COTTON, CORN, and AGRARIAN MODERNIZATION in GUATEMALA, 1944-1966 a Thesis Submitted To

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

COTTON, CORN, and AGRARIAN MODERNIZATION in GUATEMALA, 1944-1966 a Thesis Submitted To “PRODUCE MORE TO LIVE BETTER”: COTTON, CORN, AND AGRARIAN MODERNIZATION IN GUATEMALA, 1944-1966 A Thesis Submitted to the College of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon By Patrick Chassé © Patrick Chassé, October 2017. All rights reserved. Permission to Use In presenting this thesis/dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Postgraduate degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis/dissertation in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who supervised my thesis/dissertation work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying or publication or use of this thesis/dissertation or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis/dissertation. Requests for permission to copy or to make other uses of materials in this thesis/dissertation in whole or part should be addressed to: Head of the Department of History Arts Building 9 Campus Drive University of Saskatchewan Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A5 Canada OR Dean College of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies University of Saskatchewan 116 Thorvaldson Building, 110 Science Place Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5C9 Canada i Abstract This dissertation argues that the Guatemalan Revolution (1944-1954) was a transformational moment that hastened the adoption of modern, industrial agriculture throughout the country and facilitated the opening of new agrarian frontiers like the Pacific Coast. Between 1944 and 1954, technicians and bureaucrats adopted a new language for speaking about Guatemala’s economic problems that emphasized the links between dependency on coffee, rural poverty, and the threat of deforestation and soil erosion. Experts created rural development initiatives that were supposed to remake Guatemala into a more efficient agricultural producer. These efforts were challenged by landowners, labourers and campesinos who tried to define policy that best served their interests. While large landowners initially rebuffed modernization schemes, campesinos quickly adopted new agricultural technologies and pushed the state to experiment with financial and land reforms that were necessary for small farms to prosper. One of the important conclusions of this dissertation is that supposedly traditional campesinos were responsible for the success of agrarian modernization in Guatemala. The dissertation also explores the long-term social and environmental consequences of the 1952 agrarian reform. Historians have often depicted the agrarian reform as an isolated political event that created impressive, but short-lived improvements in the lives of campesinos. Using case studies from the Pacific Coast, the dissertation demonstrates that land use changed dramatically between 1952 and 1954. Thousands of campesinos obtained new land that they rapidly cleared and developed. At the same time, large landowners raced to deforest and colonize new land with annuals like cotton so that they could limit their exposure to expropriation. After the coup, Guatemalan elites rejected government efforts to redistribute land and restructure the economy. However, large landowners embraced the new productive technologies—fertilizers, pesticides, hybrid seeds and mechanization—introduced during the Revolution. On the Pacific Coast, large landowners replaced campesino farms with industrial crops including cotton, corn and sugar. This new agricultural model created wealth for a small elite but caused long-term environmental problems and impoverished Guatemala’s indigenous population. ii Acknowledgements There are few words that can convey the gratitude I feel for my family, friends and colleagues who supported me as I wrote this dissertation. Here is my best attempt. Little about this project would be possible without the assistance and insight of the many Guatemalans I met since this journey began in 2008. Special thanks to the communities of Labor de Falla, Cerro Alto, and Bolo de Oro who helped me see the world differently. I am also indebted to the Comité Campesino del Altiplano and the Maritimes-Guatemala Breaking the Silence Network. Your tireless activism inspires me to dream about a healthier and more sustainable world. I could not imagine a better place to learn about the environment than Saskatoon, where the majesty of the sky humbles and the beauty of the river comforts. Thanks to Carla Fehr, Michael Kirkpatrick, Kelly Butler, Rachel Hatcher, and Marie-Christine Dugal for your long conversations about Guatemala. Thanks also to Blaine Wickham, Michelle Desveaux, Liz Scott, Jana Miller, Erika Dyck, and Andrew Watson for your advice and good conversation. I received generous support from the HGIS Lab and the SSHRC-funded Sustainable Farm Systems Project. Thank you to all my colleagues, especially Stefania Gallini for her advice about research in Guatemala and Manuel de González de Molina for his guidance and support. Special thanks to Bea Corbacho, Antonio Cid, and Elena Galán, who helped me think broadly about inequality and sustainability. A SSHRC Ph.D. Fellowship and a Michael Smith Foreign Study Supplement enabled me to undertake research in Spain, Italy, the United States and Guatemala. I also benefited greatly from scholarships and fellowships offered by the