach do sejmików województw?, “Studia socjologiczne” 2015, No. 4. Gendźwiłł A., Cześnik M., Flis J., Haman J., Materska-Sosnowska A., Michalak B., Pie- trzyk P., Zbieranek J., Nieważne głosy, ważny problem. Wyniki badania kart do głoso- wania z wyborów do sejmików województw 2014, Warszawa 2016. 372 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Ptak A., Głosy nieważne w elekcjach samorządowych, “Preferencje Polityczne” 2012, No. 4. Sieklucki D., Praktyczne konsekwencje zmian samorządowego systemu wyborczego w Kod- eksie wyborczym – uwagi i refleksje na tle wyborów z 2014 roku, “Polityka i Społec- zeństwo” 2015, No. 3. Skotnicki K., Przebieg prac nad kodeksem wyborczym, [In:] Kodeks wyborczy. Wstępna ocena, ed. K. Skotnicki, Warszawa 2011. Stelmach A., Zmiany prawa wyborczego w Polsce a legitymizacja władzy, [In:] Prawo wyborcze i wybory. Doświadczenia dwudziestu lat procesów demokratyzacyjnych w Polsce, ed. A. Stelmach, Poznań 2010. Śleszyński P., Hipotezy głosów nieważnych w wyborach powszechnych po 1989 r., “Przestrzeń społeczna” 2015, No. 2. PART II

REVIEWS, REPORTS

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.21 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Review

Very important issue is an Analysis of the area associated with the position of the head of state in political system, including its competence in authority over the armed forces and the security of the Polish Constitutional Law in the years 1918–2015 Comprehensive analysis of the above issues also in combination with the two-tier nature of the executive power, it has not been thoroughly deliberated in the Polish legal science. In this publication written by Ph. D Krystian Nowak, legal and historical aspects of Head of state have been treated comprehensive and structured. These issues are discussed across the board – it covers the legal status since Poland regained independence until the time designated by Constitution of 2 April 1997. Book layout is clear and chapters are characterized by high scientific value. The publication consists of four chapters divided into sections, preced- ed by substantial introduction and crowned with final remarks. The title was circled precisely because it clearly indicates that main topic of this thesis is the powers of head of state in terms of supremacy over the armed forces and state security in Polish constitutional law. The introduction explain basic concepts, principles and essence of the competence of the head of state in terms of supremacy over the armed forc- 376 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 es and state security. This concrete considerations that authority over the armed forces due to the power including the possibility of enforcement of decisions, including the use of state coercion. The author also indicates that addressed security issues, they understood both as a problem of external and internal state security. The first chapter named: “Competence of the head of state in terms of supremacy over the armed forces and state security in the Second Polish Republic” (pp. 16–95), focuses on discussing the superior institution of the armed forces, being subject from the interwar period, a significant re-evaluation. The author indicates that the first function was performed by the Chief of State, respectively President of the Republic acting on the basis of the Con- stitution of March, and the turn president, whose position was formed April Constitution. The second chapter named: “Competence of the head of state in terms of supremacy over the armed forces and state security during the so-called Pol- ish People’s Republic”, discusses the competencies in the period after World War II. The author in the above section shows that the institution of the Pres- ident was involved in the mechanism of the then political system primarily for propaganda purposes aimed indicate the continuity of its political system. In a third chapter named “The President of the Republic of Poland Com- petitions In area of authority over armed forces and country security during a provisional constitution of a Third Reublic of Poland” (pp. 182–187) Pres- idents competitions in area of the authority over armed forces and security during system transformation have been subject to comprehensive discussion. Last fourth chapter has been named “The Presidents of the Republic of Poland Competitions In area of authority over armed forces and country security In the Third Republic of Poland under the Constitution of aprill 2” (p. 188–269). In this chapter, author focused on an approval at this time, system arrangments which state President as a country guard. Monography is ended with the “Concluding remarks”, in which author were trying to summarise studied arrangments. Layout of the book is logical and clear. The order of the chapters is correct and allows the proper visibility of the issues discussed. As an asset to be Review • Krystian Nowak, Kompetencje głowy państwa w zakresie... 377 considered the introduction of a cross-cutting in the vertical dimension, due to the fact that each chapter is based on objective changes in systemic and political. Monography is written with an interesting, good language and great knowledge of the analyzed issues. The technique written is correct, footnotes are prepared in accordance with the standards. Individual issues Author presented with great erudition, but also with scientific detachment, which is undoubtedly advantage of the reviewed work. Selection and use of the sources should be considered as appropriate. Bib- liography is making a very good impression, because of the diversity and the number selected by the author of legislation and studies. Without a doubt the author took advantage of the wealth of sources and studies to provide the research issues. Analysis of the complexity of the matter in question-reviewed publication leads to the conclusion that-reviewed publication was based on a solid scientific workshop. The author showed his eloquence, thorough legal knowledge and knowledge of the issues discussed. The main advantages of the reviewed publication is its intrinsic merit, relevance and a wide range of material relating to the competence of the head of state in terms of supremacy over the armed forces and state security in the Polish constitutional law. The reviewed publication is undoubtedly a commendable position which is shown in its substantive content. Monography written by Ph. D Krystian Nowak include a comprehensive study presenting the institution of the head of state as the head of the army and the political system in detail discussing the position of head of state in the aspect of national security in the Polish constitutional law. Bogusław Ulijasz SWPS University in Warsaw

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.22 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Report

The National Scientific Conference of the Solicitors’ Professional Self-government The Constitution in a Democratic State, Poznań, 21–22 October 2016

The National Scientific Conference of the Solicitors’ Professional Self-government on the issue of ‘The Constitution in a Democratic State’ took place in Poznań (Poland) on 21–22 October this year. This event was an opportunity for a common discussion of legal practitioners and academics on the matter, which is subject of current interests in contemporary Poland again. The Conference’s agenda had predicted six separate panels, which consisted of mini lectures of academics and a discussion. These discussions, in which each member of the publicity could take part, met with the highest level of interest and sometimes equally high emotions. The opening speeches of hosts’ representatives defined the main issue of considerations being made during the Conference. Firstly, it was said, that the problem of assigning primacy of political will upon the applicable legal order is once more current in Polish reality. Secondly, the common voice of legal pro- fessionals (both academics and practitioners) shall be heard by the authority and revived their inaccurate views on the state and constitutional law order. The first panel was devoted to the issue of government system in Poland from the perspective of the model of executive power1. In accordance to the

