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Envisioning a Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Afghanistan for More Information on This Publication, Visit C O R P O R A T I O N LAUREL E. MILLER, JONATHAN S. BLAKE Envisioning a Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Afghanistan For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2937 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0407-7 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface In this report, we paint a detailed picture of a plausible final com- prehensive peace agreement for Afghanistan. The report includes analysis of realistic compromises, presented in the form of a complete peace agreement text. The authors produced the text on the basis of research on the interests and views of the conflict parties, comparative research on past peace agreements from around the world, and exten- sive consultations with officials, former officials, and experts associated with all the parties and with other interested governments. The work is intended to provide a source of concrete ideas regarding potential outcomes of a peace process for use by conflict party negotiators and others interested in encouraging a negotiated settlement of the war in Afghanistan. This research was sponsored by the government of a U.S. ally and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the defense agencies, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign governments, and foundations. For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp or contact the center director (contact information is provided on the webpage). iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Summary .......................................................................... ix Abbreviations .................................................................. xxiii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Why We Present Our Analysis in Peace Agreement Form .................... 5 How We Developed the Peace Agreement ..................................... 7 Structure of This Report .......................................................... 9 CHAPTER TWO Core Substantive Issues to Address in a Peace Agreement for Afghanistan ..................................................................11 What Do the Parties Want? ......................................................12 Issues for the Negotiating Agenda ..............................................14 Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities ....................................................15 Foreign Military Presence.......................................................................15 Political Power-Sharing ..........................................................................16 Security Power-Sharing ..........................................................................17 Constitutional Reform ...........................................................................17 Transitional Arrangements .....................................................................18 Monitoring and Verification ...................................................................18 Implementation ......................................................................................19 The Regional Dimension of an Afghan Peace Process .......................19 How Detailed and Comprehensive Should the Peace Agreement Be? ......21 Limitations of a Peace Agreement ............................................. 24 v vi Envisioning a Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Afghanistan CHAPTER THREE A Comprehensive Peace Agreement ......................................... 27 Summary of Key Provisions .................................................... 27 Peace Agreement Text ............................................................31 CHAPTER FOUR Drawing on Past Experience: Comparative Analysis of Peace Agreements .................................................................. 97 Introduction ...................................................................... 97 Scope .................................................................................................... 97 Methodology ......................................................................................... 99 How Previous Agreements Can Inform an Afghan Peace Agreement .... 100 Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities ..................................................101 Foreign Military Presence.................................................................... 104 Political Power-Sharing ........................................................................114 Security Power-Sharing ...................................................................... 124 Constitutional Reform ........................................................................ 130 Monitoring and Verification .................................................................135 Implementation ....................................................................................138 Transitional Justice ...............................................................................140 Property and Land Conflicts ................................................................144 Conclusion ...........................................................................................150 CHAPTER FIVE Conclusion and Recommendations ........................................ 153 Does the Agreement Text Satisfy the Parties’ Goals and Avoid Their Redlines? .................................................................... 153 Key Risks of Implementation Failure ......................................... 156 Power-Sharing Could Exacerbate Afghanistan’s Political Fragility ........156 Clear Enough Transitional Security Arrangements Will Be Tough to Achieve ......................................................................................157 Implementation Probably Will Not Be Guaranteed by a Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement Mission .................................158 Spoilers on All Sides Will Need to Be Contained .................................158 Transitional Government and Security Arrangements Could Become Stuck ................................................................................159 Contents vii Afghanistan Will Remain Vulnerable to the Effects of Contestation Between External Actors ...........................................159 Policy Recommendations ...................................................... 160 Aim for a Substantive Peace Agreement, Not a Process Roadmap ........160 Link the Internal and External Aspects of a Settlement ........................160 Draft Preferred Outcomes Early in the Negotiating Process .................161 Provide Expert Assistance for Shaping Negotiating Positions and Compromises .................................................................................161 Anticipate the Need for Donors to Help Fund Implementation ...........162 References: Peace Agreements and Related Documents ............... 163 References: Secondary Sources ............................................. 169 Summary Despite years of halting attempts to begin negotiating an end to the war in Afghanistan, none of the conflict parties has articulated more than the barest outlines of envisioned outcomes of a negotiation. Even as the prospects of a peace process gaining traction rose during 2019, the parties’ visions of a political settlement remained obscure and under developed. This lack of detailed analysis and policy spelling out the issues likely to arise in a peace process and proposing potential substantive solutions has been one of many obstacles to moving a pro- cess forward. Overcoming resistance on the part of conflict actors who have long been invested in prosecution of the war, or who fear what compromise with the enemy might bring, is made more difficult by the absence of depiction of a plausible political settlement. The pur- pose of the work presented in this report is to paint such a picture for policymakers on all sides of the conflict and for others interested in encouraging negotiations. To show concretely what the outcome of negotiations
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