Smokejumpers Lessons Learned
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A Lessons Learned Newsletter Published Quarterly Issue 7 • Fall 2003 Knowledge management is getting the right information to the right people at the right time. In This Issue Southern California 2003 Page 1 Southern California 2003 Fire Behavior and Fuels Page 4 Smokejumpers Lessons Learned Lesson Learned – Fire Behavior and Fuels An innovative approach or work practice that The Fall and Winter editions will feature different fire and ICS positions, represent- is captured and excerpts from the Lessons Learned Information ing at least 12 different city, county, state, shared to promote repeat application. A Collection Team (ICT) interviews in Southern and federal agencies. The team sought to lesson learned may California. To view the full report go to: capture the experiences of those who also be an adverse http://www.wildfirelessons.net/ICTs.htm fought these fires, capture the important work practice or lessons learned by them, and learn how experience that is During the last week of October and the these events affected the firefighting captured or shared to avoid recurrence. first week of November, 2003, thirteen major strategy, tactics, techniques, and decision wildfires occurred throughout Southern making of those involved. Best Practice – A California. These wildfires created a disaster process, technique, on such a scale that they may redefine the or innovative use of Fire Behavior and Fuels resources, technology, concept of the wildland urban interface. or equipment that “Firestorm 2003,” as the media is calling This section outlines lessons learned regarding has a proven record it, was unprecedented in scope and impact. fire behavior as described by interviewees. of success in providing The statistics to date are staggering: 12,000 Extreme Fire Behavior significant improvement firefighters, 750,000 acres burned, billions to an organization. of dollars in damage, more than $120 million “ I’ve seen a once-in-a-lifetime fire in suppression costs, 4000 homes destroyed, How to Contact Us: three times now.” www.wildlfirelessons.net 22 human lives lost. [email protected] A six-person ICT from the Wildland - 30 year Engine Company Captain [email protected] Fire Lessons Learned Center (LLC) (520)-670-6414 x121 assembled in Southern California and spent Respondents felt it was important to fax (520)-670-6413 a week interviewing 107 people from 43 communicate to the wildland community 1 that the Southern California fires were much more than and eave spaces of neighboring houses. Consequently, typical wind-driven events. The Santa Ana influence was unlike most structures destroyed by wildland fire, these typical, with winds rarely stronger that 30 to 40 mph. urban houses burned from the inside out. The extreme fire behavior during this event resulted In some cases, the requirements of urban firefighting from a convergence of extended drought, fuel condi- and the intense heat generated by multiple structure fires tions, hot and dry weather, and wind. demanded that firefighters abandon traditional “bump and After extending into the urban environment, these run tactics” in favor of flowing large quantities of water to fires often split into multiple heads and spread along involved structures that threatened whole blocks. paths defined by the available fuel sources. Fires spread Summary of Lessons Learned — over and around barrier after barrier. The fires moved far more quickly than anyone had Transition to an Urban Conflagration anticipated or prepared for. One fire grew from 500 to Fires crossed the traditional interface into purely urban 31,000 acres in four hours. Sudden wind shifts and huge areas. Structures became another fuel type to carry the fire fire whirls threw embers and flaming debris far ahead of deeper into cities. the main fire. Wildland fires nearing urban areas spotted ½ Ornamental vegetation created an unpredictable and to ¾ of a mile past the interface and into the urban significant fuel source that blew into attic vents and eaves environment. and spread through neighborhoods by torching, crowning, The majority of respondents indicated that they did or throwing embers. Structures became involved from ember not recognize early on the need to significantly adapt attack from the strategy to the extreme fire behavior. The felt they inside out rather pursued perimeter control strategies too long before than flame shifting their thinking defensively and enacting appropri- impingement. ate tactics until the weather provided an opportunity to Firefighters go back on the offensive. All indicated that when this found heat control mental shift occurred, they were more successful in the primary factor saving neighborhoods. for preventing fire Summary of Lessons Learned — from spreading to Extreme Fire Behavior other structures once fire entered The extreme fire behavior during this event resulted denser urban from a convergence of extended drought, fuel conditions, areas. hot and dry weather, and wind. Respondents felt conditions Respondents that led to these fires are common in other areas through- believed similar out the western U.S. events will happen The extreme nature of the fire behavior surprised most in the future and firefighters. Most did not initially recognize the need to reiterated the need adapt strategy and tactics to the extreme fire behavior. to put even more They said adopting an initial protect-and-defend strategy effort into pre- before attempting perimeter control would have been incident planning. more effective. Transition to an Urban Conflagration Fire Whirls “What we were expecting to see were fire whirls “Normally we go after it. 4' to 6' tall, what we actually saw were true fire This time it went after us!” tornadoes. The fire researchers kept telling us what - City Battalion Chief we were seeing was impossible and never seen before. After three days of discussion, the fire researchers These fires burned beyond the wildland-urban started to understand that what they were expecting interface (WUI) into urban environs with little or no and what was happening was not jiving.” wildland fuels. In this environment, fires spread from structure to structure — an urban conflagration. - Division Supervisor When fires initially entered urban zones, embers from the main fire ignited spot fires in the urban zones. Respondents reported unusual numbers of fire whirls There, ornamental vegetation, such as palms, ignited that ranged from several yards wide up to a ½ mile wide. producing intense ember showers and more spotting. Destructive fire whirls, those causing structural damage Winds often carried these ember showers into attic vents unrelated to fire, also were reported. 2 Summary of Lessons Learned — the fire. Light, flashy fuels, and decadent chaparral fueled Fire Whirls the fire at lower elevations. Witnesses reported mass ignition in grassy fuels ahead of the fire — the result of dry winds, Observed fire whirl behavior was both unexpected and high temperatures, low humidity, and low fuel moistures. extreme in these fires, catching many firefighters by surprise As the fire transitioned from the WUI into the urban and significantly contributing to spotting up to ¾ mile. environment, heat emanating from fully involved structures 180-degree wind shifts proceeded fire whirls by 45 allowed the fire to spread to neighboring structures by direct seconds to a minute. These wind shifts became a flame impingement, radiant heat, and embers emanating warningsign/trigger point to some firefighters, allowing from palm fronds and other ornamental foliage. time to pull crews out to a safer area. Palm trees provided an unusual and significant fuel source, carrying the fire rapidly across streets and through Wind Shifts neighborhoods both through torching and by fronds creating a spotting source. “It does not matter how much experience you have, Dense ornamental foliage proved a significant problem the urban interface fire will surprise you. in older neighborhoods. Other highly flammable fuels I never expected the fire to move so fast against included Eucalyptus (especially when in groves), olive trees, the wind and wouldn’t have believed it and Italian Cypress. Dense accumulations of Italian Cypress if someone told me about it.” needles threw embers in all directions once ignited. Belts of natural “open space” in WUI neighborhoods - Municipal Department Fire Chief (versus greenbelts) helped spread the fire by carrying it along roads or helping fire to jump a road. Wind shifts produced fire behavior, including fire whirls. Once recognized crews developed contingency Summary of Lessons Learned — Fuels actions (including moving to safety zones) that they implemented when they detected sudden wind shifts. Fire moved very quickly through trees killed by bugs and Strategically, the shifts from the easterly Santa Anas to the chaparral. Mass ignitions were reported in light, grassy fuels. prevailing westerly winds offered opportunities to take Ornamental vegetation created an unpredictable and the initiative and gain ground on perimeter control. significant fuel source that blew into attic vents and eaves and spread through neighborhoods by torching, crowning, Summary of Lessons Learned — or throwing embers. Wind Shifts Natural open space areas contributed to fire spread. Greenbelts were effective barriers. Wind shifts were trigger points indicating the potential for fire whirls and other dangerous fire behavior. Leaders Effects of Fuels Programs and developed contingency plans to implement when wind Fuel Treatments