1 Moderator of this panel was prof. J. Ciapała (University of Szczecin). The panellists were: prof. D. Dudek (Catholic University in Lublin), prof. S. Patyra (Maria Curie-Skłodows- 380 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 moderator’s thesis that the expression ‘executive power’ is rather inappropriate to contemporary state order conditions, prof. D. Dudek emphasized that the classical separation of powers, based on the Montesquieu’s theory, is wrong. Not only because it has to be completed by the principle of power’s cooperation, but moreover it shall be reduced to dual-separation. The Sejm, the Senat and the Council of Ministers (with its administration) shall be collectively called and regarded as politically-creative power, while courts, tribunals and the Ombudsman shall be collectively understood as power of control and protection. In fact, the Polish state system functions in such shape. The next lecturer prof. S. Patyra said, that the previous evolution of Prime Minister’s office indicates, that without his strong and autonomous position it is rather impossible to establish rationalized parliamentary cabinet system. The only practitioner in politics among the lecturers was prof. H. Suchocka, who emphasized that contemporary considerations upon the model of executive power are indeed searching for a model of good governance, which could not be effective without the creation of stable political and legal culture. The last lecturer was prof. M. Wiszowaty, who decided to show the problem of president’s necessity in a parliamentary system, by leading the audience through the presidential myths (falsifying them). He concluded that in an American system a president is a central and obviously necessary element of the state structure, but in a parliamentary system it is not so obvious and a well-designed state could function without a head of state. After these lectures, the discussion began. It focused on the most effective and stable version of state’s power separation. The second panel was devoted to the issue of the role and tasks of legislative power2. The first lecturer prof. R. Grabowski indicated that in the aspect of constitutional norms and standards the Sejm’s position is stable, but in the political aspect it constantly changes a lot. This conclusion and all Sej- m’s relations to other state’s authorities deny the legitimacy of a thesis that ka University in Lublin), prof. H. Suchocka (Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań) and prof. M. Wiszowaty (University of Gdańsk). 2 Moderator of this panel was prof. W. Orłowski (Maria Curie-Skłodowska Univer- sity in Lublin). The panellists were: prof. R. Grabowski (University in Rzeszów), prof. M. Jabłoński (University of Wroclaw), PhD J. Juchniewicz (University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn) and prof. A. Młynarska-Sobaczewska (Polish Academy of Science). Report • The National Scientific Conference of the Solicitors’ Professional... 381 the Sejm is omnipotent. An important element of Sejm’s position is its legislative power, but in a democratic state it ought to be considered through the prism of citizens’ impact on a legislative process. These issues were the essence of prof. M. Jabłoński’s lecture, who analyzed all legal institutions which guarantee above-mentioned citizens’ impact. However, the scope of them is rather wide, as only two are really effective – right of access to public information and freedom of assembly. Another aspect of the Sejm’s position was analyzed by PhD J. Juchniewicz, who tried to explain practical issues of opposition co-executions of Sejm’s control upon the rest of state authorities, mostly the Council of Ministers. She assessed that the opposition does not have any political or legal institutions, which allow to execute government responsibility. The only legal tool of a great effectiveness is a right of access to public information. It means that the opposition, when the government hold the support of the majority in a lower chamber, is in the position similar to the citizens. Closing remarks were made by prof. A. Młynarska-Soba- czewska, who considered some chosen aspects of parliamentary legislative process. She noticed two reasons of a dissatisfying standard of law and incre- asing amount of bills in Poland. The first is a sectoral way of preparing projects, which determines their lack of general coordination with a legal system, and the second – is a lack of juridification of legislator’s position in acts of an appropriate legal position. These two issues create chaos in the process of legislation and influence the standard of law badly. After these lectures, the discussion began. It came to the conclusion, that the legislators (and politicians also) shall remember not to prepare too much law and that the law is rather created by those, who applied it, than by those, who wrote it in legal provisions. The third panel was devoted to the issue of the electoral law and elec- tions3. Thanks to the first speaker W. Hermeliński listeners could meet with the proposal of changes in Polish electoral law. An idea to change the composition of the State Electoral Commission from nine judges to three judges

3 Moderator of this panel was prof. A. Stelmach (University of Adam Mickiewicz in Poznań). The panellists were: W. Hermeliński (the Constitutional Tribunal judge and the Chairman of the State Electoral Commission), PhD K. Urbaniak (University of Adam Mick- iewicz in Poznań) and prof. P. Uziębło (University in Gdańsk). Unfortunately prof. S. Gebe- thner (University of Warsaw) could not be present due to his health conditions. 382 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 and six politicians was noted as the most important. A current construction guarantees a reliable electoral process, which is based on the judge’s independence, which is fully appreciated by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the European Tribunal of Human Rights in a whole sequence of their judgements. The proposed changes will surely infringe this guarantee. Se- condly, the lecturer showed some technical proposals, which inter alia predict a new way of voting by a special voting machines. After these strictly practical ideas, PhD K. Urbaniak presented a various thesis about one of the main principle of electoral law – the principle of proportionality. He indicated, how this principle could be realised and what kind of results its completion would create. Most of the listeners, who do not work with that issue daily, were rather surprised, how deeply a change in realization of this principle, which does not require amendments to the constitution, could modify results of the general elections. The next lecturer prof. P. Uziębło also presents the various aspects of another electoral principle, but this time – the principle of equality in elections. This principle was presented with the context of its origin and its references to the general principle of equality. He specified that the equality may be understood in two ways – in a real sense and in a potential sense. This distinction does not only have a theoretical importance, because each of them create other possibilities of shaping electoral regulations and these regulations will define a real power of a single vote in the process of global electoral decision’s creation. After these three lectures, the discussion began. The member of the publicity asked inter alia about other proposals of changes in the electoral law such as exclusion of prints and delivery of ballots from a scope of the Public Procurement Law Act of 2004. The fourth panel was devoted to the most significant issue of constitutional judiciary’s model4. It dealt with so called constitutional crisis raised at the turn of the 7th and 8th term of the Polish Parliament. One of the elements of this crisis a dispute on the way of electing constitutional judges, mostly resolving the issue of their choice by the Parliament of a previous term. The first