Department of History at the University of Saskatchewan and the Saskatchewan Government. I would like to express my appreciation to my committee members, Jim Clifford, Bill Waiser, Clint Westman and my external examiner, Sterling Evans. Your comments and feedback are already helping me refocus and strengthen my work. I’m especially indebted to my supervisors, Jim Handy and Geoff Cunfer. Jim, your encyclopedic knowledge of the Revolution never ceases to amaze me. Thank you for pushing me to think more deeply about my sources and providing a great example of a historian who balances rigorous scholarship with activism. Geoff, I’m continually impressed by your broad depth of knowledge iii and your ability to relax and enjoy the moment. Thank you for your indispensible advice about teaching, research, and family. Together, your steady guidance throughout the Ph.D. program helped me build the skills necessary to write this dissertation. Your rigorous feedback helped me polish my ideas so that they could shine. The final words of thanks are for my family. Thank you to Lorie, Lorne, Rachel, Leah, Matt, Adam, Bash, Hudson and Wes. You always find the fun in life and are never afraid of a little friendly competition. Thank you to my father, who inspired me to study history. My mother and my sister helped me work through the most difficult moments of the dissertation. Your unfailing support and confidence helped me to remember my Cape Breton roots and keep moving forward in the face of adversity. Thank you for your irreverence and humour. Finally, I could never have finished this project without the support of my daughter and partner. Eliana, every morning I wake, I know that you will ask a question that makes the mundane seem wondrous and novel. I live for those moments. Erin, you are are the most creative, determined, and dynamic person I have ever met. Where others see barriers, you see opportunities to build community and make the world better. Through these many years, she has listened patiently to my rambling thoughts and encouraged me to connect my research to the present day. Thank you for your guidance, patience and support. iv Table of Contents Permission to Use ............................................................................................................... i Abstract .............................................................................................................................. ii Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. v Figures .............................................................................................................................. vii Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 Sources ............................................................................................................................ 7 Geography and Environment .......................................................................................... 9 Creating Commodities .................................................................................................. 14 Chapter Overview ......................................................................................................... 24 Chapter 1: Guatemala’s Lost Paradise ......................................................................... 30 Wealth of the Tropics ................................................................................................... 31 “The Machine” .............................................................................................................
Recommended publications
  • The Guatemala Genocide Cases: Universal Jurisdiction and Its Limits
    © The Guatemala Genocide Cases: Universal Jurisdiction and Its Limits by Paul “Woody” Scott* INTRODUCTION Systematic murder, genocide, torture, terror and cruelty – all are words used to describe the campaigns of Guatemalan leaders, including President Jose Efrain Rios Montt, directed toward the indigenous Mayans in the Guatemalan campo. The United Nations-backed Truth Commission concludes that the state carried out deliberate acts of genocide against the Mayan indigenous populations.1 Since Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro took Guatemalan presidential office in 1966, Guatemala was involved in a bloody civil war between the army and guerrilla groups located in the Guatemalan countryside. The bloodshed escalated as Montt, a fundamentalist Christian minister, rose to power in 1982 after taking part in a coup d’état and becoming the de facto president of Guatemala. He was in power for just sixteen months, considered by many to be the bloodiest period of Guatemala’s history.2 Under his sixteen-month rule, more than 200,000 people were victims of homicide or forced kidnappings, 83% of whom were of indigenous Mayan origin. Indigenous Mayans were targeted, killed, tortured, raped, and * Paul “Woody” Scott is an associate attorney with Jeri Flynn & Associates in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. His practice is primarily immigration law and criminal defense, specializing in defending immigrants charged with criminal offenses, and deportation defense. He was born in San Pedro Sula, Honduras and moved to the United States at a very early age. He is fluent in both English and Spanish. 1 United Nations Office for Project Services [UNOPS], Commission for Historical Clarification [CEH], Conclusions and Recommendations, GUATEMALA, MEMORIA DEL SILENCIO [hereinafter, GUATEMALA, MEMORY OF SILENCE], Volume V, ¶ 26 (1999).
