Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean a Threat Assessment Executive Summary
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Vienna International Centre, PO Box 500, 1400 Vienna, Austria Tel: +(43) (1) 26060-0, Fax: +(43) (1) 26060-5866, www.unodc.org TRANSNatioNAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN A Threat Assessment Executive summary United Nations publication printed in Mexico September 2012 September 2012 Copyright © 2012, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educational or non-profit purposes without special permission from the copy- right holder, provided acknowledgement of the source is made. UNODC would appreciate receiving a copy of any publication that uses this publication as a source. Acknowledgements This study was conducted under the responsibility of the UNODC Offices in Mexico (ROMEX) and Panama (ROPAN), Division for Operations (DO), with research support of the UNODC Studies and Threat Analysis Section (STAS), Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs (DPA). Research Claudio Damián Rodríguez Santorum, Enrique Marín Pellecer, Felipe de la Torre, Jenna Dawson, Jorge Manuel Vargas Mediavilla, Juliana Erthal Rodrigues Dos Santos, Louise Bosetti, Bertha Nayelly Loya Marin, Simone Lucatello (consultant) and Ted Leggett (lead researcher). Translation, graphic design, mapping support, desktop publishing and printing Anja Korenblik, Deniz Mermerci, Jorge Manuel Vargas Mediavilla, Kristina Kuttnig and Suzanne Kunnen. Supervision Aldo Lale-Demoz (Director, DO) Amado Philip de Andrés (Representative, ROPAN) Antonio Mazzitelli (Representative, ROMEX) Thibault Le Pichon (Chief, STAS) The preparation of this report would not have been possible without the data and information reported by governments to UNODC and other international organizations. UNODC is particularly thankful to government and law enforcement officials met in the region while undertaking research. The study benefited from the valuable input of many UNODC staff members - at headquarters and field offices - who reviewed various sections of this report. The research team also gratefully acknowledges the information, advice and comments provided by a range of officials and experts, including those from the United Nations Task Force on Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking. UNODC gratefully acknowledges the contribution of the Inter-American Development Bank towards the cost of this report. DISCLAIMERS This report has not been formally edited. The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of UNODC or contributory organizations and neither do they imply any endorsement. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publi- cation do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNODC or the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Website: www.unodc.org Executive summary The people of Central America regard crime, and particu- in cross-border trafficking, the influx of greater volumes of larly criminal violence, as one of the most important issues cocaine greatly raised the stakes, promoting competition facing their countries today. This violence is broadly attrib- for territorial control. uted to the increase in cocaine trafficking through the region since 2006. While there is some truth to this asso- It is these groups, not the flow of cocaine, that are the core ciation, the situation is more complicated than it is com- cause of the violence. Relatively little cocaine transits El monly portrayed. Salvador today, for example – less than 2% of that crossing Guatemala. Although recently eclipsed by Honduras, El In the past, Central America was largely a refueling stop for Salvador has suffered the highest sustained murder rates in vessels moving cocaine northwards. After 2006, the year the the region. For a number of reasons, competition between Mexican government implemented its new national secu- groups has been more intense in El Salvador, entirely inde- rity strategy, it became more hazardous for traffickers to pendent of the cocaine flow. ship the drug directly to Mexico, and so an increasing share of the flow began to transit the landmass of Central Amer- In Guatemala and Honduras, in contrast, there is a clear ica. These new paths traversed areas controlled by local link between contested trafficking areas and the murder organized crime groups, upsetting the balance of power rates. Some of the most violent areas in the world lie along between them. While these groups had long been involved the Honduran coast and on both sides of the Guatemalan/ Honduran border. But the groups involved have long engaged in a range of criminal activities, from extortion to Figure 1: Cocaine seizures in Central America and Mexico, 2000-2011 migrant smuggling. Though their role in crime and corrup- tion was less visible before the recent boom in cocaine traf- 160 ficking, they have long been a drain on the nations of 140 Central America. 