4 Moderator of this panel was prof. W. Łączkowski (the Constitutional Tribunal judge). The panellists were: prof. B. Banaszak (University of Zielonagóra), prof. M. Chmaj (SWPS University), prof. A. Dziadzio (Jagielonian University in Krakow) and J. Stępień (former Chairman of the Constitutional Tribunal). Report • The National Scientific Conference of the Solicitors’ Professional... 383 lecturer prof. B. Banaszak presented his own theory, which can be reduced to the statement that the process of constitutional judges’ election is not only proceeded by the Sejm and does not finish within a vote, but also consists of a presidential decision of taking oath from elected judges. Moreover, the lecturer denied the possibility of electing judges to spare before the vacancy in the occurred. A very polemical speech to these was presented by prof. M. Ch- maj (the second lecturer), who presented a proper analyse of the acts about the Constitutional Tribunal, proclaimed in 2015 and 2016, with a wide reference to the constitutional judiciary. The core of his thesis was an unambitious manner assumption that the Constitutional Tribunal was created as a defense for the Parliament before its own unconstitutional legislation. The next lecturer, prof. A. Dziadzio, referred to the so called constitutional crisis in the aspect of historical genesis of the constitutional judiciary. He emphasized spe- cially that a very popular argument against the constitutional judiciary was its susceptibility to be politicized. This argument is still used in the public dispute, sometimes the Constitutional Tribunal encourages to make such statements by himself. The last lecturer was J. Stępień, who referred to B. Ban- aszak’s speech. In his view, the thesis that the Chairman of the Constitutional Tribunal is not able to execute Tribunal’s judgement is entirely improper, because all state’s authorities shall enforce these judgements in their own scope of activity. It would be misunderstood to deny his competition to prevent admission to the rule of judges, who were chosen unlawfully, which had been finally decided by the Constitutional Tribunal. After these lectures, a heated debate and controversy began. The main -el ement of a dispute between the panelists and the public was the question of the legal basis of acts upheld by – on the one hand – the Constitutional Tri- bunal and its Chairman, and on the other – by the President and the Sejm of 8th term. In spite of many ideas and solutions of this question, each party remained with their points of view. The fifth panel was devoted to the issue of dimension of justice demanded model5. The first lecturer, prof. A. Bałaban, dealt with the problem of a prop-

5 Moderator of this panel was prof. A. Bereza (Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin). The panellists were: prof. A. Bałaban (University of Szczecin), J. Iwulski (Chairman of the Supreme Court), Ł. Piebiak (undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Justice) and prof. J. Sobczak (SWPS University). 384 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 er legitimization of judiciary in the Polish constitutional law order. He concluded, that there is no need to look for its legitimacy in the way of appointing of judges to their positions, but by referring to the constitutional standards, which prejudice the direct legitimacy of judges from the will of the sovereign adopted in a constitutional referendum. Secondly, the lecturer suggested a change in the understanding of a constitutional term of ‘Minister of Justice’. Nowadays the meaning suggests that the Minister has got some competences in relation to judges, when in reality he has and shall have only administrative power, which could not violate judges’ independence. The next lecturer J. Iwul- ski who analyzed a position and competences of the Polish Supreme Court in a various aspects of its activity. As he noticed, there are four spheres of the Su- preme Court’s activity (supervision of the courts‘ case law, the disciplinary jurisdiction, recognition of appeals from decisions of the Minister of Justice, recognition of appeals from decisions of the National Council of Judiciary). They stabilized the Supreme Court’s position and every single change in this matter could create dysfunctions of its activity. The third lecturer was Ł. Piebiak, who presented some proposals (prepared by the Ministry of Justice) in functioning of common courts. These changes are believed to lead to the exclusion of op- portunism of judges holding senior position, but as the lecturer emphasized this kind of judges’ behavior is potential. The last lecturer prof. J. Sobczak referred to this thesis saying that, it is an obvious attempt to limit the judge’s independence. He also settled these ideas in the long history of more or less successful attempts of limiting the independence of the judiciary in Poland, taken from the last years of a previous age. After these lectures, a heated debate began again. The great majority of listeners could not understand the preparing attempts of changes presented by Ł. Piebiak. Arisen questions related to the impact of proposed changes on the independence of judges and reasons, which laid down as a basis of their creation. The speaker assured that there would not be any negative influence and avoided answering the second question. The last panel was devoted to the issue of human rights and freedoms in the aspects of their protection6. Opening remarks were done by prof. A. Bryk, who

6 Moderator of this panel was prof. T. Gadkowski (University of Adam Mickiewicz in Poznań). The panellists were: prof. A. Bryk (Jagiellonian University in Kraków), prof. H. Report • The National Scientific Conference of the Solicitors’ Professional... 385 described some fundamental contentious points in the debate of constitutional judiciary. The lecturer disagreed with the thesis, that the constitutional courts consciously seek to expand their powers. In his view, it is a result of new, highly political problems subjected to their outcome. So the constitutional courts’ activism is not their own fault. To this thesis referred prof. H. Izdebski, the next lecturer, who described a principle of proportionality as the most effective constitutional criterion of protecting human rights before their violation and limitation. The principle of proportionality, created in German administrative law doctrine and judiciary, is now a common denominator of liberal democratic states, which focused their strength on full actualization of freedom and human rights. The presentation of human liberties and rights protection would not be overall without the reflection of Islamic view on this matter. This view was presented by prof. M. Sadowski, who showed how differently from the Eu- ropean legal culture human rights are perceived in the Islamic legal culture. The lecturer also justified his interests in this matter, noting that it is the challenge of the modern legal world to take into account diversity of Islamic culture from the European one. We could not forget that the amount of Muslims in Europe raises and the need of common legal relation also increases (for instance by unknown problems of the right to marriage between Muslims and followers of other religions). The last lecturer was Z. Rudzińska-Bluszcz, who showed how so called constitutional crisis in Poland reflects on human rights’ protection. She described some representative examples. The most interesting of them was the one, which sourced from the prevention of constraining of the Constitutional Tribunal’s functions, which have to be upheld in its place by the common courts. These courts became the first and the last place to demand the constitutional justice by each entity. The short discussion, concentrated on the influence of Islam culture on the European law, closed the conference. It is a common finding that the conference allowed to understand the rule of primacy of legal order upon each political will. Jan Uniejewski University of Szczecin

Izdebski (SWPS University), prof. M. Sadowski (University of Wroclaw) and Z. Brudzińs- ka-Bluszcz (Coordinator of Strategic Litigation in the Office of the Polish Ombudsman).