    [Show full text]
  • Guatemala: Squeezed Between Crime and Impunity
    GUATEMALA: SQUEEZED BETWEEN CRIME AND IMPUNITY Latin America Report N°33 – 22 June 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. ROOTS OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT AND PERVASIVE VIOLENCE ............. 2 A. CIVIL WAR .................................................................................................................................. 3 B. LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT ........................................................................................................... 4 C. PEACE AND DISILLUSION ............................................................................................................. 4 D. MONUMENTAL CHALLENGES ....................................................................................................... 6 III. CRIME AND THE STATE .............................................................................................. 8 A. THE ARMED FORCES .................................................................................................................... 8 B. FAILURE OF POLICE REFORM ....................................................................................................... 9 C. GANGS ....................................................................................................................................... 12 D. DRUG TRAFFICKING AND INSTABILITY ......................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Intelligence Analysis and Decision-Making Behind the Overthrow of Guatemalan Democracy
    Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports 2017 In Darker Shadows: Intelligence Analysis and Decision-Making behind the Overthrow of Guatemalan Democracy William R. Weber Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd Recommended Citation Weber, William R., "In Darker Shadows: Intelligence Analysis and Decision-Making behind the Overthrow of Guatemalan Democracy" (2017). Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 6928. https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/6928 This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. In Darker Shadows: Intelligence Analysis and Decision-making Behind the Overthrow of Guatemalan Democracy William R. Weber Thesis submitted to the Eberly College of Arts and Sciences at West Virginia University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History James F. Siekmeier, Ph.D., Chair Michelle M. Stephens, Ph.D. David M. Hauser, Ph.D. Department of History Morgantown, West Virginia 2017 Keywords: CIA; Guatemala; Analyst; Intelligence Community; Cold War; Eisenhower; Árbenz; Covert Action, Decision-making Copyright 2017 William R.
    [Show full text]
  • Impact Evaluation: Guatemala Country Report
    Impact Evaluation: Guatemala Country Report By Susan Berk-Seligson, Ph.D. Diana Orcés, Ph.D. Georgina Pizzolitto, M.A. Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D. Carole Wilson, Ph.D. The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Vanderbilt University This study was performed with support from the Program in Democracy and Governance of the United States Agency for International Development. The opinions expressed in this study are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development. Revised December 2014 Impact Evaluation Guatemala ‐ Report Contents List of Figures ......................................................................................................................................................................... 5 List of Tables........................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................................... 9 I. Overview ........................................................................................................................................................................... 9 II. Main Findings ................................................................................................................................................................. 9 III. Policy Recommendations
    [Show full text]
  • Municipio De San José Departamento De Escuintla “Administración De Riesgo”
