Chapter III

YUAN SHIH-K'AI ASPIRES TO BE EMPEROR

That Yuan Shih-k'ai was an ambitious man has been fully attested to by his contemporaries. Early in his career he had unscrupulously and ruthlessly eliminated his enemies to better his own position. His great chance arrived in 1911 when, as commander-in-chief and premier of the tottering Manchu em• pire, he became the sole protector of the infant emperor. Sun Yat-sen and the knew that their revolutionary army was far inferior to Yuan's , so Sun resigned from the presidency in favor of Yuan on condition that Yuan adopt a republican form of government. Yuan had never been known for his republican sentiments and the arrangement was made to avoid bloodshed. Nevertheless, Yuan took care that his own interests were safeguarded; in the Manchu edict of abdication, which was drawn up by his followers, he had in• serted a clause granting himself full power to form a provisional republican government. He could therefore claim to derive his authority as the successor to the Manchus, not as the nominee of the republicans. In addition, Yuan showed himself master of the situation by remaining in Peking, the stronghold of his power, in defiance of the wishes of the republicans to move the seat of the government to Nanking. 1 When did Yuan Shih-k'ai conceive his monarchical scheme? No one knows exactly, for Yuan kept his ambitions secret and probably destroyed any records. 2 Moreover, extant Chinese works are polemical in character, written for the most part by or for the benefit of Yuan's antagonists. A few works have been left by Yuan's close collaborators, but they were only too eager to dissociate themselves from the monarchical scheme which ended in failure. Their writings either fail to record their own part or sacrifice the truth to make themselves look better. Therefore, Chinese historiography dealing with the years 1911 to 1916 and after consists of many legends. The following account is based on little explored American and Japanese documents, recently opened British archives, and Chinese materials which corroborate the other sources. These sources reveal Yuan's long-cherished ambition to ascend the throne and his conviction that this goal could not be achieved without Japanese support. He 63 neither cared for nor counted on the support of the Chinese people; they were mere puppets to be used for his aims. But Yuan was fooled by the apparently agreeable attitude of the Japanese, and thus brought about his own downfall. His death was easily forgotten by the Chinese, but the legacy of chaos that he left China was not as easily eradicated. As early as the first year of the Republic it was rumored that be• fore long the "Chinese Washington" would become the "Chinese Napoleon." Kang Yu-wei, a loyal supporter of the Manchus and the leader of the 1898 reform, predicted as early as 1912 that Yuan would make himself emperor. 3 Yuan, on the other hand, cultivated all potential supporters, among them the members of the Tsung-she tang, a party that favored a Manchu restoration. To please them he made Hsu Shih-chang, the tutor of the abdicated emperor, a minister of state.4 On the other hand he mercilessly suppressed the Kuomintang. When the second revolution broke out in July 1913 Yuan took the opportunity to kill off his opponents.5 He then dissolved the Kuomintang-dominated par• liament in January 1914 and promulgated a new constitution which granted him all the powers of an emperor. 6 But he was still not satisfied. He wanted to enjoy an emperor's prestige and pomp and to secure the position for his family. Yuan proceeded with characteristic caution. On December 23, 1914, he worshipped at the Altar of Heaven, a right which, according to Confucian con• cepts, was reserved only for monarchs. 7 This was the first overt sign of Yuan's ambition. Behind the scenes, Yuan Ke-ting, Yuan's eldest son and heir, tried to win the support of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, the minister of justice and China's fore• most journalist, but he met with no success. 8 However, Liang was only a civilian with a small following, and his lack of enthusiasm did not daunt the Yuans who had secured the active support of the majority of the military governors and of a powerful financial group known as the Communications Clique led by Liang Shi-yi. 9 Under Liang's direction, a mediocre politician named Yang Tu inaugurated in August 1915 the Chou-an hui (Peace Planning Society), which advocated a monarchy. For propaganda purposes the society publicized extracts of a mem• orandum written by a Dr. Frank J. Goodnow entitled, "On the Respective Merits of the Republican and Monarchical Forms of Government, with Partic• ular Reference to the Conditions in China." Goodnow was president of Johns