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego ------ISSN 2082-1212------DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.23 ------Nr 6 (34)/2016------

Report

The 3rd International Asian Congress, Toruń 18–20 May 2016

On 18–20 May 2016, the 3rd International Asian Congress was held in Toruń. There is no doubt that it is one of the biggest and most significant European events devoted to Asian issues. The scientific part of the Congress took place on 19 and 20 May, while the series of accompanying events began on 18 May. The event was organised by the Asia-Pacific Society, Professor Czesław Moj- siewicz’s International Cooperation Support Fund, the Centre for Eastern Studies, the Kuiavian-Pomeranian Province Marshal’s Office, the Municipal Council of Toruń and the Faculty of Political Science and International Stu- dies of the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń. The plenary meetings began on Thursday, 19 May, at 10:30 a.m. in Artus Dwór in Toruń. During the opening session, addresses were made by, among others, Adam Marszałek, PhD – Head of the Asia-Pacific Society, Profes- sor Joanna Marszałek-Kawa – Scientific Head of the Congress, and some of the invited guests, including Marcin Tatarzyński – Head of the South Asia Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Piotr Całbecki – Marshal of the Kuyavian-Pomeranian Province or Professor Andrzej Tretyn – Presi- dent of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń. Speeches were also delivered by the invited diplomats, including Her Excellency Patricia Ann V. Paez, Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines, His Excellency Bakhrom Ba- baev, charge d’affaires of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Poland, and Ziy- ad Raoof, Representative of the Kurdistan Regional Government to Poland. Moreover, Professor Jerzy Jaskiernia from the Jan Kochanowski University 388 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 in Kielce delivered an inaugural lecture entitled “Challenges and opportunities of the Chinese migration to Europe in the analysis of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe”. The participants of the rd3 International Asian Congress debated at panels, which were divided according to subject matter – sessions were related to, among others, economy, culture, political science, religion or education. Because of the large number of participants, meetings were held in four venues – all of which were located on the Old Town of Toruń – the Kuiavian- -Pomeranian Province Marshal’s Office, the Municipal Council of Toruń, the Business Support Centre and the Centre of Modern Art “Znaki Czasu” (“Signs of Time”). The Congress was accompanied by a number of cultural events, which began on 18 May 2016. Among them were, for example, the In- dia Day held in the House of Scouts in Toruń, which, owing to the personal involvement of Dorota Kamińska-Jones, PhD, and her students, gained co- lourful setting and was praised for its high content-related level. The inhabitants of Toruń and participants of the Congress also came in large numbers to visit the Thailand Day, attended by the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Thailand a number of diplomats. Other events accompanying the Con- gress included book promotions, movie shows in the Centre of Modern Art, a tour of the Living Museum of Gingerbread, a tour of the castle of the Teu- tonic Order with torches, or a presentation of Uzbek cuisine. Thanks to such a wide array of attractions, the guests of the Congress, apart from scientific debates, could find out about new cultures, gaining a lot of valuable information and experience. The scientific part of the Congress was attended by over 500 participants, including 400 conference speakers, who debated within the framework of 43 panels. At each panel, there was the maximum number of seven speeches followed by a lively debate. The first day of the Congress ended with a cere- monial dinner in the Zajazd Staropolski restaurant. The organisers’ intention was to tighten relations between Europe and Asia and to enable the participants to take part in a lively and interdisciplinary debate. The interdisciplinary nature of discussions was reflected in the fact that the Congress attracted a number of specialists from such diverse fields as political science, sociology, linguistics, culture, history or art. They represented both Polish and international academic centres. What needs to be Report • The 3rd International Asian Congress, Toruń 18–20 May 2016 389 emphasised, the organisers did not forget about students, PhD students, and city dwellers – who could freely take part in the meetings. The participant’s speeches will be published in the form of scientific journals by Adam Mar- szałek Publishing House. The next Congress will be held on 17–19 May 2017. Joanna Marszałek-Kawa Natalia Gburzyńska Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