    MUNICIPIO DE SAN JOSÉ DEPARTAMENTO DE ESCUINTLA “ADMINISTRACIÓN DE RIESGO” LUIS ALEXANDER MORALES VAÍNEZ TEMA GENERAL “DIAGNÓSTICO SOCIOECONÓMICO, POTENCIALIDADES PRODUCTIVAS Y PROPUESTAS DE INVERSIÓN” MUNICIPIO DE SAN JOSÉ DEPARTAMENTO ESCUINTLA TEMA INDIVIDUAL “ADMINISTRACIÓN DE RIESGO” FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN CARLOS DE GUATEMALA 2014 UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN CARLOS DE GUATEMALA FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS “ADMINISTRACIÓN DE RIESGO” MUNICIPIO DE SAN JOSÉ DEPARTAMENTO DE ESCUINTLA INFORME INDIVIDUAL Presentado a la Honorable Junta Directiva y al Comité Director del Ejercicio Profesional Supervisado de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas por LUIS ALEXANDER MORALES VAÍNEZ previo a conferírsele el título de ADMINISTRADOR DE EMPRESAS en el Grado Académico de LICENCIADO Guatemala, febrero 2014 ÍNDICE GENERAL Página INTRODUCCIÓN i CAPÍTULO I CARACTERÍSTICAS SOCIOECONÓMICAS 1.1 MARCO GENERAL 1 1.1.1 Contexto nacional 1 1.1.2 Contexto departamental 2 1.1.3 Contexto municipal 2 1.1.4 Localización territorial 3 1.1.5 Clima 5 1.1.6 Orografía 5 1.1.7 Aspectos culturales y deportivos 5 1.2 DIVISIÓN POLÍTICO-ADMINISTRATIVA 6 1.2.1 División política 6 1.2.2 División administrativa 6 1.2.2.1 Concejo Municipal 6 1.2.2.2 Alcaldías auxiliares 6 1.2.2.3 Consejo Municipal de Desarrollo -COMUDE- 7 1.3 RECURSOS NATURALES 7 1.3.1 Agua 7 1.3.1.1 Ríos 8 1.3.2 Bosques 8 1.3.3 Suelos 8 1.3.3.1 Usos del suelo 8 1.3.3.2 Agrología 9 1.3.4 Fauna 9 1.3.5 Flora 9 1.4 POBLACIÓN 9 1.4.1 Total, número de hogares y tasa de crecimiento 10 1.4.2 Por
    [Show full text]
  • Better Solutions. Fewer Disasters. Safer World
    BetterNDPBA solutions. Guatemala Final Report: Authors Fewer disasters. Safer world. Guatemala 1 National Disaster Preparedness Baseline Assessment - Final Report 2 NDPBA Guatemala Final Report: Authors Authors Erin Hughey, PhD Scott Kuykendall, MS Director of Disaster Services Disaster Management Specialist Pacific Disaster Center Pacific Disaster Center [email protected] [email protected] Joseph Green, PhD Paulo Fernandes, Jr. Epidemiologist and Health Risk Disaster Services Analyst Specialist Pacific Disaster Center Pacific Disaster Center [email protected] [email protected] Dan Morath, MS, GISP Rachel Leuck, MS Senior Disaster Risk Analyst Disaster Services Analyst Pacific Disaster Center Pacific Disaster Center [email protected] [email protected] Doug Mayne, MaOL, CEM® Cassie Stelow, MS Disaster Management Advisor Senior Disaster Services Analyst Pacific Disaster Center Pacific Disaster Center [email protected] [email protected] © 2018 Pacific Disaster Center Table 1. Record of Changes Date Description Version 1/2/2018 Technical edit of NDBPA Guatemala report Mark Shwartz 2/6/2018 Final Review V9 3 4 NDPBA Guatemala Final Report: Acknowledgements Acknowledgements A special mahalo to Guatemala’s Coordinadora Nacional para la Reducción de Desastres (CONRED) for providing coordination and insight throughout the National Disaster Preparedness Baseline Assessment (NDPBA) project. Additional thanks to the Secretaría de Planificación y Programación (SEGEPLAN) for their support in project coordination and data gathering. CONRED and its partners have
    [Show full text]
  • Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean a Threat Assessment Executive Summary
    Vienna International Centre, PO Box 500, 1400 Vienna, Austria Tel: +(43) (1) 26060-0, Fax: +(43) (1) 26060-5866, www.unodc.org TRANSNatioNAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN A Threat Assessment Executive summary United Nations publication printed in Mexico September 2012 September 2012 Copyright © 2012, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educational or non-profit purposes without special permission from the copy- right holder, provided acknowledgement of the source is made. UNODC would appreciate receiving a copy of any publication that uses this publication as a source. Acknowledgements This study was conducted under the responsibility of the UNODC Offices in Mexico (ROMEX) and Panama (ROPAN), Division for Operations (DO), with research support of the UNODC Studies and Threat Analysis Section (STAS), Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs (DPA). Research Claudio Damián Rodríguez Santorum, Enrique Marín Pellecer, Felipe de la Torre, Jenna Dawson, Jorge Manuel Vargas Mediavilla, Juliana Erthal Rodrigues Dos Santos, Louise Bosetti, Bertha Nayelly Loya Marin, Simone Lucatello (consultant) and Ted Leggett (lead researcher). Translation, graphic design, mapping support, desktop publishing and printing Anja Korenblik, Deniz Mermerci, Jorge Manuel Vargas Mediavilla, Kristina Kuttnig and Suzanne Kunnen. Supervision Aldo Lale-Demoz (Director, DO) Amado Philip de Andrés (Representative, ROPAN) Antonio Mazzitelli (Representative, ROMEX) Thibault Le Pichon (Chief, STAS) The preparation of this report would not have been possible without the data and information reported by governments to UNODC and other international organizations. UNODC is particularly thankful to government and law enforcement officials met in the region while undertaking research.
