Guatemala: Squeezed Between Crime and Impunity
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
GUATEMALA: SQUEEZED BETWEEN CRIME AND IMPUNITY Latin America Report N°33 – 22 June 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. ROOTS OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT AND PERVASIVE VIOLENCE ............. 2 A. CIVIL WAR .................................................................................................................................. 3 B. LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT ........................................................................................................... 4 C. PEACE AND DISILLUSION ............................................................................................................. 4 D. MONUMENTAL CHALLENGES ....................................................................................................... 6 III. CRIME AND THE STATE .............................................................................................. 8 A. THE ARMED FORCES .................................................................................................................... 8 B. FAILURE OF POLICE REFORM ....................................................................................................... 9 C. GANGS ....................................................................................................................................... 12 D. DRUG TRAFFICKING AND INSTABILITY ....................................................................................... 14 IV. EFFORTS TO REVERSE THE SLIDE ....................................................................... 17 A. GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT .................................................................................................... 17 B. U.S. GOVERNMENT .................................................................................................................... 18 C. CANADA AND EUROPE ............................................................................................................... 19 D. THE CICIG ................................................................................................................................ 19 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 22 APPENDICES A. MAP OF GUATEMALA ...................................................................................................................... 23 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 24 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN SINCE 2007 ..... 25 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 26 Latin America Report N°33 22 June 2010 GUATEMALA: SQUEEZED BETWEEN CRIME AND IMPUNITY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The 1996 peace accords formally ended Guatemala’s civil corrupt police. High-profile assassinations and the gov- war but failure to address the conflict’s root causes and ernment’s inability to reduce murders have produced dismantle clandestine security apparatuses has weakened paralysing fear, a sense of helplessness and frustration. its institutions and opened the door to skyrocketing vio- In the past few years, the security environment has dete- lent crime. Guatemala is one of the world’s most danger- riorated further, and the population has turned to vigilan- ous countries, with some 6,500 murders in 2009, more tism as a brutal and extra-institutional way of combating than the average yearly killings during the civil war and crime. roughly twice Mexico’s homicide rate. Under heavy pres- sure at home, Mexican drug traffickers have moved into President Colom took office in 2008 with the promise, Guatemala to compete for control of Andean cocaine like his predecessors, at least to slow the spiral of vio- transiting to the U.S. The UN-sanctioned International lence and to end impunity. However, his administration Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) has has been plagued by instability, corruption and a lack of brought hope by making some progress at getting a han- capacity. There have been five interior ministers, two of dle on high-level corruption. However, in June 2010 its whom are facing corruption charges, while two police Spanish director, Carlos Castresana, resigned saying the chiefs have been arrested for connections to drug traffick- government had not kept its promise to support CICIG’s ing. The president himself was nearly toppled, when a work and reform the justice system. President Álvaro prominent lawyer and businessman were assassinated un- Colom needs to consolidate recent gains with institutional der bizarre circumstances in 2009. Nevertheless, some reform, anti-corruption measures, vetting mechanisms and progress has been made with international assistance, in a more inclusive political approach, including to indige- particular from the CICIG. To achieve lasting results, nous peoples. however, Guatemalans and their international counter- parts need to act in the following areas: The administration of President Álvaro Arzú and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) guer- The government of Guatemala should give priority to rilla group signed peace accords fourteen years ago that reforming the police and military as well as the cor- promised a massive overhaul of the military and of a rections and justice systems; ensuring the vetting of system that marginalised the majority of citizens, among and financial disclosure by high-level government and them large sectors of the indigenous population, and state officials, so as to combat corruption; stimulating served the interests of the small economic and political the full political and economic participation of indige- elite. However, there has been little follow-through. Tax nous leaders and communities; and improving the collection is still the lowest in Latin America (some 10 legislature’s professional capacity in the area of jus- per cent of gross domestic product, GDP), in flagrant vio- tice reform and law enforcement. lation of a key provision of the peace accords. In addition Central American governments, as well as Panama and to the rise of clandestine groups, many directed by ex- Mexico, together with the Andean region, should con- senior military officers and politicians, the country has tinue to advance cooperation and information-sharing seen the proliferation of Mexican drug-trafficking organi- initiatives, in order to better combat crime, gangs and sations (DTOs) and youth gangs (maras). Criminal organi- drug trafficking. sations traffic in everything from illegal drugs to adopted babies, and street gangs extort and terrorise entire neigh- UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon should quickly bourhoods, often with the complicity of authorities. appoint a new CICIG director, and the international community should extend CICIG’s mandate beyond Guatemala has become a paradise for criminals, who have September 2011; expand it to specifically address crime little to fear from prosecutors owing to high levels of and corruption; and increase political and financial impunity. An overhaul of the security forces in the wake support. At the same time, the international commu- of the peace accords created an ineffective and deeply Guatemala: Squeezed Between Crime and Impunity Crisis Group Latin America Report N°33, 22 June 2010 Page ii nity should increase support for institutional reform and capacity building, so that Guatemala can eventu- ally take over CICIG’s functions effectively. The U.S., within the Mérida Initiative framework, should increase funding and make its support to Cen- tral America, especially Guatemala, more effective. Bogotá/Brussels, 22 June 2010 Latin America Report N°33 22 June 2010 GUATEMALA: SQUEEZED BETWEEN CRIME AND IMPUNITY I. INTRODUCTION In recent years, Guatemala has been crippled by soaring tion campaign against him, Castresana resigned on 7 June levels of violent crime and impunity, which threaten the 2010, four days before the Constitutional Court annulled security of its population and seriously undermine the Reyes’s selection on procedural grounds. His unexpected country’s institutions and state authority. Citizens from departure has cast a large shadow over the future of all walks of life increasingly face the threat of murder, CICIG (whose mandate is scheduled to expire in Septem- kidnapping, extortion, gang violence and shootouts be- ber 2011) and the international community’s attempt to tween rival drug trafficking organisations (DTOs), both help salvage Guatemala’s justice system. Guatemalan and Mexican. Higher levels of violence than during the 36-year armed conflict, which in 1996 was This report is the first in a new Crisis Group series that ended through a peace agreement, have produced a per- will examine different aspects of the effort to recover the vasive sense of insecurity and hopelessness. rule of law in Guatemala. While an outright return of civil war is not expected, the government of President Álvaro Colom (2008-2012) has been unable to reduce violent crime. In the vast majority of cases, perpetrators are never arrested, let alone charged. Extreme levels of impunity have emboldened criminal groups to employ increasingly violent tactics. The wide- spread perception of a lack of government capacity