SKOROWIDZ ALFABETYCZNY ZA ROK 2016

Część I. ARTYKUŁY

BALICKI RYSZARD, Geneza republikańskiej głowy państwa w Polsce, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.01, s. 11. BANAŚ MICHAŁ, Prezydenckie zwierzchnictwo nad siłami zbrojnymi w Polsce po 1989 roku, PPK 1(29)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.01.02, s. 41. BIEŃ-KACAŁA AGNIESZKA, Konstytucyjne podstawy prawa do sądu (zasada ustawowej regulacji władzy sądowniczej), PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.01, s. 15. BIEŃ-KACAŁA AGNIESZKA, Legal status of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Ar- med Forces, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.16, s. 297. BORSKI MACIEJ, O potrzebie reformy polskiego systemu stanowienia prawa, PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.04.13, s. 223. BUCZKOWSKI ŁUKASZ, Prawne podstawy aktywności międzynarodowej jednostek samorządu Terytorialnego, PPK 2(30)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.02.05, s. 97. CHMIELARZ-GROCHAL ANNA, Bezpośrednie stosowanie art. 45 ust. 1 Konstytu- cji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.04, s. 67. CIANCIO ADRIANA, The European Central Bank: Issues of Constitutional Law, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.01, s. 13. CZARNY PIOTR, Prawo do sądu w Niemczech, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.09, s. 197. CZEKAŁOWSKA MARIETA, Comparative view of the regulations of environmental protection contained in the constitutions of: Kingdom of Spain, Republic of In- dia and Republic of South Africa, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.06.10, s. 205 CZEKAŁOWSKA MARIETA, Konstytucyjna zasada wolności działalności gospodarczej versus konstytucyjny nakaz ochrony środowiska, PPK 2(30)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.02.09, s. 175. 392 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 CZERNIAK DOMINIKA, Prawo do sądu w sprawach karnych w Konstytucji RP, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.06, s. 129. DANKOWSKI MICHAŁ ZBIGNIEW, Buenos Aires City as an example of a derived autonomy, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.04, s. 79. DĄBROWSKI MARCIN, Prawo do sądu administracyjnego w świetle standardow wy- nikających z treści art. 45 Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.03.05, s. 103. DYŚ IWONA, Dopuszczalność dowodu z podsłuchu w postępowaniu karnym w świe- tle konstytucyjnej wolności i ochrony tajemnicy komunikowania się, PPK 1(29)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.01.04, s. 81. DYŚ-BRANICKA IWONA, Odpłatność wymiaru sprawiedliwości w sprawach cywilnych w świetle konstytucyjnej zasady prawa do sądu, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.15, s. 253. ECKHARDT KRZYSZTOF, Mechanisms of curbing statutory power in a situation of political uniformity of the legislative and executive (comments in the light of RP Constitu- tion of 2 April 1997), PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.15, s. 283. FLORCZAK-WĄTOR MONIKA, O niektórych niedoskonałościach mechanizmu ochrony praw jednostki w postępowaniu przed Trybunałem Konstytucyjnym, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.05, s. 73. FLORCZAK-WĄTOR MONIKA, Prawo do sądu jako prawo jednostki i jako gwaran- cja horyzontalnego działania praw i wolności, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.03, s. 47. GAJDA AGNIESZKA, Important amendments in polish regulation of freedom of assembly, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.18, s. 335. GAJDA AGNIESZKA, Prawo dostępu do sądu w kontekście nadzoru nad działalno- ścią administracyjną sądow powszechnych, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.08, s. 183. GALEWSKA EWA, Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji jako strażnik wolno- ści słowa w radiofonii i telewizji, PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.04.10, s. 171. GRABOWSKA SABINA, People’s initiative of putting a bill before the parliament – Pol- ish case, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.13, s. 247. GRABOWSKI RADOSŁAW, zob.: HALASZ IVAN GRZYBOWSKI MARIAN, Ownership Right – Private vs. Public Aspect, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.11, s. 223. Skorowidz alfabetyczny za rok 2016 393 HALASZ IVAN, GRABOWSKI RADOSŁAW, Hungarian understanding of the division of powers, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.062.03, s. 59. HAŁUB OLGA, Gwarancje praw kulturalnych w krajowym porządku prawnym oraz uni- wersalnym i europejskim systemie ochrony praw człowieka – wybrane problemy, PPK 1(29)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.01.03, s. 63. JABŁOŃSKI MARIUSZ, The authorized entity to perform the constitutional right of public information access – remarks on the grounds of the judgement of the Consti- tutional Tribunal of December 2nd 2015 (SK36/14), PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.17, s. 313. JUCHNIEWICZ JOANNA, O granicach swobody ustawodawcy w kształtowaniu standardow prawa do sądu, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.02, s. 31. JUCHNIEWICZ JOANNA, Odpowiedzialność polityczna ministrów – konieczność czy polityczne awanturnictwo?, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.05.03, s. 39. JUŠKEVIČIŪTĖ-VILIENĖ AGNĖ, Sąd Konstytucyjny Republiki Litewskiej wobec europejskich standardow prawa do sądu, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.15, s. 349. KASPRZYK WOJCIECH, Kodeks wyborczy a konstytucyjny system równości podmio- tów działalności gospodarczej, PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.04.03, s. 41. KŁOPOCKA-JASIŃSKA MARTA, Pojęcie sprawy w świetle art. 6 Konwencji o ochronie praw człowieka i podstawowych wolności, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.13, s. 299. KNAPIŃSKI JOANNA, Rozumienie prawa dostępu do informacji publicznej na gruncie Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.04.11, s. 191. KOZŁOWSKI MACIEJ, Konstytucyjne przesłanki dostępu do służby cywilnej w świetle Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r., PPK 2(30)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.02.04, s. 77. KROLICZEK PAWEŁ, Wybór sędziego sądu konstytucyjnego. Analiza polskiego przypadku na tle porównawczym, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.05.04, s. 53. KUCZMA PAWEŁ, Ubój rytualny jako prawo mniejszości narodowych w Polsce, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.11, s. 181. LEWANDOWSKI PIOTR, Zasada świeckości państwa w Konstytucji i orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego Republiki Włoskiej, PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.04.04, s. 53. LORENCKA MAŁGORZATA, zob.: URBANIAK MONIKA 394 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 ŁAWNICZAK ARTUR, Majowa Jutrzenka czyli gwałt na rodzimym konstytucjonalizmie, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.06, s. 91. ŁOKUCIJEWSKI KRZYSZTOF, A tale of two UK’s European referendums. Some remarks on British history, politics and the constitution, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082- 1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.09, s. 185. MARCZYŃSKA AGNIESZKA, Ewolucja Parlamentu Europejskiego jako instytucji w ustawodawstwie Unii Europejskiej oraz status jego członków – wybrane zagadnienia, PPK 2(30)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.02.07, s. 133. MARSZAŁEK-KAWA JOANNA, Remarks on The System of State Authorities in the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan of 8 December 1992, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.02, s. 35. MICHALAK ANNA, Polski Trybunał Konstytucyjny wobec europejskich standardow prawa do