    [Show full text]
  • PLAN DE DESARROLLO MUNICIPAL MASAGUA.Pdf
    Masagua Escuintla P N S 02.01.02 Consejo Municipal de Desarrollo del Municipio de Masagua. Secretaria de Planificación CM 505 y Programación de la Presidencia. Dirección de Planificación Territorial. Plan de Desarrollo Masagua, Escuintla. Guatemala: SEGEPLAN/DPT, 2010. 86 p. il. ; 27 cm. ANEXOS (Serie: PDM SEGEPLAN, CM 505) 1. Municipio. 2. Diagnóstico municipal. 3. Desarrollo local. 4. Planificación territorial. 5. Planificación del desarrollo. 6. Objetivos del desarrollo del milenio. Consejo Municipal de Desarrollo P Municipio de Masagua, Escuintla, Guatemala, Centro América PBX: 7884-8549 Secretaría de Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia 9ª. calle, 10-44 zona 1, Guatemala, Centro América PBX: 23326212 www.segeplan.gob.gt N Se permite la reproducción total o parcial de este documento, siempre que no se alteren los contenidos ni los créditos de autoría y ediciónS Directorio Alejandro Bran de La Rosa Presidente del Consejo Municipal de Desarrollo Masagua, Escuintla Karin Slowing Umaña Secretaria de Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia, SEGEPLAN Ana Patricia Monge Cabrera Sub Secretaria de Planificación y Ordenamiento Territorial, SEGEPLAN Juan Jacobo Dardón Sosa Asesor en Planificación y Metodología, SEGEPLAN Mayra Edith Pineda Roldan Delegada Departamental, SEGEPLAN, Escuintla P Equipo facilitador del proceso Víctor Díaz del Cid Director Municipal de Planificación Masagua, Escuintla Franco Doménico Martínez Mont Facilitador del proceso de planificación, SEGEPLAN, Escuintla N Roberto Aldana García Especialista en Planificación, SEGEPLAN, Escuintla Con la conducción y asesoría metodológica de la Dirección de Planificación S Territorial, SEGEPLAN Masagua, Escuintla INDICE GENERAL PAGINA I. PRESENTACION………………………………………………… 1 II. INTRODUCCION………………………………………………... 2 III. ANTECEDENTES DEL PROCESO DE PLANIFICACION…… 5 IV. OBJETIVOS……………………………………………………… 6 4.1.
    [Show full text]
  • Departamento De Escuintla
    P N S i 02.01.02 Consejo Municipal de Desarrollo del Municipio de San José, Escuintla y Secretaría de CM 509 Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia. Dirección de Planificación Territorial. Plan de Desarrollo San José, Escuintla. Guatemala: SEGEPLAN/DPT, 2010. 82 p. : il., 27 cm. ANEXOS. (Serie: PDM SEGEPLAN, CM 509) 1. Municipio. 2. Diagnóstico municipal. 3. Desarrollo local. 4. Planificación territorial. 5. Planificación del desarrollo. 6. Objetivos del desarrollo del milenio. P Consejo Municipal de Desarrollo Municipio de San José, Escuintla, Guatemala, Centro América PBX: 78481774/1626 N Secretaría de Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia 9ª. calle, 10-44 zona 1, Guatemala, Centro América PBX: 23326212 www.segeplan.gob.gt Se permite la reproducción totalS o parcial de este documento, siempre que no se alteren los contenidos ni los créditos de autoría y edición Directorio José Esteban López Presidente del Consejo Municipal de Desarrollo San José, Escuintla Karin Slowing Umaña Secretaria de Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia, SEGEPLAN Ana Patricia Monge Cabrera Sub Secretaria de Planificación y Ordenamiento Territorial, SEGEPLAN Juan Jacobo Dardón Sosa Asesor en Planificación y Metodología, SEGEPLAN Mayra Edith Pineda Roldán Delegada Departamental, SEGEPLAN, Escuintla P Equipo facilitador del proceso Carlos Quiñónez Director Municipal de Planificación San José, Escuintla Patricia del Carmen Velásquez Morales Facilitadora del proceso de planificación, SEGEPLAN, Escuintla N Roberto Aldana García Especialista
    [Show full text]
  • Military History Anniversaries 16 Thru 31 August
    Military History Anniversaries 16 thru 31 August Events in History over the next 15 day period that had U.S. military involvement or impacted in some way on U.S military operations or American interests Aug 16 1777 – American Revolution: Battle of Bennington » The Battle took place in Walloomsac, New York, about 10 miles from its namesake Bennington, Vermont. A rebel force of about 1,500 men, primarily New Hampshire and Massachusetts militiamen, led by General John Stark, and reinforced by Vermont militiamen led by Colonel Seth Warner and members of the Green Mountain Boys, decisively defeated a detachment of General John Burgoyne's army led by Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Baum, and supported by additional men under Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich von Breymann at Walloomsac, New York. After a rain-caused standoff, Brigadier General John Stark's men enveloped Baum's position, taking many prisoners, and killing Baum. Reinforcements for both sides arrived as Stark and his men were mopping up, and the battle restarted, with Warner and Stark driving away Breymann's reinforcements with heavy casualties. The battle reduced Burgoyne's army in size by almost 1,000 troops, led his Indian support to largely abandon him, and deprived him of much-needed supplies, such as mounts for his cavalry regiments, draft animals and provisions; all factors that contributed to Burgoyne's eventual defeat at the Battle of Saratoga. Aug 16 1780 – American Revolution: Continentals Routed at Battle of Camden SC » American General Horatio Gates suffers a humiliating defeat. Despite the fact that his men suffered from diarrhea on the night of 15 AUG, caused by their consumption of under-baked bread, Gates chose to engage the British on the morning of the 15th.