120 100 The groups involved in transnational organized crime can 80 be divided into territorial groups and trafficking (transpor- Tons seized 60 tista) groups. Territorial groups, such as the Guatemalan 40 crime families, focus on maintaining control over a geo- 20 graphic area and taxing all criminal activity therein, includ- 0 ing drug trafficking. Some display of violence is necessary to maintain this control. Transportistas, in contrast, prefer 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 to fly under the radar, simply moving contraband from Central America Mexico place to place, paying tribute to territorial groups when necessary. Some territorial groups, known locally as tumba- Source: Annual Report Questionnaires dores, focus on robbing transportistas of their cargo, and are 11 TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Figure 2: Murder rates in northern Central America, 2000 -2011 100 90 92 80 70 60 60 69 50 51 40 26 30 39 20 10 19 Murders per 100,000 population 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Belize 19 25 33 25 29 29 32 33 34 32 42 El Salvador 60 60 47 56 65 62 65 57 52 71 65 69 Guatemala 26 28 31 35 36 42 45 43 46 46 41 39 Honduras 51 55 56 34 32 35 43 50 61 71 82 92 Source: UNODC Homicide Database Map 1: Homicide rates by municipal area in 2011 Homicides per 100,000 persons 0 - 20 21 - 50 51 - 100 Mexico 101 - 269 Belize Municipal boundary International boundary Guatemala Honduras El Salvador Nicaragua 050 100 km Source: UNODC, elaborated from data from national police (Guatemala, El Salvador) and Observatorio de la Violencia (Honduras) 12 Executive summary a major source of violence. Finally, one type of territorial weaknesses in the criminal justice system. Poor investiga- group, street gangs known as maras, have little connection tion, lack of prosecutorial capacity, and judicial corruption to the transnational drug trade, and focus primarily on have resulted in extremely low conviction rates, effectively extortion and other local power struggles. ensuring impunity. Cocaine trafficking is currently the most lucrative organ- Even if these rates were improved, most prison systems are ized crime activity in Central America, but it is far from the overcrowded to the point that human rights may be vio- only one. Both territorial groups and the maras prey on lated. migrants moving northward, who may be very vulnerable. Figure 3: Number of prisoners and number of The recent economic downturn has reduced the flow of murders per 100,000 population in smuggled migrants, but those who continue to make the El Salvador, 2000-2010 journey north are subject to a range of abuses, including 350 being held for ransom. Some migrants are sexually exploited, 322 300 315 particularly as they reach Guatemala and southern Mexico. 283 Organized crime groups may also deal in firearms, either 250 258 stolen or bought from corrupt officials. Military weapons 188 226 200 are smuggled both northward and southward. In many 186 180 ways, the territorial groups act like a state within the state, 150 158 177 and can easily move into other forms of criminality should 130 100 their current portfolio of activities prove unprofitable. 60 65 65 65 60 62 52 50 71 47 56 57 If cocaine trafficking were to disappear tomorrow, the Rate per 100,000 population impact on violence would be unpredictable. Diminished 0 flows can actually exacerbate violent competition, and more 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 direct forms of criminal income acquisition (such as extor- Incarceration rate Murder rate tion, robbery, and kidnapping) can cause more violence than drug trafficking. The flow of cocaine through the Source: ILANUD, UNODC Homicide Database Caribbean has declined remarkably in recent years, but this reduction has not brought low murder rates. The key driver To properly target prosecutions, a strategic framework is of violence is not cocaine, but change: change in the nego- required. National crime prevention strategies, including tiated power relations between and within groups, and with strategies for law enforcement action, should be devised. the state. For progress to be made, the risk of aggravating These could involve techniques outside the normal law violence in the short term must be taken into account. enforcement portfolio. Much of what has been learned in post-conflict work could be employed to address criminal The long-term goal is to eliminate, through state building violence, including efforts to “demobilize” the maras. For and development, the opportunities for these groups to example, in 2012, the two opposing mara factions in El thrive, allowing democratically elected authorities to Salvador agreed to a ceasefire. The resulting dramatic reduc- govern. But achieving this goal is dependent on establishing tion in homicide rates suggests that negotiated solutions are order in the short-term, which will require measures to possible. reduce the capacity and incentives of criminal actors to To avoid displacement of crime problems from one area to confront and subvert the state.