sądu, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.14, s. 329. MICIŃSKA-BOJAREK MAGDALENA, Status umów międzynarodowych w rosyj- skim prawie konstytucyjnym, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.05.13, s. 223. NOWAKOWSKA KATARZYNA, OCHMANN PAWEŁ, Bankowy tytuł egzekucyjny jako instrument realizacji konstytucyjnie gwarantowanego prawa własności, PPK 1(29)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.01.05, s. 101. OCHMANN PAWEŁ, zob.: NOWAKOWSKA KATARZYNA OSYPOWICZ ROBERT, Transformacja prawnokonstytucyjna Republiki Chorwacji do- konana w trakcie procedury monitoringowej Rady Europy, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.14, s. 237. PASTUSZKO GRZEGORZ, Granice autonomii regulacyjnej w regulaminach polskiego parlamentu, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.02, s. 23. PASTUSZKO GRZEGORZ, Sztywna formuła kadencji brytyjskiego parlamentu i jej ustrojowe implikacje, PPK 2(30)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.02.06, s. 115. PAZURA ANNA, UNIEJEWSKI JAN, Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Pod- stawowych Wolności jako fundamentalny akt prawa europejskiego – czy twierdze- nie to nadal zachowuje aktualność?, PPK 2(30)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.02.03, s. 53. POGŁODEK ANDRZEJ, PRZYWORA BOGUSŁAW, Status prawny akyjkatczy (ombudsmana) w Republice Kirgizji, PPK 2(30)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.02.08, s. 153. PRZYWORA BOGUSŁAW, zob.: POGŁODEK ANDRZEJ PUCHTA RADOSŁAW, Problem standardow organizacyjnych i proceduralnych w zakresie sprawowania wymiaru sprawiedliwości w orzecznictwie francuskiej Rady Kon- Skorowidz alfabetyczny za rok 2016 395 stytucyjnej, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.11, s. 245. RADAJEWSKI MATEUSZ, Przejściowa niemożność sprawowania urzędu przez prezydenta RP w świetle Konstytucji i nowej ustawy o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym, PPK 2(30)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.02.01, s. 11. RADEK ROBERT, Executive power in the scandinavian political systems – the problem of minority cabinet in Noway (selected aspects), PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.06, s. 115. ROBL FILHO ILTON, SARLET INGO WOLFGANG, Freedom of Speech in the Fed- eral Constitution of Brazil and the Problem of its Collision with other Fundamen- tal Rights, particularly personality rights, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.07, s. 133. RULKA MARCIN, Regulacja prawna szkockiego referendum niepodłegościowego, PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.04.06, s. 89. RYCHLIK MIKOŁAJ, Mazurek Dąbrowskiego jako polski hymn państwowy – aspekt historyczno-prawny, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.08, s. 125. RYTEL-WARZOCHA ANNA, State Security And The Constitutionally Protected Hu- man Rights And Freedoms In The Light Of The Polish Constitution Of 1997, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.19, s. 349. SAKOWSKA-BARYŁA MARLENA, Konstytucjonalizacja prawa do ochrony danych osobowych w Polsce, PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.04.08, s. 125. SARLET INGO WOLFGANG, zob.: ROBL FILHO ILTON SERWIN-PINDA BOŻENA, Reprezentacja państw członkowskich w Radzie Europejskiej w kontekście zasad ustrojowych, PPK 1(29)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.01.07, s. 147. SERZHANOVA VIKTORIYA, Geneza ustrojowa ziem naddniestrzańskich, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.12, s. 203. SERZHANOVA VIKTORIYA, The Constitution of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Re- public, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.08, s. 165. SKOWYRA JAROSŁAW, Nowe formy demokracji bezpośredniej w systemie prawa polskiego, PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.04.07, s. 109. SOBCZAK JACEK, Zarząd województwa jako organ realizujący politykę rozwoju regio- nalnego, PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.04.12, s. 207. STĘPIEŃ-ZAŁUCKA BEATA. Utrata stypendiów sportowych wskutek nowelizacji ustawy o sporcie a ochrona praw nabytych, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.09, s. 141. 396 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 SUŁKOWSKI JAROSŁAW, Skuteczna opieka sędziow i sądow w zakresie realizacji praw i prawnie uzasadnionych interesow – rozważania na tle art. 24 Konstytucji Hiszpanii, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.12, s. 275. SZCZEPAŃSKI DOMINIK, The reasons of invalidity of votes in elections to voivodeship councils in 2014 in the light of the study of voting papers in the National Archive in Kielce, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.20, s. 361. SZYDŁO WOJCIECH, Konstytucyjność ograniczeń prawa do sądu w sprawach z zakresu ochrony konkurencji i konsumentow, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.07, s. 163. TKACZYŃSKI JAN WIKTOR, Der lange Neuanfang der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit in Polen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.06.12, s. 235. TKACZYŃSKI JAN WIKTOR, Federalny Trybunał Konstytucyjny w Niemczech. Straż- nik reguł gry ustrojowej czy super-organ władzy państwowej? PPK 1(29)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.01.01, s. 9. TOMASZEWSKA KATARZYNA, Udostępnianie informacji publicznej jako forma ochrony interesu prawnego jednostki w świetle regulacji dotyczących ogłaszania ak- tów normatywnych i niektórych innych aktów prawnych, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082- 1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.10, s. 163. TRZECIAKOWSKI RAFAŁ, Kompetencje prezesa Rady Ministrów i właściwych mini- strów w zakresie bezpieczeństwa i obronności państwa, PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082- 1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.04.14, s. 243. UNIEJEWSKI JAN, Czy ustawa z dnia 5 stycznia 2011 r. Kodeks wyborczy może być zmieniona w okresie stanu nadzwyczajnego? Uwagi na gruncie art. 228 ust. 6 Konsty- tucji RP, PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.04.02, s. 27. UNIEJEWSKI JAN, zob.: PAZURA ANNA URBANIAK KRZYSZTOF, The Harmonization of the electoral law for elections to the Eu- ropean Parliament. Selected Issues, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.06.05, s. 95. URBANIAK MONIKA, LORENCKA MAŁGORZATA, Prawo do sądu we Włoszech, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.10, s. 223. WALTER ŁUKASZ, System konkordatowy w laickiej Francji. Pytania o konstytucyjność modelu relacji między państwem a związkami wyznaniowymi przyjętego w depar- tamentach: Górny Ren, Dolny Ren i Mozela, PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.04.05, s. 69. WOJTCZAK DANIEL, Wolności i prawa związkowe w Konstytucji z 2 kwietnia 1997 roku, PPK 1(29)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.01.06, s. 127. Skorowidz alfabetyczny za rok 2016 397 WROBEL AGATA JAGNA, Pozyskiwanie orzeczeń sądów powszechnych i administracyjnych w trybie ustawy o dostępie do informacji publicznej, PPK 2(30)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.02.02, s. 33. ZALEŚNY JACEK, Amnesty acts in Poland in the 20th century, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.14, s. 267. ZIĘBA-ZAŁUCKA HALINA, Prokuratura w nowej ustawie z 2016 roku. Eksperyment z podległością władzy wykonawczej, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.05.07, s. 111. ZYCH RADOSŁAW, Zmiany w polskim prawie wyborczym z 2015 r., PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.04.01, s. 11. ŻELAZNY KRYSTIAN, Status prawny mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych w Republi- ce Czeskiej, PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.04.09, s. 145.