    [Show full text]
  • Graves 1 Jasmine Graves Professor Cox HIST 1493 27 April 2018
    Graves 1 Jasmine Graves Professor Cox HIST 1493 27 April 2018 Democracy Deposed: U.S. Media Coverage of 1950’s Guatemala After World War II, the United States established itself as a crusader for democracy and capitalism around the world. The urge to fight communism while advocating for democracy meant a dilemma when faced with countries with democratically elected leftist governments. By no means does leftism mean communism, however, during the Cold War, the United States feared that left of center governments could fall to communism with the Soviet Union’s influence. Ultimately, the United States was more intent on stopping the spread of communism than supporting true democracies, so it supported military coups against democratically elected leftist governments to put right-wing regimes in their place. The fact that the CIA backed these coups is no longer a secret, and the CIA has even admitted to involvement in some of them. Despite these operations being clandestine at the time, that did not stop the media from subjectively reporting in opposition to these leftist governments, especially Guatemala’s. Newspapers in the United States reported with clear bias against the leftist democratically elected government in Guatemala before, during, and after the CIA military coup. The people of Guatemala elected Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán to be their president in their 1950 national election. Árbenz ran on a platform calling for agrarian reform, and in his inaugural speech he claimed he wanted “to convert Guatemala from a country bound by a predominantly Graves 2 feudal economy into a modern, capitalist one.”1 Árbenz sought to pass policies to help the Guatemalan peasantry, who had suffered greatly under Jorge Ubico, their recently overthrown dictator.
    [Show full text]
  • Cold War Blinders
    Cold War Blinders How the CIA’s ‘Cold War Tunnel Vision’ clouded American Judgment on Guatemala in 1954 Sjoerd de Vries Lentsch History Master Thesis - American Studies Supervisor: prof. dr. R.V.A. Janssens Second reader: dr. H.B. Beukenhorst Final version: October 2014 Table of contents Introduction 5 Chapter 1: The Case of Guatemala 16 Chapter 2: The Actors: The United States of America 27 Chapter 3: The Central Intelligence Agency’s ‘Modus Operandi’ and Operation PBSUCCESS 40 Conclusion 56 Bibliography 63 Introduction Operation PBSUCCESS. The name demonstrates the great confidence and even arrogance the Central Intelligence Agency displayed in the planning and execution of its 1954 covert operation to overthrow the government of Guatemalan president Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán. The operation was considered a resounding success, as a troublesome president suspected of communism (and therefore seen as inherently under the control of the Soviet Union) was removed from power and a cooperative dictator replaced him. All this was achieved without any direct evidence that the CIA or the United States were involved, though American involvement was widely suspected. Despite this suspicion, the agency was so pleased with operation PBSUCCESS that it would be used as a blueprint for future operations, the most notorious one being the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba which ended in a complete failure for the United States, both militarily and politically. As successful as operation PBSUCCESS was considered from an operational point of view, it would become one of the most controversial CIA operations to date and did considerable damage to the reputation of the CIA and the United States, in particular in Latin America.1 Operation PBSUCCESS, or at least the situation it created, is also seen as one of the main causes of the Guatemalan civil war (that lasted 36 years and cost the lives of tens of thousands of Guatemalans).
    [Show full text]