Część II. KOMUNIKATY, RECENZJE, SPRAWOZDANIA

BIEŃ-KACAŁA AGNIESZKA (recenzja), Marcin Konarski, Marek Woch, Ewolucja prawa miejscowego jednostek samorządu terytorialnego w Polsce, Wydawnictwo Ma- rek Woch, Warszawa 2014, ss. 251, PPK 1(29)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.01.10, s. 189. BISZTYGA ANDRZEJ (recenzja), Łukasz Baratyński, Problem prawa do środowi- ska w międzynarodowym systemie ochrony praw człowieka, Wydawnictwo Wyż- szej Szkoły Ekonomii, Prawa i Nauk Medycznych im. prof. Edwarda Lipińskiego w Kielcach, Kielce 2015, ss. 212, PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.04.15, s. 269. BUCZKOWSKI ŁUKASZ (recenzja), Leges ab omnibus intellegi debent. Księga XV-lecia Rządowego Centrum Legislacji, red. Wojciech Brzozowski, Adam Krzywoń, Wydaw- nictwo Sejmowe, ISBN: 978-83-7666-401-9, Warszawa 2015, ss. 466, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.17, s. 283. CHODOROWSKA ANNA (sprawozdanie), 57 Zjazd Katedr i Zakładow Prawa Kon- stytucyjnego Aktualne zagadnienia polskiego prawa wyborczego, Zielona Gora, 17– –19 września 2015 r., PPK 2(30)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.02.12, s. 211. GBURZYŃSKA NATALIA, zob.: MARSZAŁEK-KAWA JOANNA GRABOWSKA SABINA (recenzja), Konrad Składowski, System rządow w Republi- ce Chorwacji, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łodzkiego, Łodź 2013, ss. 407, PPK 2(30)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.02.10, s. 195. GUDOWSKA-NATANEK ELŻBIETA, KUŚ KATARZYNA (sprawozdanie), Konfe- rencja Krajowej Rady Sądownictwa „Granice niezawisłości sędziów i niezależności 398 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 sądów?”, Warszawa, 18–19 stycznia 2016 r., PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.04.16, s. 279. KAPUSTA PIOTR (sprawozdanie), VIII Międzynarodowa Konferencja Naukowa „Sys- temy ochrony praw człowieka: europejski i afrykańskie. Kontekst uniwersalny – specyfika regionalna – uwarunkowania realizacyjne”, Warszawa, Sejm, 17–18 marca 2016 r., PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.19, s. 299. KUŚ KATARZYNA, zob.: GUDOWSKA-NATANEK ELŻBIETA MARSZAŁEK-KAWA JOANNA, GBURZYŃSKA NATALIA (report), The rd3 Interna- tional Asian Congress, Toruń 18–20 May 2016, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.23, s. 387. PAWŁOWSKA AGNIESZKA (recenzja), Administracja publiczna w projektach politycznych, red. Danuta Plecka, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2014, ss. 297, PPK 1(29)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.01.09, s. 181. SKOTNICKI KRZYSZTOF (recenzja), Tomasz Gąsior, Kontrola finansowania komi- tetow wyborczych. Zagadnienia prawnoadministracyjne, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, ISBN: 978-83-7666-377-7, Warszawa 2015, ss. 356, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.16, s. 277. TARNOWSKA ANNA (komunikat), ReConFort. Uwagi na marginesie projektu badawczego „Rozważania nad formowaniem nowoczesnej konstytucji”, PPK 1(29)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.01.08, s. 167. ULIJASZ BOGUSŁAW (review), Krystian Nowak, Kompetencje głowy państwa w zakresie zwierzchnictwa nad siłami zbrojnymi i bezpieczeństwa państwa w polskim prawie konstytucyjnym, The Publishing House of Rzeszow University, ISBN: 978-83- 7996-283-9, Rzeszow 2016, pp. 302, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.06.21, s. 375. UNIEJEWSKI JAN (report), The National Scientific Conference of the Solicitors’ Pro- fessional Self-government ‘The Constitution in a Democratic State’ Poznań, 21st– –22nd October 2016, PPK 6(34)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.06.22, s. 379, WALLNER MICHAŁ (sprawozdanie), V Ogolnopolski Zjazd Katedr i Zakładow Sys- temow Politycznych, Gdynia, 16–17 maja 2016 r., PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.18, s. 291. WOŹNICKI MAREK (sprawozdanie), XII Seminarium Badaczy Prawa Konstytucyj- nego Prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, Wrocław, 21–23 października 2015 r., PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.16, s. 371. WRZALIK MAGDALENA (recenzja), Ewa Wojcicka, Prawo petycji w Rzeczypospoli- tej Polskiej, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa 2015, ss. 377, PPK 2(30)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.02.11, s. 203. Skorowidz alfabetyczny za rok 2016 399 Część III. GLOSY

BIEŃ-KACAŁA AGNIESZKA, Glosa do postanowienia Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 29 lipca 2014 r. (Ts 156/12), PPK 2(30)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.02.13, s. 225. FIRLUS JAKUB GRZEGORZ, FOX NATALIE, Glosa do postanowienia Naczelne- go Sądu Administracyjnego z dnia 16 października 2015 r., I OSK 1992/14, PPK 2(30)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.02.14, s. 231. FOX NATALIE. zob.: FIRLUS JAKUB GRZEGORZ JASIŃSKI WOJCIECH, Glosa do wyroku Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z 22 października 2015 r., sygn. SK 28/14, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.17, s. 381. KRÓLICZEK PAWEŁ, Glosa do wyroku Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z 22 czerwca 2015 r., sygn. SK 29/13, PPK 3(31)/2016, Konstytucyjne prawo do sądu w teorii i praktyce, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.03.18, s. 397. TROĆ MACIEJ, Glosa do wyroku Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z 10 grudnia 2014 r., K 52/13, Dz.U. 2014, poz. 1707, PPK 4(32)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ ppk.2016.04.17, s. 287. URBANIAK KRZYSZTOF, Glosa do wyroku Wysokiego Trybunału, Wydział Ławy Kró- lewskiej (High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Divisional Court) z 3 listopada 2016 roku, PPK 5(33)/2016, ISSN 2082-1212, DOI 10.15804/ppk.2016.05.20, s. 311. Guidelines for Authors

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Wymogi formalne

Teksty należy nadsyłać w postaci wydruku (jeden egzemplarz) i w formie elektronicznej – preferowany format MS Word*, AmiPro*, WordPerfect – z dołączonym oświadczeniem o oryginalności pracy oraz o tym, że nie uczestniczy ona aktualnie w innym postępowaniu wydawniczym. Koniecz- ne jest także umieszczenie dokładnego adresu do korespondencji i adresu mailowego oraz informacji o autorze, w której powinny być podane: sto- pień/tytuł naukowy, zajmowane stanowisko oraz miejsce pracy. Zostanie to wykorzystane w pierwszym przypisie artykułu. Ponadto nadsyłany arty- kuł musi być opatrzony: 1. abstraktem do 1000 znaków; w sposób syntetyczny i klarowny wskazują- cym cele, metody analizy oraz główne wnioski, eksponując wartość do- daną dla podjętej problematyki (w języku polskim i angielskim), 2. tytułem w języku angielskim, 3. wykazem wybranych przez Autora słów kluczowych (w języku polskim i angielskim), 4. wykazem wykorzystanej w tekście literatury. Redakcja „Przeglądu Prawa Konstytucyjnego” informuje, iż w celu prze- ciwdziałania ghostwriting i guest authorship wprowadzono odpowiednie procedury związane z zaporą ghostwriting. Ghostwriting oraz guest authorship są przejawem nierzetelności naukowej, a wszelkie wykryte przypadki będą demaskowane, włącznie z powiadomieniem odpowiednich podmio- tów (instytucje zatrudniające autorów, towarzystwa naukowe, stowarzysze- nia edytorów naukowych itp.). Z ghostwriting mamy do czynienia wówczas, gdy ktoś wniósł istotny wkład w powstanie publikacji bez ujawnienia swojego udziału jako jeden z autorów lub bez wymienienia jego roli w podziękowaniach zamieszczo- nych w publikacji. 404 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6 Z guest authorship (honorary authorship) mamy do czynienia wówczas, gdy udział autora jest znikomy lub w ogóle nie miał miejsca, a pomimo to jest autorem/współautorem publikacji. Ponadto Redakcja PPK będzie dokumentować wszelkie przejawy nierze- telności naukowej, zwłaszcza łamania i naruszania zasad etyki obowiązują- cych w nauce. Dlatego też Redakcja PPK wymaga od Autorów publikacji ujawnienia wkładu poszczególnych Autorów w powstanie publikacji (z podaniem afilia- cji oraz kontrybucji, tj. informacji, kto jest autorem koncepcji, założeń, me- tod, protokołu itp. wykorzystywanych przy przygotowaniu publikacji). Au- tor ponosi również odpowiedzialność za zgłoszoną publikację. Redakcja nie zwraca tekstów niezamówionych oraz zastrzega sobie prawo do ich redagowania i skracania. Artykuł, raport z badań czy komunikat powinien liczyć do 30 000 zna- ków, włączając abstrakty, tekst właściwy, tabele i wykresy oraz przypisy. Re- cenzja, glosa, opinia powinny zawierać do 15 000 znaków. Sprawozdanie, nota powinny zawierać do 10 000 znaków. Prosimy o zachowanie szerokiego marginesu i podwójnej interlinii, bez wstawiania śródtytułów. Format przypisów bibliograficznych (op.cit.; ibidem): • książka – M. Weber, Etyka protestancka a duch kapitalizmu, Lublin 1993. • tekst w pracy zbiorowej – J.Ł. Grzelak, Dylematy społeczne, [w:] Psy- chologia ekonomiczna, red. T. Tyszek, Gdańsk 2004, s. 265. • artykuł w czasopiśmie – T. Szlendak, Techno-dzieci końca ery indu- strialnej, „Studia Socjologiczne” 1994, nr 1, s. 128. • Internet, jako źródło informacji, wygrywa z telewizją i prasą, www.internetstats.pl (27.02.2010). • powtórzenie: –– J. Kowalski, op.cit., s. 12 (gdy ponownie powoływana jest tylko jedna publikacja danego autora). –– J. Kowalski, Zależności pomiędzy..., s. 23–34 (gdy ponownie powo- ływana jest jedna z kilku publikacji danego autora). Informacje dla Autorów 405 Procedura recenzyjna

Każdy nadesłany tekst jest opiniowany przez Komitet Redakcyjny w termi- nie trzech tygodni od jego wpłynięcia do redakcji. Opinia zawiera wniosek o zakwalifikowaniu tekstu do postępowania recenzyjnego lub odrzuceniu ze względu na uchybienia formalne. Następnie każda praca (po usunięciu personaliów autora) jest opiniowana przez jednego z Redaktorów PPK. Po uzyskaniu pozytywnej opinii tekst zostaje przesłany do dwóch recenzen- tów zewnętrznych. W przypadku uzyskania recenzji negatywnej Redaktor Naczelny kieruje tekst do dodatkowego recenzenta zewnętrznego. W ciągu 3 miesięcy od nadesłania tekstu autor otrzymuje recenzje nadesłanego tekstu (po usunięciu personaliów recenzentów) oraz informację w sprawie dal- szego postępowania publikacyjnego. W przypadku tematycznego sprofilowania poszczególnych numerów PPK zakwalifikowany tekst zostaje opublikowany zgodnie z jego meryto- ryczną treścią. Na stronie internetowej czasopisma dostępne są teksty w wersji pdf z ko- lejnych numerów dwumiesięcznika.